Chapter-I

The security arrangement between the United States and Japan is a multifaceted relationship conditioned by several factors. The US-Japan security relationship on the whole illustrates the constraints and restraints faced by both pointing to the links between external and internal contexts.

From the day of the signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1951, the successive US administrations have tried to strike a balance between the security and economic implications of the relationship. However the 1980s witnessed increasing strains in trying to strike this balance. The American leadership had to contend within the international context the continued direct threat to US interests by the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, the US President had to address the issue of economic recession and stringent domestic demands to take a hard line approach towards Japan. As a result, the US began to demand an increase in Japanese share in the bearing of defense burden. The Japanese too were concerned about the increasing pressure from the US. Thus, the 1980's ushered in an era of bilateral debate over burden sharing. Domestically the US Congressional pressure on the Pentagon to demonstrate that Japan was indeed paying a fair share of the cost of its security produced a detailed and intense debate over how to measure the collective good of
the alliance.¹ The terms of the debate were precise: the percentage of GNP dedicated to defense, the share of costs for the stationing of US forces in Japan, the amount of money Japan paid for strategic aid to other countries around the world.


Before examining the US-Japan Security relationship it would be worthwhile to briefly articulate the US foreign policy directions within a cooperative framework in Asia. The challenges of Cold War influenced American decisions on its main security relationship. It was also the Cold War struggle that shaped its priorities and responses to the developments in Asia in the aftermath of the second World War. Thus Asia has been a region of major strategic importance for the United States. Within Asia, the United States has viewed NorthEast Asia as more strategically important than SouthEast Asia. The China, the erstwhile USSR, Japan and both North and South Korea are in close proximity in NorthEast Asia, Soviet and North Korean military capabilities in and adjacent to NorthEast Asia required to place primary emphasis on American security relations.

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with Japan and South Korea. Therefore the strategic alliance with the South Korea and Japan became the centre of US security concerns in Asia. Moreover, the geographical location of Japan in the Pacific Rim and its being at close proximity to former Soviet Union, China and North Korea turned US to include Japan as a frontline state in its “containment policy.” The strategic importance of Japan has been reflected into various governmental reports and memorandums. For instance, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s report on “Japan’s Contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia.”

The report says.................

There is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives---- it is seen not just by the United States and Japan but throughout the region, as a major factor for security stability in Asia.

Initially, the US had to radically alter the NorthEast Asian security structure. President Roosevelt failed to predict about the future role of China after second World War. Roosevelt believed that

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the US security would be best served by a strong, unified and independent China. He frequently voiced his intentions to see China emerged as one of the "great powers" at the end of the war. Therefore, he supported Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Forces against the Japanese. But the emergence of Communist China and its role in the Korean War totally shattered Roosevelt's prediction.4

The creation of Communist China divided the North East Asia into two mirror image camps. The powerful Soviet Union, less powerful China and client state North Korea on the one side and the United States, Japan and South Korea on the other. From the US side, the objective was to frustrate the development of China while stimulating resurgence of Japan. After the out break Korean war, the US policy was altered in favour of "the restoration of Japan (as articulated by Truman's Secretary of State, Acheson), into "workshop of Asia" and the preservation of its economy as far as possible from socialistic encroachments.5

ERA OF DEMILITARIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION:

Immediately after the Second World War, the Americans were intensely hostile to Japan and overwhelmingly persuaded that the Japanese were determined to try again to rule Asia. To end that persuaded threat, during the occupation period, most of Policy Planning Staff members struggled valiantly to create a peaceful and


democratic Japan. It was the United States who laid down the economic and political foundation of Japan. A US State Department document entitled “United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan” dated 6th September 1945 indicated that two of the most important occupation goals were the demilitarization and democratization of Japan.6 Demilitarization involved disarming and demobilizing Japanese military forces. This was a relatively easy task to accomplish because Japanese were in favour of demilitarization. A more difficult task was to try to prevent the reversion to militarism in the future. Therefore during the period of occupation the fundamental objective of US policy in Japan was to ensure that Japan would not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world; to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government.7

As a part of the effort to forever demilitarize Japan, the US placed Article 9 in the New Japanese Constitution of 1947 which stated,

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order the Japanese people renounce war as a means of settling international disputes, land,


Experts noted that during the whole occupation period of 1945 to 1952, Washington's policy towards Japan was basically shaped by three positions for post-war Japanese settlement—"The Japan hands" advocates, the moderate liners and the hard liners. "The Japan hands" advocated the soft line policy which included maintaining Japan's political, social and economic system intact while demobilizing its military. On the one hand the moderate-liners favoured extensive political, economic and social reforms designed to demilitarize and democratize Japan. Whereas the hardliners demanded for a punitive peace that would destroy Japan's industry as well as military and ensure that the country would never again be more than second rate power in the world. The final policy which adopted ultimately was the outcome of combination of the moderate and hard-line positions.9

Along with Japan's demilitarization and democratization, Washington simultaneously reinforced Japan's traditional neomercantilism. The Cold War realities and fears that Japan might be a perpetual financial burden on the United States prompted Washington to emphasize Japan's economic revival. *(The importance

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and urgency of Japan's economic development had been expressed by
many government officials and Congressmen which has been
discussed extensively in the second and third chapters). Between
September 1945 and December 1952, the US economic aid to Japan
amounted to $2.1 billion. During the occupation period Japanese
accepted a vast amount of American culture, democracy and
economic tutelage. The Americans were pleased to view Japan as an
eager docile and non threatening ally in the Pacific.

SECURITY RELATIONS: I PHASE- JAPAN FROM POTENTIAL
THREAT TO STRATEGIC ASSET.

The outbreak of Korean war brought drastic shift from the
earlier American policy of democratization and demilitarization of
Japan to construct and integration of Japan into the anti Soviet
coalition. As the Cold War intensified and extended to Asia with the
Communist victory in China, the Truman administration was forced
to reassess its Asian policy. Harry Truman in his memoir expressed
his strong anti communist feeling and narrated how out break of
Korean war forced US to bring drastic changes in US Far Eastern
policies. The State Dept's Policy Planning Staff was given task to
revise American policy towards Japan. Members of the Policy
Planning Staff were of the opinion that Japan could be made a
cornerstone of American security system in East Asia in its

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containment strategy against Communism. George Kennan, the Director of State Dept's Policy Planning Staff underscored Japan's strategic role in the containment of Communism. For Kennan China was not strategically important because of its underdeveloped economy and backward military capabilities.\textsuperscript{12} Kennan recorded the importance of Japan in the US Pacific Security Strategy in his memoir thus:

Japan would eventually constitute the corner stone of a Pacific security system adequate for the protection of our interests. If we could retain effective control over this archipelago, in the sense of assuring that it would remain in friendly hand, there could be no serious threat to our security from the East within our time.\textsuperscript{13}

Kennan believed that the fall of China to communism would create a psychological impact on Japan and thus affect the security interests of the United States in the Far East. In his opinion the economic crisis in Japan had made Japan particularly susceptible to the Chinese Communist appeal. Therefore Kennan believed, the immediate US policy objective towards Japan should be to restore Japanese industrial and military strength. Kennan's views were emphatically expressed in National Security Council resolution no. 13/2 (\textbf{NSC 13/2}) which was approved by President Truman in 1948. The NSC 13/2 formed the basis of new US policy towards Japan.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, p.359.

The document advocated Japan’s economic recovery as a prime goal of US Policy towards Japan. President Truman issued a nine point economic stabilization directive for Japanese economic development.\(^\text{15}\)

Immediately after the outbreak of Korean War General MacArther ordered Yoshida government to establish a National Police Reserve Force to consist of 75,000 men and an increase in the size of the Maritime Safety Force by 8,000 men. The purpose behind the directive was to strengthen Japanese Police Force in a manner that would fill the gap left by the transfer of US troop’s occupation duty to the Korean battlefield. Dulles met Prime Minister Yoshida in 1951 and proposed a limited armament plan for Japan for its own security which had been declined by Prime Minister Yoshida on the ground of Japan’s economic backwardness.\(^\text{16}\) Three months later the signing of Dulles-Yoshida talks, on 17th May 1951 the United States National Security Council approved a memorandum of Department of Defense on post occupation policy for Japan which recommended Japan’s total integration into the American global anti communist alliance system.

The memorandum suggested....................... 

Firstly assist Japan in the development of appropriate military forces. Secondly assist Japan in the development of low-cost military material in volume for use in Japan and in other non-Communist countries of Asia. Thirdly take all practical steps to assure Japanese membership in the United Nations and participation in a regional security arrangement and Finally establish appropriate Psychological programmes designed to further


orient the Japanese towards the free world and away from Communism.\textsuperscript{17}

In November 1952, Washington and Tokyo signed an agreement whereby the US would lend Japan eighteen frigates of 1,500 tons each and fifty landing craft of 25 tons each. In May 1954, another agreement was signed in which Washington lend an additional two destroyers of 1,600 tons and two destroyers of 1,400 tons each.\textsuperscript{18} Japan signed all these agreements and bowed to consistent American pressure in return for far more economic advantages. In March 1954, Washington and Tokyo signed a **Mutual Defense Agreement** which aimed to encourage and assist Japan to realize its military potential and assume some responsibility for its defence. In the Mutual Defence Agreement, Japan in turn agreed to assume responsibility for its own defense.\textsuperscript{19}

The changed US security policy towards Japan, as observed by a scholar, had two prominent characteristics. The first was the "inevitable harmony" notion and the second view comprised the idea of creating close partnership.\textsuperscript{20} As per the notion of "inevitable harmony", it was assumed that the interests of the United States


\textsuperscript{18} For details of US military assistance to Japan see Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Northern East Asian Affairs to the Secretary of State 1954 US Govt. Dept. of State Foreign Relations of US, Vol. XIV no.748, pp.1619-21.

\textsuperscript{19} The detail provisions of the Mutual Defense Agreement of 8\textsuperscript{th} March 1954 are given in the American Foreign Policy Basic Documents – 1950 – 55 Vol. 2 No. PP. 2437-2441.

and Japan were identical and that Japan could be counted upon to act as an agent of the United States in Asia. The notion implied reciprocal arrangement whereby the United States would provide security guarantee and economic assistance to Japan and in turn Japan would allow US to use its basis for military operations in Far East. Thus it served the purpose of both the countries. The idea of **inevitable harmony** was a grand scheme for the protection of U.S. security interests in Asia while defending Japan. For that purpose Japan was converted into a major staging area and logistic base for American troops in the Korean War. The idea of “**creating a close partnership**” was the next step of inevitable harmony which was envisaged to change Japanese mindset towards US and to overcome the Japanese domestic opposition to Mutual Security Treaty.

**Eisenhower's Changed Strategic Thinking Towards Japan.**

In the mid 1950s President Eisenhower faced the economic reality of the cost of containment. Not only did this increase American involvement in military planning, the Eisenhower administration also set defence spending ceiling on the basis of central economic conditions. As the earlier Truman administration had allocated one third of the total federal govt. budget to defense, the Eisenhower administration made it one tenth.

President Eisenhower, after his accession to office in 1953 appointed a high level committee of senior officials to strike a proper balance between perceived military necessities and the economic
realities confronting the United States. The committee reexamined America's basic foreign policy objectives and submitted its report which become popularly known as the **New Look Strategy**. It implied:

Firstly, the Truman administrations policy of containment should be continued. Secondly, emphasis should be given to the nuclear retaliation launched from foreign based strategic bomber, the missiles and the naval air arms and finally, the level of America's ground forces should be reduced to a minimum.21

The adoption the New Look Strategy brought sweeping changes in the deployment of American forces all over the globe. For instance, while there were 2,10,000 American military personnel in Japan in 1955, it was reduced to 77,000 by 1957.22 The entire Far Eastern Command was restructured and efforts were made towards the creation of Japanese air and naval forces. Evidences provides that the Supersonic F100 Super Sabres capable of carrying nuclear weapons were stationed at Japanese bases. The Okinawa Base was transformed into a huge strategic nuclear air and missile base. The end of this decade found Japan involved in an extremely close relationship with America.

**REVISION OF MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY (MST) 1960: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS.**

Before examining the basic provisions and strategic implications of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960, it is pertinent to note, although briefly, the Japanese responses to the US-Japan security arrangement envisaged by the treaty of 1951. *(The Japanese responses have* 

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been dealt extensively in the fourth chapter). It will help to understand why the need of another comprehensive security arrangements was felt seriously by the Japanese.

The initial Japanese responses to the treaty of 1951 were negative. The treaty was strongly opposed by the militant trade union members, students and opposition parties notably the Japanese Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party. The basic reason behind the opposition was the postwar Japanese peace Psychology which was an outcome of nuclear holocaust caused by dropping of atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There was a general fear that the security treaty with the US might implicated Japan in a US led war with the Soviet Union in the Far East. Therefore, the credibility of the treaty was challenged on the bases of article 9 of the Japanese constitution and the three non-nuclear principles.

However by the end of 1950s, the Japanese opposition to the US-Japan security arrangement, as observed in several studies, seemed to be mollified. The Japanese began to accept the utility of US security guarantee. This change in Japanese mindset was caused by couple of developments. Firstly, the economic benefits of security arrangement. The American policy of encouraging Japanese economic growth, open door trade policy, huge financial assistance without

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asking for contribution to the defense of Japan facilitated Japan’s economic growth after the Korean war. It was largely accepted that without American security guarantee and financial support and assistance, the economic growth would not have been possible. For elites in Tokyo the defense relationship proved extremely compatible with Japan’s economic and trade growth. Secondly, the increasing Soviet military power in the Far East was alarming to Japan. To contain the Soviet power security arrangements with the US was essential. The change in Japanese mindset was reflected in various public opinion poll conducted during the same time. On the question of “alignment with the United States or neutrality?,” a sample public opinion poll conducted by *Tokyo Shimbun* on 19th July 1959 revealed that 45-3% of Japanese supported alignment with the US. In the same opinion poll 41.1 of Japanese were in favour of the revision of 1951’s Security Treaty.24

On 19th January, 1960 the US & Japan signed a new treaty of Mutual Cooperation & Security which replaced the agreement negotiated by Prime Minister Yoshida & John Foster Dulles in 1951.25 (For detail see Appendix No.3) The treaty was essentially a

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base lending agreement. The US was granted facilities on Japanese territory for its land, sea & air forces. These facilities could be used both to contribute to the defense and in pursuit of America’s Far Eastern policies. Japan was given the unequivocal promise of American protection against external attack. For the first time Japan gave a formal commitment to contribute to the defence of American installations on its territory.26 (See for the provisions of Revised Mutual Security Treaty Appendix No.4) Therefore the treaty was strongly opposed by the pacifist and neutralist elements in Japan by arguing that it would involved Japan in another war. Infact such opposition was anticipated by the US treaty negotiators and policy planners.27

Basically the treaty was an American guarantee of Japanese security. In the treaty, there was no mention of a domestic role for US military forces to play in Japan. As per the terms of treaty

> maintained, the signatories agreed to “maintain and develop subject to their constitutional processes, their capacities to resist armed attack; and again agreed to consult, at the request of either party whenever the security of Japan on international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.”

For this purpose Japan granted the United States the use of its land, air and naval forces facilities and areas in Japan.

Japan was not committed to militarily involved in conjunction with United States operations, as was the case with members of

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SEATO. The military action under the agreement was not automatic, but subject to constitutional provisions and processes of each party. There were provisions for joint consultations regarding the US forces is Japan. Expert believes that all these provision were used by Japan to fend off American demands for greater contribution to security efforts and isolated Japan from global politics and helped it to pursue a 'low-risk and low posture' foreign policy.28

Since there were no external political commitments on Japan, it could concentrate on economic development and depended on the United States for its external security.

After the conclusion of the revised Mutual Security Treaty in 1960, US not only sheltered Japan under its conventional and nuclear umbrella but took enormous efforts to build up Japan economically by allowing Japanese products uninhibited access to America's vast market. The various trade agreements signed by the United States and Japan allowed Japanese manufactured goods free access to the US market,29 paving the way for Japan to become a world economic power while nurturing a strong, free, open and democratic society.

Japanese economic focus and upswing in building their trade fueled the approach of detente towards China. Japan's anticipated requirements of new markets in the coming era become a factor in their strategic partnership towards countries in Asia and most

specially with the China. For instance in June 1961 the than Prime Minister Ikeda made it clear that

Japan historically and traditionally has had special relations with the Chinese continent and it would be reasonable for Japan to engage in at least as much trade as the Western European Countries are currently doing."

Asahi Shimbun editorialized Ikeda's China policy thus:

As far as China policy is concerned there is a no need for Japan to adopt the same attitude as the United States we must become a country that will be taken seriously by the Chinese communists."  

Tokyo forged agreements with Beijing in 1962 and 1964 which not only expanded trade but Japanese investments and Export Import Bank loans to facilitate those economic ties. Improved Japan-China economic ties caused dissatisfaction with the Americans Kennedy Administration took serious note of Japan's lack of enthusiasm for improving its ties with South Korea, Taiwan and other non Communist countries while moving ahead with China from trade to aid was clear when Kennedy warned during US-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs meeting on 3rd December 1962 that

"the major question facing us today is the growth and Communist expansions in Asia----- US-Japan as allies should direct their efforts towards that."  

On 19th January 1963, at the Security Consultative Committee's meeting, the US urged Japan to seriously consider the implications of

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30 Asahi Shimbun 20 July 1960, p.3.
Chinese nuclear programme and cooperate positively with the western alliance.

The Cold War concerns thus operated powerfully in shaping the nuances of US-Japan security relations by bringing nuclear issue in China and consider such possibility for Japan. The US policy planners were engaged in a serious debate for the nuclearisation of Japan. China’s explosion of its first nuclear device in 1964 made the Lyndon B. Johnson administration discuss all possibilities for the nuclearisation of Japan. The Secretary of State Dean Rusk, CIA Director Richard Helms and National Security Adviser Walt Rostow were the major players in the debate. Dean Rusk strongly proposed the nuclearisation of Japan.

However, these American efforts were thwarted by Prime Minister Sato when he issued "three non-nuclear principles" whereby Japan would not produce, possess or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons in its territory.\(^{32}\) The debate illustrated the complexity of Japan’s alliance with the United States. Perhaps in response to the American viewpoint, Prime Minister Sato stated that Japan’s nuclear policy rested on:

Firstly, reliance on America’s nuclear umbrella secondly, three non nuclear principles thirdly, promotion of worldwide disarmament and finally, development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes\(^{33}\).

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In a sense these four principles reveals Japan’s commitment to limit the defense and military power to its own territory. Apparently, in this instance, Sato’s statement reflected the bridging of differences between America and Japan’s perceptions on Japan’s security planning and military posture.

AMERICAN BASES IN JAPAN AND THE OKINAWA PROBLEM

Both the Mutual Security Treaty of 1951 and the revised US-Japan security treaty of 1960 as discussed earlier stipulates that the United States would assist in coping with armed aggression against Japan. For this purpose the treaties allowed United States forces to use facilities and areas in Japan to contribute to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East. It should be noted that the provisions related to lending of bases and facilities of 1951’s Security Treaty remained untouched in the Revised Mutual Security treaty of 1960. The strategic relevance of Japanese bases to protect US security interests in the Asia pacific was crucial which has been recognized by many Pentagon officials. The defense facilities provided by an Administrative Agreement signed in 1952 includes

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airfields, harbors, garrisons, maneuver grounds, communication system etc.36

The US military presence in Japan and the strategic thinking behind it changed from time to time. According to experts, the change in base structure and strategic thinking can be divided into four broad phases.

Firstly, the end of occupation phase and Korean war, secondly the end of Vietnam war, third, the revival of cold war military competition in the early 1980s and finally the end of cold war.37

Several studies indicated that from 1952 to 1990, there is was clear linear trend of reduction of US forces and number of facilities in Japan. In 1952, there were 2824 facilities which were reduced 139 in 1975.38 Two factors determined this linear trend of reduction of US forces. Firstly, US budgetary concerns, the huge cost of deploying the US forces and maintaining large number of facilities became difficult in 1970s when the US economy was passing through great recession. Moreover the cost sharing by Japan was almost nothing. Japan contribution in maintaining US forces began in 1978 Secondly, the constant Japanese domestic opposition to the deploying of US troops and bases also caused the linear trend of reduction. The problems of


noise pollution, flight operations and increasing urbanization around the military facilities aggravated the domestic opposition.\textsuperscript{39}

Among all the Japanese bases where the US forces have been deployed, Okinawa stands first. More than 70% of American troops are deployed on Okinawa. After the Korean war, it emerged as the military linchpin of containment in the Asia Pacific area. Many American strategists agreed that a strong position on Okinawa bases was essential to the US contingency planning. As will be seen in details in the second chapter General Caraway, the United States Military High Commissioner on Okinawa, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and most of the Pentagon officials were convinced with the strategic significance of Okinawa bases. The strategic significance of Okinawa Ireland was also recognised by the Congressmen like Richard Russell.\textsuperscript{40} The Okinawan bases were also viewed as vital for the implementation of US policies towards China and the Korean Peninsula. After the outbreak of Vietnam War, the Island's role as a “Strategic Bomber Base” became even more significant.\textsuperscript{41}

In Japan and in Okinawa particularly, the popular movements demanding return of the islands had grown steadily in the 1950s and

1960s. The Socialist and the Communist parties in Japan, which played an instrumental role in generation of nationalist sentiments against US, strongly demanded the return of Okinawa. These movements were essentially and expression of rising nationalist sentiments in Japan. As a result, the Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda was forced to discuss this issue with American counterpart President Kennedy on priority basis. In June 1961, in a joint communiqué, Ikeda managed to get American reaffirmation of Japan's sovereignty over the Okinawa islands.

In the light of these developments in June 1966, the Johnson administration set up a special Okinawa Island Study Group to examine the future of US position on Okinawa under the chairmanship of Richard Snider, the State Department's Japan Country Director. The group submitted its report in 1967 which concluded that the return of Okinawa would have little effect on regional balance of power.

Richard Nixon's victory in November 1968's Presidential election brought sweeping changes in US-Japan relations as far as Okinawa

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42 The role of Japanese Socialist and Communist parties in generating national sentiments against the US is recorded by Fitz Gerald, the US Far East Division Chief, in his memorandum to the Director of CIA. He expressed fear and suspicion about increasing influence of these elements. See in US Govt. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the US, 1961-63-China, Korea Japan Memoandum from the Chief, Far East Division to Director of CIA Vol. XXII Oct. 1963 (Washington DC:USGPO) pp.22-23. For more detail on Okinawa issue see Yoichi Funabashi Alliance Adrift (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations 1999) pp.125-151.


crisis was concern. Many observers felt that Nixon’s inflexible and uncompromising attitude and the so called rigid stand against China caused the US to give renewed emphasis on Okinawa’s military role in the US containment strategy in the FarEast. Nixon wrote an article in Foreign Affairs magazine which strongly advocated regional military role for Japan. On the issue of Okinawa reversion he clarified American position in his interview to the newspaper Asahi Shimbun thus:

> It must be recognized that the United States facilities on these islands are fulfilling on important role in guaranteeing the security of Japan and the other free nations in Asia. My Administration will pay attention to ensuring that no agreement (on the future of Okinawa) undermines in any way the position or the security of free Asia.

Secondly,

> The question of the return of Okinawa is not unrelated to the question of Japan’s role in the collective security of Asia. I think it certain that as Japan becomes a leading economic power, she will come to play still greater roles, diplomatically, economically, politically and also militarily, for the maintenance of a sound balance in Asia.

Nixon constituted a policy research group within National Security Council which included Henry Kissinger, Richard Sneider, Morton Halperin. In this connection Sneider and Halperin submitted a long memorandum on American-Japanese relations to the Okinawa Policy Review Group. This memorandum expressed concerns on the “increasing fragility” of the Japanese American relations and suggested that the tension could be reduced by early reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

47 John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse no.15 p.243.
Towards this end the late 1960s saw a number of briefings, meetings and discussions on how this could be accomplished. By 1971, the final Okinawa reversion agreement was signed by the Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi Kiachi and US Secretary of State Rogers.\(^{48}\) The reversion was made according to the Sato-Nixon joint communiqué signed on November 1969.\(^{49}\) According to the Sato-Nixon communiqué

\[\text{The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States government with respect to the prior consultations system under the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese government, as described by the Prime Minister.}\]

Clearly the issue of Okinawa and the strong domestic opposition to the American bases highlighted in the US-Japan foreign policy team negotiations was a major factor in the evolving US-Japan security relations. It was also noteworthy that the Okinawan's opposition influenced the overall Japanese negotiations on the question of reversion.

SECURITY RELATIONS: PHASEII (1970-90) ERA OF BILATERAL DEFENSE BURDEN SHARING DEBATE

Before examining the bilateral burden sharing debate which became explicit in 1970s it is important to note the conflicting

\(^{48}\) For the official commentary of the agreement see Deptt. of State, Deptt. of State Bulletin, 12th July 1971 pp.33-35.

perceptions of both the US and Japan on various security and trade related issues. These conflicting perceptions introduced a feeling of antagonism and rivalry into the alliance and constituted base for defense burden sharing debate. In the United States a more detailed assessment of its policy in Asia was being attempted after its debacle in Vietnam War.\(^{50}\) Part of this assessment was the realization that a significant part of a containment strategy did not work. Another realization was that alliance partners both in Asia and Europe were less enthusiastic about becoming directly involved in the war. Japan in particular, after the Vietnam war, had grown into an economic giant with the growth rate at around eight percent, developing into world’s strongest economy after the US and the Soviet Union. The American perceptions also included that Japan must restructure its trade policy in order to keep the alliance strong. President Nixon himself was not happy with Japanese trade policies. He called the Japanese trade policies as inconsistent with its economic strength and symbolized lack of reciprocity.\(^{51}\)

The Japanese perception illustrated the divergent views over America’s defense commitment to Japan. The Japanese expressed serious doubts regarding the genuineness of America’s defense commitment. Their concerns were heightened by a series of


development such as the Nixon doctrine of 1969, America's recognition of China, Communist victory in Indo-China and Carter's announcement of troops withdrawal from South Korea. This triggered a widespread debate in Japan over alliance's economic benefit and psychological costs.

These perception brought drastic changes in the US foreign and defense policies and Japanese strategic thinking in the 1970s. For the US burden sharing with the allies became priority. The US expressed the need for its European allies to share some of the burden of the containment policy. The US changed policy and demanded for burden sharing reflected explicitly in the Department of Defense and Department of State's Annual Reports to the Congress for 1972.\(^52\)

To understand the rising tempo of American concerns over defense burden sharing with Japan, it is necessary to maintain the Japanese economic revival and growth in 1970s.\(^53\) Several analysts pointed out that Japan played a minimal role in the Vietnam war and yet the war was a source of profit for it. According to these views it resulted in the US loosing its competitive advantages to the Japan, as they were able to build a strong international market position. Experts also stated that while the US was using its resources in the Vietnam


war, the Japanese were growing economically and advanced their own national interest. Further Japan had developed into the world's third strongest economy behind those of the United States and Soviet Union. Its export industries were booming and Japan became a major economic competitor of the US particularly in the Southeast Asian markets. The US trade deficit with Japan grew to $4 billion. Japan's growth rate was around 8%. Evidences provided by well known economists revealed that if Japan had allocated 6 to 7 percent of its GNP for defense expenditure, it would have reduced Japan's annual growth rate by 2 percent point. Thus to many, Japan's integration into the US led western alliance proved to be tremendous beneficial. As rightly observed by a scholar.

The US-Japan alliance for Japan was a low risk, high return policy. The US-Japan security alliance offered Japan not only a nuclear shield against Soviet menace but also brought regional peace and stability. Without regional peace and stability, Japan's economic growth would have been severely disrupted. The alliance enabled Japan to maintain low military expenditure while concentrating most of its resources on economic development.

The US increasingly demand that Japan should accept the greater share of financial burden of its American security guarantee coincided with the increasing domestic pressure in the US to restrict the Japanese textile import. As the US-Japan trade imbalances grew, the pressure on Japan to invest in more American equipments as a 'means of modernizing Japan's Self Defense Force capability

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increased. The US reaction to Japanese close markets resulted in the US questioning the imbalances in the cost of Japanese security and favouring protectionism over American market. The changed US perception was also reflected prominently in the so called Nixon Doctrine.

The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 brought major changes in US diplomacy in Asia. This doctrine initially expressed as an informal remark by Nixon in Guam \(^57\) and later formulated into a three point policy in Nixon's address to the nation. The three instrumental points which constituted Nixon's doctrine were...

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield of a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. \(^58\)

The Nixon Doctrine called for a new approach to security planning which changed the allocation of responsibilities among allies and provided a new emphasis on shared strength. This new approach was popularly known as National Security Strategy of Realistic


Deterrence.\(^5^9\) (Details of the strategy are given in the second chapter).

The Nixon shock followed by his doctrine marked American détente with China and imposition of quotas on the Japanese textile exports to the US. Many argued that in particular, the failure by Japan to resolve the textile dispute as promised by Prime Minister Sato contributed to the initiation of Nixon Shock. The Japanese response to the Nixon Shock was in the form of persuasion of foreign policy more independent of the US. Japan retaliated by asserting its diplomatic independence by sending top advisors to Hanoi and established diplomatic relations with outer Mongolia which was controlled by Moscow. Further, the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei went to China in Sept. 1972 and supported China on Taiwan issue. He also sought reapproachment with the Soviet Union by signing a peace treaty during the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s visit to Japan.\(^6^0\)

The Sino American reapproachment altered the Cold War dynamics in Asia. It helped US to place itself in an extremely favourable position vis-a-vis its rival Soviet Union in the Far East. The main positive outcome of the Nixon’s restoration of relation with China was the dramatic shift in China’s position regard to Japan. Earlier


China used to castigate the US-Japan Security Treaty and would express fears that America’s development of Japan into an economic superpower would revive Japanese militarism. However, Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in convincing China that the US contained Japan within their bilateral security treaty and economic interdependence. Simultaneously, Nixon and Kissinger prompted Beijing’s fears of Tokyo as well as Moscow in order to increase China’s reliance on the US.

However, Nixon categorically maintained that the US-China rapprochement would not undermine the US-Japan security relations. Nixon looked at Japan at two different levels. First, Japan as a potentially independent actor in power games among major countries. Second, Japan as an ally of US in Asia.61

For Japan, the shift in emphasis in the American security arrangements raised the question of the reliability of the American commitment. The US actions prompted serious soul searching over the future of Japanese security policy as well. This led to a shift in Japanese domestic opinion which argued that Japan should move away from dependence on an American led security structure to the adoption of a more autonomous security structure. This changed Japanese mindset was reflected into Japanese Defense Agency’s annual White Papers on Defense in which Japan’s psychological preparedness for greater security efforts were outlined. Japan’s Self

Defense Force was proposed to increase to the point where it could defend Japan against a foreign invasion. The white paper also clearly recommended a transition from traditional low posture in international affairs.

"In order to assure peace and development in international society it is necessary and indispensable that Japan make such contributions commensurate with the wealth and capacity of our country in various fields, not only in the field of international economics but also in the sphere of politics and the like".62

It was a first step towards greater Japanese responsibility in which Japan committed to defend itself against limited aggression. The second step was 1978's Defense Co-operation Guidelines. It was a collective, crafted document to provide political course for future defense cooperation because in Japan opposition to an independent military capability was greater.

In July 1976 a Joint Committee on US-Japan Defence Co-operation was established. The purpose of the committee was to consult and study about US-Japan defence co-operation. The committee decided to consult on firstly, Japan contingencies secondly, contingencies in the Far East and finally, the US-Japan joint exercises.63 The committee worked out after intense discussions and negotiations, a three point formula to cope up the contingency situation in the Far East. It included following things,

First, the Japan would be in charge of limited and small scale aggression, in case of large scale aggression, the SDF would be in charge of defensive operations and the US forces offensive ones.

Secondly, three working groups on operations, intelligence and logistic support would be established. Finally, it recommends that the guidelines should be drafted.

These recommendations guided the “roles and missions” approach to bilateral defence planning in the 1980’s.

As per the recommendations of the committee, the guidelines were drafted on the basis of “roles and missions” approach. The guidelines consisted of three parts.

First, posture for deterring aggression. Second, actions in response to an armed attack against Japan and finally, Japan-US co-operation in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan.

The guidelines had profound operational, political and strategic relevance in US-Japan security relations in 1980’s. The experts called it as a “carefully negotiated division of labour”. The guidelines represented an adjustment to changes in the wake up of the Vietnam War and the guidelines gave first public authorization for the Japanese Self Defence Force and US forces to train together. Further, the guidelines played an important role in evolving of a new consensus on defence policies in Japan and laid the ground work for the “roles and missions” approach of 1980’s. While commenting on the significance of the guidelines, the US Senator Sam Nun noted.

The guidelines open the door for joint planning and greater co-operation in the key defence areas, and provides an excellent opportunity to develop highly interoperable forces. In the past, a comprehensive evaluation of the adequacy of joint US-Japanese defence efforts has been lacking, the guidelines will permit this evaluation.


ibid.

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It is believed that the increased perceived Soviet threat of the new Cold War created a strategic environment for closer US-Japan co-operation, but the fabric of that co-operation was spun by the guidelines.

**ISSUE OF TROOPS WITHDRAWAL: CARTER YEARS**

Throughout the 1970s trade negotiation with Japan had continued to raise interests in America. By the time, Carter became US President US trade deficit with Japan rose to $8.1 billion. Carter was highly concerned about the sluggish US economy and trade deficit with Japan. Therefore during Carter's time reducing trade imbalances with Japan remained top priority of US foreign policy towards Japan.66 For that purpose Carter adopted a policy of pressing Japan for greater defence efforts. Expert believes Carter’s decision to withdraw troops from South Korea, reapproachment with China, encouragement of South East Asian nations were bluffs to prod Japan to increase its defense efforts and assuming a more prominent role in Asia. In their understanding, Carter’s Japan policy was based on the assumption that:

> increasing Japanese defence efforts would not only aid the cause of burden sharing in Asia but would curb Japan’s resurgence... by channelising Japan’s enormous and growing financial resources into ... consumption and away from capital construction.67

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67 Ibid., pp.86.
Evidences point to two main reasons why Carter wanted to reduce the US military presence systematically in the area. Firstly, the Vietnam factor which manifested itself in a policy of ensuring that American troops would never again be involved in regional conflict in South East Asia. Secondly, there was an overall increase in the financial cost of maintaining a military presence in the region. The US budgetary limitations required that the US either withdraw or seek greater amount of assistance from its allies in bearing operating cost.68

Although Carter reversed his plan to withdraw US troops from South Korea due to strong Congressional opposition, the decision initiated serious debates in Japan regarding America's genuine defense commitments. At the same time with the North Korean President Kim II Sung's visit to China increased the danger of renewal of war on Korean Peninsula. During the visit he announced that his nation would not just watch it with folded arms if revolution breaks out in South Korea and would resolutely answer war with war.69

Despite consistent American pressure from Carter administration Japan was adamant on maintaining its 1 percent GNP spending limit on defense. Even China asked Japan to become more responsible. During Deng Xiaoping's visit to Tokyo in October 1978, he called on Japan to increase its military power to offset Soviet regional power. During the American hostage crisis in Iran, the Carter

administration asked its allies to join sanctions against Iran. The European Community complied but Tokyo was reluctant. The Japanese firms continued buying up Iranian oil. The Secretary of State Vance met with Japanese Foreign Minister Okita Saburo and sharply condemned Japan’s actions as “insensitive.”

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan marked the overall change not only in the US defense policies towards Asia but also in the US-Japan alignment. These developments in Afghanistan and increased Soviet militarization in Far East posed serious threat to the US interests in Asia and challenged its policy of logical isolationalism in Asia adopted by both Nixon and Carter. Even the whole Western Europe and NATO was seriously concerned about increased Soviet power. At the NATO’s Summit meeting an agreement over a long term defense program and increasing military spending by 3 percent annually was concluded.

In the late 1970’s the Soviet military built up in the Far East and Middle East, its use of bases at Cam Ranh Bay, Haiphong, and Da Nang, the deployment of backfire bombers and SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in the Far East created a great security dilemma for both the United States and Japan. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan marked the first occasion since World War

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II that Russia committed its troops in sustained combat. The intervention demonstrated the capacity of Soviet Union to rapidly mobilizes its rescue forces by reinforcing and the ability to carry out a combined air ground operation. Osama Miyoshi, an expert on Japanese security policy commented on Soviet military strategy towards Japan in 1980s.

Soviet strategy is to contain Japan within the USSR's expanding security system in the Far East, promote Finlandisation through military and diplomatic pressures and eventually subordinate Japan to Soviet political control. To make a Finlandisation policy credible, the Soviet Union must deploy around the Japanese Archipelago, overwhelming military power capable of invading and quickly conquering Japan. When the Japanese government and people begin to feel defeatist, Japan will right for complete Finlandisation by the USSR.73

These cluster of events forced the US to renew its commitment to the region. The Carter administration took few significant steps to contain increasing Soviet influence in the region. Firstly, full US diplomatic relations with China were established. Secondly, a new and revise basing agreement with the Philippines was concluded and thirdly, Carter conceded plans for troops withdrawal from Korea. Finally, the Carter administration also postponed congressional debates on SALT II treaty and called for the increased appropriations for the national defense.74

With the increased Soviet military built up in the Far East on the one hand and increasing American trade imbalances with Japan on the others the defence burden sharing debate between the US and

Japan got new turn with increased pressure on Japan for greater defense contribution. The American pressure on Japan for more defense contribution clearly revealed in Carter's Secretary of Defense Brown's statement which he made on 30th December 1980.

Japan devotes far less of its gross domestic product to defense than the United States and its European Allies. Yet Japan is as exposed to the steady increases in Soviet military power as is NATO, Japan is even more dependent than most of the other industrialized democracies on oil from the Persian Gulf, and Japan is an economic power which could certainly afford much larger defense expenditures. Under these circumstances, we have for some time been privately suggesting to the Japanese Government that a steady and significant increase in defense spending is needed, and specifically, that the Japanese Defense Agency's mid-term defense plan should be accelerated. To do this would require a larger budget increase for defense, and major commitments now for procurement of equipment and material (some of which funding would expand in subsequent years).75

RONALD REAGAN: NEW COLD WAR STRATEGY OF SHARING ROLES AND MISSIONS.

When Ronald Reagan took President's Office in 1981 the détente of 1970s was already over. The military build up initiated earlier by President Carter was expanded by President Reagan. To cope with the "harsh realities of Soviet expansionism, Reagan planned a rapid build up of US military forces and large increase in defense spending. The great dilemma that Reagan administration faced was to determine defense priorities and strategies for a military force structure over expanded by a widening set and military commitments. Ultimately the policies that emerged focused on creating a sustained American military build up and developing an effective coalition strategy.

Reagan administration adopted three sets of policies as the part of what was termed as the "New Cold War Strategy" which included:

Firstly, basic containment through NATO to encounter any Soviet threat to Western Europe. Secondly, to protect oil supplies and sea lanes in the Persian Gulf, and finally, to counter threats to US interests in Asia, Central and Latin America that emphasized on a strong coalition strategy.\(^76\)

Earlier Nixon and Carter administration had tended to look to China as providing a major counterveil to Soviet military power in Asia. However, Reagan saw Japan as playing a major role in the future US military planning in the region. During his election campaign, Reagan commented on US Asia policy on 25\(^{th}\) August 1980 in which he underlined the significance of Japan in the US Asia policy.

> "Our Republican Party Platform stresses that Japan will remain a pillar of our policy for Asia, and a Reagan-Bush administration will work hard to insure that US Japan relations are maintained in excellent conditions, based on close consultations and mutual understanding. Japan's role in the process of insuring peace in Asia is a crucial one, and we must reinforce our ties with this close ally. Japan is our second most important trading partner too. A most important example is the US Japan Mutual security Treaty which recently marked its twentieth anniversary. Understanding the Japanese perspective is important for the success of American policy".\(^77\)

A number of factors contributed to this shift. Among them the lowest priority assigned by the Chinese to their defense modernization program and the Chinese declaration of its policy of independence and refusal to join any big power and the reopening of Sino-Soviet negotiations in 1982 were significant. In contrast, Japan was viewed

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as having the potential to play much more active role in the American defense planning.\textsuperscript{78}

Several factors helped the American reappraisal of Japan despite political frictions on other issues. Prominent among them were the existing security treaty and an emerging pattern of close military ties between Japanese Self Defense Forces and US forces deployed in North East Asia envisaged by the Defense Cooperation Guidelines of 1978. Japan's strategic geographical location and the Japan's world's second largest economy. Finally, the election of Prime Minister Nakasone in November 1982 presented the United States with a Japanese Prime Minister who was determined to place a greater emphasis on the US-Japan defense relationship. Experts noted that Nakasone Yasuhiro was Japan's most pro-defense Prime Minister since the Second World War. He accepted that the approximately 26,000 US combat forces assigned in Japan would not only serve as a deterrent to an attack on Japan, but these forces and their support bases would be extremely valuable in responding to a contingency on Korean Peninsula.\textsuperscript{79}

Regan had two basic policy choices as far as its Asia Pacific basing system was concerned. He could have assumed the global containment strategy whereby the US would accept primary responsibility for the preservation of regional stability and contain increasing Soviet influence. The other policy option was to strive


\textsuperscript{79} New York Times, 28\textsuperscript{th} November 1983, p.1.
towards a regional partnership system, whereby the regional powers themselves would accept the primary responsibility of resolving regional disputes and the US would adopt a purely supportive role. Reagan preferred the later system which constituted the perfect balance by allowing the US to cut back on military expenditures in the region, while at the same time maintain a credible presence to protect its own and its allies interests.\footnote{Ronald Reagan: \textit{National Security Strategy of the US}, No.76,pp.42-45.}

Reagan's defense policies focused on creating a sustained American military built up and developing an effective coalition strategy.\footnote{Edward Olsen, \textit{US-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View} (California: Hoover Institute Press, 1985) p.20} It was perceived that American forces alone could not cope with the increasing threat of Soviet military power. Even the defense guidelines provided by the department of Defense strongly advocated that the North East Asian nations should be prepared to do more in their own defense. Within this new strategy Japan and South Korea were expected to assume greater responsibility for their own defense.\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} August 1982,p.6.}

In particular Japan was strongly urged by the Reagan administration to become a more active military ally.

In 1980 the United States spent about 5.5 percent of its GNP on defense, Germany, France and other European NATO countries about 3-4 percent and Japan less than one percent. For the fiscal year 1982,
the estimated defense budget outlays for the US were about $180 billion\textsuperscript{83} and for Japan approximately $12 billion\textsuperscript{84}.

Basically, Japan was under pressure for two purposes: firstly, to liberalize its trade, investments and economy, secondly, to increase its defense efforts in response to massive build up of Soviet military power in Central and East Asia. Most American government officials agreed that the relatively small amount spent by Japan on defense was related to burgeoning economy and large trade imbalances with the United States. By 1980 Japanese defense budget reached to $10 billion including $1 billion for support of US forces in Japan. In their understanding the amount spent on the defense by Japan was highly inadequate in comparison with the United States. On a per capita basis the Japanese burden was $82, about one seventh of what America paid -$550.\textsuperscript{85} Americans became more wary of the evolving Japanese regional role in South East Asia. In their opinion Japan used its massive bilateral aid program and the dominant position in the Asian Development Bank and other regional institutions to promote its own exports and increasingly cut Americans out of booming South East Asian markets. The US suspected that as experts noted, Japan might be building an East Asian Economic Block which

\textsuperscript{85} Deptt. of State, American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977-80, Address by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before the Japan Society, New York 21\textsuperscript{th} November 1980,No.9330 (Washington DC:USGPO) p.1041.
would not only threaten the US access to Asian markets, but would challenge the US global leadership position.\(^{86}\)

Reagan administration adopted the policy of discussing defense cooperation with its allies on the basis of “roles and missions”.\(^{87}\) Reagan kept aside the paternalistic style of alliance leadership and took Japan as a full partner and gave new importance to it as an ally. The US expected Japan to undertake its own roles and missions to improve its capabilities to defend its own territory. Reagan called for a new partnership with Japan in which Japan would be senior partner on economic issues and the US a political and military issues as Secretary of State Casper Weinberger outlined it was a “rational division of labour”.\(^{88}\)

During the June 1981 Summit between President Reagan and Prime Minister Suzuki, Reagan asked Suzuki to develop Japan’s military might to counter the growing Soviet Pacific Fleet and Backfire Bomber Force. Suzuki agreed to defend sealanes up to 1,000 miles from Tokyo bay. The Suzuki administration also agreed to augment its F-15 Eagle Fighter Force from 100 to 155 and P-3C Orion antisubmarine planes from 45 to 74.\(^{89}\) The joint communiqué issued at the time of meeting called, “An appropriate division of roles between


Japan and the US to ensure peace and stability in the region and the defense of Japan. As a part of the communique Reagan also stressed Japan to assist South Korea.

In January 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone Yashihio signed a technology sharing agreement with the United States. He declared that Japan and the United States shared a common fate in which Japan would act as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”. In his Midterm Defense Program approved in September 1985 he launched a build up in air defense, command, control, communication, and intelligence and coordination among the three military branches.

However, in the field of defense technology sharing Japan adamantly refused Reagan’s demand to allow the foreign licensing of Japan’s “dual use” technology. Tokyo denied this demand because most Japanese technology was superior to America’s and Japan did not want American firms to enjoy the free access to technology that its own firms enjoyed from United States. Japan put forward the constitutional obligation of Article '9' while denying the American demand.

However, Reagan succeeded in convincing Japan to share military technology without crossing its constitutional obligation. Three landmark agreements were signed on military technology cooperation with Japan in the 1980s.


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Armaments Cooperation and and finally, the 1988 US-Japan Science and Technology Co-operation Agreement.

Of the three, the 1983 agreement was the most important since it allowed for the transfer of dual use technology which could be applied to both military and civilian products and established the joint Military Technology Commission to facilitate transfer.\textsuperscript{91}

In 1987, Reagan announced to share the Star War anti-ICBM technology with American allies including Japan. He asked alliance partners to contribute their own finance experience and technology to develop key areas of the scheme. Japan agreed to join but contributed little to the scheme.\textsuperscript{92}

GEORGE BUSH : NEW DEMANDS OF BURDEN SHARING .

The George Bush administration represented a transition phase in the US-Japan security relations. This phase marked the end of Cold War and the change from worldwide bipolarity to unipolarity at the global level and multipolarity at the regional. At the same time this phase marked the reorientation of Japan due to its expanding political and economic power. With the collapse of Communism in Soviet Union, serious debate triggered both in the US and Japan


\textsuperscript{92} Japan's approach towards Regan's ambitious Star War programme has been discussed in detail by Walter Arnold, "Japan's Technology Transfer to Advanced Industrial Countries" in John R. McIntyre and Daniel S.P. eds., \textit{The Political Economy of International Technology Transfer} (California: Hoover Institute Press, 1990) pp.168-70.
regarding the future of security alliance.\textsuperscript{93} In the United States a new trend of isolationism and military political disengagement from both Europe and Russia was gaining support. Whereas in Japan serious discussions were being held on shifting focus from bilateral US-Japan security arrangement to evolve a multilateral security frame work on basis of economic corporation.\textsuperscript{94}

It was deeply realised by the Bush administration that in the post Cold War global and regional strategic environment, it was not possible for the US to act independently but required the cooperation of its allies both on economic and security fronts. Therefore during the Bush administration the US pressures on Japan for defense burden sharing was continued. However the nature of demands were little different than the earlier. The Bush administration was under pressure for unfair Japanese trade practices and mounting US trade deficits with Japan which made the US Congress assertive and dragged the US-Japan security relations once again into the realm of Congressional debates. This time the expenditure of US troops deployed in Japan became the target of Congressional criticism. By


\textsuperscript{94} This aspect has been discussed in detail in the fourth chapter.
1990, the total costs of the US forces deployed in Japan had reached more than $7 billion. Eventually strong demands were made by the US Congress to pressurise Japan to bear total costs of the US forces deployed in Japan.

While addressing the increasing Congressional criticism of unfair Japanese trade practices, the Bush administration used the weapon of Super 301. In 1989, the White House cited Japan along with India and Brazil as an unfair trader in Satellites, Super Computers and wood products under section 301 of 1988 Trade Act. At the same time, the Bush administration kept on demanding Japanese participation in the United Nations's Peace Keeping Forces. This demand became intense during the Gulf War of 1991.

During the Gulf War the Bush administration pressed Japan to involve militarily, diplomatically and financially. The United States assumed that Japan's heavy reliance on Persian Gulf oil would give Tokyo an override stake in defeating Saddam Hussain. Therefore President George Bush called Japan to join embargo of all oil from Iraq. However Japan was reluctant to involve militarily. Due to strong domestic opposition, the Liberal Democratic government of Miyazawa Kiichi resisted the US demands of actual participation in war efforts.

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However Japan decided to contribute $12 billion financial assistance to the allied forces.\textsuperscript{96}

The Bush administration's decision of withdrawing US troops from Philippines created a sense of uncertainty among Japanese about the future US commitments for the security of Japan. The decision led to the intensification of Japanese debates on evolving multilateral security arrangement.

\textbf{BILL CLINTON: POLICY OF POLITICAL MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN.}

During the initial period of Clinton administration the US policies towards Asia Pacific in general and Japan in particular witnessed major changes. The Clinton policies were inward looking and more emphasis was given on domestic economy. Eventually stress was given on reducing US overseas defense expenditure to address domestic problems. During this time pressure on Japan to bear more costs of US troops deployed in Japan increased. Out of domestic pressure, the Clinton administration was forced to sign a Special Measure Agreement with Japan in 1995 which allowed for the continuation of host nation cost sharing programme for next five

years. Moreover Japan agreed to bear 70% cost of the maintainance of US troops deployed in Japan.97

However the developments such as increasing Chinese military power and ambitions, Chinese nuclear tests in 1995, its claims on Sparty Islands made Clinton reconsider its Asia Pacific Policies. The changed policies of Clinton administration reflected into a comprehensive report on United States Security Strategy for East Asia prepared by the Department of Defense under the Chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joseph Nye, Jr. The report is popularly known as "Nye Initiative"98 The report emphasized on the importance of the US military presence in the North East Asia for maintaining regional balance of power and protecting the US interests. The report considered the US-Japan security alliance as the linchpin of US security policy in Asia Pacific. The report pointed out three common concerns for the both US and Japan.

Firstly, growing Chinese economic and military power. Secondly, possible military contingency on the volatile Korean Peninsula and finally strained relations between the Taiwan and China and the question of the security of sea lines of communication.99

97 This was revealed by Winston Lord in his testimony to the Congress for detail see US Department of State, Geography Bureau, East Asia and Pacific Bureau, Testimony of Winston Lord on US-Japan Relations to the US Congress, House of Representatives Committee on International Relations Sub-committee on Asia an Pacific Affairs, 105th Congress, 1st Session, 25th October 1995 (Washington DC USGPO: 1995).


99 Alan Tonelson, ibid. p.9.
Therefore the report strongly advocated that the economic differences between the US and Japan must not be permitted to jeopardize the wider security relationship. The report also called for national defence burden sharing and greater Japanese contribution to regional and global security.

As per the recommendation, a new Asian Stabilization Strategy was declared in 1995 which called for continued forward deployment of nearly 1,00,000 US forces in Asia Pacific. Under the new strategy the US military presence in Japan was viewed as essential to maintain regional balance of power.100

At the same time a serious setback to the US-Japan security relationship came from an incident in Okinawa which involved the rape by three US servicemen of a young Japanese girl. The issue took an emotional turn and later linked with the sensitive issue of deployment of US troops on Japan in general and on Okinawa in particular. The incident provided ventilation to the sense of frustration among Okinawans and strong demands were made to withdraw 27,000 US troops from Okinawa.101


The US-Japan adopted a New Defense Co-operation Guidelines to broaden the scope of their co-operation during emergencies in or near Japan in 1997. It represented a step forward towards improving the US-Japan Security System. As the logic given by the framers of the revised guidelines, although the Cold War has ended, many destabilizing factors remained in East Asia including the volatile situation on the Korean Peninsula and between China and Taiwan forced both the US and Japan to revised the 1978s guidelines to meet these challenges. The basic purpose behind the review of 1978s Guidelines on US-Japan Defense Co-operation was to face the changing realities of 1990s. They are designed exclusively for a possible emergency on the Korean Peninsula. It was a serious attempt to redefine the role of SDF in the event of Far Eastern emergency. The revised guidelines centre around the kind of operational support the SDF could provide to the US forces in the even of regional crises. The operational support includes maritime intercept operations, mine countermeasures, air defense for bases in Japan, search and rescue, intelligence exchange and counter terrorist operations to protect US facilities in Japan.102