Chapter Two

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF REGION AND REGIONALISM

Defining the term 'region' is an essential first step in any scholarly analysis of regionalism in international politics. There are many views regarding the most important factors that must exist before a tract of territory can be called a region. Regions could be delimited on the basis of geographical proximity, common ethnic, linguistic, social, religious customs, similarity of threat perceptions or close economic links. Basically, people of a region have more in common with each other than with those of any other part of the world. Ernst B. Haas once remarked that the study of region is required "in order to gain insights into the process of community formation at the international level."\(^1\) The concept of regionalism too is widely discussed in the literature on international politics. In this study the term 'regionalism' is employed to denote the idea of collective action at a regional level. Free trade, economic integration, conflict management, cooperation at the regional level are all examples of regionalism. In order to clarify the concepts of 'region' and 'regionalism', theoretically, this chapter will deal with the concept of 'region' in Section I, the theoretical aspects of 'regionalism' in Section II and Regional Cooperation in the Third World in Section III.

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SECTION I

CONCEPT OF A REGION

Though there is no standard academic definition of a ‘region’, the term is most often used geographically because geography is a more permanent factor than others. After all, India and Pakistan are part of South Asia and neighbours situated in close proximity. Neither state can take itself to some other place. As Werner Feld and Gavin Boyd write, states in a region

are in several respects interdependent, mainly because of their geographic relatedness; that this relatedness is a source of cultural and other affinities between those states; that consciousness of area identity can motivate some or all of those states to deal collectively with outside powers; and that policies towards any state in the group should take account of the likely reactions of its neighbours.2

But geography, by itself, is only a partial guide for delineating a region. If we look at the globe geographically, then the whole world can be called a single region; every state, except an island state, is located in some other state’s close proximity. Thus, geographical proximity in itself cannot be the criterion to delineate a region. William R. Thompson is this context opines, “Regional subsystems need not be geographical regions per se. Rather, the subsystems consist of the interactions of national elites, not the physical entities of political units, of which the interactions are observed to have more or less regional boundaries.”3

However, this is not to say that geography does not play any role in a region. For most states in the international system, apart from major powers, low power

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capabilities definitely constrain their commitment to external pursuits. Kenneth Boulding believed that a state's influence declines with increasing distance from home. This explains why, although in an international system all states might be related in one way or another, yet proximate states are more closely related than others. Oran R. Young opines that

a conception of region that abandons the notion of physical contiguity as a necessary characteristic opens up the possibility that entities related to each other with respect to one or more attribute will meet the requirements for consideration as a region... (therefore) the term ‘region’ is apt to become so inclusive that it is useless.

What I am emphasising is using the geographical factor in conjunction with other attributes to define a region.

A Region as a subsystem: The study of region in the late 1950s tended to move away from prescriptive, descriptive and institutional concerns of earlier writings towards formal analysis and methodology to find some framework or theory. The concept of ‘system’ or of ‘subordinate international system’ came to be used frequently in the study of regionalism to probe individual areas as well as to undertake the comparative study of regions. Some regional subsystem analysts viewed the world political arena as a network of system levels, i.e. global, regional, national and local. But this did not solve the complexity associated with the definition of a region.

To delineate a regional subsystem a number of criteria were used. Bruce Russett conducted an exercise in ‘inductive taxonomy’. He attempted to delineate regions based on five criteria:

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i) Socio-cultural homogeneity
ii) Similar political attitudes and behaviour, as reflected in voting patterns in the UN
iii) Common membership in international organizations
iv) Economic interdependence, measured by trade as a proportion to national income
v) Geographical contiguity

Russett found each set of countries constituting a region fairly stable over time, i.e. the regions in the early 1960s based on world trade patterns or UN votes or membership in international organizations were roughly the same as the early 1950s. He argued that in spite of the change in governments, change in leadership, position on issues once adopted in the UN hardly changed.

However, common membership in international organizations alone cannot be a basis for delimiting a region, especially when we talk of regional organizations or military alliances. There might be cases where all the states in geographical region are not included in a common international organization, but states from distant continents could be a part of a common organization or alliance.

Second, economic criteria by themselves cannot suffice either. If we take intra-regional trade patterns as a single attribute to judge a region, then by this definition Israel cannot be considered a part of the Middle East. Similarly, most of the Third World underdeveloped countries have intense trade relations either with a former metropolitan country or with other developed countries rather than the countries within their own geographical area.

Another way to demarcate a region is to define a set of criteria which a subsystem must meet and then apply them to empirical cases. Louis J. Cantori and Steven Spiegel used this method. They described a subordinate system as consisting of “two or more geographically proximate and interacting states which share in some...
degree common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds and whose
sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external
to the system.\textsuperscript{7}

On similar lines are the features of Michael Brecher's\textsuperscript{8} subordinate system:
limited geographic scope; at least three members; recognition by others as a region;
considered distinct by the members; inferior to the dominant system; more affected by
the changes in the dominant system than vice versa.

Brecher described a subordinate system in terms of its members and their
location (core, periphery or outer ring) which is the same way Cantori and Spiegel
differentiated between a 'core sector' (consisting of a group of states with shared
political, social, economic or organizational background producing a central focus of
international politics in that region), 'peripheral sector' (alienated from core by
economic, organizational, social or political factors) and 'intrusive' (dealing with
politically significant participation of external powers).

But Cantori and Spiegel reached striking conclusions. As far as 'social
cohesion' (based on language, history and culture) goes, Cantori and Spiegel found
that it does not have much impact on regional stability. It is the core of the Middle
East which comes first in respect of high level of social cohesion, and South East Asia
region last—though the Middle East is the most conflictual zone and South East
Asian region shows great tendency of cooperation.

Similarly 'economic cohesion' seems to be more in Western Europe, followed
by Latin America, the Middle East and South East Asia. The most economically

\textsuperscript{7} Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel. "International Regions: A Comparative Approach to
the Subordinate Systems" \textit{International Studies Quarterly}, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1969, pp. 361-
380.

\textsuperscript{8} Michael Brecher, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia" in James N. Rosenau(ed),
cohesive region, Western Europe is obviously the most integrated region in the world. But what is surprising is that the least cohesive region (South East Asia) shows great tendencies of being a successfully integrated region. These points suggest that high level of social and economic cohesion at least in the core area cannot guarantee regional stability or movement towards integration.

William Thompson in 1973 attempted to specify elements and characteristics of regional subsystems in a 'propositional inventory'. He listed 21 different attributes which were stressed by different analysts for identifying regional subsystems (Table 2.1). Table 2.2 matches the various attributes cited by the respective analysts in their definition. Table 2.3 gives the result of Thompson's dyadic index of interanalyst agreement.

It was derived by counting the shared number of attributes cited by each pair of analysts and dividing by the total number of items given by both members of the pair. As explained by Thompson, if writer X uses attributes 1,2,4 and 6 and writer Y uses attributes 1,4,7 and 8, they share attributes 1 and 4. If the total number of attributes given are six (1,2,4,6, 7 and 8). The x-y index of interagreement would then be 2/6 or 0.333.

Though the average mean for ‘interanalyst’ agreement was a dismal 0.21, yet at least two attributes were included by 86% of analysts:

- geographical proximity
- actors pattern of relations or interactions exhibit a degree of regularity and intensity.

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9 op. cit. No.3.
Table 2.1

Regional Subsystem Attribute List

(1) Proximity or primary stress on a geographic region

(2) Actors’ pattern of relations of interactions exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity

(3) Intrarelatedness – a condition wherein a change at one point in the system, affects other point.

(4) Internal recognition as distinctive area

(5) External recognition as distinctive area

(6) One or more actors

(7) At least two actors

(8) At least three actors

(9) Small powers only.

(10) Unity of power are relatively inferior to units in the dominant system.

(11) Subordination in the sense that a change in the dominant system will have a greater effect on the subsystem than the reverse and there is more intensive and influential penetration of the subsystem by the dominant system rather than the reverse.

(12) Geographical-historical zone.

(13) Some degree of shared ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, historical bonds.

(14) A relatively integrated and unified area.

(15) Some evidence of integration or a professed policy of achieving further economic, political, and social integration.

(16) Functionally diffuse

(17) Explicit institutional relations or subsystem organization

(18) Autonomy-intrasystem actions and responses predominate over external influences.

(19) A distinctive configuration of military forces.

(20) A regional equilibrium of local forces.

(21) Common developmental status.

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After going through this exercise, Thompson's conclusion sounds very meagre. He viewed the concept of regional subsystem as very immature and incapable of explaining and relating to existing empirical generalisations.

As said earlier, system analysis in international relations is responsible for much of the theoretical sophistication in the study of regions. Yet the system construct has in some ways posed complications for regional analysis. Most of the studies seem to treat regions as a 'separable' level-of-analysis which can be interposed between the nation state and the international system. Raimo Vayrynen's work on the issue is commendable. He observes,

the discussion on system vs subsystem dominance of the international system neglects, however, one crucial issue. It does not address the question in which way the global system and the regional subsystem are in reality linked to each other. A simple answer would be that the dominant structure of the global system constrains the choices available to regional subsystem and especially to their smaller members

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According to him it is vital to analyze the international power structure through an intermediate layer between core and periphery—the 'semi-periphery'. Countries in the semi-periphery, if moving upward in hierarchy, will experience industrialization; if going down, will experience deindustrialization. According to Raimo Vayrynen,\textsuperscript{11} regions are historically constituted and are located both in time and space. Thus, a region is a dynamic socio-political space. The dynamism implies the changing character of a region and its people in terms of their socio-political practices and cultural consciousness.

The capitalist world economy has penetrated through different historical process into peripheral territories and regions of the world. Penetration naturally is an uneven process imposing both a measure of homogeneity on the regional subsystems by harmonizing economic processes, and heterogeneity because they are located in different structural positions in the world economy. So, the nature and extent of penetration gives insight into the degree of autonomy of the subordinate system and its units.

Feld and Boyd\textsuperscript{12} list the configuration of a region which is built up by mapping the basic attributes of the states is and their patterns of relationship. These include Political sociology comprising national patterns of societal beliefs and values and cohesion and cleavages as well as socialization processes; Political psychology including especially elite beliefs, values, operational codes, and political skills; Authority structures and influence patterns, covering in particular relationships between governments, political parties and interest groups; Interdependencies, within

\textsuperscript{11}Raimo Vayrynen, “Regional Systems and International Relations” in Helena Lindhoch, \textit{Approaches to the Study of International Political Economy}, Padrigu Papers (Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 1992) pp. 119-137.

\textsuperscript{12}op. cit. No.2
and outside the regions, affecting policies across the issue areas; *Regional institutions*,
including their evolution, legitimacy, levels of development and their outputs;
*Regional foreign policy behaviour, Regional cooperation and conflict;* and
*Developmental issues*, including order, growth and institutional expansion.

The most important feature of a regional configuration is its relative degree of
balance and complementarity and the extent to which states are oriented towards
integrative behaviour. A relatively balanced distribution of economic capacities leads
to equality in relationships. Moreover, complementarity in economic capabilities
tends to develop between industrialized democracies owing to market-oriented
specializations depending on liberal or neomercantilist policies of government. The
level of economic complementarity between developing countries tends to be low.

Werner and Boyd demarcate the following order of regions based on balance
and complementarity in the economic sphere. Western Europe comes first, followed
by Africa in terms of balance. East Asia follows Western Europe in terms of
complementarity but there are much greater economic disparities among the
members. Marked contrasts in economic power levels and in degree of
complementarity are evident in North America, Latin America and South Asia. In the
Middle East, there is less disparity in economic power but little complementarity
exists.

Furthermore, as far as a sense of regional identity is concerned, according to
Werner and Boyd, Western Europe again tops the list with strong feelings of regional
identity, based on geography and cultural affinities. Latin American societies in the
Third World show strong consciousness of regional identity. In Africa, this sense is
somewhat weaker. In the Middle East, it is very high. Writing in 1980 they found
feelings of regional identity quite weak in East Asia.
If we look at this closely, it will be very clear that even a sense of regional identity is not a sufficient factor for regional stability. Here I would like to mention that all these concepts are western and not indigenous to the regions (South Asia and South East Asia) being analysed in this study. Moreover, the world has been changing even as they write, from the 1950s to the 1990s and now 2000 and beyond. Regional cooperation in the developing states will be further analysed.

**Approaches to the Study of Regional Subsystem**: Raimo Vayrynen discusses two approaches while defining a regional subsystem in international relations—inductive and deductive. The former aims at dividing the territorial units of the world into regions on the basis of physical distinctiveness, independence, homogeneity and loyalties. This kind of an approach may be useful for comparative purposes, but in addition to being state centric, it is inherently static in character. However, in the deductive method the concept of region is deduced from certain theoretical premises. Here also there is a problem that the concept gets its meaning from theoretical premises only and no direct test of historical or present reality is undertaken.

In weighing the relative advantages of the two approaches, the inductive approach seems to be better suited to the delineation of cooperative regions based on economic interactions or common membership in international organizations. The deductive approach, on the other hand, is more appropriate for the study of regional security complexes. This approach focuses more on systematic functions and nature of the region rather than boundaries and internal characteristics.

‘Regional Security Complex’ is another interesting concept in the study of regional integration. Barry Buzan defines a security complex as a "group of states

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whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national
securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”

This definition does not give a clear idea as how to determine the geographical scope of the complex. On the contrary, the international system as a whole contains a large number of security complexes, some of which overlap and some of which fit inside each other. Buzan recognises this complicated pattern. As a concept, the security complex suggests that states in the region interact both negatively, because of rivalries, and positively, because of shared interests. This interdependence shows that a distinct subsystem of security relation exists among a set of states owing to their shared geographical proximity. (This concept will be analysed in detail in the next chapter).

Thus, scholars and policymakers have used different criteria for defining a region. Conceptually ‘region’ has within itself a sense of boundary and pattern of interaction is more intense among certain nations which happen to form a region. Moreover, patterns of interaction are not static. They change according to political change as conditions and interests are redefined. It depends on the perception of the elite and the people. A Chilean Judge of the International Court of Justice, Alejaduro Alvarez opines “there is no rule to determine regions. Their existence must be shown by circumstances and in particular, by the agreements made by the states who constitute them.”

Thus regions are basically zones of interaction. States interact with each other—be it in cooperative, conflictual or competitive ways. In this study I propose to identify regions according to geographical contiguity; common ethnic, cultural, and social customs; political and economic stage of development; common historical

experiences; similarity of threat perceptions; and common membership of regional associations.

SECTION II

The Concept of Regionalism

Though the concept of regionalism has been widely discussed in the social sciences, there is still little agreement about the meaning of the term. Adding to the complication of definition are a plethora of necessary conditions or background variables important to it, different approaches, and various levels or stages of regional cooperation and integration reached in different regions.

What is Integration: In the literature on regional integration, the term is used with different meanings including political unification, economic unification, economic and political cooperation and free trade. For Federalists, political integration meant the creation of federal institutions; for Neo-Functionalists, it meant supranational dealings on increasingly important and controversial tasks which nations are unable to cope with today; for Transactionalists, it refers to the probability that conflicts will be resolved without violence; for Consociationalists, integration is concerned with the intermediation of the interests of segments of society that have a high degree of autonomy.

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16 For an understanding of the Federalist approach see P. Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organisation University of Illinois Press, 1966).
17 For example, see Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, School and Economic Forces, 1950-57 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).
Furthermore, some scholars define integration as a condition (that either exists or does not exist) and others as a process. If we treat it as a condition, integration could be a ‘security community’ of Karl Deutsch, a pioneer in the work on regional integration. Deutsch writes that a security community is a group of people which have become integrated, that is they have attained “within a territory... a ‘sense of community’ and institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.”20

On the same lines are the views of Philip Jacob and Henry Teune, who write “political integration generally implies a relationship of community among people within the same political entity. That is, they are held together by mutual ties of one kind or another which give the group a feeling of identity and self-awareness.”21

In fact, there is no consensus among scholars about whether a particular view of integration implies a process or a condition. If a few scholars like Leon Lindberg and Stephanie G. Newman argue that Deutsch views integration as a condition, others like Ernst Haas feel that Deutsch takes it to be a process. In my opinion, Deustch and Jacob & Teune view integration as a condition.

The conceptualization of integration as a condition has been criticised on the ground that it allows only a general discussion of environmental factors influencing integration and fails to make a distinction between the condition prior to integration and that prevailing during the process. For this reason Ernst Haas insists on looking at integration as a process. He argues, “political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their

20 op.cit. No. 18, p. 5
21 Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, “The Integration Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community”, in Philip E. Jacob and James W. Toscano (eds), The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964) p.4
loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states.\textsuperscript{22}

Claude Ake also implies that integration is a process in his definition of an integrated political system “to the extent that the minimal units develop in the course of political interaction a pool of commonly accepted norms regarding political behaviour and commitment to the political behaviour patterns legitimised by these norms.”\textsuperscript{23}

However, even these conceptualizations of integration have to undergo criticism. Viewing integration as a process does not clearly specify what would be the end-product, or how one would recognise it. Moreover, it does not clearly show which commonly accepted norm, or how much cohesion, indicate an integrated political or social unit. This condition and process dichotomy could further add to the problem. For example, if we take integration to be a condition, then the flow of people across national borders may be a precondition for it: but if we take it to be a process, then movement of people becomes a factor that advances or retards integrative tendencies.

Haas later abandoned his strict process-oriented definition based upon the activities of subnational actors, now insisting that regional integration theory is “concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to loose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves.”\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22} op. cit. No. 17 p. 16
\textsuperscript{23} Claude Ake, \textit{A Theory of Political Integration} (Dorsey Press, 1967) p. 3
\textsuperscript{24} Ernst. B. Haas, “The Study of Regional Integration”, in Leon N. Linberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds), \textit{Regional Integration: Theory and Research} (Cambridge: Harvard University, Press, 1971) p.6
Thus the problem of defining integration is a complicated one. It rests upon how it is perceived, either as a condition (it could be a ‘terminal’ condition with a clearly specified end-product, or as an intermediate condition leading to some other ‘terminal condition’) or a process (a mechanism for moving towards integration). As Fred Hayward observes, “The term ‘integration’ may be defined in a countless number of ways without violating the standards of scientific investigation,” yet lack of agreement on a common definition makes the concept confusing.

**Approaches to Regional Integration:** The study of regional integration in international relations is full of prolonged debates among scholars regarding the accuracy of various theories and schools of analysis that emerged—federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, transactionalism and, relatively recently, consociationalism. All of these influenced regional integration theory at one time or the other. Federalism and neo-functionalism are not exclusively regionalist oriented. In fact, mainstream functionalism does not favour the regionalist approach to world order. Nevertheless, it definitely has had an impact on the study of regional integration.

**Federalism**

The federalist view envisages a supranational goal on the lines of federated state unit, a supranational state dealing with the institution of warfare characterizing the anarchical system of states and also taking care of human welfare on a global scale. Institution-building is one of the main tasks in the federalist approach. It stresses the importance of constitution, calling for a division of power between supranational and national institutions in favour of the former. However, federalism in

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its pure form was soon discredited as integration movements, especially in Europe, did not resemble federalist notions. Moreover, in actual practice states find it hard to give up their sovereign rights as easily as federalism envisages.

**Functionalism**

Functionalists argue that with the globalization of technology, in a highly interdependent world society, certain social and economic problems overwhelm the capacity of individual states to deal with them and meet citizens needs. So, functionalism attempts to identify common international social and economic problems and create regional or global organizations to deal with them. David Mitrany, the foremost exponent of the functionalist approach says functionalism is a method "which would... overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would gradually be integrated."26

A distinction is being made between issues concerning 'high politics' and 'low politics'. The former deals with sovereignty, defence and foreign policy, and the latter with socio-economic functions. As 'low politics' issues have low salience in the minds of the public in terms of association with sovereignty, it will be easier to redirect these functions to international organizations. Once successful this will have a 'spillover' impact on other areas as well.

However, functionalism too lost ground to other theoretical approaches in explaining integration. When officials directly experience effective and beneficial cooperation in international institutions, they do adopt favourable attitude towards it, but do not become gradually more attached to it than to their own national communities as the functionalists had assumed. Still, we should not undermine the

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contribution of the functionalist in seeing the origins of international cooperation in the realms of governmental transnational actors.

**Neo-functionalism**

This approach is closely associated with the work of Ernst Haas and Joseph Nye. Haas attempted to correct the functionalists avoidance of politics. Haas began with the contention that the creation of limited supranational institutions to handle complex technical problems would gradually bring elites and interest groups of the countries involved to support further integration because they saw benefits in it for themselves.

Neo-functionalists were often called 'federalists in disguise' owing to their acceptance of the pluralist mode of society. Both sets of scholars were sceptical of distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gasseleschaft, the former translated as ‘community’ and the latter as ‘society’. Society is based on competitiveness and transactions based on contract. On the other hand ‘community’ is described as a sense of belonging together, common loyalty, values of kinship.

In 1964 Haas and Philippe Schmitter developed a conceptual framework which they suggested would highlight the process of regional integration in the European as well as the less developed areas of the world. Integration can be conceived as involving the gradual politicization of the actor's purposes which were initially considered technical or non-controversial. The Haas-Schmitter model specifically addresses the question of automaticity of the link between economic and political integration. They believe, "under modern conditions the relationship between economic and political union had best be treated as a continuum". Having developed

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the dynamic of politicization, Haas and Schmitter construct three sets of observable variables: *background conditions* (dealing with the size of units, rate of transactions among them, degree of pluralism and complementarity); *conditions at the time of economic union* (degree of shared agreement purposes and powers delegated to the union); and finally, *the process conditions* (decision making style, post integration rate of members' transactions and adaptability of government in case of crisis and conflicts).

Here again, the European Model is being imposed world-wide. Early steps of economic integration such as removing barriers to trade can be perceived as non-controversial, and as providing an impetus to moving to higher levels of cooperation in adopting a common external tariff, harmonization of national policies and adoption of common regional policies in the developed states. However, within the context of developing countries even the early steps are not matters of 'low politics' but occupy the realm of 'high politics'.

Joseph Nye's contribution to integration studies is significant. He argues that both external actors and events should be included as a 'process mechanism' within the evolution of integrative schemes. The way regional decision-makers perceive the nature of the external situation and their response to it is an important conditioning factor in further integration.

Nye further draws attention to the one reason frequently given to explain the failure of integration, namely 'nationalism'. In the sense of widespread consciousness belonging to community associated with a particular state, nationalism is stronger in Europe, yet this has not prevented a considerable degree of European integration.

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The first major theoretical revision of neo-functionalism came from Lindberg and Scheingold\textsuperscript{29} who argued that the process of integration may result in 'incapsulation', meaning self-maintaining an international subsystem, or 'spillback' might occur whereby in response to tensions actors consequently withdraw from their original objective, downgrading their commitment to mutual cooperation. Haas too later criticised the 'pre-theories' of regional integration for their failure to agree on a 'dependent variable' i.e. the end-product.\textsuperscript{30}

**Transactionalism**

Also known as the communication or pluralist approach, transactionalism is closely associated with the work of Karl Deutsch. It transposes laws from cybernetic theory and applies them isomorphically to the relations between groups of people, using the volume of transactions as its major indicator. It suggests that an intensive pattern of communication between national units will result in a 'community'. In the work of Deutsch integration refers to the probability that conflicts will be resolved without violence. Integration may come about through several types of security communities, 'amalgamated' or 'pluralistic', implying respectively either the presence or absence of any real central decision-making institutions or delegation of national autonomy.

The essential element of integration was the development of a 'sense of community'. "By 'sense of community' we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'."\textsuperscript{31} This


\textsuperscript{31} op. cit. No. 18, p. 5.
'sense of community' requires some particular habits of political behaviour on the part of individuals and social groups involved. People learn these habits in the face of background conditions and actual experience, as in Western Europe.

Deutsch found nine conditions essential for the emergence of an amalgamated security community: mutual compatibility of main values; a distinctive way of life; expectations of stronger economic ties or gain; a marked increase in political and administration capabilities of at least some participating units; superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units; unbroken links of social communication; broadening of political elites; mobility of persons; a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction. However, even in the presence of these conditions, disintegrative conditions could prevent, destroy or at least endanger an amalgamated security community. These include excessive military commitments, steep increase in regional, economic, cultural, social or linguistic differentiation in the community or any participating unit, and political awareness of such differentiation.

Like all approaches this approach has also faced criticism. William Fisher argues that Deutsch's socio-causal paradigm show weaknesses on two fronts:

1) He highlights Deutsch's failure to relate the key variables of social interaction and political integration and the exclusion of both internal and external variables.

2) He contradicts Deutsch's assertion that integration in Western Europe was declining. On the contrary, Fisher finds a seven-fold increase between 1950 and 1964.

However, in spite of these criticisms, Deutsch's concepts are still considered useful for the analysis of disintegration and fragmentation as well as integration.

It has often been said that regional integration has brought ASEAN to the brink of Karl Deutsch's 'security community', where no state thinks of violence as
part of conducting relations with other member states. In fact ASEAN seems to go against the ‘spillover’ logic from ‘low politics’ to ‘high politics’ of the functionalists. ASEAN's main aim during the period of Cold War was to counter-balance communist Vietnam, apart from containment of intra-regional conflicts. Today, we might say that ASEAN has recorded significant achievements in the economic field (in spite of the recent economic crisis), but the fact remains that its initial motive was politico-strategic. (This point will be further examined in subsequent chapters).

**Consociationalism**

The theory of consociationalism developed in the realm of comparative studies seems to be of much relevance to the study of regional integration. Paul Taylor argues that integration in the 1980s and early 1990s in Europe had a symbiotic character i.e. both the state and the regional system was mutually supportive. It is not necessary that an attempt at regional integration should lead to the weakening of the nation state. Consociationalism is very relevant for explaining this symbiotic process.

The theory argues that in some way international arrangements may challenge rather than reinforce the development of a transactional socio-psychological community. The process of regional integration could be reconciled with the existing interests of elites. They could look at it as a means of consolidating their power. Moreover the appearance of the regional arrangements provides a forum for the leaders of minorities to get increased specific returns and separate representation. What keeps a consociational system alive is the cost of disintegration which in terms of national tensions and outside intervention could be high.

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Thus the different approaches to the study of regional integration lay stress on different aspects. However they are not mutually exclusive. Both functionalism and transactionalism seem to believe that stability in society is dependent upon consensus. On the other hand neo-functionalists and federalists accept a pluralist model. Federalists and consociationalists both are concerned with the behaviour and interests of elites and a preparedness to find ways of reconciling their differences with a common system of government.

**Types of Regional Integration:** Most of the early theoretical work conceived of integration as a unidimensional phenomena which could be measured on a ‘single aggregate continuum’. However, scholars like Nye and Lindberg argue that integration can best be studied in multidimensional terms. In this section we look at three types of integration: economic integration, social integration, and political integration. These are not mutually exclusive but are interrelated in several ways.

**Political Integration**

According to Leon Lindberg political integration deals with a “group of nations coming to regularly make and implement binding public decisions by means of collective institutions and/or processes rather than by formally autonomous national means.” 

34 Jacob and Teune state that “political integration generally implies a relationship of community.... a feeling of identity and self awareness”. They further state that the essence of the integrative relationship is “collective action to promote mutual interests.”

35 Hence political integration has several aspects:

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35 op. cit. No. 21, p. 4.
1) Some rudimentary institutional structure, 2) inter-dependence in policy formation, and 3) a sense of mutual identity and obligation. They correspond roughly to the first three of the following types of political integration (PI): institutional (PI₁), policy (PI₂), attitudinal (PI₃). A fourth type could be Deutsch's security community (PI₄) which we have already discussed.

1. **Institutional Integration**

   Federalists hold that strong central institutions are vital for a high degree of other types of integration. Neo-functionalists too have made "political institutions capable of translating ideologies into law the cornerstone of their definition" though at a lower level than the federalists. Nye further differentiates institutional integration into two subcategories: bureaucratic and jurisdictional.

2. **Policy Integration**

   Policy integration is concerned with the extent to which a group of countries act as a group in making foreign and domestic policy decisions.

3. **Attitudinal Integration**

   Attitudinal integration is concerned with the extent to which a group of people have developed a common sense of identity. We find disagreements among scholars regarding the importance of such attitudinal attributes. Federalists argue that in the case of low levels of regional identity strong central institutions are vital to promote such a growth. Neo-functionalists prefer increasing policy interaction and assume that identity and loyalty will follow interests in supporting institutions associated with policy integration.

   Thus federalists, functionalists, neo-functionalists all have laid stress on different variables (categories). These can be presented as follows:

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36 op. cit. No. 28.
• Federalism- High PI₁, (B+J) necessary for PI₂₄

• Functionalism - High PI₂ makes PI₁, and PI₃ irrelevant for PI₄

• Neo-Functionalism- High PI₂ and intermediate level of PI₁, will lead to higher PI₃, possible higher PI₃ and PI₄.

Here PI stands for political integration, B for Bureaucratic and J for jurisdictional Institutional Integration.

**Social Integration**

This refers to the growth of communication and transactions across borders. Peter Cocks defines social integration as "the degree of ideological support that masses and elites will give to new integration structures." Subcategories of social integration include mass social integration as measured by indicators of general transactions and elite social integration as measured by contacts among special groups or elites.

Levels of social integration can be defined in terms of the sensitivity of societies to changes taking place in other societies. Those can be deliberately fostered or discouraged but definitely cannot be controlled by individual governments, especially in today's age of technological and communication advancement.

**Economic integration**

Ali M. El Agraopines, "International economic integration is concerned with the discriminatory removal of all trade impediments between the participating nations and with the establishment of certain elements of cooperation and co-ordination between them."

Different forms or types of economic integration can be envisaged.

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37 Ibid.
1) **Free Trade Area:** In a free trade area the member nations remove all trade impediments among themselves like tariffs or quotas but retain their freedom with regard to the determination of their policies vis-a-vis the outside world or non-member countries. For example the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) and North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).

2) **Customs Union:** Here in addition to elimination of barriers to internal trade, member-nations must have common external tariffs (CETs) on imports from non-member states.

3) **Common Market:** A common market has all the elements of a customs union but also follows free factor mobility across member-states i.e. factors of production, capital, labour should move unhindered among participating countries.

4) **Complete Economic Union:** It includes all attributes of common market, with complete unification of monetary and fiscal policies i.e., full unification of economic institutions and policies.

However actual agreements for regional economic cooperation seldom conform exactly to such ideal types. One type gets often mixed up with another.

In 1950, Jacob Viner challenged the assumption accepted by liberal economists till then that any customs union would increase the sum total of welfare. He differentiated between trade diversion (TD) and trade creation (TC). The former is the replacement of cheaper initial imports from the outside world by more expensive imports from a partner and the latter is the replacement of expensive domestic production by cheaper imports from a partner. Viner argues that TC is

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beneficial while TD is harmful and the relative strength of the two will determine the customs union formation.

Viner faces criticism from several quarters. It is argued that both TC and TD could be beneficial. In fact TD is preferable for it does not call for sacrifice of domestic industrial production.

However, these are static effects of trade which are far less useful in practical policy than the dynamic effects on economic growth via influences on competition, investment, etc. As John Pinder\textsuperscript{41} pointed out, reasons for joining an economic union, free trade area or customs union are political more often than economic.

In fact, this is the basic argument on which Balassa's\textsuperscript{42} five categories (free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union and complete economic integration) (Table 2.4) were criticised.

Nye\textsuperscript{43} also criticised Balassa's categories. First, they have little relevance to planned economics. This criticism does not seem to hold good today in view of the disintegration of the USSR and a surge of market economics in the breakaway republics. The second criticism which still holds good in that no adequate place was given to non-trade categories of economic interdependence between nations, such as shared services, which can sometimes be of considerable magnitude.

So we should focus on the other aspects associated with specific measurement of behaviour: trade interdependence (EI\textsubscript{t}) and shared service (EI\textsubscript{s}) (Table 2.5). The first involves the proportion of intra-regional exports to the total exports of the region. The second is the total of annual expenditures by jointly administered services as a percentage of GNP.

\textsuperscript{43} op. cit. No. 28.
### Table 2.4

**Categories Of Economic Integration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Tariff or Quotas</th>
<th>Common External Tariff</th>
<th>Free Flow of Factors</th>
<th>Harmonization of Economic Policies</th>
<th>Unification of Policies, Political Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Free Trade Area</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Customs Union</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Common Market</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Economic Union</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Total Economic Integration</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 2.5

**Regional Integration Dissected**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Integration</th>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Type of Evidence and Measurement Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic (El)</td>
<td>Trade (El₁)</td>
<td>Regional Exports as per cent of total exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Services (El₂)</td>
<td>Expenditure on joint services as per cent of GNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social (Sl)</td>
<td>Mass (Sl₀)</td>
<td>Transactions (trade, mail etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elites (Sl₁)</td>
<td>Intra-regional air passengers; Students in neighbour countries as per cent of total students, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political (Pi)</td>
<td>Institutional (Pi₁)</td>
<td>Budgets and staff as per cent budgets and administrative staffs of all member countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucratic (B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jurisdictional (J)</td>
<td>Supernationality of decisions, legal scope, expansion of jurisdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy (Pi₂)</td>
<td>Scope (per cent of ministers or equivalent affected) Salience (ranking of fields of experts and by expenditure by fields Extent (Lindberg scale of focus of decisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitudinal (Pi₃)</td>
<td>Elite and mass polls probing identity, intensity, urgency Bargaining behaviour, flexibility in length of tune and number of fields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security (Pi₄)</td>
<td>Case Studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Joseph Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), p. 49*

Thus, studying the phenomenon of integration by breaking down the concept into, political, social and economic integration and further into their subcategories is an interesting and useful approach.
SECTION III

Regional Cooperation in the Third World: Most of the literature, developed on regional cooperation in international relations is best suited to the developed states, Western Europe being the most discussed region. The model of regional cooperation for the developing states has to be different because of the underdeveloped structures and totally different conditions, with prevailing economic imbalances, weak/underdeveloped infrastructure, lack of internal cohesion, ethnic, racial, linguistic conflicts, and problems of state legitimacy which are quite unlike western conditions after World War II. Though there seems to be a realization of this aspect of the problem, yet most of the time the models developed for the western world have been applied to the developing states, with little success.

Regional cooperation in the developing states does not necessarily lead to or aim at political or economic union but rather the effective functioning of an intergovernmental association with specific purposes. It needs to be highlighted that the goal is not to create a supranational authority. Regional cooperation is only an adjustment for mutual benefit based on national interests. The idea of regional economic and technical cooperation for 'collective self-reliance' has been one of the main agenda items of the NAM conference from the Lusaka summit (1970) onwards.

Laszlo Ervin said that regional cooperation

.... is built on the constructive explanation of differences as long term complementarities and on the pooling of markets, labour forces, capital resources and energy access and scientific and technological capabilities in the achievement of the necessary levels of collective self-reliance.44

Norman Padelford has described the concept of regional arrangements "as an association of states based upon location in a given geographical area, for the safeguarding or promotion of the participants." 45 The Brandt Commission Report on International Developmental issues entitled." A Programme for Survival also suggested that regional and sub regional cooperation should be made a prime instrument for economic development in the developing countries. 46

Thus, in the context of developing states regional cooperation essentially comes under the framework of "collective self-reliance" through economic cooperation which is sometimes called 'developmental regionalism' 47 or indigenous conflict management. Regional cooperation can either be functional which stresses on piecemeal development of non-political cooperation in the economic, ecological, social or cultural sectors or be security oriented.

As said earlier, owing to differences in the economic conditions of the developed and developing countries, the integration effort in the latter is judged by its contribution to development and not necessarily by greater efficiency. This changes the traditional dynamic of measuring success as the amount of trade creation and trade diversion and makes all questions related to integration in the developing world highly political.

In terms of classical liberal economic theory it was assumed that the states involved in any sort of cooperative endeavour would already be conducting substantial trade among themselves. However in developing countries usually the

economic structures are competitive rather than complementary. Their trade relations are more with developed nations rather than among themselves.

Integration among underdeveloped countries aim not at the intensification of present economic patterns through the elimination of 'artificial' barriers but at structural changes. Attempts to establish 'partial' integration schemes which do not include measures to counter polarization and dependence are not likely to contribute to balanced regional development. They are therefore prone to instability and lack of unanimous support from member-states.

For example, the stagnation of the East African community in the 1970s can be traced to internal rivalries over the benefits to be obtained from the operation of jointly-owned corporations, railways, postal services, ports, telecommunications and air transport services. So to be successful, economic integration endeavours specially in developing countries need to incorporate measures of a redistributive nature to avoid polarization and for the equal sharing of benefits and costs.

Lynn Mytelka adapted three models for integration in the Third world:

Type I

The first model is a laissez-faire integration model based on the neo-classical theory with the primary purpose of expanding intra-regional trade. This model of trade liberalisation leads to asymmetrical patterns of exchange and polarization. Resulting disequilibrium creates forces of instability and disintegration.

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Type II

The second model is the result of the problems faced in the operation of the first model. It includes redistribution measures of both a corrective and cooperative nature for solving issues of unequal gains and polarization collectively. So, this scheme is much more complex structurally as it requires a significantly higher level of commitment in areas of 'high politics' and requires measures like development planning on the regional level and regional development banks.

Type III

The third model of integration goes further down the road and tries to tackle the condition of 'dependence'. Thus, measures are adopted to overcome or reduce the dependence on developed world like a regional policy regulating foreign investment.

W. Andrew Axline\(^5\) has examined some obstacles to these models. He argues that the central aspect of neo-functionalist theory is the 'logic of spill over' from modest beginning to economic integration to a high level of political integration. However in the developing countries integration efforts tried at low level will not succeed. In order to be successful they have to start at a high political level i.e. the Type III model in this case.

The Concept of Natural Economic Territories: The concept of Natural Economic Territories (NETs) is very relevant to the study of regional co-operation. As Amos A. Jordan and Jane Khanna write, "Sub-regions of nation-states are developing economic links with neighbours that may be more vital than links with the political centres of powers that govern them".\(^5\) On the same lines Kenichi Ohmae argues, "On the global

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economic map the lines that now matter are those defining what may be called 'region states'. The boundaries of the region state are not imposed by political fiat. They are drawn by the deft but invisible hand of the global market for goods and services." He further writes, "Region states are natural economic zones... The primary linkage of region states tend to be with the global economy and not with their host nations."  

Economic growth along China's South-Eastern coast has appreciated significantly since Special Economic Zones (SEZs) led to increased growth in the early 1980s. A decade later capital and other inputs from Taiwan and Hongkong had created an economic boom there.

Sub-regional economic co-operation in South East Asia receive far more official government help than Greater China NET. In the Fourth summit of ASEAN in Singapore in January 1992 the 'growth triangle' approach was endorsed as a parallel mechanism for regional economic cooperation.

1. The Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore growth triangle (IMS-GT)
2. The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand growth triangle (IMT-GT)
3. Golden quadrangle consisting of parts of northern Thailand, Yunnan province in mainland China, northern Myanmar and Laos.

**Conclusion**

Thus, we come to the conclusion that regionalism is one of the most interesting aspects of international relations since the end of the Second World War. But within the framework of integration studies the failure of theorists to agree on certain common elements and their inability to predict actual events on the world scene led many scholars to criticise the existing theories.

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However, in spite of these criticisms we cannot negate the contribution of integration theories and their continued conceptual relevance. Integration studies paved the way for a radical transformation of our conception of international relations in view of rising interdependence the role of non-state actors and the importance of issue areas.

Moreover today, with the end of the Cold War and rising interdependence, regional cooperation efforts seem to have more chances of success. Already Western Europe has made a lot of progress in this direction, and other regions like South East Asia, Latin America and North America are following suit. So, all this opens up new avenues for research. In fact, the study of regional cooperation is all the more relevant today because of its underlying sense of non-coercive efforts. It has been remarked,

theories of regional integration have a lot to teach us still about non-violent methods for collectively solving international problems... They can find a place in the intellectual armoury of studying alternative world orders. But this armoury must be stocked with new concepts as well. 53

World regions are neither absolutely identical, not absolutely unique. Yet they do have characteristics of their own like their relative stage of development and their needs and resources. These factors shape the objectives of regional cooperation in a particular region, their areas of cooperation, institutional arrangements and thus the form that the particular regional cooperation effort will take.

The model of regional cooperation for the developing world has to be different owing to the underdeveloped structure with prevailing economic imbalances and lack of internal cohesion in these states. Thus, the concepts of underdevelopment, dependence and regional inequalities as well as the importance of external influences

need to be included as important variables in understanding the politics of cooperation in developing states. Regional cooperation in the developing states does not necessarily lead to or aim at political or economic union but rather the effective functioning of an intergovernmental association with specific purposes.

Therefore, regional cooperation is a dynamic concept. It calls for an institutional framework meant for accomplishing some specific tasks not necessarily creating a supranational authority, with an inherent objective of peace and welfare, in the process giving a distinct identity to the member-countries. Regional cooperation is a multinational effort acknowledging the interdependence of members and this effort succeeds when member-countries develop a common sense of well being both at the political and the social level, thereby paving the way of cooperation and avoid conflict.