SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Sociologists are focusing on questions relating to change, the direction and rate of change and the factors in social change.

Social change is essentially a process of alteration with reference to the quality of change.

Some sociologists, however, differentiate between social change and cultural change. Social change is defined as alterations in the social structure (including the change in the size of society) or in particular social institutions or in the relationship between institutions. Change can also include short term changes (e.g. in migration rates) as well as long term changes in economic structures. Change may include continuous processes like specialisations. Some Sociologists have offered a distinction between endogenous change (change originating from within) and exogenous change (change entering from outside).

This leads on to another problem in social change, namely acceptance of and resistance to social change.

The Idea of Development

Development embodies hope. Development foreshadows economic or political inequality. Others prefer political inequality and more controls over
economic growth. Is political development independent of the syndrome of modernization? The simple answer is no.

**Political Development**

Lucian Pye presents the case of political development in a quite elaborate form. *Political Development as the Political Prerequisite of Economic Development* – Political development should be taken as a result of the economic development. Pye discovers four weaknesses in this concept of political development. The problems of political development would thus vary according to particular economic problems in each country. *Political Development as the Politics Typical of Industrial Societies* – Some social theorists like W.W. Rostow try to identify the process of political development with the pace of industrialization. It means that the advanced western and modern countries are the pace-setters of political development. Political development is thus identified with the politics of nationalism within the context of social and political institutions that a modern nation-state must possess. Political development is identifiable with nation-building and not with merely a nation-state. In brief, political development is nation-building”.

Change in political participation from elite to mass and from family to group is yet another dimension.

The concept of political development also covers the aspect of political decline or decay.
Concept of Political Development: Some Definitional Problems and Requirements of a New Theory

The concept is that the events which lead to political development "come from the international environment, from the domestic society, or from political elites within the political system itself". The challenges that may lead to political development are:

*Nature of the Problems Confronting a Political System:* The stability or instability, or the development and decay, of a political system very much depends on the nature of the problems that a political system is confronted with. *Functioning Pattern of the System:* The problem of political development or decay also depends upon the pattern of the political system. *Response of the Political Elites:* Finally comes the problem of the role of the political elites. *Identity Crisis:* The people should identify themselves with their political system.

Comparing Russia's political change with its *economic* 'reform' leads to exactly the same conclusion.

The federal model that existed during the Soviet period was a façade that veiled a highly centralized political and economic system. During the past decade, Russia has experienced a period of large-scale decentralization that has weakened the federal government and allowed the regions to amass considerable political and economic power.

Arguably, this development has brought Russia closer to the Western federal norm than its Soviet predecessor. For instance, the territorial structure of
the Russian federal system has been largely unchanged since the Soviet period. The Russian Ministry of Justice recently revealed that over 50,000 regional legislative acts do not comply with the federal constitution or with federal laws”. Interregional conflict also has marred the development of the post-Soviet federal state. One unique aspect of Russian federalism that is relatively understudied is the relationship between the autonomous okrugs and their host regions. “An autonomous okrug is a region located within another region. In a constitutional or legal sense, both the autonomous okrug and the host region are equal and autonomous subjects of the federation. At the same time, however, each autonomous okrug is considered to be a part of its host region”.

In an effort to understand the complex set of relations underlying matryoshka federalism and to assess their impact on the political and economic stability of the Russian Federation, a focus on the Khanty Mansiysk autonomous okrug is imperative. Khanty Mansiysk is one of two autonomous okrugs located within a larger territorial entity known as Tyumen’ Oblast’. Throughout much of its history, the okrug was politically subordinate to Tyumen’ Oblast. During the post-Soviet period, the relationship between Khanty Mansiysk and Tyumen’ has undergone a considerable evolution.

**Autonomous Okrugs: Historical Background**

An okrug’s organs of state power, therefore, were subordinate to the organs of state power of the oblast in which it was located. Moreover, they were regulated on the basis of an all-Russian law on autonomous okrugs.
The gradual but limited development of okrug autonomy in the late Soviet period intensified during the post-Soviet period. The 1992 Federation Treaty enhanced the political status of the okrugs within the federation by giving them direct relations with and guaranteed representation in federal organs of state power. The 1993 federal Constitution strengthened this autonomy by providing a legal basis for the equality of the okrugs with other members of the federation. The Russian Constitution recognizes the autonomous okrugs as equal subjects of the federation in terms of their relations with federal organs of state power and the other members of the federation. As was the case with many other constitutional issues, the federal government initially avoided the difficult task of defining the legal parameters of oblast/okrug relations. While the centralized Soviet system precluded interregional conflict, decentralization and destabilization, the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods have encouraged such divisions to arise. The ambiguous relationship between the autonomous okrugs and their host regions, and the country as a whole.

The Khanty Mansiysk autonomous okrug is located in western Siberia, approximately 2800 km east of Moscow.

"Khanty Mansiysk produces approximately 70 percent of Russia’s total oil output. As a result of this enormous natural resource wealth, Khanty Mansiysk is a net donor to the federal budget. In 1996, the okrug transferred more than 60 percent of its taxes to the federal government. Every tenth rouble in the federal budget and 30 percent of Russia’s hard-currency earnings come from the okrug."
Post-Soviet regional politicians have argued that more emphasis should be placed on using the remaining resource wealth to benefit the okrug. Although they stop far short of declaring economic or political independence from the Russian Federation, these politicians advocate greater economic and financial autonomy for the okrug in relation to Moscow and, more importantly, less dependence on Tyumen' Oblast'. Of the many figures who have played a role in Khanty Mansiysk's struggle for autonomy in the post-Soviet period, two in particular stand out: Valeriy Churilov, the head of the okrug Soviet or legislative branch until 1993, and Aleksandr Filipenko, the okrug governor since 1991.

Unlike many other regions, relations between the governor and the other parts of the okrug administration are cordial and cooperative. One of the challenges facing the okrug government in the post-Soviet period concerns the fate of its small but significant aboriginal community. Khanty Mansiysk's status as an autonomous okrug (and as an equal subject of the federation) is a direct consequence of its native population. The reality is that without this population, the region would probably still be a district of Tyumen' Oblast' with very little political or economic autonomy, let alone equal status within the federation.

Mainly those who support the unity of Tyumen' Oblast', have accused the largely Slavic (ethnic Russian and Ukrainian) industrial-economic, financial, and political elites in the okrug of supporting indigenous rights as a means of bolstering the okrug's autonomy and protecting their own political and economic interests. While there is only limited evidence to suggest that officials in the
oblast' and okrug governments support such views, these types of accusations have soured relations between the oblast' and okrug governments in recent years.

Khanty Mansiysk's Relationship With Tyumen' Oblast'

Unlike most regions, the main challenge to the autonomy of the okrug does not come from the federal government, but rather from Khanty Mansiysk's 'host region' – Tyumen' Oblast'.

Khanty Mansiysk's legal position in relation to Tyumen' is largely confusing. The federal constitution provides the legal basis for the equality of all 89 subjects of the federation, a figure that includes the ten autonomous okrugs.

The sheer number of conflicting documents that attempt to codify the okrug's legal status reflects the complicated nature of Khanty Mansiysk's relations with Tyumen'. This document, however, is very vague regarding relations between autonomous okrugs and their "host" region. At the present time, the federal law referred to in the Constitution on relations between autonomous okrugs and their host regions does not exist. This draft was submitted by the Tyumen' Oblast' Duma, a body that includes a majority of representatives from the region's two okrugs. Conversely, the okrug's rejection of the draft was supported by President Yel'tsin and several other federal ministries. It still languishes, unpassed, in the federal parliament, and the twisted process of defining oblast'/okrug relations continues.
In January 1997, the governors of Khanty Mansiysk, Yamalo Nenets, and Tyumen' signed a treaty on economic, legal, and socio-cultural cooperation.

In the main treaty between Irkutsk Oblast', the Ust'-Ordynskiy Buryatskiy autonomous okrug, and the Russian Federation, the representatives of all three governments are signatories. With regard to clarifying the relationship between the oblast' and okrug, Article 15 of the treaty states:

“Relations of the oblast' and the autonomous okrug are determined by the existing treaty, in addition to [other] agreements and also a treaty and agreements on mutual relations between the organs of state power of Perm oblast' and the organs of state power of the Komi-Perm autonomous okrug in accordance with Part 4, Article 66 of the constitution of the Russian Federation.

Many of Khanty Mansiysk's inhabitants came to the okrug during the Soviet period and still consider themselves citizens of Tyumen' Oblast' rather than citizens of the okrug. Given the “sacrifices' that the oblast' has made for the development of the okrugs, many political elites in Tyumen' proper feel it is a time for the okrugs to support the development of the southern part of the oblast'. Politicians in Khanty Mansiysk downplay accusations that they are intent on dismantling the oblast'. Although Khanty Mansiysk has a great deal of economic potential, the okrug faces enormous developmental challenges. It is apparent, though, that the continuing problems surrounding the legal position of the okrug in relation to the oblast' and the division of revenues from resource wealth have contributed to the political rhetoric between okrug and oblast' officials.
The problem initially arose when the two okrugs refused to participate in the 1996 elections for the governor of Tyumen' Oblast'. At the time, many regions were holding their first post-Soviet, democratic, gubernatorial elections. Previously, President Yel'tsin had appointed the governors of many Russian regions, including Tyumen', Khanty Mansiysk, and Yamalo Nenets.

"In response to the decree, the Tyumen' Oblast'Duma switched the date of the oblast' election from December 22 to October 27, the same day as the Khanty Mansiysk gubernatorial election. Khanty Mansiysk made similar demands.

As scheduled, Khanty Mansiysk held its election on October 27, and for a time, it looked as if neither okrug would participate in the rescheduled Tyumen' election.

**Khanty Mansiysk's Relationship With the Federal Government**

Given the history of resource exploitation in the region, the fact that the okrug is a net contributor to the federal budget and the turbulent nature of federal-regional relations in the post-Soviet period, it is unusual that the okrug government is content to maintain its current political status within the federation. After all, other regions, with far less wealth, have demanded changes in both their relationships with the federal government and their status in relation to other regions. In addition to demanding changes in political status, many regions have challenged the federal government’s role as principal lawmaker by adopting laws that contradict federal legislation. It has been argued that resource-rich regions have the greatest interest in declaring
economic sovereignty from the federal government, primarily by asserting control over their natural resources. Despite the fact that Khanty Mansiysk is one of the richest resource regions in the Russian Federation, the okrug's fight for the greater autonomy has been directed more at Tyumen' Oblast' than at Moscow. Indeed, the government of Khanty Mansiysk, unlike many other resource-producing regions in the Russian Federation, has placed added emphasis on cooperation with the federal government in areas such as the harmonization of resource legislation and the practical management of the resource sector.

It could be argued that the importance of Khanty Mansiysk and the Western Siberian oil industry to the Russian economy underlines the close and cordial relationship between the federal government and the okrug. The Russian Constitution guarantees the okrug's status as an equal and autonomous member of the Russian Federation. The okrug is a consistent donor to the federal budget. In Khanty Mansiysk, unlike most regions, the political turmoil surrounding its position within the federation has revolved around its relationship with Tyumen', not the federal government.

**Federal Reforms Under Putin**

Khanty Mansiysk and Yamalo Nenets enjoy strong representation in the district hierarchy. The federal inspector for the three regions of Tyumen' Oblast' will be based in Tyumen' proper. The okrug, on the other hand, is wary of federal attempts to extract more revenue from donor regions.
federalism underscores the problem of institutional development and legislative reform in this nascent federal state. Basic changes in the constitutional structure of the Russian Federation have encouraged regions like Khanty Mansiysk to assume more control over their administration. But the lack of a detailed legal codification of the okrug’s relationship with Tyumen’ Oblast’ has marred relations between the two sub’yekty. The conflict between Khanty Mansiysk and Tyumen’ serves as a reminder of the difficulties of blending Soviet institutional legacies with post-Soviet realities.

At the root of this new economic strategy lies the concept of uskorenie, the acceleration of social and economic development.

In the renewal of economic life through accelerated growth, acceleration of socio-economic development embraces not only the sector of economics, but affects the whole of society. Running through this programme is the concept of the acceleration of the long-term socio-economic development of the country.

To guarantee advance in society as a whole, perestroika must be realised in the economy. This is a new term in political and economic practice. Perfection implies the improvement of individual aspects and elements of the economy. Perestroika is different. The term perestroika expresses a revolutionary qualitative transformation. Political system, ideology, party working and the whole superstructure rooted in the economic base of society are undergoing tremendous changes. It is important that economic reform does not occur in

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isolation from other sectors of social life but strengthens the transformation of these sectors.

**TRANSITION TO INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT**

In the past, to a considerable degree, the economic growth occurred through significant increases in the use of resources. The Soviet Union was enormous, and rich in resources, and it was natural to develop through extending the involvement in production of the work-force, of fuel and raw materials, of capital investment and funds. In the 1990s the rate of growth of labour productivity exceeded the growth of production so that some of those involved in branches of production were freed and transferred to other branches providing services to the population. Progress was sluggish and poorly reflected in the growth of efficiency in the economy. Existing technology was being renewed slowly, old systems were retained, equipments became obsolete and as a consequence, efficiency and growth rates declined. The idea of acceleration of the socio-economic development of the country requires a qualitatively different approach.

**STRENGTHENING SOCIAL PROVISION**

It was necessary to rebuild the economy. The ageing economic system of administrative 'commands from above' aggravated this unbalanced development, neglecting the social sector, and exacerbating the gap between consumer demand and supply.
Working Women in Russia During 1990s and the Middle Class

There is no marked change in the economic, and primarily the social and labour status of women.

The Country’s Risks and Economic Policy

Macroeconomic policy oriented toward economic expansion faces several important questions. Increased competition would only work in favour of Russian companies.

Economic growth could continue on this basis for a certain time, but this does not solve the country’s long-term problems. In serious terms there are only two economic policy strategies defining the relevant scenarios of the future development of the country. It combines the principles of economic effectiveness with social justice and relies on the country’s own resources and increasing competitive development of the national economy on the world market, as well as the active use of existing and rapidly developing new potentials for economic growth.

The development of the economy is characterized by the following main macroeconomic indicators:

The first Stage: 2000-2006

The main activity of this period is the implementation of the institutional reforms aimed at forced liquidation of non-competitive production enterprises and the strengthening of dominating positions of the export oriented sectors.
The reduction of state expenses and lowering of the living standards will lead, at best, to stagnation of consumption. For seven years the common rates of economic growth will not exceed one per cent a year. The main contribution to the dynamics of the economy will be made by the energy and raw materials branches of industry, since their export potential will be exploited. Their annual growth rates will reach 1.6 – 1.8 per cent. The rates of growth in the consumption-oriented branches (light and food industry) will be close to zero.

*The Second Stage: 2007-2010*

If the production sector and population adapt successfully to the negative aspects of the first stage, some economic revival might be expected. It will be based firstly on increasing the competitive development of production and the expansion of the export sector. This will take place at the expense of bigger investments. The average annual rate of growth in the economy will reach 1.5 per cent.

Transition to more dynamic economic growth will be hampered because of structural macroeconomic disproportions. In spite of the high rates of increasing investments, their contribution to the economic dynamics will be minimal. They will compensate for the increase of the capital intensity in the primary sectors of the economy and the large-scale depreciation of the gross fixed capital formation.

The main motive force of the economy, as before, will remain the export of raw materials. Its increase at 3-4 per cent average annual growth will require
the growth of investments at 5-6 per cent annually since at this point it will be necessary to modernize the electroenergetics, transport and some other capital-intensive branches of the economy, discover and develop new gas deposits and oil fields. Accordingly, the share of consumption in GNP will be lowered from 67-68 per cent in 2005 to 63-65 per cent in 2010.

For proponents of a liberal variant of federalism, of uppermost concern is countering domination by either nationalist-minded minorities or the majority national group (Russians) by prioritising the individual rights of citizens regardless of their ethnic or national affiliations. On the grounds that minority cultural self-preservation (as well as political representation) is of fundamental importance for individuals because belonging to a minority culture provides a meaningful context for choice, the retention of minority group rights through federal support is defended as a counterweight to majority group (Russian) cultural assimilations. First, it explores the federal process that has led to the establishment of the present day multicultural federation. Second, it examines attempts since 1996 to develop a more coherent federal nationalities policy. Third, focusing on the ethnorepublics, it explores whether a democratised federation can offer an effective counterweight to both minority and majority nationalisms”.

The Federal Process and Multicultural Federalism

Central to shaping federal formation in Russia are three tensions, viz. re-federation, which entails conflict over the appropriate designation of powers
between the centre and the ethnorepublics; federal asymmetry, which raises questions concerning the principles of equality and differentiation between the federation’s constituent units; and the politics of the subject, that is, whether to structure the federation on the basis of individual or group rights.

It was the Federal Treaty, namely those provisions concerned with the delimitation of powers to the ethnorepublics, which formed part of the basis of the December 1993 federal constitution. Although it accepts the principle of national self-determination, it does not confer the right to secede, which states that the Russian federation ensures the integrity and inviolability of the federal structure. The right of the ethnorepublics to secession was interpreted by some of the Constitution's framers as an abrogation of Russia as an integral primordial-territorial entity. This, as the ethno-republics see it, is the denial of nations to practise, if they so wish, the right of national self-determination, a right which was theoretically available even during Soviet rule to its union republics. Compared with federations in late modern democracies, the federal constitution also contravenes a basic given that central authorities may not unilaterally redefine the powers of constituent units.

For many of the ethnorepublics, the constitution was therefore judged as an abrogation of the autonomous rights previously embodied in the Federal Treaty. As citizens have approved the Constitution, it is now in force in all component parts of the Russian Federation. Russia is far from unique in the way in which such an asymmetric federation has evolved as part of the federal
process. For Russian nationalists, the rejection of group rights and the promotion of individual rights is also bound up with reclaiming their own national homeland of Russia from a Soviet regime which was perceived as promoting the territorial rights of national minorities. In contrast to the ethnorepublics, which felt that the Soviet federation, in granting most of them autonomous republic status, had paid only lip service to furnishing the necessary institutional supports to ensure the reproduction of their homeland cultures, the feeling amongst ethnic Russians was that such a nationalities policy had been far too accommodating. In short, many Russians felt that Soviet nationalities policy had made them an underprivileged majority in the Russian republic (RSFSR), their own national homeland. Finally, for Moscow's federal-builders, there is the recurring theme that support for collective rights promotes geopolitical chaos and fragmentation.

In actuality, then, the politics of the subject has been caught up in promoting the rights of either the majority or minority national groups.

One powerful normative conception the decree proposes is to construct the federation around a Eurasianist vision of Russia. A term first mooted by Russian emigres in the 1920s, it is based on the notion that Russia is a continent unto itself, located between Europe and Asia and is geopolitically and culturally different from both. As Russia occupies a special and unique place within Northern Eurasia, it is therefore held that Russia must find its own particular niche and solutions to its multicultural diversity. Accordingly, the goal of a
multiethnic Russia is to ensure 'the cultural self-preservation and further development of national traditions and co-operation of Slavic, Turkic, Caucasian, Finno-Ugric, Mongolian and other peoples of Russia within the framework of Eurasian national-cultural space'. Both European and Asian experiments with state building are therefore rejected as inappropriate to what is deemed to be a more viable Eurasian way of 'harmonising the development of nationalities'. No doubt reflecting a concession to the majority culture, what is more problematic is the part ascribed to the Russians in this process, in which due to the unifying role of the Russian people, a unique and diverse, spiritual community and union of various peoples has been maintained. Inter-ethnic relations in the Russian Federation will in large part be determined by the general national situation of the Russian people, a buttress of Russian Federation statehood.

One conveys a sense of federation working towards multicultural coexistence. First, just as Soviet nationalities policy discouraged institutional ethnic Russian nation building within the RSFSR, so too the post-Soviet federation has worked towards building up nation-building institutions for the minorities.

*Federation as Counterweight to Nationalism*

The question is whether individual and group rights are more likely to be protected in a far from democratic federation than in an illiberal state.
Towards a Sustainable Multicultural Federalism

For a sustainable multicultural federalism to be realised in Russia, two conditions in particular would seem to be necessary. Firstly, central to building a democratised and stable federation is one that provides the space for promoting individual liberties as well as accommodating group rights. As part of the federal process, group rights are being realised primarily through asymmetric federalism; provided that the federal process also offers the unfolding opportunity for all constituent units, ethnorepublics and others, to renegotiate their federal status in a way in which no autonomy claims are slighted, then there is the prospect of ensuring fulfilment of both 'a politics of multicultural recognition' and 'federal stability'. Essential also for a democratic trajectory in Russia is an acceptance that citizens have had little experience with political associations that normally provide important linkages or mediating networks for individuals in liberal societies and [have] had little or no opportunity to try out their interactive skills in the political arena. Thus, if multicultural federation is to succeed in acting as a counterweight to the primordial nationalism of either the cultural majority or minority, it also needs to provide the conditions necessary for creating a plurality of identities and political actors based upon guarantees of free association and access to public forums of the sort that a civil society and economic liberalisation can help generate.

Secondly, by redefining national self-determination to include the right to national-cultural autonomy, the authors of Decree 909 raise the prospects of a
potentially more democratic and flexible version of the term, a culture-based non-territorial self-determination. There is a particular advantage in this notion of promoting a cultural and non-exclusive territorial understanding of national self-determination for, not only it is more inclusive in accommodating the rights of a wider range of cultural groups but it also offers the opportunity of 'the right to national self-determination a particular case of the right to culture', ensuring that individuals within all ethnic and national groups are provided with cultural choice. Particularly in the present period of social flux, in which identities are especially fluid, federation needs to be flexible enough not only to devolve powers to smaller, autonomous national groupings but also to recognise that the federation’s further economic regionalisation - into new and larger associations of the sort that have emerged through the Siberian Agreement, the Greater Volga Association and in the North Caucasus - should also be welcomed. Although in part motivated by considerations of economic self-interest, their development also highlights the point that regional identities need not necessarily remain static and that institutional arrangements must be flexible enough to recognise both the fluidity and benefits to be gained from institutional recognition of multiple and overlapping identities. It could well be that such a sustainable multicultural federalism, provided that it is not stillborn, will provide the best counterweight to both majority and minority nationalisms and help largely in the process of nation-building.