President Kennedy and the UN Initiatives in the Congo

Kennedy's Approach Towards Africa.

Even before becoming the President of the United States on 20 January 1961, John F. Kennedy had been regarded as a "liberal", an "anti-colonialist" and a supporter of the "African Revolution". As the Senator from the State of Massachusetts, he had delivered a number of speeches in the Senate on decolonization attacking the United States for its "insensivities" towards the colonial question. In 1957 he had delivered a major speech in the Senate castigating France for its atrocities in Algeria. The speech, though controversial in the eyes of American policy-makers and the NATO allies, had brought him into national prominence. In fact he was to become very soon the first Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1959.

On 28 June 1959 speaking at a dinner of the American Society of African Culture in New York, Senator Kennedy had called for a new policy towards Africa, by not putting emphasis on "the battle for men's minds", Vice President Richard Nixon was advocating for. Instead the United States, according to Kennedy, should try to make Africa rather stronger by means of increased American aid, and not to seek
to compete with the Soviet Union for providing assistance, the United States should extend its hand of friendship to the newly independent countries of Africa even at the risk of developing conflicts, with its friends in West Europe, as Kennedy advocated. As the Chairman of the African Sub Committee of the Senate he expressed sympathy with liberation movements in Africa and authorized a Senatorial Study Mission to visit Africa in November-December 1960 for an on-the-spot study and to make a review of the African situation in the "Year of Africa". His younger brother Edward M. Kennedy accompanied the Senators, on their trip by paying for his own expenses.

As the Democratic Party's nominee in the 1960 Presidential elections, Senator Kennedy had made four hundred and seventy nine references on Africa, in his campaign speeches. In these speeches as well as in his talks with African leaders who had visited the United States in the election year, he had voiced his concern for Africa. For instance, in his meeting with Tom Mboya, the Kenyan leader, Kennedy had stated that the United States "should concern itself more with Africa than it has in the past and not just in times of crisis as in the case of Congo". Kennedy said that he was of the firm conviction that if the civil

right legislations were promoted ensuring the principles of equal opportunities in the United States, the services of its large black population could be utilized as "cultural emissaries" in the promotion of American interests in Africa. The need to cultivate emerging Africa has become pressing according to Kennedy, because a large number of them had got their independence in 1960 and that the Soviet Union had embarked upon a massive programme to woo the Black African states. In fact, during the debates on the Congo, the Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev had made a personal visit to the UN clearly signalling how much importance the USSR was attaching to its evolution of friendly relations with the emerging African states in order to win over their votes at the UN. The United States, on the other hand, according to Kennedy, after showing "benign neglect" towards them for over a long period of time was hoping that they would support the United States on all issues before the UN. Kennedy in his campaign speeches had also attacked the Republican Administration and Vice President Nixon in particular for having "failed to foresee developments in the Congo and Cuba."

As the President-elect he sent Governor W. Averell Harriman on an African fact-finding tour. Both Governor Harriman, and his brother Edward Kennedy on their return

from tour apprised him on Africa. The CIA also had briefed him on international issues concerning Cuba, Berlin and Congo. Kennedy had organized also a "Task Force on Africa" to advise him on possible steps which he might take to improve US relations with the African countries. The notable members of the "Africa League", namely Professor David Apter of Chicago University, Professor Rupert Emerson of Princeton University and Professor Vernon McKay of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University were invited to become member of the "Task Force". In their report to the President-elect, the members had urged Kennedy to adopt a bold and positive attitude towards African states and also to seek to improve American image in Africa by severing relations with South Africa and by adopting strong anti-colonial position at the UN.419

In his inaugural address itself, Kennedy dramatized his concern for Africa by giving an indication of the desire of his Administration to develop warm and cordial relationship with emerging states of Africa on the basis of mutual confidence and friendship. For instance he stated that he promised to help"... those people in huts and villages... who were... struggling to break the bond of mass misery ... not because the communists may be doing it, not because we

419. Reference Vernon McKay's File. The author got a copy of the report from her husband who was a student of SAIS under Professor McKay in 1972-1973.
seek their votes, but because it is right. The President also referred to "American revolutionary heritage" in his inaugural speech which was probably intended to play down and counteract the communist "revolutionary ideology" of the Soviet Union. Kennedy's strong anti-colonial stance and support for the principles of self-determination as well as his "open-door" approach towards African leaders was responded by the visit to the United States by them in large numbers. For instance, in the first year of his Presidency in 1961, eleven African leaders had visited him, in 1962, ten and in 1963 before his death six. This figure can be contrasted with the fact that in Eisenhower period in 1960, only three African leaders had visited the United States. The visits of African leaders also dropped down to four during President Johnson's Presidency in 1964. Analyzing the reasons for the popularity of the new President, Professor Vernon Mc Kay pointed out that "Kennedy's youthful vigour and the image of progressiveness which he brought to African affairs were responsible for the new rapport which was established between the United States Government and various African countries".

Kennedy while acknowledging the impact of the tide of nationalism on developing countries argued that if such forces could be preserved, it would inspire developing countries to withstand pressures from undue quarters, whether

420. See Nielsen, n.116, p.264.
421. Ibid.
422. For details see Walters, n.91, pp.89-90.
423. See McKay, n.70, p.348.
from the Americans or the Russians. He therefore felt that there was the need to restate American position on non-alignment, since most of the newly independent states had chosen the path of non-alignment. The Dullesian policy of condemning non-alignment was hampering US foreign policy objectives, Kennedy argued.

It is worthwhile to point out that as far as personal attitude was concerned, Kennedy was as die-hard anti-communist as Dulles was, the only difference between the two statesmen was that Kennedy did not regard all leaders belonging to the non-aligned camp who were seeking to improve their relationship with the Soviet Union as "Communists" or the "dupes of Moscow" like Dulles. His anti-communist stance is revealed from a statement made by him on 5 September 1960 after being elected as the Democratic Presidential candidate. For instance, during the struggle for power between Kasavubu and Lumumba the American newspapers had reported that the Soviet aircrafts were engaged in the massive air lift of materials into the Congo to help Lumumba in the power struggle and during such operation had refueled at a NATO base in Athens. "If such reports were true... our government owes an explanation of what is being done to keep Russia from establishing a new satellite in the heart of Africa", Kennedy declared.

Kennedy had also made statements that Africa had become the "giant testing ground" to determine whether freedom could be maintained in conditions where masses lived on marginal edge of existence" and that Africa was the object of "a giant communist offensive", affecting the security of virtually every citizen of the United States. These are statements indicative of his deep suspicion and hatred for communism.

The President-elect, also, dramatized his attitude towards Africa by nominating Governor G. Mennen Williams, a senior Democratic politician from Michigan and a "liberal" to the post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and stated that Williams' new status was "a position of responsibility second to none in the Administration". The very fact that such a high-ranking person was willing to accept the position of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs indicated the importance both Williams and Kennedy had attached to the appointment. Along with Williams, other influential liberals who were members of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Democratic Party were inducted into the Administration. They were namely, Chester Bowles as the Under Secretary, Adlai Stevenson as the Ambassador to UN and Harlan Cleveland as the Assistant Secretary for International Organization.

427. For details see Weissman, n.29, p.117.
Later on probably on the advice of Chester Bowles, J. Wayne Fredericks from the Ford Foundation in New York was brought in to serve as first deputy to Williams. Weissman, however pointed out, that "Fredericks' appointment had been pushed by Williams". Weissman based his reasoning on the fact that Fredericks had served the Kellog Company of Battle Creek, Michigan in Southern Africa for a long time and that he had maintained his liaison with Michigan Democratic party bosses in late fifties and in the process he had been recommended to Williams by Niel Staebler, Michigan State Democratic party Chairman. In any case Frederick's first-hand knowledge of Africa as well as his strong commitment to Kennedy's liberalism had made him a useful lieutenant to Williams who had little back ground of Africa.

Kennedy translated one of the recommendations of his "Task Force" team by establishing a non-governmental Advisory Committee on Africa attached to the State Department in order to strengthen the policy-making structure of the African Bureau. Apart from the inclusion of members belonging to the "Task Force", the Advisory Committee included members also from the American Universities, philanthropic foundations, business and religious groups.

429. See Weissman, n.29, p.130.
430. Ibid.
Subsequently the President appointed another career diplomat, Edmund Gullion as his ambassador to the Congo to replace Timberlake. It is pointed out by Weissman that Gullion's name had been recommended by Chester Bowles and was promptly accepted to in view of the fact that Gullion had worked with Kennedy during his campaigns to prepare his Indo-China "speeches" and also that Gullion was an "old friend" and a "trusted adviser", of the President.432

The Road to Louvanium.

President Kennedy's assumption of office on 20 January 1961 was inauspicious from the point of view of the developments in the Congo. Because by then various power centres had developed in the Congo with each centre struggling to maintain ascendency or survival. For instance, there were four power centres namely, (a) Kasavubu-Mobutu team (b) Tshombe and Katanga (c) Albert Kalonji and the South Kasai and (d) a Lumumbaist government under Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville formed since December 1961. With the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in February 1961, the relations between the militant African states and the United States had been severely strained. In fact these militant states had formed a "Casablanca" group under the leadership of Egypt to rush troops to help the Lumumbaist government in Stanleyville. They also talked about setting up of an

432. See Weissman, n.29, p.131.
"African Joint Command", and being critical of the UN activities in the Congo, had given notice for withdrawal of their troops from the UN operation. The Soviet Union also had sought to exploit the situation in the meanwhile by rushing military support to Gizenga government through Egypt and Sudan. The domestic situation in the Congo had also deteriorated with Tshombe being firm in his refusal to integrate Katanga into the Central government and that the Kasavubu-Mobutu team were "losing ground" both in political and military sense with forces supporting Lumumba "gaining strength". Infact the matter had worsened by the bitter conflict that had developed between Mobutu and the UN, namely its Chief Representative Rajeswar Dayal of India, with Mobutu demanding the immediate withdrawal of Dayal. The militant African states, on the otherhand, were demanding the expulsion of US Ambassador Timberlake for his gross interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo. From the American point of view, the situation was thus, pretty "depressing" and "desperate.\(^{433}\)

The President, while reviewing the Congo situation was guided by the fact that two members belonging to "Casablanca" group namely Ghana and Sudan had dissociated themselves from the views of the majority and that one out of the two namely Ghana had taken up the healthy position that the Congo issue should be resolved under the aegis of the

UN and also that efforts be made for the reconvening of the Congolese parliament. More gratifying from Kennedy's point of view was the support given by Nkrumah to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, who had been bitterly attacked by the Soviet Union and the militant Afro-Asian states after the death of Lumumba. Nkrumah's views, did not contrast with the US position since the Americans were also engaged in working out behind-the-scenes for the reconvening of the Congolese parliament. This was discovered during Nkrumah's visit to the United States in March 1961 when both the leaders during discussions found large areas of agreement in respect of the Congo problem.

With regard to Mobutu-Dayal Controversy and the demand for the recall of US Ambassador Timberlake the President probably decided to seek for the views of India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru because India was a great supporter of Hammarskjöld as well as of the UN operation in the Congo and that in terms of providing man power India could only neutralize the threat and pressures of withdrawal by militant Afro-Asian states. The matter was settled probably through the process of a compromise between the governments of India and the United States by which both Dayal and Timberlake were replaced.

The President also read with interest some of the recommendations made by the Senatorial Study Mission which had visited the Congo. For instance, in its report on 12 February 1961 the Mission had recommended that "the role of the UN should be clarified and strengthened" that a "new Constitutional Conference of the leaders of the various political and geographical segments" be convened because there was an urgent need for "parliamentary backing" for the Congolese Central Government.

The President also reviewed the attitude of the Congress, reflected through the speeches of some Senators namely, Thomas J. Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut) Kenneth Keating and Jacob K. Javits (Republic an, New York) John Sherman Cooper (Republican, Kentucky) and Gale W. Mc Gee (Democrat, Wyoming). For instance, on 16 February 1961 Dodd, speaking on the floor of the Senate, stated that he concurred with the view of Columnist Stewart Alsop, contained in the Saturday Evening Post that the UN forces had been used "in the Congo to prevent a pro-western, anti-communist regime headed by a chief of state Kasavubu" recognised by the UN, and that they did nothing to "prevent the establishment of the insurrectionary pro-communist regime of Gizenga." Senators Keating, Cooper and Javits, on the other hand supported

Kennedy's initial declaration to provide firm support to the UN for maintaining the territorial integrity of the Congo 437. Senator McGee returning from the Mission's Congo trip pointed out that US policy had been in recent months "too much warped by the personality of Lumumba", Contrasting the personalities of Kasavubu and Lumumba, the Senator pointed out that while Kasavubu was a "very quiet mannered, soft-spoken man", his influence does not go very far beyond Leopoldville. On the other hand Lumumba was an "exciting and excitable personality" with great capacity for "spell binding"..." but who lost the magic power due to his absence from the seat of power 438. The President was probably heartened by a resolution of the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labour (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) the giant American labour organization, which backed the UN efforts and had warned Belgium and the Soviet Union not to interfere in the Congo 439.

It has been stated that the President had expressed his "great shock" at the death of Lumumba. This was probably done to soften the attitudes of Afro-Asian militant states, who had been accusing the United States for its complicity in the murder of Lumumba. The President also recalled Ambassador Timberlake to the United States for consultations on the Congo problem. Timberlake spent more than an hour in this regard with the President on 4 February 1961. Later on he appeared before the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee as well as the House Foreign Affairs Committee with his testimony on the Congo problem. President probably felt relieved when Tshombe cancelled his proposed visit to the United States on the ground that his presence would not be opportune. The Kennedy Administration, at this point favoured a federal government for the Congo consisting of all Congolese factions. Thus, Tshombe's visit, would have embarrassed the new Administration.

In the meanwhile the Congo was faced with severe shortages of food which threatened to a famine. To meet the crisis, the US government decided to send 500 tons of corn meal and 500 tons of corn, 10,000 tons of rice and 2000 tons of dried milk under P.L. 480 Title II scheme. It also decided to airlift 1000 tons of food, seeds and hospital supplies from a number of African countries to the Congo.

An editorial of the New York Times during this period pointed out that efforts were underway to bring together various contending Congolese leaders to a new government, as well as a move by Kasavubu to call a Round Table Conference of Congolese leaders scheduled for 25 January 1961. A third move by the Casablanche group advocated

440. See Weissman, n.29, p.140. See also New York Times, 29 January 1961, p.3.
for enunciating an African "Monroe Doctrine" to be enforced by a Pan-African forces with the UN support.\(^445\)

According to Weissman a debate was ensued within the US Administration revolving round the two approaches, namely Stevenson-Bowles-Williams approach advocating "neutral" Congo, a coalition government to include Lumumba or the Lumumbaists and the reconvening of the parliament and the European Bureau-Pentagon-Timberlake approach which called for a "pro-western" central government to exclude the Lumumba or the Lumumbaists.\(^446\) In fact, according to Weissman, Williams and Timberlake had clashed at a Senatorial Committee hearing over Administration's proposed efforts to get the release of Lumumba and for the formation of Central Government. Williams had been provoked on that occasion to characterized the statement of Timberlake as "disloyal".\(^447\)

But according to the New York Times Senators J.W. Fulbright, Frank Church and George D. Aiken (Republican, Vermont) had backed Timberlake during hearing by stating that "it would be dangerous" to have a coalition government with Lumumba.\(^448\)

The US Administration, according to Weissman, was also divided over inclusion of Lumumba into the Central Government when the National Security Council met on 9 February 1961.\(^449\)

---

446. See Weissman, n.29, pp.130-139.
447. Ibid, p.140.
449. Ibid.
The Lumumba problem was, however, settled for the time being by his death in Katanga. But the Soviet Union and the radical African States reacted violently by announcing a "war of liberation" in support of Gizenga. On 15 February 1961 President Kennedy responded to this challenge by issuing a staff warning to them not to restart such dangerous and irresponsible steps. Secretary of State Dean Rusk added that President's warning also applied to states like UAR. The Administration was however divided on the future set up for the Congo. For instance, while Kennedy advocated for "federalism", Rusk had a preference for a "national government" and that Williams backed a "Confederate" Plan. The lack of consensus in the Administration was confirmed later by the testimony of Harlan Cleveland before the Sub Committee on International Organization, where he stated "We want the Congo to develop into a stable and viable country with a broad based government, with a loose enough government to take into account the tribal and regional variation and free of unilateral outside intervention." At the same time a "Contingency Plan" was drawn up by the Defence Department to prevent the Soviet Union from providing military supplies to the Gizenga Government. The

450. Department of State Bulletin, 6 March 1961, pp. 321-323 and New York Times, 17 February 1961, p. 3. The President made it clear that "he was not going to allow the communization of the Congo, even if he was to intervene militarily to stop it", See New York Times, 16 February, p. 20.


453. UN operations in the Congo, Hearings, n. 231, p. 7.
New York Times reported that five US naval ships operating in the vicinity of the Gulf of Guinea "on a good will visit of African ports" were alerted for a possible "emergency" role in the Congo. The US also made calculations as to the cost of a combined air and navy" limited war", and asked Sudan to resist utilization of its air port at Khartoum to be used as a refuelling base for flights coming from Egypt and Stanleyville and that helicopters were provided by the US to Sudan to patrol its roads near the Congo border used by the Soviet Union to provide military supplies to Gizenga.

Assistant Secretary Williams was asked by the President to fly to Leopoldville and Khartoum for a discussion on this subject with the Sudanese Government, Kasavubu, Dayal and possibly Tshombe while the State Department undertook a thorough reappraisal of the US Congo policy in the light of Gizenga threat. A meeting in this regard was attended to by Dean Rusk, Herlan Cleveland, Williams, James K. Penfield Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary and Ambassador Timberlake.

It may be stated that the efforts by the UN Conciliation Commission as well as by Kasavubu had resulted in a summit meeting of all Congolese leaders (except Gizenga) at Tananarive, the capital of Malagasy Republic on 6-12 March 1961. The participants at Tananarive (including Tshombe) agreed to a "Confederation "plan. But at a subsequent meeting of these members held at Coquilhatville (April 24-May 28, 1961) it was decided to adopt a federal plan (a meeting

which was again not attended to by Gizenga). The Coquilhatville meeting was, however, controversial with the refusal of Tshombe to accept the federal plan and of his dramatic arrest by the Central Government. The arrest provoked sharp criticisms by the members of the Congress and especially from Representative Edward J. Derwinkey (Republican, Illinois) and Senators Richard B. Russell (Democrat, Georgia) Styles Bridges (Republican New Hampshire) who characterized it as "improper" "treacherous" and in consistent with accepted sense of "fair play". The matter, was ultimately brought to a close by the UN intervention with Tshombe making a promise that he would get the approval of the Katanga legislature to the federal plan.

The domestic efforts as well as outside pressures resulted in the reconvening of the Congolese parliament by Kasavubu. The delegates from Katanga, Equateur, South Kasai and Leopoldville provinces assembled at Louvanium University, twenty miles from Leopoldville on 27 July 1961. The parliamentary sessions continued till 2 August 1961 behind locked doors, ringed by barbed wires and under the heavy guard of UN troops. Out of 221 delegates of the erstwhile Congolese parliament, 200 delegates comprising either the supporters of moderate forces of Kasavubu or the radical forces of Gizenga attended the parliament.

456. For details see Walters, n.91, p.139.
458. See Williams, Africa for the Africans, n.27, p.96.
It is stated by Weissman that on July 24-25, 1961 the first votes were taken at Louvanium. It was found out that the Lumumba alliance had captured thirteen out of fourteen legislative offices for which the voting had taken place. However the close voting margin of successful Lumumbaist candidates indicated that the entry of Katangan delegates was desperately required to ensure a victory for the moderates as Prime Minister at a subsequent election. On 28 July 1961 the State Department summoned Michael Struelens the head of the Katanga Information Service in the United State to use his good offices to impress upon Tshombe the necessity of sending his delegates immediately to Louvanium to help in the formation of a moderate government because it was feared that Gizenga might emerge as the Prime Minister there. According to Weissman, the efforts made by Struelens as well as by Kasavubu-Mobutu forces ultimately resulted in Tshombe allowing his delegates to move to Louvanium on 3 August 1961. But by then the crucial issue of leadership in the Congo had been settled with Cyrille Adoula, the pro-American having received the parliamentary mandate to become the Prime Minister and with Gizenga having agreed to serve in Adoula government as one of the three Deputy Prime Ministers. The New York Times reporting on Adoula's election stated that Cyrille Adoula, a socialist labor with strong anti-communist views was appointed as Prime Minister-Designate. At the same time Adoula's election

459. See Weissman, n.29, p.150.
by a landslide vote, caused "surprise" in the Congolese and some foreign circles because most of them had thought that Adoula "would win only by a narrow margin". Since the initial voting pattern had showed a slight edge for the Lumumba Coalition, the interference by foreign governments in ensuring the victory for Adoula is anticipated.

Analyzing the cause of landslide victory for Adoula, Weissman pointed out that "hampered by factionalism, bribed by Khiary and fearful of another Mobutu coup" prompted Lumumbaist coalition deputies to modify their initial attitudes and to acknowledge Adoula as their Prime Minister and to accept a compromise formula by which half of the Ministerial positions in Adoula Cabinet would be occupied by the members of the Lumumba alliance. Also as stated in the New York Times, "money and shinny" American automobiles, furnished through the logistic wizardry of Langley [CIA] are said to have been the deciding factors in the vote that brought Mr. Adoula to power. Senator Thomas J. Dodd conceded in a statement in the Congress that "during the period preceding the Louvanium Conference and even during the conference itself, there was considerable jockeying for influence by the UN, by ourselves, and by the Afro-Asians and Soviet agents. In fact, Americans had outbid the Russians, Ghanaians, Checzs and Egyptians in maneuvering the election of his cabinet.

461. Ibid, 3 August 1961, p.3.
462. See Weissman, n.29, p.150.
The Government of National Reconciliation

On 2 August 1961 Cyrille Adoula, the Senator from Leopoldville province was elected by the Louvanium Parliament as the Prime Minister of a new Government to be headed by President Kasavubu called the "Government of National Reconciliation". Adoula remained as Premier till July 1964, when Moïse Tshombe, the controversial and the enigmatic leader of Katanga succeeded him. A former bank clerk and a trade union leader, Adoula became Prime Minister at the age of thirty nine. He was characterized by Williams as "a firm articulate anti-communist".465.

As the Prime Minister Adoula had to confront with the unenviable task of trying to bring together all the opposing Congolese political factions to a national consensus as well as to prevent the civil strife and the economic disasters from overwhelming the country.

Adoula was by temperament friendly and amiable. But he had neither the charisma of Lumumba nor the strong political or tribal base to back him like Kasavubu or Tshombe. He merely thrived on by making compromises with the radical and the moderate members of his cabinet. Adoula started his political career like Mobutu with Patrice Lumumba in 1958. But at the time of independence, he had made break with his former leader by joining the party of Jean Bolikango. In

465. See Williams, Africa for the Africans n.27, p.96.
Western circles Adoula had been described as a "moderate socialist", a "capable and tough administrator"466 and in the US Congress circles, he was described as a "neutralist", "a recognised friend of America" and as an "out spoken anti-clerical socialist"467. For the liberals in the Kennedy Administration, he was an ideal choice to lead the Congo because of his trade Union's affiliation with the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFLCIO) financed International Confederation of Free Trade Union (ICFTU)468. Ambassador Timberlake had described him as an "intelligent and well-balanced moderate", "a strong anti-communist" and the "best prospect" for the top leadership in the Congo469.

Adoula's cabinet consisting of forty four members belonged to a coalition of radical Lumumbaists as well as the moderates. Prominent members of the Lumumbaist coalition were Deputy Prime Ministers, Antoine Gizenga and Jason Sendwe (who had lost to Tshombe in Katanga Presidential election), Christophe Gbenye (Minister, Interior), Remy Mwambe (Minister, Justice), Marcel Bisukiro (Minister, Commerce). The moderate members were former Prime Minister Joseph Illoe (Minister, Information) and Justin Bomboko (Minister, Foreign Affairs). Egide Roche Davison, a Lumumbaist was also chosen as the

466. See Congressional Record, Vol.107, p.20195.
468. See Weissman, n.29, p.205.
469. Ibid, p.106.
Chief Administrator for Katanga. While the Lumumbaists were given key positions in the cabinet, but Joseph Mobutu continued as the Chief of Staff. The claim of General Victor Lundula, a Lumumbaist was ignored probably under Western pressures.

On 5 August 1961 Gizenga sent message from Stanleyville that he would be joining his new assignment as Deputy Prime Minister soon. In fact, he came down to Leopoldville to accompany Adoula to the Belgrade non-aligned Conference in September 1961. On his return from the Conference, however, Gizenga sought permission to go back to Stanleyville to collect his belongings, but instead of coming back to resume his duties he stayed on there to organize resistance against the Central Government. In the meantime the Lumumbaist members of Adoula cabinet under the leadership of Christophe Gbenye were expressing their dissatisfaction over the "lack of sincerity" and "vascillation" of Gizenga in not coming back to Leopoldville. Soon after a series of military engagements took place between the national Congolese army and the Gizenga's forces. It resulted in the defeat and imprisonment of Gizenga on 16 January 1962, thus, bringing to an end his secessionist attempts in Orientale province.

The installation of Adoula Government was received with mixed feelings in the United States. Whereas the Administration had taken the lead to voice enthusiasm on the
election of Adoula, dominant voices within the Congress did not share such views. For instance, Senators Thomas J. Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut), Frank J. Lausche (Democrat, Ohio), attacked the Administration for throwing full support behind the Communist-studded Central Government of Adoula. For instance, Dodd pointed out that a communist-inspired government was to be weighed not numerically but in terms of the positions assigned to the communist members and their supporters, in the Government. The UN, according to Dodd, paved the way for a communist take-over with the installation of Adoula Coalition Government. Dodd and other Senators in particular were highly critical of statements made by Adoula at Belgrade his socialist leanings and of the fact that he had assigned important portfolios to Gizenga and other important Lumumbaites in his cabinet. In the House, Representative Donald C. Bruce (Republican, Indiana), John M. Ashbrook (Republican, Ohio), John B. Williams (Democrat, Missouri) also issued statements expressing agreements with the views of Senator Dodd concerning the threat of Communist-dominated Central Government.

The support Adoula Government in the Congress was reflected in the statements made by Senators Frank Church

Both the Senators challenged Dodd's analysis concerning the activities of some left-leaning members of Adoula government and spoke enthusiastically in support of Adoula government. The views of Senators Church and Humphrey were also endorsed by Representative Charles C Diggs (Democrat, Michigan) as well as by other Senators namely Jacob Javits, (Republican, New York) and Mike Mansfield, (Democrat, Montana).

Adoula's coalition government suffered from internal tensions and squabbles. For instance the relationship between Victor Nendaka (Chief Surote) with the Interior Minister Christophe Gbénye continued to remain bitter possibly because of attempts by Gbénye to organize a private intelligence squad and a security force under him for making surveillance on the activities of his political opponents. The Lumumbaist forces felt the need to spread the nationalist ideals of Lumumba in the villages in order to build political bases of support for themselves. These activities, might have come into sharp conflict with the regional-minded moderates as well as with Adoula, who was seeking to project his image as the only nationally-recognized leader. Since the US government was interested in the easing out of Lumumbaists and other radical leaders, in the Cabinet, probably under its pressures, Adoula made the decision to make a crackdown on thirteen left-leaning Lumumbaist Ministers including Gbénye.

---

sought to consolidate his position by employing force against radicals and his political opponents. In order to keep Gbenye out of the Congolese scene, the US government arranged a scholarship for his study in the United States. Also probably with the help of the CIA money, the parliamentary majority for Adoula was ensured from time to time in the form of reimbursing the bills of Congolese parliamentarians loyal to Adoula. In fact American economic, military and political support were crucial factors by which the Adoula regime was able to survive in the face of mounting internal dissensions.

The United Nations Initiatives in the Congo.

It has been stated that the task of nation-building in the Congo had become complicated with the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the emergence of four power centres, as well as the presence of Belgian troops and "assorted white mercenaries" recruited from Belgium, Rhodesia and South Africa. The UN, in this background took its first step in the Security Council by adopting a new resolution which defined the objectives of the UN as well as made provisions for the use of armed forces if necessary, to accomplish its objectives. The Kennedy Administration supported the UN resolution warmly. The first part of the resolution in

475. For details See Weissman, n.29, pp.195-207.
sub-point(1) urged the United Nations to "take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort". The resolution also called for the "withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign Belgian military personnel serving under the UN command". The US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson reacting to the resolution stated that there was the need to avert extension of civil war and to the development of long-range steps to ensure the stability of the Congolese government. Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary answering questions in the International Organization Sub-Committee hearings on the Congo stated that "what I am driving at is this... until we stop flirting with the Belgians, we are not going to have peace in the Congo".

In the Meanwhile Conor Cruise O'Brien, an Irish national joined as the Chief of UN operations in Katanga. O'Brien after reviewing the Katanga situation discovered that some delegates (ten in number) belonging to Tshombe's CONAKAT party had reached Leopoldville for participating in the Congolese parliament, but curiously enough, they were


478. UN Operations in the Congo, Hearings n.231, p.16.
almost sitting on the fence by not joining the coalition government as expected on the pretext that they did not have the mandate to do so. It was also distressing to note according to O'Brien, that Tshombe continued to issue his own currency and to prohibit the hoisting of the Congolese national flag over his territory. At the same time O'Brien pointed out, that Gizenga in Stanleyville had put a condition that "Adoula should take action against Katanga", in order to join the national government.479

On 27 August 1962 O'Brien acted under the UN instructions to impound a plane flying regularly between Cairo and Stanleyville. On the next day O'Brien started his operation called "Rumpunch" in evacuating all the Belgian soldiers and officers who were found in the past to be notoriously involved in thwarting the process of Katangan reintegration. This exercise was undertaken with all seriousness prior to the more complicated move to disarm the Katangese gendarme. O'Brien was able to ease out in this process about half of such notorious soldiers and officers.480 But his action prompted huge uproar in British and Belgian Circles. O'Brien was asked to desist from such activities, since the situation was "likely to exacerbate tension between the UN troops and the Belgians".481 In fact, these warnings were to prove prophetic, as fighting broke out between the

479. See Hoskyns, n.22, p.400.
480. See O'Brien, n.312, p.263.
481. Ibid.
UN forces and the Belgian mercenary troops in early September. This military engagement called the "Round One" occurred between September 13-20, 1961. Since the fight continued unabated, Tshombe quietly escaped himself to Rhodesia.

With Tshombe's departure for Rhodesia, a storm of criticism greeted the UN by the British, French, Belgian and other NATO powers on the ground that it had provoked a "crisis" in Katanga. These criticisms prompted Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to undertake a trip to Katanga in order to review the situation as well as to soften the feelings of NATO countries aroused against O'Brien. But unfortunately enough, Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash while travelling to Ndola in Rhodesia to discuss matters with Tshombe. His tragic death brought to an end temporarily the violence which had erupted between the Katangan and UN forces during Round One. Mohammed Khiary, Chief of Civil Operations in the Congo travelled up to Ndola on 30 September 1961 to sign the cease-fire agreement with Tshombe. But before terminating their operation, the UN forces had consolidated their position on the airport and other strategic points lying on the outskirts of Katanga's capital Elisabethville.

---


483. See O'Brien, n.312, p.216.
The Department of State which was initially "startled" at the fighting as well as the strong words of denunciation voiced by the NATO powers against the UN, however, came out openly in support of the UN action. Also the Secretary General was quietly informed by both Kennedy and Rusk that they were "extremely upset", because there had been no consultations between the UN and the US government prior to "Round One". The United States however welcomed efforts by Hammarskjold towards a cease fire and negotiation and stated that the "effective presence of the UN in all sections of the Congo would be conducive to the peaceful process of reconciliation". Speaking at a reception hosted by the American Association for the United Nations to the US delegation for the Sixteenth General Assembly at Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York, Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that the "UN operation would go down in history to the credit of the UN". Harlan Cleveland, speaking on the same occasion hailed the UN action as "the most dramatic illustration of the UN power for peace". Assistant Secretary Williams stated later that the US recognized the importance of the UN operation "seeing through to a successful conclusion".

The United States displayed its strong support for the UN by providing four of its transport planes at the disposal of UN command for movement of troops and equipments inside the Congo. The State Department also cancelled the visa of Michael Struelens, the Chief of Katanga lobby in the United States. On 24 November 1961, the Security Council with the strong US backing had condemned the Katanga secession and had decided to expand the UN force mandate to include the use of force if necessary for "the immediate apprehension, legal action and detention pending deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisors not working under the UN Command." Also during this period Ambassador Edmund Gullion had flown himself to the United States in order to attend to his wife's illness. The recommendation of the Ambassador, according to the New York Times, was that unless Katanga's secession ended, a strong Central Government under Adoula, which was well disposed to wards the United States, might fail. Gullion, according to Weissman, reportedly told Kennedy that Tshombe's anti-communism was a "stunt" intended exclusively for the American constituency which supported him. Tshombe's regime in reality was "superficial", being "sustained by mercenaries and Europeans", Gullion is reported to have stated.

491. See Weissman, n.29, p.163.
The Congressional reactions to Round one and the subsequent attempts by the United States to strengthen the UN efforts were mixed. Once again, Senators Dodd and Lausche with Representative Bruce as their ally, spoke bitterly of the Katanga policy by the Administration and Senators Humphrey and Church defending the US government. Attacking the UN policy in Katanga, Senator Dodd stated on 16 September 1961 that "the UN has taken measures to undermine and destroy the Government of Moise Tshombe of Katanga, the most solid bulwark against communism in the Congo and indeed in Central Africa." Senate Lausche reacting to UN operation stated that instead of bringing peace to the Congo as a "catalyst", the UN had caused unending troubles. Speaking later, Dodd characterized the UN action as "arbitrary" and wondered how the State Department had become a party to the "disgraceful" and "disastrous" action against the Katanga Government. Representative Bruce was of the view that the UN force was indeed attempting "to crush the independent state of Katanga led by the pro-Western, Christian Tshombe." He urged the US government not to take "further part in trying to coerce Katanga into a Congolaise union". Representative John M. Ashbrooke (Republican, Ohio) pointed out that the UN action amounted "to an aggression against the free province of Katanga."

492. See Congressional Record, Vol. 107, p. 18758.
494. Ibid, p. 19075 and 19877.
495. For details see Ibid, p. 19183, p. A 7660.
496. Ibid, p. 20572.
Senator Frank Church defending Administration's position stated that Tshombe was merely an "opportunist" whose interest was merely to remain in power by dividing the Congo. Giving an illustration of his "opportunism", Senator Church pointed out that only a week ago the so called "anti-communist" Tshombe had threatened to go for support to the Soviet bloc countries. Senator Humphrey sharing the views of Church, defended UN actions during "Round One".497

In the meantime U Thant from Burma had became the new Secretary General. Armed with the Security Council Resolution of 24 November 1961, Thant authorized the UN to move into the Katanga for the second time in early December. This led to a large scale lighting between UN troops and Katanga forces because U Thant had ordered that both ground and air action be undertaken to end the Katanga revolt. In response to this UN action, Tshombe vowed that "his people would make the necessary sacrifice" to defend their province.498 Thus, a series of military engagements took place between December 5-19, 1961 which has been described as "Round Two".

The UN Chief Representative in Katanga, C.C. O'Brien once again masterminded the UN attack. According to O'Brien, as soon as he began pressing for removal of the mercenaries as the step towards the reintegration of Katanga, he found out

497. Ibid, p.20196.
that he was being exposed to mounting criticisms in Belgium, Britain and France. He also noted that an active "hate campaign" had been launched against him by Tshombe with heavy support received from Britain and France. Brigadier K.A.S. Raja, the Indian general, leading the UN operation sought to pacify Elisabethville and went ahead with the task of disarming the Katanga gendarmes and the mercenaries. During this operation, the UN became increasingly dependent upon US support due to total hostility displayed by the allies of the US towards "Round Two" and the military weakness of UN supporters, namely the Afro-Asian neutrals. However, the UN acted firmly and by 15 December 1961, Tshombe was able to realize the futility of continuing the fight in the teeth of successive defeats. At this point Tshombe requested President Kennedy to arrange for a cease fire, and to make provisions for his safe conduct to a place so that he could negotiate with Adoula. The UN, however did not accept the cease fire proposal of Tshombe but decided to suspend the attack temporarily unless Katanga retaliated with further offensives. President Kennedy asked his Ambassador Edmund Gullion to travel with Tshombe upto Kitona in Congo and to initiate discussions between Tshombe and Adoula. The UN team comprising of Ralph Bunche, Robert Gardiner, Mohammed Khiari and George Dumontet, accompanied Adoula to Kitona. The talk began on 19 December 1961 and on 21 December 1961.

after a series of tough negotiations between the two parties, an eight point Kitona declaration was signed.

The Kitona agreement provided the following provisions: application of the Loi Fundamentals to Katanga, recognition of Kasavubu as the Head of State, agreement of Katanga to participate in the Governmental Commission, participation of Katanga deputies in the Assembly at Leopoldville, integration of Katangese gendarme, a pledge by Moise Tshombe to respect the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. After signing the agreement, Tshombe informed Bunche of his inability to make the agreement binding upon Katanga since he did not have the mandate of his assembly to act on its behalf. Tshombe returned to Elisabethville with the pact and produced it before his cabinet which took the decision that since the agreement had been imposed on Tshombe, it had to be placed before Assembly for ratification. Tshombe in the meanwhile had accused the United States for having attempted to control the negotiations. For instance, Tshombe stated that "every time he and Adoula were near an agreement, Adoula would go off and talk with Edmund Gullion and then

come back". In view of such expression displaying Tshombe's lack of enthusiasm it was but natural that the Katanga provincial assembly repudiated the agreement. The attitude of Tshombe seemed to indicate that he was not genuinely interested in reaching an agreement with Adoula at that stage and was merely "stalling matter for time".

As in the case of Round One, the United States once again provided firm support for the UN efforts during Round Two, despite mounting pressures from its allies. President Kennedy, for instance, instructed Secretary Rusk, who had come under powerful pressures at the NATO Foreign Ministers' Conference in Paris, "not to yield to any NATO Council motion calling for a Katanga cease fire". The United States decided also to provide twenty-one additional large transport planes for the UN operation. The news, however sparked off bitter protest from Tshombe and a statement that Katanga would "resist until death, the inhuman aggression of UN forces in collaboration with the American army".

The US Government persuaded the British Government with difficulty to agree to supply UN forces with twenty-four 1000 pound bombs for use by Indian Canberra bombers against Katanga's forces, which was achieved in the teeth of strong protest by twenty-nine conservative M.P's. urging the British Government to use its influence to put a stop to the UN armed

504. As cited in Pisano, n.202, p.195, See also Weissman, n.29, p.168.
intervention. The United States Air force also provided some F-86 jet fighters to the UN for its possible use in the Katanga operation.

Weissman points out that in early November the US Administration was confronted with the dilemma concerning Katanga after Kennedy's Ambassador Averell Harriman had met Tshombe in Geneva and had been so much impressed with Tshombe that he had urged upon President Kennedy for accommodation with Tshombe. Harriman's views possibly prompted President Kennedy to ask Senator Dodd to use his good offices to persuade Tshombe to go for negotiation with Adoula. Weissman indicated further that British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan had in the meanwhile sent a message to President Kennedy indicating that "the absence of western solidarity on the Congo could only benefit the Soviet Union." According to the New York Times, unless the situation in Katanga was quietly settled, it was feared that there would be wide difference of opinion in the West over Berlin and trade negotiations with the Common Market. These developments appeared to have prompted Kennedy to think in terms of proceeding to the path of negotiation with

508. See Weissman n.29, p.161.
510. As cited in Weissman, n.29, p.168.
Tshombe. But the attitude of Tshombe proved to be the main stumbling block to any move for serious negotiation with him on the Katanga question.

The US support for the UN during Round Two and after the Kitona Accord was reflected in a number of statements made by high US officials. For instance, Assistant Secretary Williams stated that "the US policy seeks the alignment of Katanga's strength and resources along side those forces in the rest of Congo, which are anxious to build a thoroughly independent nation secure from internal subversion and outside intervention. The Kitona agreement provides for such a result." George W. Ball, Under Secretary reaffirming US backing for the UN efforts stated that "if Katanga is not peacefully integrated, the Congo will face civil war and anarchy and be open to communist penetration" opposing a ceasefire" until specified limited objectives" had been achieved, Ball added, "there simply is no legal case, no political case, no economic case, and no moral case for Balkanizing the heart of Africa." Delivering a lengthy justification of the US Congo Policy in course of a speech at Los Angeles on 20 December 1961, Ball indicated dangers inherent in the continuance of Katanga as an independent entity. He stated "If Prime Minister Adoula

should prove unable to deal with the Katanga secession, militant and extremists... would bid to take over the Central Government in the name of Congolese unity... If the Congo is to be a nation, it can hardly permit provincial leaders to break off pieces of the country". Referring to the US response to the Katanga operation, Ball pointed out that "the prompt action of UN was made possible partly by our diplomatic support, our military air lift and our financial contribution". The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the meantime had met in an executive session on the wake of mounting criticisms on US-Congo policy. Secretary Rusk appearing before the Committee not only defended the US policy in respect of the UN operations but also made a spirited defence of the speech made by Ball at Los Angeles.

The New York Times in two editorials expressed its views on the UN operation. For instance, on 12 December 1961 in an editorial it urged upon Tshombe to realise that "his own regime within a Congo federation is necessary to the Congo's stability as a balance against the left-wing Gizenga forces" and that "a break up of the Congo could lead only to violence, chaos and anarchy". In another editorial on 22 December, 1961 on the Kitona agreement, the paper lauded the effort as "a striking success for the UN and a justification for its intervention". The paper stated that

the agreement "appears promising enough to pull the rug from under the American and European critics of the UN use of force to preserve peace"517a.

The Kitona agreement, thus, marks a great milestone in US/UN initiatives on the crucial issue of reintegration of Katanga. The main story of the reintegration, however, will be dealt with in the next chapter.