The year 1960 is frequently referred to as the "Year of Africa," the year that marked the emergence into independence of seventeen states in Black Africa, including the Republic of Congo. The process of decolonization in Africa started in 1957 with Ghana, becoming independent. The emergence of Ghana provided a significant impetus to the momentum in the direction of decolonization in Africa. During the year 1960 Africa also hit the headlines due to developments in the Congo, which erupted into a crisis of international magnitude.

Kwame Nkrumah, the Prime Minister of Ghana was the most articulate advocate of African liberation. Nkrumah began his political career first in the United States, while studying at the University of Pennsylvania. He received his political training by coming into contact with the organizations interested in Africa such as the Council on African Affairs, the Committee on Africa, the Committee on War and Peace Aims, the Committee on African Students, the National...
Association for the Advancement of the Coloured People (NAACP) and the Urban League. After staying in the United States for over ten years Nkrumah went to London to study Law and Philosophy at the London School of Economics. But he soon became involved in the organization of the Fifth Pan-African Congress scheduled at Manchester in October 1945. Subsequently Nkrumah became the Secretary General of an organization called the West African National Secretariat and in that capacity visited Paris to meet African members of the French National Assembly to plan for a coordinated approach to launch an all-out war in Africa against European colonial masters. In 1947, he returned to his own country, then called the Gold Coast, to spearhead the movement for its independence, and eventually succeeded in leading his country to independence in 1957.

As the champion and the most articulate advocate of African liberation, Nkrumah had sought to speed up the process of decolonization in Africa by hosting two international conferences in his own country in 1950. These conferences were namely, the Conference of the Independent African States and the All African People's Congress. These conferences were significant in the context of decolonization in Africa, as they were attended to by a large number of African leaders belonging to both the independent African

69. Ibid.
states as well as the areas lying under colonial subjugation. This, therefore, makes Professor Vernon Mckay, the eminent Africanist to remark that, "the year 1958, marks a turning point in Africa's international relations and a subsequent shift in American policy toward Africa". It is appropriate to mention in this context that a dramatic increase in the number of independent African states occurred in the 1950's. For instance in 1950, whereas there were only four independent states in Africa, by the end of 1960 this number had swelled to a remarkable figure of twentyseven.

American interests in Africa prior to the Second World War was minimal and was restricted to limited diplomatic and governmental contacts between the African states and the United States, the activities of American missionaries, and the historical concern of the Afro-Americans towards the continent of their racial origin. The United States could not develop an integrated policy towards the countries of Africa, as it had to deal directly with the European metropoles who governed Africa. The United States, however, developed some limited diplomatic and commercial contacts with some African countries. For instance, in 1786 Morocco recognized the establishment of the American Republic, which had forfeited the protection of the British fleet for its trade and commerce and that it had been subjected to harsh

treatment at the hands of pirates around the seas off North Africa. To remedy the situation, the United States had established American Consulates in North African countries such as at Algiers (1972), Tripoli and Tunis (1795), Tangiers (1797). In 1799 the United States had also established a trading post at Cape Town in South Africa and had followed this by opening trade and consular positions in Angola and Mozambique (1853), Liberia (1863), the Belgian Congo (1884), Ethiopia (1903), Nigeria (1906), Kenya (1918). The United States also operated a consulate in Zanzibar from 1837 to 1915 to serve as a port for supplies as well as to facilitate the movement of American ships in the Indian Ocean. Thus, the United States had maintained only limited diplomatic relations with Africa from its independence till the outbreak of the Second World War.

The people of African origin in the United States constituted over ten per cent of its total population. In course of years the Afro Americans had made quests as to the origins of their dual identity. In the process they had been described variously as, "Africans" "Black" "Negro", "Coloured" and "the Afro-American". They also suffered from the fact of their "powerlessness" in American society. Though racially they constituted as the single largest minority community

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71. For details see Williams, Africa for the Africans, n.27, pp.162-163.
in the United States, very few Afro-Americans occupied positions of power and influence in American society\textsuperscript{72}.

Historically, the Afro-Americans had demonstrated keen interest and concern for Africa which had been reflected in various forms. First of all, there ensued in the United States a debate among the enlightened Afro-Americans in the nineteenth century on the proposal as how to "colonize parts of Africa with free men of colour," and thereby "to resolve their sense of dual identity"\textsuperscript{73}. Secondly, a group of thinkers in the United States had advocated the doctrine of "providential design" which pointed out that "God in his wisdom had permitted a number of Africans to be enslaved so that they might be brought to the New World to be christia-nized and civilized". Once having received the blessings of the New World, these "Africans would then return to Africa to redeem Africa". The doctrine of providential design had influenced the African Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Negro Baptist Church to launch their missionary movements and activities in Africa\textsuperscript{74}. A third movement described as the Hampton-Tuskegee approach, sought to bring about a more constructive and pragmatic relationship between the Africans and the Afro-Americans, through a program of practical education, christian ethics and accommodative

\textsuperscript{72} Bedi G. Foster, "The United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: An Afro-American Perspective", \textit{Issue} (Waltham, Massachusetts), Vol.2, no.2, p.45.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, p.47.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
race relations. It was argued by the proponents of Hampton-Tuskegee School like Booker T. Washington that since such an approach had smoothened the problems of enslaved slaves in the United States following the Civil War, it could be experimented in Africa. Fourthly in the latter part of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century, the doctrine of "pan-Africanism" had been espoused by a section of Afro-Americans, who while stressing on Black solidarity and ultimate independence of African states, had put emphasis on development of trade between Africans and Afro-Americans in the New World as well as for mutual cooperations in combating racial discrimination and the denigration of the African heritage. The father of the movement was the Black intellectual, Dr. William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, who not only had emphasised on the need to form associations for the study of negro life and culture but also had advanced proposals for pan-African conferences. The Blacks in America were divided between the adherents of the Tuskegee and Du Bois Schools. Whereas Du Bois had advocated for a militant approach through statements like that "the problems of the twentieth century would be the problem on the colour line", Booker T. Washington, a proponent of the Tuskegee approach, had put emphasis on the other hand.

75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
on an African exchange program. In fact, Washington at the behest of German Government had sent to Togoland in 1900 a team of Tuskegee graduates to teach the process of growing cotton. Washington also had volunteered to provide American teachers and other types of technical assistance to African countries, if they so required. The work of Washington had been taken up after his death by the Phelp-Stokes Fund of New York. Finally, during the 1920's Marcus Garvey had founded one of the most ambitious, as well as expansive network to synthesise the aspirations and futures of Afro-Americans with those of Africa through an agency called the Universal Negro Improvement Association. This movement, which had called for a large scale Afro-American emigration to Africa, had aroused and inspired a strong sense of commitment and concern among the Black Americans for Africa. Thus, the historical patterns of providential design, the civilization of Africa, the Tuskegee, Garvey and Pan African approaches, constituted the Afro-American perspectives on Africa prior to the commencement of the Second World War.

It was during the Second World War that the strategic importance of Africa and especially that of North Africa was realized for the first time by the American military planners. As a result, the United States had decided to open a post in 1940 at Dakar, the capital of Senegal in French West Africa, to operate as the port of

78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
entry for war-time trans Atlantic shipping and air transport. During the war, Dakar not only offered itself as an excellent American command over the South Atlantic shipping lanes, but also had provided as the nearest spot for the Allied powers from which an invasion on German troops in Africa had been launched. Also American trading posts in Africa had served the wartime interests of the allies by providing them with informations on political, economic and military situation in Africa. The United States continued to maintain the military facilities in North Africa after the Second World War.

Following the World War-II, the American policy-makers did not regard Africa South of Sahara, as a "priority area" for the United States. These areas were regarded as the "responsibility" and the "preserve" of European colonial rulers, who, were the allies of the United States in the cold war against the Soviet Union. Naturally, therefore, the United States did not intend to intrude into their sphere of influence in Africa. The factors which brought about a change in American attitude were, the cold war, the process of decolonization, strategic interests, the need for access to raw materials, prevention of extension of Soviet influence, and building of economic, political and cultural relations which aimed at inducing the African countries to remain...

80. Walter Goldschmidt, ed. The United States and Africa (New York, 1963), revd. edn. pp.5-6. See also Williams, Africa for the Africans, n.27, p.163.
 oriented towards the West in general and to the United States in particular.

The cold war situation had prompted the American policy-makers to think pragmatically in terms of the advantages which a friendly Africa offered to the United States as against the liabilities it would suffer if the African countries were taken into the Soviet sphere of influence. Already the American policy-makers had been seriously concerned over the fact of the Syrian, Egyptian and Iraqi fraternization with the Soviet Union, which had given the latter a clear edge over the United States in the Cold War struggle in the Middle East. As the leader of the "Free World" Coalition, the United States, had sought to resist further extension of Soviet influence from the Middle East to infiltrate into Black Africa.

It has been stated earlier that the process of decolonization had brought about dramatic changes in Africa. But American policy-makers, as a whole, had ignored it and had regarded Africa as the colonial "preserve" of European powers. A powerful section in the United States was, however, unwilling to envisage or endorse the continuance of European


82. Goldschmidt, n.80, pp.5-6.
control over vast areas in Africa for a prolonged period. The American Corporations, for instance, were aware of the opportunities that might open up for them if colonial ties were dissolved and the privileged positions of their European competitors removed. Equal access to American economic interests could not be made available to them so long as the European masters controlled the doors of opportunities in Africa.

The strategic and military importance of Africa barring North Africa is not significant. North Africa has strategic importance for Europe due to its geographic proximity with the Strait of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Since it forms the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO), the United States could not remain indifferent to the fact that the area would fall a prey to hostile control and domination.

According to Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, the military importance of Africa from the United States point of view was two fold. First of all, the West Africa, which forms the "closest jumping-off place" is the shortest route for the military attack upon the Western hemisphere in the route

83. See L.N. Misra, The United States and Ghana's Volta River Project A Study in Foreign Aid Diplomacy, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1975, p.3.
from Senegal to Brazil. Therefore, West Africa in hostile control could constitute as "the most direct physical threat to the integrity of the Western hemisphere". Secondly, the safety and security of the shipping lanes around the coasts of Africa, connecting Europe and Asia were of vital significance to the Western World, since the hostile control of the African coast line and of the Mediterranean "might sever seaborne communications between Europe and Asia". The closing of the Suez Canal in 1956 had demonstrated need for friendly African ports along, the Cape of Good Hope route, Mrs Frances P. Bolton, the Republican Congress Woman from Ohio in her Report of the Study Mission to Africa in 1955 had pointed out the importance of jet fields in Morocco, Libya and Liberia, the communication facilities in Eretria and Nigeria and of the ports in Africa as vital in case of a war in the Mediterranean. Also as stated by Robert Smith, Africa's airspace as well as port facilities buttressing on the Atlantic, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean can not be disregarded as we seek open access to them.

Africa is richly endowed by nature and for purposes of modern technology, it is an important supplier of rare and vital raw materials, like uranium, cobalt, manganese, rubber and industrial diamonds. To provide some statistics with

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87. Smith, n.84, p.41.
regard to its resources, Africa produces 82 per cent of world's industrial diamond, 64 per cent of cobalt, 32 per cent of chromite, 25 per cent of manganese, 24 per cent of phosphate, 22 per cent of copper, 11 per cent of petroleum. In addition, Africa contains significant quantities of bauxite, tin, asbestos, iron ore, gold, uranium and many other raw materials. Africa supplies to America over half of its imports of "natural gas, industrial diamonds, cobalt, manganese ore, uranium oxide, cocoa and over a third of such other important commodities such as antimony, chromite, platinum group metals, tantalite and coffee". As for the future, the United States would look to Africa for its chromite, platinum group metals, tantalite, petalite, gold, long-fibred amosite and crocidolite asbestos, natural industrial diamond stones and phosphate rock" and to imports in respect of "petroleum products including liquefied natural gas". Thus, Africa contains a major proportion of world's reserves of a few commodities, important from the standpoint of the strategic or economic needs of the United States. And as the cold war progressed, the United States government started the program of stockpiling of essential and critical raw materials which necessitated not only retention of free access to these African resources but also a greater stake in denying to the Soviet Union, an access to these critical raw materials. Also, as the United States was interested in the preservation and economic stability of its European

88. For details see Ibid, pp.40-41.
allies, it became, essential that its allies should have the "continuing ability to make full use of the economic potentials of Africa".89

The United States had no specific political or military objectives in Africa. American interests in Africa were a by-product of the East-West struggle and of its over-all objectives of containment. As a global policy it had prompted the United States to proceed along the two levels of operation viz military as well as ideological. Militarily, the United States had attempted to prevent the Soviet Union from "stepping over the line of military demarcation which had been established at the end of the World War-II". Ideologically, the United States had sought to prevent the Communist ideology from making inroads beyond the Iron Curtain. As applied to Africa, American interest consisted "in the denial of the African continent to military and ideological conquest by the Soviet Union".90

It is appropriate to mention at this point that the general public in the United States had always received a distorted image of Africa through its press: American newspapers, carried occasional reports on Africa. They mostly comprised of sensational articles, borrowed from either the British or the French Journalists working in Africa. These

89. See Morgenthau, n. 85, p. 298.
90. Ibid. p. 297.
reporters had acted mostly as the agents of European colonial powers who sought to perpetrate the image that the Africans were not "decent people" and that they were "unfit" to govern themselves. Curiously enough, the three national newspapers, namely The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor (Boston) and The Washington Post had not posted any regular correspondent in Africa as late as till 1950. Thus, the American public was denied of genuine informations on Africa and was, most easily carried away by sensational reportings as presented by the colonial press.

The major network of relationship between the United States and the African countries were developed through the hard work of American missionaries who had been inspired by the christian spirits to move into Africa. These missionaries had established schools and hospitals in African countries, and had worked as America's roving ambassadors to develop friendly feelings for the United States in African countries. Also important in the context was the existence and contributions of large number of organizations, both public and private, which had maintained their operations in Africa. In 1961 their figure amounted to 600. Out of

92. Ibid.
93. See Smith, n.84, p.42.
that number, 223 were business enterprises, 209 religious groups and 173 were educational philanthropic, civic and other private agencies.

Finally, the lack of American interest in Africa was due to the fact that American economic involvement in Africa, as compared to other parts of the world was minimal. For instance Africa comprised merely four to five per cent of the total overseas American investment and trade in the world. According to an American economist, Andrew Kamrack, "We could get along without African commodities and African markets without an imperceptible ripple in our standard of living."

The Executive Branch and Africa:

Though the constitution of the United States provides for strict separation of powers between the three branches of government, major policies and decisions in the field of foreign policy are arrived at by the interaction of views and forces within its Executive and legislative branches. The role of the Senate is, significant in this regard. But the initiative with regard to formulation and

94. See in this connection, Walters, n.91, p.59.

95. See Williams, Africa for the Africans, n.27, p.178 and also Goldschmidt. n.80, p.6.

execution of American foreign policy options and moves and above all to provide leadership in matters of foreign policy belonged to the Executive Branch of the United States Government. The Executive Branch in the United States with regard to foreign policy is represented by the President and his executive arm, the Department of State. The President is of course, helped in this function by a number of other associates like the White House Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Department, The Agency for International Development (AID), the National Security Council (NSC), The Treasury Department and the Bureau of Budget. The Department of State which handles foreign policy execution for the President, is headed by the Secretary of State. The matters relating to Africa are handled by the Bureau of Africa within the State Department, headed by an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

It has been stated earlier that prior to World War II, American knowledge of Africa was both dismal, and distorted despite the presence of American Blacks and a large number of American organizations, both, private and public which operated in Africa. This was due to the fact, as pointed out earlier, that Africa had been regarded as an appendage of the european colonial powers. Informations concerning each individual country in Africa was channelized through its respective metropole powers and that the United States had maintained limited diplomatic contacts with a very few African States. The lack of knowledge for an
in-depth study of Africa could be established from the fact that as late as in 1960, "there were a total of 12 African Studies Programs in the United States Universities, 18 research projects on Africa and 7 Professors teaching subjects related to Africa". Therefore, the dramatic rise of Africa in American consciousness which came only in the late 1950's and especially after the independence of Ghana in 1957, caught the American foreign policy-makers unawares, since the executive branch had lacked both the required facility as well as substantive expertise on Africa to handle the job of policy-making effectively.

Nevertheless, Africa's war time prominence had prompted the US government to create a small African section in 1943 under the Near Eastern Division of the Department of State. In 1949 the African Section was upgraded to became the Office of African Affairs under a newly created Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asia and African Affairs headed by an Assistant Secretary of State. In 1956 the Near East Bureau was reorganised by the creation of the post of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and with the bifurcation of the territorial jurisdiction of Africa into 2 offices, one for Northern Africa and another for Southern Africa. In 1958, the Bureau of Africa was created in the State Department for the first time to be headed by

97. See Walters, n.91, p.60.
98. Ibid.
an independent Assistant Secretary. Joseph Satterthwaite, a career diplomat was appointed to head the Bureau. For the American policy-makers in the Executive Branch, the task of putting Africa in proper perspective within the range of national priorities had always been difficult, because of the dual and often contradictory commitments that the United States shared with regard to the colonial question. On the one hand, the policy-makers felt committed to the concept of freedom for non-self-governing colonies of Africa. On the other hand the United States was allied with the European colonial powers in a global network for the defence of the "Free World". The United States considered its NATO alliance and its ties with its European allies indispensable for its own security and survival. It was unwilling to challenge the African possessions as long as any such move might weaken or undermine their alliance system and endanger western unity against communist expansionism. The policy-makers tried to steer a course of uttering vague indications of support to African aspirations for freedom and avoiding of actions that might be regarded as inimical to the interest of its NATO allies.

According to Morgenthau, American policy towards Africa prior to 1950 was beset with three dilemmas. The

99. Williams, Africa for the Africans, n.27, p.164.
100. See Walters n.91, p.71.
first dilemma was in respect of all countries of Africa excepting Liberia and Ethiopia with whom the United States had no direct diplomatic access. The United States could approach them only through the intermediary of their metropolitan governments. In other words, the American option was strictly restricted to what the metropolitan governments were "willing to execute them or will allow the American government to do so". The second dilemma for the United States was that most often its interests in Africa were not synonymous with the interests of the metropolitan governments. For instance, on the issue of maintenance of colonial rule there were wide divergence of opinion between them. The final dilemma for the policymakers was in respect of repercussion that might follow if the United States was to adopt bold and dynamic policies on the colonial question. According to Morgenthau, pursuance of such policies might "impair metropolitan control and run counter to metropolitan economic interests" and "create resentment against the United States within the metropolitan nations which may hold the United States responsible for their decline in national power and economic returns"102. Thus, the United States policymakers were confronted with these dilemmas in the 1950's and while trying to steer their course between these multiple scyllas and charybdises their approach naturally did not live upto an ideal standard of perfection.

102. For details see Morgenthau, n.85, pp.298-301.
It was not as though the American policy-makers were completely unaware of the importance of Africa, or that they were willing to give a blank cheque for the continuance of European control over vast areas in Africa. A section in the Executive Branch was critical of the ambivalent course adopted by the US Administration and had advocated for a more positive American posture towards the issue of decolonization. American Corporations which had developed economic interests in Africa had a stake in decolonization, as it might open up opportunities for them once the colonial ties were dissolved and the privileged positions of their European competitors removed. Military planners, drawing upon the experience of the Second World War were interested in the potential use of African facilities in a possible war with the Soviet Union. Captains of industry and resource-planners did not remain oblivious of the many vital raw materials that America would continue to need from Africa. And policy-makers were alive to the importance of ensuring continued access to these resources for the United States as well as averting the passing of influence and control over these resources into the hands of the Soviet Union. And precisely for those reasons, American policy-makers were poised to respond quickly, once an opening was created towards decolonization by any of their European allies.\footnote{Misra, n.63, p.3.}
As regards official statements by the Executive Branch concerning Africa, it might be stated that in the years following the Second World War, American policy-makers usually referred to a statement that had been made by Secretary of State, Cordell Hull in July 1942 to the effect that the United States supported the principles of self-government or independence for all people who had the desire and the capacity for it. Such a statement was intended to appease both the African nationalists as well as the European colonial powers, since it could be explained appropriately to either of them.

During the Presidency of Harry S. Truman, the members belonging to NATO had made direct references to Africa. For instance, at the beginning of 1950, at a conference of the foreign ministers of Western powers held in London, a statement was issued, "pledging the United States, England and France to a three-point programme for the political development of the African peoples, the rapid improvement of economic conditions, and a close cooperation for these purpose among the European colonial powers and the United States." On 8 May 1950, George McIhie, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs made a major policy statement while speaking before the Foreign Policy Association in Oklahoma City. He touched upon the issue of decolonization cautiously by reaffirming the traditional American faith in principles of self-determination.

as well as by stressing on the fact that the transition to self-government should be orderly if it were to succeed. Speaking on the importance of Africa from the long term interests of the United States, he added: "We must continue to have access to Africa's vital reservoir of minerals which are critical stockpile items in the United States: manganese, chrome ore, rubber, industrial diamonds essential to our machine tool industry, asbestos and many other important minerals." The same cautious approach was reflected in the speech of Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador-at-Large of the United States Government on 25 September 1952 before Ottawa Women's Canadian Club in Ottawa, Canada. In his speech Ambassador Jessup had pledged US support for the nationalist aspirations of those countries who were "progressively advancing towards the UN Charter's goal of self government", and "who by their acts show themselves worthy of it and ready for it."

The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated in the background of major issues like the Cold war, the Berlin Crisis and the Korean War. Africa did not merit any consideration, which is evident from the fact that President Eisenhower did not even mention the name of Africa in his inaugural address and that the new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in his first official speech

106. Ibid, p. 1002.
made only a brief reference to Africa by stating that "if there were to be trouble in Africa, it would be due to the communists." 108

President Eisenhower's appointee to succeed George McGhee as the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs was Henry A. Byroade, who also voiced similar ambivalence like his predecessor with regard to the colonial question. This was reflected in his speech on 30 October 1953 before the World Affairs Council of Northern California at Asilomar, California, which was characterized by Vernon McKay as the "classic masterpiece of American ambiguity" on the colonial question 109.

Byroade in his speech maintained that the movement for self determination has recently encountered a tragic paradox because of the "new Soviet Colonialism... which masquerades under the guise of nationalism". He said that the United States believed "in eventual self-determination of all people through evolutionary process" 110. He stated his position in these terms ...

When dependent peoples attain self-determination, we want it to be real, and we want it to endure ... and they should be able to maintain their independence against the new soviet imperialism and any other form of tyranny... If a few additional years of evolution can make the

109. See McKay, n.70, p.320.
difference between a self-determination that endures and a reversion to dependency or chaos, the years will not be wasted.111

Highlighting the legitimate economic interests of the European powers in their respective colonies, Byroade pointed out that contrary to much talk about "economic exploitation" of dependent people, the economic relationship between the European nations and their overseas territory have been beneficial to both the parties and that a "sudden break in economic relations might seriously injure the European economies upon which our Atlantic defence system depends."112 In conclusion, Byroade had stated that while the United States did not propose that the rights of dependent people be subordinated to the interests of the European powers, still he was of the view that "an evolutionary approach to self-determination can help to preserve legitimate European interests in foreign territories while... giving these territories economic opportunities and benefits which would be lost by a complete severance of relations."113 The Byroade approach was thus, not one that could evoke any enthusiasm from African nationalists struggling for national liberation.

George V. Allen who succeeded Byroade as the Assistant Secretary provided the first major breakthrough

111. Ibid, p.656.
113. Ibid.
in the American position on Africa by stating that "A strong, free, and friendly Africa is extremely important to the United States security". This speech made on 21 April 1956 heralded the fact that the United States had begun to take cognizance of "the winds of change" in Africa in the context of the changed international circumstances.

In October 1956, the Eisenhower Administration took a public posture of opposition to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion on Egypt, and thereby appeared to have turned its back against its historical allies. Defending American position Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles declared that the United States took one of its most difficult and momentous decisions in recent times when it resolved to be loyal to its commitments to the United Nations rather than to its historical ties with Britain and France. The changed American perception on Africa was further reflected in December 1956, when the United States joined hands with the Soviet Union for the first time in voting in the UN Trusteeship Council on a procedural question regarding the new status for French Togoland to which France was bitterly opposed.

The Cold war with the Soviet Union probably provided the impetus for such rethinking in the US.

Administration with regard to Africa. The advent of Nikita Khruschev to power in the Soviet Union as well as the skillful and flexible policies that he had initiated to support the liberation movements in the underdeveloped countries, had probably prompted the American policy-makers to adopt policies calculated to win the good will of the elites of the emerging African nations and thereby to thwart the growth of Soviet influence.

On 14 February 1957 Secretary of State Dulles announced the appointment of an American delegation to accompany the Vice President Richard M. Nixon for ceremonies marking independence of Ghana. During this African tour, Nixon visited, apart from Ghana, a large number of African countries, namely Morocco, Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya and Tunisia. In his report to the President, Nixon pointed out "the tremendous potentialities of this great continent", where developments" could well prove to be the decisive factor in the conflict between freedom and international communism". Nixon had emphasised that the "Free World" had a "vital interest in assisting the leaders of Africa to maintain and develop governmental institutions which are based on principles of freedom and democracy". The Vice President had maintained in his report that American private investment was most welcome in Africa and that during his discussions with African leaders, the latter had indicated "preference for developing their economies
through encouraging the investment of private capital and through loans from the international agencies like the World Bank wherever feasible, rather than through government to government grants.\textsuperscript{117}

The United States took a friendly position to the first Conference of Independent African states hosted by Nkrumah at Accra on 15-22 April 1958. William M. Rountree, who succeeded Allen as Assistant Secretary, reacting to the Conference stated:

\textit{... The Conference at Accra was a good example of a healthy trend in Africa toward the establishment of co-operative regional ties. Indigenously inspired and organized, the Accra conference made a display of authoritative and responsible African nationalism contrasted sharply with the Soviet and Communist Chinese attempts to control the Cairo-held Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference for propaganda purposes.\textsuperscript{118}}

Simultaneously dominant voices within the State Department continued to warn the "dangers of premature independence" and to shower praises on the role of the Colonial powers for building up of the administration, education and economy of the area in preparation for their

\textsuperscript{117} For details See \textit{Department of State Bulletin} Vol.36 p.635.

eventual self-government. The approach of the United States appeared to be to avoid any precipitate action in respect of African countries that had attained freedom which might be regarded as unwelcome or unfriendly by the erstwhile metropolitan nations. Also there seemed to be significant agreement in the Executive Branch as well as in the Congress with the concept that "the continued maintenance of economic relations between the metropolitan countries and their erstwhile colonies was not counter to American interest especially in view of the elimination of discriminatory treatment in favour of metropolitan interests as against American investors."

The "dominant" voices referred to earlier, was represented by the European Bureau within the State Department. The European Bureau championed the European colonial interests in Africa by stressing on the dangers of "premature" independence and by highlighting the strategic and economic importance of Africa in the background of the cold war. It sought to build up a theory that the interests of the United States were synonymous with the colonial powers in Africa. Due to lack of knowledge and perspective on Africa, such a theory was gaining ground in American foreign policy circles. There was no significant lobby or

119. See Statement of Julius Holmes, the interim Deputy Assistant Secretary in this regard in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 38, pp. 857-862.

120. See Misra, n.83, p.16.
countermove to resist such a propaganda. The European view gained ground also because of the fact that President Eisenhower lacked interest on foreign policy and that Secretary of State Dulles was both unfamiliar with Africa and too much obsessed with the policy of containment. The background of Christian A. Herter who succeeded Dulles, was hardly exciting from the African point of view, because the new Secretary of State allowed himself to be influenced by policies pursued by his illustrious predecessor. A final point in this regard is the statement by Democratic Senator Wayne Morse who pointed out that the African Bureau is largely staffed by persons who have spent many years on assignment in Europe in countries and have well in mind the European point of view.

Thus, in 1960, as the year of Africa approached, American policy-makers in the Executive Branch were following a "curious" policy with regard to Africa. They tended to adopt virtually in all cases the policies of the metropolitan powers and had subordinated their long-range interests of encouraging independence and development of the native population to short-run considerations of strategy and expediency.

121. See Walters, n. 91, p. 91.
The Congress was more handicapped than the Executive Branch to deal with problems relating to Africa due to absence of independent Congressional network to receive information from the Continent. The Congress had to depend almost exclusively on the Executive Branch to acquire information on Africa. Members of the Congress, in course of time became familiar on Africa through periodic visits by their colleagues, work of the African Sub-committees of the Congress, the Congressional Hearings, and the speeches made by individual members on the floor of the Congress.

From the end of the Second World War till 1960 several members of the Congress had paid visits to African countries either in their official or private capacities and had submitted their reports to the Congress. For instance in 1955, Representative Frances P. Bolton (Republican, Ohio) had gone on a Special Study Mission to Africa, South and East of Sahara. In her report to the Congress in 1956, she had pointed out that "the United States had a vested interest in the peaceful solution of the problem of colonialism in Africa, because the Soviet Union was exploiting the theme to its advantage". She also added that the

United States as the leader of the "Free World" could not "side-step its responsibilities in the unfoldment of Africa".

Senator Theodore Francis Green (Democrat, Rhode Island), Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Near Eastern and African Affairs had undertaken a tour of thirteen African countries from 4 September to 18 October, 1956 to examine the operation of U.S. aid programmes in those states. In his report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 21 February 1957, the Senator had described Africa as a "continent in ferment" and had lamented that American policy had "failed to keep pace with fast-moving developments and to anticipate their relentless sweep". "We have given insufficient attention either to the needs of this great region or to our important stake in our future", Senator Green added.

A special Study Mission of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs comprising Chairman, Wayne L. Hays (Republican, Ohio) and members, Barret O'Hara (Democrat, Illinois) and Marguerite Stitt Church (Democrat, Illinois) had visited Near East and Africa in November-December, 1957.

In their report to the House on 29 May, 1958 they described Africa, south of Egypt as "a relatively calm area", but where recently" an ardent devotion to nationalism has led to a corresponding denunciation of colonialism". The Study Mission had indicated that no constructive purpose would be served by providing military assistance to African states because their economic bases as well as manpower resources were too weak to support a heavy military establishment.

A Study Mission consisting of Democratic Senators namely Frank Church (Idaho), Gale McGee (Wyoming) and Frank Moss (Utah) visited Africa in November-December 1960. Edward M. Kennedy, the younger brother of President-elect John F. Kennedy accompanied the mission by paying for his own expenses. In their report to the Senate on 12 February 1961, the mission pointed out that the United States in the process of trying to steer a careful course between African nationalism and the interests of its NATO allies "has drawn the fire of both Europeans and Africans alike".

The Sub-Committees of the Congress dealing with Africa are the Senate Sub-Committee on Africa and the House Sub-Committee on Africa. Both these Sub-Committees were

128. Ibid, p. 4.
found after the creation of the post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the State Department in 1958 and started functioning from 1959. Senator John F. Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts) and Representative Barratt O'Hara (Democrat, Illinois), occupied Chairmanship of these two Sub-Committees respectively. Out of these two Sub-Committees, the House Sub-Committee became more active than its counter part in the Senate, primarily because of the interest displayed by some individual members of the Sub-Committee like Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (Democrat, Michigan), Frances P.Holton and Barratt O'Hara and also partly because of the money-appropriating powers belonging to the House. On the other hand, the Senate Sub-Committee met rarely. For instance, even during Senator Kennedy's energetic tenure as first Chairman (1959-1960) the committee had met only thrice.

Both houses of Congress as well as the Sub-Committees on Africa held regular Congressional hearings to acquaint the members of the Congress with African problems. Organizations and individuals interested on Africa are invited by the Chairman of Committees and Sub-Committees to testify before such Congressional hearings. Also Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had made a request to Dr. Melville J. Herskovits, Professor and Head of the African Studies Programme at the North Western University

130. See Walters, n.91, p.67.
to prepare a study of the factors which influenced American policy towards Africa. The North Western Study had been submitted to the Senate on 23 October, 1959. Also during this period a small Committee of Professors specializing on Africa had formed an organization called the "African League" which had published a pamphlet entitled "A New Policy Toward Africa" and had urged upon the Administration to pursue a new approach towards Africa. Some important members belonging to the African League were Professor David Apter of Chicago University and Professor Rupert Emerson of Princeton University. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had held a hearings entitled "Review of Foreign Policy", on 8 May 1958. William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asia and African Affairs and Professor Meville J. Herskovits of North-Western University were among others who had been invited to testify. In his testimony Rountree had lauded the peaceful and admirable manner in which transfer of power had taken place in four African States, namely Ghana, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. Answering a question from Senator Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana) as to whether neutralism was a liability from the American stand point, Rountree conceded that the United States preferred those independent States of Africa who

131. For details see Ibid, pp.60-61.
recognized the threat of international communism by joining the efforts of the "Free World". Appearing before the Committee later, Professor Herskovits pointed out that since Africa had acquired a "Continental Consciousness," the US Administration should become more "conciliatory" towards African opinion and should seek to draw a "balance between its long-term interests of cultivating African people against the short-term advantages of treating Africa on the cold war considerations".

The House Sub-Committee on Africa had held hearings entitled, "Briefing on Africa", on 5 March and 21 July 1959. Joseph C. Satterthwaite, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs appearing before the Sub Committee had touched upon the significance of several conferences held in Africa from the American point of view. According to him, whereas the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Cairo had been inspired by Egypt and the Soviet Union mainly to keep the African states under their influence, the Accra Conferences hosted by Nkrumah had

133. Ibid, p.554.
134. Ibid, p.583.
symbolized the true feeling of African personality and of African nationalism.\footnote{135}

The House Sub-Committee on Africa again held hearings on 20, 26, 27 January and on 16 May 1960, entitled, "Briefing on Africa". Some participants of the hearings were Dr. Donald A. Fitzgerald and Donalad B. McPhail belonging to the International Co-operation Administration (ICA), Joseph Setterthwaite, the Assistant Secretary and Professor David E. Apter of Chicago University. McPhail in his testimony had provided an account of US aid projects in nine Sub Sahara African states\footnote{136}. Professor Apter airing his views before the august body had pointed out that while African interest in America was growing, yet it lacked perspective because Africans tend to equate the United States with their erstwhile colonial masters\footnote{137}. Such a lack of perspective is due to the fact that Africans "do not really know America" and also that "they are presently engaged in the process of crystallizing their views", Apter added\footnote{138}.

\footnote{135} See Briefing on Africa, 1959, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Washington, D. C., 1959), pp.2-5.


\footnote{137} Ibid, p.88.

\footnote{138} Ibid, p.90.
On the floor of the Congress, several members belonging to both the Houses had spoken highlighting various issues on Africa. Prominent among them were Senators Theodore Francis Green, Mike Mansfield and Hubert H. Humphrey (Democrat, Minnesota) and Representatives Francis P. Bolton, Barratt O'Hara and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr (Republican, New York).

Making a review of American foreign policy in Africa, Senator Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana) pointed out that the United States approached the African continent through its European allies and in the process had neglected it completely. But with the Cold War entering into Africa from the Middle East, Africa had assumed significance and was "beginning to move as an independent force in international life". Senator Mansfield suggested for an increase in the flow of direct information on Africa as well as for support by the United States to the aspirations of the of the African people towards national and human equality. As the first step towards a more effective policy, the Senator suggested the creation of an independent African Bureau to deal with Africa.

Congress Woman Mrs. Frances P. Bolton speaking on the floor of the House on 15 July 1957 had stated that Africa,

139. Congressional Record Vol.97, p.9766.
140. Ibid, p.9768.
a vital portion of the "Free World" was confronted with the choice whether to opt for the freedom as the West conceives or for the slavery Moscow has so well covered with tempting words of freedom. Also Representative Wayne L. Hays speaking in the House on 16 April 1957 had urged upon the Administration to be watchful towards Russian overtures "to cultivate African states in order to grab Africa's vast reservoir of raw materials".

Senator John F. Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts) had argued on the floor of the Senate in 1957 that "nationalism in Africa can not be evaluated purely in terms of the historical and legal niceties", as advocated by the French as well as other European allies of the United States because America's own experiences "furnish a model which many of the new nations draw their inspiration". Senator Kennedy further pointed out that inorder to secure the friendship of the newly emergent states, the United States should "revert back to its traditional policy of supporting the principles of freedom and independence for all people everywhere".

Rising on the floor of the House on 23 March 1959, Representative Adam Clayton Powell pointed out that American

141. Ibid, p.11752.
143. Ibid, p.10787.
144. Ibid.
Policy in Africa is "split down the middle by a stubborn and troublesome contradiction between immediate strategic and ultimate historic interest", and in this process ignored" the realities of the time, and the revolution of rising eruptions in Africa"145.

On the floor of the Senate on 2 September 1959 Senator Hubert H. Humphrey touching on the issue, "Emergent Africa: Challenge and Response," pointed out that Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Tom Mboya of Kenya represented the symbol of a new and dynamic Africa. The United States, according to the Senator, should understand the aspirations of the emergent Africa, as represented by these leaders and respond to such aspirations "with a combination of speed, and patience, imagination and steadfastness"146.

Thus by 1960 both the Congress as well as the Executive Branch were too cautious and overtly careful not to annoy the European powers and had viewed Africa through the "NATO lens". Only a few voices had been raised to highlight American stakes in the process of decolonization in Africa. As the "Year of Africa" approached, there developed in the United States five

146. Ibid, p.17740.
constituencies who were interested on Africa. They have been described by Philip W. Quigg as "Africanists, "Enthusiasts", "Sentimentalists", "Enterpreneurs", and the "Irreconcilables". The "Africanists" were those belonging to the academic community and the professionals, who were liberal and were well-informed on Africa. Some of them like Professor David Apt and Professor Vernon McKay had close access to the US Administration. The "Enthusiasts" were those Black educated Americans who had unending interest on Africa. The "Sentimentalists" were those missionary-minded Americans who had been inspired by humanitarian spirits to move into Africa to educate and to civilize Africans. The "Enterpreneurs" referred to those "self-declaratory apolitical "businessmen of the United States who had economic stakes in Africa, and who normally held conservative positions on Africa. And lastly the "Irreconcilables" were those Americans who were either die-hard apartheid enthusiasts or were white racists belonging to organizations like the Ku Klux Klan or the John Birch Society, and who were open supporters of white regimes.

148. See in this context Walters, nn.91, pp.99-100.
149. See Quigg, nn.147, p.8.
150. Ibid.
in Africa. Some members belonging to this group had provided support for Moïse Tshombe of Katanga, who had unsuccessfully tried to secede from the Central Government of the Congo.

**AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE CONGO**

In this section, it is proposed to deal with emergence of American interests in the Congo. This necessitates a short historical review of American interests in the Congo as it evolved till the attainment of its independence. To begin with the story it may be pointed out that the United States had established an American consulate in the Belgian Congo as early as in 1884. This was a period when the Belgian King, Leopold-II, was making vigorous efforts to harness the rich resources of the Congo with the help of foreign private companies. One of the American Companies, called the American Congo Company in the process had been engaged to develop rubber plantations in the Congo.

It has been pointed out earlier that in 1893, the Aborigines Protection Society of Britain had raised hue and cry over the treatment of Congolese natives. This had provoked the United States Senate to move resolutions for

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152. Ibid.
153. See Moon, n.5, pp.86-87.
efforts to improve the conditions of Congolese natives. It has been stated earlier that such foreign criticisms ultimately resulted in the transfer of power to the Belgian Parliament from the hands of its king. But at the time of take-over, it was stipulated that concessions granted to foreign companies like the American Congo Company would be preserved.

The Congo was not mentioned in the American Circles for a long time until the advent of the Second World War during which, the uranium from the Congo helped the American scientists to produce the atom bombs that destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan.

At the end of the Second World War, and especially after the formation of NATO American policy-makers were careful not to offend their ally Belgium by criticising it for its policies in the Belgian Congo. Rather some prominent men both in the Administration as well as the Congress had reported enthusiastically about the impressive progress in the Congo under the Belgian rule. For instance, Senator Allen J. Ellender (Democrat, Louisiana) after his visit to the Congo in 1953 had stated:

155. Ibid, p.90.
If ever Belgian Government got out of this territory, the natives would suffer. To my way of thinking, it will require years of schooling and training before the natives are able to govern themselves. Darkness would return here, if the settlers leave and permit the natives to take over entirely.\textsuperscript{157}

Two years later Chester Bowles, a former Ambassador to India and an Under Secretary of State had visited the Belgian Congo. At the end of his trip in 1955 he had expressed the opinion that "not even the most optimistic Congolese patriot dreamed that in five years his country would be an independent state."\textsuperscript{158} Four years later on 5 March 1959 while testifying before the House Sub-Committee on Africa, Joseph Satterthwaite, the Assistant Secretary had stated American position on similar lines as...

"The Belgian Government has carried on a very enlightened policy in the Belgian Congo at least to the extent of educating the Congolese to become good artisans and raising their standard of living to the extent that it is probably higher than in any other dependent area."\textsuperscript{159}

It has been stated that the American Government was careful enough not to offend the sentiments of the Belgian Government in respect of the Congo. This became evident from the fact that in 1957, the State Department did not allow some American blacks to visit the Congo, as it

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid, p.17.
\textsuperscript{158} See Chester Bowles, Promises to keep: My years in Public Life: 1941-1969 (New Delhi, 1972), Indian edition, p.419.
\textsuperscript{159} Briefing on Africa, 1959 n.135, p.5.
might encourage the natives to press for independence. Also after the Belgians had made announcements for independence in January 1960 the American Consulate did not gather much intelligence informations in the Congo. Even as late as in May 1960, when the United States government had sent invitations for a visit by a group of Congolese leaders, all the guests who had gone on such a trip were only the Belgians. In short, the Americans had considered the Congo as a "Belgium Bailiwick" and had perceived America's role in the Congo as of an understanding friend.

American interests in the Congo, however, developed vigorously after its independence. As pointed by Chester Bowles, "Because of the Congo's immense size, its strategic location in the explosive southern third of Africa and especially the efforts of the USSR to establish a foothold, these prompted attention of the American policy-makers towards the Congo." But more important factor was the economic interests which the United States had developed in the Congo. In this context the role of the American Corporations is considered significant.

It has been stated in Chapter-I how the Congo produced such strategic raw materials which were significant in the context of the cold war. By way illustration it had been stated that the Congo produced 9% of World's copper.

160. For details in this context see Weissman, n.29,p.44.
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid.
163. See Bowles, n.158, p.419.
49% of its cobalt, 69% of its industrial diamonds, 6.5% of its tin and good quantities of manganese, cassiterite, zinc, columbium-tantalite and gold. Most of these mineral deposits were located in the Katanga-Rhodesia belt as well as in South Kasai. These mineral deposits had ignited foreign economic interests in the Congo including the American Corporations.

The American Corporations which had either direct or indirect economic interests in the Congo were the American Metal Climax (AMAX), the New Mont Mining, the Lazard Freres, the General Motors, the Ryan-Guggenheim group, the Dillon group, and the Morgan Guaranty Trust. American trading interest in the Congo was served by an American Company, called the Farrell Lines, which operated a steamer service between the Congo and other African ports.

The AMAX was deeply involved in Rhodesian Copper mines, which were located close to the Katanga border. The Rhodesian Selection Trust, as well as the AMAX bought power from a subsidiary of Union Miniere of Belgium which ran supreme in Katanga. New Mont Mines was associated with the AMAX. The economic interests of these corporations in the Congo were indirect.

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164. For details see Weissman, n.29, pp.33-39.
165. Ibid, p.33
The Lazard Frères and the New York Investment House, who were major shareholders in the Union Miniere had developed direct economic and political interests in the Congo. The Ryan-Guggenheim group had held a quarter of the shares of FORMINIERE which owned the jewel diamond mines of South Kasai. General Motors had operated in the Congo as the sole distributor in South Katanga and had operated service stations apart from the petrol pumps owned by them.

Douglas Dillon's US and Foreign Securities along with the Rockefeller group were associated in an undertaking in the Congo, called the Belgian Congo Consumer Industries which had been given contract to construct housing scheme for the workers in four urban centres of the Congo. But the operation was suspended because of domestic difficulties in the Congo following independence.

Among the American bankers, the Morgan Guaranty Trust had displayed significant interest in the developments of the Congo. It was the traditional fiscal agent and banker of the Belgian Government in the United States.

166. Ibid.
167. Ibid, pp. 33-34.
169. Ibid, pp. 35-36.
By way of conclusion, it may be stated that direct American economic investment in the Congo was not significant. According to eminent economist Andrew Kamrack it "totaled less than $20 millions in early sixties."\textsuperscript{170} American investments in Africa were concentrated heavily in South Africa, Rhodesia and Angola. The major American economic interests in Africa were reflected through other European companies which had investments in South Africa, Rhodesia as well as in the Congo.

But as the process of decolonization was initiated in the Congo, American Corporations looked forward to opportunities of economic infiltrations into the Congo. Because of richness as well as economic potentials of the country, these corporations preferred to enter into Congo's mineral world. But as the events unfolded itself, American economic interests, could not penetrate immediately into the Congo domain due to stiff oppositions from the Belgian interests, which controlled the Congo's mineral resources as well as its economy.