In Chapter V, it has been described how President Kennedy had supported the UN operation warmly despite severe Congressional criticisms and stiff resistance from the NATO quarters. The Kennedy Administration was also divided over the Katanga question, the sharp battle line being drawn between the "Europeanists" and the "New Africa Group". In the circumstances, Kennedy probably felt inclined to keep the door open for negotiation on the Katanga issue. This is evident from the fact that in November 1961 he had sent Harriman on a mission to meet Tshombe and that he had requested Senator Dodd to explore possibilities for an early meeting between Tshombe and Adoula, which eventually took place at Kitona. But Tshombe's strategy after Kitona appeared to be to buy time for further moves as well as to intensify domestic pressures on the Administration through the friendly members in the Congress and the friends of Katanga in the United States called the Katanga Lobby.

The origins of the "Katanga Lobby" go back to the establishment of the Katanga Information Service in New York and the appointment of an energetic "Operator", namely Michael Struelens to head the organisation. Michael Struelens, a Rhodesian by birth had served in the Belgian diplomatic
service prior to joining the new assignment. At the time of registration in the United States, the work of the organization was shown merely to be to disseminate informations on business and economic opportunities in Katanga to prospective US investors, who had little knowledge of the province. In course of time Struelens was able to streamline this modest service to grow into huge organization to spear head political campaigns in the United States in favour of Katanga's independence.

In Chapter-V, the details of Struelens' trip to Katanga have been stated. Struelens' claim has been endorsed by Senator Dodd in his speech before the Congress as well as the Congressional hearings on "Visa Procedures on the Department of State: the Struelens Case". The expenses of Struelens' trip were, however met out of the funds of the Katanga Information Service. It has been stated earlier that the Visa of Struelens was cancelled by the State Department and that Senator Dodd had intervened with his subpoena to prevent the State Department's order from being carried out. Protesting against the order, the Katanga Information Service had pointed out that Struelens had "reported his expenditures" as per US laws and had cooperated in his functioning with the

State Department" as well as with other concerned Departments. The American Civil Liberties Union protesting against the order in a letter to the Secretary of State, had stated that it was "a clear infringement of freedom of speech and due process of law". The Union had pointed out that the wrath of the State Department was due to the fact that Struelens had furnished information to the American public critical of the US policy with regard to the conflict between Katanga and the UN. For instance at the time of Congressional Hearings on Visa Case, Under Secretary George McChee testified that Struelens' Visa was cancelled on a legal technicality and that the real reason was the fact that "he was representing a cause and putting out informational materials not in consonance with the state policy in the Congo." Obviously the State Department attributed many of the criticisms on its Congo policy to Struelen's activities. According to the State Department, these activities had taken the form of "indirect propaganda work speeches or portions of speeches which he prepared for members of the Congress... his efforts to cause others to advertise, speak or write on behalf of the Katangese secession." The Struelens' Visa Case prompted a group of right wing Conservative Americans to think in terms of

520. Ibid, 30 October, 1961, p.15.
521. For details see *Hearings on Visa Procedures*, n.518, p.19.
522. Ibid, p.35.
523. Ibid, pp.50-51.
organizing themselves into a group friendly to Katanga's interest and that the lead in this direction was taken by Dr Max Yergan, a Conservative Black Educator and a former Executive Director of Council on Africa. Yergan was a friend of Tshombe, and had been trying privately to muster support for Katanga within America's right-wing section. Yergan in this context contacted William Buckley, the editor of National Review and Marvin Liebman the publicist for the "Committee of One Million" and the "Young Americans For Freedom". On 8 December 1961 Liebman received an appeal for fund-raising from a group of conservative, graduate students of Yale University, who were making efforts to organize an "International Brigade" to assist the troops of "Free Katanga" in its fight against the US and UN aggressions. According to Weissman, the occasion of his visit to Yale prompted Liebman to discuss with Yergan for forming an "America Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighers" or the "Katanga Lobby". It is quite likely that Strueslens might have suggested to both Liebman and Yergan the need to create such an Organization which could work as an ideological ally of the Katanga Information Service, headed by him.

The New York Times reported on 14 December 1961 that the "American Committee For Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighers" (Katanga Lobby) had been formed with an office at 79 Madison Avenue, 27th Street, New York to "mobilize public support for the Katangan fight for self determination against the UN military force". According to the paper, the

524. For details see Weissman, n.29, p.168.
Committee would protest vigorously the "illegal UN action against Katanga and the US air logistic support of this action" and that it would help to supply the Katanga freedom fighters with all aid "political, material, relief and otherwise" and that it would resist the Katangese from being "overwhelmed by external powers which were bent upon coercively subjecting them to a centralized regime which has proved its incapacity to govern and has failed successively to resist communist penetration". On the same day a full page advertisement appeared in the New York Times entitled, "Katanga is Hungary of 1961", in which Tshombe was portrayed as "a Christian and anti-communist in the heart of Africa" and that Katanga was an "isle of stability, economic health and popular government in a sea of chaos", Tshombe was praised as the "far and away the outstanding pro-western and anti-communist leader of the Belgian Congo". According to the New York Times, the Chairman of the Committee was Dr. Max Yergan, and the members of the Executive Committee included Marvin Liebman, William F. Buckley, George S. Schuyler, L. Brent Bozell, James Burnham, Frank S. Meyer and William A. Ruster. The advertisement listed a large number of sponsors (81 in number) including some retired military leaders, namely General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, Brig Gen William H. Wilbur, Admiral Ben Moreell, Commodore Fred G. Reinicke, two former Governors, Charles Edison of New Jersey and J. Bracken Lee of Utah, Spruille

Braden and Marvin B. McKeeally, former Commanders of the American Legion, Professors from seventeen American Universities and Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen (Republican, Illinois). The New York Times also reported that a cablegram from Tshombe had congratulated the formation of the Committee and that Senator Dirksen had withdrawn his sponsorship promptly. Very soon regional and local units of the "Katanga Lobby" were proliferated in New England and in the Mid Western states such as in Illinois and Indiana, consisting of members belonging to "conservative", "anti-UN" and "anti-Communist thinking" namely, the John Birch Society, the "Committee of one Million" and the "Young Americans for Freedom" and also some "Southern Whites" who regarded Tshombe as the "African Incarnation of Uncle Tom". The Katanga Lobby sent eminent sociologist Ernest Van der Haagon on a nine day survey mission to the Congo in order to prepare a report on the UN misbehaviour in Katanga. The Committee also resorted to publicity campaigning in the United States, for instance, a forty-six page document entitled "the War in Katanga", a television movie, an article in the National Review by Senator Dodd entitled, "Katanga, the Untold Story", a national radio programme, depicting Katanga as the "last bastion of christianity" and the "last fortress against communism in Africa". From the Committee's office four hundred telegrams were sent to potential contributors under

the signatures of Yergan, Liebman and William Buckley, the editor of National Review and that the Committee also distributed 50,000 copies of its advertisement of 14 December 1961 in the New York Times for special attention of the "Opinion moulders" in the United States 528.

The Katanga Lobby spearheaded the attack on Kennedy's Congo policy in its advertisement in the New York Times and the Washington Post by urging upon the US conservatives as well as the "Isolationists" to make attack on "what they deemed to be the too general foreign policy of John Kennedy". The Lobby demanded a Congressional inquiry and investigation into the US Congo policy and urged suspension of legislative action on UN bond issue. The Committee also issued a number of press statements attacking the US/UN initiatives in the Congo and in October 1961 published the "Secret Plan" of military attack contemplated by the UN on Katanga. The advertisements printed in the New York Times and the Washington Post were subsequently reprinted in nineteen local newspapers in the United States and payments to that effect were made through locally raised funds 529. It may be stated that in response to these advertisements, more than 3000 business organizations sent contributions to the Katanga Lobby within a period of two weeks amounting to $25,000 530.

528. For details, see Walters n.91, pp.172-173, Weissman n.29, pp.171-172 Pisano n.202, p.196.
The official "promoter" of Tshombe, namely Struelena also supplemented the efforts of "Katanga Lobby" through his Katanga Information Office. For instance, he spent $80,000 a year to disseminate the pro-Katanga views in the United States. His efforts were directed towards influencing the US public opinion through T.V., radio, and public appearances and on winning "influential converts" to his side. He kept on passing information to members of the Congress friendly to the Katanga cause and was particularly close to Senator Dodd's office. He supplied most of the information and arguments contained in Senator Dodd's speeches on the Congo issue. Not only did he visit Senator Dodd's office frequently but also arranged for Dodd's trip to the Congo in November 1961. Also he acted as the messenger between Dodd and Tshombe. In July 1962 he authorized Katanga Information Service to go ahead with the purchase of "time" for fifty two advertisements in WWRL, a New York radio station broadcasting to the Black community.\(^{531}\)

The massive propaganda network emanating simultaneously from the Katanga Information Office and the "Katanga Lobby", had the desired effect of winning a large number of friends as well as "Converts" in the United States. For instance, ex-President Herbert Hoover, Ex-Vice President Richard M. Nixon, prominent Senators namely, Thomas J. Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut), Barry Goldwater (Republican, Arizona).\(^{531}\)

Thurston Horton (Republican, Kentucky), Everett Dirksen (Republican, Illinois) Strom Thurmond (Republican South Carolina), James O. Eastland (Democrat, Mississippi), Frank J Lausche (Democrat, Ohio), Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Republican, Iowa), and Representative William E. Miller (Republican New York), National Chairman of the Republican Party. Former President Hoover criticised the US support for UN operation on the ground that the "people of Katanga were seeking freedom from communist domination". Former Vice President Nixon, pointed out that "Shahome, "the educated, christian, anti-communist head of Katanga is being forced to join the Central Government which is infiltrated by communists and communist-sympathizers." Senator Dirksen, while withdrawing himself as a sponsor of Katanga Lobby, however declared that "we find ourselves fighting a friend of the free world." Senator Goldwater stated that the US was following a "suicidal policy" in supporting UN operation. Senator Dodd returning from a Katanga trip denounced the UN attack on Katanga.

President Kennedy was no doubt worried over the support received by the Katanga Lobby from significant Congressional quarters. He was, however, heartened by support

535. Ibid, 16 December 1961, p.3.
received from ex Presidents namely Dwight Eisenhower and, Harry S Truman as well as from the former US Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabbot Lodge and Christian A Herter, ex Secretary of State. President Kennedy expressed his gratification to Eisenhower for the support provided to the Administration's Congo policy. Senator Albert Gore (Democrat, Tennessee), severely criticised the formation of "Katanga Lobby" and expressed firm support for the President. Seventy-six leaders from the United States belonging to the fields of education, religion, labour, diplomacy and public affairs also endorsed the US policy in the Congo.

Officials of Kennedy Administration issued statements attacking the activities of the "Katanga Lobby". For instance, Assistant Secretary Williams in Detroit stated that the "Katanga propaganda machine had fabricated horrendous and concocted tales of indiscriminate mayhem by the UN troops" Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Carl T. Rowan, an American Black, stated in Philadelphia that "there has been a clever big money campaign to convince Americans that they ought to support Katanga secession... By spending $140,000 over last year, Struelens has got some extremely vocal help in dispensing a string of myths and a stream of misinformation about Katanga and Congo. The

538. Ibid, 16 December 1961, p.3.
Katanga Lobby appeared to have taken exception for these statements which is evident from the remarks made by Under Secretary George C. Mc Ghee, before the Columbia Broad Casting Service (CBS) television programme that the statements made by Williams and Rowan "had not been cleared at the highest level of the State Department".

The "Katanga Lobby" was also severely criticised by Professor Samuel H. Beer of Harvard University, and National Chairman of the Americans for the Democratic Action and Clark E. Eichelberger, Executive Director of the American Association of the United Nations. Professor Beer charged that sponsors of the "Katanga Lobby" belonged to either the discredited "John Birch Society" or the right wing "anti-democratic" forces. Eichelberger asserted that support for the "Katanga group" amounted to an appeal for aid to foreign mercenaries who are opposed to the policy of the US government.

Liberal domestic groups in the United States, namely the American Committee on Africa and the Africa League issued statements in support for US/UN policy in Katanga. The mouthpiece of the American Committee on Africa, namely Africa Today issued a statement denouncing the activities of "Katanga Lobby" as well as of Tahombe in the following manner: "Projected as a mixture of dissenter, under dog, and anti-communist, Tahombe has had vast access as an anti-United Nations group.

Nations symbol. A strange combination of crack-pot right wingers, 18th Century liberals, and pious button-down authoritarians Katanga Lobby have waged a hysterical campaign on his behalf.\(^543\).

The Katanga Lobby also received some support from the Methodist missionary organizations, with Tshombe being a Methodist and they were able to place their views in the Senate.\(^544\). Also a small but powerful American business group which had economic stakes in Katanga and the white-controlled Southern Africa had expressed pro-Tshombe views privately. The firms which felt threatened by the UN action were American Metal Climax, New Mont Mining, Lezard Freres, Morgan Guaranty Trust, Belgian-American Banking Corporation, Englehard Industries, General Motors and European-African Development Corporation. These business groups sought to utilize the techniques of personal and political contacts with the decision-makers in the Administration through interactions in academic bodies like African-American Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations.\(^545\).

An official of the State Department had claimed during this period that Michael Struelens had offered

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\(^{543}\) Africa Today, January 1963, as cited in Walters, n.91, p.174.

\(^{544}\) For details see Congressional Record, Vol.107, p.19981, and Vol.108, p.15563.

\(^{545}\) For details See Weissman, n.29, pp.172-173.
S 1000,000 to a representative of Costa Rica Government in return for his country's diplomatic recognition to Katanga and that an investigation by the Justice Department into the matter had confirmed that out of the stipulated deal money of $1 million S 85,0000 was earmarked for the Costa Rican government and that S 150000 was to be paid to the person who had settled the deal. The paper pointed out that Dr Gonzalo Ortiz Martin, Costa Rica's Chief Representative at the UN had confirmed some aspects of the deal. But both Struelens and Yergan (Katanga Lobby) described the US Government allegation as "absolutely without foundations".

The New York Times also reported that the Young Americans For Freedom (YAF) and the Katanga Lobby had sponsored a "Conservative Rally for World Libreration from Communism" at Madison Square Garden in New York on 7 March 1962 and that they had invited Tshombe to address the gathering. According to the program drawn up by the Katanga Lobby Tshombe was also scheduled to appear before the "Meet the Press" television programme, to speak at a National Press Luncheon, to meet with a group of Congress men, and to give talks at the University of Virginia, Overseas Press Club in New York City and at the Boston Law College Forum and the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles. But the State Department refused to grant visa to Tshombe on the ground that the contemplated visit "would interrupt and jeopardize

547. Ibid, 17 December 1961, p.3.
the progress made towards achieving Katangan integration. According to the New York Times, the rally took place at the Madison Square Garden as per schedule in the absence of Tshombe and that more than 16,000 had attended it. The paper reported that speakers at the rally made efforts to link the pro-Katanga cause with the "liberation of Cuba" and the "destruction of the Berlin Wall" and that the participants in the rally had shouted "Down with Kennedy". Thus, the Katanga Lobby and Michael Struelens had put their heart and soul in their efforts to win favour in American decision-making circles.

The Congress and the Katanga Problem.

In Chapter-V the Congressional responses to various initiatives taken by the UN as well as its attitude towards the formation of "Katanga Lobby" has been elaborated. It has been pointed out that due to hectic political campaigning by the "Katanga Lobby" and the Katanga Information Service, the support for Tshombe in the Congress had taken an appreciable rise. In fact the anti-Administration forces during this period had outmatched the Pro-Administration camp. But there is little evidence to suggest that the Katanga Lobby had made any direct impact upon the decision-making process in the Administration. A perusal of Congressional discussions on Katanga reflected to a large extent...

extent the prevailing current of disagreement in the Country. The members of the Congress who had participated in such discussion were Senators Thomas J. Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut), Prescott H. Bush (Republican, Connecticut), Richard Russell (Democrat, Georgia) Strom Thurmond (Republican, South Carolina) Kenneth B. Keatings (Republican, New York) and Representatives, H.R. Gross (Republican, Iowa), Donald Bruce (Republican, Indiana) John F. Baldwin (Republican, California), Bruce Alger (Republican, Texas), J. Arthur Younger (Republican, California) and John B. Williams (Democrat, Mississippi) and L Mendell Rivers (Democrat, South Carolina) by attacking the Administration. However, Senators Hubert Humphrey (Democrat, Minnesota), Frank Moss (Democrat Utah), Jacob K. Javits (Republican, New York) Mrs B. Neuberger (Democrat, Oregon), Joseph S. Clark (Democrat, Pennsylvania) Albert Gore (Democrat, Tennessee) and Representatives Charles C Diggs (Democrat, Michigan), Morris K. Udall (Democrat, Arizona) and Clement J. Zablocki (Democrat, Wisconsin) had delivered speeches favouring the stand taken by the US Administration. Senator Dodd leading the attack on the Administration had made speeches on 25 January, 5 August, 24 August and 12 October 1962. In these speeches he had repeated his pet theme of the heavy communist influence in the Adoula Government, and spoke about his mission to Katanga, and the moral rights of Katanga to secede. 551 Senator Bush speaking on 15 January 1962 pointed out that the action of the UN, strongly backed

by the US, appear to run counter to what should be our national policy. Senator Russell speaking on the UN bond issue opined that he was opposed to "unnecessary act of aggression." Senator Thurmond speaking on 5 April 1962 and 12 September 1962 pointed out that he protested strongly "the act of blatant aggression against Katanga."

Representative Donald C. Bruce spearheaded the attack on the Administration by focussing on issues like the Communist-studded Adoula government and the State Department's criticisms of Michael Struelens and the Katanga Lobby and its hostile treatment to Tshombe. Bruce also sought to highlight the efforts made by the Swedish firm Grangesberg to obtain control over Katanga's Union Minière. According to Bruce, former officials of Grangesberg included prominent members of the US Administration and the UN Command such as George Ball, Under Secretary, Fowler Hamilton, Director, Agency for International Development, Sture C Linner, Chief of Civilian Operations in Katanga and Bo Hammarskjöld, the brother of the deceased Secretary General. Bruce was of the view that these individuals were responsible for waging the UN war on Katanga since all of them wanted to promote the interests of the Swedish firm Grangesberg by pressurizing

553. Ibid, p.5106.
Tshombe. Representative H.R. Gross (Republican, Iowa) made an extension of remarks in the House by appending three editorials from the Washington Star which were critical of UN action. Making another extension of remarks, Representative John F. Baldwin characterized the UN bond as a highly controversial proposal. Representative Bruce Algiers speaking on 5 March 1962 on denial of entry to Tshombe stated that "the lone friend of America had been denied to set foot in our shores". In another extension of remarks Representative J. Arthur Younger made a statement in support of Belgium. Representative John B. Williams castigated the Administration for working against Tshombe who was "a friend of the West and opponent of communism". Representative L. Mendell Rivers characterized the UN as a "racist organization" dominated by the Afro-Asian bloc, and stated that but for this group Tshombe "had been whipped by the UN troops and brought to be united under Cyrille Adoula whose loyalty to US and the West is highly questionable". Rivers hailed Tshombe as a "highly developed, cooperational and stable person who has the support of the white interests", but Rivers regretted that the West had made him a "political leper".

556. Ibid, PA 19
558. Ibid, PA.1663.
559. Ibid, p.3454.
561. Ibid, p.21788.
Criticisms were also voiced in the country against US policy towards Katanga. For instance, Representative William E. Miller, the National Chairman of the Republican Party had stated that American national interest required that "a deep congressional investigation" of US Congo policy be undertaken, since "American money, men, planes, and equipments are being used to punish anti-communist Katanga". Senator Thurston Morton (Republican, Kentucky) pointed out that "the US is assisting enforcement of a policy which seems to run counter to our historical belief in the right of self-determination". Senator Strom Thurmond (Republican, South Carolina) dispatching a telegram to Kennedy on Katanga had urged the President to withdraw support from the UN aggression against Katanga, "one of the most solidly anti-communist nation on the African Continent". Representative Wayne L. Hays (Republican, Ohio) described Adoula as a "lemon", and his associates as a "cheap bunch of thieves". Hays opposed direct American aid to the Congo government as well as for the UN operation.

Senator Dodd and his Assistant David Martin had coordinated most of the legislative efforts aimed at criticizing the Administration. Dodd's involvement with the Katanga problem was quite extensive, since he had functioned more or less as a "self designated unofficial intermediary"

563. See Ibid, 4 May 1962, p.3.
between Tshombe and Washington. For instance, he had written a letter to President Kennedy on 18 September 1962 highlighting his efforts to induce Tshombe to accept the UN Plan for National Reconciliation. He informed the President that he had deliberately omitted all references to the Plan's ultimatum because Secretary Rusk had telephoned to him from New York conveying to him that he [Rusk] did not approve of the "harsh" language of the draft UN Plan. Dodd also indicated in the letter that he had also contacted the Secretary General with a request to moderate the language of the UN Plan for Tshombe's acceptance \(^{564}\). As the Chairman of the Sub Committee to Investigate into the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, Senator Dodd had conducted Congressional hearings entitled the "Visa Procedures of the Department of State: The Struelens Case" in January 1962. Michael Struelens had been asked to testify before the Sub Committee \(^{565}\). In its report in December 1962, the Committee had concluded that it had found "glaring abuse of visa power" by the State Department and also that its conducts with regard to Struelens had been "unworthy of a great nation dedicated to freedom and justice". In the Committee report, Dodd further pointed out that the State Department had launched a vicious campaign against Struelens in

\(^{564}\) Senator Dodd's letter as cited in Pisano, n.202,p.207.

\(^{565}\) See New York Times, 10 January 1962, p.3.

\(^{566}\) Ibid, 17 December 1962, p.4.
apparent reaction against his criticisms of UN military action* and that the Department had failed to prove its charge that "Stroelens had tried to bribe Costa Rican officials into recognizing Katanga".

Supporting the Administration, Senator Hubert Humphrey (Democrat, Minnesota) described Dodd's attacks as "reckless" and "below the belt", since Tshombe was found to be "walking arm in arm with every known enemy of the US and freedom". Humphrey wondered how "avowed anti-communists in the United States were defending and encouraging the one disruptive element in the Congo namely Tshombe*567. Senator Frank Moss (Democrat, Utah) defended the integrity of various key officials of the Administration namely Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary George Ball, Assistant Secretary Williams and Ambassador Edmund Gullion, and stated that these officials "through the cooperation of other peace-loving nations have been able to keep this part of the world from falling into the hands of the communists*568. Introducing the UN Plan for National Reconciliation in the Senate on 6 September 1962, Senator Hubert Humphrey (Democrat, Minnesota) commended the efforts of Secretary of State and his associates under the general direction of the President*569. In response to Dodd's remarks that "Adoula could not be trusted" since his views at Belgrade tended to be in line with the attitudes

569. Ibid, p.10793.
of "Crypto Communists". Senator Moss refuting such assertions stated that the critics could not make such easy assumptions. Senator Jacob Javits, reacting to Adoula's visit to the United States in the Congress stated that the success of US policy towards Congo so far "not withstanding trials and doubts is confirmed by the clear progress that has been made". Senator Mrs. B. Neuberger (Democrat, Oregon) supported the US Administration by stating that the Congo operation "has been an extraordinary achievement, a signal victory not only for humanity but indeed for American self-interest", and that it has administered a sound defeat to "ignorance, barbarism, anarchy, starvation and self-interest of international communism". She described Tshombe as a "fraud" who was propped by the Belgian capital and mercenaries. Senator Joseph S. Clark (Democrat, Pennsylvania) hailed Ambassador Stevenson for his outstanding job in guiding the Congo policy along the lines desired by the President.

Representative Charles C Diggs (Democrat, Michigan) commending the US Government for its Congo policy, stated that American public had been exposed to some dangerous myths and distortions such as, that "the UN was suppressing the self-determination of Katanga", that Tshombe was pro-west.

570. Ibid, p.15554.
571. Ibid, p.1779.
572. Ibid, p.5793.
and anti-communists, that "the people of Katanga support Tshombe overwhelmingly". Diggs provided some examples to rebut these charges. For instance he pointed out that Katangans had decided their political future with the Congo at the Brussels Round Table Conference in February 1960 and that Tshombe in order to remain in power had sought to negotiate with Gizenga and the Soviet Union. Diggs further pointed out that Tshombe's CONAKAT party had captured only twenty-five out of sixty deputies in Katangan provincial elections in 1960 and that the opposition, namely the Balubakat and its allies had won 23 seats. Tshombe's cabinet was not a national government since the opposition was not represented in his government. Further, Tshombe "had not been able to control more than half of Katanga", Diggs indicated. Representative Morris K Udall (Democrat, Arizona) in an extension of remarks appended an editorial from Yuma Daily Sun (Yuma, Arizona) which stated that the attack on the UN operation had been encouraged by the "vested interests in the Congo and the national enemies of the UN".

The Congressional reactions had the effect of inducing President Kennedy to think in terms of making an appraisal of US policy to reassess its options in the light of the stalemate that had followed the Kitona Accord.

575. Ibid, P.A 1735.
The Kennedy Appraisal.

President Kennedy inherited from President Eisenhower a "protracted" Congo problem and according to Roger Hilsman, the Congo crisis was "Kennedy Administration's first sustained test". It has been stated that President Eisenhower's interest as well as personal involvement in the Congo crisis was minimal and that he merely acted on the advice given by his subordinates in the State Department and his Ambassador at the UN. His Congo policy was based on the principles of non-intervention in Congo's internal affairs, prevention of cold war through the deployment of UN force. President Kennedy, on the other hand, had shown greater personal interest in the Congo problem, by inducting into his Administration a new set of people who were knowledgeable about Africa. Kennedy started formulating his policies on the Congo soon after the meetings of the National Security Council (19 February 1961) and the Conference of the State Department (26 February 1961). A review of Eisenhower's policy must have been undertaken at these meetings and the consensus, according to Kennedy's biographer, Theodore Sorenson, had been in favour of "a continuation of Eisenhower policy". The basic formulations of such policy according to Arthur Schlesinger were, the unification of the Congo, the maintenance of territorial

576. See Roger Hilsman, n.55, p.234.

integrity, the exclusion of "Cold war" politics and the peaceful settlement of internal political controversy in the form of a Government of National Reconciliation. A number of participants belonging to the African, European and International Organization Bureaus, the White House, the CIA and the Pentagon might have been consulted at the time of review of Eisenhower's policy. The President resorted to a powerful "Congo Task Force" and a "Congo Club" to function as his effective decision-making units which were a sharp contrast to Eisenhower's weak advisory Inter departmental Committee.

According to Jane Pisano, "a Congo Task Force" had been created immediately after the Presidential Inauguration. It was stipulated that the Task Force would be convened on an "adhoc basis" to formulate and implement policy on matters which concerned the President and that the size of the Task Force would vary according to the situation.

With Mennen Williams as the Chairman, the Task Force was expected to provide "an action-oriented focus". Also high-ranking members belonging to the State Department, the Department of Defence (ODD) and the CIA were appointed as members of the "Task Force". According to Pisano, a working group called the "Congo Club" had also been formed under the Chairmanship of Williams, comprising of members like Carl T. Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

578. See Schlesinger, n.414, p.530.
Robert Miller, the Belgian Desk Officer at the State Department, Carl Kayson from the White House, Nathaniel Pelcovitch, Joseph Sisco/William Buffam from the Bureau of International Organisation, Colonel Michael J.L. Greene from the Internal Security Affairs (ISA) of the Department of Defence (Pentagon) and a CIA participant. The meetings of the Club had been attended sometimes by others like Ernest K. Lindley (a State Department Consultant), Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary, International Organization, Adlai Stevenson, Ambassador to the UN, Wayne J. Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and Charles White House and Hadyn Williams, Deputy Assistant Secretaries from the Pentagon. The Pentagon Chief, Robert McNamara and his deputy Gilpatric never attended any of the sessions either of the Task Force or of the Congo Club, since they were not interested to involve themselves in the decision-making as they considered the Congo as an unimportant subject. As for the Pentagon it was represented solely by Michael Greens of ISA from July 1960 till February 1963 both in the "Task Force" and the "Congo Club". It may be stated that when big decisions were taken, a larger Task Force Committee assembled which were attended to by high officials of the State Department, namely George Ball, George McGhee, Under Secretaries and U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs and that sometimes Task Force meetings were also held at the White House in the presence of President Kennedy. 579.

The Congo Club was responsible for policy implementations like the transportation of materials and the training of the Congolese army. It met infrequently depending on developments. As the Chairman of both these bodies, Williams had authorized members "to bypass routine procedures" and to go in for a "direct access to the upper echelon decision makers" in case of necessity. The functioning of both these bodies were facilitated by the fact that Williams had enjoyed a special status in the Kennedy Administration due to his personal relationship with the President and with the Secretary of State. But the deliberations in the two bodies, namely Task Force and the Congo Club focused sharp difference of opinion which had existed within the Administration between the "Old Europe" and the "New Africa" groups.

The members of the New Africa group were the liberals in the Administration, namely Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, and George Ball, Under Secretaries, Mennen Williams and Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretaries, Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and Ambassador Edmund Gullion. All of them were firm believers of the UN leadership in the Congo and were supported in the Congress by liberal Democrats namely

580. Ibid, p.201.
581. See Hilsman, n.55, p.570.
Senators Hubert Humphrey, Wayne Morse and Mrs Maurine B. Neuberger and Congressman Charles C. Diggs. The "New Africa Group" went for lobbying in the Department of Defence as well as in the Congress. Their view was that "African nationalism was the wave of the future and that the United States must put itself clearly and unmistakably on the side of history". The group opposed Katanga's secession, since the Congo was not economically viable without it and that its success would pave the way for further secessions in Africa as well as towards a communist take-over, in the Congo. According to Hilsman, the Administration would have initiated a more aggressive posture as proposed by the New Africa group but for several factors like the attitude of Hammarskjold that he should not be accused of being partisan, the Congolese dislike of UN Representative Rajeswar Dyal and the disagreement between the NATO members over the UN actions. The domestic criticisms which emanated out of the Congress and the Katanga Lobby also brought about a temporary eclipse of the Pro-Africa position following the Kitane accord.

The "Old Europe" group on the other hand, favoured a "European" solution. They supported Belgium in respect of its economic interests in Katanga. George McGhee, the

582. For details see Hilsman, n.55, Pisano, n.202, p.203, Walters n.91, pp.186-187.
583. See Hilsman, n.55, p.249.
Under Secretary belonged to this group and his voice
carried weight with Secretary Rusk being his old colleague.
Mc Ghee sympathized the "International business structure"
"in Africa, and conceived Africa" as an appendage of Europe
and a contributor to the restoration of a sound European
economy"585. Mc Ghee's views were supported by the Congo
Desk Officer, Arthur H. Woodruff during Congressional
hearings on the Congo Operation in 1961. According to
Woodruff, "little economic viability would be left if Belgians
were to leave the Congo altogether"586. Mc Ghee like Harriman
was also sympathetic towards Tshombe587.

There were also other forceful influences in the
American circles supporting the European views namely Senator
Mike Mansfield and Carl Kaysen and Ralph Dungan belonging to
the White House. All of them believed that the United States
was simply over committed in the Congo588. Also the old
line Europe-oriented career diplomats led by former Under
Secretary Robert Murphy, who wielded considerable influence
in business circles and the State Department were openly
contemptuous of the UN solutions as prompted by the "New
Africa Group"589. The Defence Department also came out in
support of the European position probably because a communist
take-over in the Congo might affect America's security

585. See Weissman, n.29, p.133.
586. UN operations in the Congo, Hearings, n.237, p.17.
588. Ibid, p.532.
589. See Hilsman, n.55, p.246.
interests in the neighbouring Azores base and that a "fall out" from the Congo crisis might prove disastrous to the European interests in their former colonies. These debates within the Administration continued throughout the years 1961 and 1962, with the President in real dilemma after a series of unsuccessful UN military engagements in 1961 and the unfortunate outcome of the Kitona Agreement as to how far he should go by way of ignoring completely the European interests as well as domestic opposition.

It may be pointed out that developments following the Kitona talks were distressing. According to Hilsman, the sounding from the Congolese Parliament indicated that Adoula's position had become insecure with the path wide open for "Gizenga or a notorious communist sympathizer to seize control of the Central Government".

The White House was also worried over the "considerable mischief" that had been perpetrated by Struelens and the Katanga Lobby. While the Katanga Lobby did not succeed in winning over the attitude of the Kennedy Administration towards Katanga, its influence was being increasingly felt since it was articulating the theme of the interest of the Free World in Africa rather successfully. Infact with Tshombe's backing out of the Kitona agreement, the White House felt greatly "let down".

590. Ibid, p.249.
592. See Walters, n.91, pp.215-216.
The break down of Kitona talks, prompted Kennedy to advocate for peaceful reconciliation between Adoula and Tshombe. A step in this direction was taken at Hamilton, Bermuda when Kennedy met Prime Minister Mc Millan. At the end of talks, both the leaders expressed their strong hope that further progress in the Congo "could be made through the efforts of Tshombe and Adoula." It has been mentioned earlier that the Administration was apprehensive that the success of Katanga secession might pave the way for Gizenga's take-over with the Soviet support. The United States also pledged an additional grant of $15,000,000 to the UN economic development programme in the Congo. During this period some skeptics of Adoula government had indicated that Adoula was thinking in terms of veering towards an "anti western neutralism", with his decision to reopen the Soviet embassy and his contemplated visit to the USSR. But the Administration had dismissed such suspicion by providing strong support to Adoula. In the words of Williams, during his visit "Adoula made many friends for the Congo" in the United States.

But the American official stance towards Tshombe had undergone some changes too. This is evident from a

596. Ibid.
television appearance by Ambassador Stevenson, in which the Ambassador had lauded Tshombe as "clearly one of the ablest leaders in the Congo". He added, however, that Tshombe's course has brought great trouble to Africa and the UN. 598.

The United States sought to induce the Union Minière not to stand in the way of negotiation between Adoula and Tshombe. For instance, through Admiral Kirk, President of Belgo-American Development Corporation, in New York, efforts were made to persuade the Union Minière to support conciliation efforts. 599. Also efforts were made by the US Ambassador to Belgium, Douglas MacArthur, to soften Belgian public feelings against the United States 600.

The Integration of Katanga.

In the first half of 1962, hectic efforts were made for bringing about a conciliation between Adoula and Tshombe. With the blessings of US government, it resulted in a series of meetings between the two leaders. But Tshombe sought to frustrate these conciliation measures by insisting on a de facto recognition of his regime by the UN and being denied so, he evaded from reaching any agreement.

600. Ibid, 1 April 1962, p.2.
He also sought to create deadlocks in the negotiation and on 26 June 1962, he broke off completely from further discussions, leading the country once again towards a civil war.

The failure of these discussions prompted the US government to think in terms of applying economic pressures to compel Tshombe to accept the Congo federation and efforts were made in this direction to consult the allies, by sending Williams to Belgium and Cleveland to London and Paris. It was pointed out to the allies that Tshombe would only go along with unity proposals if he becomes convinced that he had lost all support from abroad. But the response of the allies was far from encouraging. For instance, Britain and France were totally opposed to any threat of sanctions and that Belgium indicated that it would only "help force Tshombe to return to the negotiation."

President Kennedy at a news conference on 24 July 1962 confirmed the US plan for applying pressures on Katanga. The US also accused Tshombe of "intransigence" and for provoking mob fury against the UN troops, and had indicated to him that the UN would act with all possible measures short of war.


Secretary General U Thant went further as to characterize the leaders of Katanga as "a bunch of clowns". The State Department also summoned Ambassador Gullion to the capital to report on Congo's economic situation, as well as to meet the UN Secretary General on a delegation along with other US officials, namely Fredericks, Cleveland and Charles Yost (Acting UN Ambassador) for possible steps against Katanga. At such a meeting in New York discussion had taken place concerning how to coordinate the UN/US efforts. The Secretary General had expressed his impatience at the meeting with the slow and unproductive nature of Adoula-Tshombe talks. It is quite likely that U Thant might have suggested tougher action in order to make Tshombe "see reason". Ambassador Charles Yost had met the Secretary General once again with a US draft "Working Paper" on the Congo. The draft paper outlined such drastic measures as boycott of Katanga's copper, cobalt and other minerals. The less drastic measures suggested in the paper were in the form of cutting of Katanga's postal telephones, and telegraph communications and refusal to recognize Katanga's passes. The working paper was circulated among allies for their opinion. But their view appeared to be that Tshombe should not be coerced but be requested to come to negotiation immediately on the basis of a new federal Constitution.

606. Ibid.
608. For details see Ibid, 10 August 1962, p.1 and 3.
The United States, in a series of tough negotiation with its allies eventually came up with a "UN Plan" which was almost on the lines of its earlier "working paper". The Administration also made efforts to enlist the cooperation of New York firms namely Lazard Frères and the American Metal Climax, "to twist Union Miniere's arm". Belgium responded to the new "American Plan" by suggesting that more time should be given to Tshombe, "for accepting the measures of national reconciliation". Britain described the UN Plan as a combination of the "carrot" and the "stick" and agreed only to adhere to the "carrot part of the plan".611

The United States in a series of discussions with Britain, France, Belgium and U Thant made efforts to avoid a military conflagration. Such discussions led to the "UN Plan for National Reconciliation" announced by U Thant on 20 August 1962. The Thant plan contained eight provisions, the most important being a federal constitution, equal sharing of tax revenues and mining royalties between Katanga and the Central Government, unification of currency, reintegration of Katangan military force into the Congolese army, reorganisation of the Central Government to accommodate the Katangan representatives, the amnesty for political

610. See Weissman, n.29, p.178.
prisoners and the freedom of movement for UN personnel. The U Thant Plan was accepted by both Tshombe and Adoula and that the State Department expressed its gratification that Tshombe had agreed to abide by the plan. By the end of November however, U Thant who could not rely on the commitment of Tshombe had reached the conclusion that a final showdown with Tshombe was "inevitable" and "necessary", because of (a) Almost prohibitive cost of the UN operation which (5 10 million per month) had driven the UN into bankruptcy (b) Britain and France having been "fed up" with the ONUC, (c) Soviet Union being totally hostile and because of (d) US Congressional support which was getting "shaky". With the Indian government's decision to withdraw its contingent, following the Chinese aggression, the options for the United Nations, excepting for a quick showdown against Tshombe had become limited.

The United Nations announced its "Course of Action" on 26 November 1962 which contained the following four phases.

Phase I - The presentation of the plan to the Katangese and a 10 day period for acceptance, the start of negotiation between Leopoldville and Union Miniere for a redistribution of duties and the involvement of the United States in providing a modest amount of military equipment to the Congolese army for modernization.

612. For details see Williams, Africa for Africans n.27, p.97, Pisano, n.202, p.198 and Walters, n.91, pp.151-152.
614. For details see Pisano n.202, pp.198-199 and Walters n.91, pp.152-153.
Phase II—If Katanga did not accept within 10 days, interested governments would notify it of their intentions to apply an embargo on copper and cobalt, and would request more severe measures if those did not work.

Phase III—The Government at Leopoldville requests the governments involved to cease purchase of copper and cobalt from Katanga and

Phase IV—Further action

U Thant announced that economic sanctions would be applied to Katanga after the dead line contained in Phase I would be over.

But the British had not so far agreed to the American position. Some change in British attitude was however brought about following Kennedy-Mc Millan meeting on 21 December 1962, after which the British expressed concern over the dangers associated with Congo's fragmentation. There was also an indication of change in the Belgian attitude following a meeting between President Kennedy and Paul Henry Speak, the Belgian Foreign Minister after which Tshombe was threatened with "severe economic measures" if he did not concede to the proposed federal constitution. Following Belgian-US rapprochement, the United States

615. For details See Walters, n.91, p.154.
616. See Ibid.
probably suggested to Belgium that the Union Miniere be pressurized to induce Tshombe for a settlement. This is evident from the newspaper report that Henry Speake had discussed with Secretary Rusk as well as with Herman Robilliard, Executive Director, Union Miniere regarding the Katanga problem. The decisive blow for Tshombe, however, came on 11 December 1961 when the Belgian Foreign Minister denounced him as a "rebel" and also declared Belgium's open support for the UN enforcement measures. Tshombe responded to the new situation by accusing the United States for "prolonging Congolese misery" and threatened that he would "apply the scorched-earth policy" rather than submit to its military threats and pressures. The New York Times reported that around this period a group of university students in Elisabethville had stoned the US consulate over there and had shouted slogans like "Down with Kennedy" and that the US government had lodged strong protest with Tshombe for the attack on the American consulate.

It is appropriate to analyze how the American policy-makers had responded to these developments between August and November 1962. This was a period when the U Thant plan had been kept in cold storage due to Tshombe's non-cooperation and that President Kennedy had asked George

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619. See Walters, n.91, pp.154-155.
621. Ibid.
Mc Ghee, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to remain in charge of the Congo policy. In this context, Mc Ghee had conferred with UN officials for ending the secession of Katanga. On 1 October 1962 President Kennedy sent Mc Ghee to the Congo to assess the situation. According to Hilsman, Mc Ghee was sent because being close to the Belgians as well as being sympathetic to Tshombe, the Under Secretary had a better chance with Tshombe than any one in the US government, to make a last attempt at reconciliation.

According to Schlesinger however Mc Ghee "found Tshombe contemptuous of the Americans and confident of his own strength." Mc Ghee, without being disheartened made a number of trips to Katanga and the Congo subsequently to explore possibilities of resolving the crisis. In this connection he also visited Bonn, Brussels, Salisbury and London. According to the New York Times Mc Ghee had warned Tshombe that the US would apply economic sanctions if "Katanga balked at an accommodation with the Central Government."

According to Chester Bowles, Ambassador Gullion had reported to him that "Tshombe had handled Mc Ghee easily by convincing him of his sincerity in seeking negotiation with Adoula." But on hearing such a report Bowles...
sent a telegram to the President, expressing his disapproval of Mc Ghee's analysis and urging him to take forceful measures, including a blockade of Katanga's copper exports. According to Hilsman, Mc Ghee's analysis after these tours had added very little initiatives to the crisis and that his final recommendation was for indefinite postponment of sanctions until full cooperation of the allies was assured. Thus, Mc Ghee's position was one of sympathy and support for Tshombe and therefore, he might not have threatened the Katangan leader with "dire consequences" as stated earlier.

In the meanwhile Ambassador Gullion had reached Washington and had suggested to the President that the "solution was to allow the UN troops to destroy Tshombe's army." This was also the view of Chester Bowles. In mid August according to Hilsman, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research under his guidance had prepared a "paper" in which they had argued that Katanga's integration could not be achieved by threats, but by some drastic changes in Tshombe's position, or changes in the sources of his strength. Making a prediction that "efforts to achieve unification through negotiation would fail," the paper had concluded that

628. Ibid.
629. See Hilsman, n.55, p.261.
it might be wiser to consider measures such as a partial withdrawal as the step for a practical contingency.\(^631\).

Schlesinger points out that Ralph Dungan and Carl Kaysen who were in charge of Congo at the White House were highly critical of deeper American involvement. In their opinion, according to Schlesinger, "bleeding hearts" in the African Bureau were in fact "exaggerating the imminence of a communist intervention.\(^632\).

President Kennedy reviewed the situation and discovered that the Mc Ghee plan had become dead, with Mc Ghee's suggestion for the creation of a special fund for Union Miniere deposits and his proposal for outside financial experts to study the needs of both Katanga and the Congo, had not been accepted by either Adoula or Tshombe.\(^633\).

According to Hilsman, the need for Kennedy's appraisal was due to (a) Increasing difficulty of Adoula regime (b) Scheduled withdrawal of Indian troops (c) Prospects of wider Congressional criticisms at the forthcoming session of the Congress in January 1963.\(^634\). It also transpired to the Administration following Gullion's report that Adoula's regime might not survive unless Katanga was re-integrated.

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634. See Hilsman, n.55, pp.262-263.
swiftly. Also reports received from the Congo, revealed that an opposition cartel consisting of the Lumumbaists, Tshombeists and some members of ABAKO party had been formed, with the ostensible intention to over throw the Adoula government and to replace it by the new Cartel. It was further reported that due to last minute concessions made by Prime Minister Adoula as well as profuse bribery provided by the CIA, an unfavourable vote against Adoula was somehow averted. Reports also had reached Washington that the Soviet Ambassador in the Congo was in the habit of trying to court its politicians at Cocktail parties and had made offers of military assistance to these possible successors of Adoula. The Soviet overtures might have prompted the United States for swift action which is evident from the fact that a special advisory team of the Department of Defence led by Colonel Michael J.L. Greene had been sent to Leopoldville to determine the basic essentials for an effective Congolese Armed force. According to the study report, foreign military material, training and advisory assistance were considered essential. As per the Greene report, the first shipment of 20 Jeeps and spare parts was sent to the Congo in October 1962. Efforts were made to establish a US Military Mission in the Congo (COMISH).

636. See Weissman, n.29, p.185.
President Kennedy at this point asked Under Secretary George Ball on 9 December 1962 to make a review of the Katanga situation and to formulate some policy alternatives immediately for his consideration. According to Hilsman, acting under President's orders, Ball had asked him to undertake such a study as well as to recommend some policy alternatives. Hilsman stated that he had gone to Ball's office along with Robert C. Good, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Africa for discussion. Making a review, his agency pointed out that the available alternatives were three namely (a) To turn the entire problem over to the African States (2) To legitimate Tshombe's secession (3) to back Tshombe as the unifier of the Congo. After examining the pros and the cons of the matter, according to Hilsman, his Bureau came to the conclusion that the real choices for the Administration were mainly two, namely (a) "using military force to bring about integration" or (b) "disengaging the US from the Congo entirely and working to get the UN out as well". As for its recommendation the Bureau suggested the first alternative to Ball in terms of military measures to bring about Katanga's reintegration.

The National Security Council (NSC) met on 17 December 1962 to make a final appraisal regarding the American position. It is reported that the NSC decided in

638. See Hilsman n.55, p.261.
639. Ibid, pp.264-266.
favour of providing the UN with whatever materials it required to reintegrate Katanga by force. It is pointed out by Bowles that this decision was taken by the President by ignoring the advice of the European Bureau and the Defence Department. According to Hilsman, it was decided at the NSC meeting to send a US Military Mission to the Congo to "signal our intentions" clearly to Tshombe, and also to maintain close "coordination with our allies". It was further stipulated that special efforts be made to brief the press and key Congressmen highlighting the fact that Soviet activities in the Congo had shown prospects of lurking dangers of a communist take over, not only in the Congo but in all neighbouring states as well. The communist threat was considered to be the best bet through which the Congress, the allies and the American people could be convinced, Swenson pointed out.

Prior to the NSC decision of 17 December 1961, the United States Immigration Service had asked Michael Struelens to leave the country within fifteen days or face deportation. The United States also decided to dispatch an American military mission to the Congo under the Chairmanship of Louis W. Truman to help save the weakening government of

643. See Swenson n.577, p.638.
Adoula", which was threatened by a communist take over. According to Hilsman, the military mission was sent with the intention to convey to Tshombe that "his end had come and that the United States was ready to employ force to achieve the ultimate unification. Truman discussed with U Thant regarding UN military necessity in preparation for its Katanga operation. General Truman also discussed military matters with Adoula Government.

The final showdown between the UN troops and the Katanga forces (Round Three) began when on 24 December 1962, the UN troops were fired upon by a Katanga contingent and the UN retaliating the attack. The Round Three lasted from 24 December 1962 till 21 January 1963. U Thant pushed the conflict to its final conclusion by ordering a march of the UN troops into Kolwezi on 16 January 1963, causing Tshombe to surrender and to announce the ending of two and half years of secession. The UN operation during Round Three was effectively supported by the United States in the form of providing trucks, armoured personnel carriers, mine clearing equipments, transport air crafts and other military equipments. The Congolese government also participated in the successfully concluded UN operation.

The reaction of the US Congress towards the UN operations may be stated. It may be pointed out that the

646. See Weissman n.29, p.184.
consensus in the Congress did not favour Administration's policies still but significantly enough the number of supporters for the Administration was gradually increasing. Apart from traditional American supporters in the Senate namely Senators, Humphrey, Joseph S. Clark (Democrat, Pennsylvania), others, namely Senators Wayne Morse (Democrat, Oregon) and Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana) made statements endorsing the Administration's efforts when the Congress reassembled after the recess in January, 1963. The position of Pro-Administration supporters could be summed up in the words of Senator Clark that "the UN and the US policies in the Congo have been a striking success". In the House of Representatives, Congressman Adam C. Powell (Republican, New York) expressed the satisfaction over the fact that the Congo after its first 2½ years of tribulation "is rebuilding, reorganizing and reintegrating, politically, economically and socially into a viable federal state" under the leadership of Adoula. Expression of support was also evident in the extension of remarks made by Representatives Morris K. Udall (Democrat Arizona) and Lucien Nedzi (Democrat, Michigan).

The critics in the Senate included Senators John G. Tower (Republican, Texas) and Allen J. Ellender.

(Democrat, Louisiana). In a blistering attack on the Administration for the UN military campaign against "pro-Western," and "anti-communist" government in Central Africa Senator Tower described the forcible integration of Katanga into the Congo as a "short-gun wedding" which could be maintained by force only. Senator Ellender concurring with Senator Tower stated that his predictions in 1953 that "darkness would descend in the Congo" has been vindicated by the UN operation. As regards the views of Representatives, it may be pointed out that a large number of them, namely Representatives William B. Widnall (Republican, New Jersey) H.R. Gross (Republican, Iowa) E.R. Ross Adair (Republican Indiana), Edward J. Derwinsky (Republican, Illinois), Clark McGregor (Republican, Minnesota), Jammie L. Whitten (Democrat, Mississippi), William Bray (Republican, Indiana), Arthur Winstead (Democrat, Mississippi) Burl L Talcott (Republican, California) made speeches or extension of remarks in the House of Representative attacking the Administration for throwing its active support behind the UN operation. Thus, the UN offensives against Katanga and the involvement and active support provided by the United States represented a stormy chapter of the Kennedy Presidency. As regards Kennedy's

final decision to employ force against Katanga, the view of his biographer Theodore Sorenson may be noted. According to Sorenson, "it struck me in the aftermath of the Cuban success some two months earlier as evidence of a desire by peace lovers to show their belief in military solutions too".654