CHAPTER - IV
(a) The Fall of Mossadeq

When the new Republican administration under President Dwight D. Eisenhower had assumed office in January 1953, it had initially decided to follow policies of its predecessor concerning Iran. It may be pertinent to mention that despite Mossadeq's intransigence over the oil issue, as stated earlier, the Americans had apparently pinned their calculations on a rather contentious "hope" that the Iranian nationalist Prime Minister would eventually "settle down" in terms of "moderating" his policies. This, however, did not materialize upsetting all American calculations. In the process had resulted a new perspective which had begun to highlight the fact that Mossadeq was becoming increasingly dependent on communist support for his political survival in Iran. Infact, following some angry outbursts against the Shah in Tehran, the Iranian ruler had become quite "disgusted" so as to throw a hint to the Americans in February 1953 concerning his plans to "abdicate" for health reasons. This development, however, had so greatly "unnerved" the American policy-makers that they had begun to contemplate seriously in terms of emergency measures to resurrect Shah in his earlier position so that he "might serve as a rallying point for popular opposition in
Iran against the Prime Minister [Mossadeq].\textsuperscript{194} As events had actually unfolded, the Eisenhower administration had master-minded an intervention in Iran through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to bring about not only the downfall of Mossadeq on 20 August 1953 but also to pave the way for the return of Shah from exile.

To begin with the story, Mossadeq had adopted a clever strategy vis-a-vis the American policy-makers under the Truman administration. For instance, he had begun to negotiate with the Russians over the sale of Iranian oil and had also hinted about "the necessity of Tehran's neutrality in the Cold War". Further, he had demonstrated clearly to the Americans concerning his impeccable control over the Iranian masses, when the public fury had forced the reluctant Shah to rescind his decision and to resurrect the nationalist leader back as Prime Minister on 22 July 1952.\textsuperscript{195}

But a strong "upswing" in anti-American sentiments had engulfed Iran following the re-instatement of Mossadeq. For instance, in early November 1952 the head of Iran's National Oil Enterprise had publicly refused an official invitation to visit the United States on grounds of alleged American support for the British economic measures against the Tehran government.\textsuperscript{196} This had been followed by open

\textsuperscript{194} For details see Grayson, n. 142, p. 131

\textsuperscript{195} For details see Rubin, n. 7, pp. 72-73

\textsuperscript{196} L. Grayson, n. 142, p. 130
accusations made by former Tudeh party members as well as other radical factions within the National Front that a conspiracy had been masterminded by Ahmad Qavam and backed by the US embassy in Tehran for the overthrow of Mossadeq. These accusations had further escalated into an open denunciation by some Tehran masses with the slogan "Death to the Shah". Also some Iranian mobs had felt provoked to launch attacks on the American consulate as well as on its library at Tehran. The public fury had been raised on the reported claim that "Washington had stabbed Mossadeq in the back... because of its limited aid and alleged pro-British stand".

Commenting on the development, the New York Times in an editorial on 11 August 1952 had stated rather mournfully:

... We know that our object is quite honestly to be helpful and humanitarian [and] in the process to strengthen Iran against chaos and communism. To do good, even against the wishes of the beneficiary, is still the right thing..."

As for Mossadeq he did not appear to feel gloomy at the deteriorating turn of events in Iran and on the contrary he seemed to mistakenly believe that the incoming Eisenhower

197. Rubin, n. 7, p.73
198. Grayson, n. 142, p.130
199. For details see Rubin, n. 7, p.73
administration would offer him a better deal. But contrary to Mossadeq's calculations, domestic criticisms started emanating against him almost immediately after he had been declared by the Time Magazine as "Man of the Year" in 1952. For instance, the Tudeh party had declared him an "American puppet" and had charged that he would allow Washington "to convert Iran into a gigantic military base". It may be observed that Mossadeq had lost further support within the Tudeh party after he had decided to accept President Truman's offer (of American mediation through his personal emissary Averell Harriman) during the negotiation over the AIOC nationalization issue.

In view of the domestic criticisms Mossadeq had pinned great hope on the incoming Eisenhower administration to take the initiative for providing a better deal for Iran. Infact, prior to his inauguration Mossadeq had written to Eisenhower congratulating the President elect on his victory and to utilizing the occasion to castigate the predecessor administration for its "insensivities" towards Iran.

... For almost two years, the Iranian people have suffered acute distress and much misery merely because a

201. For details see Rubin, n. 7, p.76
203. As cited in Grayson, n. 142, p.130
company inspired by covetousness and a desire for profit supported by the British government has been endeavouring to prevent them for obtaining their natural and elemental rights... The American government has pursued what appears to the Iranian people to be a policy of supporting the British Government and the AIOC... 204

In his response Eisenhower had assured Mossadeq that Iran would always receive sympathetic considerations from American quarters and that his administration would adopt an impartial stance on the Anglo-Iranian dispute. 205 Possibly because of these warm reciprocal gestures there had developed some rays of hope in March 1953 that another joint Anglo-American compromise plan to solve the oil controversy might become acceptable to Iran. As for the President, in continuation of these gestures, he had decided to recommend the case of Iran as recipient of the US aid programme in his message to the Congress on 5 May 1953. 206

In the meanwhile, however, Mossadeq had begun to lose support from almost all major groups within the National Front which had initially rallied behind him in his crussade against the AIOC. The National Front had got itself split as

204. Mossadeq to Eisenhower 9 January 1953 as cited in Rubin, n. 7, pp.76-77

205. Eisenhower to Mossadeq, 10 January 1953 as cited in Rubin, n. 7, p.77

206. Grayson, n. 142, p.130
some of Mossadeq's close supporters (led by the Tudeh party) had become "disenchanted" with his "solo" performance as well as "unproductive" diplomatic battles that he had been conducting with the AIOC and Britain. Mossadeq had also further lost the support of a large segment of the religious elements as a result of strong differences that he had developed with his former staunch supporter namely, Ayatollah Kashani. In the meanwhile the Iranian Prime Minister had made hectic efforts to weaken the Shah's power by making a determined bid to place the Royal Army under the civilian control, which paved the way towards a struggle for power between Mossadeq and Shah.\(^{207}\). As for the Shah, he had made a determined attempt thereafter to oust Mossadeq from power by dismissing him on 13 August 1953. But the latter had refused to accede to the same and had remained stubborn in his office as large pro-Mossadeq mobs had surged through the capital city of Tehran by demonstrating openly their strong support behind the dismissed Prime Minister. At this point being thoroughly disgusted the Shah had decided to leave the country for Iraq by air on 16 August 1953.\(^ {208}\)

The sudden departure of Shah had naturally aroused "panic" in American circles concerning the political future of Iran. As for the British government, they had continued

\(^{207}\) For details see Ramazani, Economic Consequences of the Iranian Revolution, n. 202, p.71

\(^{208}\) For details see Grayson, n. 142, p.131
reiterate the view that Mossadeq was mainly instrumental for fomenting domestic crisis as well as perpetrating a "region of terror" which had eventually resulted in forcing the Shah to leave Iran in great anguish. Infact gradually a consensus had emerged in the United States to support the British position in view of Mossadeq's inability to compromise with the AIOC, the deteriorating Iranian economic conditions, the rise of Tudeh power and the possibility of a "Communist Coup" in Iran. Following this, the CIA had been asked to monitor the situation for a possible US intervention. 209

To begin with the CIA story, shortly before the US Presidential elections in November 1952, the British government had invited Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA operative to London for discussion concerning a plan to overthrow Mossadeq. This operation had been described as "Operation Ajax". But both the CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith as well as his deputy Allen Dulles had suggested for the postponement of the operation during the Truman administration in view of well-known opposition by Secretary, Dean Acheson to such clandestine activities. 210 Following the inauguration of Eisenhower administration, however, the British government had pressed for the operation once again by sending a mission to Washington

209. For details see Ramazani, Economic Consequences of Iranian Revolution, n. 202, p.72

210. For details see Kermit Roosevelt, Counter Coup : The Struggle For the Control of Iran (New York, 1980), pp.114-115.
in February 1953 for a discussion on the matter with the new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as well as with the concerned CIA official (Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles and Ken Roosevelt). It is further reported that at that meeting Secretary Dulles had given his consent to the CIA operation as well as for the proposal to replace Mossadeq by Fazlullah Zahedi, a prominent general belonging to the Iranian army. Also, the CIA official Kermit Roosevelt, had reportedly assured every one present in the meeting concerning Zahedi that he was "anti-Soviet", but not "anti-British" in his outlook.211

In the meanwhile the new US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had proposed to visit the Middle East beginning in May 1953. But in view of the Iranian situation, Dulles had decided to skip the country from his itinerary, as his presence in Tehran might have been construed as an American endorsement of the Mossadeq regime. Also, the US President had decided to avoid an immediate response to a letter written by Mossadeq around this time on 28 May 1953, in which the Iranian Prime Minister had made a request for an increased US assistance to his country. Infact, after long consultations with Dulles, Bedell Smith and Ambassador Henderson, the President had reportedly rebuffed Mossadeq by writing back to him on 29 June 1953 that "many American citizens would be opposed to assistance to Iran".212 While this communication had the intention of

211. For details see Ibid, pp.120-123
warning Mossadeq to desist from hostile activities against the United States. But the mercurial Prime Minister had absolutely paid little heed to such warnings and had gone ahead with his old style of functioning which seemed to have irritated the Americans greatly.  

It may be mentioned that the initial American "covert plan" concerning Iran had been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for military action in the event of a Tudeh coup as anticipated. It had contained the following: "(a) Air shows of force over Iran (b) Additional arms aid to appropriate Middle East countries (c) Deployment of US forces to Southern Turkey and (d) Deployment of US Forces to the vicinity of Basra, Iraq". By summer of 1953, however, the Chairman of JCS, Admiral Radford had revised the proposal into an emergency plan containing these strategies, "(a) Deploy ground and air forces to Tehran and other major cities to restore order, (b) Deploy ground and air forces to Abadan to protect the oil installations (c) Deploy a carrier task force group to the Persian Gulf to support friendly forces in southern Iran". But there was no need for the emergency military plan since Kermit Roosevelt had accomplished everything what both the British and the Americans had wanted in Iran with the help of about one hundred thousand dollars along with some Iranian friends. The main features of "Operation

213. For details see Rubin, n. 7, p. 80
214. As cited in Smaij, n. 149, p. 137
215. As cited in Ibid.
Ajax" had consisted of the following: "paying a group Tehran hoodlums to create street demonstrations" in favour of the Shah" and "to incite the general public against Mossadeq".

The key to the success of the operation, however, had been the fact that the entire corps of Iranian army officers, had supported the Shah whole heartedly as they had developed no loyalty towards Mossadeq.

The "Operation Ajax" had actually begun when on 1 August 1953, Kermit Roosevelt had paid a secret visit to the Shah at mid-night and had apprised him concerning the details of the CIA plan as well as the endorsement of it by both US President Eisenhower as well as the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Further, the CIA had provided $1 million in Iranian currency out of $100,000 had to been paid to the two Persian agents for its distribution among athletic club "thugs" and the poor belonging to the South Tehran slums. As per the CIA plan, the Shah had flown to a remote Iranian town on the Caspian Sea, leaving behind him two decrees namely, one dismissing Prime Minister Mossadeq and a second appointing military general Fazlollah Zahedi in his place.

But following his dismissal, Mossadeq had once again refused to bow out of office and had resorted to inciting his supporters to march on the street of Tehran. At this point

216. Ibid. p.138
217. For details see Rubin, n.7, p.82
the CIA had resorted to the hiring of mobs which in fact had paraded on the streets of Tehran shouting pro-Shah slogans and in the process clashing with the Mossadeq supporters and Tudeh party members. During such confrontation, however, some army officers (who had been contacted earlier by Kermitt Roosevelt) had extended co-operation to the CIA operation by providing support to the pro-Shah demonstrators. In the process, the CIA had won the day for the Shah, as he had returned back to his country triumphantly from Italy. Soon after, some soldiers in civilian clothing had also ensured the arrest of Mossadeq from his residence and had put the deposed Prime Minister behind the bar; leading to his overthrow from power.\textsuperscript{218} As for the final fate of Mossadeq, he had been put through a mock trial and kept in prison for the next three years. But thereafter he had been released but had once again been put under house arrest, where he had died quietly. As for his top aides as well as many Tudeh party supporters, they had either been executed, imprisoned or had been forced to go into exile.\textsuperscript{219}

In conclusion, it may be observed that the American role in the overthrow of Mossadeq had been quite significant, though the role of CIA had been merely to provide minimal financial and logistic support for the "Operation Ajax".\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{218. For details see Smaii, n. 149, p.138}
\textsuperscript{219. For details see Ibid., p.138}
\textsuperscript{220. For details see Rubin, n. 7, pp.88-89}
Summing up the situation an eminent Iranian scholar Richard Cottam had opined that "regardless of foreign participation, Mossadeq could not have been overthrown if significant elements of the population had not lost faith in his leadership".221 Such a development, in fact, had comprised an important and often-neglected aspect that had not been comprehended fully even by the CIA during the operation. For instance, the CIA operation could not have been achieved with such an amazing success, had not the general population as well as the army had supported the CIA operation rather enthusiastically to ensure the final overthrow of Mossadeq in August 1953.222 With the fall of Mossadeq, however, the period of "Nationalist Resurgence (1951-1953)" had culminated and that Iran had entered a new phase as characterized by the consolidation of power by the Shah over the country.

(b) The Consolidation of Shah in Iran

After the overthrow of Mossadeq Mohammad Reza Shah had returned back to his country to reassume his traditional and constitutional position as Iran's monarch as well as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He had formed a

222. Rubin, n. 7, p.89
military government under the leadership of General Zahedi and had put Iran under indefinite martial law. The Shah's objectives, thereafter, had been to consolidate his regime and to establish his absolute dynastic rule as quickly and forcefully as possible.\textsuperscript{223} To achieve these objectives, the Shah had decided to resort to a combination of naked force as well as the process of military modernization. For instance, he had suppressed the powers of Tudeh party by arresting ninety one of its communist-minded dissident members in 1953. He further destroyed the Tudeh network within the Iranian Army in 1954 as well as by executing Khusrow Ruzbeh (described as Lenin of Iran) in 1957. The National Front members had also received such tragic fate at his hands. He had, however, reduced the death sentence as awarded in favour of Mossadeq to imprisonment for three years. But for other leaders he had inflicted capital punishment. The Foreign Minister of Mossadeq government, Hussain Fatemi, for instance, had been executed and the revolutionary activities of the National Resistance Movement had been smashed ruthlessly. These ruthless suppressions had been accompanied by further acts of mass arbitrary detentions as well as imprisonment of nationalist elements in the country.\textsuperscript{224} In this process he had successfully muzzled all shade of domestic opposition to his regime namely, (a) the National Front

\textsuperscript{223} For details see Amin Saikal, \textit{The Rise and Fall of Shah} (Princeton, 1980), p.46

\textsuperscript{224} For details see Ramazani, \textit{Economic Consequences of Iranian Revolution}, n. 202, p.72
supporters, (b) The Tudeh party, (c) the non-partisan intellectuals (consisting of former Iranian politicians, bureaucrats, professionals and the organized clergy who had felt greatly alarmed by Shah's dictatorial tendencies) and (d) the anti-monarchist tribes (particularly the Qashqai tribe in southern Iran). The Shah had further decided to monitor as well as tackle the domestic opposition by creating a new State Security and Intelligence apparatus called the Sazemane Atlat Va Amniyate Keshvar (SAVAK) in 1957. In fact, SAVAK had very soon become a powerful organization with the active aid and assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and keen cooperation from the Israeli intelligence service, namely, the Mossad.

The opposition to Shah's regime had also emanated from some regional quarters in the neighbourhood of Iran. For instance, the Soviet Union had characterized the grabbing of power by the Shah as "an offensive by the imperialists and the Iranian reaction". The "radical" Arab nationalists (led by Egypt) had denounced the Shah's regime as an "agent of western imperialism". Their opposition, in fact, had sharpened further following Tehran's decision to pursue a policy of cooperation with Israel as well as to claim the island of Bahrain as part of Iran. In the process Shah had felt insecure over the threats as emanating from these sources as well as from

225. For details see Saikal, n. 223, pp. 46-47
226. Ramazani, Economic Consequences of Iranian Revolution, n. 202, p. 72
227. As cited in Saikal, n. 223, p. 47
the possibility of an alliance between them and the domestic opposition. Thus, the internal opposition and the perceived external threat as well as the weakness of the Iranian army, had resulted in a situation which had prompted Shah to look towards to his original benefactor namely, the United States government for support.\textsuperscript{228} As for the US government, it had responded energetically by providing full commitment to ensure the survival of Shah's regime in Iran. Further to bolster Iran, President Eisenhower had provided an emergency economic to Tehran to the tune of $43 million on the urgent request made by the newly appointed Prime Minister Zahedi on 26 August 1953. The President had further released an additional $23 million in technical assistance, which had been sanctioned earlier but had remained in the pipeline for some time.\textsuperscript{228a}

The overthrow of Mossadeq government had also been followed by attempts made by the United States to resolve the oil nationalization dispute between Iran and Britain. For instance, the State Department had deputed Herbert Hoover, Jr., the son of former US President Herbert Hoover on a fact-finding mission in October 1953 to help reach an agreement. Hoover after shuttling between Tehran and London a number of times, had made both sides agreeable to an American-sponsored compromise solution, according to which a newly-created International Oil Consortium after its establishment on

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{228} Reza Shah Pahlavi, n. 181, p.139
\textsuperscript{228a} As cited in Saikal, n. 223, p.47
\end{footnotes}
1 January 1954 would negotiate with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) concerning the exploration and refining of Iranian oil. It had been stipulated that the AIOC would receive forty per cent of the shares in the new equity at par with five American Oil Companies namely, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, Gulf Oil, Texas Oil and Socony Vacuum. In fact, each American Company had been given eight per cent of the share capital, thus totalling forty per cent in the new consortium. Apart from these American Companies, two other foreign oil corporations namely, Shell Oil and Francaise des Petroles had been provided with fourteen per cent and six per cent in the share capital respectively. In the process the oil dispute had been resolved through the American mediation in the form of an agreement signed between Tehran government and the new International Consortium on 5 August 1954. It may be surmised that the United States had resorted to its economic influence to persuade Iran to adopt a more flexible attitude concerning the oil problem by conceding to the Hoover proposal. This could be gauged from the fact that during the period of negotiation, Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and his wife had visited Tehran on 9 December 1953 as part of an official US trip to the Middle and Far East. During his stay Nixon had reportedly urged upon Tehran government to reach an agreement with Britain on the oil problem.

229. For details see Robert Stobaugh, "The Evolution of Iranian Oil Policy" in Lenczowski, Iran Under Pahlavis, n. 80, pp. 213-215
dispute since that particular issue had constituted the "key factor in determining whether it [Iran] would receive additional American aid".\textsuperscript{230}

Following the settlement of the oil dispute however, both President Eisenhower and the Shah had contemplated interim of forging an alliance relationship between the two countries. As for Eisenhower, he had developed a great distaste for Mossadeq but sincere admiration for the Shah. For instance, in his perception Mossadeq had been a "semi-invalid" who had spearheaded a "fanatical campaign" against the British, but the Shah had been a ruler with whose alliance, "we may really give a serious defeat to Russian intentions in the Middle East".\textsuperscript{231} Also, after successfully spearheading the CIA coup Kermit Roosevelt had reportedly conveyed to Eisenhower concerning his strong convictions that with American support Iran could become "a significant link in the Free World's defense".\textsuperscript{232} In fact, such a projection had prompted the Iranian ruler to enter the US-sponsored Baghdad Pact in February 1955.

The Shah had thereafter demonstrated an increasing concern to deal with Soviet "pressures" and "enticements". For instance, he had successfully checkmated Russian pressures and its propaganda machine against "Iran's alliance with the

\textsuperscript{230} For details see Grayson, n. 142, p.134
\textsuperscript{231} For details see Dwight D. Eisenhower, \textit{Mandate for Change: 1953-1956} (Garden city, New York, 1963), pp.164-166.
\textsuperscript{232} Roosevelt, n. 210, p.291
"West" as well as the granting of favourable status to American oil Corporations under the 1954 agreement. Further, in the regional domain, he had sought to counter the power of "radical" Arabs, by cultivating friendship with the conservative regimes like Saudi Arabia. Finally, he had decided to strongly favour his country's discreet relationship with Israel by asserting that it was both a "pro-Western" and "anti-Soviet" power in the Middle East. 233

In the meanwhile the Shah had sought to consolidate his power by removing Zahedi from his office in November 1955, as the latter had shown potentials of becoming a powerful Prime Minister. Following this episode, Iran had "moved towards a one-man dictatorship in which Shah relied for his political survival on the passivity of the peasantry and on the energy of the armed forces as well as strong support from SAVAK, the secret police organization". 234 The main instrument of the Shah's powers, however, had been SAVAK. According to William Colby, a former CIA Director, SAVAK had been created by the American agency, and that it had taught the Iranian secret organization concerning "proper methods of intelligence". 235 According to Kermitt Roosevelt, "certain Israeli friends discreetly joined the CIA in helping to organize and give guidance to a new Iranian security service (SAVAK)". 236 Thus,

233. For details see Ramazani, Economic Consequence of Iranian Revolution, n. 202, pp. 72-73
234. For details see Rubin, n. 7, pp. 93-94
235. Roosevelt, n. 210, p. 9
236. Ibid
the Israeli Intelligence, Mossad as well as the CIA had most probably apprised SAVAK with proper methods and techniques concerning intelligence activities. But these were of little avail in Iran due to the fact that "in an overwhelmingly illiterate society with long traditions of authoritarian government, such methods were bound to be abused as they actually were in brutal ways". 237 Thus, the role of SAVAK had become controversial in articulate Iranian circles.

Following the dismissal of Zahedi, Shah had resorted to some innovations concerning modernization of his country as well as reformation of its political institutions. As regards the modernization process, he had turned to the technocratically competent Abol Hassan Ebtehaj for support towards the creation of a plan organization. Infact, under the energetic leadership of Ebtehaj, the Plan Organization had been established which in course of time, had become "a recruitment and training base for a new technocratic elite". 238 Further, the Shah had granted a great deal of entrepreneurial freedom which had been applied to both foreign enterprises as well as the progressive elements of Iran's commercial community. 239

Beginning in 1957, the Shah had introduced a two party system on the basis of an assertion that a one-party system was "communistic" and "dictatorial" and as such could

237. Ramazani, US and Iran, n. 26, p.73
238. Cottam, n. 221, p.171
239. Ibid., p.114
not be permitted in a "Western-inspired Iran". His strategy had appeared to signal to the West concerning his intentions to democratize Iranian policies and to placate the internal opposition as well as his own pro-Western supporters. In practice, however, both the parties had been instigated and controlled by the Shah himself. For instance, the Hezb-e-Melliyun (Nationalist party) had been asked to form the government under Prime Minister Manuchehr Eqbal, whereas the Hezb-e-Mardom (People's party) had been designated by him to serve as the opposition under the leadership of the Shah's most trusted colleague, Amri Asadollah "Alam". But his regime had not allowed any political activities outside the aegis of these two parties. Also, it had enforced strict press censorship and had warned the press not to resort to public criticisms of the royal family, the military and the Americans, whose support had been construed as most "crucial" by the Shah.

The Iranian ruler had further made an announcement in 1960 that there would be new and free elections for seats to the Majlis based on democratic party lines. But when the actual election were held large scale rigging had taken place, which in fact had become self-evident. For instance, while the ruling Melliyun had won with its assured majority, the opposition Mardom had gained a respectable minority of votes.

241. Saikal, n. 223, p. 63
242. Cottam, n. 221, p. 122
243. Saikal, n. 223, p. 63
as well. The election results, had been accompanied by huge public uproar over "rigging", had prompted the Shah to nullify the same and to dismiss Eqbal as Prime Minister as well as to appoint Jafaar Sharif Imami in his place. But it had been found to the Shah's dismay that Sharif-Imami had no real political base in the country to make even a token attempt "to persuade nationalist and religious elements to co-operate with the regime". Despite this drawback, Sharif-Imami had conducted new elections to the Majlis in January and February 1961. This election also had been as highly "rigged" as in 1960, which had become evident by the fact that it had returned a Majlis that had been packed with far less subservient pro-Shah members than its 1960 predecessor. In the meanwhile domestic opposition had continued to mount up, which had eventually culminated in a teacher's strike, followed by a riot which had claimed the lives of two teachers. Being dissatisfied, the Shah had thereafter dismissed Sharif-Imami as well as Timur Bakhtiar, the head of SAVAK since 1957. Following this he had appointed Ali Amini as the next Prime Minister of Iran in May 1961. The impact of the domestic disorder in Iran had also been marked in the United States, where a large number of Iranian students had demonstrated outside the country's consulate in New York city, protesting against the alleged refusal of the Tehran government to renew passports on the ground of their alleged involvement in "anti-government activities".

244. For details see Cottam, n. 221, p. 123
245. For details see Ibid, pp.124-125
246. For details see Grayson, n. 142, pp.139-140
It may be mentioned that beginning in 1959, the Shah had been clearly inclined towards a radical approach concerning the domestic policy as well as towards the political opposition to his regime. For instance, he had become somewhat complacent in respect of continued stability of his regime due to the growing strength of his internal control as well as the steady income being funneled to Iran through its oil sources. Also, the professional, technocratic and middle class elements had been prospering extremely well and that they had appeared to have become reconciled to the Shah regime. But the domestic elements that had opposed him stubbornly had comprised the nationalist leaders belonging to the National Front. The Shah, however, had stuck to his gun in refusing to consider any rapprochement with the nationalist leaders, which might have stabilized his regime further. As for the National Front it had decided to make fierce attacks on his regime by focusing on the country's rampant corruption, nepotism, denial of the rule of law, brutality as well as insensitively in the realm of social justice. In fact, both the sides had virtually reached a point of no return by the time the controversial elections to the Majlis had been completed in 1961.  \footnote{For details see Cottam, n. 221, pp.121-123}

In the meanwhile Ali Amini had joined as the new Prime Minister of Iran in May 1961. But finding that the country had been facing the prospects of an impending collapse,
Amini had made an urgent request to the Shah to dissolve the Majlis and to equip him with emergency powers to deal with the situation which, however, had been readily agreed to by the Iranian ruler. Following this, Amini, had launched a program of internal reform and financial austerity which had been initially supported by the Shah. In fact, in a symbolic move, the Shah had donated personal properties valued at approximately $140 million for the country's economic and social developments. But very soon Shah had developed a personal aversion towards Amini due to a variety of reasons. For instance, Ali Amini was a political leader, who had somewhat resembled his kinsman Ahmad Qavam whom the ruler had never liked. Also, Amini had inducted one of Qavam's protege, Hassan Arsenjani into his cabinet. Also, like Qavam, Amini had belonged the progressive wing of the upper class and that the Shah had perceived him in the role of a "Qajar" as well as a possible "proponent of a Qajar restoration". It may be mentioned that Amini's initiatives during this period had been acclaimed highly in American circles and that he had the reputation of being "intelligent, skillful in negotiations, pragmatic, tough and courageous". But what he had lacked was Qavam's "acute sense of politics to fathom the force of an aroused public opinion". Thus, when he had put into effect an austerity programme, being backed by some generous

249. Grayson, n. 142, p. 140
American financial assistance he had instantly become the "focus" of public dissatisfaction and that the Shah had emerged unscathed through the domestic crisis somewhat stronger politically at the expense of Amini.\textsuperscript{250} Also, in the meanwhile the image of Amini as "an instrument of foreign interests" had not been confined to the pro-Mossadeq elements alone. A consensus had begun to emerge in Iranian circles that Amini was the "United States' choice for Prime Minister" and also that the Americans wanted him to be a "strong Prime Minister".\textsuperscript{251} But Amini had to suffer despite his high credentials due to strong pro-American sympathies behind him. As for the Shah, he had skillfully utilized the growing public dissatisfaction to dismiss Amini in July 1962 and to appoint his most loyal friend Amir Assadolah Alam as the next Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{252}

Following the dismissal of Ali Amini, the Shah had proceeded to announce his own reform programme called the "White Revolution". He had sought to legitimize the "six point reform programme" under the "White Revolution" through a referendum held on 26 January 1963. In this context it may be mentioned that the new experiments as initiated by the Shah had been interpreted by his detractors as the "American revolution" in the same manner they had characterized the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[250.] For details see Cottam, n. 221, pp.125-126
\item[251.] Ibid., p.126
\item[252.] Rubin, n. 7, p.109. For details see also Cottam, n. 221, pp.126-127
\end{footnotes}
overthrow of Mossadeq as an "American coup". In fact, the enthusiastic endorsement of January 1963 referendum by the Kennedy administration had provided further credence to such a perspective in Iranian circles.²⁵³ According to Amin Saikal, the "White Revolution", was a "revolution" designed to appeal to and benefit a majority of the Iranian people of different political learnings, ranging from conservatives ("White") to radicals ("Revolution") under the leadership of the traditional institution of monarchy. In effect, the "White Revolution" had represented an attempt by the Shah "to carry out a systematic process of centrally controlled general mass mobilization and selected socio-economic reforms, largely in line with Westernization". Also, it had been intended to fulfill his two main objectives in Iran namely, "to solidify and widen the popular base of his rule; and to reduce his dependence on the United States".²⁵⁴

It may be mentioned that the original six reforms, as contemplated under the White Revolution had been the handiwork of the dismissed Prime Minister Ali Amini and his trusted lieutenant Hassan Arsenjani. In fact, Shah had retained the services of Hassan Arsenjani as the minister of agriculture despite the dismissal of his political mentor namely, Ali Amini.²⁵⁵ These initial reforms had included, a

²⁵³ For details see Ramazani, US and Iran, n. 26, p.76
²⁵⁴ For details see Amin Saikal, n. 223, pp.79-80
²⁵⁵ Cottam, n. 221, p.127
comprehensive land reform, the nationalization of forests and pastures, public sale of state-owned factories as security for land reform, works profit-sharing in industry amendment to electoral law and franchise for women, and the formation of Literacy Corps. 256 These reforms, had later been included in the Third Five Year Development Plan beginning in September 1962, which had constituted as the first serious attempt at comprehensive and consistent natural planning in Iran. It defined the government's underlying development strategy and objectives and made objections of the available financial and other resources for the plan period much more clearly than before. 257

But strong opposition to the "White Revolution" had emanated from the religious forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a prominent leader of Iran's Shiite Moslem community. Khomeini had strongly protested against the Shah's plans to initiate land reforms as well as to grant the right of vote to women. 258 The religious elements had been joined by the nationalists in demonstration at several Iranian cities beginning in June 1963. These uprisings, however, had been crushed rather ruthlessly by the Shah's armed forces resulting in the tragic death of over 1000 people in Tehran alone. Also, prominent religious leaders namely, Ayatollah Khomeini of Qom, Ayatollah Qomi of Mashad and Ayatollah Mahallati of Shiraz

256. For details see Saikal, n. 223, p. 82
257. Ibid, p. 82
258. Grayson, n. 142, p. 140
had been arrested by SAVAK following these riots. In the process the domestic opposition to Shah's regime had been crushed with an iron hand.

As regards the responses in American circles, they had most enthusiastically supported the Shah's initiatives concerning the "White Revolution". As for the American media, it had depicted the Shah as a most "progressive" ruler. The New York Times, for instance, had commented on the Shah's success as the "triumph for a revolution in which Iran's ruler has aligned himself directly with the workers and peasants against conservatives and traditionalists". The paper had gone on to highlight once again that, "the great mass of the Iranian people are doubtless behind the Shah in his bold new reform efforts". Thus, the first decade following Mossadeq's ouster in 1953 had witnessed the gradual consolidation of Shah's personal dictatorship over Iran.

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259. For details see Ramazani, Economic Consequences of the Iranian Revolution, n. 202, p. 74
260. Ramazani, The US and Iran, n. 26, p. 76
261. For details see New York Times, 17 September 1963
262. Ibid, 20 September 1963
Following the political turmoils in 1963 Iran, however, had enjoyed a period unprecedented prosperity in terms of "exceptionally rapid economic growth, low inflation, and a rising standard of living for most of its citizens". The period between 1964 and 1974 has been described as "A Decade of Political Stability" as it was an era in which the Shah's control over policies in Iran (both domestic and foreign) had been practically "close to absolute". By way of background, it may be mentioned that the pace of internal change in Iran had accelerated with the Shah's launching of several programmes under the "White Revolution" in 1963. Out of these he had placed the highest priority on the implementation of his land reform policies which had been stoutly resisted by the landowning classes in the Majlis. To facilitate the process, the Shah had resorted to the suspension of constitutionalism for a period of two years in order to ensure an accelerated modernisation process in Iran as well as the concentration of personal powers in his own hands. Such actions had represented a replica of the "authoritarian" trends that had been witnessed during the pre-1941 period under the regime of his father Reza Shah.

263. For details see Cottam, n. 221, p. 132

As stated earlier, the Shah had put the programme of "White Revolution" to a referendum following several weeks of intensive official publicity in the country and had received an overwhelming popular mandate in his favour [the vote was 5,598,77 for and 4,115 against]. Such an overwhelming support in fact, had prompted the New York Times to comment later in an editorial that, "The great mass of the Iranian people are doubtless behind the Shah in his bold new reform efforts. The national plebiscite he called early this year gave emphatic evidence of this". Responding to the 1963 June uprisings, on the wake of popular protests as spearheaded by Khomeini and his religious followers, the American embassy in Tehran had characterized these as "a violent reaction to modernization and to a challenge to vested interests". As stated earlier, with strong support from the army and SAVAK the situation had been brought under firm control by the Shah and that Khomeini along with his supporters had been forced to go into exile in 1964 at the city of Najaf in Iraq. All these developments had taken place during the final end of Kennedy administration.

As for Lyndon B. Johnson, after assuming the US presidency following the tragic assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963, he had initially sought to follow the foot

265. Cottam, n. 221, p. 129
266. New York Times, 10 June 1963
267. As cited in Cottam, n. 221, p. 129
prints of his predecessor concerning American policy towards Iran. A change in US policy, however, had become clearly perceptible beginning in 1964, when Johnson had sought to deviate from Kennedy Administration's emphasis on "seeking to persuade the Shah to shift funds away from Iran's military modernization programme in favour of great emphasis on economic development". The changed American perspective had been due to its deteriorating balance of payments situation, which might have prompted the US government to undertake covert arms sales to foreign governments. In the meanwhile, the Shah had made mild flirtation with the Soviet Union by pointing out to the American policy-makers that the USSR would be an alternate source of assistance if Washington proved too unwilling to meet Iran's urgent requests. The Shah had gone a step further to sign a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in June 1964 and had followed that up by paying an official visit to Russia in late June 1965. During the course of the visit he had made a firm promise to the Soviet President Anastas Mikoyan that he would neither permit Iran to be used for aggression against the Soviet Union nor would allow foreign missile bases to operate from his own country.\textsuperscript{268} Besides, this, he had sought to expand Iran's trade, economic and technical activities with the Soviet Union by pledging to undertake the Construction of

\textsuperscript{268} For details see Grayson, n. 142, pp.140-141
Iran's first steel mill as well as the Trans-Iranian Gas Pipe line. The Shah had further decided in February 1967 that he would make a purchase of $110 million worth of arms on a long term and low-interest basis from the Soviet Union.  

As for Johnson, his attitude towards the Shah had been quite helpful and had been less critical than Kennedy. Infact, he had taken a more permissive stance towards the Shah regime by allowing the dispatch of the first major post-Kennedy American arms aid in 1964. Further Johnson had decided to provide Iran with a squadron of sixteen modern F-4 D Phantom jets in September 1966 to be financed out of the $200 million credit as guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank. A second squadron had also been made available to Iran following the visit of the Shah to the United States in August 1967. During the Shah's sojourn, President Johnson had reportedly praised him for "winning progress for country without violence or bloodshed".  

In the meanwhile domestically, the Shah's supression of the June 1963 uprisings as well as the exile of Khomeini a year later, had marked the beginning of his personal consolidation of power over Iran during the "Decade of Stability". Politically, his main tactics in this regard had been the

269. For details see Ramazani, Economic Consequences of Iranian Revolution, n. 202, p.75
270. Ibid.
271. As cited in Grayson, n. 142, p.141
pattern of policies he had followed on the wake of Mossadeq's overthrow namely, "suppression of political opposition, control of party politics through the facade of a two-party system, control of the Majlis and the press" through the instrumentality of SAVAK.\textsuperscript{272} Besides this agency an increasing need, however, had been felt by Shah intents of creating other organizations which could also serve to monitor and check SAVAK. In the process, an elaborate and overlapping internal control system had developed having a direct access to the Shah.\textsuperscript{273}

During the "decade of stability", however, a great amount of freedom had been still made available to the Iranian people. For instance, in the economic sphere the private sector had been allowed to predominate and that in the religious field the mullahs had continued unimpeded with ready access to thousand of worshippers in the mosque. Coupled with this, there had been unrestricted "freedom of movement", as exemplified through frequent travels as undertaken by Iranians abroad including for their studies in the United States as well as other European countries. For instance, in the United State alone, there were more than 50,000 Iranian students studying in different subjects.\textsuperscript{274} Besides this, his domestic position

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\textsuperscript{272} For details see Ramazani, Economic Consequences of the Iranian Revolution, n. 202, p.74.
\textsuperscript{273} For details see Cottam, n. 221, p.133
\textsuperscript{274} For details see Lenczowski, The Arc of Crisis n. 264, p.830
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interms of political power had been "formidable". For instance, he had at his command an impressive military establishment (consisting of around 2,85,000 army, 100,000 air force, and 28,000 navy) backed by an ubiquitous security apparatus. Also, he had enjoyed unprecedented wealth from oil revenues, which had averaged nearly $20 billion a year from 1974 through 1978.  

It may be mentioned that the Iranian armed forces, apart from looking after security affairs of the country had been utilized in pursuit of external security as well as in the furtherance of the Shah's foreign policy objectives under the "White Revolution".  

A major feature of the Iranian stability during the period had been a perception that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had the capacity to destroy even the most broad-based political movements and that the Americans would somehow maintain the Shah in power even if the "chips were down totally against the ruler in Iran". The notion of American intervention had comprised the most critical support behind the stability of the regime. A second factor that had contributed to the stability comprised the "ability of the Shah and his government to satisfy the material and influence needs of his people". For instance, following the "White Revolution" a large Iranian population especially the land-
less peasants who had benefitted little from the land reform measures had migrated to the urban centres in search of employment as unskilled labourers. These migratory unskilled work force along with their counterparts from Afghanistan had benefitted themselves enormously in material terms.  

A third factor contributing to the stability had been the liberal system of institutionalized corruption as had been prevalent in the country. In fact, the Shah had deliberately allowed such corrupt practices to reach astronomical proportions during this period.  

Further, political stability in the country had been brought about through the systematic subversion of domestic institutions such as political parties, the Majlis [Parliament], the specific interest groups, such as the chambers of commerce, Lawyers' associations and theological associations. As regards the subversion of political parties, he had replaced the Melliyun party with the Norvin party as His Majesty's government party. As for the opposition Mardom party, its leader Nasser Ameri had proposed reforms in the political institutions a fact, which had infuriated the Shah to dismiss him as the Leader of the Opposition. It may be mentioned that Ameri had died shortly thereafter, through an automobile accident, which, however, had been regarded as highly "controversial."  

278. For details see Eric Hooglund, Reform and Revolution in Rural Iran (Austin, Texas, 1982), p.44  
279. For details see Cottam, n. 221, p.135  
280. For details see Ervan Abrahamian, Iran: Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, New Jersey, 1982), pp.439-446  
281. For details see Cottam, n. 221, pp.135-136
Following the Ameri incident, the Shah had established an authoritarian single party, the "Rastakhiz" or "Resurgence party", which had more or less symbolized a totalitarian system that had prevailed in Iran. For instance, the Iranian parliament had become the subject of systematic rigging and that electoral campaigns had been conducted, but the determining factor for victory had been the "influence process" as perpetrated by the Shah and his political agents. Thus, the stability under the Shah had been a product of two factors namely, "his ability to offer material rewards to major elements of the elite and an improved standard of living to most Iranians, plus a coercive capability perceived by his people to be so overpowering that the regime was essentially invulnerable".

The Shah had further spearheaded efforts to achieve legitimacy through the demonstration of symbolic appeals in terms of his dynasty as well as concerning his role as the "agent" of modernization in Iran. For instance, he had organized two gigantic celebrations concerning the Pahlavi dynasty first in 1967 and later in 1971. For instance, in 1967 on the occasion of his birthday, he had hosted a long-delayed coronation ceremony for himself and Empress Farah Diba. Four years later, he had organized at Persepolis in March 1971 a celebration to commemorate the 2,500 years of monarchical rule with one of the most lavish displays of

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282. For details see Oriana Fallaci, "The Shah of Iran", New Republic, vol. 217, 1 September 1973, p.18
283. Cottam, n. 221, p.137
wealth, power and pageantry in Iranian history described as the "Cyrus celebrations". During the course of the celebration he had also made his address by standing over the tomb of Cyrus, the illustrious founder of the Persian Empire. In fact, gesticulating to his glorious predecessors in a most confident tone the Shah had stated:

"... Rest in Peace ... The Iranian flag is flying today as triumphantly as ever in the past..."

The speech as well as the celebrations, however, had evoked sharp reactions from the Iranian as well as world press circles. For instance, to project himself as a true successor of the glorious ruler Cyrus had seemed to many Iranians as the "height of presumption". Also, by connecting himself with Cyrus and by recounting the glories of Persian as distinct from the Islamic past, the Shah had unnecessarily antagonized the Islamic elements in Iran. Also, many people in the world press circles had begun to

284. For details see Garry Sick, All Fell Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York, 1985), p.12
286. Cottam, n. 221, p.138
seriously question the propriety of Iran incurring such a huge expenditure [over $100 million] just merely to satisfy a personal fancy of the Shah. 288

The Shah's regime, however, had been more successful in depicting itself as the "agent of modernization". For instance, the "White Revolution" had contributed to an unprecedented rate of economic growth despite shortages in skilled manpower as well as mal-distribution of wealth. It may be mentioned that many observers had begun to believe that Iran had almost reached the economic "take-off" stage by 1967. 289 Infact, the process of modernization had become indeed significant through achievements in the fields of technology, industrialization as well as in such major social endeavours such as women's rights. 290 Even a leftist critic of the Shah, Fred Halliday had made the following observations concerning his achievements:

"... Whatever qualifications are made, there can be no doubt that Iran's record is both a substantial one, and in any comparative sense, exceptional. Iran, now one of the most developed such states."

288. Cottam, n. 221, p.138

289. For details see Ramazani, Economic Consequences of the Iranian Revolution, n. 202, pp.74-75

290. Cottam, n. 221, p.138
states] has had one of the highest sustained growth rates of any third-
World country, capitalist or communist..."291

Thus, the Shah's regime could make its successful appeal among the upper-middle class, professional people, and the secular intelligentsia and that these elements had provided the technocratic basis behind his success during the decade of stability.292

As regards the American response to these developments, Iran had been able to maintain a generally favourable image in the United States. The American press had hailed Shah's "White Revolution" and had praised Iran's economic progress under his regime. For instance, the New York Times had reported that "a new feeling of hope and pride" had crept in Iran with the "new office buildings, super markets, free ways, and modern factories". It had remarked further that the "White Revolution" had converted the Iranian primitive peasant society into an industrialized nation".293 In a subsequent column the paper had provided an open support to the Shah regime when it had commented that the "growth and stability [under Shah] seemed enough for many Iranians, even without any democracy".294

292. Cottam, n. 221, p.139
293. For details see the New York Times, 17 July 1970
294. Ibid, 26 November 1970
The oil issue, however, had proved to be a major irritant in US-Iranian relations. It may be mentioned that following the 1954 agreement, there had been a temporary "down turn" in the world oil market sometime in 1959. This had prompted the United States to adopt protectionist policies in order to help its domestic oil industry against the inflow of cheap oil from both from the Persian Gulf as well as the Russian sources. Being infuriated, the Shah had joined with the governments of four other major oil exporting states namely, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq in establishing the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on 14 September 1960.\footnote{For details see Saikal, n. 22, pp. 101-103} The OPEC, infact, had operated peacefully by safeguarding the interests of the members concerning the stabilization of prices as well as ensuring the efficient, economic and regular supply of oil to the consumer nations almost up to 1969. But beginning in December 1970, Iran had taken the lead in sponsoring an OPEC proposal which had threatened to make a halt in oil production unless the share of the host countries was allowed to increase. This had eventually led to the signing of the historic Tehran Agreement in February 1971 between the OPEC and twentytwo Western Oil companies which had ensured an appreciable increase in the prices of the Persian Gulf crude oil.\footnote{For details see Rubin n. 7, p.131} Following this agreement, however, the Shah had announced the nationalization
of Iran's oil industry on 23 January 1973 after Libya and Iraq had done the same in respect of their oil companies in 1972. As for the US government, it had decided to put a higher priority on preserving good relations with Iran rather than making attempts to put a halt to the Shah's decision on nationalization. Such a perspective, however, did not find favour with the American public opinion. For instance, the New York Times had commented that the Iranian action "was a new blow to western oil companies which have already suffered nationalization on concessions in Libya and Iraq."  

To conclude, the Shah's action had not been severely resented to by Washington in view of its emerging alliance with the Tehran regime concerning the Persian Gulf region beginning with the Nixon Presidency. For instance, the US had allowed the Shah to move swiftly to capture the three strategic islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs in 1971. The British had also possibly endorsed the Shah's military adventures in the Persian Gulf. Infact, these activities had constituted as the first acts of Iran's new imperial era which had taken place during the decade of stability in Iran.

297. Ramazani, US and Iran, n. 26, p.27
298. Rubin, n. 7, p.132
300. For details see Ramazani, US and Iran, n. 26, p.27 and Rubin, n. 7, p.133
It has been stated earlier that the decade of stability had witnessed an unprecedented prosperity and the high point of royal dictatorship, as well as a dramatic upsurge in Iran's capacity for international activity. It, therefore, sounds quite paradoxical that the turbulent courses of the revolutionary crisis, that had engulfed Iran since 1978 should have followed such a period of domestic stability and international capability. Thus, an attempt will be made in the present section to analyze the American response to the evolution of domestic developments in Iran on the wake of the decade of stability in 1974 till the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution early January 1978.

To begin with the Iranian story, following the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1964, the domestic opposition to the Shah had been mostly confined to the political activities of some old timers belonging to the National Front namely, Karim Sanjabi and Shahppour Bakhtiar. These leaders, in fact, had remained loyal to the organization until the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution. But a group consisting of Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmoud Taleqani, Hassan Nazih, being disenchanted had left the National Front to form a new organization called the "Nehzat-e-Azadi-Ye Iran" (the Freedom Movement of Iran). The Freedom Movement had initially followed
the policies of "liberty" and "democracy" and an independent "national" foreign policy" as advocated by the National Front. But two of their founding fathers namely, Bazargan and Taleqani had supported the role of religion in politics.  

Beginning with the mid-1960s, three young men belonging to the Freedom Movement had decided to desert their organisation and to establish a new group called "The Sazeman-e-Mujaheddin-e-Khalq-e Iran (Organization of Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People)". The ideology of the "Mujaheddin" group, had varied from the "religio-nationalist" identities to the Marxist outlook. Some scholars tend to regard them as the disciples of the well-known Iranian Islamic philosopher Ali Shariati. Such a contention, however, had been disputed to by Bahman Bakhtiari, according to whom, the ideology of "Mujaheddins" prior to 1975 had "reflected more Maoist-Marxist influence than Shariati's". While Sa'id Mohsen was the founder of the Mujaheddin group, other prominent members belonging to the organisation had included Mas'ud Rajavi, Nasser Sadeq, Mohammad Bazargani, Ali Mihandoost and Mehdi Reza'i.

301. As cited in Ramazani, US and Iran, n. 26, pp.82-83.


303. For details see Ibid, pp.83-84
In course of time the "Mujahhedin" group had developed their radical ideology with a firm commitment to armed struggle. The organization, however, had undergone a split with the principal faction being led by Mas'ud Rajavi, who had emphasised on armed resistance as well as perceived the Shah as a "tool" and a "puppet" of the United States. The other faction known as "Battle Organization" (Sazeman-e-Paykar), however, had differed sharply from the Rajavi group in approach by embracing Marxist-Leninist ideology as well as by advocating for a more violent approach. The other prominent underground group was the "Fada'eyin-e Khalq" (People's Fighters), the Marxist offshoot of the banned Tudeh party. This group had viewed every aspect of the US-Iranian relations in terms of the imposition of American imperialism over Tehran through their "lackey" namely, the Shah. As regards their external support, the "Mujaheddin" had received military training in Palestinian guerilla camps under the control of Yasser Arafat's "Al Fatah". The "Fada'eyin" on the other hand had developed strong links (through its leader Hamid Ashraf) with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash.

While the radical groups had been advocating for a Marxist solution to the repressive character of the Shah's regime, a large number of Iranians, however, had been quite

305. For details see Ibid, p.81 and pp.84-85.
receptive to the ideas as advocated by the prominent Persian-French-educated intellectual namely, Ali Shari'ati, whose revolutionary ideology had a profound influence on their minds.\textsuperscript{306} As for Shari'ati, he had advocated for "self-criticism" as well as for "spiritualism" and had rejected outright the Shah's "White Revolution" as well as the American support for such "modernization" programmes in Iran.\textsuperscript{307} Further, after making a detailed study on all major religions, histories and societies, Shari'ati had observed that there were three diverse currents in all dominant intellectual and spiritual currents namely, "existence", "justice" and "mysticism", which, however could be synthesised through the Islamic ideology of "tauhid" (oneness).\textsuperscript{308} Thus, his ideology provided the basis for viewing humanity from a multi-dimensional perspective, which in fact, had exerted a profound impact on the revolutionaries in Iran.

In the meanwhile Ayatollah Khomeini had been spearheading a campaign against the Shah from his exile at Najaf in Iraq. For instance, he had expounded his political ideology through his well-known lectures on "Hokoumat-e-Islamic" (Islamic Government) in 1969. This was an extension of his

\textsuperscript{306} For details see Bahman Bakhtiari, n. 302, p. 122 as cited in Ibid, p. 86

\textsuperscript{307} For details see Ramazani, US and Iran, n. 26, p. 86

\textsuperscript{308} See R. Campbell, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique by Ali Shari'ati, translation (Berkeley, 1980), p. 122
earlier work. Secrets Exposed published in 1943. Through these writings, Khomeini had advocated for the forcible overthrow of Shah's regime and its replacement by an Islamic state based on Islamic law and the rule of the "Faqih" (Islamic jurisprudence). According to Khomeini, an individual Iranian Muslim has before him two paths to follow namely:

... Either be forced to commit sinful acts or rebel against and fight the rule of false gods ... We only have the second path open to us, we have no alternative but to work for destroying the corrupt and corrupting system and to destroy the symbol of treason and the unjust among the rulers of the peoples. This is a duty that all Moslems wherever they may be are entrusted - a duty to create a victorious and triumphant political revolution.”

According to Khomeini, the model for such a republic had already existed in two earlier historical periods of Islamic government namely, during the age of Prophet as well as during the tenure of his cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Abu Talib, Islam's fourth Caliph and the Shi'i community's first Imam. Thus, Ayatollah Khomeini had propounded for an Islamic political revolution from his exile in Iraq.

309. For details see Ramazani, US and Iran, n. 26, pp. 86-87
311. Ramazani, US and Iran, n. 26, p. 88
With this survey, an attempt will be made to analyze the fragile nature of the Shah's regime in Iran. To begin with, as stated earlier, the Shah had ruled the country with an iron hand by relying on the support from the armed forces, SAVAK, the bureaucratic and administrative apparatus and the rising oil-based middle class. Also a portion of uneducated peasants and workers had supported the Shah because of their low socio-economic consciousness and their traditional loyalty to the Iranian monarchy. Besides this, the Shah had successfully exploited Tehran's petro-dollar wealth and social divisions among its population to his advantage by employing SAVAK to germinate mutual "distrust" among the Iranian people. Infact, the increasing oil revenues had enabled the Shah "to finance ambitious economic and military programs, subsidize even basic commodities". In the process he had created "an economic atmosphere in which the Iranian people had become deeply pre-occupied with their personal pecuniary gains".312

But despite a spectacular rise in oil revenues beginning in 1974, Iran had been placed on the threshold of a "disaster in disguise". This had been due to Shah's wasteful and grandiose economic projects, the "ever-increasing mal-distribution of wealth", "widespread corruption" and the "ever-heating" of the Iranian economy. At the same time no serious effort had been made to accommodate the forces of

312. For details see Saikal, n. 223, pp. 188-189
political opposition including even the more moderate groups.\textsuperscript{313} In fact, by the time President Jimmy Carter had assumed office in January 1977, Iran's general economic and social situation had appeared to be quite grim. This had been due to numerous problems such as, the spiralling inflation, increasing corruption at all levels and mounting socio-economic inequalities that had been widening the gap between the various categories of Iranian population.\textsuperscript{314}

It may be mentioned that the Shah had welcomed rural migration to the urban centres to help the process of Iranian modernization. But the migrants had found to their dismay that suitable jobs were not becoming available in their new places of residence. Being frustrated, they had turned gradually to their religious leaders for guidance, which had paved the way towards the emergence of mass anti-Shah demonstrations of 1978.\textsuperscript{315} In fact, as stated by Marvin Zonis, the Shah could never succeed in finding suitable ways to mobilize and motivate the Iranian people mainly due to an Iranian perception that he was an American agent.\textsuperscript{316} In fact, according to Marvin Zonis, the Iranian people during this period had been found quite hesitant to discuss freely concerning the politics of their country.\textsuperscript{317}

\textsuperscript{313} For details see Ramazani, Economic Consequences of Iranian Revolution, n. 202, p.76
\textsuperscript{314} For details see Saikal, n. 223, p.187
\textsuperscript{315} For details see Rubin, n. 7, p.142
critics would further point out, "the growing gap between rich and poor, the endemic corruption, and SAVAK repressions", had contributed to the process of alienating millions of Iranians from the Shah. 318

It is necessary at this point to reflect at some length the various acts of violence that had been spearheaded against the Shah's regime as well as against the US citizens living in the country. These acts of violence had been engineered by the two leftist underground groups namely, the "Fada'eyin and the "Mujaheddin". For instance, the "Fada'eyin" had launched a most daring attack on a gendarme post at Siah-Kal in December 1970 from their "hideout" in the Gilan forest near the Caspian Sea. The Fada'eyin had another major military encounter with the Iranian security forces near the Mehrabad airport on 29 June 1976 in which ten of their leaders had been killed including their revered hero Hamid Ashraf. 319

As for the "Mujaheddin", their most favourite target had been the US employees in Iran. Their first attack, however, had been planned on the occasion of US President Richard Nixon's visit to Iran in May 1972 on his way back from the historic Moscow Summit (SALT-I). In fact, the plan had misfired due to premature explosion of three bombs in Tehran on the eve of his visit. Commenting on the fiasco, the New York Times had

318. Professors Richard Cottam (University of Pittsburg) and Marvin Zonis (University of Chicago) had expressed their views which are cited in Rubin, n. 7, pp.142-143

319. For details see Ramazani, US and Iran, n. 26, pp.88-89
described this episode as the handiwork of an "urban terrorist movement that is bitterly opposed to what it regards as the Shah's autocratic domestic policies, his friendship with Israel and his pro-Western foreign policy". Following the bombing incident the Mujaheddins had resorted to further acts of violence against the US citizens. For instance, a US general had been wounded by an assassination attempt in 1972 and that a US army colonel had been shot to death in 1973. There were further acts of violence in which two American colonels had been killed at Tehran in 1975. Another assassination attempt had been made on three Americans in 1976 who had been ambushed and assassinated while they had been driving to their work place of the Rockwell Company which had been engaged on a secret electronic project for the Shah government.

It may be mentioned that the American press had generally favoured the Shah and his policies in Iran. For instance, the New York Times had commented that the Shah was "a genuinely popular reformer who had been seeking to foster increased political participation by the general population". Similarly, the News Week, had eulogized the Shah's goals in trying utmost to "raise Iran's standard of living fast enough to prevent his subjects from ... organizing a revolution of

320. For details see the New York Times, 1 June 1972
321. For details see Ramazani, US and Iran, n. 26, pp.89-90
322. New York Times, 3 June 1974
their own against him". As for the Business Week, while it had warned against the dangers inherent in the Iranian situation, it had, however, commended the Shah for spearheading "dazzling prospects under his stewardship". Some American newspapers, however, had presented a critical approach concerning political developments in Iran. For instance, the Washington Post had commended the Shah at first in its columns for Iran's new wealth the luxury and development, as well as for invoking the confidence of his officials concerning the implementation of the country's economic plans. At the same time it had been pointed out by its correspondent Lewis Simons that a "police-state" atmosphere had prevailed in Iran, with the "Shah's growing isolation from the people, and his increasing inability to obtain accurate information from his sycophantic advisors".

In the meanwhile the Shah's image as a "progressive" ruler had been masterminded through host of direct public relations effort, including the sponsorship of pro-Shah books and advertisements. For instance, advertising agency of

323. News Week, 24 March 1975
324. Business Week, 22 June 1974
325. Washington Post, 26 May 1974
326. For details see, Ibid, 27 May 1974
Rudder and Finn in New York had received a contract amounting to $507,000 to promote the Shah's image and that one of its executives of the agency, Marion Javits who happened to be the wife of the prominent New York Senator, Jacob Javits had been paid $67,500 a year to conduct a pro-Iran information campaign. Also, the services of the former US Secretary of State, William P. Rogers had been recruited by the Shah as a lawyer to manage the operations of the Pahlavi Foundation, in the United States. 327

The most active support behind these Iranian endeavours, however, had been provided by its ambassador in Washington, Ardeshir Zahedi. It was reported that through his embassy the Shah had contributed a large amount of money to Richard Nixon's presidential campaign in 1968. In fact, after the fall of Shah, successor of Zahedi had accused that the Iranian embassy in Washington had made "cash payments, bribes and provision of luxury overseas travel and accommodation" for key American officials and public figures. 328 Besides this, Zahedi had resorted to prolific "gift-giving" intended to win friends in the US for Iran. In the process, over 1000

327. For details see Rubin, n. 7, p. 151

presents had been distributed on the occasions of Christmas, which had consisted, 150 cans of Caviar, 90 bottles of Dom Perignon champagne, along with 600 to 700 books. Besides this, Zahedi had maintained his own informal and independent sources of information in the US Congress to augment as well as to verify the news being received by him through the State Department channels. In particular, Zahedi had sought to maintain close rapport with prominent US Senators namely, Charles Percy, Jacob Javits, Barry Gold Water, Birch Bayh, Loyod Bentson and Abraham Ribicoff. 329

Finally, any study concerning the Shah would be incomplete without analyzing the role of SAVAK in both internal as well as external domains of Iran. For instance, repressive policies of the Shah as channelized through SAVAK had been mentioned in the report of Amnesty International for the year 1974-1975 as follows:

"... The Shah of Iran retains his benevolent image despite the highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief..." 330.

As for SAVAK, its domestic activities had embraced three peculiar features concerning the Iranian repressions. Firstly, the prisoners had been "subjected to horrendous
torture, equal to the worst ever devised," like "beatings, shock treatments, electric drills", which at times had made the prisoners crippled or insane". Secondly, the SAVAK had deliberately spread fear concerning its methods and had often made exaggeration of its powers in order to maintain control. For instance, the prisoners had often been released only "if they, or members of their family, agreed to become informers." Finally, the most important of SAVAK's victims had not only been a small group of active dissidents or a politically conscious minority, but the entire population who had been subjected to their constant and all-pervasive terror. It may also be mentioned that while the number of full-time SAVAK employees had been relatively small (slightly over 3000), but the organization had penetrated deep into the domestic fray through a large number of paid informers that had included the Iranian journalists students, waiters, drivers and businessmen.

SAVAK had also kept a close vigil on the American critics of the Shah. For instance, when Senator Edward Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts) had visited Iran in 1975, SAVAK agents had crashed into his meetings place at the Tehran Hilton along with journalists. The Shah had further conceded in October 1976 that SAVAK agents had also operated in the United States. In fact, students studying in the United States had been "threatened with loss of scholarships

331. For details see Ibid, pp.177-178.
332. Ibid., p.179
and persecutions at home unless they cooperated through reporting against their peers as well as fellow countrymen. Besides, this, SAVAK had also exchanged information with the CIA. Also, the CIA operatives in Iran had concentrated on gathering intelligence concerning the Soviet Union and that they had been careful not to offend the Shah. The United States in fact had become almost completely dependent on SAVAK for intelligence information concerning the Iranian domestic developments.\footnote{For details see Ibid, pp. 179-180}

A final episode of the period, however, had been the attempt on the part of SAVAK (sometime in 1975 or 1976) to assassinate Nasser Afshar, the editor of an outspoken anti-Shah newspaper, the \textit{Iran Free Press}, published from Virginia, near Washington D.C. In this context, SAVAK had contacted the State Department as well as the CIA for possible help and that both the agencies had extended their cooperation by providing all information concerning the Iranian editor. But the purported attempt had failed to materialize as the hired assassin contacted for the purpose had refused to go through the proposed ordeal and in the process a great embarrassment for the Shah had some how been averted.\footnote{For details see Ibid, pp. 180-181}

Thus, by the time President Jimmy Carter had consolidated himself in office by the end of 1977 the domestic scenario for the Shah had appeared to be on the
threshold of an impending crisis. This had been due to the failure on the part of the Iranian ruler to take advantage of opportunities as had presented to him (through the instrumentality of the White Revolution) as well as due to severe political repressions that had been unleashed by him through SAVAK. As regards the details concerning Carter's first year in office, this will be analyzed in a subsequent chapter.