CHAPTER V

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The British initially penetrated to India for commercial activities by the formation of the English East India Company. They at last survived for the establishment of political and commercial hegemony all over this country. Orissa a part of the country was not exception to it. The appearance of the European Companies named as Portuguese, the Dutch, the English and the French added a new lease of life to the new situation for the spread of commercial activities in Orissa. They initially depended upon the cooperation of the native rulers in order to carry out their commercial activities as the servants of the European Companies had very little knowledge about the area of operation and understand the dialect of the locality.

The European trading Companies contracted the local traders, producers and craftsmen who were well conversant with local language and thorough knowledge about the price and the quality of goods. Despite the contract and cooperation of the local traders, the English traders reflected them in the term of brokers, middlemen and merchants of the company. They were actually not merely brokers but traders in utilising their own capitals in trade.1

Before the occupation of Orissa by the Marathas, the Mughal had divided the coastal Orissa called Mughalbandi into five Sarkars named as Jaleswar, Bhadrak, Cuttack, Kalinga Dandapat, and Raj Mahendri. The Marathas held rule over Jaleswar, Bhadrak and Cuttack2. The two southern Sarkars of Kalinga Dandapat and Raj Mahendri had been ruled under the Muslim authority from Hyderabad 3. H. Panda referred that the mal
administration of Maratha subedars, atrocities and limitless exploitations of the misrule of the Marathas certainly became unacceptable to the people of Orissa.4

The English East India Company became the survival of the fittest and established their commercial hegemony in Orissa and Bengal among all the Christian traders. Because, the trading companies who came from Europe known as the Portuguese, the Dutch, the English, the Danes, the French and a host of nationalities who entered the province in search of fortune.5

The English Company's Govt. in Bengal desired to acquire Orissa through diplomatic maneuvering that a safe passage towards Madras would be secured and the smuggling of salt and frontier incursions by the restless landed proprietors in the border areas of the jungle and Nimki Mahals known as Forest and Salt tracts in the south west Bengal would be undoubtedly controlled and a revenue to the tune of 13 Lakh of rupees would be collected.6 The English East India Company was highly pleased from 1760 to 1803 A.D. that the Bhonsle was legitimately entitled to receive the chauth of Bengal in honouring the treaty of 1751 between the Nawab of Bengal Alivardi Khan and Raghuji I after the secession of Orissa to the Company.

The lack of foresight and miscalculation in dealing with the Britishers, the weak and feeble administrations invited personal injury and offered a golden opportunity to the Britishers in order to fulfill their desire to occupy Orissa. The Bhonsle did not observe the hidden diplomacy and kept British aspirations in good humour through out the period and permitted the safe passage of the continent of the troops under Major Achmuty (1769), Col. Pearse (1781) and Col. Cockrell (1790) and comfortably managed their diplomatic mission.
H. S. Ray observed that “so far as the East India Company’s trade with Indies is concerned, no body even the founding fathers had never thought of even in their wildest dreams that a small stock company, founded on 31, 1600 by an English charter which had sailed across the sea to Indies with little more than a hesitant and semi speculative financial venture, would be the greatest of all joint companies and would be a valuable instrument in the creation of British Colonial and imperial hegemony”.  

The British conquest of Orissa was carried out in three phases, the southern part consisting of Kalinga Dandapat and Raj Mahendri, the coastal central region consisting of Cuttack, Jaleswar and Bhadrak and the western part known as Sambalpur region which successfully ended the Anglo Maratha struggle for the supremacy in Orissa. The imperialistic and aggressive policy of Wellesley was prompted by the so called “Franco-Phobia” added fuel for the out break of the Anglo-Maratha hostilities in order to occupy Orissa after breaking down the feeble Maratha resistance.

The demise of the Aurangzeb began to crumble down the edifice of mighty Mughal empire which gave an ample opportunity the Mughal Governors of distant provinces to assert their independence. Exploiting the weakness of the weak successors of Aurangzeb, Mushid Quli Khan, the subedar of Bengal declared himself the Nizam of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa at the twilight of the Mughal rule in India.

With the disintegration of Mughal Empire, the aggressive Marathas undoubtedly became powerful and intended to assert their authority all over the country. The decline of the Mughal Empire at the same time cast an evil shadow upon Orissa by which she could not enjoy any political stability during the 18th century. Orissa became the worst victim of the repeated incursions of the Marathas. The aggressive Marathas turned Orissa as a cup board to make repeated expeditions against the prosperous Bengal in their quest for plunder.
The entire strategy to invade Orissa was chalked out by the Bhonsles of Nagpur under the guidance of Raghuji bringing a rift with Alivardi Khan, the Nawab of Bengal. The mission to establish their sway over Orissa became successful and sustained a prolonged period from 1751 A.D. to 1803 A.D. and the discharged venom of Marathas had made the people discontent which ultimately gave an opportunity to the British authority to rule over the sacred land. At the same time, the Marathas maladministration had shaken the foundation to a great extent and undermined their established prestige in Orissa.

The topographic boundary of Orissa changed during the Mughal period in comparison to the area of the Hindu Orissa. The Kingdom of Orissa had been stretched unto the Tribeni Ghat above the Hughli through Bishenpur to the frontier of Patkum in the east to the frontier of Patkum in the north, sea in the east, the Godavari river in the south and a line carried from Singhbhum to Sonepur skirting Gangpur, Sambalpur in the west. Akbar, the Mughal emperor had acquired Orissa 1592 A.D. which consisted of five sarkars known as Jaleswar, Bhadrak, Cuttack, Kalinga Dandapat and Raj Mahendri which had been extended from Tamluk to Midnapore in the north to the fort of Rajmahendri in the south side.

But, the sarkar of Raj Mahendri and a portion of the Kalinga Dandapat sarkar lying on the south of Tikali Raghunathpur were detached from Orissa on account of the encroaching attitude of the Qutbsahi kings of Golkunda. The rise of the Nizam-ul-Mulk-Asaf Jah who was responsible for the establishment of the Hyderabad state annexed the whole area adjoining to the south of Chilika Lake in Orissa. At last, Parganas in Jaleswar sarkar to the river Subarnarekha ultimately transferred to the Bengal government.

The Muslim was demarcated and bounded by the river Subarnarakha and pargana Pataspur and some parganas in the north, the Chilika lake in the south, sea in the east and Barmula pass treated as the
vital entrance to this country in the west during the second half of the eighteenth century. However, there was no preventive measure of the Govt. in the country for the protection of the western frontier in the impregnable mountainous regions except the establishment of an outpost at Malud.

However, the territories of Orissa which ceded by the Nawab of Bengal named Alivardi Khan to gratify the lustful Marathas included an area of 8,000 sq. miles and an extent of 200 miles marine coast from Pipili in Subarnarekha to Malud on the frontier of Ganjam. Before the occupation of the Orissa by the Marathas, there was tremendous prosperity in maritime activities at Balasore, Pipili, and Haripur.

B. C. Ray reflected that the state ships including the ships of individual businessmen and ships of the foreign trading companies like the English, the Dutch, Danish and Portuguese were discharging the function of load and unload at these important ports. The ports were congenial for the expansion of maritime trade on account of the geographical locations as Balasore on the river Budhabalanga, Pipili on the river Subarnarekha and Haripur on the river Patna having the outlets for the collection of commodities from the interior.

The chaotic political condition of Orissa encouraged the Marathas to appear for the acquisition of Orissa before their political entanglement with the Britishers. The Nawab of Bengal grew weaker to control over the govt. of Orissa. An example may be cited about the battle of Gheria which was fought between Sarfaraz, the worthy son of Shujauddin the Nawab of Bengal and Alivardi Khan which seized the political fate of Sarfaraz.

He was finally defeated and killed which paved the way for the succession of Alivardi Khan who declared himself as the master of Bengal,
Bihar, and Orissa. Rustam Jang, the son-in-law of Shujauddin famously known as Mushid Quli Khan II, the Governor of Orissa became hesitant to recognize the declaration of authority of Alivardi Khan which ultimately invited a battle between Alivardi Khan and Rushtam Jang at Phulwari in the memorable year of 1741 A.D. Rushtam Jang was defeated and left to the Deccan with his son in law Mirza Baqar.17

The expulsion of the later had brought the political stability of Alivardi Khan in Bengal. However, Alivardi Khan entrusted the Subahdari of Orissa on his second son-in-law as the Deputy Governor of Orissa. He was assisted by able commanders Gurjar Khan with the assistance of an army consisting of three thousand cavalry and four thousand infantry.18

The chaotic political conditions had forced Alivardi Khan to renew his campaign against Mirza Baqar after getting the sad news of the demise of Gurjar Khan and the arrest of Sayyid Ahmad. The advancement of the huge army of Alivardi Khan had dispinted Mirza Baqar and fled with his first Deccani allies in the first part of December 1741 A.D.19

At this critical juncture of the political condition of Orissa, the alluring Marathas appeared and made several raids to conquer Orissa on account of important reasons. The Raja of Nagpur Raghuji Bhonsle could not bring any success against Shahu due to his arch rival Baji Rao who was co tempting to plunder to the north east of the dominion.20 Raghuji became interested to set out the expedition on account of the inspiration of the Nizam-ul-Mulk of Hyderabad who had a perennial fear for the Maratha raids.

At last, Raghuji Bhonsle entrusted the task to Bhaskar Pandit to invade the kingdom of Alivardi Khan. Bhaskar Pandit shouldered the responsibility and penetrated Orissa probably through the Baramula Pass on the ill defended western frontier.21 S. L. Vaidya referred that the Maratha
army had captured Barabati on 09.04.1742.\textsuperscript{22} However the Marathas were disastrously defeated by Alivardi Khan near Katwah where they resumed to Ramgarh to ravage Orissa.

The advance of the Maratha soldiers had frightened Masum who suddenly fled away from Cuttack to save his precious life. Ultimately, his precious life was lost of the Marathas and possessed the historic fort of Barabati. Hearing the tragic news, Alivaaardi Khan hastened back his army towards Midnapore which frightened Bhaskar Pandit. He directed his soldiers to pursue the Marathas and bore fruitful results. Being frightened the Marathas atlast ran into the deccan crossing Chilika lake which was demarkedet as the Southern boundary of Orissa.

Alivardi Khan posted Abdul Nabi Khan as the deputy governorship and Raja Durlabhram ws appointed as the peshkar to rander administrative help to Abdul Nabi Khan. The departure of Alivardi Khan encouraged the Marathas to renew their raid in Orissa and Raghuji invaded Orissa and got the occupation of Cuttack.\textsuperscript{23}Raghuji advanced to Katwah in order to exact the chauth of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa from Alivardi Khan leaving Bhaskar Pandit at Midnapore. The situation took a new turn when Peshwa Balaji Rao intended to oust Raghuji from Bengal.

In order to checkout the plan, Peshwa Balaji Rao reached at Mushidabad and a mutual understanding was brought up between the two where Alivardi Khan agreed to pay the chauth of Bengal to Raja Sahu to the tune of 22lakhs of rupees to Balaji for the expenditure of his army.\textsuperscript{24} However, the Peshwa Balaji Rao and Raghuji came to a compromise by the timely suggestion of Raja Sahu. Bhaskar Pandit renewed the Maratha invasion over Orissa on his way to Bengal through Midnapore.

The repeated incursions of Marathas over Orissa disheartened Alivardi Khan. He cordially invited Bhaskar Pandit to settle the question of
chauth on 3ist March 1744 where Bhaskar was cold bloodedly murdered with twenty three of his captains.²⁵ The massacre had created havoc among the Marathas and ran away from Orissa and Bengal to Nagpur.²⁶

The chaotic political conditions of Orissa and the revolt of Mustafa Khan again encouraged the Marathas to invade Bengal. The appointment of spies by Raghuji in the disguise of Sanyasis were transmitting informations on the conduct of Durlabhram and the weakness of his govt.²⁷

Mustafa Khan invited Raghuji to invade Bengal. Raghuji utilised the political opportunity and renewed the Maratha Campaign with 14 thousand cavalry to avenge the gruesome murder of Bhaskar crossing the mountainous tract of Sambalpur and arrived Orissa on March 1745.²⁸

Raghuji became successful in capturing the fort of Barabati despite the stubborn resistance by Mir Adul Azir, a brave officer. The Marathas were directed to get the occupation of the whole Orissa along with Midnapore and Hugli and went to the extent of plundering major portion of Burdwan.²⁹ Abdul Azir finally surrendered the fort on 12th May, 1745 after the brave defence of two months and then the Marathas penetrated to Burdwan.³⁰

Alivardi Khan kept the perseverance of his patience and started marching Mushidabad to Katwa, Midnapore via Burdwan to resist the Marathas.³¹ The approach of the soldiers of Alivardi Khan scattered the Marathas and restored to take shelter in the dense forest. Alivardi Khan, the Nawab of Bengal took some preventive measures appointing Ali Quli Khan, the faujdar Faujdar of Midnapore for the establishment of a permanent army head quarters, sent Dost Muhommad and Mir Qasim to shoulder the responsibility of espionage system and Siraj-ud-Daulah was directed to command the army to follow the Marathas.
The war strategy to eliminate the menance of Maratha became partially successful. The Marathas renewed their vigour and plundered the ways marching towards Mushidabad when Alivardi Khan was at Midnapore in March 1750 A.D. Alivardi Khan took timely retaliatory action against the Marathas which forced them to take shelter in the inaccessible hills and forests. Alivardi Khna left Midnapore entrusting the charge of troops to Durlabhram and Mirjafar and directed them to retaliate the Marathas to drive out from Balasore.

The ill health of Alivardi Khan had favoured the Marathas which also rendered mental shock to Durlabhram and Mirjafar to check the frequent Marathas raids. Despite the ill health, Alivardi Khan had never lost his patience and proceeded to Midnapore chasing the Marathas till they returned to Orissa.

The various sequences of the protracted war between Alivardi and Marathas prepared the ground for the restoration of peace between the two parties. The old age with physical ailment and infirmity, the fall of Hari Ahmad and Zainuddin Muhammad, the revolt of the chief Afghan pillars of the state and financial deficiency to pay the heroic soldiers in the protracted war against the Marathas disheartened the patriotic alawab which ultimately broke down his warring spirits. Alivardi Khan intended restand rest and his own beloved people who were much troubled, also desired peace.32

The negotiation for the treaty was carried out and Mirjafar acted on behalf of the Nawab, MirzaSaleh representative of Mir Habib and the Marathas carried the task for the treaty. It was finally approved and signed by both the parties. The provisions of the treaty were that Mir Habib was to be acted as a Naib’Nazim of Alivardi Khan and had to rule of Orissa on behalf of the Nawab. He was directed to spend the surplus revenue of the province for the payment of arrears to Raghunji’s troops.
There was a provision of the treaty that 12 lakhs of rupees should annually be paid to Raghuji on the specific condition that the Marathas would not set their foot within the territories of Alivardi Khan. Lastly the river Subarnarekha was treated as the demarcating boundary between Orissa and Bengal. The suspicious last clause about the specific mention of river Subarnarekha certainly treated as a weak stand of Alivardi Khan which strengthened the Marathas in rendering scope for the acquisition of Orissa.

The frequent invasions of Marathas had given some political impacts. The continuous warfare between Alivardi Khan and the Marathas created opportunity for the sedition among his officers which shook the administrative structure of Govt. in Bengal. Alivardi Khan counter attack against Marathas spoiled his precious time and rendered scope for the rise of the British Colonial power in Bengal. Lastly, the Marathas raids prepared the ground for the state of insecurity and anxiety which put the people in trouble the frequent raids of the Marathas highly disturbed for the growth of trade, industries and agriculture in Orissa.

5.1. ANGLO - MARATHA CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN BORDER ISSUE:

The important treaty of 1751 A.D. was a tripartite agreement among Bhonsle, Mir Habib and Alivardi Khan which undoubtedly shifted the administrative responsibility of Orissa to the Marathas of Nagpur. Orissa continued to remain under the protection of Marathas till the British occupation of Orissa in 1803 A.D. But, there arose a pertinent question about the settlement of the boundary line between British occupied Bengal and Marathas occupation in Orissa. This question emerged as the most vexing problem in the second half of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century and showed seeds for the continuation of Anglo-Maratha conflict which turned a prime cause for
the ruination of the Maratha hegemony on the sanctified soil of Orissa from 1751 A.D. to 1803 A.D.

The important treaty of 1751 A.D. between Alivardi Khan and the Raja of Nagpur, the frontier of Bengal was demarcated at the river Subarnarekha. Alivardi Khan forced to cede all his legitimate possessions south of the river Subarnarekha Sonamukhia to the alluring Marathas in lieu of peace for Bengal and also agreed to pay to the tune of 12 Lakhs annually as chauth for Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.

The river Subarnarekha was theoretically was recognized as the demarcating line but practically it was not which remained a key factor for Anglo-Marathas dissession. Because the Marathas had some territories on the northern side of the Subarnarekha and the Bengal govt. had claimed certain lands on the southern side of it. The Zamindars of the border villages and praganas were continuing the collection of taxes from those people on lands honouring the long practice. The inhabitants staying on the both side of Maratha and English territories were traditionally paying revenue to the govt's of both the territories.

The Zamindars were treated as the tormenting element for the occurrence of disturbances on account of different reasons. The govt. became powerless over the people and became helpless to redress the grievances of the people. There was the process of shifting the responsibility between the two govt's. The matter became so complicated that the govt's at last were found to render their support to their Zamindars.

The situation turned so grave that it became a herculean task on the part of the British authorities to keep peace and tranquility in Parganas to solve the arising land dispute. An example may here be cited for the reference of the case of Lochana Choudhury the so called Zamindar in the Maratha region had applied his force to take the possession of land which
belonged to Ashram Choudhury, a recognized Zamindar in the company territorial jurisdiction.

The case of Lochana Choudhury and Ashram Choudhury was finally referred to the British authorities for a solution. At last, Ensign Campbell was entrusted the case of dispute in order to deliver to Ashram Choudhury. Finally, Campbell was compelled to resort violence in order to restore the legitimate claim of lands to Ashram Choudhury considering the apathetic attitude of the faujdar of Balasore.

Another example of disturbance of peace was the stealing of cattle from the territory of one Zamindar which was instigated by the Zamindar of other territory. The incident happened that Basant Khan of an inhabitant of Balasore forcibly took away 404 heads of cattle from the British territory which led to the formation of joint enquiry to bring solution of the disputed matter.

The Marathas had appointed an amin Parameswari on their behalf and the British authorities appointed Imamuddin. The investigation of the theft case was thoroughly done and Basant Khan was directed to give back 91 of the cattle in giving a written under taking that the rest cattle would be returned within the period of eight days. Later on, he could honour the written under taking which undoubtedly enraged the British subjects. Ultimately, they became mentally prepared to take revenge against the subjects of Marathas and snatched the buffaloes of Sagar Dutt, an inhabitant of Balasore. At last, the conflicting matter had been referred by the Marathas to the British authorities. The later became apathetic to this case which led to the position of the unsettled dispute.

There arose border tension which had created trouble some situations. B. C. Ray referred that the Zamindars of Jamukunda inhabiting within the limitation of Jamukunda in Maratha territory started attacking the
ware house of British Company at Birkul and had gone to the extent of plundering the British territory.\(^{41}\)

The attack of the Zamindars encouraged the common people to indulge in plundering activities. There was the example of nefarious activities of people under the Zamindar Bhograi who forcefully entered into a salt godown of the village of Nafri situated in the pargana of Birkul remaining under the British authorities. The people forcefully carried away five or six amlas and had mercilessly beaten the Darogha to death, ridiculously manhandled a sepoy, one or two paiks and snatched away money.

The day to day work of the salt godown was adversely affected and created havoc among the employees to save their precious lives.\(^{42}\) The unhealthy activities of the Zamindars of Maratha and their intentional attack upon the civilians and the workers employed under the British authorities undoubtedly strained the relation between Marathas and British authorities to protect the commercial interests.

The people inhabited under the British territory made the counter attack against the people or Zamindars under the territorial jurisdiction of the Marathas. An example can be cited that the traders of the Pataspur went to make business of their salt to the British territory and being inspired by the Zamindar of Kudai Paragana the people remaining under the British territories seized the salt and bullous which ultimately sold them away.\(^{43}\)

The people inhabiting under the Marathas and British authorities became the worst sufferers of the situation and the victim of the imposition of duty by the Zamindars. The officers or the recognized Zamindars turned the supreme opportunists as the countries of the both the places were overlapping each other. The British officers started collecting
duties from the pilgrims were visiting to Narasinghpur by setting a chauki there. The unhealthy system followed by the British authorities had certainly discouraged the pilgrims to visit the sacred place which also adversely affected the growth of revenue to the Maratha state.\textsuperscript{44}

The people engaged in plundering activities were taking shelter on both sides of the border of Marathas and British authorities to avoid for the payment revenue or punishment. The suitable example on this occasion was the Raja Mayurbhanj who had kept the possession of the land in the territories of the English and Marathas.\textsuperscript{45}

The Raja of Mayurbhanj belonged to this nature who kept the possession of lands on both the English and Maratha territories. He became the supreme opportunity to evade taxes in order to take shelter on the both sides alternatively. The Raja kept the possession of the Pargana of Belorchaour, a part of the British territorial possession and seized the three ghats of Rani Sarai, Mastani and Rajghat which were situated at Jaleswar. He was solely responsible for the creation of the disturbance there and did not honour to the court summon of the Collector of Midnapore.

The Raja of Mayurbhanj at last requested for the protection which was granted by the Maratha Faujdar at Balasore. The astonishing feature of the Raja remaining under the Maratha protection that he could not pay the revenue to the Maratha Govt. to the tune of Rs. 50,000 in shape of arrears.\textsuperscript{46} He agains fled the Maratha protection and ran away to the company territories in order to escape the pay payment of arrears.

The same happened on the part of the Jagabandhu Patnaik and Bairagi Bhanj the Raja’s agent had fled to Jaleswar fled to Jaleswar. People took full advantage of the chaotic situation and took privilege in order to avoid the payment of loan and revenue. Muhmmad Ali had taken a loan amount of Rs 15,00 from Sadasiva Rao, the son of Rajaram Pandit who
restored to pretence. At last, he could not pay back the money and went to
the company territory at Mushidabad. He at last denied to pay the loan
amount to Sadasiva Rao.\footnote{47}

The unhealthy activities of Zamindars indulging in plunder
and raids had brought economic loss to people on the Marathas and
company sides. The economic growth and the trade of both the sides were
adversely affected endangering the life and prosperity of the people who
were staying on border lines. It had certainly affected the livelihood of the
common people. The refactory Zamindars had victimized the poor people.

It was a difficult task on both to take timely and effective steps
for the establishment of police guard due to the lack of natural barrier
between the Marathas and the English Companies. The British became
keenly interested to pay deep attention for the boundary in 1765 when they
were granted the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1765 A.D. But, the
earlier Bengal occupation of Orissa had not drawn proper attention on the
boundary problem.

They protected the districts of Burdwan and Midnapore which
were granted by the Nawab of Bengal. They had protected the area
stationing some British soldiers to counteract the dreaded Maratha raids.
Realizing the gravity of the situation and enjoying supreme authority over
Bengal, the British authorities mentally prepared themselves to make direct
contact with the Raja of Nagpur for the direct purchase of Orissa. But, the
Raja of Nagpur became reluctant to sell Orissa despite the sending of
ambassadors by the British authorities. The Raja of Nagpur could not agree
with the monetary term of the British. The British authorities thought that
the failure of the negotiations was due to the unsolved border problem
between the two sides.
A new plan for the solution of the border dispute and frontier incursions was adopted by Cornwallis in 1788 A. D. He sent Froster to the court of Nagpur with some suggestions that the villages situated on the both sides of Subarnarekha might be exchanged and the river would be demarcated as the boundary line. He again suggested that the Jamas of the both sides of the river should be calculated after having a thorough examination. The difference of the calculation of Jamas should be paid in shape of cash. The Raja of Nagpur kept his patience to hear the timely proposals and asked Bhavani Pandit, the munshi of the Governor of Orissa to make thorough investigation of the matter and reported him after the enquiry.

After the investigation, Bhawani Pandit reported to the Raja of Nagpur that as the villages had been living there for the forty years and the existing arrangement should be affected keeping the present status quo. The Raja of Nagpur honoured the investigation of Bhawani Pandit and did not consent the proposal of the British authorities. The British continued their persistent efforts and further sent Colebrooke to Nagpur on 18th March 1799 A. D. Colebrooke made the proposal of the exchange of lands with the aim of demarcating a line between Midnapore and Cuttack. But, to the utter surprised the Raja again rejected the British proposal observing that the value of Parganas like the Pataspur and Karmada which were to be ceded by him was trible the value of the lands he was to get from the British in return.

The Raja declined the proposal on the ground that the Marathas were procuring a good source of income which ultimately failed the negotiations between the Marathas and the English authorities. The boundary remained a perennial cause of the conflicting interests to affect the relations of both the sides.
The perpetual tension between the Marathas and the English in the Bengal and Orissa borders areas undoubtedly renewed the vigour of the frontier troubles which continued from the 60’s of the 18th century. The impacts of the Marathas frontier incursions on the British authorities were that the sequences of the clash of war resulted out of frontier disputes among the clever landed proprietors for the demarcation of areas of control was one of the features.50

Secondly, the frontier incursions happened on account of the lawlessness elements and the impoverished agricultural community who had been thrown out of the economic machinery due to the unbearable pressure of heavy extortion of money in shape of awbabs and rate of interests. The frontier troubles was a political complexion based on socio–economic character.51

The frontier dispute took a new turn which resulted a clash of arms between the Maratha Zamindars and the Company’s government reached in an acute stage around in the eighty of the eighteenth century. The Maratha faujdars enhanced the ratio of land revenue and took away the legitimate rights of land owners imposing abwards or extra imposts on the land and unbearable extortion of pescash by the Maratha faujdars and the apathy of the central authority to keep tight the establishment of the faujdars.

However, the Calcutta Council of the British became successful to control over cuttack through negotiations in order to keep peace and tranquility and became successful to secure a land route through Orissa towards Madras. The British at last deeply felt that the occupation of Orissa could not be possible except by the use of arms. But, the exchange of frontier territories were turned down by the complaints made by Forster and Colebrooke.52
The audacity of Marathas and the refusal of the Bhonsle to accept subsidiary alliance during the time of Wellesley had brought the dominating existence of Marathas in Orissa at the cost of their defeat at Aragaon. The Bhonsle prolonged resistance against the British authorities ended after the fall of Gwaligarh and was compelled to sign the treaty of Deogaon on 17th December 1803. The Marathas being the victim of the situation they had to lose the revenue to the tune of 16 lakhs of rupees in comparison to the earlier of 111 lakhs.

5.2. ANGLO – MARATHA CONFLICT IN SALT TRADE:

The European factors had actively participated in Indian textile trade in order to procure alluring profit since the beginning of the 17th century. The salt item was not possibly enlisted in their variety of merchandise. The salt was a commodity of the internal trade. The vigilant Mughal Governors were usually appointing a trade monopolist known as Faker-ul-Tejar who had kept the position of a highest bidder in the payment of revenue enjoying the privileges of exclusive salt trade.

There was the emerging feature in the decline of textile industry on account of the raw cotton cultivation of Orissa which ultimately failed to meet the challenging demands for the textile of Orissa out side of India. Salt trade became the profit making business in Orissa in order to earn billion. The entrepreneurs known as Sambhu Bharati, Bairam Gopal Das, Abdus Sukkur and other small merchants enjoyed the monopoly rights in internal trade enjoying the exemption from octroi duties in salt and paddy in the external trade. They had exclusively given the right of remittance of money revenue through their hundis and had the power to issue overdrafts and loans to the marching troops suppling securities to the highest bidders of the revenue farmers before they were dispatched for positions in Orissa.
Despite the salt production in Orissa under the Marathas, the Gossain merchants of Benaras, the Girisects of Orissa and central India had invested abundant money as shroffs in the alluring salt trade. They were carrying out on banking transactions in favour of the Bhonsle Government. The increase of the salt trade was increased on account of the decline of cotton textile trade in the Balasore factory through the Bengali entrepreneurs.

The forefather of these merchants at once were acted as the revenue collectors of Mughal Naib-subedars of Orissa and later on engaged in the profit making business having exportable commodities like salt and textile between Orissa and Bengal. The Bhonsle govt. started to carry trading negotiations with Company govt. aiming to gain currency and export duties. The situation changed and they denied to cede the exclusive privilege of salt trade in Orissa to the harm of the commercial interests of the native merchants of western India.

The salt manufacturged areas called the salt Aurags had been stretched from the Maratha enclosures east of the river Subarnarekha on the north to the Chilika Lake on the south. Most of the areas of salt were within the territories of the Raja’s or the estates bordered on the coast. There were two types of salt production known as Punga and the other was Karkach. The salt workers who were engaged in the salt production known as Malangis. The Malangis were undoubtedly producing the salt at a very moderate rate and financed by the Beparies. The Malangis were paid money well in advance for the manufacture of salt.

The Beparis at last were purchasing after the production of salt. They were purchasing salt at the place of manufacture at the cost of three or four annas per maund or less than one kahan of kauris. The low price of the purchase of salt was partially enhanced when they had to pay a
sayar duty on the transit of salt. It ultimately helped for the rise of the price of salt to the tune of three kahans per maund in the interior areas.

Nirkhi, an officer of the Marathas supplied information that the salt averaged 22 seers katki or 28 seers Balasore or Calcutta weight for a Chauponi rupee equivalent to two kahans and four pans of kauris in the last four years of the Maratha government. The information for the cheapness of salt was supported by the J. Melville who penetrated Orissa at the time of British Conquest started that a person could easily purchase a maund of salt at the cost of five annas. The cheapness and the production of abundant salt undoubtedly elevated the economic status quo of the Beparis to procure good profit out of the salt business.

There was also high percentage of salt export. Three lakh maunds of salt were exported to Berar in every year by the way of the grand road along the Mahanadi. The salt trade was undoubtedly procuring an alluring profit that Sambhu Bharati, a Mahajan of Cuttack had established salt golas in the territory of the Raja of Khurda and paid Rs 1,000 as Raja's Peshkash to the Maratha Govt. in return for the commercial privilege. Sambhu Bharati at last was permitted to carry on his commerce duty free.

A good amount of salt was directly sold in Bengal which adversely affected the commercial interests when the British occupied this territory. The Company’s Govt. at Bengal prepared an elaborate plan in order to protect their commercial interests in Bengal to suppress the traditional in land trade in salt subsisting between Orissa and Bengal.

They made the installation of check posts and rigid cordoning of the frontier to check the old age internal trade in cheap salt of Orissa. The Molangis of the Company’s territories ran away to the Maratha territories of Pataspur, Karmardachour, Balasore and Gopiballavpur areas in order to escape their outstanding loans, availed cultivable lands as
Pahiryots at a cheaper produce rents and limitless opportunity in order to smuggle salt to Bengal.\textsuperscript{67}

The British authorities took cautious policy in order to prevent desertation of Molangies towards Orissa. The Company’s Govt. had adopted two effective plans to import as little as possible to Orissa salt through the Balasore factory by issuing exclusive trading privileges to the Bengali entrepreneurs direct to the Salkia golah and took timely steps to cordon the frontier by preventing desertation of labour and smuggling of cheap Orissa salt.

B. S. Das has referred that the conversion of Adjoora Molungies into the “thika” footing at the contact price of Rs 25/- per hundred maunds of salt and it grew upto as much as Rs 82/- per hundred maunds by the mid 19\textsuperscript{th} century in Orissa.\textsuperscript{68} The change brought in the production sector in Bengal could not influence the productive machinery in the coastal belt of Orissa before the occupation of English in Orissa.

However, a new class of intermediaries had been emerged in production sector replacing the class of traditional molungies who were entitled as “Subarrakary molungies”, village level patels and moquddams and village level salt employees of the monopolist merchants and the Bhonsle’s government.\textsuperscript{69} At the same time, there was the enhancement of the prestige of the “Chooleas” or salt production contractors for supplying salt at the stipulated rate and amount synchronized with the laud protest from the salt labourers for the conversion of the “adjooras” into “thika molungies”.\textsuperscript{70}

However, there was no fixity in the selling price of salt. The associated merchants of the Bhonsle government at Nagpur and merchants of the Company’s government at Calcutta known as their “Dandi Merchants” had controlled the whole productive machinery including the
The smuggling of salt was one of the prime factors for the development of bitter relation between the Marathas and the British authorities before the occupation of Orissa in 1803 A.D. It was found that there was high amount of production in the Maratha districts situated in the east of the river Subarnarekha. There was an instance that a high amount of salt had been smuggled into Calcutta.

The British Resident at Balasore was directed to purchase salt with an aim to prevent the smuggling of salt through eastern jungle. At the same time it was the British policy to purchase limited salt which would not affect the manufacture of salt in Bengal. But, the smuggling of salt was not prevented from Balasore region and the Marathas enclosure could not be prevented.

The smuggling was not prevented because on account of the geographical situation of the salt Aurangs in the Maratha districts. The Beparies and Mahajans had procured a huge amount of profit before the introduction of salt monopoly in Bengal. The situation took a new turn that the Mahajans were ultimately restored to export salt in to the Company's territories indulging in a clandestine manner when the import of salt was publicly allowed.

The river Subarnarekha was treated as the demarcating boundary line between Maratha and British territories. But, the Marathas and the Britishers had possessed lands on the opposite side of the river Subarnarekha. Kamarda, Bhograi and Pataspur were import salt productive areas of Marathas situated on the other side of the river Subarnarekha.* Pataspur the largest of the Marathas territory was within the British territory. Salt from Pataspur and Bhograi were smuggling into the
British territories. The salt was dispatched to Bengal through western jungle. Around 15,000 maunds were annually smuggled into Bengal through one pass of dense forest.\textsuperscript{75}

The salt smugglers were avoiding Daroghas appointed by the British authorities. They were quite helpless to check the smugglers on account of the prime cause that the boundary of the British territory was not clearly defined. The salt smugglers were more clever to escape the salt Daroghas on the ground that they could cross over to the Maratha territories in order to avoid the seizure.\textsuperscript{76}

Despite the preventive measures the British could not prevent the smuggling of salt to Bengal. At last, the British authorities had deputed Forster to the court of Maharaja Raghuji Bhonsle in order to applies the necessity of the march of Colonel Cockrel's detachment, the supply of salt to the Company with the salt produced in Balasore and the prevention of the clandestine import of salt to the Company's territories.\textsuperscript{77} Forster further made an appeal for the permission of the Maharaja for all the salt production in Orissa. The appeal of Forster went in vain on the ground that the grant of monopoly in salt trade to the British authority would bring ruination for the fate of Beparis. \textsuperscript{78} However the British authorities became successful in smuggling salt after the occupation of Orissa in 1803 A.D.\textsuperscript{79}

The period of 1740 to 1751 can be called a phase of unstable economic transition in Orissa.\textsuperscript{80} The conclusion a treaty between Aliwardi Khan with Raghuji I settled the incessant warfare. The Nazim of Bengal firmly assured to pay 12 lakhs would be paid in shape of annual chauth on the condition that the Marathas would not set their foot within the dominions of Aliwardi and the river "Sonamakia" would be considered the boundary line between Bengal and Orissa.\textsuperscript{81}
The treaty had brought the stability of the establishment of the Maratha rule in Orissa which virtually became a province of the Nagpur and the Maratha rulers enjoyed the status quo of revenue collection for about 50 years.\textsuperscript{82} Orissa assumed the strategic importance with establishment of British powers in Northern Sarkars and Bengal by the year 1760 A.D. \textsuperscript{83} The acquisition of Orissa on the part of the British became an alluring factor on the account of the movement of the British soldiers through Orissa remaining under the Maratha possession.\textsuperscript{84}

Marathas at last became feeble and did not make any bold stand against the English. They failed to realize their dues and adopted new techniques at cost of exhibiting the spirit of firmness and aggrandizement. The threat of Sivaram Bhatt was avoided when Mir Qasim dispatched sanods of granting Jaleswar and Midnapore to the Marathas\textsuperscript{85} Sheo Bhatt betrayed Mir Qasim who was engaged in life and death struggle against the English rather who rendered his help to Britishers. But, the English did not hesitate to take the help of Sheo Bhatt.\textsuperscript{86} In evaluating the above cited events, it can be presumed that Sheo Bhatt had absolutely honoured the strict order and did not vent to annihilate the British authority in Orissa.\textsuperscript{87}

The important letter of Januji to Robert Clive proved the ineffectness of the Maratha diplomacy in Orissa. At this critical juncture, the disastrous defeat of Mir Qasim was a shocking setback not only to the loss of power and position of the Nawab of Bengal but also to the Marathas who lost a golden opportunity to uproot their potential rival and to recover their dues from Bengal. R. D. Benerji has referred that “the Marathas of Bena and Nagur failed to take advantage of a great opportunity of joining hands with Mir Qasim Ali in this war also as they did in 1757. They paid very dearly for it as Assaye and Deogaon in 1803.”\textsuperscript{88} Robert Clive utilized his political manœuvre and exhibited his keen interests to acquire Orissa by other means instead of the deployment of British forces. At the same time, Clive
went ahead in convincing the court of Directors that he had depatched a vakil with a novel proposal that “the English would pay 16 lakhs of rupees if they were appointed as Zamindars of “Balasore and Cuttack” countries”. He further estimated that the collected revenue of Orissa would be sufficient to meet the annual demand.

Robert Clive further calculated that the English would be more convenient as the English would take the advantage of free passage by land. The movement of English soldiers from Madras through Orissa to Bengal would compensate for the loss of money that might be sustained. He absolutely was not in a mood to deploy English forces to aquire Orissa. J. T. Wheeler has reflected the mood of Clive that “I would not by any means think of employing force to possess ourselves of those districts, the grant of them must come from him with his own consent and if that can not be we must settle the church upon the most moderate term we can”.

At last, Robert Clive deputed his vakil, J. Motte to meet Bhawani Pandit at Cuttack and proposed for the secession of Orissa to the English in 1766 A.D. Motte went to Nagpur with the mission of cessassion of Orissa to sound the officers of Janoji court whether he would cede Orissa for a annual tribute”. Motte then met Bhawani Pandit at Cuttack and proposed the cessassion of Orissa in lieu of the tribute of three provinces “Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa”. Bhawani Pandit gave an evasive reply to Motte. Clive did not withdraw himself to materialize his mission and deputed Mir Zainul Abedin to the Nagpur court to negotiate for the surrender of Orissa.

Januji could not act instantly the time proposal of Robert Clive on account of his anticipated attack from the Peshwa and Nizam but did not give up his wild goose chase”. Januji had painfully expressed his internal feelings that he could not get the payment of chauth honouring the friendship with Britishers and expressed his joy that the Governor had sent a vakil to settle the matter.
Januji consented the proposal and authorized on his behalf Udepuri Gossain to enter into an engagement with the British. He also requested the British Governor not to pressurise for the expenditure of the English forces despatched to suppress Sheo Bhatt. The expenses would at last be adjusted at the time of the settlement of chauth. It is observe that Januji could not meet the challenge of English with firm and bold heart. Shivram Bhatt had kept the mind set, stamina and firmness to meet the challenge of the Britishers and force them to pay the arrears of chauth from 1760 to 67.

But, he could not act under the negative pressure of the vacillating character of his master. Otherwise, he would have never allowed the golden opportunity offered to him by Mir Kasim to make a common cause against the English to slip from his hands but for the timidity of his masters. It was expected that the course of history would have changed if Sivram had come up to the rescue of Mir Kasim. The English closely observed the attacking nature of Shivram Bhatt who created a perennial worry in the mind of the English who always tried to attack Bengal.

The English took keen interests to drive out Shivram Bhatt and took the support of a powerful faction against Shivram Bhatt in the Nagpur court and eventually brought him down to the great relief of the English. Clive deputed Zainul Abidin to Januji at Nagpur with a view to negotiate a treaty between English and the Raja of Berar and the cession of Orissa. Mr. Zainul Abidin reported that Januji demanded 48 lakhs of rupees as chauth but did not mention any thing about Orissa.

The year 1769 was a turning point in life of Januji that he realized his own debacle having no ray of hope for the survival against his arch rivals. He observed that “dark clouds of the danger of Peshwa’s invasion had been ominously gathering around him, but the much sought for alliance with English not materialized.” English Governors had
immediately called for a note with the copies of treaties between the Nawab of Alivardi Khan and Raghuji, Jaffar Khan and Januji from Muhammad Riza Khan who timely supplied all the documents of treaties available on the 1st Jan. 1768. Januji faced the most dreaded situation when Madhab Rao defeated and imprisoned his uncle Raghunath Rao with whom Januji had joined expecting the danger. Madhab Rao invaded Januji's territory in December 1768.

At last, the fight between the two contestants came to an end by the conclusion of the treaty of Kanakpur. Januji honoured the treaty and served the Peshwa as his subordinate with 5,000 troops and pay five lakhs rupees. At this critical juncture, Januji desperately requested the time help of the English who always professed their friendship for the Raja of Berar Sambhuji Ganesh made a letter to Governor request for military help on 25th May, 1769 A.D.

The Governor restored to pretence and replied that "the hot months would soon be followed by rains and negotiations for peace were being carried on, it was absolutely useless to take any military operations". Januji became frustrated as the English could not render any timely military help. At the same time, it can be assessed that the English could hardly be expected to go to the help of Januji at the cost of her own risk of courting the hostility of the most powerful Indian at that time. It ultimately changed the attitude of Januji towards the English and became restive and exasperated. He blatantly refused to comply the passage of the soldiers of English to Madras through Orissa.

Udeipur Gossain, the vakil of Januji who had shouldered the responsibility of discussing the payment of chauth and the conclusion of treaty returned with an empty handed. Januji requested the Governor to settle the chauth without delay. Januji died with a broken heart in May 1772 A.D which ensured a war of succession. But, the Peshwa selected Sabaji,
another brother of Januji and entitled him Sena Sahib Subah. The internal quarrel, the question of cessassions of Orissa, the realization of the arrear chauth or the conclusion of a treaty between the Raja and the English had been completely dropped for the period of years. Warren Hastings became the Governor of Bengal in 1772 and made the Governor General of all the English possessions of India 1774. Hastings high handedness in dealings with Indian princes, his dealings with Raja Chait Singh of Benaras, Nawab Vazir of Oudh, and the Nawab of Bengal had roused the feelings of resentment and suspicions in the heart of Indian princes. Hastings left India in Feb. 1785 and succeeded by James Macpherson who shouldered the charge of Governor General till the arrival of Lord Cornwallis.

Cornwallis observed that Tipu Sultan was a constant menace of trouble to the English and tried his level best to secure the help of Marathas and Nizam. He deputed George Forster as his enjoy to Nagpur and made a report of his impression about Mudhoji and Nagpur Government. At last, Cornwallis withdrew Forster from Nagpur. But, Forster was again deputed to Nagpur in Feb. 1790 to get the help of Raghuji II in favour of the English against Tipu Sultan. At last, Raghuji consented to render help to the English with 8000 cavalry on the payment of expenses. But Cornwallis declined the offer which failed the Forster’s mission.

Tipu Sultan declared war against the English in 1789 A.D. Cornwallis went to the extent of forming an alliance with the Marathas and Nizam against Tipu. Tipu at last forced to make an alliance with the English after the disastrous consequences. The field was set for the English to act for establishing their supremacy in India. The three great powers of India engaged interline quarrel and entertained bitterest feelings of hostility against one another to the benefit of the English.

At this critical juncture, the English was fortunate to find the placement of a worthy Governor General Lord Wellesley in 1798 A.D.
could exploit the political situation to the full extent in the best interests of the country. At his arrival, he saw that Great Britain could no longer play any but pre-dominant part in India. A balance of power among the native states became impossible however conscientiously the East India Company might strive to support it.\textsuperscript{110}

The internal fighting and interline quarrel became deep rooted from 1796 to 1802 A.D. when Baji Rao had to quit Poona and sheltered with the British. Ultimately the Marathas stood disunited and disjointed at the cost of mutual suspicion, intrigues, and interline quarrel. The British awaited the supreme opportunity and declared war against Sindhia and Bhonsle on the 7\textsuperscript{th} Aug. 1803 which is famously known as Second Maratha War between the English and the two Maratha chiefs. Orissa was at that time was under Raja of Berar naturally indulged in the war.

The English despite their military force, financial resources and local help could not underestimate the two united Maratha forces and took timely steps to weaken the strength of the enemy. They took timely steps to weaken the strength of the enemy taking the following measures like enticing away Maratha Soldiers to their side to weaken the military strength of the Marathas, preaching about the Maratha misrule, and securing the aid of Maratha allies and subjects by making promise of protection under the British arms and securing aid of the Maratha officials by the promise of alluring rewards.\textsuperscript{111}

At last, the British army under the superb leadership of Wellesley had prepared the ground with their characteristic thoroughness and elaboration to fine success in the ensuing war. They had also gone to the extent of creating of fifth columnists inside Maratha territories, weakened the military strength and also prevented the cooperation of the Maratha confederacy. The Maratha chiefs could not set their house in order which helped the British to win the war before it broke out.
Orissa being the part of the Bhonsla's dominion was involved in Second Maratha War. Lieutenant Colonel Cambell was entrusted the 74th Regiment, who commanded Northern Division of the army of Fort. St. George Capt. Blunt who had gathered vast knowledge of Orissa rendered his Company to the detachment. So the United forces under Cambell were consisted of 565 Europeans and 2200 Sepoys and a party of native cavalry consisting of 50 men. After the capture Barabati the troops had retreated towards own country.

Col. Harcourt dispatched troops under Major Forbes of Madras establishment to Barmula pass which passed the road from Orissa to Nagpur. Major Forbes could not obstruct the Marathas who escaped across the mountains before the detachment under Major Forbes. While the important discussions between the British and Januji were going on, Raghunath Rao exhibited his accumulated discontentments and indulged in a rebellion against the Poona govt. in which he was allied with Januji. In order to counteract the attack of Madhav Rao, Januji appealed to get timely military help from the British Govt. through the Subahdar of Orissa veselet cunningly replied to Januji that there was no need to send the company arms after the end of arising conflict between Madhav Rao and Januji.

Januji had also gone to the extent of accusing the British Govt. of pretence, duplicity, time serving and procrastination. He deputed his own vakil to Calcutta empty handed who was empowered only to negotiate but not to sign a treaty. Januji became quite suspicious upon the Britishers and a sense of hatredness was created towards the English as they remained non-compliance for the Januji's request for the military assistance against his rival power.

The intentional delay in the payment of chauth and the procrastination in the matter of the conclusion of the proposed treaty might have given him a shocking experience evaluating the hidden agenda and the
inner working of the English mind. Januji at last became restive and exasperated. He bluntly denied to honour the English request for the passage of an army to Madras through Orissa.

Verelst had sent a person in 1770 A.D. to Januji in vindication of his innocence with regard to the accusations of duplicity, time serving attitude and procrastination. Between the two agreements, one signed and sealed by the Nawab, Saif-Ud-Daulah and the other treaty was by the Bengasli Govt. with the hope that he would in return a similar agreement containing his pledges to carry out his part of the treaty. Januji vehemently had accused the British of duplicity, time serving, procrastination and immediately sent his own vakil to Calcutta with empty handed who was empowered only to negotiate but not to sign a treaty.

The English observed the political situations and intended to turn the internal jealousy and dissension prevalent among the Marathas and the other princes to their account by playing one against other. A. C. De reflected that the attitudes of indigenous rulers that the Indian Chiefs, on the other hand were engrossed in their own affairs and mutual quarrels that they had no time or sense to care for the third party who was posing for an all out offensive to annihilate them all after intensifying their dissensions to the utmost degree, thus rendering any joint action on their part all most impossible.112

The mission of Eliot to materialize the diplomatic proposal of Hastings failed when he died on his way to Nagpur. Colonel Goddard deputed Lieutenant Danial Watherston to as certain the views of the Raja of Berar which the later denied to agree with the proposal. Hastings preparation of for a big political manoeuvre through which he had made the plan to Counter act the menace of the attack by the French ended in fiasco.
At this critical juncture, the outbreak of war in Europe between the arch rivals the French and the English in 1778 A.D. emerged a new wave of political activity in India. Warren observed the apprehension of a great danger to Bombay incase of the combined army effects of French and Peshwar.

The political circumstances forced Warren Hastings to counteract the danger if they could form an alliance with the Raja of Berar which would secure for the English a strong central position menacing the lines of communications of enemy. Warren Hastings further applied his diplomatic brain and manure that Madhoji had maintained unfriendly talks with the Peshwa and the Nizam who were supporters of Sabaji. Hastings intended to play the political gamble too exploiting the feeling of hostility of Madhoji against the Peshwa and the Nizam in the interest of the English. He further went ahead to encourage Madhoji to claim the successor of Ramaraja who had shortly died as the direct linkage of the descent of Shivaji.

The views of Governors are clearly reflected in the secret consultations of the Governor General in July 1778 A.D. The Poona Government is the natural enemy of Madhoji. It is ours by their connection with our natural and declared enemy, the French. Nizam Ali, for the same reason is durled adversely of both and the contiguity of our respective territories in the wildest and least valuable parts of both and of course the least subject to competition and encroachments renders their union important and essential to the strength of both. On these grounds, I recommend that a Company civil servants be immediately be deputed to Madhoji Bhosle with powers to form a treaty of alliance between the chief and the Company on the terms of here in above stated.113

It was resolved on 11th July, 1778 that negotiations be undertaken for treaty of alliance with Madhoji Bhonsle, the Raja of Berar, and the Governor General had recommended that Alexander Kynynmound
Elliot be employed for negotiations. The two brothers Madhoji and Sabaji indulged themselves in fighting with each other and a compromise was made which made them coagents.

The Nizam at last renewed threat exploiting advantages of the Madhoji’s weakness for the death of Sabaji. Being yielded with the situation, Madhoji submitted to the Nizam and made an agreement of faithful cooperation with him and prayed his submission to the Poona Darbar by promising to pay 10 lakhs of rupees which ultimately conformed his Regency. At last Raghuji II emerged as the undisputed master of the Bhonsle’s territory.

The demise of Madhuji shifted the management of Nagpur territories in the hands of the Chimna Bapu. But he died in 1789, the administration was shouldered by Marya Bapu. The frequent change of political scenario in the quick succession did cast their reflections in the affairs of Orissa a which directly paralised the administration. Examples can be cited that the questions of cessassion of Orissa, realization of the arrear of chauth and the conclusion of a treaty between the English and the Raja of Berar was opened by the Warren Hastings.114

Verelst lost his self confidence in negotiation and stated that once flattered my self that Januji Bhonsla would have acceded to a treaty for the session of Orissa, but his evasive and artful behaviour has convened me that the Marathas will never desert their old and characteristic manners.115 Cartier became the Governor of Bengal after Verelst. Hastings could not find ample time to think a plan for the requisition of Orissa as he was entangled in many political affairs in different parts of India.116 ather he took some concrete steps to avoid some troubles which he might have faced from the state of affairs of Orissa over coming difficulties in the other parts of India.117
At the same time, the Bombay Govt. championed the cause of Raghunath Rao as Peshwa which certainly ensured a conflict with the Marathas at Poona vis, a powerful political Maratha leader played his diplomatic role in forming a quadruple alliance against the arch rival the British. The powers of the quadruple alliance was consisted of the Poona Govt., the Nizam of Hydrabad, Hyder Ali of Mysore and Bhonsla of Nagpur which entangled the Britishers in a war. At last, the plan was checked out basing on the strategy that Peshwa with Scindhia and Holkar had to fight with the English in Gujrat and Madhoji was entrusted to attack Bengal. The Nizam was entered into Company’s Sarkar of Chicacol, while Hyder Ali had pass the ghats and lay waste in cumnic.

A. C. De reflected that if all the potential members of the confederacy would played their role sincerely, it was quite possible that the course of History would have changed. But the four members could not play their role actively. The Nizam remained inactive though he was the founder of the alliance. But the Peshwa foughtly gallantly at Gujrat and Hyder Ali played the valiant role in right earnest to counter act the British.

Warren Hastings took political advantages out of the situation and gratified Nizam restoring him the Guntur region. Madhoji a political member whose action was fully depended on the success of the confederacy took a betrayal role. He was lured by the lust of gold who could supply all secret informations to Hastings about the formation of confederacy and its plan. On the other hand, he deputed his son Chimnaji Bapu with the strength of 40,000 cavalry to attack in the fulfillment of the responsibility assigned upon him and could not seriously expidite the attack. Chimnaji who set out from Nagpur in Oct. 1779, reached Cuttack in May 1780 when rains were about to start. The delay was quite intentional in order to avoid class with the English.
Hastings played his diplomatic stroke and lost no time in opening negotiations with Chimnaji deputing David Anderson for the purpose. An agreement between the two was concluded on the 6th March, 1781 A.D. where the English Govt. had to pay 13 lakhs of rupees in cash to Chimnaji and firmly assured to pay further amount of 12 lakhs in form of loan. Chimnaji had to leave Cuttack at once with his army. A part of 2000 Maratha horse was to render Company to Colonel Pear’s force at the cost of the British who in their turn was to assist the Raja of Nagpur in an expedition against Garha Mandala.

Warren Hastings successfully played a crucial role negotiating with Chimnaji and justified this means of obtaining the withdrawal of Maratha forces from Orissa by stating “if the treaty would not have been made, what might have been the real intention of Chimnaji or the dictates of his father, Madhoji Bhonsla, his unpaid troops had long been kept quite only by the hopes, which were held out to them of acquiring wealth from the plunder of Bengal, would have been invaded and much mischief would have been practiced in the province of Midnapur and Burdwan causing alarm against the inhabitants”.122

The prolonged negotiations for the realization of chauth of Bengal was brought to an end. A. C. De has referred that this piece of treachery on the part of the Madhoji and his son will godown in the history as one of the outstanding anti-national acts that History has recorded in as much as strict adherence to the treaty of 1780 by Madhoji would have brought about a change in the course of history favourable to the Indians.

Hastings became reluctant to offer the role of mediation to Madhoji during the first Maratha war. He deputed an envoy, Charles Chapman to Nagpur with the hope of expedition of the conclusion of peaceful treaty with Marathas. Chapman arrived Nagpur on Jan. 1782 but there was no achievements of any effective results. At last, Hastings left
India and was succeeded by James Macpherson who remained Governor General till the arrival of Lord Cornwallis.

5.3. THE ROLE OF WELLESLEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF ORISSA:

Cornwallis tried his level best to acquire Orissa through diplomacy but failed in his diplomatic mission. The arrival of Lord Wellesley as the Governor General of India undoubtedly rendered a new lease of life reviving the old policy of entering into negotiation with the Raja of Nagpur. Another proposal was given to the Raja of Nagpur for the establishment of a British subsidiary force in his territories. The proposal of the Resident was that the Governor General would readily accept a security for the payment of the subsidy of the troops and even prefer to any other arrangement, an assignment of such part of the province of Cuttack as should be adequate to the purpose, and should place under the management of the Company such as tract of the territory as should establish the continuity of their dominions from Bengal to Northern Sircars.\textsuperscript{123}

The proposed negotiation failed because there was the apprehension of the Raja of Nagpur that he would loose his independence by keeping the British force. He further exhibited his resentment at the British alliance with the Nizam of Hyderabad which had been highly responsible for Maratha plunders.

The Governor General clarified the acquisition of Orissa writing on 27\textsuperscript{th} June, 1803 to Arthur Wellesley that "from the Raja of Berar, I wish to acquire the whole province of Cuttack so as to write the Northern Circars by a continued line of sea coast with Bengal. This cession including Balasore, etc. to be made either absolutely or upon payment of a moderate rent or a security for the Subsidiary force to be introduced into the dominions of the Raja of Berar."\textsuperscript{124} The Governor General further directed to
Arthur Wellesley not to make any peaceful treaty until the acquisition of Orissa.”

Arthur Wellesley had gone to the extent of demanding that the forces of Raghuji and Scindhia should retire from the Nizam’s frontier near Ajanta in 18th July, 1803. The Governor General in council had reported to the secret Committee of the court of Directors that he had made necessary arrangements for the occupation of Cuttack. He further observed for the occupation of Orissa that the maritime territories of Marathas on the eastern side of the peninsula of India would be obtained from all inter course with French and inflict a blow against the resources of the Raja of Berar.

On 3rd Aug. 1803, the English declared war against the Maratha confederacy. Colonel Cambel was entrusted the 74th regiment and commanded the northern division of army of Fort. St. George which directed to prepare for an invasion of Cuttack. W. Thorn has referred that the occupation of the maritime district of Cuttack formed a principal part of the general plan of attack against the confederates.” The strategy of the invasion was meticulously prepared and a joint operation would be carried out from four different directions known as Ganjam, Kadigree, Jaleswar and Midnapore.

The officer who was in charge of Midnapore was ordered to reinforce the station on the frontiers of Jaleswar with three companies of sepoys and to send a whole battalion of sepoys and artillery to Jaleswar. Capt. P. Grant, an officer of the Bengal establishment was directed to accompany Capt. Morgan to assist him by his local information in the province of Cuttack, and particularly in the city and environs of Balasore”.

At last a sound arrangement for attack from three sides was completed. It was planned that the main army was to start from Ganjam under Lt. Col. Harcourt, while Lt. Col. Forgusson was proceed from
Jaleswar towards Cuttack. Captain was to chalk out his plan to proceed to Balasore by sea and occupy the town and the army under his command was to form a junction with that proceeding from Jaleswar under Lt. Col. Forgusson. After Forgusson march to Cuttack, Captain Morgan was to stay back at Balasore to consolidate the position and safeguard the passage of the army under Forgusson from any attack behind, Col. Fenwick, incharge of troops at Midnapore, was ordered to occupy the Maratha Districts north west of the river Subarnarekha and the Maratha territory intermixed with the British possessions in the province of Midnapore.”

All the possible steps were taken for the safe and successful operations and all precautions for eventualities were taken into serious considerations of the authorities before the start of the expeditions. The total number of troops assembled for invasion of the province of Cuttack amounted to the tune of 4916 men as per the list mentioned below.\footnote{127}In order to further strengthen the cited forces, 1300 sepoys were stationed at Midnapore as a reserve.

### TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Infantry</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Infantry</td>
<td>2408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Cavalry</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Capt. Dick</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Capt. Morgon</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Lt. Col. Forgusson Sepoy</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4916</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The main force consisting of 1500 native troops was assembled at Ganjam. Capt. Blunt, an engineer by his profession having some local knowledge of the country, had rendered his company.\textsuperscript{128}

Inspite of the above preparation and directions against to attack Cuttack, the Governor General intended to adopt peaceful means for the surrender of the province. The character of the Maratha administration probably appeared that the Maratha officers might be induced to surrender the province in return for pensions or donations of money from the British Govt. in Orissa. Campbell and Melville shouldered the responsibility to open a negotiation with them. They were given special instructions that “they should employ every possible precaution to preserve the respect due to the temple of Lord Jagannath and to the religious prejudices of the Brahmins and pilgrims”.

The British administration went further ahead to persuade the sacred Brahmins of Lord Jagannath at Puri and Procured a letter from Jagannath of Tribeni, the oldest and the other eminent pandits in Bengal to RamChand and Brahmins residing at Jagannath which recommended that they need not be afraid to form connection with the British Govt, which is distinguished for benevolence to its subjects. The above cited letter dispatched to Campbell to deliver them at a suitable time.\textsuperscript{129}

Captain Dick had commanded a detachment of 500 Bengal volunteers with some additional battering guns to join the main body of troops at Ganjam expecting the Maratha reinforcements from Nagpur on 30\textsuperscript{th} Aug. 1803.\textsuperscript{130}

The Governor General rendered timely suggestions to adopt unscrupulous methods like bribery to win over the Maratha officials in Orissa. Lord Wellesley dispatched official letters to Bhomuji Pandit, the Naib of Cuttack, Haribansh Ray, the Diwan, Balaji Kunar, the commander
chief, Moro Pandit, the faujdar to allure them money as a price of betrayal.\textsuperscript{131} As bribery was a common practice in securing political objectives, Lord Wellesley showed his keen interest to aquire Orissa and report to such means.\textsuperscript{132} He went ahead in sending an intelligent Muslim Subedar with Capt. Grant to follow the policy of persuasion to come to the side of British.

General Campbell chalked out the plan of Wellesley with 74 regiment, the officer commanding the Northern Division of the army of Madras Govt. with the support of Capt. Dick to launch the main offensive from Ganjam. General Campbell as the plan had to proceed on the coastal route to Puri for the occupation and then to proceed Cuttack for the possession of the Barabati Fort which was considered as the main strong hold of the Maratha power in Orissa. After the occupation of the above cited places, the English soldiers was to advance towards Baramula Pass (near Baud) to check Maratha reinforcement from Nagpur.

Campbell started from Ganjam but his serious illness before the operation led to the appointment of Colonel Harcourt of the 12\textsuperscript{th} Regiment as the commanding officer on 11\textsuperscript{th} Sept. 1803 and proceeded to Prayagi.\textsuperscript{134} Harcourt could know news from a Brahman that “the Brahmins at the holy place consulted and applied to Jagannath to inform them what power was now to have this temple under his protection that he had given a decided answer that the British Govt. was in future to be his guardian”.\textsuperscript{134}

Besides Harcourt a detachment of 500 troops and 21 artillery were dispatched from Ft. William in three ships under Capt. Morgan for the capture of Balasore port. Another detachment under Colonel Forgason was formed at Jaleswar for advancing towards the province of Cuttack together with Captain Morgan from Balasore.\textsuperscript{135}
The strategical arrangements were prepared to attack from three sides. From Ganjam in the south under Colonel Harcourt, Jaleswar in the North under Colonel Forguson and the sea under Captain Morgan. All were directed to lead for Cuttack. Simultaneously, Wellesley had appointed John Melville as the civil commissioner for the settlement of the revenue at Cuttack and acted as the negotiator with the feudatory chiefs to accept British rule over Orissa.

In order to counteract the British forces, the Maratha failed to make a massive preparation. The Maratha Govt. took timely steps and made the declaration to all the tributary Rajas to relinquish a whole year's revenue if they would render their assistance preventing the British from obtaining the possession of the province.\textsuperscript{136}

But the tributary Rajas made no response to the declaration of the Maratha Govt.\textsuperscript{137} The Maratha's preparation to counteract the invading British forces was not sufficient to match the British forces. It was found that the Maathas neither had an organized defence or inspiring leadership. The prolonged period of misrule frequenting features of the administration and extortion had thoroughly made them extremely unpopular among the people of Orissa. It was also expected that the consequences of the war was a surgeon conclusion.

Despite that the Marathas prepared their defence arrangement to prevent the British forces. The Maratha chief at Balasore was entrusted to lead the forces stationed at Guzurghat, Narasinghpur, Ramachandrapur, Khathipur in Mayurbhanj and Phulwar Pass consisted of 1,000 match lock man, 100 horses and a number of paiks.\textsuperscript{138} Balaji Kunar was entrusted the detachment consisting of 3000 cavalry and infantry took the post of north bank of river Mahanadi. The Maratha detachment was placed in the Barabati of Cuttack and Dharmaraj Pandit took the command at Piplipur (Pipli) to oppose the British army from the south. At last, 3000 Maratha troops were
stationed to leave Cuttack with the intention of disputing the passage of Harcourt at Manikpatna.\textsuperscript{139}

On 17\textsuperscript{th} September 1803, the British forces arrived at Narasinghpatna and faced some difficulties in transporting their stores by land. At last, Harcourt had made a thorough discussion of the matter with Melville about the difficulties of transport. Melville gave valuable suggestions that the Raja should be requested to render to afford timely assistance to the British forces to dispatch the stores, baggage, artillery. He further should be requested to send 3000 fighting men to co operate with them to expel the Marathas at the cost of one Lakh rupees.\textsuperscript{140} Harcourt certainly accepted proposal and a letter was dispatched which was ultimately accepted by the Raja.\textsuperscript{141}

The Raja of Khurda was lured by the proposal of Harcourt and wished to regain his control over the Puri Temple and did not like the interference of the Marathas. Harcourt who took the command on 11\textsuperscript{th} September 1803, sent a message to the Priests of Puri and firmly assured them his full protection. He became able to disporse a continent of Maratha troops at Manikpatna with ease and the fauzdar Fateh Muhmmad won them over to this side. Harcourt captured Puri on 18\textsuperscript{th} September 1803 without facing any opposition.

Harcourt after the possession of Puri took conciliatory attitude and a guard of Hindus was placed in the temple of Lord Jagannath.\textsuperscript{142} The British administration adopted effective measures to protect the honour of Brahmans and the chief officers of the temple and confidence in order to get their active support.\textsuperscript{143}

Harcourt did everything to remove the fear and misgivings of the priests whose deep influence on the people of Orissa was undoubtly profound. The guarantee of protection to the sacred temple of Lord
Jagannath enhanced the prestige of the English which helped to silence the perennial hostility of the feudatory chiefs. The protective and effective measure of the English struck a great moral blow against the Maratha power whose the people recognized as inferior to the English.

Harcourt directed Lieutenant Ogilvie at Malikpatna to guard the line of communication between Ganjam and Puri. Major Fletcher was posted at Puri to protect any Maratha raid and advanced towards Cuttack on 24\(^{th}\) September 1803. Harcourt found it difficulties to carry the task and proceeded to the direction of Ahmadpur crossing the rising nalas and rivers with great difficulty. But the march of British troops from Puri to Cuttack was not an opposed. The Maratha forces resisted the invading army of Britishers at Ahmadpur and Mukundpur. But the mood of resistance of Marathas was spineless and weak. The Marathas took shelter in the fort of Barabati situated on the north of the Island like Cuttack and commanding to the north ward the Mahanadi and the ferry.

On 8\(^{th}\) October 1803, Harcourt reached Cuttack and penetrated the town through Lalbagh fort which was on the south side of the Island and covered the town which lay between it and the fort of Barabati. Harcourt encamped 1,000 yards infront of the south face of Barabati. Harcourt continued his negotiating method in consultation with Melville to possess the fort by paying the garrison up to half a lakh of rupees. But he failed in his mission and got negative response from the Marathas. The English made arrangements to besiege the fort of Barabati.

Harcourt while engaging in the seize of the Barabati fort, applied his brain to reduce Ram Prasad, a Hindu chief at the head of the corps of Infantry, considered as their best troops by the Marathas. The attempt was considered successful which made the occupation easier. On 13\(^{th}\) October 1803, the southern wall could be blown out by artillery fire and after over coming some resistance at the inner gate, the British troops could
capture it on 14th October 1803 A.D. Two European and three Indian soldiers were killed with 16 European and 13 Indians were wounded.147

The Marathas had taken flight leaving three elephants and 120 guns of different calibers behind in the foot.148 Some Marathas were making efforts to save their precious lives, they were drowned in the ditch.149 The people of Cuttack fled away towards Tangi for safety.

Harcourt proceeded to Kujang through Patamundai. Major Forbes was sent to chase the retreating Marathas out of Orissa through the Baramula pass and John Melville remained for the restoration of law and order. On 2nd November 1803, Major Forbes reached Baramula and closed the entrance of Orissa but could fail to intercept the Marathas since they had already escaped under the leadership of Balaji Kunar, the commander in chief of the Marathas through the pass before the arrival of the English forces.

After the British occupation of the Barabati fort, Lord Wellesley took farsighted measure of appointing a commission consisting of G. Harcourt, J. Melville and T. H. Earnest (the magistrate of the Midnapore to organize the province of Cuttack and the feudatories of the Maratha chief at Nagpur.150

The Rajas and Zamindars of Khurda, Angul, Mayurbhanj, Hindol, Daspalla, Ali, Kujang, Harishpur, Darpan, Sukinda, Madhupur, Marichpur, Bishnupur and Kanika acknowledged the British suzerainty and promised to pay annual tributes. But the annual tributes. But the annual tribute was fixed in perpetuity and the British authority firmly assured them not to enhance the annual tribute.151 Wellesley came out with flying colour in displaying his stroke of diplomacy which ultimately got the recognition of the rule of the East India Company.
Captain Morgan landed at Balasore on 21st September 1803. Before the arrival of the Capt. Morgan, the British authority got the information that a party of the Marathas who had been at the ghats between the river and Jaleswar were marching ahead to protect the town of Balasore or to destroy it. The army and equipments of Capt. Morgan were transported in seven vessels known as Alexander, Anne, George, Fairdie, Lizard and Scourge and a gun boat.

It was certainly a tactical strategy of Wellesley who did not intend the Maratha garrison at Balasore to come to help of their counter part at Barabati. Morgan immediately consulted with Grant and agreed to attack the Maratha forces without waiting guns. They chalked out their war plan and halted at Balasore after crossing over paddy fields undated one to three feet in water. Moro Pandit the Maratha Fauzdar at Balasore became the worst victim as he was favourably disposed towards the British was confined in the Maratha fort outside the town. The Marathas planned the war strategy against the enemy, they advanced their army to a place where the ground was elevated and commanding and chose the space having several spacious buildings in order to accommodate the troops and to receive 400 to 500 men.

After the preparation of war strategy, the Maratha forces started quick fire against the advance party of the British soldiers. The Marathas made a futile attempt to prevent the advance of the British of the English. Being defeated by the British forces, the Marathas moved towards Soro. Atlast Captain Morgan captured Balasore along with the Maratha located outside the town. Marathas after their disastrous defeat had left three old unserviceable guns on decayed carriages, one that appeared to be a six pounder, a small quantity of grains of different kinds and two chests with papers relating the administration. Capt. Morgan after the possession of Balasore dispatched a detachment against a party of Marathas. At this
critical juncture, there was the spread of rumour that a part of the Marathas were hiding in some where at Balasore. They had taken vow to restore in vandalism in order to burn and plunder the town. It was further investigated that a large body of wounded Marathas had been camped at the village Ramnath, situated 8 miles away from Balasore.160

Lieutenant Tanner was entrusted to chase the Marathas out from the village Ramnath in order to keep the faith and self confidence of the public. Tanner resumed their journey to Balasore with his men.161 The English faced communication delink when the dak to the south of Balasore was not able to pass through Suranga. Capt. Slye was entrusted the command with two Companies to open Communication between Balasore and Cuttack.

After reaching at Haetierpur and encamped at Begunia on 29th September 1803 where the Marathas had already left encamping about 2 miles to the south.162 On Ist October, 1803 a surprise attack was made by the British forces which abandoned the Maratha forces after a feeble resistance. The outcome of the skirmish that fifteen or twenty of Marathas were killed or wounded and five Marathas were kept as prisoners.163 Another news surprised Capt. Syle that the Marathas having the number of 2,000 and 3,000 had assembled at Suranga in order to penetrate them dense forests which turned a risk factor for a fight with the small detachment, Capt. Syle wrote Morgan for the deployment of additional reinforcements.164 Atlast, Ensign Scot joined with Syle and took the possession of Suranga which forced the Marathas to abandon towards Bhadrak.

Syle got some secret news at Suranga that the Maratha forces of infantry and cavalry around 2000 were at Jajpur and about ciss towards the south. He sent Chait Singh and Baku Singh, two sepoys indisguise of Fakirs to Jajpur. They reported to Syle about the congregation of 500 well mounted horse and 600 irregular foot soldiers. They also further gave
informations that Raghunath Bakshi having a force consisting of 1000 was coming Nagpur to join at Cuttack. The Raja of the garh had a proposal to send soldiers infavour of the Marathas and the established Zamindars and rich people were in league to oppose the British forces.

To counteract the Marathas war strategy, the English was made the plan for an attack from Midnapore and a special order was made to command under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson. A special instruction was given that Ferguson to make communicating linkage with the commanding officer at Cuttack, not to interrupt the pilgrims to visit the sacred temple of Lord Jagannath and to honour the conciliatory policy to the inhabitants of Orissa passing the Maratha frontier. The prime object of dispatching this detachment was to driveout the Marathas from the immediate frontier of Bengal the country between Balasore and Jaleswar. The other aim was to drive out all the obstacles on the way Jaleswar to Cuttack and reinforce the mainforce under Harcourt. Ferguson reached at Balasore without facing any challenge from the forces of Maratha and proceeded to Cuttack on 10th October, 1803 to join with Harcourt without opposition.

A fresh plan was chelked out to occupy the Maratha territory on the north east of Subarnarekha consisting of Pataspur, Shahbandur, Kamarada, Bhograi, Rajichand and Kirchand. The prime cause of the plan was carried out by the Britishers to keep for a natural boundary between Bengal and Orissa. Colonel Fenwick was entrusted the task to win over the local Zamindars by the policy of conciliation and coercion.

The British Authority adopted to win over the local Zamindars on the apprehension that the Marathas might renew their vigour and strategy in order to take help from the local Zamindars to intervene the Company's territory. Colonel Fenwick was strictly directed to encourage the local Zamindars to oppose the Marathas on the frontier.
T. H. Ernest the acting Magistrate of Midnapore was instructed to follow the directions given to Fenwick. Sumitra Dei, the Rani of Mayurbhanj who had to pay arrears to the tune of 1600 owing to the inundations was exempted by the Governor General. Ramnand Bhuyan of Janukund could not compromise or sought the protection of the British. The same example can be cited to Raghunath Paikara Bhuyan, another audacious Zamindar of Kirchand had gone to the extent of plundering the British territory without paying slightest regards to the British proclamation. He was confined in his own fort.

Fenwick could not tolerate the audacity of cited Zamindars and ordered Captain Lamb of the 5th Regiment to establish police Daroghas and Tehsildars on the parganas of Pataspur, Karmada, Shahbandar and Bhograi. The Daroghas and Tehsildars were appointed by Ernest. Ramanand Bhuyan being frightened by the British forces surrendered to Lamb. He was arrested and despatched to Midnapore which ultimately destroyed his fort.

Lieutenant Cooper had gone to tackle against Raghunath Paikara and occupied all the possession of Raghunath Paikara on the both sides of Subarnarekha. The bamboo fences of the fort was burnt and the mud forts were delivered up. After the feeble resistance, Raghunath Paikara managed to retire with a few starch followers into the thicket part of the jungle with compromising the British authority.

The British at last occupied the whole of the Maratha territories on the north east of the Subarnarekha as the natural boundary line between Bengal and Orissa. After the capture of the Barabati the Maratha soldiers resumed precipitately towards their country. Harcourt took timely steps and sent Major Forboes of Madras establishment to Barmula Pass through which the road passed from Orissa to Nagpur. Major Forbes reached Barmula on 2nd November 1803 but could not intercept the Marathas who
escaped across the mountains before the arrival of the detachment under Major Forbes.\footnote{172}

After the occupation of the country the British took preventive measures stationing troops near passes and stratetic places in order to prevent Maratha raid from any directions. In order to materialize their plan, the English placed 1000 men exclusively 1000 on the Island of Cuttack. The established post at Manikpatna was rein forced. The British authority made a special arrangement to maintain a regular force at the Jagannath. A force of 300 men with a field six pounder was placed at Pipili. A force consisting of 300 to 400 men placed at Jajpur and Bhadrak abolishing the post at Suranga. Balasore was also secured a post taking the same number of men at Jajpur and Bhadrak.

Lastly, special attention was given to Kendrapara by placing a strong detachment which commanded the most material points towards the sea in order to counteract the Raja of Kujang and Subordinate chief in that part of the country.\footnote{173} After taking all the preventive measures, Harcourt posted the 9\textsuperscript{th} Madras Native Infantry in the Fort of Barabati consisting about 450 to 500 Europeans, 140 troopers with Gallopers, Four Six pounders, and two howitzers and wished to proceed to Sonepur.\footnote{174}

From Sonepur he took keen interests to proceed to Sambalpur to obtain the possession of Ratanpur and the district of Chhatisgarh. He intended to aquire the above cited regions in the sense that it would keep extra security to the aquired possession of British Govt. from Benaras to Ganjam. But, it was not done as tranquility was established very soon. At last, the Raja of Berar sent his ambassador Jaswanta Rao Ramchandra on 30\textsuperscript{th} November 1803 in order to conclude a peaceful treaty. He met Arthur Wellesley at a conference at Deogaon and made deep discussions on the various points for the conclusion of the peace.
Arthur Wellesley made his clarity on the ground that he badly required the province of Cuttack which would be a strategical importance and convenient frontier with the other occupied territories of the Company. The ambassador of the Raja of Berar almost agreed on all the discussed features besides one point that Jagannath was his (Raja's) own Pagoda, he was desions to retain it that his honour was involved in this point. Arthur Wellesley cunningly replied that the whole of the province of Cuttack was directly necessary on the ground that the company had a long desire to possess this province on the ground that there might not be any break in communications between Calcutta and Madras to take half of it or to allow the Raja to take half of it, would entirely defeat that great object.

At last the most awaited treaty between two contesting powers was prepared during the night of 16th December 1803 and both of them, named as Arthur Wellesley. Jaswant Rao Ramchandra signed the memorable treaty on 17th December 1803. By virtue of this the British occupation of Orissa at last confirmed. The prolonged warfare with political entanglement came an end and the conquest of Orissa smoothly accomplished on account of the negligence of the Marathas who had abandoned the province defenceless which caused Orissa complete political dismemberment with disastrous effects. The phase wise conquest of Orissa was successfully conquered by the British without much resistance by the Marathas.

The tough preparation of the English the meticulous care taken to convince the people, the British policy of religious toleration, highest honour to the priests, Hindu customs and rituals of the English to conquer Orissa smoothly bore the desired fruits. A. C. De has referred that in the history of Orissa, the event will go down as Bloodless Revolution when a change of Govt. was effected with very little bloodshed. The clever device of Wellesley and blickering operation by a through and faultless plan had brought crowning success and helped the British to possess the province of
Cuttack of Orissa which was one of the main concerns of the British as early as 1760 A.D. The application of diplomacy and force turned successful instruments or means to achieve the end which ultimately helped the British for the acquisition of Orissa.
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