CHAPTER II

Indefinite Sense and Rejection of Ideality
Later Wittgenstein

Like Plato, the early Wittgenstein was obsessed with the concept of ideality. What Plato wished was the transcendence of the soul to the knowledge of the eternal world of ideas. Plato demanded of the soul this transcendence, if it needs knowledge. For Plato the world of ideas represented the objectivity of the entire reality. He also wanted this objectivity to be the basis of the social order and called the society so based the just society. We have seen in the previous chapter that in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* this objectivity was translated into categories of the understanding and the related concepts with a subjective dimension. Kant also, like Plato, reached these concepts through the method of abstraction. The early Wittgenstein, different from Plato and Kant, did not rely on abstraction to formulate his ideality. He adopted what he then believed to be a concrete method to find the ultimate elements of reality and this was the method of analysis. He thought then that these elements explained the ideality of reality and their counterparts in language that of meanings of words. The picture of the world he had through this conception of ideality led him to reject transcendental philosophy represented by Plato and Kant among others. He was under the impression that his method of analysis provided one with the ultimate elements of reality. In his later work *Philosophical Investigations* (hereafter PI) he questions not only the transcendentalism of philosophy but also its obsession with the ideal understanding of phenomena. He now realises that his earlier method was no different from that of the other traditional philosophers at the fundamental level.

Wittgenstein’ s Rejection of Ostensive Definition

In PI Wittgenstein emphasises that when we use language we are not concerned with its correspondence to reality. The right or wrong use of a word, he
says, is not a matter of its correspondence to reality but a matter of following the rule of it. The rules of language are to be looked upon not as consisting of a relation of correspondence it has with the world but as something inherent in it. And the following of the rules of language do not suggest anything ideal or transcendental about it and it is an ordinary feature of the uses of words.

Wittgenstein understands the use of language as an act now. An act does not refer to anything outside itself. If A gives B a gift it is an act complete in itself. What validates this act is its taking place, not an ideal counterpart of it elsewhere. He gives the following example to show the nature of language as an act:

"Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples". He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked "apples"; then he looks up the word "red" in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers - I assume that he knows them by heart - up to the word "five" and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. —It is in this and similar ways one operates with words."¹

The question may arise here: Doesn't the word 'red' correspond to the colour sample in the table? Wittgenstein says that the table is only a representation of the uses of colour words. And it does not make sense, he believes, to ask such a question. His opinion is that when one uses for example the word 'red' one uses it blindly. In the context of the above example he writes:

"But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?"- Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere. - But what is the meaning of the word "five"? - No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used."²

This standpoint of Wittgenstein is pitted against his own name theory in the Tractatus and also the transcendental and idealist conception of the meaning and
existence in general. Wittgenstein understands now that the sense of language and the being of the world as something related to the uses of words in accordance with the rules in the actual situations of life. By rejecting the possibility for a formulation of the rules of language independent of the concrete uses of words he wants to show that the ordinary language as it is 'performs its offices' without being in need of a transcendental shore up.

The name theory of meaning is based on the belief that language refers to a world of objects independent of its use. This belief takes the form of ostensive definition when it is stated that what a name means is what can be pointed to when that name is used. Wittgenstein writes about the name theory:

"If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself."

Wittgenstein rejects the name theory of meaning as it is monotonous and static which does not do justice to the varied uses of words in multifarious contexts of our forms of life. He also finds that the ordinary uses of words do not point to the fact that they require anything other than their own rules to make them usable. So it was a mistake on his part that he in his early period formulated objects to correspond to names and believed that there was a division between language and the world that way. Here he raises the question: Inspite of the fact that language does not suggest a world of references detached from the uses of its words what is it that tempts us to postulate it? His answer to this is that the transparency of meanings of words given in a primitive use of language beguiles us to do so. Wittgenstein gives the following example of a primitive use of language:

'The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab","
"beam". A calls them out; --B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. --Conceive this as a complete primitive language."\(^4\)

Language conceived now as an act is a form of life for Wittgenstein. A child, when it learns a language, is initiated into a form of life shared by a community. A child may be taught its language through an ostensive teaching, though its learning it is more than this teaching can include. But this teaching makes sense only in the overall context of language and as such is a part of the training the child undergoes to adjust itself into a form of life. It is natural for a child to have a way of acting upon the world and this way is very much simultaneous with the situations it is in. A child learns a language as it learns to walk and in learning it no mental images of words which the child may have help it in determining the success of it. In the above example B's understanding of A's calls consists in acting in certain ways at them and it is immaterial whether some mental images of the building-stones in question come before his mind at those calls. Similarly in the case of the child that learns language what matters is its success of actions in, and reactions to, situations, not what come before its mind when it uses words. Suppose someone says that whenever he uses a word a picture of the object in question comes before his mind. Wittgenstein's response to it runs as follows:

"But if the ostensive teaching has this effect, -am I to say it effects an understanding of the word? Don't you understand the call "Slab!" if you act upon it in such-and-such a way? —Doubtless the ostensive teaching helped to bring this about; but only together with a particular training. With different training the same ostensive teaching of these words would have effected a quite different understanding.

"I set the brake up by connecting up rod and lever." - Yes, given the whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with that is it a brake-lever, and separated from its support it is not even a lever; it may be anything, or nothing."

The ostensive definition or teaching of meanings makes sense only in the overall context of the uses of words in a language. It presupposes the uses of words
as given in different contexts as a sign-post does an already existing way and its use to indicate that way. Suppose I see a red object and I say to someone: "That is the colour red". Wittgenstein will say that my reaction in this context is determined by the way language is used by a community and my learning it. But doesn't the word 'red' refer to the colour red? The answer to this within the framework of the PI is the question: Where will we locate the divide between the colour and the word? When I touch a tree and say that I touch a tree now the proof of the statement is the fact that 'I touch a tree now'. And what is in inverted comas here is a use of words.

Wittgenstein equates language with a form of life and the nature of both is that they evolve historically. And this contextual and a priori historicity that Wittgenstein now relies on finds its beautiful expression in the following remark of his:

"Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses."\(^6\)

And he adds to this the following remark that equates language with form of life:

"It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle. -Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others.----And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."\(^7\)

In the determination of the sense of language what helps us is the contexts of life in which it is used. We cannot point to a precisely set contours of this context for this but the context as such with its vague boundaries. No one action of mine in a context can determine the meaning of my being in a context but the whole of my
living it through my internal and external actions and reactions and understanding it in its entirety as a part of an evolved and given form of life. This shows how superfluous the ostensive definition of meaning is in determining the sense of language. What it actually doing is pointing to what is already there as a part of an activity called living, which exists there independent of an ostensive gesture on our part.

And it is against the background of seeing language as a form of life Wittgenstein questions the rationale of the belief that pointing to an object sets the boundary of the relation between the use of a word and an object. He says it is not pointing to the object in question that matters in the use of a word but its use as such, as an act in a context. He illustrates this point with an example. He says that when someone points to the colour of an object he or she does something different from pointing to the shape of it. And it gives us the feeling that the difference in these acts is given through the pointing, which can also explain the meanings of words. And it is here where our temptation to see language as situated independent of the world of objects finds its justification. But Wittgenstein points out that the shape and the colour of the object in question and also the distinction between them are not the creation of our will but the unavoidable ingredients of the contexts of the uses of words that mean them. What is not created by our will forms the contexts of our life. Wittgenstein writes:

"You attend to the shape, sometimes by tracing it, sometimes by screwing up your eyes so as not to see the colour clearly, and in many other ways. I want to say: This is the sort of thing that happens while one 'directs one's attention to this or that'. But it isn't these things by themselves that make us say someone is attending to the shape, the colour, and so on. Just as a move in chess doesn't consist simply in moving a piece in such-and such way on the board--nor yet in one's thoughts and feelings as one makes the move: but in the circumstances that we call "playing a game of chess", "solving a chess problem", and so on."
In solving a chess problem a player engages himself not with the question whether a piece in it refers to anything outside the game but the position of it in the context of the game. Similarly in a language-game what matters is not the question of a word’s referring to anything but the appropriate way in which it falls in place. The following sentences that Wittgenstein gives as examples of how the word 'blue' is used in different contexts show that a reference of the word is not the point of its meaning but its use in the given contexts:

"Is this blue the same as the blue over there? Do you see any difference? -"
"You are mixing paint and you say "It's hard to get the blue of this sky"
"It is turning fine, you can already see the sky again."
"Look what different effects these two blues have."
"This blue signal-light means...."
"What's this blue called? - Is it 'indigo'?"

In the occurrences of the word 'blue' in the above sentences what we see is not the word's act of referring to a colour but a speaker's reactions in different contexts like a player's with a piece when he or she is in a game of chess. A pristine correspondence between the word 'blue' and the colour blue is missing in these utterances. The question whether the word refers to the colour in my eye or the one out there gives way to the one how the word is used as an action or a reaction in a situation. A use of a word is like 'to be angry', 'to be happy', 'to walk', 'to look', 'to be in pain' etc. These acts are complete in themselves, so are the uses of words.

Language as a Game and Its Implications

Wittgenstein now says that language can be better understood by a comparison of it with a game. Different uses of language are like different games. Aren't there tragic as well as happy games in life? Also there are innumerable others. In the following passage Wittgenstein shows what his analogy of games means:
"Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:

- Giving orders, and obeying them-
- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements-
- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)-
- Reporting an event-
- Speculating about an event-
- Forming and testing a hypothesis-
- Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams-
- Making up a story; and reading it-

**Play-acting**-
- Singing catches-
- Guessing riddles-
- Making a joke; telling it-
- Solving a problem in practical arithmetic-
- Translating from one language into another-
- Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

-It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philos op hicus.*)"^9

The author of *Tractatus* was in search of the essences of the world and language. He found them in objects and names. He thought that the essences he arrived at there were the concrete and hard facts about reality as opposed to the abstract and transcendental ones postulated by Plato and Kant. Now he realises that what he thought concrete essences and what Plato and Kant had thought transcendental ones are the two sides of the same coin and both the views ignore the
multiplicity and context dependent richness of the uses of words that form our world. Now he believes that he is in the know of what had misled him in *Tractatus*.

It is a feature of language that it is non-arbitrary. According to him, we are tempted to attribute this non-arbitrariness to the conception that language refers to a world which lies outside it. And he says that he too was under the spell of this temptation in *Tractatus*. When we discuss his notion of rules as explained by him in *PI* we will see how he explains the non-arbitrariness of the use of language now. In *Tractatus* he thought that the determinacy of sense and its clarity could be understood by unearthing the ultimate conceptual framework that language and the world hid from our view. There the ultimate elements of the world were objects and those of language names and they gave the rough world and the vague language their crystal clear base. And objects corresponded to names *eternally* without being marred by the contingent destruction and creation of the ordinary world through change. It was also thought in that context that existence and non-existence could not be attributed to objects and that they could only be named. The reason for this conception was that what made existence and no-existence of states of affairs possible were not subject to the conditions of existence and non-existence. And now Wittgenstein understands that this conception was a result of his attempt to represent the means of representation as something independent of the representation. What lies in language as a means of representation cannot have an actual and independent representation by means of language. He says that any attempt to separate the means of representation from language to represent it runs the risk of being an idle talk and it was what he had indulged in *Tractatus*.

He makes this point clear with the help of the example of the standard metre scale kept in Paris. The standard metre scale is the means by which we represent the length in metre, but of that we cannot say whether it is of one metre length or not. That is, it cannot be represented in metre. He writes:
"One would, however, like to say: existence cannot be attributed to an element, for if it did not exist, one could not even name it and so one could say nothing at all of it. - But let us consider an analogous case. There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. — But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule. - Let us imagine samples of colour being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: "sepia" means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept hermetically sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this colour or that it is not."\textsuperscript{10}

To ascribe an extraordinary property to what we believe to be the ultimate elements is like ascribing the same to the standard metre in Paris. The arbitrariness involved in the measurement of length in metre has been done away with by our agreement to use a standard for it. Is this agreement something extraordinary? Not at all: It is as ordinary as anything called standard in our daily life. In the case of the uses of words we do not come across 'set paradigms' like the standard metre, but they are immanent in language. In the absence of the set paradigms about the uses of words we wrongly feel that there is something extraordinary about the meanings of words and that it is our task to explain this. Wittgenstein sometimes calls this a superstition about meanings or being in general. He rejects this superstition calling it a 'going after chimeras'.

Another point which Wittgenstein considers a reason for our temptation for the search of ultimate elements is our belief in the determinate sense of the word independent of the spatio-temporal contingencies of its uses. He explains this with the help of the sentence: "Excalibur has a sharp blade". If the sword Excalibur is destroyed it is not the case that the word "Excalibur" ceases to have meaning. We, according to Wittgenstein, as it were are tempted to think here that it is something extraordinary and that the meaning of the word "Excalibur" in that case has to be explained in terms of the ultimate elements that we believe survive the destruction
of the material object called Excalibur. On this line we attribute to the world its
essences as its eternal being. It was this picture, he believes, which guided even him
to postulate his own version of metaphysics in *Tractatus*. And its *transcendental*
counterparts we can see in Plato's *Republic* in the form of *ideas* and in Kant's
*Critique of Pure Reason* in the form of *categories of the understanding and pure*
*forms of sensibility*. Wittgenstein now realises that he himself in *Tractatus* and
transcendental philosophers in general are in the grip of an unnecessary anxiety
about the permanence of meanings and the being of the world. And this anxiety, he
shows in PI, is due to a misconception about the ways that ordinary language
functions. Even in the face of the absence or destruction of objects words make
sense as in the case of the word "Excalibur" that makes sense even when it is
destroyed. And *it is an ordinary feature of the uses of words*. He writes:

"In §15 we introduced proper names into language (8). Now suppose that the tool
with the name "N" is broken. Not knowing this, A gives B the sign "N". Has this
sign meaning now or not? - What is B to do when he is given it? - We have not
settled anything about this. One might ask: What will he do? Well, perhaps he will
stand there at a loss or shew A the pieces. Here one might say: "N" has become
meaningless; and this expression would mean that the sign "N" no longer had a use
in our language-game (unless we gave it a new one). "N" might also become
meaningless because, for whatever reason, the tool was given another name and the
sign "N" no longer used in the language-game. - But we could also imagine a
convention whereby B has to shake his head in reply if A gives him the sign
belonging to a tool that is broken. - In this way the command "N" might be said to
be given a place in the language-game even when the tool no longer exists, and the
sign "N" to have meaning even when its bearer ceases to exist."11

Wittgenstein's rejection of the ultimate elements of reality takes him to
question the method of analysis that leads to them. He himself, we know, practiced
this method in his early period. The tenet of this method is that everything complex
can be analysed into the component parts of it and at the end it will present us with
the ultimate elements of it which survive the destruction of the complex. Wittgenstein says that this method draws upon certain facts visible to us in the ordinary world in relation with the objects in it. But an ordinary fact about an object in the world does not warrant the extraordinary postulation of "the ultimate elements" of it or a method for this. He writes:

"A name signifies only what is an element of reality. What cannot be destroyed; what remains the same in all changes." - But what is that? - Why, it swam before our minds as we said the sentence! This was the very expression of a quite particular image: of a particular picture which we want to use. For certainly experience does not shew us these elements. We see component parts of something composite (of a chair, for instance). We say that the back is part of the chair, but is in turn itself composed of several bits of wood; while a leg is a simple component part. We also see a whole which changes (is destroyed) while its component parts remain unchanged. These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality."12

In this context Wittgenstein raises an interesting question about the results of analysis in an ordinary case. He asks whether the two forms of what is believed to be the same sentence are the same act or different ones. He takes the example of the order: "Bring me the broom". And one may say that this order is as same as saying: "Bring me the broomstick and the brush fitted on to it". But Wittgenstein objects to this way of seeing this saying that these are two different uses of words and that there is nothing that underlies them to make them the same. If at all they express the same sense it is then by virtue of their achieving the same through their uses. And their differences in their uses are as important as their similarities. He asks us to imagine a table in which the column (a) represents the sentences analysed and the other (b) the constituent parts of them reached through analysis. Then he raises the question whether we can say an order in one can mean the same in the other:
"But all the same you will not deny that a particular order in (a) means the same as one in (b); and what would you call the second one, if not an analysed form of the first?" - Certainly I too should say that an order in (a) had the same meaning as one in (b); or, as I expressed it earlier: they achieve the same. And this means that if I were shown an order in (a) and asked: "Which order in (b) means the same as this?" or again "Which order in (b) does this contradict?" I should give such-and-such an answer. But that is not to say that we have come to a general agreement about the use of the expression "to have the same meaning" "to achieve the same". For it can be asked in what cases we say: "These are merely two forms of the same game.""\(^{13}\)

He says that what is analysed and its constituent parts reached through this are two different uses of words. This position of Wittgenstein is allied to his opposition to his earlier notion that there is a general form of a proposition shared by all propositions. In *Tractatus* it was believed that though the propositions were different from one other they shared a general form. In PI Wittgenstein not only questions the very concept of the proposition as understood in the *Tractatus* but also the notion of the general form of it nurtured in that book. He says what a use of language holds with its immediate relatives as well as its distant unknown cousins is a relation of similarities and differences. This is what makes them different activities in what he calls our form of life. He writes:

"-- Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language"."\(^{14}\)

Wittgenstein calls the different uses of language "language-games". He introduces the analogy of game to drive home the point that uses of words are acts with their differences and similarities and their being called by the name 'language'
can be understood on the line of games being called by the name 'game' inspite of their differences. If one thinks that the word 'game' as the common name for different games captures the essence of a game in general he asks us to look at different games and find whether there is anything called essence revealed through them. He says that what make different games "games" are the similarities they have between them in their differences. We call, he says, Board-games, Card games, Ball-games, Olympic-games and so on "games" and some of them, he adds, have striking similarities with some others and in the case of some they look absolutely different from many others. He makes it clear that one should not search for a fundamental concept to explain the being of the games. Rather one should understand, he explains, the nature of games in general in the following manner:

"And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail."\(^\text{15}\)

Wittgenstein characterises the similarities between games as "family resemblances". The resemblances between different members of a family such as 'build', 'feature', 'colour of eyes', 'gait', 'temperament', etc., cannot admit of themselves a definition by means of a category, which is common to them. And it is the nature of a family that even its members who do not look strikingly alike share some subtle features among themselves. And games are no different from the members of a family in this respect; they also resemble one another in numerous ways in their differences.

Wittgenstein understands the relations between uses of language as family resemblances as in the case of games. He takes the example of the concept number to show that the word 'number' does not denote any common feature of different numbers. We have numbers like -1, +1, 2, 3, -9, and different others. What defines them as numbers is not any category that exists over and above the particular instances that they are. In the same way what make different uses of words belong to language are the criss-crossing and overlapping of their similarities of different
sorts. If we look at the individual words such as 'Man', 'Cat', 'Dog', Leaf, 'Skylark', etc. we see their differences but we know at the same time that they are all called words.

Wittgenstein's position as to understanding the concept 'game' is as follows:

"How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we describe games to him, and we might add: "This and similar things are called 'games'". And do we know any more about it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what a game is? - But this is not ignorance."

The concept of game cannot be explained in a definite way. But at the same time we all know for sure what a game is. This is the nature of a language-game also. We all know what a use of language is, but all the same we cannot give a definite explanation of it. Wittgenstein explains meaning also in the same way. He says that a clear description of what is it 'to mean' cannot be given, though it is a fact that our uses of words are not without meanings. We are not ignorant of what we mean, but this does not mean that we have a definite conception of meaning. He writes about our knowledge of game:

"What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean, to know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to an unformulated definition? So that if it were formulated I should be able to recognize it as the expression of my knowledge? Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of game; shewing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these; saying that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and so on."

It is in the context of Wittgenstein's use of the analogy of game to explain the uses of language we have to make sense of his behaviourism about meaning. He thinks that the behaviour of mankind as users of language is just like that of players of a game. A player in a game is as if guided blindly in his actions and reactions in
it. He says in PI that 'the common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language'. The behaviour of a player is not the totality of his sense experiences in a game, nor are his abstract thoughts independent of the context of some game, but the way he acts and reacts in it as if compelled by the rules of the game he is in.

Non-arbitrariness as Rule-Following

Language-game is not an arbitrary but a rule governed activity. Wittgenstein is of the view in the PI that though the use of a language is governed by the rules it does not mean that it conveys a definite sense through that use. The efficacy of a language-game is not that it conveys a determinate and definite sense but that it accomplishes the task for which it is meant. And in that process what make it do its work properly are its rules. And it is the rules that help us distinguish the normal uses of a word from its abnormal ones.

A rule says to us how a word is used in a language. It determines its place in a language-game or different language-games. But Wittgenstein does not allow us to have a conception of a rule of the uses of a word independent of its uses. It is the uses of a word that give the rule of it its rationale, but without its rule, which is the way it has to be in a language-game, it cannot have its usefulness. The uses of words and its rules are interrelated. Without the uses of the word 'red' it cannot have a rule of its uses. If there is not a rule about it, then it cannot have its place in a language-game. Wittgenstein says that when one obeys the rule one obeys it blindly. That is, one does not bother here whether rules determine the uses of words or it is vice versa. Suppose I say: "That red object is shining". I do it blindly. What matters in this utterance is not my being conscious of the rules of the uses of words used here but its function in the context. But aren't there cases where there will arise the problem of an unexpected use of a word due to the compelling reason of the situation at hand? But Wittgenstein rules out this possibility as something which takes care of itself and he limits the role of a rule in the uses of a word, which may
include normal and abnormal ones, into that of something dependent on their contexts. To quote him:

"I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? — "So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". — But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on. — "So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion". ---But suppose that after a time it disappears again — or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases — rules saying whether one may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with for rules for every possible application of it?"

Wittgenstein does not attribute to the rules of the uses of words an a priori logical status. The rules of language are attended by the same contingencies as the uses of language. How do I know that my form of life, which is my world, will be the same tomorrow? How do I know that the concepts as rules will remain the same regardless of whatever may happen to the content of the world? The only a priori conviction we can have of the world is that whatever may be its nature it will have certain order. And when the world understood as language used in the contexts of the situations of life, this conviction, which is prior to all that is possible will be: 'Whatever may be the ways of its uses, it has rules for its uses'. But it is a fact about the rule that one has to obey it and one obeys it. It is like saying: Whether one likes it or not one has to have a world and one always has one as long as one has one. And a player in a game cannot deny his being in it. Wittgenstein writes:

"Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light here? We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing many without finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one another with the ball and
bombarding one another for a joke and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing a ball-game and following definite rules at every throw.

And is there not also the case where we play and — make up the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them — as we go along.”

For Wittgenstein knowing a rule of the uses of a word is like knowing how to go by a sign-post. We know how to go by the sign-post through the ways of its use. And it is a matter of practice how to follow a sign-post for a purpose and the same is applicable to the rules of language also. No a priori knowledge helps us in learning a language but living a form of life gives us the uses of words.

We can imagine a table to be a formulation of the rules of language. This table may take the form of two columns: One of them will have words in it and the other the objects which they mean. Wittgenstein considers such a formulation of the rules primitive. But he does not fail to see the practical possibility of such a formulation. His objection to it is that it more often than not may beguile us to think that objects in the world correspond to the words in language and that as the former are subject to change its being must be something that is independent of change and the sense of language in such a case must be because of this being. And he knows very well that a transcendental picture of the world akin to that of Plato and Kant and that of the picture of it he had earlier has so much to do with such an ideal notion or similar ones of reality. Wittgenstein understands now that the ideality that took him to postulate the realm of ultimate elements is no way fundamentally different from the transcendental ideality of Plato and Kant which took them to postulate their own ideal essences. This ideality is a myth of logical inquiry for him that prevents us from seeing the actual uses of words in life. The later Wittgenstein does not give us a scope for the thought of having an ideal essence of the world, nor does he believe in an ideal rule of the uses of a word. To quote him:

"A proposition is a queer thing!" Here we have in germ the subliming of our whole account of logic. The tendency to assume a pure intermediary between the
propositional *signs* and the facts. Or even to try to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves. — For our forms of expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing out of the ordinary is involved, by sending us in pursuit of chimeras.”

This remark is a criticism of philosophical inquiry in general and *Tractatus* in particular. Language and world, according to Wittgenstein, are understood properly as they are without being subjected to a logical sublimation. Their ordinary reality explains their usefulness perfectly and for that there is no need of the postulation of concepts by means of a logical or conceptual thinking.

The failure of the correspondence theory which states that a rule of the use of a word is explained through its correspondence to the object it denotes is one of the points Wittgenstein time and again emphasises in PI. To quote him:

"Other illusions come from various quarters to attach themselves to the special one spoken here. Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is missing.)"

One may feel that if there is nothing a priori about the being of the rules then what makes their presence in language possible is a causal relation. The causal relation about the rule following is that we follow a rule because a situation always causes us to do so. I call the colour shared by those two objects 'red' *because* I have been trained to do so. Wittgenstein denies such an explanation of rule following because it cannot explain the ontological implications of the uses of language as they are given. He writes:

"Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule — say a sign-post — got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here? — Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.
But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.”

The necessity of my using a language is not merely a causal necessity explained in relation with the training I have received to pick it up. It has something to do with the ways in which a community uses it for the purposes of living in the world and also with a member of the community necessarily and blindly using the language of it. To have a language is to follow certain customs that form our life-world. It is not my readiness to learn a language that creates a language for me but its being there independent of my will as shared by many who may include myself as well. Wittgenstein says:

"And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it."  

Wittgenstein says that there cannot be an ultimate ground ("beyond which we cannot go") which justifies our following the rules of language. He makes it clear that the search for the ultimate ground as the justification for the rules will show us our limits:

""How am I able to obey rule?" — if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: This is simply what I do."
The relation between language and the situations of its uses is that of simultaneity. One cannot imagine language without its being related to the situations of its uses one way or other. The simultaneity of the uses of words and their situations explain the immediacy and blindness involved in the following of the rules. Wittgenstein says:

"One does not feel that one always has got to wait upon the nod (the whisper) of the rule. On the contrary, we are not on tenterhooks about what it will tell us next, but it always tells us the same, and we do what it tells us.

One might say to the person one was training: "Look, I always do the same thing: I...").^{25}

But what does the sameness of following the rules consist in? It consists in our agreement in the uses of words in different ways. We know instinctively which way we are placed in a situation and also the nature of our actions and reactions in relation with it. My always doing the same thing in following a rule explains only the nature of following a rule and it also shows that where my spade is turned at some point of my search for ultimate justification of my following a rule. If I say everyday to someone that I would meet him the next day by using the same words it is quite obvious that I mean different days by these words but at the same time they mean the same thing, that is, my possible seeing him the next day. Another example Wittgenstein gives to show the nature of following a rule, which has in it the differences and sameness related to each another, has been taken from mathematics. One may say that in the series 1,3,5,7,... the same rule is applied and it is the formula 2x + 1. But what about the difference between the numbers in the series? But this feature of the rules does not create any practical problem for our solving a mathematical problem. And in the case of following the rules in language also we see that the different uses of the same words find their appropriate ways in the contexts of their applications.
In short, it is our language that forms our world as it is placed in the situations of its uses. Language used naturally in concrete situations does not fall short of content. And it is the rules that explain the order and role of words in a language-game. If rules are not there we cannot have the notion of 'sameness' or 'permanence' that explain the sameness or permanence of objects around. This is the reason why Wittgenstein says that essence is expressed by grammar or the rules. It is grammar (the rules) that tells us the roles of words in language. He follows his line of thought to say that 'grammar tells what kind of object anything is'. And he does not find any difficulty to accept theology as a grammar, but he finds it difficult to accord philosophical discourse a natural status in language. He considers philosophy of ideal kind an idle talk and wants to do away with it.

**Sense as Use and Rejection of Ideality**

Wittgenstein likens words to the tools in a tool-box. What makes a tool what it is, is the *use* that we can make of it. In the cabin of a locomotive we see "handles looking more or less alike". But they are different in their functions. The handle of a crank moves continuously, that of switch is either on or off, that of a brake-lever is that on which the harder one pulls the harder it brakes and the handle of a pump moves to and fro. As they are all to be handled they look more or less alike. And the words, as they are all written or spoken, look or sound alike, but are of different functions. Wittgenstein identifies meaning of a word as its function or use in a language-game.

There are words that are same in their meaning. Wittgenstein says that this sameness is not due to their sharing a common content but by the reason of their uses in the contexts in question. Suppose the words 'xyz' and 'abc' are taken to have the same sense in a language. The physical appearances of these words are different, as is the sound they make. Inspite of these differences they mean the same owing to the fact they can act in the same role in specific language-games. In the example that Wittgenstein offers A says to B "Slab" instead of "Bring me a slab". But the
purpose it accomplishes is B's bringing the slab. These words mean the same because of the role they have in the context. Wittgenstein says here:

"—Of course one might object here: "You grant that the shortened and the unshortened sentence have the same sense. ---What is this sense, then? Isn't there a verbal expression for this sense?" —But doesn't the fact that sentences have the same sense consist in their having the same use? —(In Russian one says "Stone red" instead of "the stone is red"; do they feel the copula to be missing in the sense, or attach it in thought?)"

In place of meanings as essences exemplified in reality Wittgenstein offers now the picture of words which says that they may mean the same or different depending upon the roles they have in the contexts of their uses. The uses of words are the ways of our acts in the situations of the life. Instead of groaning, a child learns to say that it is in pain. In the words of Wittgenstein--- the child makes use of its newly learned pain-behaviour now. He says that our search for definite sense of a word is in vain as its use is a part of our behaviour or action, which cannot have precise contours of content. He explains his position:

"---Consider another case. When I say "N is dead", then something like the following may hold for the meaning of the name "N": I believe that a human being has lived, whom I (1) have seen in such-and-such places, who (2) looked like this (pictures), (3) has done such -and-such things, and (4) bore the name "N" in social life. — Asked what I understand by "N", I should enumerate all or some of these points, and different ones on different occasions. So my definition of "N" would perhaps be "the man of whom all this is true". — But if some point now proves false? — Shall I be prepared to declare the proposition "N is dead" false---even if it is only something which strikes me as incidental that has turned out false? But where are the bounds of the incidental? — If I had given a definition of the name in such a case, I should now be ready to alter it.

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And this can be expressed like this: I use the name "N" without a fixed meaning. (But that detracts as little from its usefulness, as it detracts from that of a table that it stands on four legs instead of three and so sometimes wobbles.)

Should it be said that I am using a word whose meaning I don’t know, and so am talking nonsense? — Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts. (And when you see them there is a good deal that you will not say)"  

This remark delineates meaning as indefinite and shows that it fails to meet the ideal standards of precision. For the purposes of living, our language is a useful instrument and it is in that respect like the table that has four legs. But as meaning cannot be fixed in a precise manner it is like the table which, though it has four legs, wobbles. The following remark of his shows how he looks at the indefiniteness of sense:

"The sense of a sentence---one would like to say ---may, of course, leave this or that open, but the sentence must have a definite sense. An indefinite sense--- that would really not be a sense at all. --- This is like: An indefinite boundary is no really a boundary at all. Here one thinks perhaps: if I say "I have locked the man fast up in the room---there is only one door left open"---then I simply haven't locked him in at all; his being locked in is a sham. One would be inclined to say here: "You haven't done anything at all". An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none. --- But is that true?"

Wittgenstein says that if an indefinite boundary does its function then indefinite sense of words also performs its offices. And, for him, the belief in the pure being of the world and the definite sense of language is a myth, which has come into being out of our superstition about the uses of language. He asks: Doesn't the word "Moses" as seen in the Bible make sense? We understand the words of our language in the way that we make sense of the word "Moses" in the Bible. He writes:
"Suppose I give the explanation: "I take ‘Moses’ to mean the man, if there was such a man, who led the Israelites out of Egypt, whatever he was called then and whatever he may or may not have done besides." — But similar doubts to those about "Moses" are possible about the words of this explanation (what are you calling "Egypt", whom the "Israelites" etc.?). Nor would these questions come to an end when we got down to words like "red", "dark", "sweet"."  

Wittgenstein does not suggest here that our language is imperfect. On the other hand, he glorifies the ordinary uses of words with their indefinite meanings. What he challenges here is the philosophical demand for a formulation of definite sense, which philosophers want to believe to be hidden in our ordinary uses of language. One may worry here about the fate of the ideality of logic and mathematics in the backdrop of his notion of sense in general. Wittgenstein is of the opinion that whether it is mathematics or logic they function as uses of words meant for certain purposes. They also have their rules and their applications, and as language-games their efficacy lies in how they are played to fulfil their purposes. The position of Wittgenstein in PI is that no body of knowledge or beliefs is free from the general features of our forms of life and that these features do not yield to an exact and definite formulation of them.

Wittgenstein on Mentalism

In Tractatus Wittgenstein believed that world could make sense of its being only as my world. He there held on to the view that there was a metaphysical subject that underlied the contingent occurrences of the psychological or empirical Ts. The Tractarian picture of the world had in it as its thinkable limits on the one hand objects and on the other, the metaphysical subject. And one of them could not be understood without being related to the other. Now in PI Wittgenstein invites us to take a look at the practical consequences of such a picture. He shows a case where the individual self is helpless to make sense of an expression foreign to its comprehension unless aided by the conventions of its use in a language. The case in point is:
"It may now be said: "The way the formula is meant determines which steps are to be taken". What is the criterion for the way the formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it.

We say, for instance, to someone who uses a sign unknown to us: "If by 'x!2' you mean $x^2$, then you get this value for $y$, if you mean $2x$, that one." — Now ask yourself: how does one mean the one thing or the other by "$x!2$"? It is not from one's own individual cases one knows the uses of words. So the use of language cannot be viewed as founded upon the individual self. Wittgenstein's position against solipsism is placed in the larger context of his outlook that opposes mentalism as a base for a theory of meaning or for one's having a world. His argument against mentalism includes his putative position against the possibility of private language also. He says that while there is a grammatical difference between the words that mean mental phenomena such as 'happiness', 'depression', 'hearing a tune', 'pain' etc. and those that mean objects like 'stone', 'leaf', 'table' etc. or creatures like 'man', 'deer', 'dog', 'pelican', etc. all these words are meant in a language used by a community. A word gets its sense not in a speaker's mind but in a language-game. And this sums up in a nutshell his view against looking for a mental base for meanings of words or being in general. Let us have a brief look at it.

When we use words, Wittgenstein says, it is not the case that either a physical or mental image of the word comes before our minds. For example, my use of the word 'cube', he explains, is validated not on the basis of the picture that may or may not come before my mind at the use of it but on the basis of how I use it in a discourse. And it has to do with the given contexts where I have located the uses of this word and also with the uses I make of it in the ways approved by the rules of language. But one may think here that in the case of the words that mean mental phenomena we have no public criteria to determine their valid uses but only the private ones. That is, to know the correct use of the word 'pain' we have to look at
what is happening in the mind of the man, who is in pain. But Wittgenstein says that even the man who cries out that he is in pain does not look into his mind to mean his words so uttered, but uses the words, which are at his disposal in virtue of his having a language. He writes:

"How do words refer to sensations? — There doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day, and give them names? But how is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? -of the word "pain" for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying? — On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it."

An objection may be raised here against this way of characterising the words of mental phenomena saying that when I say that I am in pain the hearer has to understand it as my pain not as his pain. That is, I understand the meaning of the word 'pain' from my own cases and the other from his own cases. But Wittgenstein refutes this by pointing out that in the ordinary uses of words we do not come across a situation like 'knowing meanings from one's own individual cases'. However, he says that it is perfectly true and obvious that when I am in pain I have my pain and you do not have it. But his question as to this is: What does it have to do with the meaning of the word 'pain'? . In the usual circumstances of my having pain you understand that I am in pain through either my words or my groaning. Wittgenstein states that there is no hidden mental phenomenon at work in this process. He says that there exists even the possibility of two persons' having the same pain as long as there is a possibility of the uses of words to mean it. His concept of meaning is that meaning is not a matter of our having it privately but that of our
having it in the language we use. And he says that this is true of the meanings of the words of mental phenomena as well.

Wittgenstein is of the view that the grammar of the expression 'to know' is closely related to the grammar of expressions such as 'can', 'be able to', etc. His intention to define 'knowing' this way is to show that it is not a mental activity. Suppose A is writing down a series: 1, 5, 11, 19, 29… and B is watching it to know how to continue it. After some time the formula $a_n = n^2 + n - 1$ occurs to B and he says that now he knows 'how to go on'. But Wittgenstein points out here that the mere occurrence of the formula to B or his thinking of the formula while watching the series does not stand testimony to B's knowing how to continue the series. It may be the case sometimes that a formula actually occurs to B, but when he tries to continue the series in accordance with it he gets stuck and he says that that formula is not the right one for the series. So the criterion of B's knowing to continue the series is his being able to continue the series correctly in the given context. When B comes to know how to continue the series he may have feeling of relief or happiness. And this feeling is no doubt mental though his knowing to continue the series is not, but the words that express this mental phenomenon is understood in a language. This fact leads Wittgenstein to the conviction that an inner process stands in need of an outer criterion. The person, who is happy, does not generally say that he has a feeling that no one has and it cannot be expressed. Wittgenstein's point here is that the words one uses are meant in a language, not outside it. If one says that one has a 'private language' that explains the meanings of the words that denote one's sensations and that these meanings of one's cannot be expressed to anyone else Wittgenstein says that such a language is an impossibility for the simple reason that meanings are given only in a language used by more than one user of it. And for Wittgenstein a language of this kind, if at all it can exist through some mystery, is a language that even the possessor of it cannot understand or follow.

It is not in our thoughts we mean words. This is one of the points Wittgenstein emphasises time and again in PL. The example of 'expectation' which he gives to illustrate this point is worth mentioning. Suppose someone says: "I
expect he is coming". At least two broad sets of acts are involved in this statement. One is that of someone's real coming and the other someone's expecting it. And these sets are of different natures, but they make their contact in a statement here. Where does this contact take place? In the above speaker's mind? In that case how someone's coming can become someone else's mental phenomenon? Is it the case that when I expect your coming, you come in my mind prior to your real coming to me? Wittgenstein explains this point in the following way:

"But it might now be asked: what's it like for him to come? — The door opens, someone walks in, and so on. — What's it like for me to expect him to come? — I walk up and down the room, look at the clock now and then, and so on. — But the one set of events has not the smallest similarity to the other! So how can one use the same words in describing them? — But perhaps I say as I walk up and down: "I expect he will come in" — Now there is a similarity somewhere. But of what kind?!"\(^32\)

Language as an act involves not merely the uses of words, but using them in concrete contexts. And this is what accounts for its being our form of life. It is not in my mind someone is coming when I expect it but in my seeing it as a possibility that can be materialised out there in our life situations. The use of words which is an act is many dimensional and in that it makes possible our form of life with its richness. Wittgenstein writes:

"It is in language that an expectation and its fulfilment make contact."\(^33\)

Now it is clear that Wittgenstein does not want to translate the grammatical difference between the words of mental phenomena and the rest into a distinction between what is private and what is public. For him their grammatical difference is important, but they make sense in the same language, or in the same form of life. The same criterion of usefulness is what matters in any use of language and the grammatical differences between the uses of words do not privilege a use of language over the other, or there cannot arise a division of criteria of meaningfulness on that basis. Our concern with this discussion on Wittgenstein's
notion of mentalism is not so much with his rejection of empiricist or Cartesian ways of doing philosophy as with its implications for philosophy in general and the postulation of transcendental world of concepts in philosophy in particular. He may read into the Platonic as well as Kantian world of concepts a hidden mental phenomenon where the decisions of the mind independent of the situations of concrete world gain justification owing to the imaginative meanings of words so proposed. And his criticism of mentalism is also the criticism of the journey of mind into metaphysical uses of words, and this journey can be either into the world of sensations or into that of what philosophers believe to be the verities of the reality which in their being different from sensations can be either independent of the subject as in Plato or a transcendental subject as in Kant. And another important consideration behind our engagement with his notion of mentalism is that without it an integral picture of his notion of language and its ways cannot be given.

Wittgenstein and Philosophy

Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy is a semantical one throughout. His complaint about philosophy is that it bases itself upon a misunderstanding of the meaning of words. In Tractatus this misunderstanding was explained through a reference theory of meaning. There philosophy was looked upon as a vain attempt to locate references of transcendental nature. In PI, on the other hand, the reference theory as such was rejected and instead language has been viewed as a rule-governed activity. In PI at one place philosophy has been described as a phenomenon emerging out of a primitive idea of how language functions. We, he says, feel wrongly that the meanings of words are definite and clear as the uses of words in a very primitive language where everything is strikingly transparent. He writes:

"That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language, more primitive than ours."34
Wittgenstein demands that our reflection on the world or language take us not beyond the consideration of words as they are applied in the contexts of life. In the contexts of the uses of words we do talk about the same colour, the same shape, etc. But he points out that the concept of sameness as understood in the contexts of the ordinary uses of words will not give us the feeling that there is something common to different objects of the same colour or of the same shape and this something is the most real aspect of the colour or the shape in question. Wittgenstein's question is not whether the world of objects and living beings with their different qualities is less real as understood by Plato or whether it is the case that this world is that of contradictions and unrelated experiences if it is not founded transcendentally as Plato or Kant imagined. He says that it is the uniform appearance of words written or spoken that confuses us into the formation of sameness of meanings independent of the actual uses of them. He writes:

"Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us clearly. Especially not, when we are doing philosophy!"  

The word 'table' has different possible uses and the object called table different instances of it. Plato traced the source of common being of particular tables to the idea called 'table'. And Kant through radical abstraction traced them to a limited number of categories and concepts. Wittgenstein says that the possibilities of the world do not demand of it a transcendental plane where these possibilities have been shown as originated from an unchanging and indestructible structure. His challenge to such a structure is evident in the following remark:

""Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed, and that is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing."—Certainly it makes no sense to say that the colour red is torn up or pounded to bits. But don't we say "The red is vanishing"? And don't clutch at the idea of always being able to bring red before our mind's eye even when there is nothing red any more. That is just as if you chose to say that there would still always be chemical
reaction producing a red flame. — For suppose you cannot remember the colour any more? - When we forget which colour this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language.”

This passage clearly shows that our talk about the ideal or universal world has to be dependent throughout on the contingent matters of the uses of words. So this poses a serious problem for the methods of philosophy in general. Wittgenstein conceives philosophy as 'holiday of language', as it does not have an actual use in a meaningful and concrete manner. When language does not work we feel that there is something materialised in it independent of the actual uses of it. Philosophy for him represents such an idle language where everything is static and given once forever. He is satirical of the ideality that philosophy searches for:

"The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe. — Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.”

Wittgenstein sees that our attempt to represent the method of representation of language takes us to the belief in the highest general order of the world. Suppose I want to represent the way the word 'red' is used. I choose for this a shade of the colour red and keep it as a standard on the line of the standard metre scale in Paris. And I say now that the colour that corresponds to this sample is called 'red'. And this symbolic way of representing what we cannot otherwise represent gives us the impression that this standard ideal red is predicated of all the instances of the red colour in the world. Wittgenstein says that this is because of our mistaking a symbolic gesture for what is actually the case with the uses of words. A sample of the colour red is a particular shade of it and the generality it now acquires is by reason of our using it so. Wittgenstein's criticism of seeing the symbolism involved
in this use as an actual correspondence between the standard colour and different instances of the colour is expressed in the following way:

"We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality."\(^{38}\)

Wittgenstein shows that the philosophical notion of ideality cannot have an ontological foundation. And his position about the philosophical notion of ideality is diametrically opposed to the notion of ideality expounded by Plato, Kant, and his own earlier self. And the ideality he wants to propose now is the ideality of the ordinary uses of words and for him that is the whole ideality we have of the world. He writes:

"We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm. [Note in margin: \textbf{Only} it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways]. But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties.

The question "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?"\(^{39}\)

His point here is that what looks like an abstract entity is actually a concrete fact about the ordinary uses of language and there is nothing abstract about it really. A \textbf{rule} of the uses of a word is very much a part and parcel of its uses. And it cannot have an existence independent of its particular uses. Now a natural question that arises in this context is: Does it mean that philosophy gives way to empirical inquiries? Wittgenstein knows it very well that it is not from an empirical outlook about reality that the philosophical problems arise. And his reflection on this matter includes an outline of what is to be the task of philosophy now. In his own words:

"And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all \textit{explanation}, and
description alone must take its place. And this description gets it light, that is to say its purpose—from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving a new information, but by arranging what have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.40

We, according to Wittgenstein, take a grammatical joke seriously and the result is the search for the depth of phenomena in philosophy. The grammatical joke Wittgenstein has in mind is the look of the symbolic attempt to capture the method of representation of language as an actual phenomenon of language. And the persistence of the mind in seeing it as real in its search for ideality in philosophy is what he calls an illness of it. And he says that there are different methods to solve philosophical problems, as there are different therapies to cure mental illness. One of them is to explain how language functions in daily life by means of analogies and examples taken in various ways.

The following remark indicates the nature of the methods he favours to solve the philosophical problems:

"When philosophers use a word—"knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name"—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?—

What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."41

Wittgenstein believes in PI that it shows philosophy of the ideal kind the way of its disappearance. He imagines there that he has succeeded in giving philosophy "peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question". Our question now is: isn't it the nature of philosophy to face up to the
enigmas posed by what Wittgenstein considers to be the misplaced questions? And isn't philosophy ever ready to engage itself with the ironical questions about reality?
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23 ibid., p. 81f.
24 ibid., p. 85f.
25 ibid., p. 86f.
26 ibid., p. 10f.
27 ibid., p. 37e.
28 ibid., p. 45f.
29 ibid., p. 40f.
30 ibid., p. 77f.
31 ibid., p. 89f.
32 ibid., pp. 130f–131f.
33 ibid., p. 131f.
34 ibid., p. 3f.
35 ibid., p. 6f.
36 ibid., p. 28f.
37 ibid., p. 45f.
38 ibid., p. 46f.
39 ibid., p. 47f.
40 ibid., p. 47f.
41 ibid., p. 48f.