CHAPTER I

The Conceptual Field and the Question of Meaning

The philosophical concepts are an attempt to redefine or rethink the ordinary world to conform it to the standards of objectivity one way or other. But they are postulated not merely for the sake of the concrete objectivity of ordinary kind but in search of an objectivity of the transcendental nature. In the broad sense, for philosophy this objectivity is the basis not only of a philosophical understanding of knowledge and the world, but also of knowledge and discourse of any kind, which includes religion, ethics, science, art, literature, etc. Though the transcendental objectivity that philosophy seeks encompasses even what seems to be the most trifling matters of existence and life, but in its transcendental nature it finds a realm for itself over and above what it considers to be the world of appearance.

Here this question arises: When objectivity becomes transcendental, what does it really mean? Does not it lose its objective status then and become a supernal fancy that does not have anything to do with earthy existence and day-to-day affairs of life? I can verify the fact that there is a chair in my room through different means which we generally make use of in our dealings if there at all arises a doubt as to this fact. But, if I say that this particular table is because its being is determined by a transcendental world of verities, naturally the question that, then, stares at me is: How I am to prove this position of mine? Those who question transcendental objectivity draw their inspiration from the objectivity we resort to, knowingly or unknowingly, in our ordinary talk about the world, and they base their position on the questions of the above kind. Those who take the help of language to question the transcendental realm of concepts, which we may call by the name Conceptual Field, ask us to look at the language of our ordinary discourse and find whether its meanings can support the claims of transcendental philosophy. It is here that the question of meaning becomes an important question of philosophical inquiry.
Let us take the examples of Plato and Kant to see how the world of appearance takes philosophers beyond itself, when they define the reality of it. It may be remembered here that Plato and Kant are not philosophers of the same nature. While Plato formulates a world of concepts independent of the Subject, Kant’s world of concepts find its place in the Subject. In this study we are not concerned with this difference much, though as it is it is a part of it, but with the general spirit of conceptual inquiry which they undertake. And when we consider the question of meaning in the context of philosophy in this chapter, we will take into consideration the early Wittgenstein, who rejects philosophical propositions calling them nonsensical on the basis of his theory of meaning.

Plato and the world of Ideas

Plato understands the ordinary world as the world of appearance. According to him, there is some other world, which is more real than this one. He calls this more real world the world of ideas or forms. Compared to the world of ideas the ordinary world is a dim adumbration of it. He says that the significance of human existence is fulfilled only when the soul of man travels from the world of appearance, which is that of changing and shifting phenomena, to the world of ideas, which is eternal, real, and without change.

What is the rationale behind the postulation of the world of ideas? To answer this question let us take a look at his well known dialogue Republic and see how he proves the possibility of such a world that stands in close relation with the concrete world of everyday life.

Plato relates the world of ideas with the absolute understanding of the nature of a phenomenon. He takes the example of pleasure to show how an attempt to understand its true nature necessarily takes us away from the ordinary comprehension of it. For him, pleasure is something positive and it must be defined positively. But, he says, most of the pleasures in life are defined in terms of the
absence of pain. And conversely, pain is defined as absence of pleasure. To capture the positive nature of pleasure in its absoluteness, he argues, we have to transcend the ordinary world, which is that of pleasures mingled with pain invariably, and this process, as testified by his dialogue, is not an easy task.

To show that our experience of pleasure is invariably related to an illusion of it, he makes a distinction between pleasure, pain, and the middle stage between them and he bases this distinction on the logic of our ordinary understanding. He finds here that ordinary understanding of pleasure involves contradictions and its logic is in need of correction. Let us see how he shows it. We define pain as absence of pleasure and pleasure as absence of pain based on the simple fact that if we are in pain we are deprived of pleasure then. So it necessitates in the transition between these two, a plane, which is neutral with regard to both of them. He calls this neutral plane quietude, which is supposed to be neither pleasure nor pain. Socrates, the protagonist in the dialogue, asks: How quietude can be neutral at all? If it is a passage between pain and pleasure, he says, it cannot be neutral for it is where one of them ceases to be and the other begins and therefore both are present in it at the same time. An object in which both pain and pleasure reside at the same time cannot be said to be neutral with regard to them. But by definition quietude is independent of pain and pleasure, that is, it is neutral. Now it turns out to be that quietude is both neutral and non-neutral at the same time. A similar contradiction is the feature of the definition of the related phenomena such as pleasure and pain if we confine ourselves to ordinary understanding of them in our definition of them. If pleasure is the cessation of pain, what this cessation results in is either something neutral or something which is both pleasure and pain or a state which defies a definite characterisation.

For Plato, these three categories as understood in ordinary terms juggle with human understanding. Quietude, whose nature is unknown to us, in juxtaposition with pain is called pleasure and in juxtaposition with pleasure pain. A reflection on this phenomenon, Socrates says in the dialogue, will show us the necessity for taking
the pleasure from this ironical situation to an intelligible world and only there we will be able to see it of and in itself. He says further that cases of the like will convince us that the world of true being cannot be the same as the ordinary one. And he takes the world of ordinary experience as contradictory in nature and that of intelligibility as true being. For him, it is the world of ideas that represents the world of true being.

The world of ideas cannot be the result of whims and fancies of our imagination. Its existence has to be proved on the basis of objective thinking. Socrates in the dialogue depends on different examples to show that there is such a world. We have in the ordinary world objects like tables, chairs, trees, etc. He says that what gives an object its identity is its essential nature. Let us see what he means by it with the help of the example of tables which he offers in the dialogue. We know that there are different particular tables out there. They are of different shapes, colours, and made of different materials. But they are all called tables owing to the common form they share among themselves. Socrates calls this common form the idea of table, and he says that this is the most real aspect of a table or tables. A carpenter fixes his eyes on this idea when he makes a table. The carpenter depends on the idea of table to make one out of the ordinary wood, as the case may be, and the one thus made is subject to change and destruction, but the idea of it which is the most real can never be destroyed. Like the table, all other objects in the world also have got their own ideas, which are the most real aspect of their existence and are beyond destruction. An idea of chair is common to all chairs there and that of tree to all trees in the world. Similarly ideas of other objects are shared by them and they define their essential nature. According to Socrates, the ordinary world only resembles the world of ideas as the dim reflection of it.

The objects, which have a common form, can have only one idea common to it. For example, the tables cannot have two ideas common to them. If there happened to be two ideas of table, then we would have to be in search of the idea common to these two and this would be the most real table, and it shows, according
to Socrates, that there can be only one idea in the intelligible world to correspond to all the tables of ordinary world. And the author of the intelligible world of ideas, where the entities will number less than those of the ordinary world, is God.

In the context of the division between the intelligible and the ordinary worlds Socrates in the *Republic* examines the status of poetry and art. He finds that they are three removes from the truth that lies in the intelligible world. A craftsman depends on the ideas of the intelligible world while making crafts. A craftsman imitates the world of ideas in his work. But a painter, on the other hand, imitates the objects of the ordinary world. It is a fact that when an artist paints or draws a table we do not say that he makes a table but imitates an ordinary table, which for its reality in turn depends on the idea of it. Another feature of an artist's work is that he does not engage himself with the intelligible aspect of objects but with their appearances. For example, a table may look bigger or smaller according as it is viewed from different distances. It may again differ from itself as it is viewed from the side or the front or some other way. But it has got its own reality beyond the differences it suffers in appearance and this reality, Socrates states, cannot be captured by the brush of the painter. So he concludes that a painter lives on the contradictions of the world and a poet does not differ from him in this respect.

A poet, according to Socrates, without understanding the reality of the experiences of a hero characterizes him in his poem. It shows that he approaches the characters and incidents he describes in his poem with the irrational part of his soul and not with the rational part of it. As in the case of the painter the poet ends up in the characterisation of appearances of appearance and therefore poetic creations lack genuine or true reality. Socrates calls poems and arts mimetic. And what the works of a poet and an artist nurture is not the rational part of the soul of the people but the irrational part of it. This leads Plato to the rejection of them in his ideal state. However, he happily admits the poems that praise Gods and good men to his ideal state.
Plato wants the human soul to open its eye to the world of ideas, where he sees that it will behold the reality of existence and being. The soul can do it only with the part of it that loves wisdom. He divides the soul into three parts: 1) the rational part; 2) the high spirited part; 3) the appetitive part. This division is not a random one, but based on the matters of life and experience. And it is effected through the pure conceptualisation of our everyday existence. Let us see how in his dialogue Socrates demarcates these parts with their absolute boundaries.

The appetitive part of the soul contains desires and the most conspicuous of them are hunger and thirst. After stating this Socrates wants to show that the functions of this part cannot be performed by the other two parts, they being the principle of high spirit and the wisdom. We cannot be hungry or thirsty with the part of the soul through which we get angry nor with the part with which we become wise. And it is the work of the appetitive part, which is the part for desires. Before we proceed to know how Socrates shows the division of labour of the different parts of the soul, we may see the logic behind the endeavour. In the words of Socrates:

"It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was not the same thing functioning but a plurality."

He applies this, which he sees as a fact about the order of the world, to the desire called thirst. Thirst has to be taken in isolation to know what it is. Thirst as it is, is a desire for drink. It should not be understood as a desire for good or hot drink. Good, hot, etc. are qualified of drink and they, being predicates, have their own existence. If we go after these predicates when we define thirst, we will lose a proper characterization of thirst in itself and also its object as such. Depending on the situations the drink, for which thirst is a desire, can be qualified differently, but thirst taken in and of itself is always a desire for drink. Another important point
Socrates makes here is that what propels thirst cannot be that which controls it as propulsion and deterrence are opposite forces. That is, when someone is thirsty for drink if he is controlled from it at the same time, then there are two parts of the soul at work there as the same thing cannot contain in it two forces which contradict each other at the same time. An example will help us here. Suppose a man is ill and asked by the physician not to take drink for sometime, but as he is thirsty now he wants to drink and he controls his desire to do so because of the physician's prescription. Socrates recognises that it is the appetitive part of the soul that propels one to fulfil one's desires and the part of it that controls this propulsion must be different from it and he calls it by the name reason or the love of wisdom. About reason and appetitive part Socrates in the dialogue speaks in the following way:

"Not unreasonably, said I, shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rational, and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive-companion of various repletions and pleasures."²

Now the endeavour of Socrates is to show that the principle of high spirit that is responsible for our getting angry is different from the appetitive part and also the rational part. Socrates asks us to imagine a person, who is in the wrong. The man in question realises that he has wronged somebody and here there could be a chance of his being angry with the person whom he has wronged, but he thinks that it is not becoming to him to be so. When he carries this conviction in him he is hungry and thirsty also. Socrates says that an analysis of the situation at hand will convince us that it is the control of the high spirit by the rational part that avoids his chance of getting angry with the other and it is obvious, according to him, that desires such as hunger and thirst have nothing to do with controlling the anger by the rational part. To make his point clear Socrates asks us to consider the man, who has been wronged, and in this case it may be that he is hungry and thirsty and at the same time angry at his being wronged. And to execute his anger if at all he takes help it
will be from the rational part as hunger and thirst cannot execute it. Only if we can conceptualise the classification which Socrates effects through his argument, we can locate the different parts of the soul with their well defined boundaries.

After explaining how the principle of high spirit is different from the appetitive part Socrates now goes on to show that it should not be identified with the rational part also. A look at the small children, who are toddlers, he thinks will help us prove his point. A small child, who is not rational in the ordinary sense in its behaviour is seen getting angry at times. Another example he takes to prove his point is that of animals, who are not seen controlling their anger by means of reason. Moreover, he says, it is obvious that anger and thought are two different phenomena and must therefore belong to two different parts of the soul.

The three parts of the soul have three kinds of function which are natural to them. The work of the appetitive part is to desire and that of the principle of high spirit is to create anger, and the work entrusted with the rational part is that of the search for wisdom which consists in the knowledge of the real nature of existence. Socrates says in the dialogue that the reality of the existence cannot be found in the ordinary world and to discover it the soul has to open its eye to the world of ideas compared to which the former is a dim adumbration of it. Socrates explains in Republic the soul’s beholding reality by using two striking analogies. Let us see how he does it.

The Divided Line and The Life in a Cave

Before we take into account these analogies, we may see what Plato means by knowledge, opinion, and ignorance. Knowledge, for him, pertains to what absolutely is, opinion to what is and what is not at the same time, ignorance to what absolutely is not. Socrates in the dialogue says that he who knows knows something and "that which entirely is is entirely knowable, and that which in no way is is in every way unknowable". And if there is anything that lies between knowledge and ignorance
thus understood it will be called opinion. And aren't there things each of which is *is and is not* at the same time?

"This much premised, *let* him tell me, I will say, *let* him answer me, that good fellow who does not think there is a beautiful in itself or an idea of beauty in itself always remaining the same and unchanged, but who does believe in many beautiful things—the lover of spectacles, I mean, who cannot endure to hear anybody say that the beautiful is one and the just one, and so of other things— and this will be our question. My good fellow, is there any one of these many fair and honorable things that *will* not sometimes appear *ugly* and base? And of the just things, that will not seem unjust? And of the pious things, that will not see impious?"³

The great is small according to a different standard, and the light similarly becomes heavy, and what is just in the world of appearance sometimes seems unjust, and one object is many at the same time in the ordinary world. Socrates calls this world the world of *is and is not* at the same time. And the positive being of this world can be found only in the intelligible world, which is the world where beauty is always beautiful, that is, it is beauty in itself and it is there justice is justice in itself, greatness greatness in itself and so on. Against this broad distinction between knowledge, which is about the world of what entirely is, and opinion, which is about the world of what is and what is not at the same time, Socrates describes what the soul, while making its journey from opinion to knowledge, beholds at different regions of being, with the help of two analogies. Let us first take the analogy of divided line to see how the being is divided to form different levels of it according to its different natures.

At the topmost height of *being* is the idea of good. Socrates explains its role in the realm of existence with the help of the example of the *role* of the sun, which shines in the visible world. We should not lose sight here of the Platonic-Socratic conviction that the ordinary world is an imitation of the intelligible world. It follows from this conviction that when Socrates explains in Republic the role of the
idea of good in the intelligible world he has in mind its intimate relation with the evanescent world. The sun is the source of light in the visible world and also provides for its generation, growth, and nurture; yet it itself is not generated by anything in the visible world for which it is responsible. The visible world is seen by the eyes because of the presence of the sun in the sky. But neither the eye nor the vision is identical with the sun, though it is responsible for the vision in the eye. And Socrates points out that the eye is "the most sunlike of all the instruments of sense". The power of the eyes to see, Socrates says, is what it receives from the sun as an influx. Here we see that the sun gets a divine place in this scheme. In this what is literally and ordinarily understood and given gives way to what is metaphorical and metaphysical, but for Plato what is metaphysical is always at the service of the mundane and the less real as it is being the source of their existence. Let us not digress so that we will not miss the spirit of Socratic analogy of the sun to understand the idea of good and its relation with the intelligible world.

The sun makes possible the vision of the visible world to the eye. And the some vision beholds the sun also. The sun can be seen by the eye and it is an important feature of the vision. Socrates calls the sun the cause of the vision and the eye the vehicle of it. If the sun were not there, in spite of the world's and the eye's being there the eye will be blind to the world. It explains well the important role the sun has to play in making the vision possible. But the sun always transcends both the vision and the visible. In the same way the idea of good transcends the intelligible world though it is responsible for its being lit up for the eye of the soul. And the sun, Socrates says, is the offspring of the idea of good in the visible world. In his own words as given in the dialogue:

“This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good which the good begot to stand in a proportion with itself. As the good is in the intelligible to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.”

4
In the light of dim luminaries of the night either the edges of our eyes are blunted or they appear almost blind and we feel then that the vision is either dim or impossible. If the soul does not locate the good in the sky of the intelligible world the ideas in it will not be given to the soul. The soul will be blind to the ideas of that world though they are very much there. When the soul does not behold the good and see the entire existence and being in that light it can only opine in the matters of world and knowledge about it will lie far away from it. And in that case it of necessity takes the changing world for the real and indulges in opinions about it with the belief that these opinions are what we are entitled to have about the existence.

As the sun gives the eyes the power for vision, so the good gives power for knowledge to the rational part of the soul. Just as the sun, though responsible for the generation and growth of the visible world, is not as same as it and transcends it, so too the good, being the source of essence of the ideas of the intelligible world, is not as same as it and transcends it. The sun gives visibility to the visible world and the good provides the world of ideas with light of the truth. It is through metaphors and similes Socrates brings home the role of the idea of good as he perceives it in making the world possible.

It is only after describing the idea of good and its relation with the intelligible world Socrates explains how different planes of being can be represented through a divided line. He asks his companions in the dialogue to divide a line unequally into two sections. One of these sections will represent the intelligible world and the other the visible. We have to remember here that the intelligible world will have less number of objects than those in the visible. And each of the above sections will have to be divided further into two sections in the same ratio as before. So the section which represents the intelligible world will be of two unequal parts, so also that which represents the visible or the ordinary world. In the section representing the intelligible the small part portrays the purest being of ideas and the other, which is bigger than this, represents the ideas thought with the help of images. When soul
attains to the purest ideas it does not require the help of images to think about them, but they are given immediately in thought. The lower section of the line also has also two unequal parts and among these the smaller pertains to the objects and creatures of the ordinary world and the bigger to the exaggeration of it through shadows, reflections, and picturing of them on different planes such as water, mirror, and other surfaces like them. We are familiar with the section, which represents the visible world and also the part of the section of the intelligible where images represent the forms of objects. We can think of the common form of all tables in the world with the help of an image, but we do not know what it is in its purest form, where images which describe it disappear and the most real being of it presents itself to us. It is in the realm of the purest being that the soul finds the real without being mediated through any image whatsoever and it is here that it is face to face with the splendour of existence and life.

These four levels of being correspond to four kinds of affection in the soul. The affection of the soul which corresponds to the shadows and reflections Socrates gives the name picture thinking or conjecture and that which corresponds to the objects, plants, and creatures of the ordinary world is belief, and he calls the affection due to the realm of being which is represented by images about ideas understanding, and the highest is knowledge, which is the affection of the soul where it thinks the ideas as they are without mediation through any image whatever. The aid to the soul in attaining to knowledge of ideas, Socrates says, is dialectic, the method of question and answers. He includes the truths of mathematics and astronomy where abstract thinking finds its aid in images under understanding and our grasp over the ordinary objects, plants, and creatures involve sensory aspects in it and for him the name it deserves is belief. And the picture thinking is at the farthest end from the most real. Only the dialectician can know the ideas and he only sees how the good lights up the intelligible world as the sun the visible world.

Socrates equates the life of those who have been taken in by the ordinary world of myriad colours and sounds with the prisoners who have been chained in a
cave and not seen the world of objects lit up by the sun from their childhood up. The analogy of the cave in *Republic* explains vividly the detrimental force of ignorance of the reality and its outcome. And it also narrates the liberation from the fetters of being away from the truth and the need to know the truth, which sustains and gives reality to even the most trifling matters of existence. Let us see how Socrates introduces this analogy. He asks his friends in the dialogue to imagine a subterranean cavern. In it are men who have been chained in such a way that they lie there on their back facing the **wall** of the cave opposite its face. And they cannot even move their heads, but **only** can see the **wall** that fronts them. Behind them, higher up and at a distance, a fire is burning, and between fire and the prisoners there is a road along which there has been built a low wall. Past the wall men are carrying images and shapes of men and animals wrought in stone and wood and other materials, and the shadows of these images will be cast on the **wall** of the cave which the prisoners face. As the wall screens the men, who are carrying the artifacts, their shadows **will** not be cast on the wall, which fronts the prisoners. **And** if these men speak when they move along the low **wall** carrying the images then it **will** produce echo in the cave and the prisoners **who** have never seen living human beings or animals, not even each other, will think that it is the shadows of the artifacts that they see on the wall who are speaking. Their state of this is that of picture thinking and the moment they see each other and realise the presence of the fire that burns over their head they **will** rise to the level of belief, and the states of understanding and knowledge, which are **represented** in this analogy as corresponding to the visions of objects at their different reality in the world outside the cave which witnesses the splendour of the majestic sun, are still far from these prisoners.

Socrates in the dialogue conveys to us that a man can order his life justly only when he knows the order of the world in relation to the ideas. A man, who is just, knows himself and also his responsibilities and duties in the society. He judges the matters of ordinary existence not in their relativity but in their relation with what absolutely is. This will enable him to know the right and wrong of the ordinary
matters of existence in their dependence on the absolute standard. He will see that his personal interests do not clash with the common good of the society but rather harmonise with it without the slightest difference between them. And he further says that only when a society is ruled by those, who through dialectic attains to the knowledge of ideas which will enable them to see the social reality with a mind which does not waver in decision making and in its adherence to the truth even in the midst of most adverse and difficult circumstances, it will be a just society, where what matters is not the desires of the individuals which stem from picture thinking and belief but the order of reality. Plato in Republic relates the question of justice with the question of the truth about reality and shows how it breathes in the idea of good, which lights up the world of ideas where time cannot damage or destroy its form and content. Plato in his dialogue magnificently connects the time bound existence with the timeless and eternal reality and explains to us the need of this endeavour taking into consideration the invincibility of the truth and the ethical demands on our life from different quarters.

Immanuel Kant and Questions of Knowledge as Questions of World

Plato does not start his inquiry by an examination of the possibilities and limitations of the soul in its ability to know the world. His question is not how much the soul can know but where it can reach through knowledge, to which he believes it has access undoubtedly. Kant questions the claim of Plato that the subject or the soul is endowed with the ability to know what he defines as ideas, and argues that the world we have is a construction of the subject through its categories. Kant’s Conceptual Field does not exist outside the subject, and includes in it a priori being of space, time, and twelve categories of the understanding.

Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason states that human reason does not possess an unlimited power to know. This limitation on human reason is the result of the conjunction between the understanding and the sensibility, a faculty of the mind and the capacity of it to receive the representations from objects through the senses respectively. It is the understanding in conjunction with the sensibility which
makes the world we have possible for us. In this process the understanding is limited by the sensibility, and this is the reason why he calls the knowledge of the object or the world empirical. But for him the knowledge of what makes experience possible is a priori and transcendental. It is because of the reason that what is transcendental, though it always stands in relation to experience, is independent of and presupposes it. And our aim now is to see what Kant means by experience and how the sensibility and the understanding produce it which define the realm of human reason in regard to its claim to knowledge.

For Kant, experience, which is empirical, consists of a priori and transcendental elements as well as contingent matters of fact. The contingent matters of fact change according to the difference in situations in which experience takes place. But the transcendental and a priori elements of experience are fixed and account for the necessary structure of knowledge. And knowledge may be either a priori or empirical. The knowledge of object is empirical for in it along with a priori elements of experience, sense experience, that is, the contingent matter of fact, is also involved. On the other hand, knowledge we have in mathematics and that of the basic propositions of physics, are a priori for they are necessary, and possible only as related to the transcendental and necessary structure of experience. Kant calls them not only a priori but also synthetic owing to what he sees as their nature that being a priori, the propositions of mathematics and those express the basic laws of nature have in them their subject terms which do not yield their predicate terms through analysis and the latter stands outside the former in spite of the fact that they are in a relation of necessity.

Kant traces the a priori elements of knowledge or experience to the subject. These elements are a priori and transcendental because they provide the ground for the synthetic a priori propositions about the structure of our experience. Here we are concerned in respect of these a priori elements only with how they make experience of object possible.
Kant says that we can know an object only as it appears to us. We cannot know what an object is in itself. So the necessary and therefore *a priori* elements of knowledge cannot be found in the *object* as it is in itself but only as it appears to the subject which experiences it. It is the subject which makes an object appear to itself and it shows, Kant says, that the *a priori* elements of knowledge of object are a contribution of the subject to experience. Here we see how the concepts of philosophy find a subjective source in Kant.

Kant *gives a priori* status to space and *time*. He says that if they are not viewed so, the propositions of space in geometry and those of time in arithmetic cannot be understood as necessary. And this view of space and time in *Critique of Pure Reason*, is necessitated also by the view that space and time are necessary accompaniments of all our experiences. And these factors about experience make the propositions of arithmetic and geometry *a priori*. Kant also discovers twelve categories of the understanding that correspond to the concepts of general logic. They are *a priori* and transcendental for him for it is evident from the *a priori* knowledge we have in physics and this can also be proved from the fact that every mode of our experience presupposes them as its necessary and unavoidable general structure. An important feature of Kant's view of knowledge is that the twelve categories stand in combination with space and time and without this *combination* knowledge in general is impossible.

Sensibility, the capacity of the mind to receive the representations, receives the manifold of representations as given to it through the senses by the object. And it is through the *intuition*, which sensibility yields, our knowledge is related to the object. Space and *time* are *a priori* intuitions of the *sensibility*. Besides being intuitions themselves they are also *a priori* forms of all intuitions. Kant explains their relation with the object in the following manner:

“*What* objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. We know nothing but our mode of
perceiving them- a mode which is peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, certainly, by every human being. With this alone have we any concern. Space and time are its pure forms, and sensation in general its matter. The former alone can we know *a priori*, that is, prior to all actual perception and such knowledge is therefore called pure intuition. The latter is that in our knowledge which leads to its being called *a posteriori* knowledge, that is, empirical intuition. The former inhere in our sensibility with absolute necessity, no matter of what kind our sensations may be; the latter can exist in varying modes."^{5}

Sensibility receives "representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects". And we have seen that space and time, for Kant, are *a priori* forms of sensibility, which intuit the relation *between* knowledge and objects. Of these, space is *the* property of the mind, which enables us to represent objects as outside us. And time is the form in which the mind, its states, and all other intuitions without exception are given. No intuition whether inward or outwardly projected, can escape time. The feature of time as formal condition of all appearances makes it different from space, and this nature of time has an important role to play in that part of the Critique where the connection between sensibility and the understanding is contemplated.

"Time is the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances *whatsoever*. Space, as the pure form of all *outer* intuition, is so far limited; it serves as the *a priori* condition only of outer appearances. But since all representations, whether they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state; and since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belongs to time, time is an *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever"^{6}

Space and time, as the pure and *a priori* forms of sensibility, which can only receive the representations of the object in the mode in which the mind is affected, are passive in nature. In that respect, they cannot account for how these
representations are synthesised in different ways. To make these manifold belong to an original consciousness in their synthesised form, a faculty of the mind which is spontaneous as opposed to its faculty of the passive receptivity, is needed. The faculty of the mind that acts thus for the spontaneous act of synthesis of the manifold of representations received in sensibility is the understanding. The understanding does it by means of categories, which correspond to the pure concepts of general logic. These categories, as explained earlier, are \emph{a priori} in that they are prior to experience and also transcendental in that they relate to experience to make knowledge of the world possible.

We have already seen that the pure forms of sensibility are passive and categories of the understanding active. Another difference between them is that space and time are pure and \emph{a priori} forms of intuitions only in relation to the way in which the senses are affected by objects. They are limited this way. But categories of the understanding belong to the original apperception of the mind in that they represent the thought in general. They can produce knowledge of objects in conjunction with sensibility even if intuitions are given to it in a different mode of sensibility. And also the category can \emph{think} of an object not limited by the forms of sensibility. But we cannot know what will be the nature of object that is the result of the combination of the categories of understanding and a sensible intuition, which is different from ours. In the case of the non-sensible intuition, as it implicates the absence of intuition in the sensibility' to correspond to the thought of the understanding, knowledge of an object is impossible. (Here we may remember Plato's ideas as examples of this conviction of Kant's, but a little reflection on this matter will inform us that even Kantian scheme of thought cannot do without positing a realm of entities which can only \emph{be thought of}, but he makes them subject oriented and qualify them by different descriptions in his attempt to justify his conviction).

As it is, categories or concepts of the understanding can yield knowledge only in conjunction with the mode of our sensible intuition. Kant writes:
"space and time, as conditions under which alone objects can possibly be given to us, are valid no further than for objects of the senses, and therefore only for experience. Beyond these limits they represent nothing; for they are only in the senses, and beyond them have no reality. The pure concepts of understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike ours, if only it be sensible and not intellectual."\(^7\)

The table of pure concepts or categories of the understanding given by Kant is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Of Quantity</th>
<th>Of Relation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>Of Inherence and Subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Of Causality and Dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totality</td>
<td>Of Community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of Quality
- Reality
- Negation
- Limitation

Of Quality
- Reality
- Negation
- Limitation

Modality
- Possibility-Impossibility
- Existence-Non-existence
- Necessity-Contingency

Kant addresses the problem of sensibility's intuiting the categories of understanding, which are pure and non-sensible through the notion of *transcendental schema*. The transcendental schema is *intellectual* in one respect and *sensible* in another. So it can mediate between sensible intuitions and the pure categories. In order to understand what the transcendental schema is we have to understand what the faculty of imagination is, as the schema is a product of this faculty.

As time provides the formal condition for both inner and outer appearances, it must be a condition with a formal unity. Otherwise appearances cannot hold themselves into a unity when they are given in sensibility before being taken up for the combination by the categories to determine them as objects. Moreover space and
time, being intuitions themselves, have their own *a priori* manifold of representations which are also to be united at the very beginning. We have to remember here that the unity now in question is absolutely formal and is the one that is present in all the combinatory activities of the categories as an unavoidable presupposition. As ‘to unite’ is a spontaneous activity it cannot be the function of either space or time, which are passive in nature. And this activity belongs to the understanding and its categories. And Kant says that the only unity we know is the unity that the subject provides to experience and in his scheme of thought the question whether the world independent of the subject is united or not is impossible to arise.

Space and time, the formal conditions of experience, passively receive the representations and at the same time they are united formally before the understanding take the matter given in them for combination in order to make them determinate objects. How does it take place? As the understanding is purely intellectual it cannot reach out to space and time, which are sensible. What is intellectual and what is sensible are heterogeneous from one another. But there is a fatal link between both and this is provided by time. Time of necessity is the formal condition of both outer and inner appearances or experiences. It shows that even the understanding is intuited and as understanding is not something extended out there, Kant concludes that it is intuited in time. Kant seems to think that intuitions are present in the sensibility passively and without this passive forms the world we have will lack a proper characterisation. One may wonder that the relation between the intuition and experience in Kant's framework is analogous to the attraction that lies between the magnet and the iron. And the subject and its faculty, the understanding, are not beyond the clutches of time and they are intuited under it. This explanation of the knowledge of subject satisfies Kant's general definition of knowledge that nothing *is* known to us except through the sensibility. And this relation between time and the understanding is the background for the faculty of imagination to be a medium for the understanding to effect the formal unity of sensibility. But here the movement is reverse and in this act of effecting the formal
unity of experience obviously the beginner is the understanding. In this time, which is sensible, becomes intellectual in nature and it is in a double role now. The understanding keeps its dignity of being intellectual in this act but transforms time through the imagination. The a priori productive imagination determines time as an act of the understanding and thus makes a synthesis of time. As whatever is in space is also in time, this formal unity will encompass both time and space. Kant calls this transcendental determination of time by the understanding through the imagination by the name transcendental schema. In its temporal aspect the schema is sensible and in its relation to the category it is intellectual. The schema provides what is given in the sensibility to the categories in accordance with what is given there and now the understanding is at work to supply it with the final synthesis that construct the objects of our experience and it is these objects which make up our world. And it shows that the schema has a pivotal role in making the link possible between the categories of understanding and the sensible matter and if it reminds us of the thought of pure ideas through images in Republic it is not incidental. But the schema is not something we can understand as the thought of Plato's ideas through images, and its activity is hidden from us. Kant writes:

"This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze. This much only we can assert: the image is a product of the empirical faculty of reproductive imagination; the schema of sensible concepts, such as of figures in space, is a product and as it were, a monogram, of pure a priori imagination, through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible."

The schema is a thought image, the result of the relation between the understanding, the imagination, and time. A schema is not like a sensible concept that is exemplified, for example, as a figure in space. It "can never be brought into
any image whatsoever”. This is the reason why Kant says that schema “exists nowhere but in thought”.

"Indeed it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure sensible concepts. No image could ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle in general. It would never attain that universality of the concept which renders it valid of all triangles, whether right-angled, obtuse-angled, or acute angled; it would always be limited to a part only of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere but in thought.”

There are differences and similarities between Republic and Critique of Pure Reason. In Republic ideas are taken as what give reality to the world and they cannot be counted as the categories of the understanding. Ideas are non-sensible and when they are thought with the help of images they become sensible and it is only in their non-sensible form we can have knowledge of them. And, most importantly, ideas are independent of the subject, which aspires to know them. In Critique of Pure Reason instead of ideas we have the categories and they number twelve and in that respect they are radically abstract. There is no question of our aspiring to know them because they are within us and are intuited under the formal condition of time. But just like ideas they are not concrete and require the mediation of the schema for them to be the part of experience. Nevertheless we know them as the transcendental and a priori elements of experience, though we do not know what they are as such. In the Critique of Pure Reason both the object in itself and the subject in itself cannot be known to us. It also may be noted here that what corresponds to the Platonic idea of good in Kant is ‘the synthetic unity of apperception’, which is a priori and presupposes any synthesis whatever. Whereas Plato opens to us the vistas for the unbridled metaphysical thought provided we train ourselves for it through systematic methods, in Kant metaphysics depends on the possibilities and the limitations of the subject in knowing things. But the striking similarities between both these philosophers may tempt one to see the project of Kant in Critique of Pure Reason as a subjective restatement of Platonic thought in general.
Early Wittgenstein and his Challenge to Philosophy

The early Wittgenstein questions the credibility of philosophical propositions as meaningful signs. In his epoch making book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* he finds that the mistake philosophy committed was its forgetting of asking the question: how its propositions get meaning. He urges us to look only for the meanings of propositions and the entities in the ordinary world which correspond to them. And it is his conviction in *Tractatus* that meanings cannot be read off from the traditional philosophical theses and that we do not know what they are actually about. If we want to feel that it liberates us from the arduous task of philosophical thinking we are in the wrong for the reason that Wittgenstein himself in his book entertains metaphysical entities which resemble Platonic ideas and Kantian categories and notions. But his metaphysical entities, one may argue, are minimal and soft and do not come in the way of our understanding of them and without their being postulated, a reflection on the world is a difficult task. But one had better remind oneself here of the fact that what we need is not the liberation from philosophical thought at the cost of a grasp of the truth of the enigmatic nature of the world for the sake of a literal and transparent view of it. Let us see how Wittgenstein sees the world and language and also his approach to philosophy, which is that of calling philosophical propositions nonsensical and among the nonsense thus called he includes the propositions of his own book *Tractatus* also.

For Wittgenstein this world is not less real in comparison with a more real one. This position of his is an outright rejection of Plato's conception about the world. And also he never goes for the categories such as Quantity, Quality, Modality, and Relation as Kant does for the simple reason that they do not refer to anything in the world. In his book if at all he wants to posit the concepts of metaphysical entities, his aim is simply to find the thinkable limits of the world through them. And he says that the purpose of *Tractatus* is to clarify thought and after one uses it for this purpose one can throw it away safely!
In *Tractatus* what Wittgenstein seeks is a **concrete** description of the world. Nothing abstract is admitted into this description. We have seen that Plato and Kant developed their metaphysical concepts through the method of abstraction. **Wittgenstein** does not find this method suitable to a correct description of the world. He expresses this in the following manner:

"5.5563 In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.-That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is not an image of the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety.

(Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete that there are)"\(^{10}\)

The whole of endeavour of Wittgenstein in his early phase is to capture this logical order of ordinary language and the order of the world corresponding to it. This definite logical order of language Wittgenstein finds in propositions and for him propositions with their relations with one another constitute language. And, in his vision, what corresponds to this structure of language is a world, which he sees as states of affairs with their relations with one another. And **the thinkable** limits of this world are objects and the subject, both no doubt, are metaphysical in nature and it is an important feature of them that one of them cannot exist without the other.

**Objects and States of Affairs**

It is stated in the *Tractatus* that objects make up the substance of the world. They are simple and do not change, but their configurations are what change. It is the nature of an object that it is always in some configuration of objects. There cannot be an object that is not in someway related to other objects at any point of time. Wittgenstein says:
"Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.

If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the possibility of such combinations."\(^{11}\)

At the outset of a reading of *Tractatus* we have to keep in mind that the statements of necessity which Wittgenstein makes in it do not belong to the world and they lack sense. No statement of necessity, Wittgenstein says, can belong to the world, which is that of the contingent matters. So the statements of *Tractatus* which describe the world ought to be nonsensical. Wittgenstein attempts to explain the order of the world and the logic of language and it is to define their being and sense. But the world as it is is independent of this explanation. Let us take for example one of the statements of *Tractatus*:

"2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: If a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself."\(^{12}\)

This is a statement about the order of the world as Wittgenstein sees it and it expresses the necessity of the world to be so. Does it mean anything? Does this refer to anything in our ordinary world? And if we follow Wittgenstein in letter and spirit we must reject this statement and other statements of *Tractatus* as nonsensical. Wittgenstein sees the dilemma involved in a description of the sense of the world:

"6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists-and if it did exist, it would have no value. •
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and what is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.

It must be outside the world."¹³

Given the framework of Tractatus, it is a kind of paradox that the sense of the world lies outside the world. We may doubt the rationale of the Tractatus because of this paradox. But Wittgenstein is justified in indulging in this paradox for the reason that ever-changing world is with a being that being gives language its sense. But Wittgenstein, contrary to the approaches of Plato and Kant, does not want to accept this feature of the world as something that we can account for within our world and being in our language. So he himself rejects his attempt to formulate the sense of the world as nonsensical.

"6.54 My propositions serve as elucidation in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them-as steps-to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright."¹⁴

Wittgenstein explains how meaning has to be understood and at the same time, considers this explanation nonsensical. But he believes that his explanation indicates the perfect logical order of everyday language. And this logical order cannot accommodate an attempt to explain itself for the reasons explained now. And it cannot also accept the ethical propositions as propositions with sense because
"propositions can express nothing that is higher". And let us see how he explains the order of the world and the sense of language, each one of these cannot be understood without the other.

For Wittgenstein, the world consists of actual and possible states of affairs. He identifies a state of affairs as a fact. He says:

"2 What is the case -a fact- is the existence of states of affairs.  
2.01 A state of affairs is (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)"\(^{15}\)

Any world, which we may imagine, even in its radical difference from the world of our actual experience, has something in common with the actual one. And it is objects that constitute any world whatsoever. Wittgenstein thinks that it is objects that explain the solidity of the world and make the propositions of language meaningful. And they can do it because though their configurations change they do not. If everything is in change world cannot be said to have sense at all. The changing material properties, which are due to the configurations of objects, cannot explain the sense of the world but the ideality of permanent objects, which form the substance of the world, do it. We can ideally conceive an object, which is in a different configuration now, to be in a past one in which it was, to explain the sense of a proposition which depicts this past configuration. This is made possible because of the fact that the object in question has not changed. Wittgenstein says:

"2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.  
2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs."\(^{16}\)

In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation with one another. And it is the states of affairs that account for the material properties of the world. Wittgenstein calls the determinate way in which objects are related to one another in a state of affairs the structure of a state of affairs. And for him the totality of
existing states of affairs also determines the states of affairs that do not exist. He says that once objects are given along with it all the actual and possible states of affairs are also given. It is not that there can be a state of affairs, which is not already there as either an actual one or a possible one. We cannot have a state of affairs as an unexpected guest in this scheme. Tractatus envisages a world that is already arranged in every respect to perfection. Let us see how Wittgenstein defines world thus.

"2.06 The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality." 17

Suppose we have three states of affairs such as "this solid chair", "this blue flower", and "this dog which likes sweet". The being of these states of affairs determines, according to Wittgenstein, not only their existence but also their non-existence in different combinatory ways. For example, it is a possibility that none of them exists and the probability for this is 1, or any one of them may exist and the others not and the probability for it is 3, or any two of them exist and the other does not and the probability for this is 3, or all the three may exist and the probability for this is 1. The summation of all the possible existence and non-existence that prevail on the actuality and possibility of these states of affairs put the number at 8. Wittgenstein says:

"4.27 For n states of affairs, there are

\[ K_n = \sum_{\nu=0}^{n} \binom{n}{\nu} \]

possibilities of existence and non-existence.

Of these states of affairs any combination can exist and the remainder not exist." 18
Picturing States of Affairs

In *Tractatus* Wittgenstein says that language *pictures* reality, and it has the same order of the world. According to him, each proposition pictures a state of affairs. Before we go on to consider the nature of language's picturing reality, we will see how Wittgenstein understands the nature of a picture in general in its relation with what it pictures.

For him, a picture is a model of reality. The relation between a picture and what it pictures is immediate. This *immediacy* of the relation between a picture and what it pictures is of crucial importance to the tractarian description of the world. In the words of Wittgenstein:

"2.1511 *That* is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it"\(^19\)

In a picture an element of it corresponds to an object, which is a part of what it pictures. The relation between the elements of picture corresponds to that of the elements of what it pictures. The structure of a picture represents the possibility of its materialisation in the actual world. But irrespective of its taking place in the actual world, a picture possesses this possibility. In a true picture this possibility is materialised and that is why it is called true. The picture's possessing the structure of what it pictures irrespective of its materialisation in the actual world, as explained now, is intrinsic to it and Wittgenstein calls it by the name *pictorial form*. This form is logical for him, so he calls it also *logico-pictorial form* and it, under this name, connotes its richer implication that every picture is logical though not every one of them is meaningful or true. And he further says that the logico-pictorial form of a picture cannot be pictured but is shown in it. A picture *shows* its logico-pictorial form. Wittgenstein makes use of this important feature of the relation between a picture and what it pictures to get rid of many a difficulty, which one
may face in a philosophical reflection on reality. Wittgenstein talks about this feature in the following way:

"2.172 A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it."²⁰

A picture is called true when it is in agreement with reality. Here Wittgenstein seems to mean by reality the actual states of affairs only. A picture can represent anything possible, but that does not make it a true picture. The truth or falsity of a picture comes to the front when it is compared with reality. The point, which Wittgenstein drives home here, is that there is a divide between a picture and what it pictures. It shows that the truth of a picture is not a matter of a priori contemplation. We have to compare it with reality to know whether it is true. He says:

"2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224 It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225 There are no pictures that are true a priori."²¹

Wittgenstein says that every picture represents a possible situation in logical space. He explains what logical space is in his discussion on objects in Tractatus. Logical space is the sphere of actual and possible occurrences of objects in different states of affairs. He is of the opinion that "every picture is a logical one at the same time". It is not that a picture is a picture only if we make it on a plane outside us. A thought is a picture whether we give it a physical form or not, and it depicts a possible situation in logical space. Of thoughts, which are pictures in virtue of their depicting possible states of affairs there are true ones and also false ones. The true thoughts agree with the actual states of affairs and the false ones do not. Against this background Wittgenstein makes the following remarks:

"3 A logical picture of facts is a thought."
3.001 ‘A state of affairs is thinkable’: what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves.

3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.”

Language as a Picture of Reality

Language expresses thoughts through its propositions. A proposition gives sensible cloth to a thought, which is a logical picture of facts. The difference between a thought and a proposition that expresses it is that the latter can be perceived by the senses. A proposition can be a written or an oral statement. Wittgenstein says:

"3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses

A proposition represents a possible situation in logical space. This possible situation is its sense. And the existence and non-existence of states of affairs form logical space. Language, Wittgenstein says, can only correspond to logical space and not be as same as that. It points to the fact that a proposition expresses a sense and it cannot contain it. The sense of a proposition is not in itself but in logical space. A proposition is a projection of its sense and is not its sense itself.

In Tractatus, a proposition is a combination of names, which are defined as simple signs. These simple signs correspond to objects in reality. And object is the meaning of a name. It is the combination of names that change, not the names themselves; and they always mean the same objects. Now it is clear that a proposition corresponds to a state of affairs and that they both change in different ways. But a proposition has a sense and a state of affairs being. In the scenario where change is the law what preserves the sense of a proposition is the names out of which it comes into being and what guarantees the being of a state of affairs its being is the objects. About the possibility of a proposition's having sense, Wittgenstein writes:
3.23 The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate.\(^{24}\)

Propositions correspond to states of affairs in every respect. If there are \(n\) states of affairs, as we have seen, there are \(2^n\) combinations about their existence and non-existence. This is a feature of propositions also. An example will explain this. Suppose we have three propositions such as "This chair is solid", "This flower is blue", and "This dog likes sweet". There is a possibility for all of them to be true, or that of any one of them or any two of them or all of them. If we add all the possible ways in which they can be true or false in their combinations we will see that it comes to 8 ways. In the words of Wittgenstein:

"4.42 For \(n\) elementary propositions there are

\[
\sum_{k=0}^{n} \binom{n}{k} = 2^n
\]

ways in which a proposition can agree and disagree with their truth possibilities."\(^{25}\)

Abstraction and General Form of Proposition

The theory of language that *Tractatus* offers is a referential one. The whole edifice of this book is based on the assumption that language refers to reality. Wittgenstein in this book conceives reality as consisting of existence and non-existence of states of affairs. And in this picture of the world it is also shown that each state of affairs is independent of the other. From one state of affairs, Wittgenstein says, it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of the other. As he believes in the change of states of affairs, which are independent of one another, and attributes unalterability only to objects, he does not see a vista for what is common to several material properties that may look alike for a prejudiced onlooker. And this approach takes him to reject the possibility for the existence of
abstract qualities. It follows from this view that the propositions that talk about abstract qualities do not refer to anything in reality.

The relations that exist between propositions are understood in *Tractatus* as that of truth-functions. Wittgenstein says that a proposition is a truth-function of itself, that is, it is either true or false, and related to other propositions as a truth-functional component. By limiting the relations between propositions into that of truth-functional ones Wittgenstein closes the door of his world to abstract qualities of Platonic or Kantian genus.

But, strangely, Wittgenstein finds here that there is a form that is common to all propositions. And he calls this the general form of a proposition. Nevertheless, he gives this form only the status of a variable. He points out that this form cannot be articulated in a proposition but is shown in each proposition. As it is a variable it is obvious that it does not refer to anything in reality. But Wittgenstein considers it an indispensable feature of a proposition. He says:

"The existence of general propositional form is proved by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e., constructed). The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand."

A proposition represents a possible situation in logical space. An elementary proposition, says Wittgenstein, represents an elementary fact or a state of affairs. By relating elementary propositions by means of truth-operations such as ‘either…or’, ‘if…then’, ‘and’, 'negation' etc. we construct non-elementary propositions. Propositions other than elementary ones can be analyzed into elementary ones and they in turn correspond to possible states of affairs. One may wonder what it might be a truth-operation refers to. Wittgenstein says that truth-operations do not refer to anything and the relations they represent in language are pseudo ones.
5.42 It is self-evident that v, ID, etc. are not relations in the sense in which right and left etc. are relations.

The interdefinability of Frege's and Russell's 'primitive signs' of logic is enough to show that they are not primitive signs, still less signs for relations."

The nature of a primitive sign is that it defines itself and cannot admit itself to be defined in terms other signs. But we know that each truth-operation we have can be defined in terms of the others. Wittgenstein includes logical product and logical sum among the truth-operations. He distinguishes generality sign from logical product and logical sum and says that the former cannot be understood in terms of truth-operations of the latter sort and that it is a necessary accompaniment of the representation of reality. A truth-operation does not characterize the sense of a proposition and there are cases in which their disappearance does not affect the sense of the proposition in question. He explains it with the help of 'negation'.

"The proposition ‘∼p’ is not about negation, as if negations were an object: on the other hand, the possibility of negation is already written into affirmation.

And if there were an object called ‘∼’, it would follow that ‘∼p’ said something different from what ‘p’ said, just because the one proposition would then be about ∼ and other would not."28

Wittgenstein admits only one logical constant into the tools of language which it cannot do without. This logical constant is the general form of a truth-function. Since each proposition is a truth-function and related to other propositions as a truth-functional component, it is the general form of a proposition as well. In his own words:

"6 The general form of a truth-function is \[ \overline{p, e, N(e)} \].

This is the general form of a proposition.
6.001 What this says is that every proposition is a result of successive applications to elementary propositions of the operation $\bigwedge \bigvee \overline{\mathcal{A}}$.

(In the above remark: $\mathcal{P}$ stands for all atomic propositions, $\overline{\mathcal{A}}$ stands for any set of propositions, and $N(\overline{\mathcal{A}})$ stands for the negation of all the propositions making up $\overline{\mathcal{A}}$. See Russell's introduction to *Tractatus*.)

Russell states in the introduction to the *Tractatus* that it is Wittgenstein's application or mimicking of the Sheffer Stroke that makes him see the general form of a truth-function this way. The Sheffer Stroke means 'not...or not...' and all logical relations can be translated to it by a successive application of it. Though in practical discourse the Sheffer Stroke does not help us in any manner, Wittgenstein makes use of the rationale behind this to capture the general form of a truth-function and a proposition. It may not be out of the context to quote Cordell's remark about the Sheffer Stroke when it is viewed in the context of ordinary discourse:

"Suppose a young man wished to tell his girl friend, "If you wouldn't go to Europe with me, I will go with Mary." If he were an enterprising logic student and wanted to express this using just the stroke, the simplest thing he could say would be "Either not either you will not go to Europe with me or you will not go to Europe with me or not either I will not go with Mary or I will not go with Mary"- hardly a contribution to mutual understanding."  

A proposition can generate from it propositions of number, property etc. It is due to their nature of containing in themselves references to number and properties of different kind. States of affairs and the propositions that depict them cannot escape the mathematical multiplicity they necessarily possess. Wittgenstein states this in *Tractatus*. But he says that this shall not take us to postulate an abstract world for numbers. When he shows what is the general form of a transition from a proposition to another related to it he makes it clear that what emerges as an outcome in this process always depends on the source. He refuses to accept a
different world to make meaningful the propositions obtained through transition. He stands for concrete reference of the propositions in *Tractatus*.

We can conclude this section with a glance at what Wittgenstein thinks about the sign of identity in *Tractatus*. He says that a thing cannot be identical with another thing. And his view about states of affairs is that they are different from one another. To say a thing is equal to itself, Wittgenstein says, is to say nothing. He shows how we can rewrite the statements of formal logic which express the relation of identity in such a way that the sign for it will not find a place in it thereafter. Let us take a familiar example and see how it works in an ordinary context. We have the statement in language that "Morning star is evening star". This statement expresses a relation of identity between the two terms because both of them refer to the planet Venus. But we can rewrite this sentence as "The planet Venus appears in the morning and it also appears in the evening" or in some similar way.

*Tractatus* and *Philosophy*

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein rejects philosophy as a meaningful discourse on the basis of the analysis of language which he thinks lays bare the mechanism of its function. The analysis convinces him that only the statements that refer to existence and non-existence of states of affairs are meaningful signs. Though he accepts that all signs of language are logical because of the very fact that they are possible as linguistic signs he does not accord all of them meaningfulness. For him the propositions of logic and mathematics are tautologies and cannot refer to anything in the world. Tautologies are true independent of what is the case in the world. In the case of contradictions the case is reverse where they are false regardless of what is happening in the world. When talking about logic he says that its propositions represent the scaffolding of the world and are a priori and for this reason, they cannot mean anything. But they are not nonsensical. And the propositions of mathematics, he says, take after those of logic and their truth or falsity can be
decided by looking at the structure of propositions themselves. They stand in relation with the world, but being a priori they do not mean anything in it.

Wittgenstein says that we can very well give an a priori description of language. But the actual functioning of it is a question of actuality. This is the reason why he does not hesitate to call the propositions of his own book nonsensical as it offers an a priori description of the functioning of language which is not affected by the contingencies of matters of fact. As his book does not claim for itself a cover of immunity that will protect itself from the blistering attack he makes on philosophy in general, the only purpose of the book is to clarify our thoughts so that we will remind ourselves of the nonsense of philosophy and see the world aright. He categorically states that philosophical propositions are not only without meaning but also nonsensical.

Philosophy, Wittgenstein says, confuses an expression of language for another one. He explains this with the help of the example of the statement: ‘**Green** is green’. In it the first word is a proper name and the last an adjective. His complaint about philosophy is that it does not realize the order of words. A philosopher finds comfort in the thought that in the above statement the last word is also a proper name and wants to consider it independent of the first word. For Wittgenstein, the above statement depicts a state of affairs in a logical space and its function does not necessitate any metaphysical ado about it. He says about philosophy:

"4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only establish that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language."
Wittgenstein limits the function of philosophy into that of a 'critique of language'. It has to show only the way that language functions and where the limits of a meaningful discourse lie. And it can check thus the illusion that may arise out of the misunderstanding of the function of language. He says that limits of one's language are limits of one's world and one cannot transcend them.

In his later period Wittgenstein rejects this picture of the world of his in favour of what he believes to be a more dynamic and concrete one. And there he attacks philosophy more severely and he does not spare from this attack even his own philosophical leanings in his early period.
REFERENCES

2 ibid., P. 681.
3 ibid., p. 719.
4 ibid., p. 743.

6 ibid., p. 77.
7 ibid., p. 163.
8 ibid., p. 183.
9 ibid., p. 182.
11 ibid., p. 9.
12 ibid., p. 7.
13 ibid., p. 145.
14 ibid., p. 151.
15 ibid., p. 7.
16 ibid., p. 13.
17 ibid., p. 13.
18 ibid., p. 63.
19 ibid., p. 15.
20 ibid., p. 17.
21 ibid., p. 19.
22 ibid., p. 19.
23 ibid., p. 19.
24 ibid., p. 23.
25 ibid., p. 65.
26 ibid., p. 71.
27 ibid., p. 89.
28 ibid., p. 89.
29 ibid., p. 119.