INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an inquiry into the nature of Conceptual Field and about the reasons why the foundations of transcendentalism have not been shaken by the anti-transcendentalist views of the later Wittgenstein, Quine and Derrida. The first chapter of it defines the Conceptual Field of transcendentalism and its relation with philosophical semantics with reference to Plato, Kant and the early Wittgenstein.

The second chapter of the thesis is about the later Wittgenstein and his criticism of the ideal sense. There we will deal with his conception that it is our obsession with ideal picture of reality that takes our thoughts away from the concrete uses of words. This chapter will be focused upon the themes such as Wittgenstein's rejection of ostensive definition, his notion of language-game, rule following, use theory of meaning, mentalism, his rejection of philosophical theory as a bewitchment of language and replacing it by a therapeutic conception of it.

What comes next is the chapter on Quine. What is explained here is his empirical approach to inclining, his ontological relativity and his concept of translation. And we see here how his pragmatic approach to meaning based on empiricism is a rejection of transcendentalism.

The fourth chapter is on Derrida. Here we discuss his notion of differance which provides the rationale of his criticism of presence of being, which transcendentalism makes the starting point of its argument for an a priori being that provides the ground of any being. This chapter takes into consideration his notion of grammatology, writing, and pharmakon in the context of his rejection of presence in general and that of transcendentalism as a consequence.

The last chapter of the thesis offers a defence of transcendentalism underlying the idea of Conceptual Field. This defence starts from an examination of Plato's dialogue Theaetetus to see how Plato himself offers a solution to the
scepticism of it in *Republic*, and how Kant and the early Wittgenstein formulate this solution in their own ways later on. After seeing how a transcendental notion of being is required as a justification of our engagement with the world this chapter examines where the later Wittgenstein, Quine and Derrida fail in their attempt to reject the same.