CONCLUSION

What we have done so far in this thesis is an examination of both transcendentalism and the rejection of it in the context of the eternal question of being that philosophy makes its subject-matter. Our reflections as expressed here on this question take us to the conclusion that only a transcendental outlook provides an answer to this question. Now we will see in this brief conclusion how certain characterisation of philosophy by Wittgenstein, Quine and Derrida fail to hit the mark and we will see it in the context of transcendentalism.

In *Tractatus* itself Wittgenstein calls the propositions of transcendentalism nonsensical and he also includes his own propositions of it in the category of nonsense. His attitude of this nature is guided by the notion that he had then which considers the logic of necessity something that cannot be captured in the language of day-to-day life though the latter is in perfect logical order. It shows that he there sets limits for human reason and its engagement with the question of being. This feature of *Tractatus*, though perhaps not others, is in some sense reminiscent of the Kantian limits of human reason as Kant asks of it to limit itself into the boundaries of sensibility and the understanding. An important feature of Plato’s thought is that he believes in the ability of human mind to know the being in itself. His reason for this belief is that we are not foreigners to the ground of our being. Though Kant sets the boundaries for reason he sees that transcendentalism as a meaningful discourse is possible and his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he believes, provides it. But the strange feature of Wittgenstein is that he reserves the meaningfulness only for propositions of science which he is not engaged with in *Tractatus* and his calling its own propositions nonsense along with the transcendental thought in general. And what we can do here is to ignore his fear about the relation between pure being and ordinary reality and sets his book in its Plato-Kantian mode that makes it a profound treatise of transcendentalism.
But in PI, a book of tremendous depth and rich reasoning, but sadly with the intention to bury the question of transcendental being forever, Wittgenstein says that our disposition to philosophising is a mental illness. And he proposes there that the cure for it lies in the realisation of the possibility of this disease and philosophy as a means of this realisation should act as a force of its own undoing. Philosophy, he suggests, must be a therapy! But a little reflection will show us that it is not the search for the ground of our being that ought to be an illness but the Wittgensteinian dictum that we must be content with our ordinary uses of words. Wittgenstein's taking the profound subject matter of philosophy in its literal and elementary logical sense holds him in the captivity of a disease called the fear of seeing beyond.

Quine's easy method of settling the problem of what is there is to see it as a value of a variable. His attempt to trivialise the question of a priori being thus is a result of his thought that our language in combination with the sensory stimulations is responsible for whatever is there. And we have already shown that unless the being of stimulations and language is transcendently grounded it will be engulfed by the Derridean differance.

Derrida equates our epoch with that of aftermath of philosophy. He writes that it is the eve and aftermath of philosophy and the beginning of literary engagement with reality where nothing holds onto a determined order and everything gives way to its other within itself as an eternal abyss of its own absence. Plato examines this absence in *Theaetetus* and rejects this possibility in his entire philosophical endeavour. So Plato thus marks the end of differance. Differance is not a stranger to transcendentalism and Derrida knows it. And Philosophy is eternally the death of differance and the aftermath of protowriting.