Chapter - III
Indonesian Society and Islam

This chapter extensively deals with the foundation of Indonesian society and its linkages with Islam and various other traditions and beliefs practiced by the people and discusses the concept of Pancasila and its relationship with the existing cultural ethos at length.

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Indonesians after accepting Islam, molded it according to their preferences, which was in tune to their continuing primordial culture and tradition. This view has been shared by many authors who have dealt extensively with Indonesian society, for example, Clifford Geertz, (1960) Allen M. Sievers, (1974) Julia Day (1999) Howell, Taufik Abdulla (1986)

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B. J. Bolland (1971), Anthony Johns (1961) and others. Various modernist movements that started in the late 18th century changed their original shape when they percolated deep down into Indonesian society. Their rules and code of conduct were also deeply influenced by the Indonesian culture and tradition.\footnote{Clifford Geertz, "The Religion of Java, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960, pp. 136-139.}

A few days back there was television news on Bali. According to the news telecast a few Balinese who were involved in performing different rituals to propitiate the evil spirits were still believed to be responsible for the attack at Kuta beach of Bali\footnote{Daily News, “Bali” By NDTV, “Aaj Tak” 16/11/2002}. This clearly strengthens the fact of their deeply interwoven mystical beliefs\footnote{Jha Gautam Kumar, “Indonesian Puppet” JNU News, Vol. 20, No.5: Jan-Feb. 2002, pp. 12} are still intact along with other religious practices. This particular phenomenon is not confined to Bali alone but is also pervasive in the entire archipelago.

Islam with the greatest number of adherents, is the dominant religion in Indonesia. Around 143 million people who constitute almost 89 percent of the total population in 1985, and between 160 million and 170 million estimated adherents in 1992. This high percentage of Muslims makes Indonesia the largest Islamic country in the world.\footnote{See the Culture and Tradition, Indonesia, Lonely Planet, Lonely Planet publication. 1990} Within the archipelago, most provinces and islands had majority populations of Islamic adherents (ranging from just above 50 percent in Kalimantan Barat and Maluku provinces to as much as 97.8 per cent in the Special Region of Aceh). According to orthodox practice, Islam is a strictly monotheistic religion in which God (Allah or Tuhan) is all pervasive. The Prophet Muhammad is not deified, but is regarded as a human who was selected by God to spread the holy words through the Quran, Islam’s holiest book, which contains the revealed words of God.
As Islam is based on high moral principles, it necessitates its adherents to abide by its principles. Shari'ah (syariah in Bahasa Indonesia) is based on the Quran; the Sunna; on Islamic traditions which includes the hadith, the actions and sayings of Muhammad, the ijma, the consensus of a local group of Islamic jurists (experts of shari'ah) and, sometimes, the whole Muslim community; and on qiyas or reasoning through analogy. Islam is universalistic and, in theory, therefore does not believe in national, racial, ethnic and other artificial loyalties. Islam has two main branches, the Sunni and the Shia. To a significant degree, the Indonesian Islam reflects the striking variations in the practice and interpretation of Islam—in a much less austere form than that practiced in the Middle East. Introduced piecemeal by various traders and wandering mystics from India. Islam probably came to this region in the form of mystical Sufi tradition. Sufism easily gained local acceptance and became synthesized with local customs (See the details in the chapter II).

The introduction of Islam to the islands, however, was not always peaceful. As Islamized port towns undermined the waning power of the East Javanese Hindu Buddhist Majapahit kingdom in the sixteenth century, Javanese elite fled to Bali, where over 2.5 million people kept their own version of Hinduism alive. In coastal Sumatra, Islam was adopted both by the elite and the masses partly to counter the economic and political power of the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms, whereas in the interior of Java the elite gradually accepted Islam but only in a formal, legal and religious context of Javanese spiritual culture. These historical processes gave rise to enduring tensions between orthodox Muslims and more syncretic, locally based religious groups that were still visible in the early 1990s. In Java, for instance, such kind of tension exist between santri and abangan, an indigenous blend of native and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs with Islamic practices sometimes also called Javanism, kejawen, agama Jawa, or kebatinan. The term and precise nature of this opposition is still in disputed. In Java santri are referred not only to those who are exclusively Muslim but also to those who have removed themselves from the secular world to concentrate on devotional activities in Islamic schools called pesantren—literally the place of the santri. In contrast to the Mecca-oriented philosophy, for most santri, there is a current of kebatinan, which is an amalgam of animism, Hindu-Buddhist, and
Islamic—especially Sufi—beliefs. These loosely organized current of thoughts and practices were legitimized in the 1945 constitution and further in 1973, when it was recognized as one of the agama with President Suharto counting himself as one of its adherents. Kebatinan is generally characterized as mystical, and there are certain varieties, which are concerned with spiritual self-control. Although there were many versions prevailing in 1992, the principal kebatinan often implies pantheistic worship as it encourages sacrifices and devotions to local and ancestral spirits. These spirits are believed to inhabit natural objects, human beings, artifacts, and gravesites of important walis (Muslim saints). Illness and other misfortunes are attributed to such spirits, and if sacrifices or pilgrimages fail to placate angry deities the advice of a dukun or healer is sought. Kebatinan, while it connotes a turning away from the militant universalism of orthodox Islam, moves toward a more internalized universalism. In this way, kebatinan move towards eliminating the distinction between the universal and the local or the communal and individual. Another important tension dividing Indonesian Muslims is the conflict between traditionalists and modernists. The nature of these differences is complex, confusing, and a matter of considerable debate in the early 1990s. The traditionalists generally reject the modernists' interest in absorbing educational and organizational principles from the West. Specifically, the traditionalists were suspicious of the modernists' support of the urban madrasah, a reformist school, which includes the teaching of secular subjects (see the details in chapter 1). The modernists' goal of taking Islam out of the pesantren and carrying it to the people was opposed by the traditionalists because it threatened to undermine the authority of the kyai (religious leaders). Traditionalists also sought, although abortively, to add a clause to the first tenet of the Pancasila state ideology requiring that all Muslims, should in effect, adhere to the shari'ah. On the other hand, the modernists accused the traditionalists of escapist unrealism in the face of change; some even hinted that santri harbored greater loyalty towards the ummah¹²¹ than to the secular Indonesian state. Despite these differences, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (literally, Revival of the Religious Scholars, also known as the Muslim Scholars' League), the progressive Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (Masyumi), and two other parties were forcibly streamlined into a single Islamic

¹²¹ Congregation of believers
political party in 1973 as the United Development Party (PPP). Such cleavages may have weakened Islam as an organized political entity, as demonstrated by the withdrawal of the Nahdlatul Ulama from active political competition, but as a popular religious force showed signs of good health and a capacity to frame national debates in the 1990s.

**Sufism**

Sufism stands for attaining salvation through personal approaches and deeper self-introspection. Sufism brought large-scale conversions in India and Southeast Asia because of its compatibility with mystical faiths prevalent in pre-Islamic Indonesia. One significant aspect of the process of conversion in Indonesia was that unlike other parts of the world Islam did not come in Indonesia via Muslim conquerors. So naturally, it did not provoke any hate towards alien faith. Secondly, Islam before the late 17th century hardly stressed on weeding out the strong primordial traditions and culture, which are now considered as un-Islamic. Thus the primordial faiths continued and flourished simultaneously and almost parallel to the Islamic practices.

By thirteen-century, there were four Main schools of Shafi’i (pure), of which most liberal was dominant in India and Southeast Asia. After the forceful assertion from the Modernists Muslims, the Sufis in the early decades of the twentieth century abandoned identification with Islam and claimed independent superiority of “Islam Java” (Javanese Islam). Consequently a number of kebatinan (mystical) groups began to form around local gurus. The founder of the Javanese Hindu sect Sadhar Mapan is a bright example.  

122 As Prof. Nagarajan explains:

“Perhaps Sufism is the natural development of the Quranic piety. A liturgical proximity of the Sufi doctrines with the old Indian tradition partly explains the triumph of Sufi-conversion. For example, the idea of fana is close to Buddhist Nirvana as well as Hindu Advaita tantra or kundalini with Latifa. Like the yogic exercises the Sufis

also concentrated on the body successively the mind, the heart and ultimately consciousness or in exclusive Sufi terminology the naqs, the qalb and ruh.

In India similar faiths or sects came into existence simultaneously with the Hindu way of life. Some of the faiths like Jainism and Buddhism attacked the primordial Brahmnical hierarchical attitude and caste practices among the Hindus. Later it turned popular among all those who found it a more radical agenda to attract the masses. In contrast, Sufism did not attack Islam outrightly, rather it emphasized the mystical values and promulgated the ideas which appealed to the people to delve into self-introspection. Thus Sufism, when it pervaded Indonesia, found it as a natural home because of the existing kebatinan system, which welcomed it to embolden the beliefs of people. Thus Sufism was incorporated into the Indonesian social domain almost automatically.

Sufism, a much liberal variant of Islam, was predominant in Indonesia even before twentieth century. In fact, the first proselytizers of Islam in Java, popularly remembered as the legendary Nine Saints (Wali Songo), were Sufis of the orthodox Ghazalian mould. Since the sixteenth century the local Muslim educational institutions in Indonesia, have been pesantren. Today, the most famous form of pesantren is described in Cliford Geertz’s influential work, The Religion of Java (1960):

“It is the pesantren that educates the children and the youths and therefore provides accommodation primarily for them”.

Earliest pesantrens were primarily places for Sufi ritual practices. People did not have to necessarily follow the orders of the Sufism to be called themselves as “Sufis”.

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123 Ali Anwar, “Muslims Mind and Society in Bangladesh- An Historical Retrospect” in Asghar Ali Engineer (ed.) Islam In Southeast Asia (Ajanta), 1985, pp. 185-228
125 In Java pesantren is also called pondok, (a bamboo hut), In west Sumatra, comparable institutions are called surau and in Aceh, North Sumatra, they are called rangkang meunasah.
126 There are evidences that the Prophet himself initiated Sufism and revealed first to Ali of Kherka about the esoteric mysticism to him. Even Koran contains such Sufism materials. Sufi has been derived from the world of Saffa, which means a person who is not a slave of desires, also whose heart is Safa (pure) towards God. Sufism contains six pillars of principles which are based on Islamic faith. God exists. (Nagarajan S)
would attend the pesantren to perform together both the obligatory prayers required for all the Muslims and certain other optional ones instructed in the sacred texts. Over the period of time, however, the emphasis on textual instruction for the youths increased until it became the primary activity in most of the pesantren. Thus, by the eighteenth century the pesantren, which had hitherto served as the physical loci and social hub of Sufi orders, took upon the task of educating young people in the basics of Islamic scholarship, including studies of the law.

In the mid-nineteenth century the easing of restrictions on Haj and the improved availability of transport increased the number of Meccan-trained and well-qualified ulama, which further contributed the rapid proliferation of both pesantren schools for children and the tarekat associated with them. The rapid growth of the tarekat in the late nineteenth century owed primarily to the returning of large number of ulama to the Indies after having studied with the charismatic Syekh Khatib Sambas, leader of Qadiriyyah order, and Syekh Sulaiman Effendi, leader of the Naqsyabandiyyah order.¹²⁷

In the early twentieth century, both the number of pesantren and the students enrolled in it continued to grow (see the table below). However, the increased availability of western-style of schooling in the twentieth century and an expanding range of occupations available to Indonesians with such schooling threatened the pesantren as centers of youth education in the long run. Although, traditionally the major pesantren spread literacy (in Arabic and Malay) and, for the more advanced students, the analytical skills associated with Muslim jurisprudence, but before the twentieth century none taught mathematics and science. Many pesantren did teach a variety of other subjects that could be said to form a part of a secular curriculum: from Javanese literature and writing in Malay to "practical arts (including trade skills and magic practices), and fine arts". Nonetheless, the pesantren curriculum was limited to subjects needed to enter the

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¹ God is one, 2. There are angels, 3. There are prophets, 4. There is a day of restoration and, 5. There is a fate.

Al-Junaid defined Sufism (tasawwuf): "God should cause thee to die from thyself and life in him" This dying off is fanna and the life in his boga. (Swami Prabhananda, "Meditation According to Sufism" in Paths of Meditation. Sri Ramakrishna Math Madras, 1984, pp.190-195.) The sufists describe this method of apprehension of Godhead the Real (al haqq) as a haqiqa. The training is travelling the path (Salak-at-Tariq)
expanding range of twentieth century white-collar positions\textsuperscript{128}

By 1990, many \textit{pesantren} started to expand their curriculum to include more secular subjects in a graded system of education, i.e., \textit{madrasah} education. This proved attractive as throughout the late colonial period higher levels of schooling were still beyond the reach of most native children\textsuperscript{129} despite the expansion of government primary education. But the real challenge to the \textit{pesantren} came after independence, when the new republic started to develop government supported western-style education at all levels. The impact was severe, as smaller \textit{pesantren} disappeared in the 1950s and 1960s, leaving only the major ones functional\textsuperscript{130} \textsuperscript{131}

\textbf{Tarekat}

Until recently, \textit{tarekats} (mystical associations or Sufi orders) were primarily associated with rural society in Indonesia. In some areas urbanization and mass communication eroded the social base of the traditional mystical associations, but in many other areas \textit{tarekats} demonstrated a remarkable resilience. Recently, several \textit{tarekats} and related movements surfaced in the urban centers and their rapid spread shows that mystical associations continue to act as a vehicle of social and cultural cohesion.

The general and worldwide reform within Islam had an impact on mystical orders in various ways. On the one hand, several of the existing orders became more \textit{shari'ah}-oriented than they had been before, on the other, new orders which were more compatible to reformist

\textsuperscript{131} As demonstrated by Azara, currents of Islamic reform moved through the Indies well prior to the nineteenth century, beginning as early as the second half of the seventeenth century. Many of these earlier movements, however, were efforts at the renewal and redirection of Sufism, which Azara calls "Neo-Sufi" Azara, Azyumardi, "The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Ph.D. dissertation., Columbia University.
Islam made their appearance. Simultaneously, a new wave of counter movements surfaced either in reaction or in opposition to reformist Islam.

By the beginning of the 20th century a number of Muslim intellectuals and activists questioned the position of tarekats in Indonesian society. In general, these reformists Muslims propagated rational references of the sacred texts and Islamic law. Some rejected mysticism outrightly, whereas others expressed strong reservations against certain aspects of tarekats. In particular the close association between tarekats and the veneration of saints and holy places were severely criticized. The pantheistic concept of wahdat al-wujud, the performance of ecstatic rituals, and millenarian tendencies received equal critical treatment.

Neosufism

The critical posture towards mysticism facilitated the introduction of neo-Sufi mystical orders in the 1920s and 1930s, which originated from the Middle East. Central to the teachings of these tarekats is their opposition to the veneration of saints and their references to Islamic law. They disassociated themselves from existing mystical tradition by the use of very short silsilas (chain of initiation and transmission of mystical knowledge) in which entire generation of mystical teachers were omitted. The most prominent representative of the neo-Sufism is the Tijaniyah order. It met with strong opposition from the established tarekats, notably the Qadiriyah wa Naqshbandiyah and the Naqshbandiyah Khalidiyah. (Little is known about the position taken by other "established" tarekats, like the Syattariyah and the Khalwatiyah, towards the neo-Sufi tarekats). Nevertheless, it continued to attract adherents and, at present, it has a large and devoted following both among the rural population of Java and Madura and in the large cities.

Local Tarekat and Aliran Kebatinan

Opposition to reformist Islam gave rise to various new tarekat-like movements. Some of these defined themselves as Islamic but incorporated strong local elements both in rituals and in believe. Others, more explicitly, based themselves on non-Islamic inspirations. The former are known as the local tarekats. Usually, the local tarekats express the religious perceptions of rural populations. Keramat, the magical ability to heal, forecast and influence
events, is often ascribed to the leaders of these tarekats. Unstable, and lacking sound silsilas, they often quickly disappear or disintegrate after the death of their leader. Some reappear in different form and sometimes under different name. Only few, like the Wahidiyah, seem to have acquired a somewhat more permanent character and have spread over larger regions. Rural migrants introduced this local tarekat in major cities. Mystical associations which have explicitly adopted non-Islamic sources of inspiration are known as aliran kebatinan (meaning esoteric movements). The degree to which these movements are influenced by Islamic concepts, however, has often been underestimated. Both, the local tarekat (in Java), and the kebatinan movements are influenced by Javanese customs and folk beliefs, kejawan. To the reformist Muslims, kejawan is anathema, but traditional Muslims do not necessarily perceive it in contradiction or conflict with Islam. In last few decades there has been a general tendency towards affirmation of canonical Islamic obligations, even within these more "syncretist" movements.

*Muktabarah Tarekat*

In reaction to the tendencies described above, some of the larger, traditional tarekat have joined forces. At present, they stress adherence to Islamic law and the vital importance of sound silsilas. A number of tarekat leaders reject the concept of wahdat al-wujud, but others show ambivalence to this widespread idea. The so-called Muktabarah (respectable) movement of "orthodox" tarekat (Jam'iyah Ahli Thoreqat Mu'tabarah founded in 1975) was meant to serve as a national platform for the traditional tarekats and as an instrument to promote "orthodox" and to suppress "heterodox" tarekats. An older (political) platform of mainly traditional orders is the PPTI (Persatuan Pengamal Tarekat (Thareqat) Islam). However, the troubled history of the PPTI and, to a lesser extent, Muktabarah movement demonstrate that the mystical movements are less disposed to systematization compared to other religious movements. Mystical authority may have become more diffused and disseminated, but the charismatic qualities of tarekat leaders and the individual bond between him and his followers have remained the main loci of mystical association. Combined with the multiple sources of mystical inspirations tarekat and related movements defies any easy categorization. The emotional bond, the experience-oriented approach of
mysticism, and the capacity to embrace a great variety of ideas remain a vital aspect of Islam in Indonesia.

**Tarekats in urban area**

The growing popularity of *tarekats* in urban centers demonstrates that the demise of traditional society does not inevitably result in the decline of *tarekats*.\(^{132}\) Dissatisfaction with the rational "modernist" trends which had dominated the expanding cities for decades induces people to seek emotional religious alternatives. Because of this demand a number of *tarekats* are spreading rapidly in the urban centers as religious surrogates. The search for individual or communal self-improvement or discipline is another reason why people turn to mystical teachers. The larger *tarekats*, in particular those having an international reach, like the Naqshbandiyah, as well as individual teachers increasingly appealing to educated urban class. Some new mystical associations are primarily urban in character, like Pangestu and Tawakal.

*Tarekats* not only fulfill the functions of the urban (upper) middle classes but also across all classes. Particularly their *dakwah* activities, are especially relevant for the rapidly expanding communities of rural migrants. Certain devotional and associational patterns of rural *tarekats* have included both the orthodox traditional and the heterodox local *tarekat*. In the urban setting mystical associations fulfill important social functions and facilitate the social and cultural accommodation for migrants. They do so without alienating the migrants from traditional values, at the same time, connecting them to urban based networks. In facilitating housing, work and medical care *tarekats* have become instrumental. Subsequently, the role of *tarekats* in community development is increasingly appreciated by the government.

**Changing Pesantren and Tarekat**

Threats to the *pesantren* have necessary implications for the *tarekat*. As the *pesantren* have been both, the traditional loci of *tarekat* as well as an important recruitment base for

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them, with former pupils returning later in life to their old pesantren or to another pesantren network to undertake more weighty spiritual regimes. But probably more significant to the continued vitality of the tarekat has been the direct challenge to Sufism posed by the reformist movements of the late colonial and republican periods. Of particular importance was Wahabbism (for details see the foot note No 24 Chapter II), which considered Sufism as tolerant to idolatrous folk rituals. The heretical assumption of divine powers by syekhs (to which holder reformist also object), offensively rejects old-fashioned hierarchical relationships that stifle independent thought in young students and impose unquestioning obedience on adult members of the orders. Sufism came to be known as “the Islam which is not Islam” (Islam yang bukan Islam).

Over the course it was promoted by Modernist organizations such as the Muhammadiyah. That “strict” sometimes-called santri Muslims associated with the Modernist movement came vehemently in opposition to less committed and nominal Muslims (in Java, abangan or kejawaen Muslims). As the politics of nation building sharpened, religious identities gained further legitimacy through their formal incorporation in different political parties and pressure groups. 134

As the ethos of acceptable Muslim practices shifted considerably under the influence of hidden syncretic forces in the twentieth century. A new genre of culture emerged in the new conditions, which had its deeper roots in mystical Sufism and only auxiliarily related to Islam. In some cases not even remotely identified with the Islam. In rapturous communion with the Lord, one would lose all awareness of the self and the others and experience absolute identity with the Divine. And it is only in this precise context that the tenth century Persian Sufi mystic al-Hallaj declared” I am god!” His spiritual brothers, regarding the ecstatic affirmation a heresy against the cardinal tenet that there can be “no seconds” to the One God, had him executed. 135 The Javanese tradition that one of the first Walis, a certain Seh Siti Jenar, achieved such an ecstatic union with God and was

similarly punished for the sin of speaking openly of it, has been a reference point for heterodox Sufis for generations.\textsuperscript{136} There were also similar kinds of views from other walis, who have also declared that they have personally achieved identity with God.\textsuperscript{137} Some with past connections to Sufi oriented teachings and others informally schooled by parents and through participation in the religious life of the community in loosely Sufi Javanese practices of asceticism and meditation, people have been indirectly indoctrinated into sufism. During my stay in Bandung and Jogjaya I visited a number of houses and had discourses with the family members on various topics relating to the presence of Indic values in Indonesia. The mystical associations of the people are reflected in a very conspicuous manner as they could not dissociate themselves with various cults of Hinduism and its mystic values. Some of them are even devoted pupils of ‘Sri Sain Baba’ and other saints of India who are known for their mystical and spiritual power.

When the New Orders began to flourish the number of kebatinan groups increased automatically. They formed an association to promote their interests demanding a full-fledged recognition from the government, at par with Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism, under the provisions of Constitution. The government has already acknowledged the later three religions by establishing a separate department under the Ministry of Religion, which was dedicated to their support. Few kebatinan groups like Agama Adam makrifat (The religion of the perfectly realized Adam) and Agamga Sapta Dharma went ahead and declared themselves “religions” regardless.\textsuperscript{138}

However, the number of pesantren and the students have been growing since 1942 but the essence of the mystic values are decreasing rapidly. These values are being supplanted by the true Islamic values (scripturalist).

Sufism, once strongly associated with the traditional and rural sector of Indonesian society is obviously not at the verge of extinction but has survived with great potentiality as it still plays very important role in the formation of the curriculums of the pesantren. Sufism will keep playing a counter-check for those who endorses orthodox type of Islam. Simultaneously it has opened the door for those Muslims who wanted to take shelter from the on going social pressure exerted by the neo-revival of Islam. It is working as a middle path for these people. Sufism has created a common path for both the followers of Modernist and Traditionalist nature of Islam, with strong links with the Neo-Modernist liberalism which at one hand also endorses all sorts of spiritual practices which were prevalent in the Pre-Islamic period of Indonesia\textsuperscript{139}

From the second half of the nineteenth century, attempts were being made to purify Sufism from its alleged un-Islamic excesses. Fiqh, the religious legal method, became the vehicle of the attempted reformation. From that time Egyptian Quranic exegesist Al-Settee's Itmam-Al-Dirayah (fourteen religious sciences) was adopted as the main curricula of pesantren.\textsuperscript{140}

In Indonesia, legal theories (Usul al-fiqh) formulated in the ninth century AD provides the complete set of rules on how to treat quranic sayings and the Prophets' traditions (hadiths) and apply them to every day problems. The popular belief is that unattainable,

\textsuperscript{139} Howell, Julia Day, “Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival”, The Journal of Asian Studies, No.3 August 2001, pp. 701-729. The above article gives an elaborate account of the development of Sufism and assesses the relevance of Sufism in Indonesia in the modern period when Modernism or Pan-Islamic influence is very pervasive in the Indonesian society.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. (footnote-1)
should not be rejected entirely and local customs should be utilized. Prevention of destruction causing action is given priority over performing good deeds. The legal philosophy (nikmah al-tashri') of the last two centuries is being re-examined too. For example, ablution, a ritual associated with prayer, is seen in a dietary framework. These approaches do not meet or cope with the demands of modernization. Of let mood has been to revive original purity i.e. in Quran's and the Prophet 's traditions, rest should be omitted. (i.e. non-interpretative code). Their pet teaching is zakat (alms giving) i.e. the promotion of social welfare in Islam.

Sufism is also undergoing a new mood of refashioning its old norms such as visits to sacred tombs, frequent voluntary self-withdrawals (khalwat), personal allegiance (bai'ah) to the master and similar such ideas. However, it continues to live with inner self-growth through piety, meditation etc. 141

**Dakwah in urban communities**

Dakwah (or da'wa) --the "call" to God-- stands for the propagation of the Islamic faith; the dissemination of Islamic ideas and values. Dakwah has never been confined to the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam. At present, Dakwah is also being used as a platform by the fundamentalist groups to spread their polemics in the name of weeding out the traditions which they find incompatible with the Islamic (shari'ah) norms. The leadership, adherents and target groups of dakwah organizations, is multifarious and generally lies outside the circle of traditional religious authorities and their followers. Therefore, modern dakwah involves competition between various sources of religious (and moral) authority.

After the adoption of Pancasila as the foundation stone of Indonesian constitution by nationalist groups, many ulamas and Muslim aspirants who were eager to see more and more of Islamic ethos to be incorporated into the state system abandoned there ideas and accepted Pancasila on the call of nationalist groups. However, they could not sustain themselves in their effort to implement Islamic values on various educational and social activities. A number of dakwah movements have relations with international organizations

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141 Abdurrahman Wahid, "Islam the state and Development in Indonesia" in Ashgar Ali Engineer, (ed.) op.cit. 1985 pp. 75-112
(Rabitah al-'Alam- al-Islami, Jam'i'ah al-Tabligh wa-al-Da'wah, also known as Tablighi Jam'i'at etc.) and various other movements which originated from other Muslim countries and are actively involved in dakwah in Indonesia (Darul Arqam, Hizb al-Tahrir etc).

Indonesia witnessed a conspicuous development of dakwah movements and organizations. The incentive came from a number of Muslim individuals and movements in the early decades of the 20th century. Modernist corrective movements, like the Muhammadiyah, were among the prime initiators, but neo-Sufi tarekats, like the Tijaniyah, became active as well. Nowadays, most religious organizations which were established during the first half of this century --including the "traditionalist" movements, such as the NU and the Qadiriyah wa Naqshbandiyah tarekat-- are engaged in dakwah. Besides that, numerous other dakwah organizations sprang up. Dakwah is also generated at grass-root level by, for instance, kelompok pengajian (discussions groups) and majelis taklim (learning groups). The scope of its activities and the number of organizations involved expanded gradually until the 1970s, after which it began on a large scale.

In the last two decades the state developed its own dakwah institutions. One of the main functions of the Directorate for Islamic Information of the Ministry of Religious Affairs is to train the dti'is; Islamic propagation workers. Following the example of private institutes for higher religious learning, faculties of dakwah were created in the state-run IAINs, and these institutes are developing rapidly. Besides, several dakwah organizations are affiliated to or sponsored by political parties and leading politicians. The Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah and the Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia, for instance, are attached to the Golkar.

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142 Mitsuo Nakamura, “The Emergence of Islamizing Middle Class and the Dialectics of Political Islam in the New Order of Indonesia: Prelude to Formation of the ICMI”, unpublished paper presented at Conference on Islam and the Social Construction of Identities: Comparative Perspectives on Southeast Asian Muslims, University of Hawaii, 4-6 August 1993, pp. 12-34

143 Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class", Indonesia, 56 (October 1993), p. 6

Dakwah Activities in the Urban Area

Dakwah is getting more popular in urban areas as a result of migration of a large number of workers from the rural areas. The people from rural areas often tend to gather in such activities where they find a congenial social environment. Sometimes wayang (shadow puppet) shows reflecting the ideas of the dakwah activists are organized throughout the night to keep the people engaged for a long time. Dakwah covers a great variety of activities and is motivated by a wide range of perceptions and expectations. It involves different social groups of varied social-economic strata. Most dakwah activities are developed in the public sphere, like (formal) work, schooling and community development. Religious and social facilities have sprung up in and around industrial plants, banks, offices, hospitals, schools etc. Most of these institutions are operated by formal (or established) dakwah organizations. Self-improvement and individual and communal discipline, including the implementation of a new work ethics figure prominently in dakwah programs. 144

Education and the dissemination of religious authority

Education has always been an important instrument in the processes of dissemination of religious authority. In this context education serves two main goals: firstly, the propagation of "proper" rites, tenets and values aimed at motivating and disciplining (prospective) believers, and secondly, the sustenance and reproduction of religious knowledge and authority. Although, the primary focus of this research is Islamic educational institutions, and propagation of Islamic ideas but other religious manifestations does not rest on educational institutes alone. Moreover, it has been marked earlier (see conceptual framework) that the spread of modern education combined with the advent of mass communication has created a large audience of believers who have access to authoritative texts and who are in a position to select and reject it independently on their own. This process has altered the structures and networks of religious authority and yielded important changes in methods and strategies. Education is also the domain with the largest state

interference in nation building (compared to the other three research programs: fatwa, dakwah and tarekat) particularly in the Orde Baru period.

**Pesantren and Madrasah**

Propagation through instructions and education, both formal and informal, is the main traditional method of dakwah. Indonesia has a great variety of Islamic educational institutions. In the early 20th century the traditional pesantren (Islamic boarding school) was supplemented by the madrasah, which are modeled on recent Middle Eastern educational reforms. Some of the earliest founders of Indonesian madrasahs had a pesantren background and leading ulama like Hasyim Asy'ari and Ahmad Dahlan and others were established by organizations of the Arab origin, like the Jami'at Khair and al-İrsyad. Both traditionalist and reformist systems demand a devout lifestyle, but the santri are trained as a religious specialist and custodian of sacred knowledge, whereas the students attending a madrasah are prepared for active and broad participation in community activities and are also offered vocational training in addition to religious training. Spatial organizations reflect the differential approaches to be adopted: the pesantren offered boarding in order to facilitate the development of a santri lifestyle whereas most madrasah students continued to live with their families. Madrasahs, along with other secular educational institutions, were instrumental in the formation of a new group of religious leaders who had no (full) traditional religious training.

**Ulama and Fatwa**

The importance of fatwas as a source for understanding Islam and Islamic societies have long been recognised, e.g. the famous Dutch Islamicist C. Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936)

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145 A fatwa is a religious advice extracted from the shari'ah released by a mufti (fatwa giver) at the request of one or more Muslims who regard this mufti as a social authority. Fatwas may be given on any topic i.e. food prescriptions, marital affairs, ritual issues. Contrary to a legal judgement given by a judge, a fatwa is not binding and enforceable. The giving of fatwas is called iftî, while the asking for fatwas is called istsifâ. Many fatwas from the entire Muslim world have been preserved, and every day new fatwas are issued. These texts have the following form: in the first place, the question to the mufti is mentioned, followed by the mufti's answer, giving his opinion from the authentic sources of Islam. The size of a fatwa may vary from a few lines to an entire treatise. Because fatwas are given at request, they present a picture of all kinds of issues which are of topical interest to Muslims, and might give an insight into the tension between the Islamic ideal, as formulated by the authoritative muftis in their fatwas on the one hand, and all kinds of practices which were carried out in daily life on the other.
holds the view that fatwas gewären dem aufmerksamen Leser ein lichtvolles Bild vom Leben und Treibe der Gesellschaft.\textsuperscript{146} In present-day scholarship the attention paid to fatwas is clearly increasing.\textsuperscript{147} Earlier, in Indonesia, the fatwas did not have much importance because of the prevailing socio-economic status and the upgraded standard of living of the people in the urban areas. But in spite of the various movements of modernisation in Islam, fatwas and mufti found new roles to play. As a result People got more attracted towards the Islamic court than the state judicial system.

In Indonesia shari'ah did not exist as a category sui generis, but was only taken into consideration as far as the elements of it are concerned and they have been received into a particular adat; this was the so-called 'reception theory'. Some of the Islamic laws were included in the legal system of Dutch East Indies which were considered as a concession to the Muslim population in 1882, and religious courts, the so-called 'Priesterraden', were founded to operate in Java. However, the jurisdictions of these courts were restricted to family laws only and various other subjects such as inheritance law etc remained outside its purview.\textsuperscript{148}

During the orde baru the ulamas kept silent as a result the pace of religious dissemination retarded considerably although, with a little effect. The Islamic groups failed to insert shari'ah (see the Jakarta charter in the chapter I) in the constitution (undang –undang dasar 1995). Therefore, presently in Indonesia, the implementation of Islamic Law is also limited. The Jakarta Charter focused on the sentence that states: in conjunction with four other principles, the State is to be based on the belief of One God (dengan kewadjiban mendjalankan Sjari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluk-nja) with obligations to carry out Islamic Law for its followers. It is clear that if this preamble had been accepted it would

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{147}] K. Masud, B. Messick and D. Powers (edited), "Islamic legal interpretation: muftis and their fatwas", Harvard University Press 1996), This gives a detail account about the various interpretations about the fatwa by 28 contributions made by scholars from the entire world.
\item[\textsuperscript{148}] Hooker, M.B., “Islamic Law in Southeast Asia”, Singapore, Oxford University Press. 1937 pp. 12-45
\end{itemize}
have given the *shari’ah* a constitutional status. At present the religious courts have been retained and introduced into the entire Archipelago as a result of the efforts of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The jurisdiction of the courts is somewhat enlarged, but apart from this the *shari’ah* does not play any important role within the national legal system (see the details in the chapter IV). The place of the Shari’a in both the colonial and the post-colonial legal systems has remained rather limited, and as a result the institutionalised influence of the *ulamas* is limited. The *ulamas* have voiced their opinions through non state-sponsored institutions like the *pesantren* and through *fatwas*. As *fatwas* deals with all social and family problems, it is essential to deal with fatwa to understand the basic problems of the Islamic society in Indonesia.

A nation-wide body of *ulamas* was formed in 1975 at the initiative of President Suharto—the *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI). This organisation was founded to give the government advice in the form of *fatwas*, which are issued by the *Komisi Fatwa* of the MUI. Regional branches of the MUI also issue *fatwas* from time to time.

A new Islamic epistemology generated a heated debate between *Kaum Tua* ('the Old Group'; the traditionalists) and *Kaum Muda* ('the New Group'; the modernists). Both groups issued their own *fatwas*, many of which have been listed in the inventory of sources, e.g. the decisions of the congresses of the traditionalist organisation, NU. Presently, various institutions issue *fatwas*, for instance the national Majelis Ulama Indonesia, regional branches of Councils of Ulama; and Muslim organisations, like the above mentioned Nahdlatul Ulama (on various levels) and the Muhammadiyah.

However, the nature of Fatwas differ from the mainland of Java to Aceh i.e. there has been a continued conflict between the coastal Islamic communities of Sumatra and the Islamic communities of the hinterland of Java and other islands. This happened because

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149 The Jakarta Post 6th August 2002, See the Debate over *Shari'ah*
151 Hooker, M.B., “Islamic Law in Southeast Asia”, Singapore etc.: 1984 Oxford University Press, pp.10-12
of direct contact of the Arab world with coastal people due to their relatively more developed overseas trade system than the hinterland people. As a result a long and protracted chain of spiritual conflict occurred between this Southeast Asian Sufi Islam and the indigenous spiritualism deeply rooted in pre-Hindu and the subsequent Hindu-Buddhist religious beliefs of these hinterland kingdoms. In contrast to Aceh, at the northern tip of the island of Sumatra, where purity of Islam was given weight, in west Sumatra the synthesis between the pre-Islamic religious conventions and Islamic beliefs began to materialize. Like in Java, the Hindu-Buddhist tradition was much more live, which merged with the new religion, Islam.

The Javanese variant of Islam is looked down upon by the fundamentalists of Aceh, Minangakabau etc. They called it the heretical branch of the Islamic mystical movement, the Wahdaniyah. According to this Javanese belief, even today, full communion of a worshipper with God is emphasized with devotion.

Sources of the religious dissemination
The Indonesians have about more than 10 thousand pesantren dispersed among 70,000 villages, ranging from small compounds with only a few santris to those with more than 3,000 students. Pesantren is the place of the santri (the learned ones in the scripture (shastera). It is a place of Islamic religious education and the teacher is known as kiyai. They permit the collective rituals such as nyepi (literally isolating oneself) which differs from the original Javanese concept of self-annihilation as a temporal rejection of worldly life. In this pesantren, secrets of the righteous life on the path of Allah with necessary rituals are taught. Besides this, there are various institutions which also work as the other source of religious dissemination which encompasses the general mass i.e. different associations working on the village level only.

The villagers' attachment to Islam is shown most conspicuously in their participation in various socio-religious activities rather than in purely Islamic rituals. The continuity of these activities has been maintained by the popularity of local institutions such as the
Religious and social gathering among neighbors generally would take place on certain occasions. Religious study, where people of all age come together and recite Quran.

Yasinan is also a religious gathering which is specially arranged to recite a special chapter of the Quran, sebelasan gathering is held on the eleventh day of the lunar month, generally the gatherings would also arrange a feast to commemorate the death of Syaiks' Abdulqadir al-Jilani. The recitation takes place in Arabic. Generally an Ulama would recite the introductory chapter of the Quran which would specially address to the Prophet Muhammad, May God Bless him and grant peace to him, his family, his wives, his descendents, his companions, and also to all messengers, prophets and Syaikh' Abdulqadir al Jilani, and generally sent to the deceased male and female Muslims and believers as well as the souls of all the inhabitants of the grave (jami ahl -al-qubur). To make this prayer for long time the religious leader would repeat it for number of times and would ask the devotees to follow him. Like:

1. May God bless our prophet Muhammad and grant him and his family peace. (41 times)
2. Blessing and pace be upon you, oh the messenger of God" (41 times)
3. Oh God you are the guide, the all-knowing, the all wise, the almighty (100 times) etc.

Rasulan is an ad hoc feast which is held to express one's gratitude for his achievements. It is thus different from the regular selamatan, which is generally related to life cycle feasts.
by some religio-political groups. Generally, the frequency of this kind of workshops rises during elections when Ulama cum politician types of personalities gathers to address people. Before 1960s mustamian was only limited to the urban life, gradually it pervaded the far-flung rural areas as well. In the beginning Mustamian was mostly attended by the women because they were forbidden to pray in the mosques with their male counterparts. The dakwah groups found it to be best suited to reach the common people, which have made mustamian more popular among the rural areas.

Ulamas with good knowledge of scriptural Islam are generally invited to address the mustamian but sometimes new hazis are also invited. Mustamian is a great way of religious dissemination as various sorts of ulamas, hazis, or scholars of theocracy use this platform to disseminate the current information about the pan-Islamic world. Thus mustamian works as a means of dissemination of religious knowledge for the villagers.

**Village Mosques**

Most of the Indonesian mosques are constructed on the pattern of Wahhabiya, the movement that made very strong impression in the coastal areas of Indonesia. There is no dome in the structure of mosques and it is like a small house, which has big verandah with a separate well, and washroom. Ritual prayers are performed inside as much as possible. When the participants grow in number they also pray in the yard of mosque, especially on Fridays. The verandah is used by the imam to provide religious instructions. Villagers also use mosque verandah to gather and pass their time in leisure. Generally in the village, women are not allowed to perform their prayers inside the mosques but in some of the towns women have separate curtained place inside the mosques. The village mosque symbolizes the unity of the village and the imam of the mosque is considered to possess a powerful personality. In most of the villages imams are salaried and they have to visit the nearby town routinely. Besides performing Islamic rituals most of the imams also run madrasahs which are mostly funded by either a religious political institution like Muhamadiya or other religious non-state organizations.

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158 For details, see the footnote No 25 (Chapter II)
Dukun

Before Indian religion disseminated into Indonesian archipelago, most of the beliefs of the inhabitants were of animistic nature. The general masses even after accepting Hinduism and Buddhism could not leave their earlier other faiths, ritual and magical powers completely. Like tantriks in India, Dukun in Indonesia are also supposed to posses similar spiritual power. Dukuns have procured a very prestigious position in Indonesian society because they perform as spiritual healers, doctors and invokers of the spirits. Thus the dukun is in a position to tame, directly or as a mediator, evil spirits that disturb fellow villagers. Unlike the ulama, the dukun mainly depends on indigenous formulae in his practices. For example, a dukun claims to have assistants in the forms of spirits of the deceased who were previously great figures. Upon request, usually obliged by the inducements of a state of trance, the spirits will appear and speak directly to the audience using the dukun's tongue. The villagers believe that illness is caused by physical conditions or by an evil spirit, or by both. Most of the times when a villager suffers from an illness, practical treatment is sought and only after the failure of general medication, one seeks the help of dukun but sometimes general illness or chronic health problems are co-related to the evil spirits’ wrath. The inaccessibility of cheap, effective modern medication to villagers undoubtedly has perpetuated this tendency. In the course of time the dukuns have changed their pattern of recitation the mantras, on the place of reciting the Sanskrit names of the supernatural power they first recite the word like bismillah, and other esoteric Arabic words in order to use Islamic symbols. Despite the opposition and resentment from the ulamas, dukuns continue to attract a large number of patients and people who believe their poor conditions are caused by the evil spirits. Ecologically, it is very interesting that dukuns always co-relate the mishappening with the imbalance of the natural entity between cosmos and environment and they also sought to preserve the natural wealth like forest, volcanoes and mountains etc which deepens the faiths of the mass as they always find their existence linked to the natural phenomenon. This can be seen in their basic assumption that one’s problems are related to his or her own mistakes and faults in dealing with the supernatural objects. Thus, he is in constant need of keeping harmony with the unseen, including preserving the natural wealth.
Dukun’s relation with ulama is not very cordial, despite the fact that both attempt to symbolize village harmony, continuity and order. Each maintains a different orientation and point of reference. Although, the dukuns do not have a network of stable and organized followers, still they represent an important segment of village, which is in constant conflict with the ulama. Within limits they also from an alternative channel for the external attempts to introduce changes in the villages. Precisely for this reason the dukuns have also been susceptible of joining a political party opposed by the ulama. Yet because many changes in health care and education directly affect the dukun’s domain of influence, the latter, too, strongly oppose any external effort of restructuring village life style.

**Kebatinan**

Niels Mulder observes, “Ethically, Kebatinan is neither this worldly nor other-worldly, but directed towards harmonious perfection in the consciousness of the unity of all existence.”

This is similar to the vedantic ideal, which according to Dr. Nagaraja Rao: is perfect rest and peace amidst minds ceaseless toil and incessant activity. It does not ask us to indulge in the natural appetites nor does it ask us to suppress them, but urges us to utilize them to build the spiritual life. It neither negates the world nor affirms its autonomy, but only judges it in the measures it is useful to us to live our spiritual life.

*Kebatinan* mystical journey is often thought to be performed in four states, moving from outside to the inside. The lowest stage of mysticism is to respect and to live according to religious rules. For the mystically inclined Muslim, this especially implies the faithful performance of five daily prayers that serve to remind him of God and keep him in the consciousness that all is in god’s hands. The second state, often called the state of *Tarekat*, in which the consciousness of the essence of behaviors described in the first stage should be enhanced and reflected upon, a basic preparation to meet “God” in ones innermost being. The third stage *hakekat*, is a confrontation with the truth. It is the fully

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developed consciousness of the essence of prayer and service to the God, the deep understanding the only possible way of being is to be servant of God. Regular prayer begins to lose its significance because life and behavior becomes permanent prayer to God. The last and highest state is mahrifat when the goal of eternal unity of servant and master has been reached; the individual soul has blended with the universal soul and one’s life has become a permanent prayer to God, irrespective of what one does. At this point, one will shine like the full moon over the earth, beautifying the world and being a source of inspiration to others by one’s very presence: one has become a representative of God on earth.\textsuperscript{161}

*Kebatinan* practices challenge not only the wave of modernist nature of Islam but it also empowers individual to meet the “God”. It emphasizes every individual’s potentials to be like God.

**Socio-religious organization on village level**

Several national level religious organizations have established their branches at village level following independence. In 1955, (see the table) the NU, PSII, Masyumi represented the Islamic parties and their maximum votes came from the rural areas. Since 1955 elections the people of the rural areas have been more supporting to the Islamic parties than any other parties. There are various rituals and festivals where religious gatherings turn a great source for the political parties to convey their motive.

The Javanese *petani* (farmers) live in nuclear families, though kinship relationships are important socially, politically, and economically. The village is a corporate body which itself posses land and carries on communal activities. The village is a self-governing entity, although, perhaps not as democratic as often asserted. The Javanese villager is a devout Moslem without exception, but there is a real cleavage between the devout, or *santri*, and the syncretistic *abangan*.

\textsuperscript{160} Nagaraja Rao, “Introduction to Vedanta,” (Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1986), P.35.
Adat

A number of article and books have been written about adat since it was first discovered by the Dutch scholar G. vari Vollenhoven at the beginning of this century. The significance of his seminal work lies in the fact that no genuine study of Indonesia is complete without reference to it. Proposed as the principle of unity in opposition to all the forces of diversity throughout the Indonesian islands, it has been immensely popular with Indonesian nationalists. While literally meaning custom, adat has more of the force of the Roman jus gentium.

Adat is first of all essentially an attribute to the folk, the rural masses, and the petani (the farmers). The rakyat, or common people, constitute one or two percent of the population and the vast majority of these are villager peasant. Adat defines the local way of governing, formal and informal, including the power of the village chiefs a village council. It also refers to the unconscious obligations and ways of behavior assumed by villagers because of immemorial custom. The meaning of adat is not without ambiguity. The underlying assumption of those who speak of adat is that it is uniform throughout Indonesia. While this is in a sense the rule, in as much as adat derives from the most ancient layers-the common matrix-of Indonesian life, it is also true that it varies considerably from one ethnic group to other, from desa to desa (village) and from generation to generation. While stable, it is not immutable. Adat is a kind of common law, but one, which has never been codified or standardized. It possessed the full force of law under the Dutch, who permitted a large measure of self-government to desa. On the other hand, Dutch authorities modified it to suit their mode of administration. The village chiefs, for example, were pawns of the Dutch under the forced cultivation system of the nineteenth century, but all in the name of adat. Under Sukarno regime, there was a nationalistic appeals to adat as the basis for the Sukarno ideology and social system and simultaneously a fear by the regime of adat a local rival for the authority of government, which the regime preferred to centralize. It was from adat that Sukarno derived his doctrine of a national statecraft ‘gotong royong’ based on village patterns of governance. Throughout the centuries, adat remained a strong counterbalance to other resources of authority, including the ancient keraton (palace) rulers, the priyayi, or educated, aristocratic, administrative class, Moslem religious leaders, and the Dutch themselves.
Adat has undoubtedly been modified in detail and weakened in total effectiveness by all the foreign forces which have impinged upon Indonesian society for four centuries and more, but its very survival attests to its hold on the lives of masses.

In the past adat has proved flexible, producing, along with undoubted conflicts, the twentieth century modernizing call involves a king for transformation of society which is not new in exclusive Indonesian context. Equally well, adat may block crucial change just as historically it broke the power of Islam. This leaves the perennial problem of economic development unresolved, whether the social structure can change sufficiently to admit behavior patterns involving rationalization, efficiency, large-scale organization and administration, saving, investment, enterprising and work discipline, which are probably necessary for a modern social economy to function. As adat is a unifying force in the unity and diversity dichotomy, the differences in local adats may perpetuate cleavages such as those between Java and Sumatra, or Javanese and Sundanese. Adat provides a way of looking at the critically important petani classes and its behavior in respect to interclass order and the relation of the petani to various leaderships. However, knowledge of adat has led us to only a limited understanding of the process of modernization in Indonesia. Dutch, and particularly American scholars, representing a wide range of the modern social science spectrum, have used numerous other approaches to study not only the petani but also a variety of what might be called microscopic phenomena in Indonesia.162

**Pancasila and Cultural Ethos**

Sukarno unlike few nationalist intellectuals in India who emphasized upon the cultural and religious symbolism as means to appeal the mass rather chose the egalitarian cultural ethos, which was stronger and deep-rooted in the primordial kebatinan system existing in the archipelago than the Islam as a symbol to woo the mass. Prof. D. Norbu states:

"Nationalist intellectuals were primarily concerned with the fate of their great tradition in the emerging modern world, their successor

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162 Islamic Turn in Indonesia; a Political Explanation, R. William Liddle, The Journal of Asian Studies 55, No.3 (August 1996) 613-634. 1996 by the Association for Asian Studies, Inc.
became interested in religion as an effective means of mass mobilization and assertion of national identity. Throughout the nationalist movement the eminent leaders made it a point to write something on or about the Hindu tradition. Raja Rammohon Roy wrote something on or about the Hindu tradition. Raja Rammohon Roy wrote six books on the various aspects of Vedanta Philosophy; Bal Gangadhar Tilak four books on Vedas and Geeta, Sri Aurbindo, three on the Upanishad, Gita and Yoga; Gandhi, on the Bhagavad Gita, and so on the S. Radhakirshnan (1888-1975, who became sophisticated and respected ideologue of Hinduism and Buddhism”.

Early nationalistic intellectuals were much more interested in the nation building without playing the card of religion for the mass mobilization. They wanted to assert themselves in the emerging world. This was especially true to third world countries, who had just got rid of the colonial yoke and were still struggling to emerge as a nation-state. In the case of Indonesia the situation was different. Sukarno who spent throughout his life in Indonesia unlike most of the intellectuals of India who pursued their higher education in Britain and for this reason they were much more westernized in their approach. They were very much influenced with their own culture, which they felt deeply while they were abroad. They did worked on epics or Vedanta not for the religious purpose or to woo the mass but to glorify India.

As various writers wrote about Sukarno’s Pancasila that he formulized his own theory of Pancasila without giving much time in it. The Pancasila is vulnerably exposed to varied interpretation especially its five principled constitution but still a concrete meaning of the constitution is yet to come. Sukarno, being a nationalist, powerful and the most respected leaders among the lot, took the liberty of not only experimenting with the constitution of the country but also to lay a concrete foundation for the strong democracy where people adhering to a particular religion would never feel betrayed. It is different matter whether

he himself abided by that later. However, it did not work initially and when he read his first draft of five principle of Pancasila to the committee preparing for Indonesian independence on 1st June 1945 it invited a protest from the Islamic groups. This was the first occasion when the concept of Pancasila was put forward in public.\(^{164}\) He interpreted all the principles separately. ‘Belief in God’ was the fifth in the original draft.\(^{165}\) According to Sukarno this principle of Believe in God implied that first, the state was based on religion and the giving the equal status to all the people of Indonesia to believe in their Gods which implied to all the section of Indonesian society.

Sukarno, who was deeply influenced with mysticism and his syncretic Javanese traditions and culture did not want to leave any scope for the Islamic leaders to step into the making of the constitution. His own background was of mixed religion. His mother was a daughter of a Brahmin priest of Bali. He never had any background of learning Arabic or Quran. He was very much influenced with Srivijaya and Majapahit because during the tenure of these kings Indonesia was stretched from Java to Bali and from Sumatra to Irian Jaya. He was influenced with Dr. Sun Yat Sen who set up an independent Chinese state in 1912 when Sukarno was still in his high school.

Before setting up the Pancasila Sukarno made a long speech which will come in 31 pages if translated. In the beginning of his speech he answers the question asked by the investigating committee of Japanese Government Dai Nippon to put forward a basis for the independence. He explained the public what does mean by the basis... that is in Dutch.... *Philosofische grondslag* (*The philosophical basis*) for Indonesia Medeka. He put forward the definition of an independent state for Example, Saudi Arabia Britain, China, Russia, and Germany. He narrated the story of Ibn-Saud that when he set up the state of Saudi Arabia 80 per cent of people were not aware about the word independence. He further narrated about Russia that when Lenin established the Soviet State eighty percent

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\(^{164}\) A.M.W. Pranarka, *Sejahra Pemikiran Tentang Pancasila* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), p. 31

\(^{165}\) The sequence of five principles in his speech was Nationalism, Humanism, Democracy, Social Justice and Belief in God. Sukarno, “*lahirnya Pancasila*”, in *Tjamkam Pancasila! Pancasila Dasar Flasafah Negara* (Jakarta: Departmen Penerangan Pancasila, p. 30.)
could not read or write. Here he narrated the problems of an independent country, which Indonesia as is going to face soon:

In his book *Menchapai Indonesia Merdeka* (Get Indonesia Freed) he wrote in 1933, he compared independence with political independence. He says these two things are nothing but a bridge, a golden bridge. He went further and said that the most important thing in making a nation is to build up the society first. He gave the example of Ibn-Saud who first tried to strengthen the society where people once forwarded grass to a motor car because they did not know that motor runs by petrol.

He made it very clear to the Islamic leaders in his committee for the preparation of the independence as it was given task by Dai Nippon the then Japanese head of the government. Later he furthered his speech and appealed:

"Both our friends called the nationalist group who are present here, as well as our friends named the Islamic group, all of them have *mufakat*, agreed in unanimity, that it is not such a state as this which is our aim. We want to establish a state "all for all" neither for a single individual, nor for one group- whether it be a group of the aristocracy or a group of the wealthy- but "all for all". This is one of the basic ideas, which I will go into again later on.

Thus what has always throbbed in my soul, not only during these days of the sittings of this Investigating Body, but ever since 1918, for more than 25 years, is this: The first basis, suitable to become a foundation for the state of Indonesia is the basis of nationalism".166

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166 *The Birth of Pancasila, An outline of the Five Principle of the Indonesian State, Issued by the Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia in 1960.* p. 17. The above excerpt is the English version Sukanro's speech which he delivered to reveal the Pancasila the basis of the Constitution of Indonesia.
He laid his first preamble of Pancasila of the constitution as Nationalism. Before he uttered this word he made the people mentally prepared by giving an example of Saudi Arabia and other countries. He also indicated that the five principle of Pancasila is not merely a few days work but more than 25 years have been invested in drawing the sketch of the constitution of Indonesia Merdeka. He contended:

I ask Ki Bagus Hadikusomo and other (from the Islamic groups) to excuse my using the word “Nationalism”. I, too, am a man of Islam. But I ask that you do not misunderstand when I say that the first basis for Indonesia is the basis of nationalism. That does not mean a state in a narrow sense. As Ki Bagus Hadikusomo said yesterday, he is an Indonesian, his parents are Indonesians, his grandparents were Indonesians, his ancestors were Indonesians. It is upon Indonesian nationalism in the sense meant by Ki Bagus Hadikusomo that we shall base the Indonesian state.\(^{167}\)

He later defines the “Nation State”. According to Renan, the requirement for a nation is the desire to be united. The people feel themselves united and want to be united. Ernest Renan said that the requirement for a nation is *le desir d'etre ensemble*, namely, the desire to be united. According to the definition of Ernest Renan, it follows that what becomes a nation is a group of people who want to be united, who feel themselves united. He gave example of Otto Bauer in his book *Die Nationlitatenfrage*, where the question is raised:

"*Eine nation ist aus Schicksalgemeinschaft erwachsene Charaktergemeinschaft*" (A nation is a unity of conduct which comes into being because of unity of destiny). This, according to Otto Bauer, is a nation. According to Sukanro, Ernest Renan and Otto Bauer only looked at men alone.

\(^{167}\text{Ibid}\)
They thought only about the *Gemeinschaft* and feeling of men, *l'ame et le désir*. They were only thinking of character, not thinking of the earth, the earth inhabited by those people, the place. What is the "place"? That place is a country. That country is one unity.

According to geopolitics, Indonesia is our native land, our country. Indonesia as a whole, neither Java alone, nor Sumatra alone, nor Borneo alone, nor Celebes alone, nor the Moluccas alone, but the whole archipelago ordained by God Almighty to be a single unity between two continents and two oceans—that is our country. Therefore, if I recall that there is relationship between people and place, between men and their lands, then the definition *d'être ensemble* is inadequate. Otto Bauer’s definition, *aus Schicksalgemeinschaft erwachsene Charaktergemeinschaft*, is inadequate.

This is what we must all aim at: the setting up of one National State upon the unity of one Indonesian Land from the tip of Sumatra right to Iran. I am confident that there is not one group amongst you, neither the Islamic group nor the group called the nationalist group, which does not agree. This is what all of us must aim at.”

He further gave example of other newly independent countries. He also described the Unity of India by describing its different provinces and its community. Then he gave the best of example of nation state which was Indonesia existed during the time of Sriwijaya and Majapahit and he urged the people that there is need of similar kind of nation state in Indonesia. He also emphasized that the nationalism of Indonesia will not reflect the

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168 Ibid
169 Sriwijaya lasted for about 7 centuries from 7th centuries onwards and Majapahit lasted for about two centuries from 13th centuries.
particular region of Indonesia like Javanese, Sumatra, Borneo or Sulawesi, Bali or any other. He wanted all of them together, which will be the basis of one national state.\textsuperscript{170}

He also despised the kind of nationalism, which was prevalent in Europe at that time. The second principle he gave was internationalism, which according to him can not be built unless nationalism is very deep rooted in the society.

The third principle he formulated was totally based upon the Indonesian society's principle that \textit{gotong-royong} or \textit{mufakat} or \textit{permusyarawatan} or consensus. He also emphasized that he is also a Muslim and he also has certain religious duty to fulfill.

He appeals to Muslim leaders:

\begin{quote}
"If we really are Muslims, let us work as hard as possible so that most of the seats in the people's representative body which we will create, are occupied by Muslim delegates. If the Indonesian people really are a people who are Muslim for the great part, and if it is true that Islam here is a religion which is alive in the hearts of the masses, let our leaders pursue every one to mobilize as many Moslem delegates for this representative body, which has one hundred members, let us work, work as hard as possible, so that sixty, seventy, eighty, ninety delegates sitting in this people's representative body will be Muslims, prominent Moslems. Then, automatically, laws issuing from this people's representative body will be Islamic"\textsuperscript{171}
\end{quote}

He clearly showed Muslim leaders that the majority of the people of Indonesia would favor Islam. He challenged the Muslim leaders rather euphemistically that if the Islam is truly lived in their hearts then gather support from the masses and

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{170} Ibid p.21
\item \textsuperscript{171} Ibid
\end{footnotes}
change the policy according to what Islam say. He was confident that the majority of Indonesians would never like Indonesia as a theocratic state.

“Friends, I suggest: if we are looking for democracy, it must not be western democracy, but ‘permusyawaratan’ which brings life, that is, *politico-economic democracy* which is capable of bringing social justice.

The people of Indonesia have long discussed this matter. What is meant by the idea of Ratu Adil is *social justice, the comfort of people*. The people who have felt that they lack enough to eat, enough to wear, created a new world under the leadership of Ratu Adil, in which justice does exist.”

Sukarno vastly traveled almost all the parts of inhabited Indonesia during his fight against colonial rule. He had conventional wisdom as a child, youth and leader. Therefore his third principle was totally based upon socialism which appeared in his lectures more than once.

India, which was about to be liberated by the British, was not fostering religion as the basic principle of the country. Therefore, to become an assertive force in regional and Asian matters and to be at par with other Asian countries he formulated the principle of Pancasila. Dr. Ganganath Jha rightly mentions in his article:

“After getting independence Indonesia tried to be assertive in the politics of the region in particular and Third World and opposed the US policy of containment. He endeavored to nurture a system, which could prove ideal and indigenous by Asian Standards. Thus, the word Pancasila, also pronounced *Panchashila*, was popularized for the political system. *Pancasila* became the ideological and philosophical foundation of the Republic and its ideals
Sukarno gave his own principles, which has been a core issue in the discussions throughout the contemporary political history of Indonesian. He was very ambitious, and wanted to structure the country along modern secular values but simultaneously did not want to ignore the native Islamic forces which had so assiduously aligned with him in thwarting the Dutch colonial yoke on the name of jihad. Thus he tried to strike a bargain between modern secular and orthodox Islamic values which found its natural reflection in Indonesian constitution.

Anticipating protests from the Islamic forces particularly when the nation was about to be formed he abandoned the tight rope of the secularism and immediately sought to form a nine member committee which made a truce between the nationalist and Islamic groups. The truce is called Jakarta Charter or Piagam Jakarta which read: ........Independence of Indonesia is expressed in the Constitution of Indonesian nation...., which is based upon Belief in God (Ke tuhanan) with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practice Islamic Law, in accordance with the principles of Humanity that is just and civilized, Unity of Indonesia, Democracy guided by wisdom of representative deliberations, and social justice for all Indonesians people.  

Jakarta Charter evolved as a subject of moral fight between the Islamic forces and the Nationalist forces in the committee preparing for the independence. First the order of Five Principle was reversed so that Belief in God, which stood fifth in the original draft, came first. Second, the equal treatment of the five principles in Sukarno speech was not retained, and Belief in one God was highly placed than the other four principles. Third and most importantly, a phrase was added concerning the ‘obligation of Muslim to practice Islamic Law that is shari’ah. Here Sukarno did not replace this principle in order to be followed by all the Muslims. “Obligation of Muslims to practice Muslim law”

172 Ibid
which read in Bahasa Indonesia...dengan ke wajiban menjalankan sayri'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya. (Because this whole sentenced is made of seven words, B.J. Boland, see the previous foot note, has called this sentence ‘the seven words’) which clearly implied that not all the Muslims in Indonesia practice Islamic law to the same degree. This clearly shows that the contemporary Islamic leaders were very recessive in decision making in the formation of the future of their nation where Sukarno and his nationalist leaders were very dominant in decision making. In later political development, however, the advantages anticipated by the Islamic group could not be secured. The preparatory meeting of the Committee for Independence of Indonesia (Panitia Kemerdekaan Indonesia), convened just after the proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945, replaced Belief in God and “the seven words” with the expression “Belief in God” (Ke tuhanan yang Maha Esa); the other four principle remained intact. Apart from being unable to prevent this development, the Islamic groups also failed to include a stipulation in the Constitution that the presidency of Indonesia must be reserved for Muslims.175

Pancasila is an old legacy, which emerged from the syncretic cultural ethos of the Indonesian people, and has developed under the inspiration of the great ideas of Sukarno to become the philosophical basis of a modern Indonesian state. The most important point is that it did not leave any room for the Political Islamic aspirants or any other religious force to impose its unilateral ideology on the state and system. In its outline, it could be said that Pancasila on the one hand holds the dignity of man, human rights and private initiative, but on the other hand also underlines the essential equality of all men and social justice. It is a philosophical trend that follows a middle road between individualism which over emphasizes the rights of the individual and collectivism which over-emphasizes society swallowing the individuals. Pancasila takes into account both the individual and social dimension of men within the proper balance. Man is acknowledged as a person who is endowed with a noble dignity and inalienable rights, but up to his/her

roots is also a social being, which can live as a human being and attain his/her well being only in a society.

The adoption of Pancasila as the state basis means that the Indonesian State is subject to Pancasila and shall implement it through the legislation. Within that context Pancasila shall be translated in a basic law that regulates that system of government, including the establishment of state in situations with their respective position, task and competence and their relationship with one another. That has been done in the 1945 Constitution, which constitutes the Indonesian State as a democracy, which shall uphold social justice and humanity.

Being the basis of the state, Pancasila also constitutes the supreme source of the legal order, which regulates life within the society and state towards the achievement of security and common welfare. It shall therefore be translated into statutory laws and regulations. These should be in conformity with the principles of Pancasila and the imbu ed by their spirit. In that way positive law will become the implementation of Pancasila, whether as its application, elaboration and conclusion or as a guarantee of its implementation by both citizens and state executives. As a result it should reflect everywhere in politics, economy, society and other aspects of Indonesian affairs.

As these principles of Pancasila are essentially moral ones, and the adoption of Pancasila as the basis of the state also means that in Indonesia the law is not detached from morality, but is closely intertwined with it. Pancasila morality is the supreme source of all laws. Consequently it shall guide lawmakers in their legislation. Pancasila morality is the norm for laws. This, however, does not mean that every moral norm has to be passed into law as state laws have their limits. Spiritual matters are for instance beyond the competence of positive law.  

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