Chapter – I

Islamisation - A Conceptual Framework

Islam in Indonesia is different from the other Pan-Islamic countries. It has a distinguished identity of its own. This chapter will deal with the introduction of Islamic values in the politics of Indonesia starting from the 1955 General Elections. However, in order to understand the extent of Islamic influence, it is necessary to know the ethnic setting of the people in Indonesia.

The composition of ethnic groups in terms of percentage are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic groups</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundanese</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madurese</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Malays</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious adherents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1% (1998)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Languages: Bahasa Indonesia (official, modified form of Malay), English, Dutch, local dialects, the most widely spoken of which is Javanese

Literacy: 83.8%

There is a great paradox about the Islamic state where although one talks about equality and regard for other religious adherents, secularism has no room. Although one talks about justice for everybody, only stronger people always rule. There is no tangible
evidence in the present Islamic states where a lay man has got the governing power.\textsuperscript{1} Asghar Ali Engineer states:

"In fact, the concept of an Islamic state does not fit into any classical model. The Qur'an presents a concept of society, not of any state."\textsuperscript{2}

In fact when Hazrat Muhammad disclosed his revelation to the Sunna, the entire Arabian society was divided into various ethnic communities and the social system witnessed a complete pandemonium. If we see the contemporary neighbours of Arabia, the Persia and Rome were enjoying well established monarchies. Therefore, to thrust Islam onto a state system would be fallacious approach. However, if the state system is fitted into Islam, which would be a rather modern approach for them and not a traditional one, then why the ulamas are reluctant to endorse secularism? During the Prophet’s mission for the promulgation of the faith people of different faith existed in Madina, and there was no attempt to impose Islam on to unwilling. If one reads the biography of the Prophet he will find that his entire approach to the sunna was truly secular\textsuperscript{3}.

The Prophet from the beginning was concerned about the binding of the society into one strong thread of Islam as the society at that time was breaking down and a new commercial society was being born in Mecca which was a centre of high finance and commerce. The Quran underlines a society, which is based on the justice for all human beings where concept of a utilitarian society was very much conspicuous. It exhorted the rich to be sensitive to others’ suffering and required them to redistribute their wealth and levy Zakat, which was to be spent on the deprived sections of the society. Equality and justice became primary values of Islam. And it became the duty of all believers: men and women, to enforce what is good and eradicate what is evil. The primary concern of

\textsuperscript{1} Nasution, Harun, “Pembaharuan dalam Islam” Sejarah Pemikiran dan Gerakan, Penerbit dan Penyehar Buku-buku Jakarta, 1975, pp.1-40
\textsuperscript{2} Asghar Ali Engineer, “Islamic States Have No Qur’anic Sanction”, The Times of India, 25\textsuperscript{th} April, 2000
Quran is to provide moral guidance and develop moral and spiritual atmosphere and set up a society which is just and benevolent to all, including the people of other faiths.\(^4\)

After the death of the Prophet, a political crisis of regarding his successor developed. Those who came to be termed later as Sunnis believed that the Prophet while the Shi’ah Muslims, on the other hand, believed that he had appointed Ali, his son-in law as his successor. There was no unanimity on the question of the Prophet’s political heir and successor.

The fight over the differences of the opinion of power holder arose after the death of the Prophet as all the intellectuals among the umma were not able to evolve a consensus over the right person for the Caliph. However, the ulamas developed a theory of legitimizing two Caliphs ruling over the Muslim world. Earlier it was theorized that only one Caliph could be legitimate one and other would be a titular. Things could not work according to the new rules and many caliphs and rulers i.e. Fatimids in Egypt, Umayyads in Spain, Abbasids in Baghdad, Ghaznavaids and others in Central Asia came into existence. Turkish generals now captured real power and the Abbasid Caliphs became mere figure-heads. Thus the political theories had to undergo repeated changes in the Muslim world. All a ruler could claim was that he was enforcing the Islamic Shariah to claim the Muslim support. But even the Shariah was never implemented in its real spirit. Most of these rulers were tyrants who were hardly interested in implementing the true essence of Islam in the society. The Quranic concept of a just and benevolent society was an ideal concept, which could not be realized in practice except for a small attempt which lasted for a few years. Muslim countries claiming to be Islamic states are far removed from these ideals. The greatest ideals projected by the Quranic justice – both in personal conduct and in distribution of wealth is conspicuous by its absence in the Muslim countries.\(^5\)

Islam deals with material, mental and all the spiritual aspects of life. The relevance of Islam in modern society is based on the ever-growing importance of universalism in any

\(^4\) Ibid. p. 5
\(^5\) Ibid
religious doctrine. During the Ottoman era, Islam was portrayed as an exclusive doctrine by its bigoted exponents, and was sought to be preserved by an intensely devoted group, insulated from all other faiths and ideas. The very catholicity and exclusiveness, preached by the over-zealous enthusiasts, perhaps, did considerable harm to the cause of Islam and its illustrious prophet. This exclusiveness was a natural response of a beleaguered religion, striving for its self-preservation.

The fundamental principles of Islam while elucidating the mutual relationship between creator and created, envisages sublime universal principles valid for all the times, transcending geographical, racial, ethnic and other artificial boundaries. Its corresponding moral principle demands accountability of all human actions and the inevitability of consequences for every action. Accordingly, it preaches corresponding proportional justice where good will certainly be rewarded and evil punished. Is there then no hope for those who have transgressed the boundaries? Islamic answer is in affirmative and for it the hope lies in the grace of god, which exhibits itself when there is true repentance. Just as the law of retribution is a natural law, so is the law of divine grace and pardon. This constitutes the fundamental basis for establishing of a personal relationship between the creator and the created.

In its true ethos, the Quran is an intensely human and practical document, codified to meet the specific historical demands. In the initial verses, the holy Quran appears as short and crispy because of the extremely turbulent life conditions, which the Prophet came across during his initial struggle days in Mecca. Subsequently there was recognition and consolidation, which finally culminated in Medina, where conditions were conducive for such developments. This is where codification of laws and foundation of Islamic jurisprudence, as well as the laws of wars, conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners, distribution of property and matters of protocol and etiquette found its most elaborate attention.

Islam has a pervasive nature even after originating in the tribal surroundings, it disseminated to areas from Spain in the West to the countries of the Far-East and Southeast Asia indicates that, in its social and legal system, there was an inherent
capacity to answer the needs of myriad societies of various complexities and at various stages of material and political development.  

**Introduction**

For most of the contemporary authors who have attempted to delve into Indonesian politics, society, culture, economics, Islam has been discussed as a major subject in their works. In fact, observing the socio-political condition of the country, Islam in Indonesia seems to be the most important part to deal with as it is directly linked with its way of life. The secular origin of contemporary Indonesian politics could have afforded it a leadership role among the developing countries where politics is somehow still centered around religious symbolism. But after five decades of independence, this country seems to be endorsing the same approach as most of the Pan-Islamic states have already experienced or experiencing. Besides this, those who have written mainly on Islamic affairs in Indonesia have referred to Indonesia as an Islamic state as the majority of the Indonesian people profess Islam. The same thing does not imply to India where a majority of people are Hindus. Undoubtedly, the way of life of the people are based upon their cultural ethos. There is a general tendency among the west-oriented scholars to define Islamic orientation of one state by equating it with the political development in other states where Islam has effectively ignored a secular ideology or has been trying to formulate its ideology to procure political power.

In the case of Indonesia, it is to be noted that the Dutch had revered the Indonesians with the title of “*het zachste volk der aarde*” (the softest people of the world). The religious zealotry among the native people has been less conspicuous as compared to the religio-political development of other developing nations where Muslims are in a majority. The dissemination of Islam had been very fast during the colonial period and subsequently new movements like Wahabbia, Naqshebandiyya emerged to make the masses aware about the political power of Islam and keep them about the happenings in other pan-Islamic countries. Compared to the Islamic development in the other parts of the world,

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Indonesia scampered slowly and peacefully in accepting the Islam in toto. This peaceful process of Islamization in Indonesia is very unique and it does raise a number of questions about Islam in Indonesia. Whether it can co-exist peacefully with secular and democratic institutions or whether slowly it will get merged in each and every field of society, politics, economy and consequently theocratize the state?

**What is Islamisation?**

Is Islamisation a process where the ulamas try to invoke the beliefs of the people to revert to the original tradition of Islam, which certainly prevents them to change the life style along with a changing world?

Islamisation can generally be identified as a process of religious socialization in accordance with Islamic norms, precepts, value postulates and rituals in other words it should correspond to the *sharia*, the supreme law of Islam. The final stage of this

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8 There are codified beliefs of organized literate Islam in the Quran, the Hadith and Shari’ah. Quran carries the revealed messages while the Hadith are the actions, traditions and sayings of the Prophet. The Shari’ah are the Islamic law and theology. To interpret these messages of the Allah, men are appointed and in their religious capacity, such men deliberate upon Islamic justice and jurisprudence. These messages seek to address the social injustice and create an egalitarian community. But soon after the death of the Prophet the problem of succession to the leadership of Muslim community emerged. The first three leaders, khilifa or the Caliphs were the companions and peers of the Prophet and belonged to the Quraish tribe and kin related to him in one way or another. Abu Bakr (632-34) was the father of the Prophet’s favorite wife Aisha; Umar (634-56) was the father of the Prophet’s wife Hafsa; and Uthman (644-56) was the Prophet’s fifth cousin and son-in-law who married two of his daughters. When Uthman was murdered, the mantle of Caliphate fell on Ali (656-61) son-in-law, cousin, and foster brother of the Prophet. During Ali’s reign process of political fission impacted upon Islam and it quickly split in two major groupings the Sunnis and the Shias. The split of Islam into Sunnis and Shias is the historical proof that divergence of opinion is seen as a weakening of the group, and that is better to cast out the disputing group and let it pursue its own course if it is strong enough.

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Sunnis can be considered an orthodox line based upon *sunna*, or the customs propounded by the Prophet. Shias are considered as breakaway sects who repudiate the first three Caliphs. The concept of Shia, which means “those who see things differently” is condemned in the Quran as “those who split their religion and became sects” (al-ladina farraq dinahum was kanu shian) Shia refers here to Jewish and Christian sects and that is the way Islam regards ahl al-kitab, the peoples of the Book. They only accept Ali and his lineage. But both Sunnis and the Shias got further divided until three major sub-sects of the Shia and four sub-sects of Sunni survived. Each attempted to justify their doctrinal position through the medium of Hadith. Since then “the Quran and Hadith plus commentaries” (tafsir) on the two, equated the rise of various Sunnis and Shias, Shari’ah and the religiously oriented and inspired codes of law. By the 9th and 10th Century AD relatively Shari’ah set the pattern for the next thousand years.

9 See Col. B. K. Narayan, “Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam, A Flame in the Desert” for a comprehensive knowledge of the events during Prophet’s time.
process demands more or less a resurrection of the original tradition and that prevailed among Arabs. It requires adoption of a process of religious orientation, indoctrination and enforcement of Islamic beliefs, traditions and thoughts. Due to the pervasive nature of Islam, Islamisation as a process assumes a wider scope and perspective encompassing the philosophical, socio-economic and political strands of an individual follower of Islam or a Muslim community. The process of Islamisation is also carried out under the influence of another state where Islam has been displaying its political power in a very effective manner.

Professor Surendranath Kausik, who defines Islamisation in a theoretical framework, refers to its philosophical, socio-economic and political dimensions. The philosophical dimension combines the moral and ethical aspects of the individual Muslims or the community as a whole. The psychological make-up or attitudinal orientation of the Muslim community is shaped in accordance with the teaching of the Quran and Sunnah. Establishment of *Ukhwat* (a common community of believers) is the ultimate objective of Islam. The socio-economic dimension as stated in the Quran and the *sunnah* has prescribed measures for evolving a just and egalitarian socio-economic order, free of corruption and exploitation. Islam advocates collective human enterprise for the upliftment of the poor and downtrodden. In political terms, Islamic scriptures and tradition have distinct connotations of state, government, political parties, elections, and judicial system. Islam attempts to mould and regulate the political order in accordance with state. This dimension recognizes the nature of an Islamic state and strives to impart to citizens an understanding of Islamic ideology.¹⁰

Over the years, Islamisation has become synonymous with fundamentalism and when these groups of religious fanatics indulge in organized violence, it is referred to as Islamic militancy. Various international and domestic factors have contributed to the growth of Islamic militancy worldwide and the emergence of Islamists as major contenders for political power in many Muslims countries.

So far there has not been a clear-cut definition of Islamic fundamentalism nor is it a clearly defined category of religio-political thought in modern Islam. It is more or less a process of putting forward an ideology by politically ambitious groups which appeals to the sunna.

It is generally held by social scientists that Islamic fundamentalism in all its forms is opposed to modernity. Islamic fundamentalism, therefore, could be defined as a religio-political movement, which essentially means going to the original sources and roots of Islam. It advocates adherence to the original beliefs of religion in their literal interpretations as fundamental and basic principles thus transcending all social, economic, political and cultural transformations which span a period of 14 centuries.\(^1\)

Thus, Islamisation in common terms can be defined as pervading a common culture, which emanates from Mecca, in a particular Muslim society. The history of various countries where Muslims are in majority reflects that the interpretations of shariah have been changing according to the socio-economic conditions of the country.

In fact, various modern interpretations of Islamic laws and ethos which advocate anti-west culture in Indonesia are becoming less popular for people are getting greatly influenced by the modern culture which is the result of a direct influence of globalisation. In the case of Indonesia, during the proclamation of the state constitution, the Pancasila stood as a strong symbol of anti-Islamic clergyism which was later reflected in the formation of Darul Islam Movement in Central Java and was subsequently suppressed by the then regime. Many states where Islam was much more incorporated into the governing system failed as a strong political system and could not sustain for long period. Olivier Roy states:

"The state the Islamist parties are challenging is not an abstract state, but rather one that is more or less rooted in history and is part of a strategic landscape. The Islamist parties themselves are the product of a given political
culture and society. Despite their claim of being supranational, most of the Islamist movements have been shaped by national particularities. Sooner or later they tend to express national interests, even under the pretext of Islamist ideology. A recent survey of the mainstream Islamist movements in the 1990s showed that they have failed in producing anything resembling an "Islamist International," even if their ideological references remain similar. As soon as the end of 1980, the Iranian Revolution played on patriotic sentiment. It is clear that, at least since the death of Imam Khomeyni in 1989, Iranian foreign policy has been shaped by Iranian national interests rather than by ideology: keeping a low profile against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; support for Christian Armenia against a fellow Shi'a country (Azerbaijan); joining a strategic axis with an independent Russia against Turkish and Western encroachments in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia; rapprochement with conservative Arab States (1970 in order to defuse tensions in the Persian Gulf and achieve a decrease in US military presence; and the instrumentalisation of Shi'a minorities abroad in the name of the Muslim ummah and then letting them down as soon as it fit the Iranian national interest (Iraq in 1991, Bahrain in 1996, Afghanistan after the Taliban offensive of August 1998). The Iranian Revolution never established links with the mainstream Sunni Arab Islamist movements (such as the Muslim Brothers) because the latter are too close to

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Arab nationalism (as demonstrated by their support for Iraq during the first Gulf War.)"  

Indonesia’s own cultural ethos whose essence has been nurtured by Hinduism and Buddhism never let the majority of the people of Indonesia to profess a fundamentalist nature of Islam.

**Distinct identity**

Indonesian Islam has a different essence, which has matured in its own cultural keg. The geography, culture, tradition, and the geo-strategic location of this country compel it to maintain its own identity of Islam. People of Java, Sumatra or other islands share more or less similar beliefs. Indonesian perspective of Islam is very close to the Indian perspective of Hinduism where existence on this planet is considered to be merely an interim, a wayside stop on a long journey. Man lived before mortal birth and he continues to live after the phenomenon called death. Indeed the patience with which the Indonesian, the Indian and other Asians put up with intolerable conditions of life can be traced back directly to their conviction (regardless of what creed they profess) that life after death will be better, that they will enter through “the gates” into spiritual bliss.

Indonesian life and religion appear to be deeply mystical. The religious and cultural history of Java consists of the successive integration into its closed world of animistic magic of the spiritual techniques and occult formulas of each of the religion that has come from the Asian continent; the cults of Shiva, Vishnu, Buddha, and Mohammad. The successive ‘conversion’ of the new Javanese courts to the new religions were never anything more than adoptions of new rituals designed to win over the cosmic forces to the side of the initiated.  

The faith of today’s Indonesian, a devout and a sincere believer in God, is built upon layers of several religions; it is a strong and rich blend that serves her well and accounts for the depth of its convictions and its tolerance of other faiths and viewpoints. Islam

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came to Indonesia in the late thirteenth century. It was a gentle Islam, and it became a kind of veneer over the animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism preceding it. The Indonesians embraced Islam, softened as it was by the blending. The quality of love that had built the great Borobudur was transmitted to the new religion.

The percolation of Islam in Indonesia displays a pattern totally different from other parts of the world where Islam migrated with might and force. What has often been called “the Moslem invasion” was no invasion at all, in the usual sense of the word, but was rather imported by the foreign traders - Indian, Persian, Arabian, Turk - along with the goods they had to sell. The simplicity of Islam, with its one God, its emphasis upon a direct and personal relationship between God and man, the sense of man’s equality before God, and its lack of a priestly hierarchy enjoying special privileges appealed to the Indonesians, especially to the kings of the islands. The concept of a God-king was indigenous to Indonesia; but a king who was also Sultan acquired religious authority in addition to his temporal power and, more important, he acquired a particular aura as the direct representative of the deity. Indeed, the first major conversion of a Javanese potentate occurred when the king of Mataram who, as his empire expanded, had bestowed upon himself the title of “Susunan,” or Emperor, embraced Islam and obtained a set of documents from the Caliphate of Turkey, officially conferring upon him the title of “Sultan.” Thus Islam had a political as well as a religious attraction for the early Indonesian rulers, particularly after the decline of the Majapahit Empire, when rival kings and petty chieftains were endeavoring to consolidate their respective hold.

Indonesian people in the fourteenth century, who were basically peasants, accepted the in-built message. There was only one God, and man was beholden only to Him. A peasant could kneel and pray five times a day and know that he had just as much right to talk to God as the most powerful potentate on land. To him, in a world full of gods and goddesses, goods and evils, princes and potentates, the realization of one all-powerful God to whom he was alone responsible for his deeds and with whom he could communicate directly came as a reassuring relief.

Historical perspectives

Indians migrated about 2000 years ago and they brought with them their religion and culture. After Hindus came the Buddhist who reached their zenith in the seventh century, with a mighty kingdom extended to many parts of the archipelago. The University of Sri Vijaya enjoyed a good reputation and was frequented by scholars from other Asian countries. A great Buddhist monument was in Borobudur, a stupa, in central Java, which is believed to have been built in the eighth century by a king ruling in the central part of Java. The Majapahit Empire, a Hindu-Javanese kingdom, under King Hayam Wuruk succeeded in dominating a great part of the archipelago after conquering Sri Vijaya.

But in the beginning of the Islamic century, these islands were governed by Hindus or Buddhist kings. The spread of Islam in Indonesia in particular and in Southeast Asia and in the Far East in general is the living proof of the fact that Islam was not spread by the force of sword. Muslim traders from Arabia and from the Indian sub-continent took Islam with them and it was through their honesty of purpose, their good behavior, their good morals and their disciplined life that they won the hearts of the people, and these people were charmed by the simple teachings of Islam and by its egalitarian approach.

It is said that the first conversion to Islam, of which there is a record of a few locals in north-Sumatra, was by a Muslim and this missionary work was carried on by his disciple Shaika Burhanuddin in western and southern Sumatra. In the 14th century, a few Muslim ‘duat’ (preachers) under the leadership of Shaikh Ismail, came from Hejaz for a further spread of Islam in Sumatra. In the same century Islam began to spread in Java, both through the traders and through the Muslim ‘duat’ like Shaikh Malik Ibrahim (maghrabi). The tombs of these early dedicated Muslim missionaries are still found in Indonesia.

The first Muslim kingdom to rise was the kingdom of Samudra in Sumatra. King of Samudra embraced Islam at the hands of Shaikh Burhanuddin and was named Sultan Malik Al-Saleh and thereafter Islam began to spread far and wide. It was when a king of this dynasty was ruling in Samudra that Ibn Batuta, the well-known Muslim traveler, visited Sumatra in 1346 and in his memoirs there are interesting records of this Muslim
kingdom and its glories. The Sultan then was Zainul Abideen Al-Malik Al-Zahir. In the middle of the 15th century this kingdom passed on under the domain of the Sultan of Malacca, in Malaysia.

After the decline of the kingdom of Samudra, rose the Muslim kingdom of Aceh, in Sumatra in AD 1496-1874. Islam spread in southern Sumatra from 12th century but the first Muslim kingdom rose in 1648. It was founded by Sultan Abdul Rahim at Palembang in the 15th century, Majapahit kingdom started persecuting Muslims and this resulted in the Muslim rallying under of the leadership of Raden Fatah, who defeated the Hindu king and established a Muslim kingdom in Demak in Central Java. With the fall of Majapahit kingdom the Hindu period in Indonesia came to an end except that it left its glory in Bali islands. Islam soon became the religion of the vast majority of the people of Indonesia and simultaneously arose various Muslim kingdoms in Java, Sumatra and in other islands. The most conspicuous among them was Sultan Agung Hanjokrokusomo of Mataram in central Java (1613-1647) who succeeded in uniting the greater part of Java under his rule.\(^{15}\)

**Islam post-Independence**

Today, Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, with a population of 203.5 million and growth rate of 1.35% during 1990-2000.\(^ {16}\) The political Islamic force of the country so far has not been able to Islamize the whole society in order to theocratize the state. However, efforts for doing it has continued since Indonesia proclaimed its independence.

The republic of Indonesia encountered a host of crisis during the period 1945-49, some of them stemming from disunity among the nationalist ranks. There were those who scorned any compromise with the groups that had collaborated with the Japanese. The Islamic Masyumi Party denounced the Marxist-oriented socialism. The PNI was split into several groups. The greatest challenge to the republic came from the communist PKI,

\(^ {14}\) Ibid p. 21
\(^ {15}\) See more detail in the Chapter III (Pan-Islamic Influences on Indonesian Society)
which flourished under the patronage of Sukarno and attempted to overthrow the government by kidnapping members of the cabinet in June 1946. Two years later, another communist revolt took place. Both revolts were effectively suppressed by the republic which was also fighting the Dutch forces intermittently from late 1945 to 49.

During the liberal democratic (Constitutional) period (1949-58), there were four major political parties representing the two cultures. The PNI, basically a Javanese party, enjoyed the support of the priyayi (mostly government officers) and the abangan. The PKI also drew its support from Java, but it was largely based among the lesser priyayi and abangan peasants. The two Muslim parties received their support from devout Muslims. The NU’s support came from the Javanese santri and commercial elements in small towns in both Central and East Java. The Masyumi on the other hand, drew its support from the outer islands. Its influence was especially strong among landlords, traders, and modern Islamic intellectuals. It is true that the followers of those parties represented different ethnic groups and classes, but their origins cannot be explained solely in class terms.

The politics of the country in the above period was only centered on the conflicts between the abangan, priyayi and the santri which is easily reflected from the General Election held in 1955 (see the Table –1) and lastly in the general election held in 1999. (see the Table: 8) The combined votes of the Islamic parties Masyumi, PSII, PERTI, and the NU made altogether 43.05 per cent. The majority votes were obtained by abangan parties. Sukanro, the PKI and the army, who were dominant in the Guided Democracy era (1959-65), were also part of this political culture. But the struggle between the PKI and the army for power led to the liquidation of the PKI and the downfall of Sukarno. After 1965 the army emerged as the most significant force on the Indonesian political scene. However, dominated by abangan elements, the army co-operated with the Islamic and Christian groups in its efforts to fight and totally eradicate the PKI and left-wing PNI

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17 Satyavati Jhaveri, “The Presidency in Indonesia, Dilemmas of Democracy”, 1975, Bombay Popular Prakashan, p. 4
18 Daniel Lev, “Political Parties in Indonesia”, Journal of Southeast Asian History 8, no 1 (March 1967): pp. 54-57 (for a brief discussion on the nature of Indonesian political parties up to the Guided Democracy Period)
elements, resulting in the greater influence and power of the Islamic groups during the New Order but slowly it became a helpless wayang, a shadow play of the Suharto government.\textsuperscript{19}

However, after the independence the Islamic parties enjoyed strongest influence during the parliamentary phase when they played an important role as members of the various coalition governments of that period. They were, however, neither able to consolidate it with political organizational unity nor contribute to stability of the polity. The situation paved way for emergence of authoritarian regimes first under Sukarno and then under President Suharto. The armed forces acquired a key position relegating political parties, in particular the Islamic groups, to the background. Neither the regimes nor the army can be described as hostile to Islam but both have been reluctant to make Islam the basis of governance as, they feel, it would disrupt national unity and development on one hand and on the other the ruling elite will no longer will be powerful.

After independence, the two outstanding Masyumi party leaders: Dr. Soekiman and Dr. Natsir's governments, decided to hold national elections for the Parliament in September 1955 and for the Constituent Assembly in December 1955. The seats in Parliament numbered 273 and there were 77 political parties. 43,104,464 voters were registered of whom 87 per cent cast their votes. The four major parties which took part in the election held in 1955 were classified in three categories:\textsuperscript{20}

1. Parties orientated to religion.
2. Parties orientated to nationalism.
3. Parties orientated to Marxism.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19} The cooperation between the Suharto government and the Islamic parties, however was short lived. Once all the Communists mostly belonging to PKI were eliminated, the abangan dominated army came to suspicious towards the Islamic parties. They started targeting mostly those Muslim leaders who had helped them in the massacres of the Communists. This suspicion towards Islam is rooted in the political history of Indonesia. There are many examples when army ruthlessly crushed the movements of Darul Islam in West and Central Java, Aceh and south Sulawesi. After the PKI the next target of the ruling government was to crush the political Islam if not to split the major Islamic groups into several factions.


\textsuperscript{21} Official release from Indonesian Embassy, New Delhi. November 1996
**Result of the Parliamentary Election, 1955**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SL</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No of valid votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>No of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>PNI (Indonesian nationalist Party)</td>
<td>8,434,633</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>MASYUMI (Consultative Council of Indonesian Moslems)</td>
<td>7,903,886</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama (NU Ulama Association)</td>
<td>6,955,141</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)</td>
<td>6,176,914</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>PSII (Islamic Association Party)</td>
<td>1,091,160</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Parkindo (Christian Party)</td>
<td>1,003,325</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Partai Katolic (Catholic Party)</td>
<td>740,740</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>PSI (Socialist Party)</td>
<td>753,191</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>IPKI (League for the Upholding of Indonesian Independence)</td>
<td>541,306</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>PRN (National People’s Party)</td>
<td>483,014</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Partial Burh (Labour Party)</td>
<td>242,125</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>GPPS (Movement to Defend the Pancasila)</td>
<td>219,985</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>PRI (People’s Party)</td>
<td>206,261</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>PPPRI (Police Employees Association)</td>
<td>199,588</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Baperki (Citizenship Consultative Council)</td>
<td>178,488</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>PIR (Greater Indonesian Union)-Wongtenggorol</td>
<td>178,481</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Gerinda</td>
<td>154,792</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Permai (Proletarian People’s Union)</td>
<td>149,287</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Dayak (Dayak Unity Party)</td>
<td>146,054</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>PIR (Greater Indonesian Union)-Hazarin</td>
<td>114,644</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>PPTI (Tarikah Unity Party)</td>
<td>85,131</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>AKUI</td>
<td>81,454</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>PRD (Village People’s Party)</td>
<td>77,919</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>PRIM (Party of the People’s of Free Indonesia)</td>
<td>72,523</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Acoma (Young Generation Communists)</td>
<td>64,514</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>R. Soedjono Prawirosoedardo and Associates</td>
<td>53,305</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Other parties, organizations, and individual candidates</td>
<td>1,022,433</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**: 37,785,299 (100.0) 257

The largest four parties which emerged during the elections were: the Masyumi 57 seats, Indonesian Nationalist Party-57 seats, Nahdlatul Ulama (Conservative Muslim Party) which left the Masyumi later)-45 seats and the Communist Party-39 seats. The coalition government was formed by the Nationalist Party. For almost a year Sukarno faced a number of domestic problems particularly in the Parliament regarding the reluctance of Islamic parties in accepting Pancasila in toto. In 1956, President Sukarno visited Russia and People’s Republic of China and on return he promulgated the theory of “Guided Democracy” as the only way to make progress.


23 Guided Democracy is a term sometimes used to justify the absence of anything remotely resembling Western representatives in developing countries. It was first formulated in the 1960s by the Pakistani leader Ayub Khan, who ruled with the support of the Army. It is in many ways analogous to the Marxist
Guided Democracy meant that half of the members of the Parliament should be nominated. The Constituent Assembly refused to give assent to this, on which by a Presidential Proclamation, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved on 15th July 1959, and the Constitution which had been provisionally proclaimed in 1945 was re-instituted. On 13 March 1960, the Parliament was also dissolved to give way to Parliament which could fit in with the "Guided Democracy". The Masyumi Party and the Socialist Party refused to fall in the line with the new policy, but the Nationalist Party, the NU and the Communist Party supported the new dispensation. The newly formed Constitution bestowed on President Sukarno the title of "Great Leader of the Revolution" thus giving him a position above the Constitution and in 1963, Dr. Sukarno was elected as the life President.

Most scholars have divided ethnic Javanese Muslims, who constitute about half of the total Indonesian population, into the categories of santri (devout or orthodox, in the sense of nonsyncretist) and abangan, or animist-Hindu-Buddhist-Muslim syncretists. The abangans were thought to predominate, perhaps by as much as two to one. Most non-Javanese, with the exception of various Christian, Hindu, and other religious minorities, were considered santri.

The santri population was in turn divided into traditionalists and modernists or reformists. Traditionalism in the Indonesian context means adherence to the Syafi'I mazhab, or school of legal interpretation, one of the four major schools in Sunni Islam worldwide. Among Javanese Muslims, it also meant adherence to such beliefs and practices as the veneration of deceased religious teachers, thought to have been derived

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24 The term santri, literally a student in a traditional Islamic school, is used widely in Indonesia to distinguish devout from non-devout, or more accurately syncretic Muslims in Java called abangan. Javanese abangan religious beliefs combine layers of indigenous animism, Hinduism and Buddhism brought by Indian traders over a period of several centuries before the coming of Islam. Elite abangan are known of their fondness for Hindu-derived mystical practices, while ordinary villagers are more animistic in their beliefs.

from Javanese rather than Islamic tradition. Most Javanese santri, especially in the villages and small towns of eastern Java, were traditionalists. Nahdlatul Ulama, founded in 1926, was their largest and most important organization.

Islamic modernism or reformism in Indonesia meant a preference for jihad, individual interpretation of the Quran, over adherence to the Syafi’i or any other mazhab. It also meant hostility to Javanism- both the abangan and the traditionalist santri forms. Sociologically, modernists tended to be urban, middle class, and educated in Western-style instead of Quranic schools. They would rather prefer to be called as Mr. Or Mrs rather than Pak or Ibu and hello in the place of ‘salam’!. They wanted to be both religious and modern, in the Western sense of rational and scientific mind, and sought to free Islam from what they believed to be medieval and superstitious beliefs and practices. Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, was the prominent organization of modernist Indonesian Muslims.

Since the 1970s, both the categories-santri versus abangan and modernist versus traditionalist- appear to be breaking down. Many abangan, or the children and grandchildren of 1950s and 1960s abangan, are becoming santri. Perhaps most importantly, the social prestige of Javanism as a religious preference, always rather shaky, has declined considerably making it increasingly difficult for Javanists to defend their beliefs and practices. The boundary between modernism and traditionalism has also blurred. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, with more than fifty million members between them, are still large and vital organizations, and still differ in their respective emphases on adherence to legal tradition (and to Javanese custom, which they consider Islamic) versus the right antithesis.

Although Islam spread rapidly, the roots of local traditional religions as well as Hinduism and Buddhism survived and created the varieties of Islam that had strong local characteristics. The character of Islam in Aceh, the northern tip of Sumatra, for instance, is quite distinct from Islam in the heartland of Java. Historically the archipelago has never been a single political, social or ethnic entity. Its political organization has traditionally been fragmented, with discrete
and localized centers of power emanating from its many island groups. The spread of Islam was similarly uneven; some coastal regions were influenced much earlier than other parts of the country. The centralization of power, which later allowed for the creation of an independent Indonesian state after the Second World War, was largely a product of the Dutch colonial policy. The Dutch East Indies (as Indonesia was then called) was consolidated through a highly politically centralized colonial state structure centered in Java. The colonial period, while thus contributing to the unification of the archipelago, also resulted in major structural imbalances between Java and the outer islands. Islam remained uneven throughout the archipelago which continues till the present day.

The Islamic communities kept fighting among themselves on the issue of Pancasila. It is very important to note that the santri or “fundamentalist” can be divided into two groups:26

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Before this period to the 1965 coup, the radicals wanted to establish an Islamic state through revolutionary (violent) means as exemplified by the movement of Kartosuviro of West Java, Kahar Muzakar of Sulawesi and Daud Beureueh of Aceh.

The leaders of this group were basically those who were involved in the reformist movement (Gerakan Ide Pembaruan) and joined MASYUMI and NU. They were such leaders as Muhammad Natsir and Idham Chalid who were exponent of a liberal Islam and was compatible towards the Pancasila.

However there have been new leaders in New Order who have very diversified thinking which are slightly different compared to the Muslim leaders of the Old Era.

Model A:
- Radical
- Moderate

Santri

Model B:
- Radical
- Santri
- Moderate

Those who favoured the separation of Islam and Politics such as Nurcholis Madjid

Those who rejected the notion of such a separation for example Amien Rais.

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28 A native of Java, educated through college level at Islamic schools, Nurcholis Madjid, born in 1939 rose to national prominence in the late 1960s as leader of the Islamic Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam). He advocated deep-rooted changes in Islam to keep pace with the changing world, even using the controversial term secularism. His 1984 doctoral dissertation under Fazlur Rahman at the University of Chicago on the thirteenth- to -fourteenth century Islamic reformer Ibn Taymiyya-sought to “re-explain” his views with greater historical and philosophical sophistication. Still an active and controversial figure in Indonesian Islamic debates, Madjid now heads a private Islamic research institute.
29 For differing interpretation of Madjid views, see Muhammad Kamal Hassan in Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order” Modernization in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kementerian Pelajaran, Malaysia, 1980)
The moderates during the New Order neither advocated violence nor the formation of an Islamic state per se. However, they insisted on the major role of Islam in Indonesian life and politics. In the eyes of these moderates, Islam could accept Pancasila but they rejected the abangan interpretations of Pancasila. For them Islam was more than Pancasila, not the other way round. 31

The unity of Islamic parties represented by Masyumi came to an end after it converted itself into a political party when the NU withdrew support and set itself as a rival to Masyumi. In the elections held to replace the provisional Parliament with an elected one, held in 1955, the secular National Party secured the highest percentage (22.3) of votes, Masyumi stood second with 20.9 per cent and NU third with 18.4 per cent. 32

The 'Islamic State' set up as a revolt against Dutch occupation continued its struggle under the new Indonesian government and the leadership for this movement was provided by the Masyumi elements. In late 1956 and early 1957 several regions in Sumatra and Celebes decided to sever links with the central authority in Jakarta following which, in 1958, a rival government called the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) was formed. The revolt was allegedly supported by the CIA but it

31 Clifford Geertz, “The Religion of Java” (1960). In his work, he presented santri and abangan along with priyayi as three religious orientations among Javanese people who were Muslims. (More than nine out of ten Javanese were Muslims at that time) reflecting Modernist Muslim views, he characterized the abangan and priyayi orientations as more rooted in Java’s Indic and indigenous religious heritages than in Islam. The santri orientation, in contrast, stressed engagement with “strict” Islam. These orientations were characteristic, as Geertz saw it, of groups commonly designated by the same terms. Thus the abangan were mostly peasants and constituted the vast majority of the population. They differed from the priyayi, in this typology, in being more focused on ritual forms and magical practices deriving from the “Hindu-Buddhist” heritage. The priyayi occupying the aristocratic and bureaucratic strata, had more of an intellectual style and hence stressed the mystical aspects of the “Indic” heritage. Since both the abangan and priyayi placed little emphasis on Islamic orthodoxy, as Geertz saw it, their credentials as Muslims appeared questionable. In contrast, the santri (concentrated in urban Javanese trading communities but also found in small numbers in the countryside) sent urban children to the pesantren to study with ulama and to varying degrees attempted to follow Islamic law, even when it came into conflict with local customs.

However, things have changed fast, the rapid dissemination of religious knowledge in the global era has made a very deep impact on the people of all these three groups. There has been conspicuous emergence of strict Muslims in all the strata.

did not succeed. Only the Masyumi was embarrassed and the party split on the question of measures to be taken to deal with the crisis. It also marked the collapse of the parliamentary democracy leading first to the imposition of martial law and then to the Guided Democracy.

The political system of the country rested on two pillars, Sukarno himself and the army. Gradually political authority passed into the hands of army and the prominent and the whole-hearted Islamic groups got isolated throughout the country. Dominant political elite in Java and in most outer island societies remained basically syncretic in religious orientation. So far as Muslim parties were concerned, they denied any essential differences in matters of faith but remained politically divided and mutually competitive some endorsing the traditional practices with some other necessary practices of Islam and some being totally modernists preferring the Arab way of Islam only. The secular nationalist leaders while paying due respect to symbols of Islam, insisted on keeping religion and politics separate.

In 1965-66 the Islamic parties had played an important role in crushing the Communists (Partai Komunis Indonesia) of Indonesian Communist Party in their coup attempt and hoped to gain a legitimate place on terms of quid pro quo in the post-Sukarno "New Order" regime of Suharto. The Islamic parties were deeply interested in helping the Armed Forces in weeding out the communists and their families and other relatives. Most of those who were left got converted to Christianity, Hinduism or Buddhism on mass scale later. These Muslims killed Muslims in the name of jihad as they considered communists as kafirs. However, the internal interests of the Islamic leaders replaced the vacuum left by the communists. This ploy did not yield much as few Muslim leaders would have wished. The long struggles and sacrifices of those Muslim leaders who were involved in the 1965 massacres of the communists went in vain as military backed Suharto showed them a narrow footpath and asked them not to walk united but separately. The result was obvious, Masyumi lost its popularity. Its rivals the NU and PSII were encouraged, which were more pliable and responsive to secular approach.33

Suharto’s policy towards Islam was based largely on the views of the orientalist Islamologists Snouck Hurgronje who was for encouraging religious activities but at the same time proscribing the attempts of religious parties to develop a powerful political base. In practice, it was similar to the approach of Sukarno who had created fissions in Muslim unity by extending patronage to NU, allowing non-political Muhammadiyah and banning Masyumi.

Suharto caused further damage to Masyumi by making a partial accommodation for the Masyumi. He refused the demand for its rehabilitation. However, he allowed some of its leaders to participate in a new Islamic party formed in 1968. At the same time his military regime was watching closely that Masyumi leaders could not acquire important positions. Therefore, preference was given to Muhammadiyah, which was prepared to co-operate with Suharto’s policy.

Among them only nine political parties and one new mass organization participated in the 1971 General Election. The new party was Golongan Karya or Functional Groups usually abbreviated into Golkar representing people from all classes. The executive of Golkar was in the hands of senior army officers, with Lieutenant-General Sukowati as chairman during the election period.

The parties contesting the election were:

1. **Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)**, the national party was once associated with former President Sukarno in the colonial period;
2. **Nahdatul Ulama (NU)**, comprising orthodox Islamic scholars with their mass support;\(^{35}\)
3. **Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII)**, a small Islamic Party with socialist tendencies which later was divided into two distinct groups.
4. **Perti**, a small orthodox party with basic support in Sumatra;
5. **Partai Muslimmin Indonesia (Parmusi)**, considered as the successor of the banned Masyumi party;
6. **Partai Katolik**, the official Roman Catholic Party of Indonesia;

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\(^{34}\) Golkar (Golongan Karya) the Functional Group. They had a Joint Secretariat (Sekretaria Bersama) under the guidance of the Army officers during the Suharto period. The functional groups, a provision of the 1945 constitution, came into being after the return to the Constitution of 1945 had been decreed by Sukarno in July 1959. The representatives of professional and regional groups were expected to supplement the party system, a importance which was gradually and systematically reduced.  

\(^{35}\) See Gatra, November 1991
7. *Partai Krsten* Indonesia (Parkindo), the party of Indonesian Protestants;  
8. *Partai Murba*, usually called 'Trotskyist' because it was ideologically influenced by the late Tan Malaka, a prominent anti-PKI communist; and  
9. *Ikatan Penduduk Kemerdekan Indonesia* (IPKI), the League for Upholding Indonesian Independence, some times associated with veterans of the Indonesian army.

During the election campaign from April to July 1971, these political parties were forbidden to criticize the government's policy and at the same time a series of other prohibitions were introduced which were totally against the democratic norms. The arrest of the prominent leaders of NU and Parmusi for being involved in the activities of the banned PKI gave the opportunity to the Golkar to mobilize the support of the people. The official result are shown below (announced on 8 August 1971, without the nine seats representing West Irian that was still to be contested at that time)
Table: 2 (A)
The 1971 Parliamentary Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Golkar</td>
<td>34,348,673</td>
<td>62.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. PDI</td>
<td>(5,516,894)</td>
<td>(10.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. PNI</td>
<td>3,793,266</td>
<td>6.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Parkindo</td>
<td>733,359</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Partai Murba</td>
<td>48,126</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. IPKI</td>
<td>388,403</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Partai Katolik</td>
<td>603,740</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PPP</td>
<td>(14,833,942)</td>
<td>(27.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. NU</td>
<td>10,213,650</td>
<td>18.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. PARMUSI</td>
<td>2,930,746</td>
<td>5.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. PSI</td>
<td>1,308,237</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. PERTI</td>
<td>381,309</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DPR Seats, 1971 (B)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>No</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Partai Katolik</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>PSII</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>NU</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Parmusi</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Parkindo</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Murba</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Perti</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>IPKI</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

351+9 (West Irian Jaya)\(^36\)

Total 360

\(^36\) The Sovereignty of the People rests with the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Hence, the President is accountable to the MPR. The legislative power is vested in the Dewan Parwakilan Rakyat (DPR) House of representatives. The present Constitution of Indonesia is the "Constitution of 1945" (Undang Undan Dasar 1945). This constitution was drawn up in August 1945 shortly after the proclamation of Indonesian independence, but was abolished as a result of the Round Table Conference with Dutch held at the Hague at the end of 1949. It was re-promulgated by former President Sukarno on 5 July 1959 and became the political framework of the ensuing regime of Guided Democracy. The 1945 Constitution is still maintained as Guided Democracy. The 1945 Constitution was maintained under the New Order regime of Suharto.
The nine seats of West Irian Jaya ultimately went to Golkar.\textsuperscript{37}

In this constitution supreme state power is vested in the \textit{Majelis Permusyaratan Rakyat} or MPR\textsuperscript{38} (People's Consultative Assembly). The MPR determines the general orientation of state policy, and elects the President and Vice President for a period of 5 years and he is answerable to the MPR. He has the obligation of implementing MPR's decisions. Thus the position of the President is subordinate to that of the MPR. In the execution of the government policy, power and responsibility are concentrated in the President. In exercising his duty the President is assisted by a Vice-President.\textsuperscript{39}

The surprises of the election results could be seen in the severe setback experienced by the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), that obtained only about 7 per cent of the total votes or 20 seats out of the elected 360 in the new Parliament. In comparison Golkar won 227 seats, or nearly two thirds of the elected seats in the legislative body. The major cause of the defeat of the PNI was that the President Suharto had given proof of his benevolent attitude towards the restructured Nationalist party the purpose of balancing the influence of the Islamic parties in the future Parliament.\textsuperscript{40}

Muslim organizations supported the establishment of the New Order and many took an active part in the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI. The Muslim community expected to benefit from its support for the army's seizer of power, but instead the political and social role of Islam was further restricted. The Muslim Masyumi party, banned by Sukarno for its alleged involvement in the regional and religious

\textsuperscript{37} Kompas, Jakarta, 29 October 1971

\textsuperscript{38} The elections were for 425 seats in the People's Representative Assembly (\textit{Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat}, DPR). This is Indonesia's parliament, the body responsible for making laws. The DPR also contains 75 appointed Armed Forces (Abri) representatives. Abri members do not vote in the election. Indonesia's super-parliament, the People's Deliberative Assembly \textit{Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat}, MPR) consists of 500 members of the DPR, together with another 500 representatives of regional parties and 'functional group' representatives, who are effectively appointed by the President. This body is Indonesia's supreme law-making institution. It meets every five years. Its two chief functions are to elect a President and Vice-President, and to enact the Broad Outlines of State Policy (\textit{Garis Besar Haluan Negara}, GBHN).


\textsuperscript{40} Sundhaussen, "Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters with democracy", Adamantine Press Limited, London: 1974, pp. 12-21
rebellion of the 1950s, was not rehabilitated. In 1973, the existing Muslim parties were forced to merge into a federation, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), which became manipulative and controlled the government.

After the 1971 General Election, Suharto slowly started tightening the political activities of the Islamic groups throughout the country. There has been a deep-rooted antagonism between the Indonesian army and the political Islam. Armed conflicts between Muslims and the army have occurred in many parts of Indonesia, especially in West Java, Aceh, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. However, as stressed by Zifrdaus\(^4\), the major Muslim organizations have never clashed with the army.

The main Muslim organization, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah have on the whole been very accommodative towards the government as they had certain compulsions to do so. The NU is the main traditionalist organization while the reformist or modernist wing of Indonesian Islam is represented by Muhammadiyah\(^2\). The differences between the two organizations have over the time narrowed considerably. As noted by Tamara:\(^3\)

"The modernists and the traditionalists have more similarities than differences. This point is stressed by the fact that the highly reformist and independent-minded Abdurrahman Wahid is head of the NU."

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\(^1\) Adnan Zifradaus, "Islamic Religion: Yes, Islamic (Political) Ideology: No", Islam and the Strategy in Indonesia, (1990) Clypton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University (Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No.22

\(^2\) Some Indonesians decided to change their way of religion to avoid mixed practices, and to follow Islam the way that the rest of the world did. These people are sometimes called "modernists", although they often call for a return to old traditions. People who choose to stick to the way Islam is practiced in places like rural Java are sometimes called "traditionalists". In Indonesian history, these differences have come to the surface from time to time. The "Padri War" (see the details in chapter II) in the Minangkabau region of Sumatra during the 1820s and 1830s was partly a conflict between "reformers" who wanted a more standard Islam and the traditional leaders who did not want to change. In Aceh in 1945, the traditional leaders were viewed as being pro-Dutch, and were swept away by pro-independence feelings as well as the idea of Islamic reform.

Like many countries Indonesia has experienced Islamic revival. Basically this is a reaction to swift social changes in the country. One explanation is that many Muslims lost their economic and political power under the early New Order as foreign dominant capital destroyed traditional industries (batik, and textile etc).

**Table: 3**

*The 1977 Parliamentary Election*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Golkar</td>
<td>39,750,096</td>
<td>62.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. PDI</td>
<td>5,504,751</td>
<td>8.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. PPP</td>
<td>18,743,491</td>
<td>29.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table: 4**

*The 1982 Parliamentary Election*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Golkar</td>
<td>483,347,24</td>
<td>64.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PDI</td>
<td>5,919,702</td>
<td>7.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. PPP</td>
<td>20,871,880</td>
<td>27.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table: 5
The 1987 Parliamentary Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Golkar</td>
<td>62,783,680</td>
<td>73.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. PDI</td>
<td>9,324,708</td>
<td>10.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. PPP</td>
<td>13,701,428</td>
<td>15.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Muslim Parties showed tremendous resilience by avoiding a head-on clash with government and participated in the elections held under the 'New Order' even though the conduct of the electoral process was heavily weighted in favor of the ruling party Golkar. The vote for these parties never reached more than 44 per cent which Muslim party had achieved in 1955 general election. It remained substantial, ranging between 27 to 29 per cent, between 1971 and 1982.

Until 1970s, the New Order Government under Suharto adopted overall Islamic strategy aimed at dragging political Islam into an open political contest. The modernist Muslim groups were at first allowed to form a new party, the Partai Muslim Indonesia, but government's efforts to control the selection of leaders at local and national levels made this party a mere shadow of its precursor, the Masyumi. The NU, which had been spared government crackdowns against parties in the past, suffered a major setback in 1972 when it was deprived of its control over the Ministry of Religion.

Once it had consolidated its power, the New Order moved to increase bureaucratic leverage over Islam. K. H. Wahid Hasim was replaced with Muhti Ali as head of the Ministry of Religion. Ali was both a modernist and a strong accommodationist as far as relations with the state were concerned. However, while limiting the political power of

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Islam, the military managers were careful not to offend Muslim sensibilities too much. For example, in 1973, army leaders agreed to amend a draft law in marriage in deference to the objections of Muslims that it ignored Islamic laws and courts. This compromise enabled the government to avoid having to defend itself on two fronts at a time when student demonstrations on secular issues led to mob violence in Jakarta in 1974.

In 1979, further relief was provided to the protagonists of Islam, when certain mystical streams of belief, popular among Java's syncretic Muslim majority but anathema to devoutly orthodox Muslims, were not given the status of a major new creed in the Ministry of Religion. They were declared mere folkways and were assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture. This survey, thus, leads to the conclusion that while there is an Islamic challenge to the Indonesian government, it is not at all threatening. Current developments suggest that the present relationship between the state and religion is unlikely to undergo a drastic change.

The unpopularity of the PPP has shown that it reduced its seats to 16 per cent in 1987 after winning a stable 27-29 per cent in the previous three elections. It can be traced to following factors:

1. The first factor has its origins in 1984, when the NU, the largest of the four Muslim parties that fused into PPP in 1973, decided at its annual congress in Situbondo, East Java, to re-adopt its 1926 spirit (Khittah). This decision was a direct result of PPP General Chairman Jaelani Naro's move to consolidate his hold on the party leadership by squeezing the NU into a corner. Seemingly, this decision meant a crippling blow to the PPP, but in practice, pesantrens and Kyai affiliated with the NU remained active in supporting and representing the PPP.

2. The second factor has to do with the PPP's 1985 decision to accept Pancasila as its constitutional ideology (asas tunggal). One consequence of this decision was that the PPP's electoral symbol changed in 1987 from the Ka'abah in Mecca to a five star. To may PPP supporters, especially the older traditionalists, this change was symbolic of the party's deviation from its original spirit.
3. The third factor (and most temporary in nature) was the unpopular leadership of Naro, the party’s General Chairman since 1977.

One of the changes made by the PPP since 1987 was the total ouster of Naro along with his family and supporters from the leadership and the candidate list. In addition, the NU returned to a position more in line which was better than active ‘deflation’. Given that the PPP’s acceptance of the asas tunggal seems permanent, this leadership change and the change in NU’s attitude are the bases for the PPP’s hopes to recapture some of its former 27-29 per cent share of votes.46 The unpopularity of PPP had many factors: during the early 1980s, feelings of discontent started increasing among Muslims as the regime pressurized all the parties by setting a legal framework to require all parties and organizations to accept the state ideology of Pancasila as their base (asas tunggal). This issue basically attacked the core ideology of the PPP. Leaders of the PPP such as Jaelani Naro and the NU’s Idham Chalid were opportunists and had maintained very cordial relationship with military intelligence, which was monitoring and steering the Muslim federation. Although they did not enjoy majority support, they manoeuvred to get into key positions within the party. With the help of material support from the military authorities, they were well placed to buy loyalty from local kyais.

Things became more confused as the government party Golkar launched its own scheme to attract ulama into its ranks. It set up its own federation, the Federation for the Advancement of Islamic education (GUPPI), to compete with the PPP. In an attempt to contain Muslim assertiveness, Golkar went into the 1977 elections projecting a double image, a santri image as well as an abangan image. Many ulamas were attracted by material benefits; the regime was still in a position to dispense large sum of money from the earnings of oil exports. Mosques and pesantrens received huge donations to improve their buildings and facilities, provided they joined the ranks of the government-friendly

Muslims groupings. Local military commanders also contributed money to build new mosques in order to create good relations with local Muslims. The government also sent civil servants on government funded trips to Mecca to acquire the prestigious title of Haji. Gradually the government also took a more active role in various international Muslims conferences, sending government officials to participate instead of letting the traditional Muslim organization send their own chosen envoys.

Political Islam in Indonesia consists of fundamentalists who believe that violence is necessary to achieve their goal of establishing an Islamic State and it is also justified in eliminating un-Islamic elements in the existing state and society. Muslim fundamentalists are generally drawn from the modernists rather than traditionalist stream and see themselves as continuing the struggle pioneered by the Dar-ul-Islam and part of the Masyumi. In the 1990s, a Muslim middle class regained economic and political

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47 Promotion of religions by Ministry of Religious Affairs
At the end of 1994, the number of mosques was 584,017 mosques. There was special arrangement for the Haj pilgrimage, the number of Haj pilgrims totaled 123,000, which was an increase of 18,000 or 17% over the previous year. The arrangements included: improvement of procedures as well preparation in the area of origin before departure, the itinerary, practice of pilgrimage rituals in Mecca until the devotee return to their native place. In order to support the improvement of Haj Pilgrimage services, the accomplishment as well as rehabilitation of 5 Haj dormitories in Bekasi (West Java), Padang (West Sumatra), Jambi (Jambi), Palembang (South Sumatra) and Ambon (Maluku) had been conducted during fiscal year 1993/94. Besides, upgrading for 200 Haj pilgrimage officers and the supply of 30 practical Haj ritual equipment were also implemented.

Judiciary and Religious law: Rehabilitation and expansion of 43 religious court buildings, education for 248 religious judge candidates as well as 50 senior religious judges and upgrading for 230 confiscators were implemented. Besides, the counseling of religious judiciary laws for 12 thousand government’s apparatus and community’s prominent leaders and the supply of 22 thousand library books and Islamic law compilation were undertaken. In the framework of formulating the principal policies in the development of the religious sector, religious research has been continuously carried out. Those research activities cover the study on religious anticipation against modernization’s negative effects, formation of religious map, the study on religious guidance, research on old manuscripts of Islam and evaluation of D2 equalization program. Besides, the studies on performance development of children’s life as well as children’s development through Islamic education institution has been also conducted. In order to improve researchers’ quality, training for 20 religious researchers was organized. During Repelita V, the studies on 15 titles and the training for 80 religious researchers had been successfully executed.

See also <http://www.thejakartapost.com>, May 14, 2002

influence and this process was manifested in the formation of ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia) the Association of Muslim Intellectuals.

In the wake of the general Islamic revival, and as a reaction against the conservative accommodating tendency of the established Muslim organizations, a new generation of Muslim activists emerged. These activists played an active role in the student movements of 1974 and 1978, and the campaign against compulsory Pancasila indoctrination. The new Muslim groups have also cooperated with non-Muslim democratic groups. Unlike the colonial Java of the 19th century, it is the religious teachers and preachers at the base who, being independent from the government, are becoming the leaders of underground resistance. This is overstating the case, as many Muslim leaders are conservative and do not oppose the regime. Nevertheless, sections of the Muslim community do play an important role in their opposition to the New Order. This is partly explained by the fact that the Muslim community has been less vulnerable to the government's restriction on the political participation and expression through political parties, mass organizations, and the press than other groups relying primarily on some formal political organizations. The Muslim community retained its ideology and traditional structures centered on the mosques and religious schools despite the restrictions imposed on their "modern" organizations.


Table: 6
The 1992 Parliamentary Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No of Seats</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Golkar</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>68.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PPP</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. PDI</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7
The 1997 Parliamentary Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No of Seats</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Golkar</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>74.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. PPP</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>22.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. PDI</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indonesia held so far a truly democratic parliamentary elections since 1955. The elections were critical to a nation crippled by the Asian economic crisis and ethnic and sectarian violence. The PDI-P party, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, won the most seats in the election but was unable to get the majority.

Table: 8
June 1999 Election Results 53

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>No. Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Megawati Sukarnoputri)</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>37.4153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Golongan Karya Golkar</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>20.9120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa National Awakening Party (Aburrahman Wahid)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>17.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan United Development Party</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional National Mandate Party (Amien Rais)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang Crescent Star Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan Justice Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nahdlatul Umat</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahdlatul Umat Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Justice and Unity Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa Democratic Love the Nation Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>(11) 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Armed Forces (appointed seats)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Seats in the Parliament</td>
<td>462</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Indonesian election of June 1999 was prelude to the democratic set up of the country. Though the unorganized electioneering process yielded the result very late affecting thus

53 See the web-site <www.hebatindo.com/inopages/Elect99_eng.htm> 1999 Indonesian Election - Pemilu Indonesia 1999
the whole process of the electing the President and so on. Megawati Sukarnoputri took first place with 37.4 per cent, well short of a majority. Other leading parties were Golkar, the party of the New Order, the parties led by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Amien Rais, and the United Development Party. The President Aburrahman Wahid was selected by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in November of same year. The MPR is made up of the Parliament and regional and social group representatives. The main Presidential contenders were Megawati, President Habibie, Gus Dur and the chief of the armed forces (TNI), General Wiranto. Winning TNI's support was still crucial for any aspiring President of Indonesia. TNI has been more supportive of Megawati than Habibie and Gus Dur. Amien Rais had been attempting to build a bloc of support to balance Megawati and Habibie. If Megawati could not become President before Gus Dur then it was because she was financially and resource wise not equal to her other rivals. Habibie had lost much of his remaining support because of scandals in the banking industry and events in East Timor. There were threats of mass upsurge in support of Megawati if she was not made the President and the same time there was demonstration from the hard-line Muslim that a woman will not be the President of Indonesia.\(^{54}\)

There was an urgent need to revive Indonesia's political institutions because they were emptied of their power by the Suharto regime. Now Indonesia had a parliament elected by the people, a new working relationship between the legislature and the executive had to be established. Indonesia's system of government is basically Presidential, but it has features of parliamentary government which, could lead to disagreements and deadlock between three contending centres of authority. The possibility of military intervention was also mounting but the enthusiastic participation of general mass in the election could not let them to stem in.

The events following the East Timor referendum made clear the main features of the continuing political crisis in Indonesia and the pressing requirement for reform. As the incumbent President with little legitimacy, just like a titular authority, it was inherently difficult for Habibie to manage the process of

\(^{54}\) The Jakarta Post, 7 July 1999, p. 1.
separating East Timor. But in his haste to gain political advantage for his presidential bid, Habibie's failure to build a coalition of support for his initiative within the military and other power centres, doomed it to a tragic result.

TNI appeared to see East Timor as a way of issuing a threat to other parts of the country, especially Aceh, that might want to separate from Indonesia. Events in East Timor showed that no major governmental decision can be made without the agreement of TNI, although it remains unclear what effects those events will have on the standing of the military in the longer term. Democracy in Indonesia will remain fragile until the country can win the loyalty of all its regions, complete the reconstruction of its political institutions and reconcile its armed forces to a withdrawal from civil politics. 55

The burst of enthusiasm for democracy after Suharto's downfall gave rise to the creation of over 200 new political parties. Of these, 48 parties were ruled eligible to contest the election according to regulations designed mainly to ensure that parties had support and organisational structures across a number of provinces. It quickly became clear, however, that no more than six or eight parties had the capacity to win significant representation in the DPR. Such expectations proved correct, with five parties winning over 90 per cent of the vote and most of the remainder received by another five or six parties. The other expectation which came to fruition was that no party would win anything approaching a majority and that negotiations and alliance-building would dominate post-election affairs (see the above table). It is well known that, as expected, the party which took first place was Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)-the party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Sukarno, leader of Indonesia's independence movement and the country's first President. With 37.4 per cent of the vote, however, PDIP's plurality is well short of the level

required to control the DPR on its own. Megawati's support is particularly strong in the important central islands of Java and Bali, but less extensive in the strongly Islamic provinces of Sumatra and in the outer islands in the east of the country. The party whose support was most difficult to predict was that of Golkar, the official party of the New Order. Golkar suffered from its association with the Suharto era, the unpopularity of President Habibie and internal factionalism which almost prevented it from naming a Presidential candidate in time for the election. However, the party retained the support of many members of the bureaucracy (who were legally obliged to support Golkar under the New Order) and still has vast funds at its disposal, thanks to official largesse during the days of Suharto. Some commentators predicted that Golkar would be obliterated by the widespread desire for change, but others thought that its resources would allow it to out-campaign its rivals. 56

In the event, Golkar performed at the higher end of expectations, coming second after PDIP and taking 20.9 per cent of the votes. Although Golkar was abandoned by most voters in Java and Bali—the heartland of the urban-centred movement for reformasi—the party managed to retain support in many of the outer islands, including large islands such as Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The party closely associated with the popular Islamic leader, Abdurrahman Wahid (usually known as Gus Dur), the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party), did not perform as well as many people had expected, at least partly because Nahdatul Ulama, the mass Islamic organisation led by Gus Dur, was not united in its support for the PKB. Although some predictions suggested PKB might rival Megawati's PDIP, the party was outpolled by Golkar and received 17.4 per cent. PKB's support is strongest in Java. Apart from Golkar, the other main survivor from the time of the New Order has been the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party) which received 10.7 per cent of the vote. Although the

56 The Jakarta Post, 10 August 1999, p. 2.
PPP was one of the three parties allowed to contest the ritualised elections under the New Order, it did become a centre of limited criticism of Suharto during the final years of his rule. The PPP combined its reputation for political independence with an appeal to some of the stricter and more doctrinal of Indonesia's Muslims and was able to win significant pockets of regional support, especially in Aceh and other parts of Sumatra. Perhaps the biggest surprise for foreign observers was the poor showing of the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party), led by the modernist Islamic leader Amien Rais. International media reportage of the events of May 1998 often exaggerated the role of Rais in leading the mass anti-Suharto movement and his continued high foreign profile led to over-optimistic estimates of his party's support. The 7.3 per cent obtained by PAN also reflected the fact that the mass Islamic organisation previously led by Amien Rais (Muhammadiyah) did not provide full support to PAN. Many Islamic voters appear to have opted to support the PPP. PAN's result has greatly reduced Amien Rais' chances as a credible presidential candidate.57

The number of votes captured by each party does not directly translate into numbers of seats in the DPR. Following the passing of the new electoral laws in early 1999, the DPR is now elected by proportional representation. Constituencies are formed on the basis of Indonesia's 27 provinces, in a manner similar to the Australian Senate.58 Unlike the Senate, however, the number of representatives for each province is not equal, but is weighed according to the population of the provinces, which vary greatly in size. Nevertheless, consideration is given to the special interests of smaller provinces by providing them with a greater number of parliamentary representatives per head of population.59 Thus the demographically and the politically dominant island of Java (with

59 Total Number of Voters (1999): 127.6 million, Voting Age: 17 years, or younger if married, Seats Contested (1999): 462 seats were contested (38 were reserved for the military), Distribution of Seats
about 110 million of Indonesia's 209 million people) has fewer representatives per head than the smaller provinces in Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Irian Jaya. Since, as indicated above, the major parties have an uneven regional distribution of support, the weighing to smaller provinces has had major implications for the parties' actual representation in the DPR. The big winners have been Golkar and the PPP, whose strength has been in the eastern islands and in Sumatra respectively. The losers, on the other hand, have been the parties with strong support in Java-Megawati's PDIP and Abdulrahman Wahid's PKB. While the PDIP's vote far exceeded the vote for Golkar (37.4 per cent to 20.9 per cent), the two parties' parliamentary representation are not far apart (154 seats to 120 seats). For the PKB the situation is far worse because although its 17.4 per cent vote was not far behind Golkar's 20.9 per cent, it has received only 51 seats to compare to Golkar's 120. The PPP won 58 seats for 10.7 per cent of votes compared to the PKB's 51 seats for 17.4 per cent votes. Three small Islamic parties which won 1.8, 1.3 and 0.9 per cent of the vote also benefited from the regional weighting by receiving 14, 6 and 6 seats respectively. (See above table –8 votes versus seats for the major parties.)

The MPR is made up of 700 members, comprising the 500 members of the DPR (including the appointed TNI members), plus 135 regional representatives and 65 social group representatives (such as labour, business, religious and women's groups). The regional representatives are chosen by the regional legislatures and the social group representatives are determined by the General Election Commission (KPU).

Both the President and the Vice-President are selected by the MPR, but candidates are not required to be members of either the MPR or the DPR. During the New Order, when Suharto's selection as President was a foregone conclusion, the MPR decision was reached by a putative consensus.

(1999): 232 seats on the island of Java, where more than 60 percent of the voters live. Another 103 are on the island of Sumatra. See also report of the Lembaga Pemelihan Umum. See Also: http://Jakarta Post\1999 Indonesian Election - Pemilu Indonesia 1999.htm

60 "Indonesia: A Pariah State?" Business Week, 27 September 1999
Chapter - II

Pan-Islamic influence on Indonesia

Map 1: Straits of Malacca (Sea Roche)

Map 2: Indonesia
This chapter will discuss stepwise dissemination of religious knowledge between the main Arab World and Indonesia. During the 1970s and 1980s, major changes occurred into the social, cultural and political behavior of the entire Islamic world. Indonesia also responded, although somewhat less promptly than other states, in the wake of a number of political constrictions it was facing. But this hindrance could not stop it altogether to be influenced by the profound impacts of the happenings of the Islamic world which found its natural manifestation in all aspects of Indonesian social ambit. The process of Pan-Islamic influence has continued and being pronounced in various modes which is becoming conspicuous day by day. However, it always faced resistance from primordial inherent traditional values. And it is in this backdrop that a struggle between mystic cultural ethos of Indonesia and modernist Islam became apparent.

**Pan-Islamism through the Ages**

Before the trade routes of Southeast Asia were established with outer world, the religious accounts of this region gave a very mixed picture. The primordial existence of its cultural linkages among the inhabitants of the whole archipelago is also responsible for its present cultural shape. When the Malacca routes were established, the first faith which disseminated into these islands was Hinduism and it changed the statesmanship of the kings and their court system which eventually transformed the Javanese, Balinese, and Sumatran societies on the Hindu pattern in its entirety.

The present religio-social shape of Indonesia reveals that the people were more tolerant and receptive to new cultural influences than the people of Indian sub-continent. The cultural history of Indonesia gives immense evidences about the people of this region accepting new faiths without exhibiting ideas ethnocentrically. The primary cause of this receptiveness towards new belief system was their scattered beliefs in different religion. The entire continent was divided into thousands of islands. The cultural communication was not homogenous, as transportation was limited among few islands only. The beliefs of the people differed from one island to another. Thus, they found themselves less assertive in identifying their own indigenous religions. Prior to Hinduism making its way
into Indonesia, the animistic nature of religions with vaguely heterogeneous code of conduct, had very limited adherents, confined to particular islands only. Hinduism found very favorable atmosphere and reigned in the hearts of people for quite a long time. However, it also brought with it its caste system, and sharply divided the society into various varnas but Islam came with its concepts of brotherhood equality. Within a span of few hundred years, it proselytized most of the inhabitants of this archipelago.

Acceleration of trade with the Arab world through Sunda and Malacca Straits pushed the dissemination of Islam further in this archipelago. It deeply influenced particularly those areas where the major trades were taking place like Aceh, Banten, Jambi etc. (See the map-1) The arrival of Portuguese produced a sharp reaction in the new trading towns where Islam had already been established. 61, 62, 63 Linked to the western Asia by trade, these states naturally identified their own cause with that of the Muslim world as a whole. Acehnese tradition asserts that this area was surrendered to the suzerainty and protection of the Ottoman Empire by a sixteenth century embassy to Constantinople. Turkish gunsmiths, cannons, and soldiers were sent to assist the Acehnese in order to counter the crusade against Portuguese. According to the Acehnese (Malay chronicles), Islam was introduced into the northern tip of Sumatra sometime around 507/1112 by an Arab missionary whose name is referred as Syech ‘Abd Allah ‘Arif. One of his disciples Syech Burhan-al Din, later carried on his missionary work as far as Pariaman down the West Coast. The date of establishment of Islam in North Sumatra is given as 601/1204 when Djoan Shah became the first Sultan.

One large Turkish cannon, together with the red Turkish flag survived from this period until modern times to remind the Acehnese that they were distant members of no-mean empire. Though these links could not be maintained, it is important to remember that the inflated picture of Turkey’s position and power which prevailed partly in nineteenth

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62 F.C. Danvers, “The Portuguese in India” London: 1844, pp. 480-534. The Turkey credited Sultan Selim -I (1512-20) with having granted vassal states to Aceh. This was probably done in 1563, when the arrival of an Acehnese embassy is recorded in the Ottoman archives: P. Voorhoeve, ‘Aceh’ Encyclopedia of Islam, New Ed. Leiden/London, 1960) 1743
century Southeast Asia derived partly from their sixteenth century connections, when Turkey was still a power for the infidels to reckon it.64

The feeling of brotherhood and universality of Islam among the stronger states in Arab world willingly extended a protectionist hand to the distant weaker states, which were newly inspired by the Islam, and seeing other Islamic states as its brethren. The feeling of oneness and responses from the bigger states to the Sultans emboldened the belief of the general mass and simultaneously provided a feeling of self-identity, which still can be seen in Acehnese. The rapid dissemination of Islam in this region however did not replace its old well established 'adat' which is the essence of Indonesian society even today. In fact, they continued to practice all the rituals of Islam with 'adat', which later gave a distinct identity to Indonesian Islam.

Despite the imposition of a number of restrictions by the Dutch authorities, a remarkable number of Indonesians made the pilgrimage to Mecca. In the last three decades of nineteenth century there were four to eight thousand per year, forming an average of about 15 per cent of the total overseas arrivals in the Haj. 65, 66 The pilgrimage was the principal source of foreign ideas in the nineteenth century Indonesia particularly those outside of Java. Apart from visiting Mecca on a Haj pilgrimage they also interacted with the people of other Islamic countries. They also interpreted the talks and speech by the leading ulamas of the Muslims world and thus they were able to establish a deep relationship with rest of the Islamic world. They also had a chance to know about their fellow pilgrims and after coming back from Mecca some of them kept contact among themselves. Some of the pilgrims also resided in Mecca for longer time in order to help their countrymen.67, 68

65 J. Vredenbregt, "The Hadji, Some of its Features and Functions in Indonesia", BKI, 1962, p. 118
67 G.H. Bousquest, La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas, p. 38-39 (Paris, 1928), There were estimated 10, 000 such residents in the 1920s through an official count in 1037 revealed only 3,113 of whom 1,400 were students.
Apart from natural dissemination of religious knowledge, representatives of puritan Islam, and Arab immigrants particularly Sayyids were instrumental in proliferating Islamic teachings in the land. During nineteenth century, a large number of Arab emigrants settled in the coastal areas in Aceh, Siak, Palembang, and Pontianak became extremely influential in these areas. There is also tangible evidence that large-scale emigration from the impoverished Hadharamaut began at the end of eighteenth century affecting Sumatra first and Java by the middle of the nineteenth century, though their number remained relatively small. Netherlands-India alone counted 20,500 people claiming to be Arab descent in 1885 and 27,000 in 1905. This emigration continued along the Malay Peninsula. The largest concentrations were in the big cities like Surabaya, central Java, Batavia, and Singapore, Palembang, Aceh, Pontianak. 69, 70, 71

Observing an increased communication between the Indonesian Muslims and Arab world, the Netherlands-Indian government started imposing a number of restrictions on the Arab nationals whom they preferred to call “foreign Orientals” or the emigrants from the Arab world. They obliged them to live in special cantonments in the main town and to apply for a pass every time they wished to leave their place of residence. Similarly, the Dutch also tried to curb the ulamas and religious activities by prescribing a huge sum of 110 guilders for a pilgrim passport to visit Mecca between 1825-1852. In 1859, the Haj pilgrims were also required to show their financial ability to make the return journey and provide for dependents at home72.

Simultaneously, the Dutch also encouraged the secular leaders of ‘Adat’ against the Muslim leadership and provided certain privileges to the former. Thus the Dutch tried to engrave a breach among the general mass on the lines of religious faith. The various anti-Islamic activities branded the Dutch in the eyes of Arabians as fanatic opponents of Islam, which reflects in a statement made by Snouck Hurgronje:

69 L.W.C. van den Berg, “Le Hadhramaut et les colonies arabs dans l’archipel Indien” (Batavia, 1986) pp. 105-120
72 Ibid
"In the Muslim daily press our government is frequently derided as the enemy of Muslims while in geographical textbooks used in Turkish and Arab Schools the Netherlands is tersely indicated as a Power unfamiliar with the principles of tolerance, under whose yoke millions of Muslims suffer."  

Reflection of Modern Arab Social Consciousness

Padri movement was a turning point in the history of Islam in Indonesia. It was the first clear evidence of the new Muslim dynamism in the nineteenth century of Southeast Asia. An important group of Muslims emerged in Minangkabau in the late nineteenth century as strict and orthodox adherents of Islam. There were three prominent Hajjis who had been influenced by the militant puritan ideology of the Wahhabis. This tradition attacked the customary interpretation as being insufficiently attentive to the letter of Islamic doctrine. Against local deviations, the revivalist traditions urged a renewed emphasis on the Arabic language (the language of revelation), the illegitimacy of local political institutions (as usurpers of God’s sovereignty), the authority of the revivalists as the sole qualified interpreters of Islam, sometimes drastic expressions of personal piety, and the revival of practices from the early period of Islam. Muhammad Ibn-Abd al-Wahab’s revivalist movement in eighteenth century Arabia was aimed precisely at ridding the Islamic heartland of the customary traditions, the un-Islamic practices that had returned to the region in the millennium after Islam was revealed.  

The current reformist thinking which was in the forms of Islamic religious, social, and political thought started disseminating from Mecca and al-Azhar towards the coastal areas of Sumatra, Java, Moluccas and Malaya by the Muslim merchants. Singapore, which has hitherto been the melting point of the Southeast Asian people, became the

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73 Snouck Hurgronje, *Nederland en de Islam*, 2nd Ed. (Leiden 1915) pp. 73-75. An antagonistic attitude of western educated Turks used to be reflected in Constantinople Newspaper, "La Turquie," in May-July 1873.

It harbored a large population of immigrants from Minangkabau, Javanese laborers in transit to and from the rubber plantations of Melayu, and other Indonesians who passed through in the course of their pilgrimage to Mecca. Dutch’s new policy for the Indonesian Haj pilgrimage made the British ruled Singapore the major port for the Indonesians pilgrims. Singapore also had a significant number of Arab and Indian Muslims communities. The Arab settlement was especially important. Many Arabs worked in Singapore as brokers arranging pilgrimage traffic. Shykh and Sayyids from Hadramaut had a very prestigious life in Southeast Asia and were respected for their religious probity. They formed a commercial elite by owning land and houses and investing in rubber plantations.

In the early part of the 19th century, a religious revival set on foothold in Sumatra. In 1803, three Sumatran hajis, returned to their native country from Mecca; they had been profoundly influenced by the currently prevailing Wahhabi reformist movement, during their stay in the holy city. They were now eager to introduce the same reforms among their fellow countrymen and also to stir up in them a sense of purer and more zealot religious life. Accordingly they began to preach the strict monotheism of the Wahhabis sect, forbade prayers to saints, drinking, smoking and gambling and all other practices contrary to Quranic ethics. They made a number of proselytes both from among their co-religionists and the heathen populations. They later declared jihad against Bataks which had conspicuous population of Dutch officers. The movement lost its original character and degenerated into a savage and bloody war of conquest. In 1821, the so called padris

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75 There were few people who were known as reformist in the Muslim world like Muhammad Abduh, Syaayid Qutub and Rashid Ridha from Azhar University Egypt, Al-Afghani, Sayyei Ahmad Jhan, Sayyid Amir ali, Muhammad Iqbal and Al Maududi of Alligarh Muslim University, and the Punjab University of India turned determinative factor in the field of modernism of Islamic world.
76 Clifford Geertz, “Islam Observed”, London, pp. 56-59. The above new thinking formulated an idea that basically pressed upon the purification of Islam by removing un-Islamic elements that was the foreign elements present in Indonesian Islam.
78 During the second half of the nineteenth century, direct contact with Mecca had become more frequent. Arab traders who came from Hadramaut started proliferating rapidly in their numbers as they found Singapore as the perfect place for their business. They also settled in Indonesia in a quite large number and started disseminating orthodox Islam resulting increment in Indonesian pilgrimage to Mecca. In 1860 the number was around 10,000, in 1926 it was 50,000. (See footnote 64 Anothony Reid)
came into conflict with the Dutch government, and it was not until 1838 that their last stronghold was taken and power broken. 80, 81, 82.

Dutch military intervention on the side of the conservative ‘adat’ chiefs in the 1820’s and 30s gradually transformed the “Padri” cause into a patriotic one, representing broader interests than the militant Puritanism with which it had began. Although the “Padris” were finally crushed militarily in 1837, their legacy was undoubtedly important in bringing Indonesian Islam closer to the that of the Western Asia which was effectively able to raise the eyebrows of the Ottoman empire against the Dutch oppressive attitude towards the Muslims.

Dutch resistance towards the ‘Padri’ cause certainly caused a feeling of patriotism in the hearts of local people and compelled them to adhere more strongly to the preaching of the ‘Padris’. However, the Dutch government finally crushed this movement militarily, 83 which gave a feeling to the people of Sumatra as Muslim brethren, which brought Indonesian Muslim closer to the Muslims of other islands as well. 84

Although B. Schrieke has denied the presence of the influence of Wahabbism among the three hajjis but during this period Wahabbism (1115-2101/1705-1787) certainly stirred the whole Islamic world particularly to the religious zealots (See the detailed foot note). 85

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82 Madjolelo and Marzoeki, R.A Kern , “Padri” The Encyclopedia of Islam , Islam III (Leiden /London , 1936) pp. 46-7, 1018.B. According to the view of Anthony Reid- Schrike’s emphatic contention that the Padris were not Wahabbis is strictly correct, in view of the paucity of communication with Arabia and the very different conditions with which reformers in Minangkabau were faced. His argument does not however, appear to destroy the orthodox view that the three Minangkabau Hajis were to some extent inspired by the examples of Wahhabis, then threatening Mecca and Medina from their base in Nejd.
83 Ibid. p. 273
85 Wahhabism/ Muwahhidun: Movement in Islam from mid-18th century, calling for a renewal of the Muslim spirit, with cleansing of the moral, and removal of all innovations to Islam (Arabic: bida). The movement has played an important role in the founding of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism is known for its conservative regulations, which made impact on all aspects of Muslims' life. It has been recognized as being in accordance with Ibn Hanball doctrine. The term 'wahhabism' is not used by them. The term they use is 'muwahhidun'. 'Wahhabism' is a term given to them by their opponents, and is now used by both
European scholars and most Arabs. The name 'wahhibims' comes from their founder Abdu al-Wahhab. The term 'muwahhidun' is Arabic, and means 'Unitarians'.

The founder was the Banfi Sinan, a branch of Tamim and was born at 'Uyaina (as written by travelers Ayainah, el-Ayenah, al-Ajenna, Ayana). He studied at Madina under Sulaiman al-Kurdi and Muhammad Hayat al-Sindi, both of whom detected heresy (ilhad). Many years of his life seem to have spent in travel. He lived four years in Basra, where he was a tutor in the house of a kadi Husain. Then he spent five years in Baghdad, where he married a wealthy woman, who died leaving him 2000 dinars a year in Kurdistan. He went to Isfahan at the commencement of Nadir Shah's 1736 here he said to have studied for four years of peripatetic philosophy; the isherakiya and the sufi system, then went to Kummafter where he became an advocate of Ibn Hanabai's school. Returning to Uayaina, where he had property, he spent eight month in retirement, and then publicly preached his doctrines, as set forth in his Kitab al Tauhid. He met with some success, but also with much opposition, and indeed from his own relations, such as his brother Sulaiman, who wrote a tract against him, and his cousin 'Abd Allah B. Husain. It appears from his correspondence that his vies attracted attentions outside Uayaina before he left the place. Different reasons are assigned for his expulsion. His dispute with his cousin led to bloodshed between Tamim clans of Yamama, in consequence of which Sulaiman b-Shamis al-Anari, prince of Hasa wrote to the governor of the place demanding that he be expelled. He departed with his family and property and was received at Dariya where the chieftain Muhammad b. Saud accepted his doctrine and undertook its defense and propagation. And since then Wahabbism started spreading all over the Muslim world.

His general aim was to do away with all innovations (bida) which were prevalent in later than the third century of Islam; thus the communities are able to acknowledge the authority of the four sunni law schools, and the six books of traditions. His written polemic and that of his followers is almost entirely aimed at the cult of saints, as exhibited in the building of mausoleums, their employment as mosques, and their visitation. The following list seems to agree with what is known as Wahhabism practice

1. All objects other than Allah are false, all who worship such are deserving of death.
2. The bulk of mankind is not monotheists, since they endeavor to win God's favor by visiting the tombs of saints; their practice therefore resembles what is recorded in the Quran of Meccan mushrikun (plural of shirk people).
3. It is polytheism (shirik) to introduce theme of Prophet, saint or angel, into a prayer.
4. It is shirik to seek intercession from anyone but Allah.
5. It is shirik to make vows to any other being.
6. It involves unbelief (kufr) to profess knowledge not based on Quran, the Sunna, or the necessary inferences of the reason.
7. It involves unbelief and heresy ((ilhad) to deny kadar in all acts.
8. It involves unbelief to interpret the Quran by tawail.

His system is said to have departed from that of Ibn Hanbal in the following matters:

1. Attendance of public salat obligatory.
2. Smoking of tobacco is forbidden and punished with stripes not exceeding forty; the shaving of the beard and the use of abusive language are to be punished at the Kadi’s discretion.
3. Alms (zakat) are to be paid on secret profits, such as those of trading, whereas Ibn Hanbal exacted them only from manifest produce.
4. The mere utterance of the Islamic creed is not sufficient to make a man a believer (Muslim), so that animals slaughtered by him are fit food. Further inquiry must be made into his charter.

The list given by S.Zwemer in the Mohammedan World of today (New York 1906, p. 106) does not differ materially from the above, but contains the following item which may be noticed: they forbid the use of the rosary, and count the names of God and their prayers on the knuckles of the hand instead. Wahhabi mosques are built with the greatest simplicity, and neither minarets nor ornamentation are allowed.

The Kawdat al-alajkar devotes a long section to a list of the practices savoring of paganism during Wahab’s time. Like to offer gifts and food to the grave or pay reverence to particular trees. It is clear that
Prof. Dawa Norbu states about the genesis of Wahhabism:

The genesis of modern Arab social consciousness with the overtones of Arab nationalism directed against the Ottoman Empire may be traced to Wahhabism which stemmed from the Arab-centric teachings of Muhammad Ibn-Abd-al Wahab (1703-91). This Islamic scholar contented that the Ottoman rule in the Arab World, where he extensively traveled, had regrettably resulted in the degeneration of Islamic culture and corruption of Islam. He quoted ‘true Islam’ with the generation of he Prophet which meant ‘the Arabs alone were the true bearers of Islamic culture and tradition. (Tibi 1981:63) 

Prof. Norbu also states the inter-civilizational rivalry between Islam and the west started taking a shape during this time. Al-Wahhab was the ideologue of the anti-Ottoman Arab nationalism, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) and his pupil Muhammad “Abduh (1849-1905) performed a similar function in the production of latter day-anti-European nationalism. Unlike al-Wahhab whose approach was scholastic-cum priestly, al-Afghani had been exposed to the western learning and therefore they considered Islam more of a civilization than a religion, standing against the West as a gladiator. Samuel P. Huntington echoes almost similar view:

“Islam is the only civilization which put the survival of the West in doubt”

In a similar tone John Esposito comments:

the two latter were not “innovations” but survival of pre-Islamic usage. He and his followers destroyed a great amount of the tombs and mosques, which had pre-Islamic symbols. The direct influence of Wahhabism was only seen in the Middle East, Central Asia and India. There is no any conspicuous evidence of its direct influence in Indonesia or Southeast Asia.

87 Ibid. pp. 135-136
"...Often found the two communities in competition, and locked at times in deadly combat, for power, land, and souls". 89

Obviously the originator of Islam was born here, grew, struggled, waged wars with anti-\textit{kafir} ideologies (and \textit{kafir} encompasses the rest of world after the Islam) and succeeded in the last. And these were the people who led Islam to the world. The tendency of leading attitude and balancing own Islam as original is certainly found among Arabs and obviously it had a deep pervasive impact on other Islamic world. Islam promulgated unity, which formed power, and encouraged Muslims to fight against the imperialists in the name of \textit{kafirs}.

Islam was only a banner from where the leader could appeal the general masses to fight against the Dutch or \textit{kafir}. During this period, a number of anti-Dutch movements tinted in religious color, took place particularly in South Sumatra, which also affected other islands as well. Banten revolt, whose main support came from the religious leaders of the Cilegon district was crushed by the Dutch troops in March 1850. In this resistance, some of the ulamas escaped to lead another crusade in Lampung which ended when the leader, Haji Wachia, was captured by a strong Dutch force in 1856. Similarly there were significant revolts in Palembang between 1848-1859, which increasingly assumed religious character, as it grew more desperate. 90, 91

Jambi, which was an autonomous state since 1833 under the Dutch sovereignty, extended help to Palembang resulting into creation of a new sultan, Taha Saffiuddin. The latter neglected to declare his allegiance when he ascended the throne in 1855, and resisted Dutch attempts two years later to negotiate a stronger treaty with him while envoys from Batavia were trying to win him round. Taha appealed to the Ottoman Sultan for document declaring Jambi to be a Turkish territory in which foreigners (Dutch) had no

90 E.S. de Klerik, "Histroy of the Netherlands East Indies", Rotterdam:1938, II, pp. 279-84. Once more the international connection is not well established. The Dutch did, however, took actions in 1957 against a rumor circulated in Sumatra by returning Hajjis, to the effect that some ulama in Mecca had received a revelation that the Prophet was weeping over the advance of Christian Powers in Asia.
91 Ibid p.273
right to interfere. Taha entrusted this letter to his emissary in Singapore with 30,000 Spanish dollars to undertake the journey to Constantinople. The emissary Sharif Ali traveled only to Mecca where he procured forged letters from the Caliph authorizing the expulsion of the Dutch from Southeast Asia. Taha’s letter did, however reach its destination: the Turkish Grand Vizier asked the Netherlands Ambassador in Turkey whether Jambi was independent and when he answered that it was part of the Netherlands-India the Vizier promised to give no reply.

In November 1958, the Dutch occupied Taha’s capital after a long resistance and installed a new Sultan who was ready to be loyal to the Dutch. Taha escaped, however after the withdrawal of the Dutch troops, he came back and resumed his position and remained de facto ruler of Jambi for more than half a century.92

However, during the same time, the famous Indian mutiny of 1857 took place in India and catalyst elements of the revolt were totally religious. The frightening impact of the Indian Mutiny convinced many Dutch statesmen that a pan-Islamic movement was the greatest danger to the region.93

The only territorial acquisition, reluctantly undertaken was the large but scarcely populated area, between Jambi and Siak on the East Coast of Sumatra. The ruler of Asahan, the most defiant of the small states in this district, made the obvious appeal to a holy war, requesting solidarity against the Dutch from his fellow rajas. It should be kept in mind here that Indonesians in Mecca also reported to have encouraged him to cooperate with Aceh in order to invoke Turkish protection to Aceh. At the same time a general calling for Muslim unity started taking place in the Malay-peninsula which reflected in a letter from the Dutch appealing to British for the unity against the rising tide of Muslim’ fanaticism.94, 95 Aceh has a long history of resistance in declaring it a sovereign state and keeping Ottoman empire on heed as protectionist. In 1873 Dutch’s

92 Ibid.
94 Ibid p. 274
3000 strong well-equipped force had to withdraw as it commander was killed in the Capital of Aceh. The Acehnese opposed the only serious attempt to the Dutch consolidation of Sumatra during this period. Aceh was wealthy, organized and well armed and fully determined to remain as a sovereign state. The Dutch force that first invaded Kota Raja (Banda Aceh) 1973 was driven out and when Kota Raja was finally defeated the following year the Sultan and much of the populace fled to the hills to begin guerilla war against the Dutch and it was formally ended in the early 1990s. This Aceh war clearly gives a strong presence of Pan-islamism and Ulama leadership.96

Aceh’s continuous resistance and fight for the sovereignty as well as to strengthen militant Islam and a long-time link with Turkey had become and remained an integral element in Acehnese patriotism. However, as the present leader of GAM still claims,97 during Sultan Ibrahim’s reign the relationship between Aceh and Turkey grew very strongly. Sultan Ibrahim kept sending his envoys to the Ottoman Empire to show his solidarity with the Muslim world as well to show the Dutch that it is linked with the larger and stronger state. For this, in 1850, Sultan Ibrahim received two firmans from the Ottoman Empire Sultan Abdul Mejid, one renewing the Turkish Protection over Aceh and other recognizing Ibrahim as the legitimate Sultan of Aceh. Later, Sultan Mahmood, and his successor also kept very cordial relationship with the Ottoman empire and till 1873 the Turkish Pasha of Jidda, as well as some of his subordinates repeatedly confirmed the Netherlands Council that Aceh was a part of the Ottoman Empire.98 99. In 1873, Dutch eventually invaded Sultan Mahmood’s Aceh and put Aceh on the front row of the Pan-Islamic discussions among Arabs. At the end, with the help of Habib Abd-al Rahman az Zahir,100 who was working as protectionist to Aceh and had long served as a means of communication between Aceh and Ottoman brought an appeal of Mamood for the Turkish Sultan Abdul Aziz who found the Aceh problems as suitably righteous to anti-West cause. He tried his best to internalize its problems by accusing Netherlands of

96 Hasjmy , A, Bunga Rampai Revolution of Aceh, Jakarta1978, pp. 137-134
98 Ibid p. 275
100 Habib Abd-al rahaman az Zahir was a Hadramaut Sayyid who first visited Aceh in 1864 after a long journey of Arabia, Egypt, India and Europe and Malaca.
illegitimate invasion. However, Sultan Aziz was not able to garner support from other colonial masters like Britain on this ground and later by tracing firmans of 1850. Habib revealed Ottoman's commitment to protect Aceh from foreign hands. Consequently the radicals of the Sultan's cabinet were then able to force a decision to appeal the Dutch not to renew its hostilities in view of Aceh's long subordination to Turkey. The frequent attacks continued from the Dutch side and the Acehnese whenever they were in problems sought the help of Ottoman's empire. The greatest danger to Dutch rule was in those areas in Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes where the traditional rulers were still capable of opposition where Islam was politically important and where the close commercial contacts with Singapore were maintained.

The tenacity of the Acehnese resistance can certainly be attributed to the efforts of the pesantren-based ulama, the most distinguished among them being Cik di Tiro. By the time guerilla warfare commenced in 1881, he had taken over the leadership from the hulubalang or uleebalang and their religious officials. The ulama constructed ramparts in the mountains, collected holy war contribution, and even succeeded in re-conquering areas, which were returned to the hulubalang. What constituted the basis of their popular appeal is the ulama who counted themselves among Arabs of Hadhramaut Sayyid descent, who provided links to the reformist and anti-colonial currents in the Islamic world. Committed to the goal of a revitalized Islamic community, they and their pupils lived in perpetual tension with the chiefs and ordinary villagers, who had other visions of their own. It was the circumstances of war that enabled the obligation, in order to unite as Muslims. But even then, what appealed most to the guerilla fighters was the vision of a heavenly existence. As Hikayat Perang Sabil (Epic of the holy War) put it, "the blessings of Allah are unlimited for those who serve, who fight perang sabil. To those he gives paradise full of light, seventy heavenly princess. More than can be counted... he gives. You will get a new face, a young one....Allah will give you wealth and life..." Several wars of resistance to the Dutch rule in the nineteenth century (such as the revolt led by Prince Diponegoro in Java and the Padri and Aceh wars in Sumatra) were Islamic.

in character as was the first mass movement of Indonesian nationalism. Though by 1903, the royal family and the hulubalang had been completely subdued but the guerilla war continued in the form of attacks by small bands under the guidance or outright leadership of ulama. These Muslims as the Acehnese called them, preferred to die a martyr's death rather than submit to the rule of kafirs. It was only in 1913 that the two main centres of resistance were broken and by that time tens of thousands of Acehnese had died in the war. The Dutch attempted to neutralize further outbreaks by propping up the hulubalang as district chiefs, in the same way that they had established collaborative ties with the Javanese priyayi chiefs religious affairs. This, however, merely deepened the divisions, aggravated by war, within the Acehnese society.

During (1876-1908) the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid in Turkey, the movement for a universal and effective Caliphate received consistent encouragement from the top. Encouraged by the enthusiastic response from the whole Islamic world an anti-European sentiment compelled them to send a mission from Mecca in 1881 to Southeast Asia making it clear that he wished to be regarded as a Pope and protector of Suni Muslims everywhere. But the mission was soon intercepted as the Dutch arrested a group of thirty jihadis in Palembang including several members of the former royal dynasty for alleged participation in a plot to murder Dutch officers who were on an official visit to Palembang.

Anti-Dutch sentiments were further propelled by the visit of Muhammad Alsagoff and the Sultan Johore to Java in 1881 to show the solidarity to its Muslim brethren. There were similar outburst in Bantam where sporadic upsurge of several religio-political movements badly disturbed the Dutch calculations. In July 1904, Sultan Abdul

102 Zuhri. K.H. Saifuddin, The History of Islamic Resurgence and Development in Indonesia, Bandung 1979, pp. 570-78
105 See the letters written to Weld to Klaouberley, Aug 27, 1881 Co-273/109, Singapore Museum, Singapore.
106 Similar letters of Weld to S. Jacob the High Officials of the Dutch Government deputed in Indonesia can also be seen, October 4, 1881, (Most Confidential) private Singapore Letter book (III) Singapore Museum.
Hamid told the Dutch Representatives at his court that he wished to appeal personally to the Dutch Queen on behalf of Indonesian Muslims as he had been receiving frequent letters from Indonesian Hajis. The Sultan had received a special petition from a chief; not far from Singapore with a name like Tachar who alleged that several mosques have been destroyed and several Muslims were massacred by the Dutch forces. However, when the Dutch politely replied that this was none of the Sultan’s business, he drew an analogy with the Pope’s frequent representation on behalf of Catholics in Syria.

Muslims of Indonesia had no accurate idea about the Ottoman’s power to deal with the colonial masters particularly those of Europeans. However, Snouck Hurgronje repeatedly kept warning the Dutch government about controlling the pan-Islamic influence on Indonesian society. He suggested that the government should define a religious sphere, notably including the Hajji in which the strictest neutrality and tolerance would be maintained. On the other hand it should abandon its qualms about crushing any religious leader ruthlessly, like those in Aceh, who encouraged rebellion or allegiance to a foreign power. On the positive side, Hurgronje pressed for more western education to establish a fruitful bond between the European and Asian subjects of Holland on the line of modern Dutch culture.  

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Islam started appearing in all the social aspects of the life of the people. The reappearance of the agrarian unrest, centered on local ulama, was only one aspect of the political ferment of the early 20th century. Far more important and spectacular were urban developments. In the first place, European and Western-influenced Indonesians took the lead in new political movements partly

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108 Bantam was also a centre of mercantile emporium and the meeting points of Muslims. Conquered by force in 1862 and again after a revolt in 1751, the inhabitants of the northern coastal plain in particular were even prone to express their discontent over miserable economic conditions by revolting under religious leadership. The minor outbreak of 1881 was one of several revolts, marking a gradual rise in tension from the preaching of Haji Abdul Karim in 1872, and the activity of the Naqsbandiyah-tariqa, to the violent climax of July 1888, when all the European in Tjilegon, including an Assistant-Resident of Serang, were assassinated. Most of the leaders of the revolt were hajjis, one of them a son of Haji Wachia. The effect of the Tjilegon affair on contemporary Dutch opinion was considerable; it cost not only the lives of a small group of Europeans established there but also normal working of the intelligence of a much more important number of Europeans in the Indies”


based on associationist ideas. Secondly, a variegated group of leaders, some of them western-educated, gave birth to an Indonesian party in which the Islamic elements played a significant role. The party succeeded for some years in welding rural unrest into a mass movement under urban leadership unprecedented in the history of Indonesian Islam.

Side by side with these political developments, and to some extent overlapping them, an urban Islamic renaissance was taking place whose evolutionary growth was to outlast the political storms of the early decades of the century, leaving a lasting imprint of Indonesian Islam on the colonial rule. Fundamentally, this renaissance affected both the political and religious aspects of Islam. The Indonesian Muslims, whether they chose political or socio-religious organizations, were influenced by identical currents in the Islamic world. Since the outset, political actions took the limelight and, Islamic political groups remained divided for years. Thus the movements towards granting more power to Indonesians which accelerated with the establishment of the Volksraad or people's Council in 1918, meant a weakening of the regal ideals associated with the traditional Muslim rulers and the encouragement of more popular forms of Islamic political power.¹¹¹

Upon the implementation of Hurgronje, the Dutch made a distinction between Islam as a religion and Islam as a political militancy. Anti-Dutch political action was ruthlessly suppressed. Thus, while Islamic religious opposition did not shake Dutch rule, Islam became more deeply rooted in Indonesian society.

While Islamic kyai and peasant resistance in the traditional structures of the Indonesian society, Indonesian nationalism had its origins in the late nineteenth century reaction of the priyayi aristocracy and aristocratic privileges was a regressive revival of local court cultures.¹¹²

An Islamic organization called Muhammadiyah, originated by al-Afghani, made a pervasive impact in the other Muslim world. Muhammadiyah attacked the un-Islamic

traditions, which were originally linked with their own soil in the other Islamic countries.¹¹³

In 1912, an Islamic reformist organization, called Muhammadiyah, was founded. This was the Indonesian expression of the Modernist movement in Islam, launched in the 19th century by Muhammad al-Afghani in Persia and Muhammad Abduh in Egypt, whose aim was to strengthen Islam so that it could face the onslaught of the west by assimilating its knowledge. To do so, it rejected the various schools of Islamic interpretation which had accumulated over the centuries and based itself directly on the two holy books, the Koran and the Hadith or Tradition.

The significance of Muhammadiyah, and Islamic modernism in general, is not to be underestimated. Snouck Hurgronje, the eminent Dutch Islamicist and Indies Government advisor, had rejected Islam as a viable re-interrogator of Indonesian society, on the grounds that this would condemn the country to medieval sterility. He evidently failed to recognize the possibility of Islam modernizing itself from within, even though at the time he was writing (late nineteenth century), the Modernist movement was well established. And it is to the Muhammadiyah that the Islamic community in Indonesia owes many of its most prominent leaders, though the movement kept itself clear of politics.

The Muhammadiyah was part of the process of readjustment of the Muslims of Indonesia to the changes brought about by the European liberalism. And this in turn was an echo of the acceptance of Islam into the archipelago in the sixteenth century. Wherever the Portuguese went, they found that Islam had just preceded them. It would seem that, threatened with the disruption of their society by these aggressive westerners, Indonesians turned for help to another social order which, though also new, nevertheless was more hospitable to their own (in permitting many of their traditional beliefs and practices) and which, being opposed to their enemy, was their friend.

This reliance on Islam as a symbol of opposition to the west, and even as a source of support to oppose it, remained a constant theme in the Indonesian history. As late as the

closing years of last century, when the Acehnese were resisting Dutch control, they
turned for help to the sultan of Turkey as caliph of Islam. They learnt what everyone else
already knew, that the Muslim states were now impotent against the west.

Those who bore Islam to Southeast Asia were traders from Gujarat in Northwest India,
who were naturally sympathetic to mysticism they found in Java. The religion was
embraced, initially, by the coastal states who saw their commerce threatened by first the
Portuguese and then the Dutch. They found in their new faith a basis for alliance with the
Muslim traders and so a means of withstanding Christian depredations. The strength thus
acquired made them dangerous to the inland kingdoms, so that these too eventually
amalgamated Islam with their Hindu-Buddhism cult. But their concerns were other than
the trade and henceforth not fundamentally attached to the Islam of Southeast Asia.

This division of interest persisted under Dutch rule and continued to survive till date.
Broadly speaking, the people on the northern coast of Java and the trading communities
of the other islands are more devoted to Islam than are the inland Javanese. Similarly,
trading communities are more likely to identify themselves with Islam than those who
work in the fields or serve the state. The economics of religion explains both the
phenomena. Acceptance of Islam had largely been an act of state on the principle of *cuius
regio, religio*.

The ruling houses remained devoted to their Javanese way of life and its
considerable infusion of Hindu-Buddhism. So the followers of Islam had often been
adherent rather than converts, and the religion became simply another layer of belief laid
on the previous skins of animism and Hindu-Buddhist.

Javanese culture and social structure has no room for the merchant class. Even in the
early part of this century a rich trader would take precedence after the lowliest clerk in
the local administration at official ceremonies. But whilst discouraging commerce,
Javanese social structure offered no means of social ascent for poor and the promotion of
able young men-depended on the strength of their right arm, or the favor of the ruler.
With the imposition of the Dutch control, both of these alternatives were closed. Dutch
superiority in organization made short shrift of any revolt, while the nobility became a
loyal member of the establishment, particularly after the Java war of 1830. The Dutch on
their side reserved the responsibilities of subordinate government almost exclusively for the nobility. *La carriere ouverte aux talents* could not be the colonial dispensation.

Commerce, therefore, increasingly became a means of social mobility, but since it was outside the pale of Javanese values, they offered the trader neither a guide to life nor a necessary esteem. Thus ever shrinking space within their own cultural ambit compelled this class to embrace Islam. This may seem paradoxical, considering that some 95 per cent of Indonesians profess the religion. But for most this is simply the compliment that apathy pays to fervour. And just as nominal Catholics in France may be violently anticlerical, so many Muslims in Java fulminate against their religion.

However, if in France Catholicism has been identified with the establishment, in Indonesia the reverse is the case for Islam. In the first place, it emphasizes the equality of all believers. Unlike the hierarchies of Christians any believer can lead prayers in the mosque. The practice of equality does—not extend beyond but it serves as an ever-present counterpoise to the inequalities which naturally proliferate in any society. Thus Islam was always available to support the poor and oppressed, and it is perhaps significant that the more and fervent adherents were to be found not among the Javanese nobility but among the commoners too.

Another relevant characteristic of Islam here is opposition to rule of the faithful by unbelievers. When the nobility (and the mosque officials who were often their relatives) turned to serve the Dutch, they seemed faithful to be denying their religion. The Dutch were able to subdue the Acehnese rebellion after thirty years only by following Snouk Hurgronje's advice to bear down heavily on the religious leaders but favor the traditional elite, and not impede in any way the practice of religion, while firmly suppressing all attempts at revolt.

In brief, the social organization of Islam in Indonesia rested on two structures headed by the official, consisted of the mosque functionaries, headed by the pengulu in each regency. He was often, in Java, a relative of the regent or local native head and, perhaps partly for that reason, was usually loyal to the Dutch. This structure was quasi
bureaucratic, in that holders of office had relatively clearly defined areas of responsibility, ranks, grades and emoluments.

Parallel with this structure was the loose, more informal one of the Kyai and the ulama with somewhat amorphous norms of recruitment. Kyai were simply men who acquired a reputation for holiness, which often meant miraculous powers, while ulama were those who had a reputation for being learned in Islamic law. In neither case, their interests were linked to the establishment - the one looked out of this world and the other out of Indonesia for his inspiration. Together, they provided latent spores of resistance throughout colonial rule.

Organizations and Movements

It was expected, therefore, that the first mass political party should adopt Islam as its banner. Originally, an association called Sarekat Dagang Islam (Society of Muslim traders) was formed in 1911 as a means of mutual protection by Javanese and Arab traders in Central Java against the encroachments of the Chinese. Within a year, however, its original aim had been overwhelmed by wider ambitions. In 1912, it re-emerged as the Sarekat Islam (Muslim Association), with a nobleman called Raden Umar Sayed Tjokroaminoto as its leader. It was to become one of the most important Indonesian associations of the early twentieth century due to its considerable determination to keep it as an all-embracing Indonesia association. The Sarekat took the commercial, social and religious advancement of Indonesians as its object. The leaders of the Sarekat looked on the world through western eyes despite having a Javanese origin. It was hardly surprising that a bulk of Sarekat leadership came from lesser nobility and middle income group families rather than from the highly educated Javanese class. But it is doubtful if the masses that followed them saw things in the same light.

The Sarekat grew rapidly and, despite the western orientation of its leaders, its members mainly came from rural areas. The magnet that drew them was of course religion. As the news of Sarekat spread through the villages, preparations for forming a branch were usually laid by the local religious teacher or official. The actual inauguration of the branch was accompanied by secret oaths, pledges and rituals of religious nature, and by
semi-religious mystical practices such as the selling of charms promising invulnerability or a special favor. Of course, those who joined were conferred with a sense of belonging to the elect and, most importantly, to a group which cared them most. This sense had filled the social vacuum created in their lives by progressive colonial policies. Thus, the structure of the Sarekat, with its topmost branches in western culture and its roots in Islam and animism, became the most legitimate forum to which rest of other Indonesian associations owed their survival.

The Sarekat conceived its duties in terms of aggregation and appropriation of grievances of the Indonesian people in order to bring multifaceted improvement in their lives. But, unlike political associations elsewhere, it was not confined to act as mere a postbox but actively bestirred it to discover discontents and even to suggest them where they were lacking. However, in the course of time the collection of complaints and putting blame on likely superficial sources for them, became the principal objective of Sarekat. This activity, of course, encouraged its growth, since the people soon recognized that their complaints were more likely to be heard by Sarekat Officials than by the local administrator who was hemmed in by the official regulations. Thus it is hardly surprising that the Sarekat grew to be the largest Indonesian associations although, size did not mean strength on account of several factors. First, its membership was frantic as anyone could easily get its membership by paying a nominal fee and no further contributions were required, though of course appreciated.

Like its organizational structure, its unrestrained membership was also an obvious source of weakness. In 1913, the year of Sneevliet's arrival, the then governor general, Idenburg, had refused to give it a national Character, on the grounds that it had not yet demonstrated sufficient organizational and financial strength. However, he allowed the local associations to exist autonomously and the central leadership at Surabaya, East Java, to act as an information center, until requirements were met. The association accordingly took this form, and when three years later the governor general decided to recognize the movement nationally, it was too late to change. In consequence, the Central Sarekat Islam had no power to discipline the branches and any of these could
propagate its views through the association without any hindrance. As we shall see, Sneevliet and his friends were not slow to take advantage of this situation.¹¹⁴

Thus, in the course of time, even though the dissemination of religious knowledge between Indonesian Muslims and other Pan-Islamic countries increased, Indonesian Islam remained unchanged. However, there was fear of the submergence of different un-Islamic traditions and rituals during the freedom struggle when certain Islamic organizations like Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah came forward to unite Muslims against the Dutch colonial rule by announcing certain objectives:

1. Social and religious reforms of the Muslim community.
2. To emancipate them from un-Islamic beliefs and various taboos.
3. Presentation of Quranic teachings in such a way that they could help in solving contemporary social problems.
4. To establish an education system based on Islamic principles and expansion of education.
5. To teach modern sciences along with the revival of Islamic sciences and their development.
6. To establish institutions for the purpose of social, religious and educational reform.
7. To protect the rights of women and bring them to the same status as men in terms of education.

The above mentioned objectives were agreed upon as the main principle of Muhammadiyah on 18 November 1912. In uniting the Muslim community, the major reason was to enhance their economic conditions against the Chinese trading community who were the colonial ally of the Dutch.

At the advent of a new millenium, the overall outlook of Islam in Indonesia is still different from the rest of the Pan-Islamic states. The discourses between traditionalist and

modernist Muslims in Indonesia so far have not been able to take a definite common shape to further their ideology in order to see Indonesia as a theocratic state. In retrospect, Indonesia never produced a natural orthodox organization to assert a claim for a theocratic state. Nevertheless, a number of Dar-ul-Islam rebels came forward openly and strove for the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia. However, the genesis of this organization took shape in a very different circumstance where such organizations played very pertinent role to thwart the colonial masters by forming an umbrella group of different Islamic groups under one banner called Masyumi.

Starting in West Java, where the Islamic state of Indonesia, or *Negara Islam Indonesia*, was proclaimed on Aug 7, 1949, the movement subsequently spread to other parts of the Central Java, South Kalimantan (Borneo), South Sulawesi (Celebes) and Aceh. The Dar-ul-Islam activity was also reported in the lesser Sunda islands, the Moluccas and Halmahera.

Dar-ul-Islam, was the first Islamic organization who proclaimed Indonesia as a theocratic state (Negara Islam Indonesia) on August 7th, 1949. Subsequently it spread to other parts of Central Java, South Kalimantan (Borneo), South Sulawesi (Celebes) and to Aceh. Darul Islam activity was also reported in the Lesser Sunda Islands, the Moluccas and Halmahera. But, Dar-ul Islam had always been suppressed by the ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*), the Armed Forces of Indonesia. But despite this consistent targeting of West Java in 1962, Kalimantan in 1963 and Sulawesi in 1965, the ABRI was not able to quell the rebellion fully. However, it kept smoldering in Aceh (western part of Sumatra). The continued survival of the rebellious groups owed much to the antecedent factors i.e. the presence of this sentiment among the aboriginal people of Sumatra long before the Dutch arrival in Indonesia rather than its not being under Dutch colonial rule. The movement in Aceh received fresh impetus in the wake of Suharto’s transmigration policy during the 70s.

Even non-Islamic Muslim parties have been able to garner the support of only a fraction of the committed Muslims. Individual Muslims and also major Islamic movements have for various reasons preferred to support secular parties. Personal, class or other group
interests may be at stake, the movement may wish to alleviate suspicions on the part of the secular (military) establishment or may genuinely believe in separation of religion from politics, or priority may be given to other ways to gain power or establish a more Islamic society (such as dakwah, general education, journalism, infiltration of the bureaucracy and the army).

Islamic clergies besides playing a role in the social development as Indonesian society is already considered to be an ideal one where families within a larger or smaller community like desa (village) are interdependent on each other. People share the mundane problem of the other family as it is directly related to the karma rendered the possibility of a theocratic state as it was a favorable moment for them when they were fully united under the Japanese occupation. Indonesia being the largest Islamic country should have turned into an Islamic state long ago but the syncratic nature of its culture and rulers and also of the different sections of Muslim community prevented it from becoming so.

The local traditions of Indonesian Muslims (which, if we see in the light of Islamic rules and regulations) are totally un-Islamic. For that, customs as propagated by the Ulamas through (dakwah), permit a great variety of un-Islamic beliefs and practices to thrive i.e. the birth of a child, harvesting the crops and the death of a person, known as adat. As the sole authority of Islam, the ulamas who were supposed to be custodians of Islamic practices had to mould themselves according to the prevalent un-Islamic practices carried by the people, but as the dissemination of the religious knowledge increased the nature of ulamas also changed. To weed out the un-Islamic practices a new theory emerged known as Dakwah which was basically intended to purify Islam (see more details in the chapter III). Thus, seeing the Muslim society, the ulamas played a greater role in changing the society and political configuration of the country as well.

During the late 80s, the exchange of Islamic knowledge between Indonesia and the rest of the Pan-Islamic world became so rapid that the Muslims started feeling an urge to embrace Islam with more vigor and a number of pesantren - Islamic schools - emerged to
educate Muslims in Islamic way. This mushrooming growth of Pesantren was facilitated by the massive inflow of economic assistance from the Arab world.

In early 1991 Suharto, the then President of Indonesia who ruled the country for more than 30 years, started looking at the Islamic organizations as major threats to his regime. He came out with an option of a similar Islamic organization called ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia), Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (in reality it was an association of bureaucrats), putting his cabinet minister Prof. B. J. Habibie as its leader and the counterpart of the existing Muslim organizations in the country. However, the main idea behind this association could not continue for a long time. It emerged as a threat to other major Muslim organizations of the country as well. Many Muslims, of course, take their religious faith very seriously. For this group particularly, Islam in Indonesia has been a study of frustration. Shunted aside under Suharto's authoritarian and nominally secular rule, many Muslims felt that they were deprived of their rightful place in running the nation. However, this did not dilute their political aspirations. This huge frustration reflected in the June 1999 General Elections where 13 Islamic political parties contested. Abdurrahman Wahid widely known as Gusdur, a veteran Muslim leader of the largest Islamic Organization Nahdhlatul Ulama became the President of Indonesia.

**Source of the religious scholarship**

**Middle East**

Until recently, most of the efforts of religious institutions focused on primary and secondary education. Consequently, the students went abroad for higher education. The centers of religious learning in the Middle East, in particular Mecca, Medina and Cairo figured as the main intellectual and doctrinal centers of Indonesian Islam. After independence, several initiatives were taken to create indigenous institutions of higher Islamic learning. But a national program could only be developed after the establishment of the first Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) in 1960. The IAIN was by and large modeled on the Azhar of Egypt, but a restructuring soon followed with the opening of few more centers (at present 14). At present the IAIN curriculum is compulsory for private institutes of higher Islamic education, aspiring official recognition. The development of national centers of learning and the
training of religious specialists was further stimulated by the recent establishment of specialized research centers like Pusat Pengajian Islam dan Masyarikat (PPIM), and the state patronage of "modernist" and "neo-modernist" intellectual groups, like ICMI.

Despite the opening of large number of Islamic centers, dependence on foreign learning centers has continued. Hundreds of Indonesians are still studying in Egypt and, very recently, new groups have been dispatched to Medina under a special agreement with the Saudi government. However, many graduates from IAINs and other institutions are sent to Western universities. In response to globalization on the one hand and fear of religious-political dissidence on the other, the Indonesian state supports the development of a polycentric religious culture. In the official discourse, Indonesian Islam is often represented as being particularistic, in the sense that Indonesian Muslims seek harmony and are devoid of militant Islamist tendencies. The repositioning of Indonesian Islamic institutions vis-à-vis the centers of learning in the Middle East is complex and sensitive for a number of reasons. Firstly, a popular notion in Southeast Asia holds that Middle Eastern or Arabic Islam, for instance, as embodied by the Azhar, is genuine and worth imitating. Translated writings of Islamist authors form the Middle East, including Sayyid Qutb, are also widely read, especially among students. Secondly, good relations with Arab states are appreciated, in particular with Saudi Arabia, in view of the increasingly popular hajj and omrah. Thirdly, reservations on the part of many traditional Muslims towards the Islamic modernism under the patronage of high state officials compels the national leadership to stress the great value of tradisi.

Due to the developments mentioned above, the different religious trends within Indonesian society seem to have become less distinct. The career of many religious students starts at a pesantren and is combined with SMA and madrasah-training. The great majority of IAIN students have a pesantren background. Many of them become teachers at madrasahs after their graduation.

India

India has the second largest Muslims population after Indonesia. Being a source of the religious dissemination India is also considered to be very high in Islamic education. For a
long time it has attracted students of theology from Malaysia and Indonesia, especially those who could not pursue their higher religious education in the Middle-East. Many of them prefer north Indian universities like Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), Laknow University, Jamia Milia Islamia University and other universities in India.

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115 Cultural and Information Section of Embassy of Indonesia and Indonesian Students Union of India, Safdurjang, New Delhi