INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MAJOR SOCIAL EVENTS OF 2002

While interpreting some of the major events the only difficulty that arises is that we do not get enough literature on every single event. Moreover, some of the events (those who have been selected in this research work) have not been presented by the authors and publishers in the world or Indian market. Nevertheless, there is a little try of interpreting some events and henceforth the issues by some recognized authors of world literature. In 2002, there are 4 events among which Godhra Train Burning, Gujarat Violence and Murder of Daniel Pearl have been interpreted but the rest is not due to the above mentioned problem.

GODHRA TRAIN BURNING

58 train passengers, including women and little children, were charred to death on 27th February 2002 when their compartments were set on fire just as the train moved out of Godhra railway station. The first incidents of retaliatory mob violence were reported on February 28. They continued in full intensity on 1st and 2nd March. By 3rd March situation was under control. After that small incidents were engineered in a few pockets but they were put down firmly. Normally, record of actions claimed to have been taken by governments during riots is not trustworthy because no proper inquiries are held to authenticate those claims. In the case of Gujarat, the record of actions can be taken seriously for the following reasons:

- Inquiry Commissions and SIT investigations have been conducted under full glare of a media which cannot be accused of being friendly towards Modi government. Moreover, SIT investigations were monitored by the Supreme Court.
- State government cannot fudge facts about the deployment of army and paramilitary forces because of elaborate protocols involved in the movement of troops.
- The number of bullets fired, pattern of arrests—how many Hindus and how many Muslims held under preventive detention laws—can’t be fudged when high level inquiries by central agencies are going on.

If these facts had proven to be wrong, Narendra Modi could not have escaped indictment by the Supreme Court monitored Special investigative Team or the Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice Nanavati in 2005 or the High Court of Gujarat. The following fact sheet provides only a brief glimpse of actions taken to quell riots.
On 27/02/2002

- CM reaches Godhra at about 4.30 p.m. and goes to inspect the rail bogies which had been set on fire and issues the following official statements:
  - *The government has taken a serious note of this....This government will not allow anyone involved to go scot-free and is taking fool-proof steps...This is mass violence. This government is always trying to bring about communal harmony and is in favor of preventing any communal flare-up.'...This inhuman terrorist crime of collective /mass violence is not an incident of communal violence.***
  - *The Government will not be lacking in discharging duty...No efforts will be spared in ensuring law and order.***

In the press meet on 27th itself, the Chief Minister said that though the Godhra incident is shocking and sad, people should not take law into their hands and government will ensure law and order by taking necessary steps.

- Imposition of curfew in Godhra and other potential trouble spots from the day of Godhra massacre;
- First alert message of 27.02.2002 from the Home Department covered the need to take precautionary measures including adequate police *bandobast* and preventive measures including instructions to impose prohibitory orders in disturbed areas.
- All the Police Commissioners, District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police directed to remain in the headquarters and monitor the situation.
- In order to cope with the emerging law and order situation during the Gujarat Bandh call given by BJP, VHP and others to protest the massacre at Godhra railway station, request was made to the Government of India to provide 10 companies of Central Para Military Forces in addition to 4 companies of Rapid Action Force.
- Large scale preventive arrests of Hindus and Muslims starting February 27, the day of Godhra incident. On the day of Godhra massacre, 217 preventive arrests made, out of which 137 were Hindus and 80 were Muslims. This despite the fact that several BJP leaders, including some who were part of Modi’s own Cabinet, were actively fomenting trouble;

The entire police force of 6000 is deployed in sensitive areas of Gujarat on the very first day.
- 62 Companies of State Reserve Police Force and Central Para Military Forces companies deployed on February; Out of 62, 58 were of SRPF and 4 were of CPMF.
- After his return from Godhra, Chief Minister calls a late night meeting of senior officials at his residence at 11 p.m. to review the law and order situation and assess the preparedness of the government in dealing with it. Modi asks his officials to explore the possibility of army deployment.***
Enquiries made with the local army revealed that no force was available for deployment, as all the units were deployed on the Gujarat border with Pakistan where a war like situation existed following the Pak inspired terror attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. At such a point, the Centre alone could take decision regarding Army deployment. This led to the huge and aggressive Gujarat Violence.

**GUJARAT VIOLENCE**

**On 28/02/2002**
- Gujarat Government requests neighboring states of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan to send additional police force. Digvijay Singh as CM of Madhya Pradesh and Ashok Gehlot as CM of Rajasthan decline the request saying they have no forces to spare. Maharashtra CM, Vilasrao Deshmukh sent some police force which was returned to them as soon as the situation came under control.
- Modi makes a telephonic request to the then Home Minister, L.K Advani for deployment of the Army.
- As a follow up, Gujarat government sends a fax to the Secretary Ministry of Defence at 2.30 p.m. seeking deployment of the Army.
- Due to tense situation at the Border and the on-going Operation Prakram, the Army cannot be withdrawn from the Indo- Pak border of Gujarat. Therefore, army units have to be airlifted from other states.
- CM issued instructions to provide safe escort to the 6000 Haj Pilgrims returning to the State. This was followed by further measures in later days. All the 6000 Haj pilgrims from 400 different towns and villages of Gujarat reached their homes safely under police escort on 20.03.2002.
- Message from Home Department to all the concerned officers to round up anti social elements and known communal elements under preventive laws.
- The first aircraft carrying army personnel lands at Ahmedabad by midnight of 28th February.
- 13 Columns of Army deployed to assist the State Civil administration.

**On 1/03/2002**
- Chief Secretary issued orders to use force including **Shoot- at- Sight** on 1\(^{st}\) March, that is, within a day after the riots broke out on 28th February.
• Army deployed on the ground within 20 hours of the start of violence despite troops having to be airlifted.
• The Defence Minister personally supervised the deployment of the army which commenced on the morning of 1st.
• The deployment was facilitated on a war footing by the government. The District Magistrate Ahmedabad provided 6 buses, 9 trucks and 15 jeeps for use by the army by 2:30 a.m. By 3 p.m. 26 red flags were also provided for the army. During the day 39 other vehicles were also provided to the army personnel.
• 18 mobile phones were provided to the army on 1st March itself to facilitate better communication. Liaison officers and escort officers from the police were also provided to the army by the morning of 1st March.
• By 11 a.m. the Army reached some of the affected areas in the city i.e Paldi, Juhapura, Vejalpur, Shahpur, Bapunagar, Rakhial, Gomtipur, Meghaninagar, Draiapur, Kalupur, Naroda and Dania Limba. In Ahmedabad total of 9 columns of Army were deployed on 1.03.2002
• A total of 131 vehicles were provided to the army for their movement.
• In addition 7 Executive magistrates were provided to the army by 7:30 a.m. followed by three more. A total of 32 Executive magistrates were provided to the army because the army cannot shoot without a magistrate’s orders.  

On 2/03/2002
• 14 aircrafts airlifted to Rajkot and the first plane landed in Rajkot by 0300 hours on 02-03-2002. Later on 2 columns of the Army were dispatched to Godhra on 02-03-2002 and they reached Godhra at 1.30 p.m. on the same day.
• Two columns of the Army were moved to Baroda on 01-03-2002 at 1830 hours.
• Two columns of Army were moved to Rajkot on 02-03-2002 at 1100 hours.
• A total of 573 preventive arrests were made out of which 477 were Hindus and 96 Muslims. 16 persons were killed in police firing, out of which 12 were Hindus and 4 Muslims. 482 Hindus and 229 Muslims were arrested for offence.
• Total SRPF and CPMF deployed in the state on 2.03.2002 was 88-1-2, out of which 64-1-2 were SRPF and 24-0-0 were CPMF.  

81
On 3/03/2002

- Army columns were moved to Surat on 03-03-2002 at 11 a.m. and to Bhavnagar on 03-03-2002 at 10.35 p.m. hours in the wake of incidents of violence reported from Bhavnagar and Surat. At the peak of deployment there were 26 army columns in the state.
- Total number of preventive arrests on 3.02.2002 was 280 Hindus and 83 Muslims. 416 Hindus and 173 Muslims were arrested for offences. 10 Hindus were killed in police firing.\(^{11}\)

On 4/03/2002

- 65 SRPF and 29 CPMF companies were deployed in the state during that day. Out of 285 preventive arrests 241 were of Hindus and 44 of Muslims. 301 Hindus and 75 Muslims were arrested for offences, while 4 Hindus died in police firing. The details are:
  1. During the riots, police fired 103,559 rounds of bullets. More than half fired in the first 72 hours;
  2. Through the period of disturbances, in all 66,268 Hindus and 10,861 Muslims were taken into custody under preventive detention laws. The above provides a brief over view of the actions taken by the government during the first 3 days of riots.\(^{12}\)

During a hearing of a Gujarat riots case, the Supreme Court chastised the Gujarat government for being modern day Neros. However, this adjective has stuck to Modi’s name. Compared to many other epithets used against Modi, this is actually the least vicious. There is no denying that due to incompetence or complicity or both-- the police failed in many instances to control the violence that shook Gujarat for three days starting February 28, 2002. There is also no denying that some of the administrators proved incompetent in handling the situation and a good number of politicians were involved in instigating mob violence. Some even led murderous mobs. But there are many instances of the police and armies having saved Muslims whose homes or settlements were surrounded by murderous mobs. But anti Modi brigades almost never mention those instances just as they never mention the number of Hindus killed in police firing while saving Muslims or the instances of retaliatory violence by Muslims. One of the biggest disservices done by the self appointed guardians of Muslim community is that they exaggerated, overstated and distorted the events of 2002 beyond recognition solely with a view to serving partisan interests of the other party. Their aim has never been to ensure punishment of those guilty of murders and mayhem during the 2002 riots. In the process, they have actually weakened their case by introducing endless lies to their narrative to project Modi as the man who personally ordered and directed mob violence against Muslims. This campaign has been sustained through propping up dubious witnesses.
whose testimonies have been rejected by the Supreme Court appointed Special Investigative Team (SIT) as being false and motivated. And yet it is sustained with the help of pliable media houses and intellectuals acting as the foot soldiers of the other Party. All of that clearly indicated that despite being new to administration (he had taken charge as CM only 3½ months ago of a state whose machinery of governance was communally polarized due to frequent riots most of which occurred under Congress regimes), Modi took all necessary steps to quell the riots even though his administration and even his political colleagues either failed him, or played mischief at many places. This included getting army units airlifted and deployed on the ground within 20 hours of the outbreak of violence.

Report submitted by the Special Investigative Team (SIT) appointed and closely monitored by the Supreme Court to investigate charges against Modi and his government provides instances of police and army saving Muslims from riotous mobs. Some even braved hostile mobs but did not allow rescued Muslims to be harmed. Despite lapses and partisan conduct of the police in many places the police and army saved numerous lives of those who were held hostage by violent mobs. News reports of the time provided several instances of police officers risking their lives to save trapped Muslims. Here are few of many instances:

• 5000 people were saved from Noorani mosque by Ahmedabad Police.
• 240 persons were saved at Sardarpura in Mehsana district and shifted to safe places.
• 450 lives were saved in Pore and Nardipur villages and shifted to safer places.
• 200 persons were saved in Sanjoli village.
• 1500 persons were rescued from Fatehpura village in Vadodra district.
• 3000 people were saved and shifted from Kawant village.

Various aspects of the relief and rehabilitation of victims by the Gujarat Government were agitated against in various forums. All such petitions were rejected by both the Gujarat High Court and Supreme Court of India – with the courts in fact appreciating the Relief and Rehabilitation steps taken by the Government. The Gujarat High Court appreciating (and advising the petitioners to appreciate) the steps taken by the Government in the management of the camps, made the following observations among others:

"It must be said that since the State has already appointed Mr. S.M.F. Bukhari, a retired I.A.S. Officer, as Chief Coordinator for looking after the relief and rehabilitation facility at various camps…, the Court is of the opinion that the State has also taken care to some extent in trying to sort out the problem, which is ventilated by the petitioners in this petition, and the said gesture on the part of the State is required to be appreciated. The efforts put in by the State Government in this behalf, as indicated above, are required to be
appreciated” [Gujarat High Court Order - Special CA No: 3773 of 2002, (3 May 2002)]. The Supreme Court also disposed of petitions alleging negligence in relief and rehabilitation along with various other allegations - directing the petitioners (Mahasweta Devi - [WP (Crl.) No.530/2002] and Mallika Sarabhai - [WP (crl.) No. 221/2002]) to approach the Gujarat High Court, where these issues are being monitored. [Supreme Court of India - WP (Crl.) No.530/2002 & WP (crl.) No. 221 of 2002, (17 Aug 2004)].

The SIT Conclusion

“No case is made against Narendra Modi because even though during riots ghastly violent attacks had taken place on Muslims at Gulberg Society, Naroda Patiya and elsewhere by unruly mob, yet the alleged statements made by Chief Minister Narendra Modi appeared to have been quoted out of context.” The full text of the SIT report clearly shows that this exoneration is based on examining not just the veracity of the controversial remarks of that day but also examining various other statements and speeches Modi made in the days following the Godhra incident. In addition, SIT also examined the actual actions of the state government. This included airlifting and deployment of the Army within 20 hours of the outbreak of violence. Despite various lapses, it is not as if the police was deliberately immobilized. Police lobbed 15369 tear gas shells to quell the rioters. Out of 10559 rounds of ammunition fired 5450 rounds were fired during the first three days itself. Numerous Hindus were killed in police firing at riotous mobs. Even though violence had broken out at numerous locations in different parts of the state, riots were controlled within 72 hours. Most important of all, the state has been totally free of communal tension in the last 13 years. There has not been a single day of curfew since then whereas in the earlier decades, curfews due to frequent communal outbreaks were a routine occurrence. Since the newspapers and TV channels that misquoted Modi, refused to rectify their mistake the mischievous misquote acquired a life of its own and continues to be used as part of smear campaign even after the SIT cleared Modi of this charge.

MURDER OF DANIEL PEARL

Daniel Pearl began working for the Wall Street Journal in November 1990 as a reporter in Atlanta and then moved to the paper’s Washington, D.C., bureau in 1993. He assumed an important position in London in 1996, where he reported on the Middle East, and then on to Paris where he covered the Balkan crisis. Other colleagues at the Journal say Pearl did not fit the stereotype of the bold and swaggering correspondent running off into harm’s
way. In late 2001, when other big media correspondents were clamoring to go to Afghanistan to cover President Bush’s initial front in the War on Terror, Pearl declined, saying, “It’s too dangerous. I just got married, my wife is pregnant. I’m just not going to do it.” How, then, did this prudent and cautious reporter come to place himself in circumstances that led to his cold-blooded murder?16

Pearl decided to cover the War on Terror from Islamabad, Pakistan, away from the fighting in Afghanistan, but plagued by its own dangers from local assassins and kidnappers. On January 6, 2002, Pearl read a story in the *Boston Globe* about Richard Reid, the accused “shoe-bomber” who allegedly tried to blow up an American airliner. The story said Reid had studied under a Pakistani Islamic leader named Sheik Mubarik Ali Gilani. Pearl decided to seek an interview with Gilani, and he contacted a man who called himself Arif who agreed to set up a meeting with a friend of Gilani’s. Pearl had no way of knowing that “Arif” was actually Hashim Kadir, an operative of Harkat ul-Mujahedin, a radical Kashmiri group with a history of kidnapping Westerners. Pearl sensed that he was onto a good story, but he was uneasy. He consulted with a local antiterrorist group called the Citizens Police Liaison Committee about the advisability of a meeting with an associate of the sheikh of an Islamic extremist group. Pearl received the same advice from the committee that he had received from his colleagues in the press: ‘Don’t go, but if you do, don’t go alone, and make sure you meet your source in a public place’. Pearl chose to disregard the advice. He had agreed to meet his source at the Village Restaurant at 6:30 P.M., and by the time he arrived, darkness had fallen and the restaurant was almost empty. A single unarmed kidnapper awaited Pearl at the restaurant, with one or two accomplices waiting out of sight on a motorcycle. The unsuspecting Pearl climbed into the man’s car and was driven for about forty minutes to the northern outskirts of the city. The car followed the motorcycle into a small compound containing a two-room building. When Pearl stepped out of the car he was approached by the motorcycle driver, a man named Naeem Bukhari, leader of the militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Bukhari put his arms around Pearl’s shoulders as though in friendship, but with his other hand he pushed a gun into Pearl’s ribs. “Now you are kidnapped,” Bukhari said. Initially, Pearl thought the man was kidding, but he was roughly handled, strip-searched, and left in his underwear.17

Pearl’s tragic journey into Karachi’s shadowy Islamic kidnapping network had begun. By dawn, when Pearl had not returned home, his wife Mariane was filled with dread. A journalist herself, she knew full well the dangers her husband faced. She and her Indian-born Muslim friend and colleague Asra began calling anyone who might know of Danny’s fate.
Among their calls was one to Khalid Khawaja, former ISI (Pakistani intelligence) agent who claimed to be a friend of Gilani and of Osama bin Laden. Asra reached Khawaja by phone and said, “You know my friend Danny Pearl. He was scheduled to meet Sheikh Gilani last night at seven, and he never returned.” Khawaja said it must have been a setup, perhaps by the CIA, because Gilani would never agree to meet with a journalist, particularly not a foreigner.¹⁸

When Khawaja dismissed Asra’s concern for Mariane and her unborn child by launching into an extended lecture on innocent women and children killed by American bombs, Asra hung up. None of the “authorities,” Pakistani or American, seemed to have much to offer Mariane, so she and Asra turned to street connections, trying to reconstruct the chain of contacts that Pearl had used in his attempt to interview Sheikh Gilani. They began with Asif, known as Asif-le-fixer, a journalist for the local publication Jang, who had frequently arranged interviews for Pearl and other Western journalists. Asif, who has good contacts with fundamentalist groups, sent Mariane to Jaffar, another journalist for Jang, who introduced her to a key player who called himself “Bashir.” But Bashir was in fact Omar Ahmed Saeed Sheikh, a British-reared Pakistani who had lured four Westerners into a kidnapping in India in 1994. He had deceived Daniel Pearl and now he was deceiving Mariane. Even so, Mariane’s meeting with Bashir provided some crucial details on Pearl’s abduction.¹⁹

Pearl had asked Bashir to arrange an appointment with Gilani. Bashir agreed, but said Danny would first have to prove himself by submitting a selection of his articles. If the articles passed muster, a meeting with Gilani would be arranged. Danny e-mailed the articles to Bashir, setting in motion a series of communications between the two. On January 19, Danny received a message from Bashir saying Sheikh Gilani “has read your articles” and “you are welcome to meet him.” The following day, Danny and Bashir made plans to meet with the sheikh in Karachi. Bashir’s e-mail to Pearl said, “When you get to Karachi please contact Mr. Imtiaz Siddique [at] 0300-2170244 who will arrange to meet you and take you to Gilani.” But of course, Danny was never taken to Gilani, and the entire process was undoubtedly a ruse used to lure him into captivity. Bashir (Omar Saeed Sheikh) would later tell police that he did not originally intend to abduct Pearl, but when “Arif” (Hashim Kadir) told him that an American journalist was seeking an interview with Gilani, he decided to meet Pearl himself. Their series of e-mails followed, which Bashir later admitted was simply a way to trap Pearl. As the process proceeded, Bashir concluded, “I might as well do it,”
because the abduction of an American journalist would receive wide attention and strike a blow against the United States.  

Bashir then assembled a team and devised the kidnapping. The plot involved independent cells of people who communicated largely through mobile phones. Like Bashir, everyone involved used false names. Bashir assigned one person to buy a camera and scanner, another to photograph Pearl in captivity, and a third to deliver the photos to a person who would scan and transmit the material to media organizations. Finally, he recruited a friend whom police call “Haider,” a longtime militant who formerly trained radical fighters in Afghanistan, to do the actual kidnapping.

Even as Mariane began to assemble these pieces of the puzzle, she received the first of a series of chilling e-mail messages containing photos of Pearl bound with chains, a nine-millimeter pistol held to his head. The attached message from “kidnapper guy” began: “The National movement for the restoration of Pakistani sovereignty has captured CIA officer Daniel Pearl who has [sic] posing as a journalist of the Wall Street Journal.” The e-mail made a series of demands, including the release of the former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, now held by the United States; the release of Pakistani detainees held at the American naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba; the provision of lawyers for Pakistanis arrested in law enforcement sweeps in the United States; and the expedited delivery of F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan. The e-mail stated that Pearl would be held in “very inhuman circumstances” until the Americans improved the treatment of their detainees.

On the morning of January 30, another e-mail from Pearl’s captors arrived containing two photos similar to those in the first e-mail. The new message read, “We have interrogated Mr. D. Pearl and we have come to the conclusion that contrary to what we thought earlier he is not working for the CIA. In fact he is working for mossad. Therefore we will execute him within 24 hours unless amreeka fulfils our demands.” The message concluded, “We warn all amreekan journalists working in pakstan that there are many in their ranks spying on pakstan under the journalist cover. Therefore we give all amreekan journalists 3 days to get out of pakstan. Anyone remaining after that will be targetted.”

Within twenty-four hours after the e-mail was made public, the media had made six hundred inquiries of the Wall Street Journal, asking for information and offering support and assistance. Prominent celebrities offered their help. Muhammed Ali submitted a powerful statement that began, “I pray this message reaches those who are detaining Daniel Pearl. . . . Daniel is a professional journalist. . . . Treat him as you would wish all Muslims to be treated by others. . . .” Another Muslim celebrity, pop musician Cat Stevens, his name now changed
to Yusuf Islam, wrote a statement ending, “As a message to those who are holding the journalist Danny Pearl: If justice is your goal, the cause of justice will not be served by killing an innocent man who has nothing but a pen in his hand.” Paul Steiger of the Wall Street Journal also issued a statement that seemed aimed at the kidnappers: “The world now knows, and you seem to know, that Danny is a journalist, nothing more or less. Journalists are, by definition, trained messengers. Danny can be your messenger. . . . A captive or killed Danny cannot speak for you, cannot help you or your cause.”

On February 5, Mariane received a phone call from the trusted Pakistani police officer she calls Captain, who excitedly told her that his computer expert had traced the route of the e-mails from Bashir, who police had confirmed to be Omar Sheikh, to Danny, leading to the arrest of three men and the discovery of further details on Danny’s abduction. Omar Sheikh had used the three men to set the trap for Danny. Mariane would later describe the situation as follows: “Omar Sheikh was probably looking for someone to kidnap. . . . He’s a psychopath, but he’s also a very bright man in his evil way. . . . He set the plans—the plan to trap—and, of course, Danny never got to meet this Gilani; he was just brought into a place where he was kept in captivity.” Omar Sheikh himself was soon in custody, but it immediately became clear that Omar did not know where Danny was being held. Omar was just one link in a complicated chain. He was a tool, the lure, while others were the captors. In court, Omar shocked everyone by declaring, “As far as I understand, he [Danny] is dead.”

Mariane refused to believe it, but over the next few days evidence surfaced that Danny had indeed been killed. Captain told her there was a video showing his execution. Mariane, who is a filmmaker herself, said film could easily be faked, but Captain was firm. “Mariane,” he said. “Danny is dead. . . . They had a knife, and they used it in such a way that there is no doubt. . . . He was beheaded.” The struggle was over. Daniel Pearl was dead. Further detail on the circumstances of his abduction and murder surfaced in the testimony of suspects in police custody. Pearl was held in an isolated shack in a compound on the outskirts of Karachi, far from any roads or passersby. He had tried to escape by shimmying through a vent in the bathroom, but he was caught, brought back, and chained to a car engine. Another time, he tried to break loose while walking with his guards in the compound. He had also tried shouting to door-to-door vendors, but to no avail.

The man guarding Pearl spoke little English, preventing any real communication between them, and Pearl was apparently unaware that he was marked for death. Around February 1, three new men—Arabic-speaking, probably Yemenis—were brought to the compound and left in a room with Pearl and one guard. The guard who remained later told
police that at least one of the visitors communicated to Pearl in a language the guard didn’t understand. According to the authorities, “Mr. Pearl, who could speak French and Hebrew, responded with an angry outburst, his first conversation of any length since his capture. After the interaction calmed, one of the visitors turned on a video camera, and another asked Mr. Pearl questions about his religious background. . . . After the videotaped statement by Mr. Pearl . . . [he] was blindfolded and killed.” Not until months later was Pearl’s body found, cut into ten pieces and dumped in a four-foot-deep grave in the compound where he had been held.29

Meanwhile, Omar Saeed Sheikh and his three accomplices were tried in a Pakistani court. The three accomplices were found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. Omar was sentenced to death by hanging, but his sentence is on appeal. Testimony in the trial clarified the elaborate cell structure involved in Pearl’s abduction, detention, and murder. The first cell was that of Omar Sheikh and the three men who kidnapped Pearl. The second cell, responsible for holding Pearl and burying him after his murder, was headed by the man police called “Haider,” who belongs to the Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami group. Omar had called Haider and asked him to find a safe house for their use. All of these men are linked to the wealthy Karachi factory owner Saud Memon, who still evades police custody. Memon, who owned the compound where Danny was held, brought the three Arab executioners who comprised the third cell.30

Memon drove the Arab speakers to the hideout on Pearl’s eighth or ninth day of captivity. They bought the video equipment and ordered all the guards out of Pearl’s room except Fazal Karim, who had been at the shack since Pearl’s arrival. With video camera running, Pearl was blindfolded and murdered. Police have never determined who actually ordered the murder, although Omar Saeed Sheikh and Saud Memon are the leading suspects. Saeed Sheikh continues to claim that he never meant to harm Pearl, and Memon remains at large. Meanwhile, fringe players in Pearl’s murder are still being pursued by Pakistani police. Amjad Farooqi, a Pakistani militant with ties to al-Qaeda, has been declared “the most wanted man in Pakistan,” partly because he was present when Pearl was beheaded, but mostly because he has been implicated in two failed attempts to assassinate Pakistan’s president. Farooqi was one of the seven Pakistanis originally indicted in the Pearl case.31

Another accomplice in Pearl’s kidnapping and murder, Asim Ghafoor, was killed in November 2004 as Pakistani agents tried to arrest him at a hideout west of Karachi. In July 2005, Hashim Kadir (alias “Arif”) the man who lured Pearl into the hands of his kidnappers,
was arrested in Gujranwala, Pakistan, in the province of Punjab. He subsequently confessed to working for two al-Qaeda linked operatives.32

REFERENCES:

**Godhra Train Burning**
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

**Gujarat Violence**
8. Supra 1, pp 34 – 38.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
15. Supra 13.

**Murder of Daniel Pearl**
19. Ibid, P-82.
20. Supra 17.
22. Ibid.
25. Ibid, P-129.
27. Ibid, P-184.
28. Ibid, P-188.
29. Ibid, P-198.