While interpreting some of the major events the only difficulty that arises is that we do not get enough literature on every single event. Moreover, some of the events (those who have been selected in this research work) have not been presented by the authors and publishers in the world or Indian market. Nevertheless, there is a little try of interpreting some events and henceforth the issues by some recognized authors of world literature. In 2001, there are 7 events among which Gujarat Earthquake, Manipur Problem, Assassination of Phoolan Devi, Indian Parliament Attack, September 11 Attacks and War in Afghanistan have been interpreted but the rest is not due to the above mentioned problem.

GUJARAT EARTHQUAKE

The Kutch earthquake of 26 January 2001 was one of the worst natural disasters to strike Gujarat. The earthquake was most devastating in terms of its magnitude and intensity. It posed enormous challenges because of its magnitude and geographical spread for rescue, relief and rehabilitation. Indeed, it appeared, at least during the first few hours, to be overwhelming to the government and the society. Yet, they faced the challenge with courage and conviction. Rescue and relief activities were organized within the shortest possible time. What is remarkable is that a comprehensive rehabilitation and reconstruction program was put in place at the earliest. An adversity was transformed into an opportunity.\(^1\)

The Devastation: A Glimpse

Overall, 7,633 villages in 21 (out of 25) districts of Gujarat were affected to varying degrees. The districts most affected were Kutch, Surendranagar, Jamnagar, Rajkot, Patan and Ahmedabad. About 40 percent of the state’s population was affected. The number of human lives lost was 13,805. About 1, 67,000 persons were injured. Over a million houses were damaged or destroyed. About 10,000 small and medium industrial units went out of production, affecting income and employment. Thousands of artisans lost their livelihood. It was a calamity of rare severity. The impact on infrastructure was devastating.\(^2\) The power system, water supply and telecommunication were severely disrupted. About 442 villages were flattened, four towns of Kutch were in ruins and a number of high-rise and low-rise buildings collapsed in Ahmedabad and other towns. About 53,000 schoolrooms and 5,000
structures providing health and child/women welfare facilities were damaged or destroyed. The civil hospital at Bhuj—the most important government hospital in the district—collapsed, resulting in the death of patients, their relatives and medical personnel. The district administration of Kutch was traumatized because many of their employees lost their lives, homes and relatives. Personnel of the armed forces, especially the Air Force, had a similar predicament. The task of damage assessment was equally complex. Thousands of people were affected. Hundreds of villages and towns were involved. Different types of houses and other premises had to be surveyed. Gujarat is one of the India’s richer states. However, the area affected by the earthquake included a significant proportion of population that is poor. The district of Kutch and the affected areas of Jamnagar, Rajkot, Surendranagar and Patan are resource-poor and arid regions. These areas are vulnerable to several hazards such as earthquake, cyclone and drought. The earthquake was followed by two consecutive years of drought in 1999 and 2000. Indeed, Gujarat suffered five major disasters in four years: cyclones of 1998 and 1999, droughts in 1999 and 2000 and the earthquake of 2001.

The complexity and enormity of the task before the administration during the few days and weeks after the earthquake were unimaginable. It may be easy to comment, with the wisdom of hindsight, that certain things should have been done and that there was delay in certain measures. Much depends on the ground realities. It may not always be feasible when the impact is so severe, widespread and complicated, to have a system which triggers automatic action at all places. The fact, however, remains that there is a need to improve upon the existing arrangements, systems and procedures.

The severity and spread of damage and destruction could overwhelm any system. As mentioned earlier, the area affected was larger than the area of many states and even countries. Many government employees and officials were traumatized because of the death and injury of near and dear ones. The communication system broke down. Even the telephone lines between Gandhinagar, the state capital and Ahmedabad stopped functioning for the first few days. Therefore, it took some time for the state machinery to mobilize all the available resources. Similar situations arose in the past in Kobe, Turkey and many other places. A few months earlier there had been tremors in Bhavnagar. Consequently, there was some awareness of the implications of earthquake. Some do’s and don’ts were available with the Revenue Department and some of the districts including Bhavnagar. Yet, the severity of the disaster was beyond anybody’s imagination. Detailed contingency plans particularly focusing on earthquakes were not available, especially in the affected districts.
Narrow streets caused enormous problems for rescue operations because vehicles could not move in the affected areas. No doubt local people, police and armed forces tried their best and rescued many people who had been trapped. But the fact remains that modern rescue equipment and manpower trained specially for earthquake-related rescue were not available. In the absence of a systematic inventory of equipment and resources, it took some time to mobilize them. The above aspects provide important lessons for the future. Many steps have already been taken based on this experience. As mentioned earlier, many initiatives were taken by the Government of Gujarat. The Government of India also took a number of initiatives as follows:

Even prior to the Kutch earthquake, it considered the transfer of the subject of disaster management from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Home Affairs. This was debated for quite some time. The Kutch earthquake possibly provided a new sense of urgency. The subject of disaster management was transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs which was at that time headed by the Deputy Prime Minister of India. The Ministry of Home Affairs took a number of initiatives relating to prevention and mitigation in addition to upgrading of the emergency response system.

A DRM program was introduced by the Government of India in collaboration with the UNDP. It was envisaged to cover 17 states in India. In each state, vulnerable talukas and villages have been identified. The objective is to put in place a comprehensive multi-disaster-based program of community preparedness and capacity building. It also aims at the preparation of disaster management plans at the district, sub-district and village levels. Another initiative by the Government of India focuses on vulnerable cities. A program known as the Urban Earthquake Vulnerability Reduction Program was introduced as a part of the DRM program. The idea is to strengthen the earthquake preparedness of 38 earthquake prone cities in India with a population of more than 500,000 and located in seismic zones III, IV and V. These 38 cities are located in 20 states.

The Government of India has also taken initiatives for revising the syllabi of engineering colleges in various parts of India, including disaster management in the syllabi of schools and training of teachers of engineering colleges through the IITs. There have been important initiatives in upgrading the search and rescue capability. A.S. Arya, who functioned as Seismic Adviser to the GSDMA, has recently joined as an adviser to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. The Government of India has made commendable efforts to replicate in other states some of the measures introduced in Gujarat.
In case of the Kutch earthquake, the number of houses being reconstructed and repaired is large because the impact was widespread.\textsuperscript{10}

One may argue that the houses in rural areas are smaller and easy to construct compared to urban areas. However, because of the geographical spread there can be complex problems of implementation. The strategy of reconstruction of houses has been an own owner-driven approach, supplemented by NGOs for about 20 per cent of the houses reconstructed. The Kutch earthquake reconstruction program is possibly the first such program in a developing country, to follow an owner-driven approach to reconstruction, which has been very successfully implemented both in terms of number and quality.\textsuperscript{11}

The above aspects are relevant to most states and countries. Yet, the specific structure will have to be designed keeping in view the hazard profile, availability of resources and prevailing organizational structure. In fact, the organizational structure of the GSDMA itself, appropriate for the post-reconstruction scenario, needs to be addressed at the earliest. This is necessary for both long-term aspects of disaster management and sustainability of the organization.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Consolidation and Sustainability of Initiatives}

There is a sense of urgency because the memories of the earthquake and the devastation still linger. When the memories fade, will the interest and enthusiasm remain? Do we have systems and procedures in place that ensure continuity of the new initiatives? For example, thousands of masons and even engineers have been trained in earthquake-resistant construction. What about those who have not been trained? Those who have been trained during the aftermath may need more intensive training. Training of teachers of engineering colleges still remains a challenge. It is necessary to ensure that the GSDMA continues to receive the same attention and high quality of human resources that are available to it at present.\textsuperscript{13}

In the aftermath of the earthquake there has been awareness generated about earthquake-resistant construction. But we have to go a long way for enforcing building codes. There has been some improvement in the construction practices. Engineers and builders today are more conscious and careful. Municipal by-laws have been modified. Yet, it is felt that an effective system is yet to be in place. There is still dearth of qualified technical personnel. It is necessary to undertake programs of capacity building of municipal engineers. Though it is essential to focus on municipal corporations, it is also necessary to address the problems relating to municipalities and other urban areas.\textsuperscript{14}
There is also a need of exploring the potential of financial mitigation—mitigation measures in the form of financial instruments such as insurance and contingency credit. In the past there have been major disasters in India and in other countries. Every earthquake or a similar disaster leads to a flurry of activities that lose momentum and focus as time passes. The Kutch earthquake resulted in one of the most comprehensive endeavors in history, with numerous initiatives. It is necessary to ensure that all such initiatives and innovative measures are further strengthened and consolidated so that they become sustainable.\textsuperscript{15}

**MANIPUR PROBLEM**

The Naga armed conflict which began in 1950s continues to have a tremendous impact on Manipur. The NSCN-IM, a prominent Naga armed group, has been pressing for the formation of ‘Nagalim’ comprising all Naga-inhabited areas of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur and some areas of Myanmar which it believes to be the rightful homeland of the Nagas. The NSCN-IM’s self-defined ‘Nagalim’ spreads over approximately 1, 20,000 km\textsuperscript{2}, which is at least seven times bigger than the area of the present state of Nagaland (16527 km\textsuperscript{2}). The NSCN-IM maintains that ‘Nagalim’ was subdivided by the Government of India into four different administrative units: Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Nagaland, in addition to a fifth part that is now in Myanmar. The proposed map of ‘Nagalim’ includes the Karbi Anglong and NC Hills districts of Assam. Besides, the map is also shown to include parts of the districts of Golaghat, Sibasagar, Dibrugarh, Tinsukia, and Jorhat. It also includes Dibang Valley, Lohit, Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh and significant parts of four districts of Manipur: Tamenglong, Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel.\textsuperscript{16}

In 1997, the NSCN-IM and the Government of India entered into a ceasefire agreement that involved intense negotiations to resolve the long-standing Naga dispute. When the ceasefire was extended ‘without territorial limits’ on June 14, 2001, there were violent agitations in Manipur. Since at least four districts of Manipur (Chandel, Senapati, Tamenglong and Ukhrul) are included in ‘Nagalim’, Manipuris believe the Nagas are trying to destroy their state. The Nagaland Legislative Assembly passed resolutions on four occasions for the integration of the Naga areas adjoining the state of Nagaland to ‘fulfill the aspirations of the Nagas’. On the other side of the divide, the Manipur Legislative Assembly had also unanimously adopted several resolutions to uphold the territorial integrity of Manipur. The situation took a violent turn on June 18, 2001 when thousands of people took to the streets in Imphal, and the protesters targeted politicians of all hues and set ablaze the building housing the Manipur Legislative Assembly, residences of legislators and offices of
several political parties. Eighteen protestors were killed when the security forces opened fire to control an irate mob. In response to this violence in Manipur, the Government of India ordered limiting the scope of the ceasefire within the boundary of Nagaland.\textsuperscript{17}

This led to a further polarization of the society and polity of the state. The Manipur government declared June 18 as ‘State Integrity Day’ in honor of the 18 persons killed while protesting against the extension of ceasefire between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM to Manipur. In response the ANSAM imposed a 52-day-long (June 19 to August 11, 2005) blockade of the Mao-Imphal section of the NH-39. To provide relief to the people, the Indian Air Force was pressed into service to airlift medicines to Manipur from Guwahati.\textsuperscript{18}

The divide extended into other fields as well. When Nagas living in the hill districts of Manipur organized an agitation for affiliating schools there to the Nagaland Board of Secondary Education, the Meiteis in the valley interpreted it as a step towards integrating these areas into the state of Nagaland.\textsuperscript{19}

**Options**

By and large, the armed conflict in Manipur was viewed as a ‘law and order’ problem; and hence the response was also a ‘law and order’ approach. Thus, Manipur was declared a ‘disturbed area’ and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 was imposed. A number of armed groups were notified as unlawful organizations. From time to time, a number of operations had been directed against the armed groups. Over the years, a large number of security forces have been deployed in the state. It has the highest police-people ratio in the country, with 627 policemen for every 100,000 persons. Beyond this, however, efforts to bring a negotiated peace in the state have been minimal.\textsuperscript{20}

There have been some efforts by successive state governments to move towards a process of dialogue. The erstwhile People’s Front government headed by Radhabinod Koijam offered, on February 28, 2001, a unilateral month-long cease-fire, commencing March 1, 2001, to 17 separatist outfits. Subsequently, on March 19, 2001, the then Governor Ved Marwah announced the setting up of a contact group to liaison with separatist groups. However, they rejected the ceasefire offer and continued to commit acts of violence.\textsuperscript{21}

A second response has been to earmark a large amount of development funds exclusively for Manipur with the principal motive of buying peace and development. In order to achieve faster economic development, the Government of India has made special provision by declaring all states of the North-East region as the ‘Special Category States’. Besides,
various central ministries have been outlaying funds through their respective budget for the development of their respective sectors in these states. These states are also implementing their own development programs. Furthermore, the North Eastern Council (NEC) and the Ministry of Development of North East Region (MDONER) exclusively handle the developmental needs of the region.\textsuperscript{22}

Unfortunately, these policy responses have been, at best only partly successful in coping with the problems in Manipur. Indeed, it could even be argued that they are counterproductive. The adverse reaction to the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act has been so adverse that it may have even served to accentuate the problem. And with the rampant corruption in the state the additional funds allocated to it sometimes only goes to finance militant activities.\textsuperscript{23}

The result of the government’ initiatives have thus been mixed. The government has managed to arrive at cessation of hostility accords with several Kuki armed groups since 2005. However, none of the major groups have shown any intent to engage in negotiations. Indeed, the UNLF ruled out any negotiations with the Government of India without the United Nations mediation. It considered a plebiscite is the only way to go if government wanted armed conflict in Manipur to end. Similarly, PLA ruled out accepting the government’s offer for peace talks, saying that entering into a dialogue would not ‘restore freedom’.\textsuperscript{24} In 2005, the UNLF made a four-point proposal to resolve Manipur’s armed conflict. They are:

i) to hold a plebiscite under UN auspices to enable the people of Manipur to exercise their democratic right on the restoration of Manipur’s sovereignty and independence;

ii) to deploy a UN peacekeeping force in Manipur to ensure free and fair conduct of the plebiscite;

iii) UNLF to deposit all its arms to the UN peacekeeping force and India to withdraw all its regular and paramilitary forces from Manipur before a deadline prior to the plebiscite date to be decided by the UN; also, the peacekeeping force to call upon all other armed opposition groups in Manipur to follow suit; and

iv) the UN to hand over political power in accordance with the result of the plebiscite.\textsuperscript{25}

The UNLF alleges that peace talks are always one-sided and work in favor of the government. It even appealed to ceasefire groups to realize the danger and return to the revolutionary path. It also expressed willingness to work with NSCN-IM on territorial issues of Manipur, if the latter abandoned the path of ‘compromise with India’ and resumed its
armed struggle. Having said that there has not been sincere attempt on the part of the state to bring the major armed groups to the dialogue process, but, UNLF proposal for plebiscite has triggered some response among a section of the people. In this context, the proposal should be taken as a positive indicator to reach out to the UNLF leadership.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{ASSASSINATION OF PHOOLAN DEVI}

In India Phoolan Devi, a poor Dalit woman, became famous through the 1980s until her assassination in 2001 as a woman bandit who took the laws of the land in her own hands and allegedly killed several upper caste men. According to Bishnupriya Ghosh, Phoolan attracted the attention of the press because as a low-caste Dalit woman, belonging to the sub caste of Mallahs, “designated as Other Backward Castes in state parlance,” her actions challenged hierarchies of caste and gender in rural India where caste politics, intersected by gender and class issues, assume a complex feudal scenario. Just as slaves who escaped from the brutal system of slavery in the American South were labeled “fugitive” for breaking the laws of a slaveholding society, the Dalits who break away from the repressive caste stranglehold are ousted as baghis (rebels/outlaws). They commit “crimes” like “looting, arson, or murder” to avenge the injustices of the upper castes and are considered dacoits or bandits who can no longer live in society. Along with other crimes, Phoolan’s supposed killing of twenty- two Thakurs (upper caste men) in Behmai, an ordinary village in Uttar Pradesh, a state in north India, forced the Indira Gandhi-led central government to launch a “massive paramilitary operation” to terminate Phoolan’s ‘lawlessness.’\textsuperscript{27}

When she was finally apprehended by the Indian government in 1983, Phoolan made headlines during her surrender to the state government before being imprisoned for eleven years. After her release in 1994 she launched her political career by getting elected to the lower house of the Indian Parliament, Lok Sabha. In 2001 she was murdered by men who claimed to avenge the Behmai massacre.\textsuperscript{28}

Phoolan’s unconventional life and career took the media in India and Europe by storm. Several books detailing her extraordinary life and a famous film, \textit{Bandit Queen}, by Indian filmmaker Shekhar Kapur, have attempted to recapture the life of Phoolan. In the process of multiple representations, however, the ‘real’ Phoolan is probably lost. Except for newspaper reports and the aforementioned books and film there is no archival record of the actual person anymore. It is important to note that a practical problem with hearing Devi’s own voice was her illiteracy that made her completely dependent on journalists’ transcriptions of her experiences. Phoolan spoke Bundelkhandi, a regional dialect of Hindi,
the Indian national language, which had to be translated first into standard Hindi in order to be translated once again into English for a wider audience within India and abroad. In such a case, the credibility of translators and the writer’s own maturity played a crucial role for an accurate version of Devi’s voice, twice removed from the final re-presentation.29

**INDIAN PARLIAMENT ATTACK**

On 13 December 2001, five terrorists infiltrated the Parliament House in a car with Home Ministry and Parliament labels. Many members of parliament (MPs) and government officials such as Home Minister LK Advani and Minister of State for Defence Harin Pathak were believed to have still been in the building at the time of the attack. More than 100 people, including major politicians were inside the parliament building at the time. The gunmen used a fake identity sticker on the car they drove and thus breached the security deployed around the parliamentary complex. The terrorists carried AK47 rifles, grenade launchers, pistols and grenades. Delhi Police officials claimed that gunmen received instructions from Pakistan and the operation was carried out under the guidance of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.30

The gunmen drove their vehicle into the car of the Indian Vice-President Krishan Kant (who was in the building at the time), got out, and began shooting. The Vice-President's guards and security personnel shot back at the terrorists and then started closing the gates of the compound. A similar attack was carried out on assembly of Srinagar, Kashmir, during November 2001, when 38 people were killed by terrorists.31

**Victims and Perpetrators**

Constable Kamlesh Kumari was first to spot the terrorists and was shot dead by them as she raised the alarm. One gunman's suicide vest exploded when he was shot dead; the other four gunmen were also killed. Five policemen, a Parliament security guard, and a gardener were killed, and 18 others were injured. The ministers and MPs escaped unhurt. The total number of deaths was 14 and at least 22 people were injured in the attack.32

Delhi Police claimed that five militants carried out the attack and the names given by them were 1.Hamza, 2. Haider alias Tufail, 3.Rana, 4. Raja and 5. Mohammed, all of whom were killed by the security. Indian court observed that three more people from across the border (i.e. Pakistan), namely, Maulana Masood Azhar, Ghazi Baba alias Abu Jehadi and Tariq Ahmed were also involved in preparing the attack.33
Trial

The attack triggered extensive investigations which revealed possible involvement of four accused namely Afzal Guru, Shaukat Hussain and S.A.R. Gilani and Navjot Sandhu a.k.a. Afsan. Some other proclaimed offenders said to be the leaders of the banned militant organization known as Jaish-e-Mohammed. After the conclusion of investigation, investigating agency filed the report under Section 173 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (India) against four accused persons on 14 May 2002. Charges were framed under various sections of Indian Penal Code, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, and the Explosive Substances Act by the designated sessions Court.  

The designated Special Court was presided over by S. N. Dhingra. The accused were tried and the trial concluded within a record period of about six months. 80 witnesses were examined for the prosecution and 10 witnesses were examined on behalf of the accused S.A.R. Gilani. About 300 documents were exhibited. Afzal Guru, Shaukat Hussain and S.A.R. Gilani were convicted for the offences under Sections 121, 121A, 122, Section 120B read with Sections 302 & 307 read with Section 120B IPC, sub-Sections (2), (3) & (5) of Section 3 and Section 4(b) of POTA and Sections 3 & 4 of Explosive Substances Act. The accused 1 and 2 were also convicted under Section 3(4) of POTA.  

Accused No.4 namely Navjot Sandhu a.k.a. Afsan was acquitted of all the charges except the one under Section 123 IPC for which she was convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine. Death sentences were imposed on the other three accused for the offences under Section 302 read with Section 120B IPC and Section 3(2) of POTA. They were also sentenced to life imprisonment on as many as eight counts under the provisions of IPC, POTA and Explosive Substances Act in addition to varying amounts of fine. The amount of a million Indian rupees, which was recovered from the possession of two of the accused, namely, Afzal Guru and Shaukat Hussain, was forfeited to the State under Section 6 of the POTA.  

On appeal, the high court subsequently acquitted S. A. R Geelani and Afsan, but upheld Shaukat's and Afzal's death sentence. Geelani's acquittal blew a gaping hole in the prosecution's version of the parliament attack. He was presented as the mastermind of the entire attack. Geelani, a young lecturer at Delhi University received support from his outraged colleagues and friends, who were certain that he had been framed. They contacted the well-known lawyer Nandita Haksar and asked her to take on his case. Shaukat Hussain was released nine months prior to his official date of release, because of his "good conduct".
Response

The Indian Government initially accused Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed of involvement in the attack. However, Lashkar-e-Taiba denied any involvement in the incident. In November 2002, four JeM members were caught by Indian authorities and put on trial. All four were found guilty of playing various roles in the incident, although the fourth, Afsan /Navjot Sandhu, wife of Shaukat Hussain (one of the accused) was found guilty of a minor charge of concealing knowledge of conspiracy. One of the accused, Afzal Guru, was sentenced to the death penalty for the incident.38

World leaders and leaders in India's immediate neighborhood condemned the attack on the Parliament. On 14 December, the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) blamed Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed for the attack. Home Minister LK Advani claimed, "[w]e have received some clues about yesterday's incident, which shows that a neighboring country, and some terrorist organizations active there behind it", in an indirect reference to Pakistan and Pakistan-based terrorist groups.39

The same day, in a demarche to Pakistani High Commissioner to India Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, India demanded that Pakistan stop the activities of LeT and JeM, that Pakistan apprehend the organizations’ leaders and that Pakistan curb the financial assets and the groups’ access to these assets. In response to the Indian government's statements, Pakistani forces were put on high alert the same day. On 20 December, India mobilized and deployed its troops to Kashmir and Punjab in what was India's largest military mobilization since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Following the attack, many suspects were arrested, and in December 2002 four Jaish-e-Mohammed members were convicted for roles in the attack. In 2003, India said its forces had killed the mastermind of the attack in Kashmir.40

Afzal Guru, sentenced to death by Indian court and due to be hanged on 20 October, had his execution stayed. His family had camped in New Delhi to meet the President Dr. A.P.J Abdul Kalam to accept the mercy petition. Also the family of Kamlesh Kumari, a CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) Jawan who died in the attack has said that they would return the Ashok Chakra, if the president accepts the petition, but it is unclear if it had been done so.41 On 13 December 2006, the families of the deceased returned the medals to the government. As of April 2007, the then President of India, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, refused to interfere in the judicial process. The sentence was scheduled to be carried out on 20 October 2006, but Afzal was given a stay of execution and remained on death row. On 3 February 2013, his mercy petition was rejected by the current President of India Pranab Mukherjee. He
was hanged at Delhi's Tihar Jail around 08:00 A.M. on 9 February 2013, and buried in Tihar jail with full religious rites.42

SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS

FBI Director Mueller has admitted his case against 19 FBI-named hijackers would never stand up in a court of law. Despite his admission, however, the FBI has refused to alter its list. And only one month after the FBI began to investigate the alleged hijackers, President Bush himself called off their investigation on the pretext that manpower was needed to fight the anthrax threat. After that threat dissipated, the hijacking investigation itself had been hijacked: the FBI never returned to complete it. And the FBI never released the original 9-11 airline flight manifests after it had quickly confiscated them. Then the FBI said it located “suspects” in those manifests, investigated them, and promptly named 19 Arab hijackers. Passenger lists made available by the airlines, however, contained none of these 19. Within 24 hrs of the attacks, CNN had this first FBI list of 19.43

A simple story of the 9-11 operation is easiest to convey to the public at large. And there is nothing inherently wrong with simplicity. The official/simple story goes something like this: Osama bin Laden assembled together an Arab group of hijackers willing to commit suicide (apparently, with few accomplices), who booked cross-country flights on four heavily fueled planes, somehow got past airport securities with knives, overwhelmed the crew of the planes in mid-flight, surprised air traffic controllers and air defenses, and then, with steeled and coordinated determination, skillfully guided three planes into the World Trade Center (WTC) 1 and 2 (both soon to collapse) and the Pentagon. Due to passenger heroism, the hijackers only failed on the last flight which went down in a Pennsylvania field. The nation as a whole was surprised, to say the least, as Condolezza Rice exploited in her initial statement. Doubts and concerns began to be expressed about various elements of the story, but then the bi-partisan 9-11 Commission (2004) confirmed the story. Any significant contesting of the story would be called “conspiracy theory”. In this context, the very word “theory” implies opposition to “truth”, that is, the story as verified by the Commission.

On the basis of this story, tens of thousands of people are already dying, millions already suffering increasingly, an national/international context is being changed, and world war cannot be excluded as an eventual outcome except that the Commission report is sloppy, at best, and clearly serves the Bush administration and the Commission’s membership can hardly be considered independent. Anyway, the person serving the office of U.S. President has his own conspiracy theory and has dominated the public discourse.
A little-known fact is that, besides the name of Mohamed Atta, it contained four names from the Flight 11 manifest, which the FBI dropped and replaced with four other Arab names. Are we then to believe there were at least nine Arab names on Flight 11 to choose from, and four of the FBI’s five choices were wrong? Because the original manifests have never been released to the public, despite the many requests of the researchers who have all been refused, there is no way to know. Yet lists of the deceased passengers on each flight were released minus the alleged hijackers, it was said, because the airlines did not want to upset families who had lost loved ones. In Flight 11’s case, there should have been – but were not – four Arab names among the deceased who were not hijackers. Total passenger counts for each flight similarly fail to correspond to the total names on each airline list plus FBI-named hijackers for that flight. No discrepancy exists in this respect: none of the airline lists contain any hijacker names.\footnote{44}

Finally, 10 of those named by the FBI have since turned out to be alive, documented as such by authorities and interviews with those named. Meanwhile, the FBI has stubbornly refused to adjust its list to reflect these facts. Most frustrating to researchers and investigators are instances in which the US government, intelligence agencies, and Pentagon have simply confiscated or destroyed the evidence. Then, when hard-pressed to make a disclosure, as for example in the recent Senate Hearings on the top-secret Able Danger intelligence unit, they only disclose they did indeed destroy some documents. The Able Danger case revealed 2.5 terabytes of documents (equivalent to one-fourth of all printed materials in the Library of Congress) were destroyed.\footnote{45} Among them were documents identifying ringleader Mohamed Atta as a terrorist two years before 9-11. Most of the time the government has simply refused to disclose evidence or brief the public about what happened on 9-11. It seems pretty clear that the government, through the FBI and an FBI-complicit 9-11 Commission, has as its goal to cover-up what happened that day.\footnote{46}

No one knows exactly how the FBI came upon their original list of 19, nor how it made such grievous errors. The FBI never explained how the errors came about, CNN was forced to print a retraction, and the rest of the media left the FBI off the hook. After Flight 11 crashed into the WTC killing thousands, the FBI appeared to rush in to doctor the original flight manifest, and then seemed to pretend their alteration of evidence never happened in this criminal murder case. Then the US government became preoccupied with war against terrorists and refused to release authenticated videos of terrorists boarding the planes that crashed. The Boston, Dulles, and Newark airports were all equipped with security cameras, which would have captured all of the passengers who boarded those flights that day. Since
authenticated airport security videos of the boarding of the four 9-11 flights had to have existed at some time, why have they never been shown at least one of them? Why could not all four of them just as easily have been released to the public as evidence against the accused hijackers? Could it be that none of the alleged hijackers were on these planes? 47

The 9-11 Portland Jetport video of Abdul Aziz al-Omari and Mohamed Atta contains verifiable airport security data on its entire footage. Such data include the date, a digital clock showing the ongoing time of day, and the camera identification number which gives the camera’s airport location, all necessary factors to authenticate an event, as well as the video itself. Through this footage, the FBI was able to identify Atta as the terrorist ringleader, although it was never explained how the FBI could identify him so quickly. However, the Portland video does not count as proof that Atta and al-Omari hijacked the plane that crashed, since this video only depicts them boarding a connecting flight. Under the viewing public’s stress of witnessing the 9-11 tragedy on television, it is understandable that events would get confused and conflated in the viewing and memory of which plane was being boarded. 48

This factor was most likely taken into account in the overall plan of the real perpetrators of 9-11, and it may be why Atta and al-Omari took the detour from Boston to Portland, Maine, only to fly the connecting flight back to Boston. The Dulles Airport video is unlike the Portland video in every way. While the Portland video has sharp, clear resolution, the Dulles video’s resolution is poor and grainy. While the Portland video was released soon after 9-11, only heavily edited versions of the Dulles video with segments missing were not made available to the American public until almost three years later, on July 21, 2004, one day before the Commission Report’s release. It took a lawsuit by families of some of the victims of the 9-11 attacks seemingly to pry the video loose from the government’s grip. The video was finally obtained by the Associated Press from the law firm representing the families. 49

Without verifiable security camera data imprinted on the entire tape – standard for all airport videos – and without evidence to indicate erasure, there is no possibility that the video is authentic. Hence, the possibility that the Dulles Airport video is a forgery. Devoid of such security data, both as a security video and as evidence of an event to be used in a court of law, what possible use could this video have? Finally, the missing security data are all the more suspect given the camera’s location at the airport terminal’s security screening checkpoint. These missing data are just one of five major problems identifiable in the Dulles video. Photographs have also turned up in the news, but these are merely stills reproduced from the same Dulles footage, some zoomed-in or blown-up, but all lacking authenticity by
virtue of their origin. Therefore, two of these photographs show, for example, the al-Hazmi brothers passing through metal detectors before proceeding to board a flight of unknown date and destination.\textsuperscript{50}

The presence of Salem al-Hazmi allegedly preparing to board Flight 77 introduces another problem: both he and al-Mihdhar could not have boarded that flight since they were reported alive after 9-11, and yet they, of all five “hijackers,” are perhaps the most clearly identifiable in the Dulles video images which bear close resemblance to their FBI photographs. In al-Mihdhar’s case, one report comes from the FBI itself, which warned all banks to watch for him after 9-11. As for Salem, he testified for himself that on 9-11 he was working at a Saudi petrochemical complex in Yanbou.\textsuperscript{51}

The government’s case that the “hijackers” were agents of bin Laden’s al-Qaeda had as its best evidence the Dulles video purportedly showing them preparing to board the plane which crashed into the Pentagon. All problems with the evidence combine to undermine the Dulles video’s authenticity and corroborate its forgery. It is the flimsiest evidence upon which the entire weight of the official story collapses. No airport security video has appeared for the other flights. Therefore, no evidence exists that any of the “hijackers” ever boarded planes that crashed on 9-11.\textsuperscript{52}

The major proof the Bush administration touted to incriminate bin Laden, the hijackers, and al-Qaeda, the so-called bin Laden “confession” video, should have become a major embarrassment for Bush. In the “smoking gun” video, which aired December 20, 2001,\textsuperscript{53} bin Laden praises five great martyrs who were alive after 9-11. However, inaccuracies and distortions of White House and Pentagon translations from the Arabic went unreported in the American press. Saudi experts and German investigators alike have found these translations “manipulative” in misleading the American people.\textsuperscript{54}

Correctly translated, the bin Laden video, far from providing proof to support the official story, actually discredits itself and the official story. Whereas only one hijacker is named in the White House translation, and only three in the Pentagon version, Ali al-Ahmed, director of the Saudi Institute, accurately translates bin Laden identifying nine of the suspected hijackers: Mohamed Atta, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Salem al-Hazmi, “four from the al-Ghamdi tribe,” and “two others, both named al-Shehri”. Of these nine, five turned up alive. But the US government’s showcasing of the bin Laden video as proof of his self-confessed guilt would only have boomeranged had the correct translation become known to a receptive American media who in turn reported it to the American people. Bin Laden erroneously
praising uninvolved men makes no sense. At the expense of embarrassing himself, bin Laden would also be proliferating propaganda in support of the US war effort.\textsuperscript{55}

Most likely US intelligence moles created this video forgery for that reason. Abnormalities in the video prevent from determining when or where it was taped, and chances are good that the soundtrack was tampered with and therefore fabricated. Who has the kind of sophisticated technical assets to pull off such an operation? Qui bono? Who benefited from this “confessional” video precisely because they knew that the correct translation of names of men who were alive and uninvolved in the attacks would be withheld from the American public? Sadly, four years later, the vast majority of Americans still do not know. If the real bin Laden had masterminded 9-11, he certainly would have known not to name those names. An illogical and un-self-serving absurdity, this “confession” video chock-full of abnormalities and practically screaming forgery only makes sense when noticed the “bin Laden” in it is a double, and just one of many doubles who functioned in a covert US intelligence operation. The FBI not only lied but has also engaged in a massive cover-up.\textsuperscript{56}

Not only do the disclosures discredit the FBI’s official story of Atta’s timeline and activities as a story riddled with discrepancies, but they also reveal that the FBI erased and effectively confiscated other information that would show Atta had ties to numerous close non-Arab associates in Florida as well as meetings with visitors from abroad during the final weeks of preparations for the attacks. Atta’s father was not the innocently concerned father shown in interviews after 9-11 denying his son had ever been to the United States or participated in the attacks. In retrospect, Atta Senior is also not the man he pretends to be, and his statement that his son phoned him the day after the attacks, as evidence his son was still alive, cannot be trusted.\textsuperscript{57}

Four years later, after at least ten named on the FBI’s final list of 19 have been verified to be alive, with proof that at least one other, Ziad Jarrah, had his identity doubled and therefore fabricated, the FBI has nevertheless refused to make the necessary corrections to exonerate those falsely accused. Here is the list of those 11:

(1) Waleed al-Shehri
(2) Wail al-Shehri
(3) Mohand al-Shehri
(4) Abdulrahman al-Omari
(5) Abdul Aziz al-Omari
(6) Khalid al-Mihdhar
(7) Salem al-Hazmi  
(8) Marwan al-Shehhi  
(9) Saeed al-Ghamdi  
(10) Ahmed al-Nami  
(11) Ziad Jarrah (Although missing and presumed dead, he is proven to have been innocent). The documents reveal that many of these “stolen identities” are pilots or work for airlines. Apparently, terrorists with pilot credentials and/or pilots with terrorist experience are in short supply. Alternatively, someone from inside Saudi Airlines assisted in the acquisition of these identities. Whatever entity was the source for the 19 FBI-named hijackers, what this list shows is that someone took pains to provide either actual pilot identities or fabricated terrorist characters with certified pilot identities.

In an early, September 12, 2001 disclosure, CNN reported being provided with a list of 19 hijackers from the flight manifests which the FBI presumably possessed. This particular list of 19 is instructive for the kinds of errors it contains, and for the four names the FBI had quickly changed. Two of these corrections involved the deletion of Adnan and Ameer Bukhari who were called brothers in most press releases. But in others Adnan denied Ameer was his brother. After deleting the two Bukhari names, could the FBI have then discovered what the real identities of the people on the plane were within 24–48 hours when all evidence lay destroyed under a pile of rubble? The fact is the FBI did implement and hastily release changes within two days of 9-11. It seems they merely substituted two new names of post-mortem recruits who, because they were not in the US, would not immediately show up at a local FBI office as had Adnan Bukhari, giving the lie to the FBI’s list.

Levi presents proof that from the very beginning US authorities, especially the FBI, engaged in lies and the fabrication of evidence against 9-11 hijacker suspects. By its own account, the FBI initiated its investigation by searching American Airlines’ and United Airlines’ flight manifests for the names of possible suspects. Next, the FBI found where these suspects lived and traced their movements before 9-11. The list of five suspects the FBI says it allegedly chose from the manifests and investigated immediately after the attack: “Mohamed Atta, Adnan Bukhari, Ameer Bukhari, Abdulrahman al-Omari, and Amer Kamfar”.

Why did “they” have to create the illusion hijackers flew the planes into buildings? The answer is fivefold: (1) to implicate an outside, foreign, Arab source and more specifically, to set up al-Qaeda as overall patsy. Conveniently for the US war machine, al-Qaeda lacks a specific national identity, a fact which makes it necessary for the US military
to hunt them down in multiple countries: Afghanistan, Iraq…; (2) to give the perpetrators a
decidedly fanatic, fundamentalist Islamic “‘face,’” captured so well in Atta’s “‘death-mask’”
photograph, and thereby to convince that this enemy had the necessary religious extremism to
martyr themselves as the hijacker/“suicide bombers” the official story needed as cover story;
(3) to act as a red-herring used to divert attention away from government insider moles, the
only perpetrators capable of carrying out an attack using multiple war games as a crucial part
of its strategy; (4) to divert attention away from the use of computer technology and Global
Hawk by which piloting of the planes could have been overtaken from a remote location, for
example the military command bunker that the Vice President occupied, and (5) with the
construction of hijackers flying planes in suicide missions as the agency that brought down
the WTC twin towers, to divert attention from the actual agency of the towers’ destruction:
pre-planted, controlled demolition explosives.

In the list of 19 hijackers the FBI took from the flight manifests, most of the identities
offered are frauds, composites, or myths. The Flight 11 manifest from which the FBI
allegedly named five hijackers, only one of which – the so-called ringleader Mohamed Atta –
remained in its final version. The FBI just deleted Adnan Bukhari, Ameer Bukhari,
Abdulrahman al-Omari, and Amer Kamfar from their initial list when those individuals began
showing up alive and simply substituted new names. With the exception of Atta, the only
constant in its two lists, the FBI changed all the rest of its first list of names aboard Flight 11,
and its manifest evolved as follows:

1. Adnan Bukhari replaced by Waleed al-Shehri;
2. Ameer Bukhari replaced by Wail al-Shehri;
3. Abdulrahman al-Omari replaced by Abdul Aziz al-Omari; and
4. Amer Kamfar replaced by Satam al-Suqami. This “‘new and improved’” second (and
final) FBI list, however, failed as well since all except Satam al-Suqami have turned up alive.
Such revelations pretty much discredit the FBI’s method of rounding up and investigating
hijacker suspects.

However, the fact that the FBI interrogated Adnan Bukhari under a polygraph and
were satisfied that he was not an accomplice, and also deleted al-Omari and Kamfar from
their suspect lists, would indicate that none of the four were guilty of aiding in the alleged
hijacking. So rather than “‘enhance’” the original story, the guilty appearance of their abrupt
departure is anomalous behavior since they were not in fact guilty. Or were they? If the
hijacker handlers also had influence inside Saudi Airlines’ corporate office, then it would
explain how and when certain employees in Florida were picked to be recalled to Saudi
Arabia, and the coincidence of their sudden departures would be no coincidence. The part of the plot where the unwitting patsy hijackers, who were not on the planes, have somehow to be liquidated is also taken care of without bloodshed or loss of life, through job cutbacks or employee recall program.  

The evidence found in Atta’s luggage, which conveniently missed the connecting flight and was left in the airport to be found by the authorities. In Atta’s two bags were: a copy of the Koran, Boeing flight simulator manuals, a religious cassette, a note to other hijackers regarding mental preparation, Atta’s personal Will, a passport, and an international driver’s license. If Atta knew he was going to hijack and crash Flight 11, and everything would be burnt to a crisp, why would he pack, among other things, his Will? This is yet another point the 9-11 Commission failed to address. Such fabrications were very fortuitous: the leaving behind of Atta’s Nissan Altima rental and Atta’s luggage both replete with just the right kind of evidence to yield an image of Atta as a meticulously prepared, well-organized, religiously focused terrorist leader, the kind of image desired by those who wrote the cover story. In the same vein, the flight attendant’s phone call that the FBI Affidavit also lists conveniently makes reference to the hijackers’ specific seat numbers, which was probably a fabrication as well.  

Having familiarized with the account of the Bukharis and company, the FBI, acting alone, tried to cover-up an embarrassing episode of stolen identity. The FBI did not have time to discover that an identity had been stolen or by whom. Then it would be written off the Bukharis as just more unwitting patsies. On September 13, 2001, James P. Hopkins, an International Aviation Operations Specialist with the FAA in Washington, DC, searched the FAA database for the name Adnan Bukhari and found a match. A Saudi Arabian national, Adnan Bukhari had trained in Aviation Security for the FAA in Oklahoma. Now why would a Saudi Arabian Airlines flight engineer, who later turns up training to fly just before 9-11, have had training in Aviation Security for the FAA? And how did he come to be on the FBI’s original list of 19 hijackers? Hopkins’ FAA supervisors reprimanded him and then fired him for his detective work. Hopkins took his case to the US Office of Special Counsel, which had him reinstated in his job.  

This case not only illustrates the sensitivity of this Bukhari identity, whether he was to be used as a would-be hijacker or not by the hijacker handlers, but also shows that the FAA was, like the FBI, in on the cover-up. Ultimately, Hopkins had risked his job – his life with the FAA will probably never be the same – only to find that Adnan Bukhari was cleared of any wrongdoing by the FBI. Adnan Bukhari, with his background in Aviation Security at the
FAA and with the FAA’s demonstrated sensitivity to keeping his connection with them unknown, seems to be much more than an unwitting flight student or patsy. Like Atta, he could have been a double agent until his cover was blown, or one of the hijacker handlers imbedded in the flight student community of sleepy suburban Vero Beach, Florida.73

Before assuming that Atta and company boarded the respective Boeing 757 and 767 airliners on 9-11, for which there is no credible evidence, everybody assumed that these men were psychologically motivated enough, fanatically fundamentalist Muslims with a deep desire to martyr themselves for their religion. Setting all speculation and accounts of these hijackers’ deficiencies aside, and focusing solely upon the question of whether it was physically possible for these men to crash Boeing airliners into the 9-11 targets, it is the consensus of professional airline and military jet pilots that they could not have piloted them with the degree of competence necessary to do so. Most of the respondents added that the hijackers needed much more than the practice only some of them had flying Cessnas, Pipers, and Lear jets; they would have needed a substantial amount of practice flying Boeing 757s and 767s, and not just on flight simulators, to be able to fly them with any kind of accuracy.74

Superficially, it would seem that hijackers and their masterminds could not have pulled off the 9-11 attacks because they could not have arranged to synchronize them with so many different military exercises. However, because this question demands an in-depth scientific understanding of both the aeronautic and computer technologies involved and the codes terrorists would have had to break, steal, or be given to coordinate their flights on 9-11, the answer remain unanswered. Considering the depth and widespread reach of the US intelligence community, the most plausible answer is the one that accounts for the vast resources it would have taken not only to plan and execute the attacks but also to maintain the cover-up and to foil investigation with a paralyzing atmosphere of fear and uncertainty.75

The role of doubles sheds significant explanatory light on an entire covert operation of 9-11, which, without the discovery of their existence, would be an impossible riddle. The role the CIA played in the Dubai airport subterfuge was to alert authorities there in advance to watch for Ziad Jarrah and to interrogate him for them, a fact which, the CIA then later vigorously denied. This CIA denial combined with their claim that they never had any knowledge of Ziad Jarrah before 9-11, and that they therefore had no reason to put him on a terrorist watch list are all contradicted by the careful testimony of a UAE official who, for obvious reasons, wished to remain anonymous.76

Is this the face of a man uncomfortable with and embarrassed by the woman next to him because her short sleeve blouse and uncovered flowing hair demonstrate a refusal to be
more observant of fundamentalist Islamic precepts? Who wrote the propaganda for the Commission? Another factor which calls the authenticity of the paper passport photo of Jarrah into question is its almost miraculous survival after the black box was never found and most of the Flight 93 wreckage was reduced to ashes or blown to metal bits in a debris field strewn over eight miles. It seems likely this passport photograph was planted, and no credible evidence exists that any of these hijackers boarded Flight 93. While the Jarrah family has been eager to give DNA samples, none have been taken, and only the deceased of non-hijackers have been verified through their DNA. No DNA samples are needed for two of the other three hijackers allegedly on Flight 93: al-Nami and Saeed al-Ghamdi have both been confirmed alive.77

While 10 of 19 have turned up alive, the Ziad Jarrah case goes against the grain because, while it contains the best evidence of at least one double who went by the same name, neither the one who was stopped in Dubai en route from neither Afghanistan nor the one who had rented an apartment in Brooklyn has shown up alive to claim that his passport was stolen. All the best evidence shows the accused Jarrah was framed by his double, and he no doubt had to be liquidated for the cover story to hold. The 9-11 Commission (2004) appears to be complicit in this framing of Jarrah, albeit after-the-fact, since they never even consider the documented existence of Ziad Jarrah’s double in their report.78 Providing neither proof nor evidence of Jarrah’s guilt, their report just assumes his guilt-by-association with statements like, “In Hamburg… apparently never resided with his future co-conspirators. It is not clear how and when he became part of Atta’s circle” (9-11 Commission, 2004, p. 163).

The Dulles Airport surveillance videotape, submitted by the FBI as evidence, has been taken to be authentic by the 9-11 Commission, while it so obviously lacks any verifiable sign of authentication and has so many other flaws that point to its forgery. Yet many who view it probably think the FBI or CIA would not forge evidence in such an obvious fashion, nor would the Commission accept it as evidence if it were so obvious a forgery.79

Who were these two alleged hijackers and what is the evidence of their contacts both with FBI (under an agent’s 24-hour surveillance prior to 9-11 for a period of at least four months) and with as many as 13 of the alleged hijackers months before 9-11? Unlike the resumes of the rest of the notorious 19 which the FBI has seen fit to provide us, the backgrounds of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar show them to have been involved in al-Qaeda-like militant activities. Both apparently participated in the Bosnian conflict and then fought in Chechnya several times between 1996 and 1998. Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were not like any of the other hijackers; they were experienced, battle-hardened militants.80

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Failure of any of the US intelligence agencies to take them out cannot be explained by bureaucratic error or failure to share information with each other, because an exhaustive examination of the literature of news accounts and of the presentations before the Congressional Intelligence Committee reveals that any one of the intelligence agencies, unassisted by the others, had both the means and at least one opportunity each to do so. In short, the two should have been caught. They could easily have been turned in by Abdussattar Shaikh after they moved to San Diego, somehow located this undercover FBI agent, paid him rent, and moved into his house.\textsuperscript{81}

According to a Congressional Inquiry report, however, the NSA did not share this information with other US intelligence agencies even though “it was in the NSA’s database.” Nor did the NSA submit the names of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to the TIPOFF database. From their biographical backgrounds as veteran mujahideen, much vaunted by intelligence agencies, one would think the security threat the duo posed would have forced them to act in a more surreptitious fashion. However, from the way they casually moved about in the open, one gets the impression they knew they were “protected.” Such was probably the role of reassurance their live-in landlord Abdussattar Shaikh assumed, even while as an undercover agent he provided the FBI with a means to infiltrate their very living space and keep them under surveillance 24/7.\textsuperscript{82}

Before moving in with Abdussattar Shaikh, the two took up residence early in 2000 at San Diego’s Parkwood Apartments where they were joined in February 2000 by Hanjour who lived there for at least a year. Oddly, the Congressional Inquiry reported Hanjour was out of the US until December 2000 and, upon returning, took up residence not in San Diego but in Arizona (Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02). This report conflicts with eyewitnesses who saw Hanjour with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in May 2000. What possible purpose could this official alteration of dates serve? Meanwhile, according to several mainstream-presses reported eyewitness accounts, the Parkwood Apartments were visited by Hanjour, Haznawi, al-Shehhi, Ahmed al-Ghamdi, and other Arabs who may have helped them.\textsuperscript{83}

Had al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar been trailed, intelligence agencies would have uncovered their contacts with the other “hijackers,” which would have led to the uncovering of the entire 9-11 cell. But, from a detailed look at US intelligence agency behavior, it must be questioned if that was indeed their goal. That question becomes academic, however, when al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved in with an undercover FBI agent at whose residence they were visited by even more hijacker associates including – according to several eyewitness
neighbors but denied by their FBI landlord – Mohamed Atta, the FBI-named ringleader. Atta was a “regular visitor” to the home of Abdussattar Shaikh, while Shaikh, the Congressional Inquiry and the FBI all deny Atta visited Shaikh’s residence. The neighbors must have all been mistaken or delusionary then.\(^8^4\)

The revelation of such a strategically placed undercover FBI agent must have been an embarrassment to the entire US intelligence community. The CIA admitted they had al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar on some sort of watch list but bemoaned “losing” them. The NSA claimed to have had them “in their sights” in early 2000 at the al-Qaeda summit in Kuala Lumpur, but failed somehow to bug the place so they missed the terrorists’ detailed conversations. The FBI’s tired refrain was that it was left out of the loop by the CIA. As far as al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were concerned, with Shaikh, the FBI had effectively infiltrated their lodgings and their very lives. The FBI had claimed that it knew so little that it had to prevent Shaikh from talking to Congress about how little the FBI knew. At the very least, the FBI was caught lying and engaging in a cover-up. And al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar lived out in the open, like two enemy agents living under its enemy’s protection, or as if their files were flagged in US government databases as having National Security overrides.\(^8^5\)

The Congressional Inquiry turned up so many instances of “intelligence failure” claims by the CIA alone that these redundant claims soon began to lack credibility, especially after the much heralded Kuala Lumpur “top-level al-Qaeda summit,” the most pivotal gathering of al-Qaeda prior to 9-11 that took place on January 5–8, 2000. After that meeting, the CIA’s claims of ignorance and intelligence failure rapidly escalated. The CIA Director later claimed that, at the time of Kuala Lumpur, he thought the meeting was only to plan an attack elsewhere in Southeast Asia (CIA Director Congressional Testimony, 10/17/02). Thus, although the CIA knew this would be a top-level meeting of all the al-Qaeda bigwigs, for surveillance it allegedly requested Malaysia’s security service to perform in its stead. Thus, since CIA agents were not themselves present, photographs were taken for them of the suspected terrorists as they did their shopping or ducked into cyber cafes to email friends. Captured on videotape were some of the attendees, including al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. However, for some unaccountable reason, the meeting was not wire-tapped and the CIA failed to have the actual discussions monitored.\(^8^6\)

So they said. At the Kuala Lumpur summit were the alleged masterminds of the 9-11 hijackings, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), and the logistics specialist who was slated to be the 20th hijacker, Ramzi bin al-Shibh. Bin al-Shibh had tried to get a visa for the US on four separate occasions and failed each time according to the official story. (Perhaps his US
handlers had other plans in store for him, like being caught after 9-11 to reveal convincing
details of the plot in Al-Jazeera interviews.) Interestingly, although the US had known KSM
was a mastermind terrorist since his connection with Operation Bojinka in 1995, the
Congressional Inquiry revealed that CIA Director Tenet had blocked the declassification of
all information regarding KSM. Consequently, KSM’s name was not even allowed to appear
in the report (Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02). Also curious is the fact that,
although bin al-Shibh’s presence at the January 2000 summit had also been videotaped, his
attendance at the meeting had not been publicly disclosed until nearly two years later, in
September 2002, one full year after the 9-11 attacks he had allegedly helped to orchestrate.\[87\]

Associated with the “wanted” KSM and bin al-Shibh, the presence of al-Hazmi and
al-Mihdhar at the Kuala Lumpur summit plus all the more detailed and incriminating
evidence the CIA had in its possession would indicate they had ties allegedly to bin Laden
due to their attendance at this high-level – allegedly al-Qaeda – summit, to their use of
multiple-entry visas, and to their choice of travel through a Yemeni organization considered
by the CIA to be a “logistical center” for al-Qaeda. All of these significant breadcrumbs left
a trail that would have required the CIA to flag al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar on their watch list,
but the CIA failed even to add them to the extremely low-threshold TIPOFF database.\[88\]

In the transcript of these so-called “intelligence failures” disclosed at the
Congressional Inquiry, there are so many examples in which the CIA learns something
crucial and then “does nothing with the information,” or “fails to follow up,” or again
“failed to do anything about it,” or “failed to act.” Worse still, there were CIA cables which
routinely required that no action be taken. Perhaps the real reason that nothing was done or
there was a “failure to follow up,” was precisely because the system was generating the
explicit instruction: “Action Required: None.” Why intelligence was not shared on different
intelligence agencies’ databases? Was there some kind of National Security “override” in
effect whenever the names of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were entered into the US government
computer system? The instruction, “Action Required: None,” while apparently innocuous,
reveals a consistent pattern that may be evidence of inside government moles.\[89\]

Mohamed Atta’s first immediately visible American hosts were Rudi Dekkers and
Wallace Hilliard, owners of Huffman Aviation in Venice where Atta’s cadre trained. Like
much else about this setting – foreigners who frequented the flight school and the unexplored
history of CIA presence in Venice – these two men were not at all who they pretended to be.
Their flight school business was just getting by and not a real source of money. Not the kind
of money that could support an extravagant life style entailing ownership of helicopters, half-
a-million dollar yachts, and much more. Nine months before the “hijackers” arrived, neither of these men had a clue how to run a flight school business. While it was never the type of business they were in even while they ran it, the flight school did serve as perfect cover for two off-the-shelf CIA “cut-outs.” In spy parlance, a cut-out is a party used to conceal the contact between two other parties, usually a handler and an agent, who do not want to meet because they know one or both of them could be under surveillance. Thus, the CIA could plausibly deny it was ever near Atta while, at the same time, it employed Hilliard, for example, who in turn employed Atta, and perhaps al-Shehhi, to fly his Lear jets to pick up some interesting packages in the Bahamas.\textsuperscript{90}

Atta’s association with these nefarious members of the wealthy elite in south Florida was just the tip of the iceberg of his connections. The deeply submerged part of the berg are those with the deepest pockets, powerful American political figures like David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger who, were closely tied to a little-known private organization that ran an elite international exchange program known variously as “Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft,” CDS, or Carl Duisberg Society International. The list of CDS’ elite power-broker supporters also includes Bill and Hillary Clinton. In 1987, both Kissinger and Clinton praised CDS International’s service not only for keeping close business ties between Germany and the US, but also for supporting career development programs for its participants, namely young German engineers. More recently the program was widened to include participants from other countries as well. Why would CDS International’s elite sponsors, apparently influential enough to keep their organizational name out of the media, want to keep their generous support of such an international student secret in the first place? Were they psychic? Or did they know what role Atta might play in the future because they had a hand in grooming him for it?\textsuperscript{91}

These were probably people who paid for his subsequent vacations to far-away places like Governor Jeb Bush’s “Sunshine State” of Florida. Given that the FBI, CIA, DEA, DIA, and Able Danger have never whispered a word about Atta’s presence in Venice, Florida, from early in 2000 until just a few days before September 11, 2001, the eyewitness testimony from many of the locals – waitresses, strippers, bartenders, employees of the flight school, pharmacists, cab drivers, Yellow Cab management, and more – that Atta lived in Venice and participated in much more than flight training.\textsuperscript{92}

In “Was Pentagon Tracking Mohamed Atta Just Days Before 9-11 Attack?” Whether some major part of the US government, the insider moles in the model, not only allowed the 9-11 attacks to happen, but orchestrated them, cleverly using Arab-looking types as patsies to
pose as their cover of “flight students” who go through the motions of appearing to acquire
sufficient flight training to carry out the attacks. Just as interesting is how the FBI takes up
where military intelligence leaves off, cleaning up all the evidence as it were. Perhaps the
best evidence of the sensitive nature of Atta’s activities is of the FBI’s blanket
implementation of all the resources at its disposal to ensure a cover-up. Unfortunately, the
mainstream US media have been effectively steered astray or, like many eyewitnesses,
silenced by FBI tactics of intimidation, harassment, and bullying.93

The multitude of credible local residents who witnessed the real conspirators’ use of
intimidating FBI silencers in Venice, Florida, to cover up those connections. The stunning
accounts by numerous credible Venice witnesses who, after seeing Atta’s father on television
news after 9-11, phoned the Sarasota FBI office to report he had been there visiting his son
just two weeks before 9-11. The FBI never whispered a word of this visit; in fact, it returned
to Venice to intimidate these witnesses into silence. Meanwhile, when it was not busy trying
to destroy the people’s history, it was hunting down leads, not to uncover information, but to
kill it.94

CIA cut-out Dekkers asserted that Atta departed Huffman Aviation and Venice for
good in December 2000, nine months before 9-11. The FBI concurred with this wanted
criminal, international conman’s assertion that Atta had indeed left Venice, Florida, in
December 2000, never to return. While the entire FBI timeline has been shown by many
independent investigators, to be seriously flawed, there is proof that the FBI is not merely
incompetent or mistaken; it is in fact lying. Bob Simpson, and other Venice Yellow Cab
employees who also testify to having been interviewed by the FBI itself just three days after
9-11, “Atta took numerous cab rides to and from Huffman Aviation as well as several other
locations in Venice during August 2001 [and] on at least two of these occasions Atta was
traveling with Rudi Dekkersy”. Thus, both Dekkers and the FBI are lying. Evidence that
corroborates Atta and Dekkers carousing together at least twice as late as August 2001 is
provided by the Yellow Cab office manager in Sarasota, Florida, who confirmed the trips
were recorded in the firm’s cab logs.95

Historically, the FBI has been silent about most sensitive evidence that might reveal
the FBI’s – and, later, the 9-11 Commission’s official account – to be a tissue of lies, with
major misdirection and deception thrown in, and on this tissue the FBI rests its case. Despite
all the evidence the FBI had collected from credible witnesses to the contrary, it refuses to
alter its story or its timeline of the hijackers. What information is so dangerous about Atta’s
activities in and out of Venice during those nine months leading up to 9-11 that the FBI has
done its best to cover-up? More specifically, what doesn’t the FBI want to know about Atta that the Pentagon has also done its best to block the public’s right to know during the ‘‘Able Danger’’ Senate hearings? What are all these agencies of the US government lying to conceal and protect from disclosure?  

Daniel Hopsicker predicted that the 9-11 Commission would not examine what is four years after the attack still largely covered up: the trafficking in narcotics by agencies of the US government together with elites, both American and Saudi, for the most part. It is also the reason, why the 9-11 Commission intentionally failed to interview firsthand eyewitnesses, and why Mohamed Atta, the ringleader, was free to travel around the United States – despite the fact that his name was on CIA, FBI, and INS watch lists. Atta was contributing as a pilot in a very lucrative heroin trafficking operation linking Osama bin Laden’s thugs with their counterparts in America.

From interviews with the cab-driver Simpson, at the very same time when the two terrorists, Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, were taking frequent one-way trips from Venice to the Orlando Executive Airport, DEA agents were ‘‘brandishing submachine guns’’ there and seizing a Lear jet belonging to Wallace J. Hilliard. Hilliard was the secret financier/owner of Dekkers’ Huffman Aviation, the flight school attended by Atta and al-Shehhi, two of the alleged hijacking pilots. The DEA found 43 pounds of heroin in Hilliard’s jet, ‘‘the largest seizure in Central Florida’s history’’. The reason for the DEA’s successful drug bust was, according to the agents themselves, ‘‘because this airplane is known for running drugs in and out of the country’’. The bust had actually been an accidental one performed by ‘‘low-level DEA operatives not clued-in to the protected nature of the trade. The US State Department blocked investigations showing links between criminal drug trafficking networks and the terror attacks on 9-11.

Such illegal arms and drug trafficking has been kept as secret as possible with the help not only of official sanction and protection on US soil, but also, apparently, of the 9-11 Commission which never addressed the issue of drug trafficking by the 9-11 terrorist ‘‘hijackers’’ despite the fact that the FBI was their major source of information and the FBI knew Atta’s stay in Venice had begun much earlier than it divulged and also that Atta had made frequent trips between Venice and the Orlando airport whence CIA cut-out Hilliard’s fleet of Lear jets would take off for Rum Cay Island in the Bahamas, an insiders’ well-known drop-off point for heroin/opium from Afghanistan, the world’s top supplier.

It is not plausible that fake fanatic fundamentalist and sybaritic playboy Atta would have chosen the tiny, sedate, retirement community of Venice to satisfy his needs for
nighttime excitement, or as his cadre’s home away from home. Almost certainly Venice was
chosen for them by US government moles with the proximity, convenience and ease of
surveillance of the CIA, DIA, ‘‘Able Danger,’’ SOCOM, and the US Central Command in
mind for the purposes of controlling their patsy prey. CENTCOM’s headquarters were just
down the road at Tampa’s Mac Dill Air Force Base, as was the top-secret Able Danger Army
intelligence team, and the CIA – all over the history of Venice – was represented from inside
the flight school itself by cut-outs Dekkers and Hilliard who, coincidentally, arrived just in
time to set up shop for the ‘‘hijackers’’ arrival. Also, there are indications of an NSA
presence in Venice as well.\footnote{100}

The choice of Venice locates the hijackers’ center stage both geographically and
historically in the theater of covert operations. A brief review of that history turns up obvious
links to the CIA whose agents – in particular E. Howard Hunt, Frank Sturges, and Felix
Rodriguez – reveal a continuity of involvement in scandal after scandal, from the Bay of
Pigs, Kennedy assassination, and Watergate, to Iran–Contra (exposed in 1986 with Felix
Rodriguez serving as Bush Senior’s operative) to the not-yet-sufficiently-exposed
‘‘Hijackingate.’’ The presence of George Bush, Senior, former Director of the CIA is also
prominent throughout this continuity of CIA scandals.\footnote{101}

Shortly before September 11th, Atta cashed a $100,000 check he received from a
group of people led by Mahmud Ahmed. The check was allegedly delivered by Saeed Sheikh
who was later captured for involvement in the beheading of reporter Daniel Pearl. As the
planes were crashing on the morning of September 11, Mahmud Ahmed who was head of the
ISI – Pakistan’s version of our CIA – was meeting with US Senator Bob Graham and Porter
Goss, who became head of the CIA after the events of 9-11. The official story tells nothing
about the connection between the head of the ISI and the alleged financiers of 9-11, or about
the history of the connection between the ISI and the CIA. The official story would rather
make believe that terrorist Islamic fundamentalist groups financially supported their own
terrorist hijackers, Atta included.\footnote{102}

Focusing on the 9-11 ‘‘hijackers,’’ the US government withheld crucial evidence
from the public for no justifiable reason, fabricated other evidence in support of its story, and
confiscated and destroyed still other evidence which would prove that story a falsehood. For
Flight 11’s manifest, the FBI has been caught altering the evidence in the investigation of the
murder of over 3,000 people. All the crucial government evidence depicting Islamic hijacker
terrorists were responsible for 9-11 – the videos, the photographs, the alleged in-flight phone
calls, the cockpit audiotapes, and these ‘‘doctored’’ flight manifests – have been proven to
lack authentication if not also proven, with corroboration from other evidence, to be fabrications or forgeries. A close investigation of most of the hijackers has revealed the use of “doubles,” a staple of any US intelligence covert operation, especially one dealing with the forging of evidence against “terrorists,” most of whom, if not all, were unwitting patsies whose doubles had to be introduced to engage in certain incriminating activities the patsies either would not or, lacking competence, physical presence, and/or motivation, could not have performed.103

The official story and the evidence in support of it had been manufactured with the intent to mislead the American people and to justify the US government’s rush to pre-emptive war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Patriot Act, the huge increases in defense and Homeland Security budgets, and all else. The significance of demonstrating that Islamic hijacker terrorists were not the agency responsible for 9-11, and that evidence to show they were had been manufactured, is to force to confront the hollow, indeed falsified pretext upon which all these policies have been based and, hopefully, turn the US government around from the dangerous direction in which it has headed.104

WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

While war is always about the organized use of violence to achieve political ends, the character of a given war may change dramatically over time. Since 2001, the character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved markedly, from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters, to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda’s use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. In that first phase, a primarily military effort, U.S. and other coalition forces, working closely with Afghan opposition forces, quickly removed the Taliban regime.105

After the fall of the Taliban, the character of the war shifted to a multifaceted COIN effort aimed at smothering the diffuse insurgency by shoring up the efforts of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to provide security, governance, and economic development. Leading practitioners view efforts in all three areas—and not just kinetic military operations—as essential to any successful counterinsurgency campaign. As U.S. Army General David Petraeus, now Commanding General of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has frequently stated, “You can’t kill your way out of an insurgency.”106

The
three areas are generally viewed as interdependent and mutually-reinforcing—sufficient
security is a prerequisite for some governance and development efforts, and longer-term,
sustainable security requires both functional governance and economic opportunity. COIN
theorists argue further that these areas require substantial civilian as well as military efforts.
As the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2006, COIN Manual states: “Military efforts are
necessary and important to counterinsurgency efforts, but they are only effective when
integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power.”

As a central pillar of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan, the Afghan and
international military effort aims broadly at defeating the remnants of the Taliban and other
insurgents, securing the population, and helping extend the reach of the Afghan government.
The international military effort now includes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led
(NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to which the U.S. government
contributes troops, as well as the separate US-led OEF mission.

Prospects for the Outcome of the War

Afghanistan’s results to date have been mixed, and no concrete end of the war is yet
in sight. Despite the achievement of some major political milestones—including ratifying a
new constitution and holding presidential and parliamentary elections—progress to date in
extending the rule of law, establishing effective governance, and furthering economic
development has been relatively limited. Meanwhile, for several years, practitioners and
observers have expressed concerns about a worsening security situation on the ground,
including the greater frequency and sophistication of attacks, exacerbated by the ability of
insurgents to find safe haven across the border in Pakistan.

Experts differ on the further prospects for the Afghanistan effort and the war’s likely
outcome, in part because they pose the question in different ways. One approach addresses
the relatively short-term goal of defeating the insurgency—that is, ensuring that insurgents
cannot directly challenge the authority of the Afghan state. As of late 2009, few if any
practitioners or observers expected the war to end in a clear Taliban victory, including
Taliban control of the state of Afghanistan. Some suggested that a more likely worst-case
scenario would be a reversion to the civil war and chaos of the early 1990s, including
warlordism, a general lack of stability and opportunity for ordinary Afghans, and a
proliferation of ungoverned spaces that might be used by terrorists as safe havens. To some
extent, these conditions are currently manifested in parts of southern Afghanistan.
In late 2008, as a rule, U.S. and other international senior officials in Afghanistan expressed measured optimism regarding near-term results of the counterinsurgency effort. They pointed to some recent progress breaking down insurgent networks and expected further gains, particularly if more resources were made available and greater cooperation from all parties, including neighboring states, achieved. As a rule, international officials did not argue that without more resources, the COIN effort would fail, but rather, that without more resources, the effort would cost more money, more time, and more lives. In August 2009, General Mc Chrystal’s report carried a notably less optimistic assessment, raising the possibility of failure without timely and adequate resourcing of the allied counterinsurgency efforts.11

Another approach to the question of Afghanistan’s prospects takes a broader and longer-term view. Observers from this school of thought point to thirty years of war, occupation, displacement and chaos that have destroyed Afghanistan’s infrastructure, ravaged its human capital resources, and left most of its relatively youthful population with no memories of living in a society not disrupted by conflict. Some experts caution that even if the insurgency is defeated in the near term, it is not hard to imagine that some remnants or some later generations might draw inspiration from the current fight, and resume the attack whenever the political and security constellation seems more conducive to their success—as Afghans say, “You have the watches; we have the time.” Other observers note that in comparative and historical global perspective, it is quite rare for states to achieve “stability” and “good governance,” and that Afghanistan, given its relative poverty of human and natural resources, faces steep challenges and unlikely odds in aiming at those objectives. Accordingly, some senior U.S. and other international officials have urged a tempering of expectations about Afghanistan’s long-term prospects.112

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**War in Afghanistan**


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108. Supra 105.


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