CHAPTER – V

Relations with Europeans

Relations with Portuguese:

The Portuguese rise to power in India is attributed to their capture of the port of Goa and its cession to them by Bijapur. In this study the relations with Portuguese beginning from 1508 to 1686.

The Portuguese were the first European nation to establish overseas commercial intercourse with India during the Medieval period of Indian History. A Portuguese chronicler says that the Portuguese were keenly desirous of bringing Christianity to “vast tribes lying under the myth of God.” Inspired by religious fervor and fired with the crusading spirit, the Portuguese, during the closing years of the fifteenth century, attempted to drive all Muslim shipping from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The next hundred years were occupied in establishing factories on the west coast of India and in waging wars with the Indian rulers. With the landing of Vasco da Gama on 17th May, 1498, near Calicut, the Portuguese became the first Christian nation of Europe to acquire power in India, and they maintained it by the policy of “dvide et impera”—by playing off one Indian State against another. They succeeded in achieving their goal and in obtaining foothold in western India, only after several determined naval attacks on Muslim traders, their fleet and their States.
A new phase in Luso-Indian relation began from 1508 with the dispatch of Francisco de Almeida with the title of Viceroy and authorization by the King of Portugal, to consolidate Portuguese commerce with the east on imperial lines. Almeida was instructed to conclude alliances with the Indian rulers and to interrupt Muslim spice trade by the control of the Red Sea. Portugal thus pitted herself against the commercial organization of the Muslim world. By a system of licenses (Cartaz) he sought to control all oriental trading-ships. This system threatened immediate ruin to his commercial rivals and it was not long before the struggle began, especially after the conquests of Socotra off the Red Sea by the Portuguese.

The rulers of Egypt, Gujarat, Ahmednagar, Bijapur and Calicut were astir, and they were induced to take a concerted action. The allies gave a naval battle to the Portuguese, off Chaul on the western coast of India in 1508. Bijapur joined the allies in fear of the loss of its trade, revenue and monopoly over the seas. The Portuguese, with a re-enforcement retaliated and gave a crushing defeat to the allies on 2nd February 1508, off Diu. This assured the Portuguese of sea power in the Indian Ocean.

Commercial motives incited Yusuf ‘Adil Shah to join the allies. But there was neither any political nor diplomatic reason for Bijapur to join against the Portuguese. The Portuguese on their part had not done any hostile act against Bijapur. This was the first indirect between the two States. This involvement of Yusuf ‘Adil gave an opportunity to the Portuguese to declare hostilities against Bijapur. The Portuguese suspected that Yusuf ‘Adil Shah
was trying to reconstruct the confederacy recently collapsed at Diu. This furthered the cause of the Portuguese as they could hardly expect better justification, to declare open hostilities against Bijapur with a possibility of making some gains.

In December 1508, on his way to Diu, Almeida took “revenge at Dabhol (a Bijapur port) for the assistance which had been given there to the Egyptian fleet. The Bijapurs were driven out and the Portuguese occupied the harbor on 30th December 1508. Next day the victors set the buildings of the town on fire and returned to their ships. The Bijapurs did not retaliate. This action of Almeida was only a reprisal and he did not desire to establish a factory at Dabhol nor did he wish for any territorial gains. Almeida was guided by the directions laid down for him by the king of Portugal to the extent of hindering the Arab trade and of assuring Portuguese commercial preponderance in India. He had decided that the continuance of this preponderance would depend entirely on sea power and held the opinion that numerous fortresses would be a source of dispersion and weakness.

The appointment of Afonso de Albuquerque in 1509 as Viceroy of Portuguese India by King Emanuel ushered in a new era in Luso-Indian Polities. In contrast to Almeida, Albuquerque was bolder, more independent and envisaged not only Portuguese sea power, but imperial dominion throughout the known Orient. This policy necessitated a metropolis and Albuquerque choose Goa, which by its island position half-way down the coast
of India, best fulfilled the strategic requirements of the capital of a maritime empire.

A famous pirate Timoja tried to ally with the Portuguese. He gave the intelligence that the time was opportune to make a sudden assault on Goa and capture it. As at that time Yusuf ‘Adil Shah was far away in the interior on a expedition and he Bijapur governor of Goa Malik Yusuf Gurji was powerless to resist. Albuquerque, having collected a fleet, started for the proposed conquest of Goa. He found that the army of Bijapur was absent on an expedition and he captured Goa with little effort, on 3\textsuperscript{rd} March 1510. Soon Yusuf ‘Adil Shah returned with a large army. Before attacking Goa he made overtures to Albuquerque for a peaceful settlement. He also sent Mustafa Khan and endeavoured to arrive at a settlement with the surrender of Cintcora with its islands and revenue to the Portuguese instead of Goa. But when Albuquerque declined this offer, Mustafa Khan suggested that Goa itself would be surrendered, if Albuquerque handed over Timoja to the Bijapur. This proposition was also rejected by Albuquerque and he challenged the conquest of Goa. Eventually, Yusuf ‘Adil Shah’s army made its way into the island of Goa on 17\textsuperscript{th} May 1510 and re-conquered it\textsuperscript{4}.

The policy adopted by Yusuf ‘Adil Shah in the conquest of Goa needs special mention as he exhibited unusual and surprising attitude towards the enemy. It seems that the Portuguese fleet remained at anchor at the mouth of the harbor of Goa for nearly three months. During this period the Portuguese in the fleet suffered heavily from sickness and starvation. When this was brought
to the notice of Yusuf ‘Adil Shah by the deserters, he, with true chivalry, offered to send provision to the Portuguese fleet, stating that he wished to conquer them not by starvation but by the sword. Albuquerque resolved to receive no such assistance from the enemy and made a show of enough food and wine in front of the ‘Adil Shah’s messenger. Throughout the siege the two generals vied with each other in generosity.

Another fact is that Yusuf ‘Adil Shah, at the request of Albuquerque, refused to allow the Portuguese deserters, who had joined him, to continue going down to the banks of the harbor to invite other soldiers and sailors to desert. This honesty of Yusuf ‘Adil Shah, conclusively proves that he wanted to defeat his enemy by fair means and not by unfair means.

Albuquerque was forced to retire to Cochin, after the defeat. But as the Portuguese were seized with great indignation, they made great preparations and attacked Goa again. The time was also more opportune. Timoja gave information to Albuquerque that Yusuf ‘Adil Shah had left Goa for Bijapur, and that there was a general insurrection at Goa against the Bijapur army. He therefore pressed him for a second attack. On 25th November, 1510, the Portuguese assaulted Goa successfully in three columns. The Bijapurs fought desperately but the Portuguese recaptured and sacked Goa.

Isma’il ‘Adil Shah received a personal letter from Albuquerque. It was a surprising diplomatic move on the part of Albuquerque to extend an offer of peace and friendship to ‘Adil Shah after capturing the latter’s territory. The
letter was both curious and characteristic. It throws a flood of light on Albuquerque’s policy which he was to adopt in future in relation to Bijapur. It laid the foundation of Portuguese empir in India. Albuquerque wrote to ‘Adil Shah: “-I wish most sincerely that your father had been living, that he might know me to be man of my word; out of regard for him, I shall be ever your friend, and I will assist you against the king of the Deccan and against your enemies, and I will cause all the horses that arrive here to be carried to your stations and your marts, in order that you may have possession of them. The merchants of your land bring their merchandize of the sea, and of the land, and horses, and I will give them a safe conduct. It you wish for my friendship, first, your messengers come to me with your communizing and I will send you others on my part, who shall convey to you my communications; if you will perform this which I write into you, by my aid shall you be able to gain possessions of much land and become a great Lord among the Moors. Be desirous of performing this, for thus, it shall be well with you, and you shall have great power; and for all that the Sabio (Yusuf ‘Adil Shah), your father, be dead, I will be your father and bring you up like a son.”

After the recapture of Banestarim, Albuquerque ordered, in May 1513 Garcia De Sousa to cruse off Dabhol and not to permit a single vessel to go into, or out of the port. For Bijapur this created a serious problem. Bijapur now had no other alternative but to sue for peace. Kamal Khan sent an envoy to Goa to propose peace. Albuquerque professed friendship and peaceful relations to Bijapur envoy, but demanded certain rare articles and deputed his own envoy.
to Bijapur to fetch them. On the request of the Bijapur envoy Albuquerque ordered his men to open the naval blockade of Dabhol, with free ingress to the ships, pending negotiations of the treaty. It was a gesture to establish friendly relations. Ambassadors were then exchanged between Bijapur and Goa. Diogo Fernandez was the Portuguese ambassador, and he accompanied the Bijapur envoy to Bijapur. The former was accompanied with over two dozen persons.

Though Albuquerque himself offered in a letter to Isma’il ‘Adil Shah that he would allow free import of horses into Bijapur, he soon changed his mind on receipt of a proposal from the Raya of Vijayanagar. The Raja proposed to Albuquerque to join a war against Bijapur. Albuquerque first gave a diplomatic reply to this proposal; but upon being again pressed on the matter he agreed to join the Raja in a war against Bijapur.\(^7\)

The news of this projected alliance perturbed Kamal Khan at Bijapur. He sent an envoy to Goa with instructions to say that Bijapur desired to maintain friendship with the king of Portugal and to arrange the trade in horses and that the Portuguese ought not to favour the Raja of Vijayanagar in that respect. Albuquerque delayed giving reply to the Bijapur envoy. He was expecting confirmation to the Raja’s genuineness about the alliance. As he had no reply from Vijayanagar he hastened to change his mind again, this time in favour of Bijapur. He dispensed with the Bijapur envoy and sent with him Jao Goncalves de Castillo Branco as his envoy to Bijapur. Through him, Albuquerque expressed that out of a desire to maintain friendship he would let Bijapur have all the horses that might arrive at Goa but on condition of Bijapur
surrendering the mainland adjacent to Goa as far as the ghauts, in order to render Goa more secure. Albuquerque also promised that the king Dom Manoel of Portugal would give all assurances of no war with him, nor thwart his policy to the advantage of Vijayanagar. Albuquerque further demanded the surrender of some Portuguese personnel. By the time the envoys returned, with replies from Bijapur, Albuquerque was dead.

In 1545, Asad Khan having entertained designs to depose Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I, prevailed upon by means of presents the Portuguese governor to espouse the cause of ‘Abdullah, brother of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah. ‘Adil Shah was very indignant, but endeavoured to gain the Portuguese governor to his side by liberal offers. Martin Affonso de Sousa, the governor was not interested on who was the rightful success to the throne; but he was interested in who ever offered greater advantages to the crown of Portugal in return for sponsoring the cause. From this point of view de Sousa was disposed rather to favour Asad Khan who offered the territory of Konkan the revenue of which was over a million; and he prepared to support ‘Abdullah by force of arms. However, at the instance of Pero de Faria, who pointed out the gross injustice of such a course of action, de Soisa changed his policy and secured the person of ‘Abdullah. But soon with the death of Asad Khan the prime mover of the intrigue was removed from the scene. Still Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I offered to make over the lands of Salsette and Bardes to the Portuguese, if de Sousa would deliver ‘Abdullah to him. Notwithstanding the action against the man whose cause he had so recently proposed to support, de Sousa promised that in
consideration of these lands being made over to him, he would send ‘Abdullah away where he should not again disturb ‘Adil Shah. To the latter agreed and having fulfilled his part of the contract by making over Salsette and Bardes to the Portuguese de Sousa sent ‘Abdullah to Cananore, but shortly afterwards brought him back openly to Goa. This was a breach of the agreement by the Portuguese. ‘Adil Shah in addition to making over Salsette and Bardes to the crown of Portugal, had also gifted de Sousa with vast treasures, estimated at one million of ducats which Asad Khan had collected for the purpose of carrying out the conspiracy.

Being thus deceived, ‘Adil Shah pressed de Sousa either to fulfil his promise of sending ‘Abdullah away, or to restore what had been made over to him on that condition. The governor, endeavoured to temporize and sent Joso Fernandez de Negreiros as an ambassador to treat with him on the subject. But ‘Adil Shah seized him and all the Portuguese personnel that accompanied him and put them in prison. They were retained as hostages for the due fulfillment of the agreement by the Portuguese. De Sousa was thus forced to comply and gave an assurance that as soon as the season should permit he would send ‘Abdullah to Mallacca. De Sousa did not keep up the Agreement and he sent Galvao Viegas to ‘Adil Shah, demanding payment of a sum of 50,000 parades in gold in exchange for which he undertook to hand over ‘Abdullah, who was then at Goa⁹.

De Sousa was succeeded, in 1546, by Dom Joao de Castro as governor. The new governor did not agree to the contract made by de Sousa with ‘Adil
Shah. On account of these differences when ‘Adil Shah sent for ‘Abdullah, de Castro refused to oblige. ‘Adil shah broke off relations with the Portuguese. De Castro feared lest matters might culminate in hostilities, he made his soldiers go through their drills in sight of the ‘Adil Shah’s forces on the main land. He greatly increased and improved the army and sent a message to ‘Adil Shah to the effect that if he was determined to come against Goa, he would have the roads cleared and have bridges constructed in order that his passage might be facilitated.

Anti-Bijapur Alliances of Portuguese with Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar

To check Bijapur’s longing eyes on the Portuguese possessions and in order to prevent any coalition between Bijapur, Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar against the Portuguese, de Castro concluded in 1547, separate treaties with Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar kingdoms, the two adversaries of Bijapur. This strategy maintained balance of power and forced ‘Adil Shah to be at peace and friendly with the Portuguese. Any hostility with the Portuguese meant the opening of hostilities on two other fronts, with Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar; and Bijapur could not fight at three fronts simultaneously with three powerful adversaries.9

In the treaties provision was made to check Bijapur’s military power. The terms of the treaties directly affecting Bijapur were:
“The Portuguese and Vijayanagara were to be friend of friends, and enemy of enemies of the other. And when called upon, to help the other, with their forces against all the rulers in India, the Nizam Shah always excepted;

“the Governor of Goa will allow all Arab and Persian horses that land at Goa to be purchased by the king of Vijayanagara on due notice and proper payment, none being permitted to be sent to Bijapur;

“The king of Vijayanagara will compel all merchants in his kingdom trading with the coast to send their goods through ports where the Portuguese have factors permitting none to proceed to Bijapur ports;

“The king of Vijayanagara will forbid the importation of saltpeter and iron into his kingdom and any Bijapur port and will compel its purchase from Portuguese factor ; and

“The king of Vijayanagara will also allow no Moorish ship or fleet (obviously implying of Bijapur) to stop in his port and if any army should come, he will capture them and send them to Goa. Parties agreed to wage war on ‘Adil Shah, and the territories captured shall belong to Vijayanagar except lands on the west of the ghats from Banda on the north to Cintacora, on the south which lands shall belong to the king of Portugal.”

In the treaty with Ahmednagar too, there were similar terms. Those relevant to and directly affecting Bijapur were:
“There were to be friendship between Ahmednagar and the Portuguese, who were to help each other, when necessary against all the kings of India (obviously Bijapur was not mentioned specifically), with the exception of Vijayanagara; and

“the Portuguese governor bound himself to not to make peace with the ‘Adil Shah without previously giving notice of the same to Nizam Shah.”

These two treaties signed with Vijayanagar on 19th September 1547 and with Ahmednagar on 6th October 1547, resulted in a tripartite alliance against Bijapur. This triangular league was in contravention and in supersession of the peace treaty which the Portuguese had signed on 26th February 1546 with Bijapur. The Portuguese failed to keep up the terms of the treaty and changed the whole course of their relations with Bijapur\textsuperscript{11}.

When in November-December 1570 ‘Adil Shah marched to besiege Goa other members of the league too made simultaneous attacks. The Bijapur is commenced attack on Goa by a furious bombardment with more concentration on the port of Goa and works of Banestarim, which suffered sevely. The Portuguese, while defending Goa, sent de Vasconcellos to Dabhol, to destroy the port. The Viceroy used every possibly means of securing intelligence from the Bijapur camp. He bribed some of the renegade Portuguese in the Bijapur camp. He succeeded in obtaining information regarding secret designs and intentions. When Bijapur’s strategy leaked out, ‘Adil Shah found it impossible to continue war\textsuperscript{12}. He again made proposals for peace; but the siege was
continued. With the re-inforcement in the Portuguese army, the Bijapur is retreated. ‘Adil Shah however resolved to make another vigorous attempt to invade the island. In spite of stiff resistance the Bijapur is succeeded in crossing over the Mercantor pass. In a day long battle on 13th April, 1570, the forces of ‘Adil Shah was defeated. ‘Adil Shah was furious at this defeat and openly vowed that he would not stir from before Goa until victory. Nevertheless he could not but recognize the difficulties of the situation and secretly desired for a peaceful settlement with the Portuguese. At last ‘Adil Shah himself offered terms for the conclusion of a treaty. One of the terms was that the Portuguese should surrender Goa to ‘Adil Shah. It was an unacceptable condition by the offer failed. The Portuguese unable to check ‘Adil Shah unilaterally, conspired to murder ‘Adil Shah. Dom Luiz de Atayle entered into negotiations with Nuri Khan for killing ‘Adil Shah. The conspiracy did not materialize.

The proposed terms of the treaty of peace having failed, the siege of Goa continued but could make little advance. ‘Adil Shah in order to divide and weaken the Portuguese camp, again persuaded the Rani of Gersoppa to attack Onor. She did oblige ‘Adil Shah by collecting a large army and besieging the fort. With the reinforcement coming from Goa, the besiegers were put to flight. In retaliation, the Viceroy endeavoured to create a diversion in his favour by secretly stirring up other neighbouring rulers to invade Bijapur and by that means he thought of compelling ‘Adil Shah to raise the siege. Nothing appears to have come out of this project. Both the Viceroy and ‘Adil Shah were equally
anxious for peace; but neither desired that the other should be aware of it. To all outward appearances, the siege and defences were carried on as before without any spirit or vigour. The siege prolonged for ten months and finally the Bijapurs retreated without effecting any treaty or settlement.

In retaliation, the Malik at the port of Dabhol captured one hundred and fifty Portuguese men, including their chief officers and brave soldiers. He put to death many of them and sent some of them to ‘Adil Shah. ‘Adil Shah took measures to blockade Goa and also dispatched in 1578 messenger with letters. and presents to ‘Ali Adhiraja of Malabar, the Samri (Zamorin) of Calicut and the Kolattiri of Malabar, seeking in Vain their assistance against the Portuguese. A fierce naval battle took place in which the Portuguese were successful.  

In 1581, King Philip-II of Spain also became King of Portugal, under the title of Philip I. Portugal owed allegiance to the King of Spain on 3rd September 1581. The Portuguese possessions in India came under the suzerainty of the King of Spain.

On 29th January 1582, a treaty was concluded by which all the previous treaties between Bijapur and the Portuguese were renewed and affirmed. Peace was established between the two states.

In 1584 ‘Adil Shah sent an envoy to Goa for negotiating an alliance and joint expedition against the Nayak of Sanguicer to punish him for causing the death of Dom Giles Yanez, and to put down the piracy that existed on that
coast. It was agreed that the governor of Ponda should attack by land while De Mascarehans to attack by sea. The strategy worked successfully. The allied army attacked the town and laid waste the territory. The Nayak who had fled for the safety, sent an envoy to implore mercy, promising to submit on any conditions, provided he was restored to his power and his territories were spared. A settlement was effected and the allied armies retired.

Even though there existed treaties of firm friendship and alliance, yet the governor and the king of Portugal expressed grave concern over the expansion of ‘Adil Shahi territory in the Kannara. In view of the existing treaties between Portuguese and ‘Adil Shah, this concern of the Viceroy and King Philip II apparently raises doubts over their true friendship and integrity towards ‘Adil Shah\(^1\).

**Triple alliance of ‘Adil Shah, Portuguese and Nizam Shah**

In 1595 Maties de Albuquerque sent an embassy to Bijapur with the intention of forming a triple alliance between ‘Adil Shah, Malik ‘Ambar of Ahmednagar and himself in order to defend the growing imperialism of the Mughals. Approving this proposal of Albuquerque, King Philip II of Spain wrote to the new Viceroy, Dom Francisco de Gama, on 25\(^{th}\) February, 1596 to continue to adopt the policy of Albuquerque and to help in achieving the goal by way of persuading the rulers of the Deccan, one after the other, to form an alliance.
‘Adil Shah tried to foster the triple alliance for his own benefit. King Philip II too continued to persuade, by recommending again on 5th February, 1597, the Viceroy to form an alliance. King Philip II of Spain wished to maintain cordial relations with Bijapur as is evident from his letter to the viceroy, dated 21st November 1598 from Lisbon. The king wrote- “I approve of your interest in keeping the king of Bijapur on good terms – although he ordered no visit to be paid to you until now, as is customary. Treat him always, remembering how necessary is the alliance with the neighbouring kings to defend us all against the Mughal (Emperor). Obviously the king of Spain wished to preserve the independence of the two barrier states – Bijapur and Ahmednagar in order to prevent the direct onslaught of the Mughal imperialism on the Portuguese possessions on the west coast of India. This is evident from another letter of the King Philip II of Spain to the Viceroy, Ayres de Saldanha, dated 25th January, 1601. King Philip wrote: “---since that king (Akbar) is very powerful and suspicious and desirous of approaching to that island of Goa, I recommend you to keep your eyes open on his designs and intentions to prevent them with the necessary remedies”.

In spite of seven years of negotiations (1595-1601), the triple alliance did not materialize. This was partly due to the fading off of the danger for which the coalition was negotiated. Alarmed at the defeat of Malik ‘Ambar at the hands of the Mughals in 1615 the Portuguese once again directed their efforts to bring about the alliance by initiating negotiations of peace with ‘Adil Shah and Nizam Shah. ‘Adil Shah played a major role in establishing cordial
relations between the Portuguese and Nizam Shah. On 9th October 1615, at Nauraspur (near Bijapur) the Treaty of defensive alliance was signed between ‘Adil Shah, the Portuguese and the Nizam Shah. Malik ‘Ambar sent his ambassador Kashi Pandit with the authorization that – “Whatever agreement is entered into by Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah and Shah Nawaz Khan of Bijapur with the Viceroy shall be signed by our ambassador, Kashi Pandit; this will be observed by us.” Likewise Portuguese envoy Antonio Master had obtained authorization to sign the treaty from king of the Portugal as early as 13 May, 1615.

Slight modification was made in the above treaty by the addition of the condition for the institution of a Board of arbitration for disputes regarding the disputed ownership of coconut gardens and groves. The modified treaty was signed at Goa on 1st January 1617 by the Viceroy and the Bijapur envoy.

Sharif Malik the commander of Ponda was giving some trouble to the Portuguese. The Viceroy Dom Hisrome suspected that ‘Adil Shah was supporting the Malik. He therefore sent Antonio to Bijapur with a request to check the Malik of Ponda and expel the Dutch, who were attempting to establish a factory at Bijapur. ‘Adil Shah accepted these demands. For this purpose the Portuguese bribed a favourite courtier of Bijapur, through Vicente Ribeiro, who was residing at Bijapur and had close connection with the Bijapur nobles17.
Portuguese assistance to ‘Adil Shah against the Mughals

During the siege of Bijapur by the Mughal commander Asaf Khan in 1631, the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa, Conde de Linhares, helped ‘Adil Shah secretly with bombardiers, power and munitions. Linhares was tempted by greedy offers of the Mughals and he soon changed his allegiance and thus wrote to the King of Portugal on 16 November 1632 that – “I was obliged to help him (Mughal General) to gain the kingdom of ‘Adil Shah and that they would give me as my share almost all the low lands (Konkan) of these surroundings.” The Portuguese adopted duel and flexible policy to suit their own purpose and the exigencies of the time. They failed to keep up their treaties with Bijapur. They even deviated from their own proposals. The Viceroy, on the basis of the resolution passed by the Portuguese Council of State on 3rd April 1632, offered all help and favour to ‘Adil Shah against the Mughals. This offer was made by virtue of a command of the king of Portugal. It was decided that “in case the Mughals pressed ‘Adil Shah too much, when his Excellency (Viceroy) would arrange to come to his help in order that the Mughals should not prevail in destroying him and taking from him his kingdom.” And the Viceroy expressed his pressing anxiety in a report to the king of Spain that “should ‘Adil Shah lose his kingdom to the Mughals, the Portuguese territories would be placed in a position of greater danger of the direct onslaught of the mighty Mughals.”
Naval Hostilities – 1636

Early in 1636 the Portuguese attacked an outgoing ship from the Bijapur port of Dabhol on her way to Persia and Mecca and “shamefully murdered the Moors.” The Viceroy had tried to excuse this attack and the massacre of the people by sending an envoy and some presents to ‘Adil Shah. In retaliation, the Bijapurs attacked a Portuguese ship coming from Muscat to Rajapur. The goods amounting to about 6000 ducates were confiscated and the Portuguese were imprisoned. This action of the Portuguese was due to the violation of the terms of the treaty by the Bijapurs. According to the treaty the Bijapurs were bound to ship their pepper only to Portuguese ports.19

Friendly attitude of Muhammad ‘Adil Shah towards the Portuguese

Early in the year 1654 Muhammad ‘Adil Shah sent an ambassador, Malik Yaqut, to Goa to settle the old dispute about the territories of Bardez and Salsette. Malik, Yaqut carried a Farmanr of ‘Adil Shah in the name of the Portuguese Viceroy asking the latter to allow the Jesuits Fathers of the College of St. Paul, to reside at his Court at Bijapur. The Viceroy De Castro did not object to this proposal. When Yaqut returned to Bijapur, a Jesuit Father Antonio Betelho accompanied him. The Father brought a present for ‘Adil Shah on behalf of Viceroy and informed ‘Adil Shah of the favourable disposition of de Castro towards Bijapur. The Jesuit Father carried a letter of de Castro for ‘Adil Shah. Yaqut induced ‘Adil Shah to favour the Portuguese and he obtained from him two Farmanr, which were favour able to the Portuguese.
The first was addressed to Shivappa Nayak, the chief of Ikkeri, commanding him to raise the siege of the fortress of Onor (Hanovar) at once and to retire to Ikkeri as ‘Adil Shah exercised the sovereignty of the whole Kanara. The Nayak defied the Farmanr and continued the siege. Another Farmanr issued by Muhammad ‘Adil Shah was addressed to the governor of Goa.

Dom de Castro, on receiving the Farmanr of ‘Adil Shah, called the Council of State and informed the counselors of its contents. They decided to send a gift as a sign of their gratitude for the issuance of the two Farmanrs. Fr. Martins was sent to Bijapur in April 1654 but not as an official envoy with some secret message. Martins was given two documents by de Castro. One was the credential letter declaring him as the envoy of the governor to treat with ‘Adil Shah about the business and settlement of the Jesuit Mission at Bijapur Court. The other document contained the secret instructions suggested by the Portuguese Council of State. The letter of the Viceroy to ‘Adil Shah contained the Counsel of States’ decision, which expressed indebtedness to ‘Adil Shah and professed cordiality and friendship²⁰.

**War and Peace (1654-55)**

One of the instructions given to Fr. Martins by de Castro was to prevent any war between the Bijapurs and Portuguese in the border provinces of Bardez and Salsette. In fact war had broke out there even before Martins reached Bijapur. ‘Adil Shah without any sufficient cause declared war in August 1654
and marched against Bardez and Goa with a large army. The Portuguese who were in Bardez surrendered. In October 1654 ‘Adil Shah invaded Salsette and capture Sarzora and Cutuly.

In the meanwhile Fr. Goncalo Martins arrived at Bijapur and by the favour he enjoyed he easily induced ‘Adil Shah to stop the war. ‘Adil Shah ordered the retreat of his troops from the Portuguese territory. The reply of ‘Adil Shah to de Castro throws light on the friendship and intimate relations between the two states. ‘Adil Shah explicitly declared that he did not want any war with the Portuguese. Embassies were exchanged between Goa and Bijapur and from December 1654, trade was resumed between Bijapur and Goa. To strengthen the bond of friendship, Muhammad ‘Adil Shah and de Castro entered into a new treaty. On 7th March, 1655, the treaty was signed by the Bijapur envoys, the governor, and other eminent persons. The Council of State decided upon ratifying the former treaties of peace with Bijapur viz., the treaty of 3rd April 1633, that of 1576 and that of 29th January 1582. Malik Yaqut and Fr. Martins accepted the decision of the Council21.

After the treaty the envoys returned to Bijapur and Muhammad ‘Adil Shah ratified the treaty in May 1655. When this news reached Goa, de Castro sent another gift to ‘Adil Shah. It was a beautiful ring enriched with a precious stone.

The new Viceroy, de Silveira, in a letter of 15 December 1655 refers to de Castro’s relations with Bijapur and wrote to the King of Portugal that: “I
found this business in such a state that the Dialxa (‘Adil Shah) seemed to wish to receive tribute from us and I feel sure this would have happened if my coming had been postponed. Probably this appreciation is an exaggeration. It was perhaps partly influenced by hatred towards de Castro and partly due to the letter of ‘Adil Shah, addressed to de Castro, but reached after his fall in the hands of de Sarzeda.”

The letter of ‘Adil Shah contained proposal for help against his rebels in the form of duty and command to obey the Bijapur ambassador. This annoyed the new Viceroy. The latter apparently suspected the desire of ‘Adil Shah to make the Portuguese a tributary to Bijapur. The tone of the letter itself shows that ‘Adil Shah considered the Portuguese as his tributary. De Sarzedes misunderstood the letter and arrived at a wrong and hasty conclusion. ‘Adil Shah wrote that letter on the basis of friendship and alliance that subsisted according to the existing treaties. ‘Adil Shah being the sovereign head of the State his tone was slightly dictatorial. More so because the viceroy was not considered as equal to the Sultan, as the former was not the sovereign head of the State

De Sarzedas was not on good terms with the Malik Yaqut who was still at Goa. He desired to dispose him off.

After 1656, the Bijapur were busy in dealing with the Mughals and had therefore no opportunity to renew hostilities with the Portuguese. Hence from
1656 to 1686, nothing special happened to disturb the peaceful relations between the Portuguese and Bijapur.

Commercial rather than political factors determined the Bijapur – Portuguese relations. The Portuguese sovereignty of the seas compelled Bijapur always to adopt conciliatory policy even at the cost of territorial losses. Import of Persian, Arabian and ‘Iraqi horses and foreign emigrants were the main causes which made Bijapur to yield and adopt a weak policy towards the Portuguese. These factors dictated Bijapur to put an end to the hostilities abruptly in peaceful settlements. The Cartaz System also governed the Bijapur-Portuguese relations over the seas\textsuperscript{23}.

**Portuguese Sovereignty of the Sea – ‘The Cartaz System’**

The Portuguese policy in the Indian Ocean aimed at a monopoly of the Eastern trade with Europe by exercising a command over the sea-routes. King Emmanual of Portugal offered his merchants the privilege of trading with India in their own ships, provided they paid a fourth of the profits to the King’s treasury and under took not to deal in spices which was a Crown monopoly. The Portuguese achieved their objective by the help of their powerful navy. Their victory over the combined fleet of Bijapur, Ahmednagar, Gujarat, Egypt and others established their supremacy over the seas. They claimed the sovereignty of the sea and compelled all powers, to seek their express permission for navigation. Such a permission had to be purchased by every
trading vessel. Even vessels of the Indian sovereigns were not exempted from this acknowledgement of the Portuguese naval supremacy.

The system of licensing the ships of all oriental trade was started by Almeida, and was perfected by Albuquerque and his successors. Bijapur was no exception; it too had to obtain Portuguese cartazes to a specified number. But these permits were accompanied by vexatious conditions. Bijapur was not allowed to import or export specified articles mentioned in the cartaz. They were prohibited from visiting the port of Imam of Muscat and of other enemies of the Portuguese. They were not allowed to carry any Christian’s slaves. To ascertain the implementation of their conditions the Portuguese claimed and exercised the right to search; in cases of any violation of the rules penalty was imposed by the Portuguese. The Portuguese assumed the right of exclusive possession of the trade initially of two essential commodities pepper and ginger. Gradually they added to the list Chinnaman, clove, spices and several other articles which yielded large profits. The Muslims were forbidden business in all these articles and were not allowed to undertake sea voyages for trade to the neighbouring countries.

Early in 1513 Albuquerque sent Gracia for the naval blockade of Dabhol. This strategy made Bijapur to come to a peaceful settlement with the Portuguese. Pending the negotiations of the treaty, the Bijapur ambassador requested Albuquerque to open or suspend blockade of Dabhol. Albuquerque complied immediately this request under the following conditions: true ingress to the ships which were thither bound with merchandise and provisions;
provided “no prohibited merchandise” were carried. ‘Adil Shah had to apply and seek permission of the viceroy or governor at Goa for the free navigation of Bijapur ships.

The blockade of Dabhol and its opening by the Portuguese meant the destruction of Bijapur’s sovereignty over the seas and their oceanic trade. The Portuguese compelled Bijapur to obtain cartazes for their ship under vexatious conditions. They exercised the sovereignty of the sea in a high handed manner. They jealously guarded their interest, maintained the sovereignty, initially through mutual negotiations, by agreements and finally through specific clauses of treaties or ‘Contracts’. Treaties signed between the Portuguese and Bijapur, had stringent clauses regulating the oceanic trade. They imposed a duty of one per cent on the merchandise carried by the Bijapur ships. This was on the pretext of defraying the expenses of the fleets that were guarding the Bijapur coast for the safety of Bijapur ships.25

A very peculiar feature of the terms of the Treaty of 1576 was that they were applicable to Bijapur ships originating from Bijapur ports, and destined for non-Portuguese, as well as Portuguese ports. This reveals the magnitude of illegal sovereignty of the seas the Portuguese claimed and enjoyed. Even though the Portuguese had no jurisdiction over the Bijapur ports they exercised illegal sovereignty and guarded them in their own commercial interest but at the expense of Bijapur and also by exacting duty on the merchandise. This was due to their maritime supremacy. The number of cartazas to be issued annually was regulated by the treaties, but on special demand by ‘Adil Shah, additional
cartazas were issued. The study of the system throws considerable light, as to how systematically the Portuguese destroyed Bijapur’s oceanic trade and rights over the seas.

**Relation with British:**

The success of the Portuguese in establishing a lucrative commerce with the east excited a desire among other nations of Western Europe to follow the example. England was not an exception, and it too awakened and showed signs of inspired interest in the eastern trade. English merchants began to dream of wealth to be gathered in the East. A merchant adventurer Ralph Fitch, with official permission of Queen Elizabeth, made a tour of enquiry in India, bringing home golden reports[^26].

During 1585, Ralph Fitch visited Bijapur city and several places in the Kingdom of Bijapur. He did some business in diamonds. Ralph Fitch, accompanied by John Newbery, William Leedes and James Storey, when reached Bijapur in April 1585, they were cast into prison on suspicion of being spies. They were examined before the justice and demanded for letters. They were in prison till 22 December 1585 when they were released on the surities of two thousand ducats, which Fr. Stevens an English – Jesiut, paid. Fr. Stevens was at that time residing at Bijapur.
The East India Company (1612-37)

The out came of Ralph Fitch’s tour of Bijapur was the founding in 1599 of an association in London for eastern trade. It was mainly an expression of the growing national desire in England for the trade with the east. The bells which rang out the year 1600 rang in the first East India Company, which was incorporated by a Royal Charter of 31 December 1600 from Queen Elizabeth, under the name of the “Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies.” The Charter granted the Company “whole, entire and only trade and traffic to the East Indies forever.”

In February 1612, Sir Henry Middleton visited the Bijapur port of Dabhol. He was assured of friendly relations and help in trade by the Governor of Dabhol. However, the latter secretly prevented the merchants from business with the English. This action of the governor was interpreted as a mark of a sympathy with the Portuguese and a sufficient cause for the English to retaliate. The English were waiting for an opportunity, which they got five years later in 1617. Writing to Pepwell on January, 1671, Roe advised him to endeavour to make prize of the Bijapur vessel that yearly traded between Dabhol and the Red Sea. As a pretext for interfering with the vessel, Roe recalled the incident at Dabhol and ‘made stay’ of the ship of Bijapur; but the governor of the port, induced him tactfully to release the ship. These fresh overtures of friendship, league and a promise to procure a Farmanr from ‘Adil Shah in favour of the English, ‘granting privileges to trade at Bijapur ports, brought to nought the whole plan of Roe to avenge the governor’s action of 1612. Some
correspondence ensued between Roe and the governor, on the subject of concessions to be granted for trade in Bijapur.

Sir Thomas Roe advised on 27 April, 1617 to the governor of Dabhol appre hending the overtures made by him to trade and seeking further assurances. Roe undertook “on behalf of the King of England a good and firm peace towards his master, his subjects free passage in the seas from any oppression by our fleets, and that yearly I would either send a ship to his port for trade or (if it so required) leave and establish a residence in his Government.”

The Bijapur governor’s reply was received by Roe in June, 1617. In this he reiterated the promises made to Pepwell but he would not commit himself to buy any specified quantity of goods yearly. As for the desired Farmanr of ‘Adil Shah, the governor sent Roe’s letter to ‘Adil Shah and said that he would communicate the decision to the British ambassador. The governor’s reply seemed to Roe sufficiently encouraging, to follow up the matter; and he arranged in the following February (1618) for the ‘Anne’ to call at Dabhol on her way to the Red Sea. This, however, was found to be impracticable and nothing more was done till the sailing of the fleet in 1619. However, it seems that ‘Anne’ under the captain Andrew Shilling did sail to Dabhol in August, 1618. Edward Heynes was one of the Englishmen on board of ‘Anne’. Heynes further informs us that on 11th August, 1618, the captain of of Dabhol, Malik ‘Morvet’ (Muhammad), sent to them his letter of recommendations to ‘Adil
Shah, regarding the freedom of trade, friendly usage at Dabhol and promise to defend the ships home-wards bound from pirates etc.

In 1619, Captain Bonner, at Roe’s suggestion, called at Dabhol. No sales were affected. But the Bijapur authorities were so lavish in their promises that the English forebore to enforce a trade; and sent a word to Surat advising a further attempt in sending cargo to Dabhol in the following year. With this beginning British ships stared calling at Bijapur port, and import of British goods and export of Bijapur merchandise started.

In March 1623, Captain Michael Green reported to President Rastell at Surat that they had received a letter from Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah. ‘Adil Shah desired firm friendship and amity with the English, and wished to conclude a peace treaty. He desired help and alliance of the English to drive out the Portuguese from all his territories (both present and former lost territories of Bijapur Kingdom). ‘Adil Shah sought the assistance of the English by sea, while he himself wished to operate from land. To these desires and demands of ‘Adil Shah, Captain Michael sent conciliatory and encouraging replies through the former’s messenger, and advised ‘Adil Shah to wait till the opportunity permits to execute the said desires and wished to continue and maintain the amity just began. This cold reply of Captain Michael for ‘Adil Shah’s proposal of an alliance against the Portuguese was guided by the policy of non-interference formulated by Sir Thomas Roe for the East India Company. Sir Thomas Roe’s policy was “unaggressive and wholly mercantile.” Roe disliked the military-commercial policies of the Portuguese and the Dutch which he
believed to consume all their profits. This policy of Roe was adopted by the Company for about seventy years from 1615 onwards, but with an exception, when the British allied with Bijapur against the Portuguese in October, 1637.

By 1635, the English trade at Dabhol had increased considerably. This necessitated the establishment of a factory at Dabhol. For this purpose the Company requested ‘Adil Shah to grant a license to establish a factory at Dabhol. On 3rd December 1635 President Methwold and the Council at Surat passed instructions to William Pitt to proceed to Dabhol in the ‘Francis’ and deliver letters to the Bijapur governor of Dabhol. The governor was given other letters and presents for passing on to Agha Raja at Bijapur, with a request for a speedy action for obtaining from Muhammad ‘Adil Shah a Farmanr to establish a factory at Dabhol. The ‘Adil Shahi Farmanr was so essential for the British that William Pitt wrote from Dabhol to the President and Council at Surat on 17th April, 1636 that: “The King’s Farman is expected daily.”

At last the long awaited Farmanr was issued by ‘Adil Shah in August 1636. It was not very much to the liking of William Pitt; and he expressed his dissatisfaction over it.

On 27th January, 1637 when Captain Weddells fleet anchored at the Bijapur port of Bhatkal, the Shah Bandar and ‘king’s merchant’ came on board and assured the Englishmen of a welcome, offering to provide pepper and made an agreement for the barter deal of lead for pepper. They sent a letter and a present to ‘Adil Shah, who replied promising all reasonable concessions. The
Englishmen also sought permission to establish a factory or a ‘settled residence.’

During February 1637, the Bijapur governor of Rajapur desired Englishmen to trade there and promised all freedom and undertook to furnish 3000 candys of pepper yearly and buy large quantities of English commodities. Though the Englishmen traded at Dabhol and Rajapur they also travelled down to various places in the interior of Bijapur kingdom for the purchase of commodities and for selling English goods-coral, broadcloth, lead etc. As some of the ports viz., Rajapur had neither goods or merchants and everything had to be obtained from markets in the interior of the kingdom 31.

**British Alliance against the Portuguese**

Contrary to Roe’s non-aggressive policy and in furtherance to the reply to Captain Michael to Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah in 1623, the Englishmen took initiative in 1638 to collaborate with Bijapur in a military expedition against the Portuguese. In October William Jacobszoon Kester left eleven vessels in Goa Road, where they were to remain throughout the monsoon to prevent the sailing of ships of the Portuguese; and if possible, to attack on the city of Goa, in conjunction with ‘Adil Shah Preceding to this naval action there must have been some preliminary dealings leading to an understanding to collaborate. Though the English vessels got ready and waited to attack the Portuguese
possession jointly with ‘Adil Shah’s help. As ‘Adil Shah was forced to stay at Bijapur on account of impending Mughal attack on Bijapur.

British Factories at Deccan Ports:

In 1639 the English sent a mission to Muhammad ‘Adil shah with rich presents consisting of several articles valued at 2500 pagodas. In return the English demanded a Farmanr for trading in his dominions. Permission was granted to the English to trade at Karwar and Rajapur. The English built a house at Karwar to serve as a factory, but were unable to carry on any business there. They next contemplated building factories at Rjapur and Raybagh. At Karwar they stationed a few English factors.

In October 1648, the governor of Rajapur, Muhammad Qasim, broke open the English Company’s warehouse and carried away the stock of cloth, under pretence that it belonged to Courteen, another Englishman who was operating in Bijapur and owed custom dues to the governor. The governor imprisoned Gowton, Oxidion and Captain Blackman on their arrival at Rajapur. They tried in vain to settle the matter and get release of the Englishmen. Later Blackman sailed for Kharepatan (Carapatan), another Bijapur port. Here he was received well by the governor with promises of all possible assistance for the restitution of the cloth confiscated by the governor of Rajapur. The governor of Kharepatan granted a “cowle or warrant for free trade at that port;” and gave a list for the payment of customs upon easy terms.\(^\text{32}\)
At Kharepatan, Blackman threatened the governor that the English would take their revenge upon the shipping of the port of Kharepatan. This threat worked effectively. The governor wrote to the Court at Bijapur, urging that the English goods should be returned to the owners. The Rajapur merchants who had falsely certified in writing that the goods were there of Fourteen now confessed that they did so under compulsion and that the statement was false. Though the English threatened retaliation yet they were unwilling to use force against Bijapur as this would hinder their investments on that coast. The English stopped issuing passes to the ships belonging to the port under ‘Adil Shah. This caused all the Bijapur merchants of those ports to solicitate satisfaction in favour of the English. The English, in September, 1649 seized two Bijapur junks and carried them to the bar at Goa where they held them as security for the return of their men and goods by the Bijapur authorities.

The Company’s Agent Beni Das was deputed to the Court at Bijapur for pleading the cause of English for the release of the cloth, which had been confiscated at Rajapur. On his arrival at Bijapur, Beni Das met the Queen-Mother of ‘Adil Shah, and leading noblemen, for influencing the Sultan to favour the Englishmen.

By September 1649 the differences between the English and the Bijapur authorities were settled. The new governor of Rajapur invited the English to resume their business at that port. ‘Adil Shah promised satisfaction for the cloth seized by paying one-half of its worth in ready cash and the other half to
The dispute was further widened by another incident which took place in October, 1650, at Rajapur. On return of an English factor, Morse from Combroon to Rajapur, a dispute ensued. Whereupon Morse, with some of his men assaulted merchants’ house, killing three persons and wounding many others. There upon governor collected some men and took away from them the money they were carrying off and put them in irons. He seized everything that was in Morse’s house, to the value of 5000 pagodas and reported the whole matter to the Sultan of Bijapur. The latter directed that the money and goods be sent to the Court and that the prisoners should be transferred to a fort. Morse himself escaped, and re-quisitioned Surat to rescue his men. Morse took revenge by attacking and burning the Bijapur junks, returning from the Red Sea.
Grants privileges to the British

In March 1659, Revington came to Rajapur and obtained grant of privileges from Rustum-i Zaman. On 24th July, 1659, Agha Murshid, governor of Karwar, granted to Randolph Taylor and Philip Gifford, the following privileges, on behalf of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah for the port of Karwar: guarantee given to the English for free trade; the customs dues were fixed at 1½% on imported goods; treasure was exempted from duty; the governor of Karwar was to assist the English in the recovery of debts; the English were permitted to administer justice to their own servants; the English were permitted to build a new house, with the permission of Rustum-i Zaman; and other ‘usual privileges’. Later these privileges were confirmed by the Court of Bijapur.

Though Lari was in use along the Bijapur coast, due to the absence of silver coinage in Bijapur, great inconvenience was caused to the traders. To get rid of this trouble, Revington proposed to Rustum-I Zaman to procure permission for the English to establish a mint at Rajapur, and strike silver coins, similar to that of the Mughal. Rustum-I Zaman agreed and recommended for a license to the Court of Bijapur for permitting such an undertaking to the English. This proposal only materialized thirteen years later, and a mint was established at Bombay. The coins minted at Bombay were also intended partly for circulation in the Bijapur Kingdom35.

Revington then proceeded to Hukkeri, to meet Rustum-I Zaman and negotiate with him regarding payment of customs on the portion of the pepper
which had been sent to Karwar for shipment. After smoothing the way by the presentation of articles valued at a hundred pagodas, Ravington obtained a grant. The privileges which Rustum-i Zaman granted were: “The English could buy pepper at Hubli; without paying any customs there. They were to pay the customs only at Rajapur, from where it was exported. Nor they were to pay at Karwar but only at Rajapur.”

Revington had a scheme for the development of trade in the Bijapur Kingdom. In his dreams of the future, he saw Rajapur the centre of a large trade in saltpeter, pepper, calicoes, and cotton yarn; the site for a mint providing coinage for use all along the west coast; and the headquarters of the Presidency coinage for use all along the west coast; and the headquarters of the Presidency in place of Surat. He also planned to built a fort near the mouth of the river. To achieve his dream he developed and maintained good terms with Rustum-i Zaman. And he was awaiting for an opportunity to oblige Bijapur. This came in 1660 and Revington was quick to seize the opportunity of offering to sell his mortars and shells to Siddi Johar (Salabat Khan) for the reduction of the fortress of Pandhalla held by Shivaji.

In 1661 Shivaji took revenge over the English for their help to Bijapur, by imprisoning their President, Revington and a few other Englishmen. In retaliation to this action the English ordered for the seizure of Bijapur ship along the western coast. For their release the English tried to intercept the Queen of Bijapur on her way back from Mecca at the end of August, 1662. For their release the British President at Surat also wrote a letter to ʿAli ʿAdil Shah
to use his good offices. The English wrongly believed that Shivaji was ‘Adil Shah’s “subject” and Rajapur still a port of Bijapur. In response to President’s letter, ‘Adil Shah replied that it would be of no avail to write to Shivaji for releasing the Englishmen. ‘Adil Shah said that an army of his was proceeding against Shivaji, and if successful, he hoped to accomplish his and their (Englishmen’s) desires. The English played mischief and they robbed and plundered a squadron of Bijapur vessels. This led to the closure of the Rajapur factory for a few years.

The English demanded a Farmanr from ‘Adil Shah for the security of the Englishmen and their goods in the Bijapur Kingdom.

In 1663 there was a conflict between the governor of Karwar and the English over the payment of custom duty at Shiveshwar port. The governor seized the English goods. The English left the port of Karwar and stopped all trade at that port. When the matter came to the notice of ‘Adil Shah, he issued a Farmanr in July, 1663 in favour of the English. Assuring security he directed the English to return to Karwar to re-establish their trade, without fear of any molestation. He likewise wrote to Rustum-i Zaman to give orders to his men at Karwar to use civility and be good in their relations with the English and not to trouble them. Through the above Farmanr and letter the English obtained the following privileges 37.

The governor of Karwar was directed to behave gently and to not to exact any unreasonable customs, besides what had been already agreed with the
English; the governor of Shiveshwar was commanded to not to make any unjust claims from the English and not to levy any new customs; the governor of Cudder was commanded to maintain the previous abatement of the customs of two pagodas per 100 oxen from the English; and the English were assured security for themselves and their property.

By August, 1663, the English factors started returning to Karwar. The Directors of the East India Company in London observed that “Trade should be maintained at Karwar and a ‘faire correspondency’ kept with the ‘king of Deccan (Bijapur) by all possible means.” However, with all the good gesture of Bijapurs towards the English, the latter, refused to issue a pass for the ship of the dowager Queen of Bijapur for Basra and Baghdad. The English demanded specific Farmanr from ‘Adil Shah himself for the issue of a pass.

By 1665, Rajapur once again coming in the possession of ‘Adil Shah, the governor of Rajapur invited the English to re-establish their factory and trade which was closed down due to the capture of Rajapur by Shivaji. In spite of the English being reluctant to return to Rajapur the Bijapurs refused permission to the Dutch to establish a factory at Rajapur on the grounds that “the place was at the English’s refusal.” Implying that the place was at the disposal of the English and they (Bijapur) could not permit the Dutch to establish factory there unless the English refused to re-establish it there.
Due to wars between Bijapur and the Marathas the English factory at Karwar was closed down temporarily from March 1666 and the factors left for Hubli for safety.

In spite of the agreement, differences and disputes did arise. In 1670, the Desai of Karwar demanded half-percent separate duty on goods. This claim he put forward after the factory was resettled by Randolph Taylor under the agreement. The agreement provided a comprehensive duty of one and half percent; and the Desai sought to get half-per cent either out of this, which the governor refused or from the factory. The English refused to comply the demand and the Desai caused some trouble by preventing them from building the factory house. However, the Desai gave license and the building of the new house, for which the governor of Karwar laid the foundation stone, came up. At the opening ceremony in 1674, the same Desai was present.

Until 1673 relations with the English were restricted only to the factories and trade in the west coast. On 10th March, 1673, Nadhir Muhammad, Bijapur governor of Ginji, invited them to settle a factory on the Coromandel coast, at or near Porto Novo and at Valudavur near Pondichery. The governor offered the English all possible facilities and suggested construction of forts for their own defense with promises of grant of privileges. He extended a friendly invitation for the deputation of an English Agent to him and sent a present. The English welcoming the invitation, sent a formal reply with a handsome present through Elihu Yale to the Khan. They initiate negotiations for the acquisition of a port in Bijapur territory. The Khan advised the English to send their men to
take the possession of the port and set up the English flag there, in order to free him from the importunities of the Dutch and the French. The proposed project to acquire the port was confirmed by the Directors of Company at England, who instructed the Agent at Fort St. George that – “we approve of the settlement you have made in the Ginji country and would have you nourish it by all means possible.”

Concessions to the British

During 1675, the English factor Child established good relations at Raybagh. He got a remission of half the custom duty, usually charged at Raybagh, from Bahlol Khan, Commander-in-chief of Bijapur.

In April, 1678 the governor of Hubli, Antaji Pandit, forced the English to pay a part of the chouth, which he had to pay to Shivaji for the safety of that town. The governor sent 20 peons and forced open the Company’s warehouse at Hubli and, took 25 per cent of broadcloth and put them to sale in the bazaar to realize partly the wealth tax of 500 pagodas and partly the contribution for chauth. For satisfaction and peaceful settlement, the English factor wrote to the Court of Bijapur. He requested the appointment of a new governor and implementation of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah’s former Farmanr which granted privileges to the English’\(^{40}\). Pending the decision from the Court, the English factors were directed by the Council to sell the remaining goods at Hubli and then retire to Dharwar, another Bijapur town of trade, where ‘Adil Shah granted them,
through a Farmanr, exemption of two years customs and permission to build a warehouse. They were also advised to seize the two ships belonging to deceased Bahlol Khan as retaliation for the action of the governor of Hubli.

**Courteen’s Factory at Karwar**

Sir William Courteen, a Cornish gentleman was the first Englishman to establish a factory at Karwar in Bijapur territory in the year 1639. Muhammad ‘Adil Shah granted to him a piece of land, where Courteen established a factory and carried on the trade under the banner of Courteen’s Association. “Later on this Association founded factories at Rajapur and Bathicola. The Association was afterwards styled as “The Assada Merchants”.

Earlier in 1636, Sir William Courteen had obtained from Charles I a license to engage in Indian Trade. Mountney and Captain Weddel were dispatched to Surat, on behalf of the new Company of Merchants Trading to the East. The King (Charles I) received a share in the venture of the Courteen’s. This move was a violation of the Charter granted to the London Company. It was therefore necessary to find an excuse and it was duly set forth in the preamble of the grant that “the East India Company had neglected to establish fortified factories, or seats of trade to which the King’s subjects could resort with safety – that they have consulted their own interests only, without any regard to the King’s revenue – and in general, that they had broken the
conditions upon which their charter and exclusive privileges had been granted to them.”

King Charles I assured the East India Company, on the word of a ‘Christian King’, that the new Courteen’s Association will not complete the Company and directed them to render assistance to the new Association.

When in 1639 Sir William Courteen died, his license for trade in Bijpaur Kingdom was renewed in the name of his son and his associates.

In 1639-40 Leonard Woodman of the Courteen’s Association was permitted by the Rajapur governor to trade at Rajapur. He presented to ‘Adil Shah costly articles of various description, valued at 2535 pagodas. He presented to Muhammad ‘Adil Shah a petition desiring freedom of trade throughout his Kingdom paying usual customs, as other Bijapur merchants do. He further requested the issuance of a Farmanr for the recovery of 12000 pagodas, imprested in 1639 by Mounteny to the chiefs of Karwar for the supply of pepper which was till then not delivered. It seems that ‘Adil Shah granted the petition’.42

By 1646 the Association sank into bankruptcy. They submitted a piteous appeal to the East India Company to take over the Karwar factory. The Company declined the offer. In 1647, the House of Lords gave Courteen three years time to withdraw.
Srizure of Karwar Factory by Bijapur

On 13th January, 1649 the governor’s brother sent for the factor Lloyd to his house at Shiveshwar. About 50 soldiers seized the factory. Daniel Mason and others in the factory were taken by surprise as they never expected such an action by the Bijapurs. Daniel and other were brought as prisoners to Shiveshwar. Lloyd sought an interview with the governor, why they had been thus treated. But his request was refused and he was told that the reason for his imprisonment was that four year’s rent amounting to 800 pagodas principal, with compound interest at 25% making 1500 pagodas in all was due to the governor. The governor complained that Captain Durson had given him no satisfaction for an adventure sent by him to Ormuz, for which 1700 pagodas were claimed, reckoning cent per cent gains at Ormuz and as much for the returns with interest at 25% The matter was settled when they signed a declaration of owing large sum to the governor43.

The Association lingered on till 1657, when Cromwell renewed the Charter, and the East India Company absorbed Courteen’s bankrupt Association and resumed its monopoly.

The original English settlements in India were merely emporia, bazaars, places of commerce and no more. The original policy of the Company was to avoid acquiring real property, which could be taxed or which might have to be defended, but this was found to be inevitable. Then the element of security that the warehouse must be protected. The traders became armed traders. The next
step was to employ soldiers to defend the settlement; and then to establish ‘spheres of influence.’

The year 1661 ushers in a new era in the relations of Bijapur with the British. By the Royal Charter, the East India Company’s servants in India were authorised to make peace and war with any prince or people, not being Christian; and to administer justice for themselves and their dependents. These privileges transformed a body of Ware-house men into a political corporation, which might almost be called a Government. From the very beginning the Britishers adopted a policy of friendship and amity with Bijapur, non-interference in the affairs of Bijapur and a policy of non-align-ment (with one or two exceptions) Roe adopted an “unaggressive wholly merchantile” policy. He disliked the military – commercial policies. When in 1623, Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II sought British alliance and collaboration against the Portuguese, the English gave a cold reply to wait for appropriate time with a view to divert and postpone the idea. In 1637, one exception to the non-alignment policy was made when the English took the initiative to make naval attack on the Portuguese, in favour of Bijapur.

It was their non-aligned policy which failed to appeal the English, the invitation in 1659 of Rustum-I Zaman to assist Shivaji in taking the fort of Danda-Rajapuri and become partner in the share of rich treasure in that Bijapur port. In 1674, when Rustam-i Zaman came back to Bijapur service, he requested the English to spare him guns and ‘bullions’ in his conflict with
Shivaji. The English factor at Karwar, Bandish refused to comply pointing out that “they were merchants, who had come to Karwar to trade and not to fight.” Sometimes the Englishmen assisted Bijapur secretly.

The Britishers were directed by their Directors of the Company in England to adopt peaceful and reconciliatory measures with Bijapur. The gestures of friendship, amity and help rendered by Bijapur and his governors to the English, doubted their integrity, when the question of their favouring the Dutch along with the English came up. On 10th January 1666, the President and Council at Surat advised the factor Robert at Karwar to “not to trust to the favour of the king of Bijapur or Rustum-i Zaman,’ for they are all the slaves of bribes, and money will incline them any way.”

British relations paved the way for building up British power in south India.

**Relations with Dutch:**

The Dutch came to trade with India towards the close of the sixteenth century. For the Dutch Lisbon was the market from where they purchased Indian merchandise. In 1580, the Spanish and Portuguese dominions were united under the Spanish Crown. King Philip II closed the harbours of Spain and Portugal to the commerce of the Dutch in 1585 and they were thus deprived of Indian goods. The Dutch then decided to engage directly in the Indian trade. The conflict between Spain, Portugal and Holland grew.
ships were confiscated and their owners were imprisoned. This rivalry between the Dutch and the Portuguese continued between them and their possessions in India.

From the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch had determined to take full advantage of the weakness of the Portuguese and oust them from their eastern trade. The Dutch having command of the seas in the East, hindered and interrupted communications between the Portuguese ports. They even prevented the sending of reinforcements from the mother country. Their cause was further strengthened by the agreement between the English and the Dutch in 1619. The Dutch being fully aware of the chronic enmity between the Portuguese and Bijapur, took advantage of seeking an alliance with Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II against the Portuguese. They gained several other favours from ‘Adil Shah on the pretext of helping him against the Portuguese. In 1637 the Dutch adopted the policy of annually blockading Goa. They wanted to build a port and a fortified factory at Vengurla to serve as a point d’appui for blockading Portuguese fleets and as a port of observation during the months when they were not there.  

**ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDIAL RELATIONS AND ALLIANCE**

**Dutch Embassy**

With this background and motives, the Dutch Governor-General and the Council of the Dutch sent Juan Van Twist as ambassador to Bijapur. In
January, 1637, Van Twist Chief Factor for the Dutch at Surat landed at Dabhol, on his mission to ‘Adil Shah. The purpose of the mission was partly ascribed to procure trading at Dabhol, but mainly to seek the assistance of Bijapur against the Portuguese at Goa. This is evident from the letter of Commander Jacob Cooper, addressed to ‘Adil Shah which throws considerable light on the Dutch diplomacy. The letter which is dated 31 December, 1636 reads: “Very mighty king, the much esteemed Mr. Antonio Van Diemen, Governor-General and the Councillors of India, who rule the United States in the East and the illustrrious and very mighty members of the Privy Council of the free Netherlands and his Royal Grace Fredrik, Hendrick and Prince Orangic etc., and the rulers of the general East India Company have been pleased to send me with a big fleet of well 14 equiped warships to these districts, not only to do as much harm as possible by land and at sea to the Portuguese, our enemies and the enemies of His Majesty (‘Adil Shah), but also to enter into a closer contact with your Majesty and other princes and friendly rulers, and to give them every help and assistance against, the said Portuguese and their allies. For that purpose, we arrived about two months ago safely with our fleet on the Indian Coast and in the roadstead of Goa…. 47”

“With the remaining ten ships, we are lying in the bay and roadstead of Goa in the range of vision of the Portuguese castles and their galleons, which we expect at sea every day to give us battle…… And in order to show your Majesty the good intentions which the illustrious Governor-General and the Councillors of India, have always had to please and serve your Majesty, these
gentlemen have ordered me to offer your Majesty their friendship and assistance as much as possible, not only to the glory and prosperity of His Majesty’s kingdom and subjects, but also to the prosperity and rest of the whole coast of India against the insatiable imperialism of the Portuguese and their allies, our enemies and the enemies of His Majesty; and they promise that just as we have closed Goa now from the seaside with our fleet, they intend to continue this practice every year, so that we dare assure your Majesty that if your Majesty (who has got many soldiers) is willing to bring his land forces before Goa and to cut off the supply from that side, Goa will soon be forced to surrender to your Majesty. For this purpose and in order to close a good treaty, of peace with your Majesty in the name of our principals, and to obtain free entrance in all the countries of your Majesty, we have agreed to send over special ambassador with proper orders and full authority to the Court of your Royal Majesty. As per the instructions of the Governor-General and the Council of India, we have therefore committed our brave and beloved Joan Van Twist, Fiscal of the fleet and the first man in our secret Council, to bring this letter. We respectfully request your Majesty to believe our said ambassador and brother in everything which we will propose in the name of us and our principals, and to let him enjoy the favour of your Majesty, in which we trust. Sire, we kiss the hands of your Majesty, and pray the Almighty to protect the throne of Your Majesty in happiness and beatitude for many years and also the person of your Majesty.”
On Van Twist’s arrival at Bijapur, the above letter was read out to ‘Adil Shah by an interpreter. ‘Adil Shah, after hearing the contents of the letter and understanding the commission of the Prince of Orangil, he uttered “Bahot Khub”. ‘Adil Shah immediately granted permission for the Dutch for the free trade in his kingdom, and ordered his minister, Mustafa Khan to issue a Farman in favour of the Dutch. ‘Adil Shah also agreed for joint attack on Goa. For the service and help of Dutch ships at sea, ‘Adil Shah granted the Dutch freedom from tolls; and promised to pay half the tribute of the “afandigos” and of the revenues of Goa and booty, after its conquest49.

**Dutch Alliance**

Van Twist’s mission was successful and ‘Adil Shah issued a Farman granting the desires of the Dutch with the sole intention of meeting the challenge of the Portuguese on the seas. The Farman of 1046/1637 reads:

“To the esteemed and highly respected lion of the sea, Mr. Antonio Van Diemen, Viceroy of the Dutch in India. I should like very much trust that during the September monsoon you will send a strong fleet before Goa. At the same time, I shall send support of horsemen and footmen from the land side, and I hope that they will fight with courage against the Portuguese and seize the town of Goa and the surrounding countries; and that they will deliver the town and countries to my governor and Captains”.
“And I shall order to give a place in my country to the Dutch, where they may come and go for trade purposes without having anything to ask for any person. When the Dutch arrive in my harbours, I shall order my governors and captain that they must favour them and help them and give them everything they want, viz., food stuffs, drinks and other things they want in connection with the war.”

“And because the Portuguese have broken the peace contract and the old friendship we had with them, I give permission to the Dutch to come in all my countries and if the Dutch deliver to me the said town of Goa and the surrounding countries, I undertake to give them half of the revenues and of the tributes and also a place where they like to establish themselves either in Goa or in other ports of mine wherever they will like.”

They may be assured of this my promise and may trust me; and when they come next year before Goa, this contract, which I have made with them, will be in force just the same as the contract I made with King Sicander, I shall never act against it but always live up to it.”

Dutch activities against the Portuguese

On the advice of Van Twist, Mustafa Khan gave orders for the fortification of Vengurla, and for its reinforcement to help the Dutch. For the Dutch, Vengurla was of prime importance and they considered that “without it, it
would be impossible to continue the siege before Goa.” Mustafa Khan advised Van Twist to appoint a Dutch Agent at the Court of Bijapur. This was in order to prevent the Portuguese factions who were out to obstruct the Dutch-Bijapur alliance. Van Twist wished to send a permanent ambassador to Bijapur. This proposal seems to have materialized as in one of the dispatches Van Twist writes on his arrival again at Dabhol, that he was “greeted by Mr. Ramadhan, ambassador of your Royal Majesty in the empire of Visiapour.” This person does not seem to be a Dutch national.

The Dutch continued the war with the Portuguese with increased vigour and almost with unvarying success. The blockade of Goa was resumed and fierce naval fighting took place between the Dutch and the Portuguese at Sea, near Karli river, south of Malvar
51.

After the war misunderstanding started between ‘Adil Shah and the Dutch. ‘Adil Shah demanded from the Dutch all the booty, especially the artillery. The Dutch refused to send the booty, ‘Adil Shah caused the Dutch factors at Vengurla to be apprehended and imprisoned. The chief of Dutch merchant, resident at Vengurla, Peter Paets, presented to ‘Adil Shah two very large pieces of brass ordinance and several other valuable things and offered continued assistance of the Dutch at Sea, if ‘Adil Shah sent his forces by land. ‘Adil Shah expressed his inability to send land forces, as they were busy in the Karnatak.
During the naval blockade of Goa by the Dutch in 1638-39, the Portuguese Viceroy felt hopeless to compete with the Dutch single-handed; he dispatched an embassy to ‘Adil Shah with a view of inducing him to help them to turn out the Dutch. The Portuguese were unaware of the Bijapur-Dutch alliance. Portuguese ambassador, met with but little encouragement and entirely failed to accomplish his object. And during 1640-41, Bijapur-Dutch relations were friendly and peaceful.[52]

THE DUTCH ON COROMANDEL COAST

By 1649, the whole of the district of Ginji, including the sea board Tegenapatam was conquered by Bijapur. The Dutch promptly obtained from the Bijapur Commander in charge of Ginji and Madura a reassuring “Kaul”, for trade and other facilities in the Bijapur Kingdom. In 1650 the new governor of Bijapur gave further assurances that the trading rights of the Dutch in Ginji and further south would be duly respected. In August 1651, Farmanars from ‘Adil Shah, formally guaranteed the Dutch trading rights at the Bijapur ports as well as the Coromandel coast, and fixed the tolls for Tegenapatam at two and a half per cent, which was only about half the previous rate.

With Thanjavur Nayak’s acceptance of Bijapur’s suzerainty, the Dutch factory at Karikal also came under Bijapur’s suzerainty. The Bijapur governor granted ‘Kauls’, to the Dutch in 1649 and 1652, with the same conditions as formerly granted in ‘Adil Shah’s Farmanr of 1651.
Though it was Khan-i Khanan, commander-in-chief of the Bijapur army, who gave the ‘Kaul’ to the Dutch to trade and got them Farmans from ‘Adil Shah, yet in 1652, the Dutch refused passes for his ship to proceed to Achin and Queda. Instead of these places, the Dutch offered him passes for Tenasserim and Pegu. This did not satisfy the Khan and he decided to send one ship to Achin without a pass. In 1655, one of the Khan’s ships, while returning from Achin without a pass, was attacked by a Dutch ship cruising in the Bay. Such incidents were a source of continuous tension despite Khan’s generally friendly and helpful attitude towards the Dutch Company. The nobles of Bijapur wanted to develop trade relations with the eastern countries and this clashed with commercial interests of the Dutch.\(^{53}\)

During the Bijapur-Golconda conflict in 1652 over the partition of the Karnataka the Dutch adopted a neutral policy and was endeavouring to live as peacefully as possible with both the contenting powers. In August, 1654, the Dutch obtained another Farman of ‘Adil Shah, granting them privileges at Tegenapatem and neighbouring ports.

**Diplomatic endeavours and Peaceful Relations**

By 1659, the Portuguese were successful in their endeavour to instigate the Queen of Bijapur against the Dutch. The Portuguese sent an envoy to Bijapur with very costly presents valued at 100,000 pagodas, and a further promise of offering 10,000 Pagodas annually if amicable relations between
Bijapur and the Portuguese were restored; and if the Dutch were expelled from the Bijapur territory. The Portuguese obtained nothing more than a renewal of former treaties. This animated the Dutch. But for the diplomacy of the Dutch, relations would have strained. No sooner did the Portuguese envoy left Bijapur, the Dutch supplanted favour of Bijapur by offering ‘peshkash’ and got cancelled the Portuguese proposal of sending Bijapur’s army against the Dutch. Due to the diplomacy of the Dutch, the Queen was induced to send an army against the Portuguese to claim Bijapur’s rights over the territories of Bardes and Salsette. She demanded 20,000 pagodas as yearly payment for claim over these territories⁵⁴.

In 1660 the young ‘Adil Shah granted the Dutch exemption from tolls on the cows purchased at Vengurla. In the following year the Dutch showed their friendly gesture by providing a ship to the Queen-mother of Bijapur for her pilgrimage to Mecca. Later when visited Persia, the Dutch even carried her letters to Bijapur. They loaned money to her in Persia, while ‘Adil Shah was directed to pay the amount to the Dutch Company at Golconda.

In January, 1663 Dutch solicitations for permission to establish a factory at Karwar was granted by the Bijapur governor of that place.

In February 1661 Shivaji secured possession of Porto Novo and Tegenaptam but, in 1662, the Bijapur commander Bahlol Khan recaptured it. During the siege of the fort of Tegenapatam, the Dutch trade was completely disturbed and all the merchants, flew to neighbouring towns. After the capture
of the fort, the Dutch governor Pit sent Pieter de Lange and Francois Thivort, to
the Bijapur Commander with the object of restoring normalcy in the town and
settling the dispute with the merchants. It was agreed that the amount of 250
pagodas, which the Bijapur soldiers had exacted, from the Dutch soon on their
arrival at Tegenepatam, to be adjusted against the tolls they were to pay. The
Bijapur commander, Sher Khan Lodi promised and assured the Dutch that
during the reign of his brother, Bahlol Khan the Farmanrs would never be
exactted from the Dutch both, at the port of Porto Novo and Tegenapatam;
except in extraordinary circumstances.

In August, 1669, Sher Khan, the Bijapur governor of Ginji entered into
an agreement with the Dutch at Tegenapatam to suppress the revolt of the
craftsmen and weavers Sher Khan sided with the Dutch on account of heavy
losses he was suffering in the revenue due to the revolt.

The growing wealth and prosperity of Pondicherry, a French port, made
the Dutch jealous of the French. The Dutch, in 1674, stationed a war-ship off
San Thome to prevent the ingress of foodstuffs to Dela Haye. They also
mobilised the garrisons at their factories at Porto Novo, Devanampatnam (later
Fort St. David) and Negapatnam for the purpose of attacking Pondicherry. The
Dutch approached Nadhir Muhammad, the Bijapur governor of Ginji who
agreed to dispatch a body of cavalry to lay waste the region of Pondicherry.
Dutch Treaty, 1676

Ekoji, commander of Bijapur, conquered and occupied Thanjavur in 1675. The Dutch approached him for confirmation of their trading rights on the Coromandel Coast. After negotiations between Ekoji and Peter Verwer, they agreed and signed a treaty in 1676.

From the study of the Treaty the following facts emerge:

That this Treaty was variously called an ‘alliance’, ‘contract’, ’kaul‘, ‘agreement’;

That the previous privileges enjoyed by the Dutch, unhindered trade and half toll on imports and exports were accepted and confirmed by Bijapur;

The ten old villages in the possession of the Dutch were to remain with them; the Poyyur garden to the south of the fort of Negapatam and the garden to the west of the new Veligopuram were also to remain with the Dutch; and the Dutch were to pay annually 1200 pon as rent for the ten villages to Bijapur.

Bijapur agreed to surrender all claims over Negapatam, ten old villages, Poyyur and Veli gardens. Ekoji was to hand them over to the Dutch by the 13th of the month of Purattasi in the Ananda Year, (A.D.1674). In return for territorial cessions, the Dutch Company agreed to give Ekoji one tusker elephant and cash as detailed below, viz., 1200 pon per annum for theen old
villages of the Company at 10 panams of 3½ mattu per pon; 300 pon for Negapatam; making in all 4200 pon and one tusker elephant to be handed over by the end of the year.

Ekoji approved and authorised the Dutch to establish a mint at Negapatam for the minting of panam, varahan and pagoda. The profits earned after meeting the expenditure of the mints were to be divided equally between the Dutch Company and Ekoji. Further, one of the representative of Ekoji was to stay in the mint for the verifications of accounts and profits.

Ekoji undertook to offer protection to the Dutch possessions (mentioned in the Treaty) wherever necessary. If he failed, then, the Dutch were to do themselves at the cost of Ekoji;

The devadaya, brahmadaya, manya and madappuram in Negapatam were to be continued as before.

Differences over the parts of Karikal and Tirumalai Raja’s pattanam, in the possession of the Dutch were to be settled by a treaty on the arrival of Signor Governor from Ceylon to Negapatam. Ekoji was to continue to told the two parts under him till final settlement.

The sum of 3150 pon (detailed above) which the Dutch Company had to pay to Ekoji for the period of a year and a half from A.D. 1676 Rakasa year, Tai month to A.D 1677, Pingala Year, Ani month viz., at the end of Tai, in year Nala, A.D. 1677.
The Dutch Company was to conform to the terms of this agreement.

This treaty was friendly and peaceful in nature, safeguarding commercial interests of the Dutch and did not had any provision for military alliance nor did it involve other European Companies nor other Indian rulers. It was merely a treaty involving cessions of Bijapur territory and its claims to the Dutch.

Though relations begin from 1637, as early as 1615 the Dutch made an attempt to establish commercial ties with Bijapur. In September 1615 the factor Leonard Wolff was sent to Bijapur to obtain the right to trade in diamonds in Bijapur kingdom. But Wolff’s mission failed. Pieter Gilliaz, who was sent to replace Wolff, did not achieve anything.

The Dutch Company shifted involuntarily from a commercial to a territorial and political basis as the Company had to compete with other European companies established in India. The first move was naturally to establish factories, forts etc. They took interest in the affairs of Indian States; and this encroached in the native politics. Since from its foundation on 20 March, 1602, the States-General of Holland endowed the Dutch Company with a strong military power, we find them seeking commercial ends through militant and diplomatic channels. Their relations with Bijapur were both militant and commercial. Their militant policy with Bijapur was to gain alliance against the Portuguese and the French, in order to safeguard their commercial interest and to achieve monopoly. They approached ‘Adil Shah, in
1637, to form an alliance against the Portuguese. The Dutch were aware of the age long enmity between Bijapur and the Portuguese. They fully utilized the opportunity, on the one hand to gain favour of ‘Adil Shah and on the other to increase the animosity between the Portuguese and Bijapur. By making tempting offers of naval attacks on Goa, the Dutch got sanctions for trade and establishment of Dutch factories in the Bijapur kingdom. On the basis of military assistance they sought exemptions and concessions from customs and tolls. The militant-relations with Bijapur were only restricted to the Portuguese and the French; in relation to other Indian powers, they did not side with or against Bijapur. This attitude is evident from an incident of 3rd October 1664, when the Bijapur governor Rustum-i Zaman asked the Dutch resident Leendersz, where the Dutch friends of Shivaji, to which the Dutch replied, “not only with him but also with all other Rajas there about it”

Except for a few minor incidents, the Bijapur-Dutch relations throughout from 1637 to 1686, were friendly. There was never any war or hostility between the two; as was the case between Bijapur-Portuguese relations.

**Relations with French:**

Sher Khan grants Pondichery to the French – Helps them against Golconda and the Dutch.
In 1670, Sher Khan Lodi, the Bijapur Governor of the Province of Valikondapuram of Ginji, sent to Francois Martin (one of the French Directors in India) a proposal to settle a factory in his territory. The adviser of de la Haye, Francois Caron prevented Martin from replying to Sher Khan.

Francois Baron and Francois Martin sent Bellangarde Lespinay, in November, 1672, to Sher Khan, seeking from him the provisions needed by the defenders of St. Thome. Caron was not in India, Lespinay was free to act. He obtained from Sher Khan not only munitions and victuals, but also a site for a factory at Pondichery. Just as Lespinay was about to take leave on 2nd January, 1673, an agent of the Dutch Company arrived in order to prejudice Sher Khan against the French. The Dutch Agent said proudly “those merchants were not soldiers, and that the he knew the difference between the Dutch and the French.” Sher Khan to the great surprise and joy of the Dutchman, declared that “as the Dutch and the French were neighbours in Europe, so they should be in India.” Sher Khan granted Pondicherry to the French for a factory. The young Vendomois performed the first diplomatic mission of the French to Bijapur with much skill. By the order of the French Directors in India, Lespinay established himself at Pondicherry on 4th February, 1673.

Factors determining the Relations – French – Dutch-English rivalries:

The French-Dutch rivalry on the Coromandel coast and the fear of Dutch attacks and provocations compelled the French to establish relations
with Bijapur, with a view, to provide themselves with a place of refuge in case of evil days, the two French Directors Baron and De La Haye ordered Francois Martins to place himself in communication with Sher Khan Lodi for the grant of a piece of land which they might call their own. Martin obeyed, found Sher Khan accessible and was allowed to purchase a plot of ground at Pondicherry. In April, 1674, some sixty French men went to the site and took charge of the plot of the land, which later on became Pondicherry.

Besides the French-Dutch rivalry, competition with the English was also one of the causes which led to the establishment of French factory at Pondicherry, and necessitated contacts with Bijapur. As early as 1673, Nadhir Muhammad, the Bijapur governor of Ginji, offered the English to establish factory and fortify it either near Porto Novo or at Valudavur near Pondicherry. The English, considering the dangers they were exposed to from the Dutch and the French and disturbances in the trade, wished to avail this offer; and the directors at England too approved the proposal. Elihu Yale was sent to the Khan for further negotiations. The French sensing the danger they would be exposed to, must have arranged to establish relations with Bijapur and a factory in the Bijapur Kingdom.

**Founding of Pondicherry and Establishment of close Friendly Relations:**

From 21st September, 1674, Martin was left at Pondicherry and he became founder of Pondicherry as he developed it, transformed and made it the
capital of the French settlements in India. Besides Lespinay and Martin, to whom the credit goes for establishing Pondicherry, credit also goes to Sher Khan who went even to the extent of advancing loan to the French to establish their factory at Pondicherry.

On 26 February, 1675, Sher Khan sent one of his cavalry captains at Pondicherry to Baron. The latter reciprocated the courtesy by sending Deltor to Sher Khan. On the request of Sher Khan, Baron sent some French soldiers to join Sher Khan’s contingent at Cuddalore and to proceed to Porto Novo. This gesture was for the show of friendship between Bijapur and the French.

The accounts of the amount advanced by Sher Khan to the French in 1673 were still unsettled. On 17th April, 1675, Martin left Pondicherry to meet Sher Khan in order to settle the account and the differences. Baron advised Martin that “the settlement arrived at should be favorable to Sher Khan” – “because of the services rendered” to the French by him.

After the settlement of the accounts, Martin and Sher Khan discussed “an enterprise” – probably the conquest of Ginji and Golconda kingdom; and in the words of Martin, it “had every chance of succeeding, provided, Sher Khan received assistance from the Court and the powers in France seconded our efforts by sending out troops and money to these quarters.”
French Alliance 1675

Martin writes that in April, 1675 Baron was very anxious to secure an interview with Sher Khan and the latter too appeared as eager for the meeting. After envoys had been exchanged between them it was decided that Baron was to go to Cuddalore to meet Sher Khan. During the interview plans about the ‘enterprise’ were framed and discussed. Sher Khan entered into a ‘pact’ with Baron, who in the first instance, was to advance for his ally five lakhs of pagodas and send one hundred Frenchmen. With this French aid, the Khan wished to fulfil his ambition of becoming master of the whole of South India. After consolidating his authority in the newly acquired territory, his plan was to conquer the kingdom of Golconda – ‘an enterprise’ for which Baron promised to obtain 5000 cavalry and 20,000 French soldiers\textsuperscript{63}.

Baron’s correspondence with the French minister Cobert shows how very serious he was about the ‘enterprise’. And for the success of his ambitious ‘enterprise’, Baron wanted de La Haye to come back to India. The project did not materialize. As the French, King Louis XIV was completely absorbed in continental wars and was temporarily disheartened by the failure of the French at St. Thome. Martin, considered that the plan would have surely materialized had the Bijapur Court given a helping hand to Sher Khan. It implies that the Bijapur Court did not approve Sher Khan’s scheme.

In the meanwhile, Baron tried to tap other sources. In 1675, he approached the Maratha Prime Minister. Baron tried unsuccessfully to forge an
alliance between Shivaji, Bijapur and the French. Even as late as February 1676 Baron was still busy discussing the project with de La Haye. Even though his efforts as a whole did not materialize still he was able to achieve part fulfillment of the project. The French successfully helped Sher Khan in crushing Nadhir Muhammad, Bijapur governor of Gingi. It was the first stage of the grand project, which was achieved by Bijapur-French alliance.

Sher Khan called the French to capture Valudevur. On 9th September, 1676, he sent a Brahmin as his envoy to Martin with full credence to negotiate. The background is the mutual conflict for supremacy between Sher Khan and Nadhir Muhammad. The envoy informed Martin that Sher Khan had appointed mediatars to settle the differences between him and Nadhir Muhammad and the proceedings were going on very slowly. Sher Khan was unable to take any action against Nadhir Muhammad. He advised Martin to initiate hostilities with Nadhir Muhammad by attacking Valudevur. On the mid-night of 23rd-24th September, 1676, Martin received a letter from Sher Khan in which he requested him to siege Valudevur “on behalf of the king of Bijapur, for his rebellious subject” Nakhir Muhammad. Sher Khan also assured Martin that he would send to him reinforcement of troops. On the morning of 24th September Muhammad Rada was sent by Sher Khan to guard Pondicherry and was placed at the disposal of Martin.64

The whole affair was very delicate; Martin could not take any steps on his own responsibility. He convened a meeting of the French Council at Pondicherry to discuss the proposal of Sher Khan. The Council considered that
“Sher Khan had not only given us valuable assistance during the siege St. Thome, but also without his support it would be impossible for us to maintain ourselves in Pondicherry. For our sake he was on the point of rapture with the Dutch, as they were refusing to provide passports to his ships.” The Council therefore decided to help Sher Khan by attacking Valudevur. A French force under Martin stormed Valudevur. By November 1676, Nadhir Muhammad was forced to make peace and ceded most of the territory to Sher Khan.

Sher Khan was very grateful to the French for this service. He promised them a large sum as the price of their help and kept up a close alliance with them thereafter. For these services rendered by the French and to keep them under friendly obligation, Sher Khan offered to cede the fortress of Devi Kottah, near Pondicherry. The French however did not have sufficient resources at that time to maintain a new possession, and being disinterested, they did not take any decision. Sher Khan wrote a letter to the French to take charge of the possession on 15th April, 1676. As Martin was getting ready to start with his men, he received another letter from Sher Khan, offering the French only the fort of Devi Kottah, while he himself wished to retain its surrounding territory. This condition was not favourable to the French; they did not avail the opportunity and allowed the proposal to lapse in course of time.

Afraid of Shivaji’s expedition and levying of Chauth, Martin realized that a handful of Europeans in his contingent would not be able to meet any eventuality. In 1676, he applied to his friend Sher Khan for permission to entertain and recruit some Indian soldiers. Sher Khan willingly assented and
made over to Martin three hundred of his own men. Martin used them not only as soldiers but as colonists. He gave each a piece of land and encouraged them to build houses, and to employ themselves profitably in the manufacture of tissues and other articles for export. Thus, Pondicherry grew to prosperity.

**French Neutrality in Shivaji’s Campaign against Bijapur:**

The campaigns of Shivaji in the Madras-Karnatak placed the French in an embarrassing situation. Martin sent an envoy to Sher Khan to enquire about the measures he intended to take in order to defend himself. He also sought Sher Khan’s permission for the French to retire to Tegnapatam (Fort St. David), from where they could only escape to their ships in case of an attack. Sher Khan assured the French envoy that there was nothing to fear from Shivaji; since he had sufficient forces to defend. He offered Palamcotta to the French as a place of retreat instead of Tegnapatam. Martin interviewed Sher Khan’s son Ibrahim Khan, on 22\(^{nd}\) May, 1677 in regard to the measures to be taken to meet the situation. He also inspected the fort of Valudevur for retreat in case of emergency\(^6\).

Sher Khan appealed to Martin for help. But the latter “deserting the cause of Sher Khan actually sent an ambassador to Shivaji.” The French envoy met Shivaji near the walls of Vellore fort; Shivaji was surprised to learn about the shift in French attitude towards Sher Khan.

After the fall of Ginji on 31\(^{st}\) May, 1677 Martin sent his agent Antonio to Shivaji with a letter to the following effect. “Our Company is established in
your territory at Rajapur and we beg of you to be protected in the same way on this Coast.” The French envoy had three interviews with Shivaji. In the second audience, Shivaji espousing the cause of Bijapur governor, Nadhir Muhammad, directed the French to return the fort of Valudevur to Nadhir Muhammad. The French envoy replied that the French were under the obligation of Sher Khan and therefore, could not draw sword against him. Shivaji assured safety of the French provided they maintained neutrality. When Shivaji was “assured of the defection of the French” to Sher Khan he returned to South to attack the Khan.

Sher Khan owed money to the French Company. With the change in political situation and visualizing the defeat of Sher Khan at the hands of Shivaji, Martin became anxious to get back as much money as possible. He sought interview with the Khan. During the interview, Sher Khan asked for French help. But in view of the assurance given to Shivaji, of maintaining neutrality, Martin diplomatically avoided the issue. This neutrality and attitude of the French changed the whole course of Bijpur-French relations and the politics of South India. Had the French allied with the Khan, Shivaji would not have attacked Sher Khan67.

After Sher Khan’s rout at Tiruvadi, early in July, 1677 he sought refuge in the woods of Ariyalur. Even in this precarious situation, Martin sent several times messengers to Sher Khan, demanding repayment of money he owed to the Company, but each time he expressed his inability to pay. At last due to constant persuasion he handed over to the French some very costly emeralds.
With the signing of the Treaty on 17th July, 1677 between Sher Khan and Shivaji, the French and Bijapur relations came to an end; as Pondicherry was now ceded by Bijapur to Shivaji.

**French Desertion**

Throughout the brief span of eight years of Bijapur-French relations, Sher Khan proved to be friend, helper, financier and an ally of the French. Owed much to Sher Khan or Bijapur than what Bijapur or he owed to the French, Sher Khan helped and allied with the French at the cost of the enmity of the English, Dutch, Golconda, and even of Nadhir Muhammad. At one time, in 1676, the Dutch threatened Sher Khan from issuing passports to his ships, unless he expelled the French from Pondicherry. Sher Khan replied that “he owed us (French) protection no less than the Dutch themselves. As for the navigation on the sea, he had no comments to make. He however, wrote to the French to not to provoke the Dutch as they were strong at sea. He also warned them to be on guard as a contingent of Golconda horse was awaiting near Pondichery.” In the time of need the French left their friend and benefactor in the lurch and sided with his opponent Shivaji. Had French sided with Sher Khan, that would have changed the whole course of politics of South India.\(^68\)
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