CHAPTER II
RATIONALE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The world is in the midst of post-Cold War transition, which is likely to continue for some more time to come. On the one hand, cataclysmic changes have ushered in a new global political/security situation in which certain security dilemmas were minimized and on the other this has created new international and domestic risks and threat perceptions. While some scholars regard it as a fundamental paradigm shift of global proportions, these changes viewed in historical context might prove to have elements not that fundamentally different from similar situations in the world’s history.¹ It could be postulated that the main international traditions identified after the Second World War and even earlier, remain relevant in explaining on a micro level perceptions regarding international relations, particularly regarding security-related issues. Each of these traditions embodies a great variety of doctrines about international relations among which there sometimes exists only a loose connection. these traditions, however, incorporate a set of distinctive questions and assumptions about the basic units and forces in international relations.² Such paradigms or World views represent through the main traditions of political thought, a description of the nature of international relations and a set of prescription about international conduct.³
Martin Wright has identified these main traditions as the realist, rationalist and the revolutionist traditions. He described these traditions as related to three interrelated political conditions which comprise the subject matter of international relations. The first condition is that no political superior is acknowledged and a multiplicity of independent sovereign states accepts the use of military force and warfare ultimately as a method to regulate relationship. This is the basis of realist worldview of international relations. Realists stress power and interests, rather than ideals in international relations.

Realism is basically conservative, empirical, prudent, suspicious of idealistic principles, and respectful of the lessons of history. It is also more likely to produce a pessimistic rather than an optimistic view of international relations. Realists regard power as the fundamental concept in social sciences, although they admit that power relations are often cloaked in moral and legal terms. Realists view theories as rationalizing, rather than shaping events. They criticize the utopian approaches to international relations, for preferring visionary goals to scientific analysis. According to the realists, a State’s ideological or ethical preferences are neither good nor bad but what matters is whether its self-interest is served.

The second condition identified by Martin is that diplomacy and commerce form the basis of international and institutionalized interaction between sovereign states. Laying emphasis on how people ought to behave in their international relationships rather than how they actually behave, rationalists
usually spurn balance of power politics, national armaments and the use of force in international affairs. Instead they stress international legal rights and obligations, the natural harmony of national interests as a regulator for the preservation of international peace, a significant reliance upon reason in human affairs, and confidence in peace-building function of the “world court of public opinion.”

Thirdly, the concept of a society of states or a family of nations, brings with it certain moral and psychological as well as possibly even legal obligations. Revolutionists tend to concentrate on the society of states or international society but can be defined more precisely as those who believe passionately in the moral unity of a society of states. This view is strongly influenced by an ideological world view. They postulate a transcendental source of authority behind political structures, social interaction and government. At first, revolutionists endeavour to explain the overall structure of the global system, within which behaviour takes place. In this regard the tracing of the historical evolution of systems is especially of value. In general revolutionists assume particularly that mechanisms of domination exist that keep disadvantaged people as well as nations from development, and that they contribute to worldwide inequalities. The revolutionists provide a framework for opposing this situation and foresee a deterministic solutions to these problems.

The three competing world views offer different starting points, explanations and predictions. This leads to differences in the issue on which
proponents of the different world views would focus. It is, however, possible to contrast explanations and predictions with the aim of testing them against the empirical situation. These traditions have a fundamental role in evaluating the impact of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, in international relations, especially regarding international security, as well as in global efforts to stop the further spread of these weapons through international non-proliferation measures and activities.

In the immediate aftermath of the advent of nuclear weapons, the sheer destructive power of these weapons, as could be evidenced from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ensured that they were destined to fulfill a strategic/political role based on their military capability. Either the state that used them would be totally destroyed by a retaliatory attack, or the devastation would be so great that no territory, wealth or population would be gained after their use. The cost of a war would be unprecedented, bringing about total societal disruption in a few hours. While distance and time once protected the states, the advent of sophisticated delivery systems such as ballistic, cruise missiles and unarmed air vehicle (UAV) made few targets unreachable. It became unnecessary to defeat an opponent’s armed forces before being able to destroy its people and wealth, as has been the case in conflicts.

However, the international scenario has undergone considerable transformation during the post-Cold War. The nature and consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons changed, inter alia, with greater emphasis on
nuclear proliferation in the developing world. These differences, however, seem to be overemphasized because of the growing scholarly and political interest in the proliferation of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. The attention devoted to horizontal proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons capability to additional states) is especially a case in point, while issues regarding the continuing vertical proliferation (the enhancing of capabilities and the accumulation of more weapons by the existing nuclear weapon states) seem to be largely ignored.

Deterrence plays an important part in preventing a situation of constant war. The principle of deterrence is based on giving a potential adversary a view of the consequences that such a state might suffer, if it were to provoke war. It is believed that this view will prevent the said state from launching action that could result in war. Deterrence rested on the assumption inherent in a calculation of risk versus gain. It is a psychological phenomenon involving a threatened intent and perception of that threat. As a matter of resolve; the real consequences for the said state are always not that important. The main problem regarding deterrence is making the threat believable. According to the Realist school of thought; the state must often go to extremes because moderation and reconciliation are apt to be taken for weakness. Although the state may be willing to agree to a settlement that involves some concessions, it may fear that, if it admits this, the other side will respond, not by matching concessions, but redoubled efforts to extract a further retreat.
Prior to the advent of nuclear weapons, deterrence was created by, inter alia, the forming of alliances, erecting theoretically impenetrable fortifications along borders, deployment of forces at strategic places, and periodic and highly visible military movements. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, the international system of multiple states of approximately equal strength has been replaced by two states (United States and former USSR, now Russia) with unequaled military power. Deterrence then came to be closely associated with testing of nuclear weapons, ballistic as well as cruise missiles deployment and dispersal and concealment of offensive as well as defensive bases to escape detection and premature destruction and to retain and maximize retaliatory capabilities.

Nuclear deterrence is based on the study of concepts encompassing a focus on either counter-value (targeting urban centres and other civilian facilities) or counterforce (targeting military force or other infrastructure), on a combination of such concepts. Minimum nuclear deterrence is the notion that the potential enemies can be dissuaded from aggression or war by the mere possession of enough nuclear weapons and delivery systems to destroy enemy's homeland. Seeing that the destruction involved is enormous, the notion is that the rational leader would not choose aggression as an option to attain his goals. Many military/strategic analysts did not generally accept minimum deterrence as sufficient against war. Assured destruction deterrence was considered as the answer for a real level of strategic level of deterrence. The emphasis in such a
case is on the ‘second strike’ capability of a state. That is, the ability of a state’s forces to survive a surprise attack by an enemy and then to inflict an unacceptable level of destruction on enemy’s territory.\textsuperscript{19} This ability must be unequivocally communicated in order to be effective.\textsuperscript{20}

A state that forswears preventive war must thus devote sufficient military energy to diminishing substantially the advantage that the potential enemy can derive from launching a surprise attack, by guaranteeing the survival of the retaliating force under attack.\textsuperscript{21} Deterrence is achieved only if: firstly the enemy knows that you have the capacity to deliver the unacceptable damage even after absorbing a first strike; secondly, the enemy believes that you would in fact do so if attacked; and thirdly, the enemy is a rational decision-maker.\textsuperscript{22} This ultimate function of nuclear weapons (especially the strategic nuclear weapons) is to act as a counter value or as a counterforce war capability, or to support a threat do so for the purpose of blackmail or deterrence.\textsuperscript{23} A strategy to ensure security that is satisfactory both in military and political respects must combine deterrence with a credible capacity for defence, if such deterrence should fail.\textsuperscript{24} Although the main characteristics of this dominant deterrence paradigm include, first and foremost, the prevention of attack against the country itself (central deterrence), it also includes commitment to use nuclear weapons to deter attacks launched by nuclear or conventional means against the allies (extended deterrence).\textsuperscript{25}
Since the days of the Cold War, neither of the nuclear powers, particularly US and Russia, has depended solely on one type of weapons system in its strategic nuclear forces. Each superpower possessed land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), large numbers of bombers capable of attacking other’s territory, and many Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Together, aircraft, ICBMs and SLBMs formed a triad of different kinds of weapons, each having different capabilities, and each protected in different ways. In the case of nuclear superpowers such a retaliatory force ensured a delicate balance of terror with the aim of ensuring a stalemate between them.

Even mutual nuclear deterrence entails the possibility of breaking down. Peace based on military strength remains a peace with risks. The most the distribution of nuclear weapons can do is to minimize the number of occasions on which war is used and to minimize the level of destruction in war. Even this does not ensure that the policy of deterrence does in itself totally remove the danger of accidental outbreak or even limit the damage in case deterrence failed, nor would it be adequately accurate for preventing crises on the periphery of the global system.

A nuclear weapon provides an alternative to conventional forces and creates one more option. It was not surprising, during the period of global dominance by the two superpowers, to observe that states with nuclear capabilities always desired to have more nuclear options and to upgrade their
existing nuclear inventory so as to hedge against technical breakthroughs by the state’s opponent. To hedge against the greatest anticipated threat, nuclear weapons would be continually improved or procured as the cushion against the opponent’s own possible developments.\textsuperscript{31} Realists generally regarded with scepticism the slowdown in this technological arms race brought about by a series of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. Realists tended to explain these efforts as the consequence of seeking excessive gains to the point of significantly increasing the probability of total destruction and thus as sensible moderation.\textsuperscript{32}

Acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons are more perceived to serve the ends of ensuring national security. What is important is the political utility that nuclear weapons produce, not the actual detonation of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{33} The very existence of nuclear stockpiles created and enforced considerable caution in relations among nuclear-weapon-states (NWSs). The availability of such military means enables a state to express unequivocal commitment to its national defence. A threat of nuclear response, therefore, promises a rational means of reaction or riposte in case deterrence fails. Possession of nuclear weapons may, therefore, not only be for deterrence but also has a value as a defence instrument.\textsuperscript{34} Furthermore, possession of nuclear weapons could also be regarded as constituting a formidable expression of political power by enabling a state to honour its commitments, supplying the currency to sustain status quo. Possession of nuclear weapons also serves other political purposes
such as appeasing domestic and allied opinions.\textsuperscript{35} While nuclear weapons are regarded as strategically valuable because of their deterrent value, their further utility seems to be suspect especially for the rationalists, and even for some realists.\textsuperscript{36}

More recent views of realism, such as neo-realism, also have implications for views regarding the utility of nuclear weapons. \textsuperscript{(Neo-realism is the basic classic realism with a added dimension, namely that the structure of international system (whether unipolar, bipolar or multipolar) influences international relations and can be used to explain international outcomes.\textsuperscript{37} Kenneth Waltz, a neorealist, has advanced two arguments, namely that the existence of nuclear weapons has greatly enhanced international security by greatly reducing the probability of war, and that he further spread of nuclear weapons would be desirable to entrench peace. Waltz also argues that nuclear weapons have had the effect of greatly reducing the possibility of war between states armed with nuclear weapons by reducing the likelihood of miscalculation because with “... nuclear weapons, peace and stability rest on easy calculations.” He has further opined that nuclear reality has not been fully reflected in the actual force structure and doctrines of the nuclear powers, because states still desire counter force options and they fear that small difference in number of nuclear weapons matter politically.\textsuperscript{38}

Although the nuclear capability does provide security on a micro-strategic level, even these security spin-offs have some serious limitations. Nuclear
weapons have no use against guerilla operations or terrorists. They could not be used a government to seize territory or topple foreign government. The main value of nuclear weapons, once they are created, has rested on their nonuse: deterring the use of nuclear weapons by other nuclear powers. The use of power between two nuclear states has also been regarded as dangerous because the risk of escalation.\textsuperscript{39} This is a big dilemma especially for a small state obtaining a nuclear capability. The actual use of nuclear weapons against a state not possessing nuclear weapons could result in dire international consequences for the nuclear aggressor. Except for possible international measures such as sanctions, the direct involvement of other nuclear power could be conceivable.

This chapter examines previous scholarship on nuclear proliferation and evaluates their utility for a theoretical understanding of the problem. This is followed by a series of critical questions pertaining to the problems which must be addressed, and justification for undertaking the present research work.

Within the nuclear proliferation literature scholarly works can be grouped into two sets: studies on the causes of proliferation, and studies on the consequences of proliferation. The first group focuses on states' motivations or incentives and disincentives for acquiring nuclear weapons, while the second has concentrated on the type of impact the spread of nuclear weapons could have on international and regional security. Although both groups of scholars
have, by and large written since the 1950s, serious works on proliferation motivations began with the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968.\textsuperscript{40}

This does not mean that the spread of nuclear weapons did not become a concern until after 1968; the Baruch Plan, Atoms-for-Peace Plan, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed as part of the attempt to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Baruch Plan was presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) in June 1946 and was designed to have monopoly ownership and management of atomic energy activities regulated by an international agency under the aegis of the United Nations. The Plan ultimately failed because of the lack of consensus among member state.\textsuperscript{41}

Later, in 1953, the Eisenhower Administration proposed the Atoms-for-Peace Plan to allow the transfer of nuclear materials and facilities to other countries only if an agreement was reached that these materials would be used for peaceful rather than military purposes. Consequently, the second part of the Atoms-for-Peace Plan called for the establishment of a new international agency to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The statute of MA was adopted in 1956 and came into force in 1957.\textsuperscript{42}

The French nuclear explosion of 1960, followed by the successful Chinese nuclear test of 1964, made the West more concerned that other countries might follow in the footsteps of the first five nuclear weapon states. The NPT
therefore was the result of a strong determination by the nuclear states that the nuclear club could not be allowed to increase and that further proliferation of nuclear weapons had to be resisted by all means. Western scholars began to show an interest in finding ways to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons. Scholarly efforts during 1968-1989 focused primarily on identifying the possible incentives/disincentives for states going nuclear.

During the cold-war years, because of the US-Soviet rivalry and the superpowers’ lenient attitude towards their client states’ aspirations for acquiring nuclear weapons, mainstream International Relations (IR) scholarship devoted less time to studying the consequences of further proliferation. The focus was on the impact of US/Soviet nuclear arms race on global stability. From the late 1960s to the 1980s terms like ‘nuclear haves’ and ‘nuclear have-nots,’ ‘vertical proliferation’ and horizontal proliferation,’ ‘declared nuclear states’ and ‘undeclared nuclear states,’ ‘first generation proliferators’ and ‘second generation proliferators,’ and ‘nuclear weapon states’ and ‘opaque nuclear states’ were in the forefront of the proliferation literature.

With the end of the Cold War, scholarly attention was redirected towards the consequences of nuclear proliferation, and terms such as ‘problem states’ and ‘rogue states,’ which were relatively unknown during the Cold War period, began to be used in the proliferation literature. The end of the Cold War was instrumental in bringing about this new scholarly interest in the consequences and ramifications of further proliferation. The subject of new states acquiring
nuclear weapons and, inevitably, increasing the size of the nuclear club was not only vexing, but the effects of this spread also became a matter of great scholarly concern -- especially in the West.

Although the present study is focused primarily on an examination of the causes of nuclear proliferation in protracted conflict states, to some extent it also deals with the consequences of proliferation, since it demonstrates the effectiveness of non-traditional nuclear deterrence in the protracted conflict states. Consequences of proliferation may not in some cases be instability as is depicted by some scholars. It is more important to find out the causes of proliferation and to offer prescriptions accordingly, rather than to dwell on what might or might not happen with a few more nuclear weapons-capable countries or new nuclear states in this world of already existing nuclear states. Prescription without an understanding of causation is unacceptable; and the association between the two must be taken seriously. Therefore, the primary objective should be to identify what motivates states to go nuclear and which kind of states are most nuclear weapons prone. Only then is a more comprehensive understanding of the consequences of such states' acquisition of nuclear weapons possible. Where states aspire to possess nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes, the consequences of proliferation may be limited to the same kind of stability that the world had witnessed in relation to US/Soviet nuclear acquisition. The difference is that the world would witness a sub-
systemic stability and not a systemic one as was the case in the cold war period.

Before reviewing scholarly works specifically about motivations for nuclear weapons acquisition and beginning a more focused discussion, it is important to state the rationale for the present study. Despite the scholarly attention given to nuclear proliferation (both causes and consequences), the endeavors have been generally descriptive in nature. Barring a few works, there has been substantial theoretical contribution to the proliferation literature. A theoretically-driven explanation is necessary to explain why some countries have, until recently, acquired nuclear weapons opaquely while others are pursuing the nuclear option in a limited way. It is also important to note that there has been lack of in-depth studies that examine the question of nuclear proliferation in the protracted conflict regions with connected variables.

Scholarly works on proliferation incentives have made no distinction between motivations for vertical proliferators and motivations for horizontal proliferators, while two distinct general patterns of nuclearization—‘visible’ and ‘opaque’—have been clearly recognized by some scholars. Even though a clear distinction is made when identifying the five nuclear states and the undeclared nuclear-weapons-capable countries, such distinction is absent when identifying the motivations for nuclear weapons acquisition of the former and the latter group of states. This is interesting because it could mean that today’s ‘undeclared nuclear states,’ ‘new nuclear states,’ or ‘the problem countries’
may, in fact, have the same incentives that the five nuclear weapons states had with regard to their possession of nuclear weapons. Consequently, more new nuclear weapon states in today's world may not mean a disruption of peace and stability. Just as system stability and balance was enhanced with nuclear weapons possession by the first generation proliferators, sub-systemic stability and balance may be reinforced by the second generation nuclear weapons states.

Scholars have identified several motivations or incentives for states going nuclear. They comprise a combination of military, political, economic, and leadership concerns and motivations. This study reviews these proliferation motivations and groups them into three categories--systemic, state and individual actor---in accordance with the levels of analysis framework used by International Relations theorist. Simply put, scholars have identified three levels of explanations for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Table – 1 provides the list of motivations for nuclear weapons acquisition at the systemic, state, and individual levels.

### Table - 1
Proliferation Motivations at Three Levels of Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systemic-Level Motivations</th>
<th>State-Level Motivations</th>
<th>Individual-Level Motivations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Quest for Security</td>
<td>1. Domestic Turmoil</td>
<td>Attitudes and Beliefs of Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Seeking Regional</td>
<td>2. Economic Motivation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hegemony</td>
<td>3. Public Opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Obtaining Bargaining Advantages</td>
<td>5. Bureaucratic Politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the section below, all of the explanatory motivations arising from different levels of analysis provided by proliferation scholars are put forward and then followed by a systematic evaluation of each motivation. I argue that even though the security incentive—a system-level factor—is a critical variable for the present study, it is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon. It is better understood as an intervening variable. Independent variables from the two other levels of analysis cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for the dependent variable (proliferation in the PC regions) which are examined here.

**SYSTEMIC MOTIVATIONS**

Within this category it is argued that explanations for the possession of nuclear weapons are to be found within the anarchic relations that exist between states. The motivations from this level of analysis are, basically, explanations of nuclear proliferation from a Realist theoretical perspective. At the systemic level many scholars treat security calculation as the most important incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. Seeking regional hegemony, gaining international prestige, and obtaining bargaining advantages have been other systemic related motivations to proliferation.

**a) Quest for Security**

As regards security, scholars have argued that in most cases a state's effort to attain nuclear weapons capability can be explained in terms of its quest for
security. The simple logic is that a state would be inclined to acquire nuclear weapons if it were insecure. William Epstein writes that:

The dominant positive and negative incentives to go, or not to go, nuclear are those involving a country’s military security... Whether the disincentives to go nuclear can be reinforced and made to outweigh the incentives will, to a large degree, depend on whether satisfactory alternatives can be found to the possession of military power as a means of ensuring Security.

This quest for security is further enhanced when a country desires an effective deterrent capability against a hostile nuclear power. If the adversary is a nuclear power, there is more reason for a country to go nuclear. The reasoning is that the devastating nature of a possible nuclear weapons retaliation would dissuade any hostile state from committing aggression against the other. Therefore, with the acquisition of nuclear weapons, a state could increase its security margin and deter any existing or would-be adversary from attacking. At the very least, a state that possesses such weapons effectively deters most unacceptable actions of another state. Epstein argues that it is, essentially, to meet these kinds of vital security challenges that most countries want to acquire nuclear weapons.

Along the same line, Strong argues that the apprehension that an enemy has, or might have, nuclear weapons is perhaps the most important motivation for nuclear proliferation. This implies that the security motivation becomes more important when a state’s national security is threatened with the possibility of an adversary’s possession of nuclear weapons. The drive to
acquire the capability and thereby match the capability of the adversary becomes crucial. A security dilemma is thus created because the additional security obtained by one state results in a sense of insecurity by the other, which, in turn, tries to increase the margin of its security by means which the first state perceives as a threat. Both the US and USSR acquired nuclear weapons because of security concerns. In the case of the US, scientists and decision-makers strongly believed that the US should acquire this devastating weapon before Germany obtained it. The Manhattan Project scientists agreed with President Harry Truman regarding the original reason of American nuclear research: “The compelling reason for creating this weapon with such speed was our fear that Germany had the technical skill necessary to develop such a weapon.” From this it is clear that security has always been one of the most important systemic motivation for states going nuclear. Whether it is for deterrence, bolstering military capabilities, or matching the capabilities of an adversary, the acquisition of nuclear weapons seems to represent a viable answer to a variety of military threats.

b) Seeking Regional Hegemony

In terms of regional hegemony it is argued that states which wish to dominate a region will be more inclined to develop nuclear weapons. According to Lloyd Jensen, “nuclear status may enhance power and prestige in relations with smaller states. A state that acquires nuclear status may assume a position of increased importance within its particular geographical region.”
This is important because if nuclear weapons can turn a state into a regional power, it will not have to engage in regional war to demonstrate power and status in its geographical region.

c) Gaining International Prestige

Some proliferation scholars have argued that in acquiring nuclear weapons a state may bolster its international prestige.\textsuperscript{58} Epstein argues that:

\begin{quote}
It has become obvious to all countries that the acquisition of nuclear weapons and technology for making them enhance a nation's prestige and status in the world, not just in military terms, but also in other ways. States possessing these arms are given greater weight in the entire range of foreign policy matters. They are brought into more top level international discussions of all kinds, and their views are treated with greater respect.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

Similarly, Meyer writes that nuclear weapons have been perceived as consonant with global power status and that the nuclear status of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council has been the most obvious illustration of this.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, achieving international prestige and international status/position may also drive states to pursue the nuclear option. Although international prestige motivations and international status motivations are not exactly the same, they fall into a single category because international prestige is derived from international status and so they overlap. Unless a country gains its rightful status in international politics, gaining international prestige is unlikely.

Under the international power/ prestige incentive category, a country may pursue its nuclear option to enhance its status and position in the eye of other
world powers. It is believed that nuclear weapons "somehow magnify a nation's image." With regard to the British nuclear incentives Rosecrance writes:

The existence of a major enemy, Nazi Germany was not the only spur to the development of a nuclear weapon. The British also intended the bomb for post-war purposes, presumably to enhance or confirm their station in world affairs. Prestige or general power factors then combined to reinforce the primary motivation of dispatching a dangerous foe. Similarly, China's acquisition of nuclear weapons may partly be explained by this incentive; it was determined to achieve great power status and global recognition of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate government of China. Quester writes that the world took Britain and France more seriously because they possessed nuclear weapons. In the case of India—the new nuclear state—it has often been argued that the Pokhran test of 1974 was conducted to obtain a major power status in the world. All these scholars uphold the view that states may very well have gone nuclear and might acquire nuclear weapons in the future to enjoy an enhanced international prestige and status.

d) Obtaining Bargaining Advantages

A number of scholars have also argued that occasionally countries are inclined to possess nuclear weapons because these weapons can be used as bargaining chips where needed. Quester comments that a nation possessing nuclear weapons may be able to compel other nations to make concessions. This could be of particular importance for countries that do not have alternative means of bargaining or acquiring concessions.
could use the threat of nuclear acquisition to obtain diplomatic leverage or force the world to take notice of their concerns (for example, South Africa and North Korea).

STATE-LEVEL MOTIVATIONS

State-level proliferation motivations are found within the internal structure of states. It is argued that why states go nuclear may have more to do with states' domestic politics and economics than with the anarchic structure of the international system. This is a liberal view in which scholars express the belief that state-level explanations are ultimately more important in any policy choice.

It is believed that an increase in domestic turmoil or unrest would move national leaders to consider the nuclear option. It has been suggested that national leaders may consider the nuclear option as means of diverting domestic attention away from internal domestic problems.68

A domestic-level economic explanation would state that, given the increasing cost of conventional weapons, states are more inclined to develop nuclear weapons to obtain defense at a low cost.69 According to some views, domestic public opinion motivation suggests that it is the public pressure that drives states to acquire nuclear weapons.70 Scientific/technological momentum also propels a state with the potential capability to develop nuclear weapons.71 Finally, bureaucratic imperatives are responsible for nuclear weapons acquisition.72 It is pertinent to look at these factors more closely.

a) Domestic Turmoil

---
Scholars have often argued that domestic political considerations may enter into nuclear decision-making, since going nuclear may serve the political interests of particular individuals or groups.\textsuperscript{73} It has been suggested that the nuclear option can be exercised as a strategy to divert public attention away from domestic turmoil. International Relations theorists have long argued that often leaders who are engulfed in a domestic turmoil look for opportunities to become involved into international conflicts so that the population ultimately "rally around the flag."\textsuperscript{74}

Similarly, proliferation scholars argue that in times of internal crises or unrest, leaders may find it useful to go nuclear so that domestic energies are diverted away from internal problems such as civil strife, ethnic hostility or other kinds of unrest.\textsuperscript{75} In India, Shastri's decision to start the nuclear weapons program after the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 and Indira Gandhi's decision to test nuclear weapons in 1974 are often used examples by scholars to argue that in times of political instability at home, leaders tend to make critical decisions.\textsuperscript{76}

Others have x-ed somewhat differently. Here the subjects of the domestic problem are the leaders and the governments rather than the public. When leaders lose popularity and political weakness predominates in the domestic political structure, they may have the impetus to go nuclear, to divert public attention away from domestic problems.\textsuperscript{77} Here, the leaders' ambition may not
only be to provide the public with diversion, but to regain popularity. Under such circumstances, it is assumed that nuclear weapons will restore or strengthen popular support for a government or regime. In the Indian case, it was believed that Indira Gandhi had lost popularity in the early 1970s at a time when domestic internal troubles were persistent. Under such circumstances, the leader tested nuclear weapons to divert domestic attention and gain back her popularity.

The domestic turmoil-diversion motivation of proliferation thus remains one of most important incentives provided by proliferation scholars to the extent that it has little to do with nuclear weapons per se, and more to do with obtaining relief from current domestic troubles. This motivation, if demonstrated to be a practiced, proved useful tool, is alarming because all states--in some way or other- face domestic turmoil and may have the need to adopt the nuclear option.

b) Economic Motivation

Simply stated, the argument is that nuclear weapons may after all be cost-effective and that a country could reduce its defense expenditures with the possession of such weapons. When the cost of conventional forces in a country becomes too high and the state is no longer able to maintain such high defense expenditures, “acquiring nuclear weapons would permit the nation to maintain (or increase) its military capability with less of an economic burden.” The acquisition of nuclear weapons would eventually result in a reduction in the
quality and quantity of conventional forces and, consequently, reduction in defense expenditure.

Scholars including Quester write about the extreme version of this economic incentive. He argues that nuclear bombs could become very cheap and that time may arise when avoiding nuclear weapons could be expensive. Whether the bombs are cheap or net, most of these scholars argue that Britain and France have reduced their defense expenditures and have also become secure with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Others believe that countries like India or Iran may not have to spend millions on such bombs and that ultimately they may be able to reduce their defense cost by going nuclear.

**c) Public Opinion**

With regard to domestic politics, scholars have occasionally discussed public opinion as one of the motivations for a state's nuclear choice. There are countries where public enthusiasm remains high for their state going nuclear for various reasons and they pressure their governments to undertake the nuclear option. Thus, scholars argue that public pressure to go nuclear has sometimes played an important role in states' nuclear decisions. Robert Strong writes that sometimes public pressures may nuclearize the country and the concerned leaders may resist such pressures to a certain point. Pressure may also develop from specific interest groups within the countries for going nuclear. According to this view, when such pressures continue, governments have no choice but to embark on a nuclear weapons option.
d) Scientific/Technological Momentum

When a country makes progress in nuclear technology a momentum is generated which spurs further advancement. It is argued that when scientists succeed in developing a particular technology, they often have an incentive to develop more sophisticated, but related technology. Developing nuclear weapons is in itself a great technological achievement for a country and therefore, if a country has the ability to do so and possesses the nuclear technology, it will eventually acquire the weapons. These scholars believe in the "existence of a technological determinism." Others, like Greenwood, have argued that nuclear weapons could be used by the elite as a symbol of modernity and technological competence. Stephen Meyer states, "Nuclear technology itself is the driving force behind decisions to acquire nuclear weapons --that a technology imperative pushes nations from latent capacity to operational capacity." The decision to acquire nuclear weapons is made because the technology is available.

Other scholars have argued about the technological motivation differently. Here the argument is not about technological momentum per se, but about the spill-over effects of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Quester, for example, argues that the production of electricity by nuclear reactors makes perfect sense in the modern world. The operation of such reactors, however, puts countries into contact with the materials needed for bombs, namely, plutonium and enriched uranium. He maintains that "staying away from the
bomb might require staying away from the most cost-effective source of energy. Nuclear energy programs, he believes, are a powerful incentive towards nuclear weapons proliferation.

e) Bureaucratic Politics

This motivation concerns the decision-making process itself. Decision-making authority in some countries may be highly compartmentalized and nuclear behavior may be shaped by the strategic, technical or the bureaucratic level. Where countries are ruled by a military regime, it is likely that the military's special interest in these weapons will drive these states to acquire nuclear weapons. Even where democratic political institutions are present, the military may play a vital role in nuclear decisions. Similarly, the scientific community's role should not be underestimated in any nuclear choice.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MOTIVATION

Individual-level explanations of nuclear proliferation deal with the personalities, attitudes and beliefs of decision-makers in nuclear choices. According to the motivations from this level of analysis, cognitive beliefs and the perceptions of decision-makers play an important role in any policy choice, nuclear choice being no exception.

a) Attitudes and Beliefs of Leaders

At the individual level in single case studies, scholars have argued that the attitudes and beliefs of key leaders and their personalities have often shaped
nuclear decision.\textsuperscript{91} This is especially stated in the context of Indian and Pakistani nuclear decisions involving the attitudes of Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto respectively. In the Middle East, the leadership roles of Ben Gurion of Israel, the Shah of Iran, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq have been specifically associated with the Israeli, Iranian and Iraqi nuclear weapons programs respectively. Meyer has argued somewhat differently; but he too emphasized the role of individuals. He contends that countries go nuclear because specific individuals come to power at specific times and create the proper conditions for nuclear proliferation.\textsuperscript{92} Although he does not write about the beliefs and attitudes of these key individuals, he states clearly that these individuals play a decisive role in creating an atmosphere that favors pro-nuclear decisions.

**EVALUATING THE MOTIVATIONS**

Having stated the above motivations discussed in the existing literature, I argue that the individual and domestic level motivations are inadequate to explain nuclear proliferation in protracted conflict regions (which is the focus of the present study). Systemic arguments, except for security motivation, also have questionable value in explaining PC proliferation. Although the security motivation is important, it needs to be well-explained for an understanding of nuclear proliferation in protracted conflict states. An evaluation of each of these motivations is provided below.

**INDIVIDUAL LEVEL MOTIVATION**

a) Attitudes and Beliefs of Lenders
With regard to individual-level explanations of nuclear proliferation, specifically the attitudes of leaders, the most important problem appears to be that it is not just one single leader who is responsible for a state going nuclear. To say that a single leader's attitude propels a state to acquire nuclear weapons is to deny the existence of the nuclear program that involves so many key actors.93

Nuclear weapons program requires years of preparation from the development of an infrastructure to the development of the weapons grade material. Throughout these stages, in most cases, one individual does not provide leadership in a country. Regimes or governments change, and with these changes come different political parties and leaders. Indira Gandhi, for example, was not in power in all the stages of the Indian nuclear weapons development. This case shows that a leader who enthusiastically made the decision to launch a nuclear weapons programme may not have much say at a later stage of the program when the country is, in fact, ready to make the nuclear bomb. Even if a leader tries to influence the final decision to acquire the bomb, it is hard to prove that it was due to this leader's strong determination or drive that a country had gone nuclear because there are many key players involved in the program. Scientists play a vital role in the nuclear programmes of all countries and they can enhance or reduce the speed of the programme based on their best interests.
Individual-level theories contribute little to the understanding why India and Pakistan continued their nuclear programs even after these prominent individuals—Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Mi Bhutto—departed from the respective governments and why often less-enthusiastic leaders—Moraji Desai and Benazir Bhutto—have been obliged to continue the program. It is clear that this explanation is inadequate for an understanding of the nuclear decisions of countries with leadership changes that have not resulted policy change with regard to the nuclear weapons issue.

Finally, what is important to consider is that, overall, this explanation is inadequate for the present study because it does not consider why all leaders with different personality traits in a PC state would want their country to go nuclear. Moreover, the attitudes of individuals are often difficult to generalize and thus have limited relevance in theory formulation, which is the central purpose of this study.

**STATE-LEVEL EXPLANATIONS**

a) Bureaucratic Politics

Bureaucratic politics explanations of nuclear decisions cannot explain why militaries should be interested in weapons that are essentially for deterrence. In most countries the military has not been keen to acquire nuclear weapons because expenditures on non-conventional defence mean less expenditure on conventional defense. Moreover, militaries are concerned about budget cuts related to huge nuclear expenditures, and they are unlikely to tolerate such
cuts. The Pakistani military has occasionally shown little desire to develop nuclear weapons for budget reduction.

Finally, if the military as an institution wanted to acquire nuclear weapons, they would want their countries to go openly nuclear. They would not be satisfied with the capabilities that most of the new nuclear countries appear to have possessed for a long time. After all, it is the weapons that bring the power and might, and not the capability that has to be assembled in times of need. In other words, nuclear capabilities that still require assembly, as is the case in an opaque proliferation, are not the same as nuclear weapons that are ready for use.

b) Scientific/Technological Momentum

Technological incentive remains a weak argument because, except for India, none of these new nuclear states has performed a test for several decades which is the ultimate way to demonstrate technological development. Although India and Pakistan tested their weapons in 1998, they kept their option open for decades. If technological momentum had anything to do with nuclear weapons acquisition within the PC states, then the possession would not have been opaque for this long in South Asia and until today in the Middle East. How can a country prove its technological development without conducting open tests? Within the technological motivation, as far as the spill-over effects of a peaceful nuclear program are concerned, it would be naive to
imagine that a country acquires nuclear weapons capability without actually having the intention to possess it.

Specific decisions must be made to possess nuclear weapons capability; even if weapons-materials exist, it does not necessarily mean they will be used for weapons purposes. Several countries, including Japan and Canada possess nuclear materials, but have not followed the weapons path. The possession of nuclear materials and technology alone does not induce a country to develop nuclear weapons. There must be specific intentions to make these weapons. Thus, it is evident that technological spill-over effects may not necessarily compel a country to acquire nuclear weapons unless specific aspirations are there, and simultaneously, efforts are made to go nuclear.

c) Public Opinion

As regards public opinion, it is difficult to find any country that has gone nuclear due to public pressure done. It is certainly possible for the public in a democratic country to influence vital policy-decisions, but it is highly unlikely that in the realm of nuclear proliferation—where there are few key players—public opinion would be a central motivating factor. Leaders certainly use public opinion when it is in their best interest to do so in any policy choice and disregard it as much as possible when the opposite is the case. The extent that the public plays a role in nuclear weapons acquisition is not only hard to say, but also uncertain because of a lack of proper statistical evidence. Public opinion surveys only demonstrate public desires on a policy choice, but they
certainly cannot infer that leaders have given consideration to these public opinions. It is unlikely that public pressure would automatically bring about nuclear weapons possession by a country. Moreover, leaders may mold public opinion in favor of their decision. What is more interesting about public opinion as a motivating factor to go nuclear is that it is very unlikely that the population of any country would want their state to possess nuclear weapons opaquely. Simply put, if public pressure plays a role, open nuclear possession would be the end result. Most regional protracted conflict states are still undeclared nuclear states. If public pressure was the central motivating factor in India and Pakistan's nuclear choices, then these two countries would have been openly nuclear a long time ago. It is, therefore, unlikely that public opinion influences nuclear weapons acquisition much even if leaders pay attention to public pressure.

d) Economic Motivation

The domestic economic motivation is often inadequate since nuclear weapons do not replace a country's conventional forces. Empirical evidence does not suggest that any of the five original nuclear weapons countries has reduced its conventional defense expenditures. A country does not stop developing its conventional forces just because it has the nuclear bomb. In fact, a country may have to allocate additional funds for its defense budget for the nuclear weapons program. China has been spending heavily on conventional forces during the 1990s even though it is a declared nuclear-weapon country.
This has also been the case with the former USSR and the US. The new nuclear states are not exceptions and cannot stop their conventional expenditures. An economic incentive is thus unlikely to have driven PC states to proliferate.

**e) Domestic Turmoil**

Domestic incentives also have limited significance as they do not explain why some states, such as Israel, are still undeclared nuclear states, or why others, such as India and Pakistan, have maintained that status for many years. As far as the domestic turmoil motivation is concerned, it is hard to imagine a country diverting domestic attention by the possession of nuclear weapons alone, particularly if the possession is an opaque one.

What do nuclear weapons have to do with diversion? When countries are involved in international wars, domestic or civil wars may subside; consequently one could argue that scapegoat theory has worked. When there is a common external enemy, internal enemies may unite temporarily to fight against it. The scapegoat theory, however, has very little relevance in the realm of nuclear proliferation. Why would a civil unrest stop – even temporarily – with the possession of a nuclear weapon? It is only a technological achievement that can hardly unify the internal rivals unless there is a war or intense external pressure. The Kashmiris did not stop fighting after India detonated its nuclear device in 1974; nor did they stop fighting after India conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998. They did not rally around the Indian flag at that time, nor are they doing so now. Similarly, the ethnic problems within
Pakistan—the secessionist sentiments among Baluchis and Pashtuns—did not stop after 1987 when Pakistan officially declared the possession of nuclear weapons capability.

With Pakistan's first nuclear tests in May 1998, the internal conflicts did not rest. The Mohajirs are still fighting in Pakistan and internal civil strife continues. Even though both declared and undeclared possession of nuclear weapons are unlikely to divert domestic turmoil, the undeclared possession has a slim chance when compared to the former. Therefore, I argue that the new nuclear states—mostly undeclared or ones which have very recently become openly nuclear—do not seem to have been motivated to go nuclear by domestic considerations.

**SYSTEM-LEVEL ARGUMENTS**

The system-level incentives, which include obtaining bargaining advantages, gaining international prestige and seeking regional hegemony, are of limited value as long as a state does not officially declare its possession of nuclear weapons.

**a) Obtaining Bargaining Advantages**

With regard to increasing bargaining advantage with nuclear weapons acquisition, one has to consider the extent that world powers could be manipulated using the possession of nuclear weapons as the stick. Other means of getting concessions must exist. Are the expensive and risky endeavors of going nuclear to get concessions or political leverage worth it? How many countries would take the risk of having sanctions imposed rather than
concessions or political leverage? These are crucial questions to ask because the answers will facilitate an understanding that unless other critical motivations exist, a state—especially a developing one—can not be expected to take such major risks by acquiring nuclear weapons.

Rather than increasing bargaining advantages, Iraq had military and economic sanctions imposed by the West as a result of the discovery of its nuclear weapons program during the 1990-91 period. The country has not been successful in convincing the West to withdraw the sanctions to date. Although it has consistently attempted to halt the UN weapons inspectors from investigating its weapons of mass destruction until the UN lifted the economic sanctions, its tactics have not worked.

In South Asia, Pakistan was subjected to economic sanctions once its nuclear program was officially disclosed in the post-1987 period. India and Pakistan received major economic sanctions after their nuclear tests in 1998. It is also interesting to note that the Prime Ministers of both countries, during their speeches immediately after the tests, made it clear to their citizens that they would have to accept economic hardship because economic sanctions from the West were inevitable. This indicates that the Leaders anticipated sanctions rather than an increase in their country's bargaining power before they tested nuclear weapons.

b) Gaining International Prestige
In terms of gaining international prestige by possessing nuclear weapons, history provides no evidence of states attaining international prestige through the possession of the bomb alone. Other attributes, especially economic capability, are necessary for increased prestige. It is unlikely that a state could bolster its prestige in relation to the major powers by the possession of nuclear weapons alone. It is also unlikely that states could acquire more international prestige by keeping their nuclear option open. When a state's nuclear status is ambiguous, gaining prestige also remains a remote possibility. As stated earlier, the key protracted conflict states in the Middle East are undeclared nuclear states, although Israel is the most significant one in that sense, while Iran and Iraq are pursuing the nuclear weapons option in a limited way. In South Asia, both India and Pakistan had maintained a similar nuclear status until May 1998. If international prestige were important, all of these countries would be nuclear states.

The point is that the opaque status of the PC proliferators appears not to serve the purpose of achieving prestige in relation to the major powers or obtaining concessions from them but that it may serve other purposes that are more important and do not require an open nuclear posture. This means that there are other primary interests which are promoted through the acquisition of opaque nuclear weapons which this study discusses later in this chapter and more specifically, in the chapter on nuclear deterrence of the new nuclear states.
c) Seeking Regional Hegemony

On the motivation of regional hegemonic ambition, an official declaration of possession of nuclear weapons could be one way of gaining the regional hegemonic status. This is something most PC proliferators have refrained from doing, with the exception of India and Pakistan. What is interesting is that a regional power can play a dominant role even with superior conventional capability alone, as has been the case of India, Iran, and Egypt. Going nuclear to dominate the region is not logical if conventional weapons can do the job just as well. In South Asia, India could take care of its regional hegemonic ambitions very well without nuclear weapons. Although Pakistan could not do so, its aim has never been to dominate the region.

d) Quest for Security

The search for security is the significant variable in proliferation literature that could be used to develop a theory of PC proliferation. However, it, too, needs to be properly specified and clarified. The problem remains not with security motivation per se, but with the way it has been used to generalize proliferation.

Why is security the most salient motivation for obtaining a nuclear weapon capability? Which kind of states are most worried about security? Why do PC states differ in their quest for security? What is the role of war-probability in this whole security/proliferation equation? These are extremely important
questions that need to be addressed to understand similar states' differing proliferation propensities.

It is important to mention here that system-level explanations of nuclear proliferation are Realist in nature and, therefore, in evaluating the security motivation, it is also pertinent to understand Realism within the context of proliferation. It is essential to put forward how proliferation is understood by the Realist theoretical paradigm because it sets the stage for the exploration of the research problem. As soon as it is demonstrated that some states proliferate according to the tenets of Realism and that there are others that do not, a puzzle that needs to be addressed. A plausible explanation of the dichotomous situation is required. With this, the study also evaluates the utility of realist approaches to an understanding of proliferation in protracted conflict regions.

In the international system, states co-exist in a situation where anarchy prevails. Under such conditions, states attempt to ensure their survival, and generally military capability can keep a state secure from external attack. Nuclear weapons are especially useful in this respect. Structural realist Waltz argues that:

"Nuclear weapons deters nuclear weapons ... The temptation of one country to employ increasingly larger amount of force is lessened if its opponent has the ability to raise the ante. Force can be used with less hesitation by those states able to parry, to thrust, and to threaten at varied levels of military endeavor."
For Waltz, the mere possibility of nuclear use requires extreme caution all around, so the likelihood of war decreases as more countries acquire nuclear weapons. He further contends:

Over the centuries great powers have fought more wars than minor states, and the frequency of war has correlated more closely with a structural characteristic—their international standing—than with unit-level attributes. Yet, because of a change in military technology, a change at the unit level, waging war has increasingly become the privilege of poor and weak states. Nuclear weapons have banished war from the centre of international politics.

For Realists, war is always a probability and states must be prepared to face it. Although some of them consider conflict to be inevitable because of the imperfectability of human nature and the scarcity of material resources, others believe that the anarchic structure of the international system causes uncertainty regarding other states' intentions and consequently, a security dilemma is created. To many Realists only military force is the final arbiter of disputes between states. As Carr suggests, "war lurks in the background of international politics," therefore, "for each state its power in relation to other states is ultimately the key to its survival." From the above Realist assumptions, it follows that nuclear weapons would be the choice for states deeply concerned about security and war while living under the negative effects of the anarchic international system.

Nuclear weapons have made warfare less likely among the states that possess them. Given the utility of nuclear weapons in the above sense then, all states facing security threats from their adversaries should be expected to
acquire nuclear weapons. PC states are more likely to acquire such weapons because war is always a possibility and deterring war is important for antagonists. It, however, is not the case in international security relations. Viewed in a broad spectrum, within the PCs there are states which tend to proliferate and others that do not. Similarly, we see states with nuclear weapons in non-PC situations, and a majority of the states in the international system in non-PC situations are non-nuclear.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed nuclear proliferation incentives provided by scholars for the purpose of examining the adequacy or inadequacy of the existing literature to explain the proliferation propensities of protracted conflict states. The intent has been twofold: to show the underdeveloped state of the proliferation literature in terms of theory-building, and to demonstrate that security motivation-- though important-- needs further clarification and specification for a more comprehensive understanding of proliferation in the protracted conflict states.

**Notes**

8. P. R. Viotti and M. Kauppi, n. 3, pp. 399-400.
17. R. L. Pfaltzgraff, n. 11, p. 145.
19. Ibid., pp. 244-245.
20. Ibid.
27. Ibid., pp. 300-301.
29. T. Taylor, n. 15, p. 133.
30. A. Wholstetter, n. 28, p. 234.
33. Ibid., pp. 203-204; Herman Kahn argued that deterrence could serve a wide spectrum of political aims including providing “... support for the achievement of ‘peaceful’ political objectives and for tactics such as controlled reprisals, other limited wars, mobilizations, negotiations, and so forth”, see Herman Kahn, “Thinking About Unthinkable”, in W. M. Evan and S. Hilgartner (eds.), The Arms Race and Nuclear War (Englewoods Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1987), p. 108.
34. A. S. Y. Wrong-Fraser, n. 12, p. 12.
35. Ibid., pp. 12-13
40. Although the US tried to stop other countries from developing their own nuclear weapons, it did not really oppose all states from proliferating. Despite other views, the US in fact, supported the British and French nuclear weapons acquisition. Additional nuclear weapons states in the world became a major US concern as soon as the NPT came into existence. Therefore, soon after NPT was concluded, proliferation scholars devoted much time to anticipate motivations that could drive states to go nuclear. Although this was the case in the 1950s and 1960s scholars were still aware of the spread or the chain reactions to nuclear weapons possessions. See, Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London: Chatto & Windus 1962); Richard N. Rosecrance (ed.), The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Leonard Beaton, The Struggle for Peace (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966); Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread (Harmondsworth, MDDX: Penguin Books, 1966).
42. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), No. 3988, Vol. 276, 1957. The objectives of the agency were: a) to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, b) to ensure, so far as it was able, that assistance provided by it, as its request, or under its supervision or control was not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. (Article II). This agency was also authorized to establish a safeguards system. (Article III).

43. During this period the primary security concern for the two superpowers became mutual nuclear deterrence. How far and to what extent mutual nuclear deterrence could work and ensure world stability was the central debatable issue among the scholars.

44. Nuclear non-proliferation has remained in the security interest of the US since the beginning of the NPT. However, US/Soviet rivalry prevented the US from devoting much time, money or even diplomatic effort to discouraging states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Sometimes it has even overlooked nuclear activities of states that were strategically important to it, such as the case of Pakistan and Israel. The point is that as soon as the cold war ended and the East-West rivalry came to a close, the US, once largely indifferent to the problem of regional proliferators, now made the proliferation issue the centerpiece of its new strategic outlook. Moreover, nuclear developments in countries such as Iran and Iraq have prompted greater attention to non-proliferation efforts. For more information in renewed US interests on emerging regional nuclear powers, see, among others, Michael Ware, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).


46. Protracted Conflict theorists, such as Edward Azar, Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, have been more concerned about the characteristics of protracted conflicts in general rather than how they are expected to behave in the realm of policy choice such as, nuclear proliferation. Although other policy choices such as war are central in their discussion, they have not looked at the association between PCs and war-probability which, in turn, affects nuclear weapons acquisition.

47. Levels of analysis have been the most common framework used by International Relations theorists. By using this framework, a researcher makes it clear at the outset which variable from which level of analysis exactly explains the research puzzle. In other words, whether the explanatory variable is to be found in the anarchic nature of the international system, or the internal structure of the states in question, or the personalities and pre-dispositions of individual decision-makers, is spelled out at the outset. See, Stephen J. Andriole, "The Levels of Analysis Problems and the Study of Foreign International and Global Affairs: A Review Critique and Another Final Solution," International Interactions, Vol. 5, Nos. 2-3, 1978, pp. 113-133; Joseph S. Nye,

48. Security has been identified as the most important incentive to proliferate by theorists such as Stephen Meyer, William Epstein, William Potter, Ashok Kapur among others. They also consider the security dilemma to be a crucial imperative for a state to go nuclear. Other domestic motivations, however, have also been listed by these and other scholars. See George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973); Ted Greenwood, Nuclear Proliferation: Motivation, Capabilities and Strategies for Control (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), p.57; William Epstein, "Why States Go and Don't Go Nuclear," Annals, No. 430. March 1977, p. 17; William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gum and Hain, 1982), p. 236; Stephen M. Meyer, Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, n. 6, pp. 46, 56-57; Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (London: Croom Helm, 1987).


50. Ibid. p. 18.


58. Quester writes about the indirect advantages that a state could obtain from the possession of nuclear weapons. He considers obtaining security with nuclear weapons as a straightforward advantage and acquiring world prestige as an indirect advantage derived from the possession of nuclear weapons. According to him, China would not have received so much world attention after the Great Cultural Revolution had it not been for its nuclear weapons possession. See also Lloyd Jensen, Return from the Nuclear Brink, n. 57, pp. 35-36; William Epstein, “Why States Go and Don't Go Nuclear”, n. 48, p. 21; William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, n. 48, p. 139.


61. Ibid., p. 46.
64. George Quester, “Reducing Incentives to Proliferation”, n. 51, p. 71.
67. George Quester, “Reducing Incentives to Proliferation”, n. 51, pp. 70-81.
74. Diversionary theory of scapegoat hypothesis has often been used by scholars in International Relations, especially, when they wanted to prove that it is ultimately the domestic situation that explains most major state policies like war. The important thing that needs to be stated is that scapegoat theory is not always easy to prove. There has to be an existing enemy for this theory to work. See Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring 1988, pp. 666-672.
81. Ibid.

82. Scholars, especially when writing about regional powers, have stated that the public has a role in nuclear decisions. In the case of India between 1966-1971 majority of the Indians supported the development of nuclear weapons by India. In 1971, another survey found that the Indian public was even more enthusiastic about their country having nuclear weapons. Others, like Stephen P. Cohen, stated in 1984 that Pakistan's nuclear weapons would be greeted with widespread support at home. In fact, that is what happened in Pakistan after the nuclear tests in May 1998. For more information on these, see, Akhtar Ali, Pakistan’s Nuclear Dilemma (Karachi: Economic Research Unit, 1984); Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

83. Robert Strong states that according to some observers, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did not want India to go nuclear and thus resisted the option to a certain point. She, according to this view, could not overlook the pressures from the parliament, public opinion and the government officials after a certain point and finally gave in.


86. Technological determinism here means that “political decisions are dictated by the material progress of time.” If this is true, then very little can be done about proliferation. Nations follow the same path of military development – even though moving at various speeds – and always leading to the acquisition of the best available equipment and strategy.


89. George Quester, “Reducing Incentives to Proliferation”, n. 51, p. 72.


91. Ashok Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear Development, n. 9, p. 120; Ziva Moshaver, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent, n. 32, pp. 62-70.


93. This is not to undermine the important role leaders generally play in their states’ nuclear decision, especially when they are the ones who finally have to approve it, but to point out that other key actors are involved.

94. In an article written after the cold war, Robert Jervis has argued that with the end of the cold war, it is not clear whether we are entering a world of bipolarity because of the number of nuclear weapons owned by the US and Russia, or multipolarity because Germany and Japan are also economic powers in addition to the US, or unipolarity because the US has it all. What this means is that nuclear weapons alone cannot give prestige to a country and that ultimately even with vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons, Russia cannot be considered as an equal power when compared to the US. See, Robert Jervis, "The Future of

95. The survival motive is taken as the basis of action in a world where security of states is not assured. The drive for security is fundamentally the drive for self-preservation and true security is obtained by ensuring that the territorial and political boundaries of the homeland cannot be changed by others. See, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).

96. Ibid, p. 188.

97. Waltz's argument has been straightforward: that deterrence between the new nuclear states is possible and that the problems pertaining to deterrence instability, that some proliferation scholars (namely Sagan and others) seem concerned about with regard to new nuclear states, have generally been unimportant.


