Chapter V

Disclosure of Being

The most important task within Being as First Philosophy is the disclosure of Being and the postulation of the meaning of Being. This is the aim that Being as First Philosophy sets out for itself; this is philosophy's culmination of itself. In fact, we can argue that if this were to ensue perfectly, philosophy would realise and transcend itself; philosophy would have fulfilled its aim. And indeed, this is exactly why Heidegger asserts in What is Philosophy? that Heraclitus and Parmenides are not philosophers; and as we shall see in this culminating chapter, why Hölderlin is both one of the great ones to come and one who has already anticipated himself: one who will never perish. In a certain sense, this aim of knowing Being has been fulfilled in silence; that is in ways which can only be contemplated upon and not expressed. That is why I will try to argue in some detail on the implications of Heidegger's affirmation of Socrates as the purest thinker of the West, and a thinker who wrote nothing. As Philipse argues, it seems that Heidegger believed that at some point in time, there was an event of the witnessing of Being. This is for Heidegger the culmination of phenomenology; I call it the becoming one of method and content, the becoming ontology of phenomenology; phenomenology realising and fulfilling itself. Even in reading and understanding Plato, we come to the enigma that he might have grasped Being, but chose not to write it. Plotinus also talks of the silence of knowing the One: "This is the life of the gods and of the godlike and blessed among men, liberation from the alien that besets us here, a life taking no pleasure in things of the earth, the passing of solitary to solitary." Heidegger in fact became ever more elusive about Being, and latter writings like "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," or "Language"—all discussed here—are by intention elusive.

In this sense, one would have to argue that the culmination of the First Philosophy of Being is a paradigm of the Wittgensteinian silence, the dropping of the ladder that the great

thinker advocates at the end of his *Tractatus*. At the same time, there is a lot that is said about the disclosure of Being at the penumbra of this silence. This is in terms of language; in terms of creativity and also in terms of thinking; and of course the domain of truth. I begin the discussion, however, with the Heidegger’s second greatest work, *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning*, which lingers back and forth into Heidegger’s oeuvre.

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Being to be-ing/being:  
The Enowning of Being

One of Heidegger’s most important and radical texts, and in its brilliance and intricacy second only to *Being and Time*, is his other *opus magnum*, the *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning*. Written not even a decade after *Being and Time*, it already extends, turns and at times even rejects some of the stands of its predecessor. Marking the turn, and determining it to the end; the *Contributions* is a quintessentially important text; and I seek to devote a whole section to it, given its prime importance.

*Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning*, reverses one aspect of *Being and Time*: in *Being and Time*, while Being is the most important phenomenon/event, and Dasein must set out to investigate the meaning of Being; at times it appears that there is either more importance accorded to Dasein than even Sein itself, or at least, that Dasein gets an excess of importance. For example, the most contentious point of *Being and Time* remains the postulation that only through Dasein can Sein be approached. The problem here is not that only Dasein can understand and has a pre-and partial-understanding of Being, but that the approach to Being makes human being central.

This position is rejected in the *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning*. It is Being that determines and sustains all turns of history and beings; even the abandonment of Being. The forgottenness of Being is also determined by Being itself, and so is Dasein. As I just discuss, even Dasein has undergone a change: Dasein which means existence in the precise sense of human existence; and used for human being, is made restricted in *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning*. Da-sein is a higher categorization or name, in the precise sense that not every man is Dasein. Only a few are actually Dasein: man has to become the Dasein. There is a forgottenness of Being: it has been there since the very beginning of metaphysics with the Greeks and has persisted; but our time is the climax of this forgottenness; given the surge of technology, ruthless quest for power and a mindless obsession with commodity and materialism. Moreover, this first beginning has never been able to understand Being; its understanding of Being is actually an oblivion. The problem is that we do not even understand the distress of the abandonment of
Being. Thus we must understand the distress of Being, which is determined by Being and from within which Being calls. Hearing the echo of Being, understanding the first beginning of metaphysics; we must make a leap into the “other,” and the true, beginning. Dasein is the guardian of the truth of Being. All this: forgetting, abandonment, echo, leap and other beginning are determined by Being itself; who holds full, first and final sway.

In Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, Heidegger is even richer and more radical with his language and terminology which must be properly understood at the very point of commencing into his text. In the original German text, Heidegger uses two words; both meaning Being and yet completely different. The first is Sein, and the second, Sein. As the translators of Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, make clear, Heidegger uses Sein as an orthographic variant of Sein, current in the eighteenth century. Both Sein and Sein sound the same; Heidegger uses Sein to mean the metaphysical grasping of Being; that is, Being as used in the first beginning, and which he rejects, and Sein where Being is understood in its true sense. The translators have used “being” for the first sense, and “be-ing” for the second, and it is as such that I will use them here.

The second key word is Ereignis and the group that is etymologically and ontologically gathered around it: Eignung, Eigennung etc. The translators choose to translate it as “Enowning.” Enowning is formed of a prefix en-, and “owning.” En- “conveys the sense of “enabling,” “brining into the condition of,” or “welling up of . . . Enowning approximates the movement of er- that runs through eignen and eignis in Ereignis . . . By sometimes hyphenating this word, he [Heidegger] draws special attention to er- as an enabling power and as naming the always ongoing movement “in” and “through” without coming to rest in a “property” or “possession.” The point is that be-ing enowns (en-owns). It enowns the thrownness, openness and “projecting-open,” (covered under the German Entwurf and related words) as also the “thrower” or Dasein who is thrown by be-ing itself. The fact that Sein never pulls away or absents itself, is so noticeably expressed by Heidegger in his key word, Abgrund, the choice of translators to translate abgrund, which is not abyss or non-ground.

Finally, one would from the very beginning do well to remember the difference between the grounding question (be-ing) and guiding question (being). The guiding question is never able to understand or reach be-ing. This question guides metaphysics from Anaximander to
Nietzsche, that is, from its inception to the end. It inquires into beings as beings, inquiring into being of beings only from this “starting point and direction,” where being means beingness. The grounding question on the other hand inquires from within the truth of be-ing. This question is of be-ing as the essential ground of beings, it is “the question of the essential swaying of be-ing.” We have only asked the guiding question and have to go to the grounding question; this is by no means a smooth transitional process:

Going from the guiding question to the grounding-question, there is never an immediate, equi-directional and continual process that once again applies the guiding question (to be-ing); rather there is only a leap, i.e., the necessity of an other beginning. Indeed and on the contrary, a crossing can and should be created in the unfolding overcoming of the posing of the guiding question and its answers as such, a crossing that prepares the other beginning and makes it generally viable and intangible.

The guiding-grounding question leap is a later stage of development towards experiencing the sway of be-ing. The first is to critique the abandonment of being; to realise the distress; in fact the distress of not having even known the distress. Heidegger declares in the *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning* that the abandonment of Being has reached its culmination in his contemporary time; that is, the latest bits of the present epoch, the result of man’s obsession with machination and technology. This era of machination should be spoken of as “the epoch of the total lack of questioning,” and “which extends its duration within time, beyond the present, far back and far ahead.” With the throwing aside of creativity and true thinking and in the subjugation of matter, everything is deemed possible and constructible, and “re-presentable,” that is as something which is accessible to the manoeuvres of production, calculation and intention. This era of technology, has a grotesque sense of “lived-experience.” How do we understand this lived experience?

“Lived-experience” is understood here as the basic kind of machinational representing and of residing therein; “lived experience” means making mysterious, i.e., what is stimulating, provocative, stunning and enchanting – which makes the machinational necessary – public and accessible to everyone.

This, then makes—no matter how perverted it seems—a claim to eternity:

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10 Ibid., 34, p. 52.
11 Ibid., 34, p. 53.
12 Ibid., 34, p. 53, emphasis Heidegger’s.
13 Ibid., 51, p. 76, emphasis Heidegger’s.
14 Ibid., 51, p. 77.
15 Ibid., 51, p. 77.
True to their lack of limits and embarrassment, everything is open to and nothing is impossible for machination and lived-experience. They must fancy themselves to be the whole and to be what endures, and therefore nothing is so familiar to them as the “eternal.” Everything is “eternal.” And the eternal – this eternal – how should this not also be the essential?\(^{16}\)

How does one understand the abandonment of be-ing, since for Heidegger the abandonment of be-ing is Be-ing concealing itself. By this Heidegger perhaps means that the abandonment is long and massive, but also a very subtle process; and therefore not surprising that the abandonment of be-ing has withstood for such a long expanse of time. “What is not ownmost to beings, the non-beings, spreads – and indeed in the semblance of an “important” event.”\(^{17}\) Heidegger recognises three concealments that are basic to the abandonment of be-ing: (i) “calculation” (ii) “acceleration”: this sums up the tendency to not recognise and “not-being-able-to-bear the stillness of hidden growth,” and, (iii) the antipathy to awaiting. Thus man is swept by the mania of acceleration, newness and fleetingness. There is no maturity and patience to recognise the magnificence of true maturing and ripening; which is subtle, demands time and is dynamic. This also relates to the madness of quantitative assessment and magnitude, and the desire for immediate gratification by means of superficial newness and surprise. (iii) “The outbreak of massiveness”: this means both the surge of the masses and the surge of numbers and calculations in an era of all-accessibility, all-explicability and experiment. This leads to the fourth, “divesting, public song and vulgarising of all attunement”: this covers the loss of sensibility to language, what and how it means and what it speaks to us.\(^{18}\) These factors define abandonment and the sweeping of technology, which reduces everything to quantity, quantificational magnitude and the slime of averageness.

The abandonment of Being is not restricted to the present time, but is the very history and movement of metaphysics, as Heidegger sees the contours and course of this history. He posits that the abandonment of be-ing occurred in Christianity; in its very presentation of all beings as created beings, who originate from the creator. The Creator assumes all and everything ownmost to be-ing, and the other beings once made by God now come to have a human making, in the precise sense that henceforth “beings are taken and controlled in their objectness.”\(^{19}\) Therefore, be-ing abandons beings who consequently become objects of

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 66, p. 91.
\(^{17}\) Ibid., 58, p. 85, emphasis Heidegger’s.
\(^{18}\) See, Ibid., 58, pp. 84-6.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., 52, p. 78.
Machination. This abandonment is the history of this metaphysics and continues to Nietzsche and the present time.  

Machination is in fact an activity not only not recent, but embedded in the roots of the metaphysical tradition. Machination is a "human comportment," and relates to ποιησις and τεχνη (poiesis and techne); but this comportment is only made possible on the basis of the interpretation of beings, because only this interpretation brings into visibility their makability. This is related to the root meaning of φυσις (phusis) which refers to the fact that "something makes itself by itself," and thus is also makeable; in other words to "self-making" and "makable." For Heidegger, phusis is something accomplished by techne; but this disempowerment of phusis at the very beginning of metaphysics, machination was not able to come to full terms with itself. Machination extended itself, though in a covered up sense, in various concepts and systems—entelechy, creator-created beings, and finally to the technology, productivity and representibility of the modern ages. For Heidegger it seems to express itself as a law that the more powerful is the "unfolding" of machination, the more "stubborn" is its hiding of itself. This relates to the second law that the more the hiding of machination the more its "insistence" on "lived-experience" which on the face of it seems opposite to it. And from this, the third law: the more the "lived-experience" becomes the parameter for truth, the dimmer is the prospect of gaining insight into the roots of machination. The more machination hides itself, or remains hidden, the more problematic it gets to access beings and the more the antipathy to the question of be-ing.

This abandonment seems totally negative, deprived and perverted. It is not so in fact; on the opposite, those that can hearken properly to it, can understand the abandonment of be-ing in its vast temporal expanse, "in its long, hidden and self-hiding history," and inquire about be-ing from the other beginning and consequently "encounter" the first beginning truly and revealingly.

The distress that occurs through the abandonment of be-ing, is positive and enhancing. This would seem strange because the nature of distress has not been understood; it is wrongly assumed to be a lack of good and therefore in itself evil. But the distress is the distress of the abandonment of be-ing, of experiencing be-ing's abandonment. It hides in itself the route to the

20 See, Ibid., 52, pp. 77-9.
21 Ibid., 61, p. 88.
22 Ibid., 61, p. 88.
23 See, ibid., 52, pp. 78-9.
true beginning; it is genuinely futural and transcends the notion of progress, good and evil.\textsuperscript{26} From this distress the echo arises that seeks to bring us back to be-ing. Be-ing belongs to beings but has abandoned them. We can understand this abandonment as “basically a dis-swaying of be-ing,” and a dis-swaying, abandonment which happens to all beings including “that being which as man stands in the midst of beings and thereby forgets their be-ing.”\textsuperscript{27}

One condition is fallenness—the absorption in inauthenticity; the other is the diagnosis of this inauthentic condition and understanding its proper signification in order to critique it and bring it properly into view. One aspect is the falling into the grips of machination and technology and living unwittingly in the abandonment of being; the other is letting our understanding come to terms with this abandonment. When we seek to understand the abandonment intelligently and wittingly, we trace in it the echoes of be-ing. In the ordinary—what is termed as the “normal” signification of the word, machination refers to a disparaging activity; in the real investigative context of be-ing, this changes completely:

In the context of the be-ing question, this word does not name a human comportment but an essential swaying of being. Even the disparaging tone should be kept at a distance, even though machination fosters what is not ownmost to being. And even what is not ownmost to being should never be depreciated, because it is essential to what is ownmost to being.\textsuperscript{28}

Heidegger’s take on machination seems rather intriguing but becomes more than explicable if we make a careful reading of his text. He express a deep antipathy to machination because machination hides what is ownmost to beings (“Machination is the early and still long hidden showing of what is precisely not ownmost to beings”).\textsuperscript{29} This makes the importance of machination absolutely clear: in it is hidden the ownmost of beings. Therefore, we must study machination in its proper terms, which needs the realisation that even machination has been covered up: therefore a double covering of the ownmost aspect of beings, and therefore being. In fact, Heidegger believes that \textit{techné} was covered up, and hidden in notions and systems that are vast, highly complex, influential; and on the face of it appearing as far as the extreme end, from anything machinational: this includes not only entelechy, but also the whole medieval system of creator and created beings (the chain of being), as also Cartesian metaphysics (For Heidegger: “The step taken by Descartes is already a first and decisive consequence, a “compliance” by

\textsuperscript{26} See, ibid., 53, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 55, p. 81. See, 55, 80-1, passim.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 61, p. 88, emphasis Heidegger’s.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 61, p. 89, emphasis Heidegger’s.
which machination assumes power as transformed truth (correctness) namely as certainty. 30

This is all the more crucial an enclosure since machination is related to phusis which lies at the very core of the whole metaphysical tradition beginning with Plato and Aristotle. How did this covering up of being and be-ing come in the first place? Heidegger does not believe that humans could have themselves hidden be-ing. I understand him also to mean that the hiding of something demands a capability to see it in the first place, which explains why humans could not have hidden be-ing. But even the non-recognition of be-ing was determined by be-ing itself. Thus, machination contains the sway of be-ing, and the inability to understand machination is the withdrawal of be-ing. Therefore says Heidegger:

Machination itself withdraws; and since it is the essential swaying of be-ing, be-ing itself withdraws. 31

For Heidegger the aim should be to understand machination, and to realise as non-contingent and non-arbitrary the togetherness that holds between machination and lived-experience. The relation of machination and lived experience contains the answer to understanding the first beginning, and the stimulation for the other, true beginning:

The belonging together of machination and lived-experience can be grasped only by returning to their broadest non-simultaneity and by dissolution of the illusion of their utmost oppositionality. When thinking-mindfulness (as questioning the truth of be-ing and only as this) attains the knowing awareness of this mutual belongingness, then the basic thrust of the history of the first beginning (history of Western metaphysics) is grasped along with that, in terms of the knowing awareness of the other beginning. Machination and lived-experience are formally [formelhaft] the more originary version of the formula for the guiding-question of Western thinking: beingness (being) and thinking (as re-presenting com-prehending). 32

And what is this lived-experience: it is the making public and all-accessible of all that is mysterious and enchanting; 33 since the mystery and enchantment of machination is the will to control, produce and make present and makeable everything. 34

30 Ibid., 67, p. 92.
31 Ibid., 61, p. 89.
32 Ibid., 61, p. 90.
33 See, Ibid., 51, p. 77.
34 Cf., Ibid., 64, p. 90, which makes the following graphical assertion:

Machination

\( \text{oousia (techne – poitisis – ideai)} \)
ens creatum
nature
In order to understand the first beginning (made by the Greeks) and cross over to the real beginning of being; metaphysics must be brought to an end: “In its essential impossibility metaphysics must now be played-forth into philosophy; and philosophy itself must be played over into its other beginning.” Metaphysics as Heidegger sees it never inquired into being; it transformed the inquiry of being into beingness (idea), ens creatum or certum or the object of science and logic. Metaphysics should be won over form the “ground up” and be transformed. This transformation and overcoming of metaphysics is different from the pseudo-overcoming of metaphysics by naturalist ideologies like positivism, which not only work within metaphysics but in no way can look for, leave alone understand being. The other beginning is not a counter thrust or a counter movement of the first or any beginning, because for Heidegger counter-movements are obsessed with themselves and with what they are against, and in reversing what they are against. The other beginning intimates to the first its problems and its truth, and also to the first its otherness; which is its intimate self-ness. Thus it intimates to the first beginning the need to turn itself and thus become itself:

Thus setting [the beginnings] into perspective also does not mean opposition, neither in the sense of crude rejection nor in the manner of sublating the first in the other. From a new originariness the other beginning assists the first beginning onto the truth of its history – and thus unto its inalienable and ownmost otherness, which becomes fruitful solely in the historical dialogue of thinkers.

Heidegger credits Being and Time as a text that understood metaphysics “originarily” and simultaneously overcame it. In order to unfold and overcome the first beginning and in order to overcome metaphysics; Heidegger believes that we understand and re-enact and yet reject and transcend, the great moments of metaphysics:

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history

causality and objectness

re-presentedness

Lived experience

See also the graphic in Ibid., 65, p. 91.
36 Ibid., 85, p. 121.
37 See, ibid., 85, pp. 120-2.
38 Ibid., 92, p. 131, square emphasis translators'.
39 See, ibid., 91, p. 128.
to make manifest Leibniz's unfathomable shaping of the onset of the question but to think Da-sein instead of monas;  
to re-enact Kant's main steps but to overcome the "transcendental" point of departure through Da-sein;  
to question thoroughly Schelling's question of freedom and nevertheless to place the question of "modalities" on another ground;  
to place Hegel's system in the commanding view and then to think in a totally opposite direction;  
to dare to come to grips with Nietzsche as the one who is nearest but to recognize that he is farthest removed from the question of being.\textsuperscript{40}

What is to be performed is inceptual thinking that is en-thinking or a thinking en-owned by being. This inceptual thinking unfolds and opens up; but what is opened up is precisely that in which it places itself while unfolding itself with what it unfolds. That is, in this unfolding the unfolder "loses every semblance of self-empowerment,"\textsuperscript{41} is rectified and unfolded by the very thing that it unfolds and thus understands the sway of be-ing.\textsuperscript{42} The Great Philosophies are likened by Heidegger to great mountains, which are the "aiming point[s] and forever form the sphere of sight." They are not to be conquered or vanquished but understood in terms of their perseverance for us and set into perspective; the great perspective that must translate into the other beginning.\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{Being and Time} is credited with having understood and overcome metaphysics, because firstly, it replaced thinking with temporality, and secondly it understood the real meaning of truth and placed truth in the forefront, while it earlier lay hidden.\textsuperscript{44} What is very crucial to understand here is Heidegger's precise take on metaphysics. We are not to understand metaphysics as an error; not because metaphysics seemingly enquired into the fundamental question of be-ing which it did not, but because metaphysics is also a swaying of be-ing itself, and contains the great moments which we must go into and from which we must unfold. We must set apart from metaphysics and "show that the heretofore existing interpretation of beings is no longer necessary . . . and can no longer experience and induce any distress for its truth. . . ."\textsuperscript{45} This clearly reflects that for Heidegger metaphysics did have a function which in its moment was necessary.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 88, pp. 123-4.  
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 21, p. 39.  
\textsuperscript{42} See, ibid., 21-2, pp. 39-40.  
\textsuperscript{43} See, ibid., 93, p. 131.  
\textsuperscript{44} See, ibid., 91, p. 127-8.  
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 94, p. 132.  
\textsuperscript{46} See, ibid., 94, pp. 131-2.
The question of the few is very prominent indeed in *Contributions*. Only the few can understand the distress; hear the echo and know the first and the other beginning. To them belongs the heritage:

But in coming to grips with the first beginning, the heritage first becomes heritage; and those who belong to the future first become heirs. One is never an heir merely by the accident of being one who comes later.\(^{47}\)

The movement from the first beginning to the other beginning requires a "mindfulness of ontology," that is, "laying the foundation of ontology as its overcoming."\(^{48}\) What kind of overcoming of ontology? The overcoming of ontology from within its origin: not a rejection of ontology, but unfolding it from the beginning, understanding it thoroughly; especially from the point of view of the difference between the guiding question and the grounding question.\(^{49}\)

The leap, a preparedness of crossing from the end of the first beginning to the other beginning, "is not as if man simply enters a "period" that has not yet been, but it is rather that man enters a totally different domain of history." And, therefore, "The end of the first beginning will for a long time still encroach upon the crossing, nay even upon the other beginning."\(^{50}\) This most "question-worthy" crossing will be recognised by the mass of men, who cannot understand the true nature of leap and distress, leave alone be-ing. Only the few will participate in it. These few humans will not even know of each other; but will prepare for this, and this alone momentous crossing.\(^{51}\) What will happen in this is equally momentous:

In long periods of time, which to be-ing history are merely moments, be-ing history recognises exceptional enownings. Enowning as such as: allotment of truth to be-ing, the collapse of truth, consolidation of what is not its ownmost (correctness), abandonment of beings by be-ing, the return of be-ing into its truth, the enkindling of the hearth fire (of the truth of be-ing) as the solitary site for the passing of the last god, the flashing of the once and only uniqueness of be-ing.\(^{52}\)

What happens after the crossing, in the other beginning? In the other beginning, be-ing is not seen through beings; beings cease to serve beings—"beings are sacrificed for be-ing."\(^{53}\) Why? Because only from be-ing do beings first receive their truth. We will have to understand that,

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\(^{47}\) Ibid., 100, p. 138.
\(^{48}\) Ibid., 117, p. 163.
\(^{49}\) See, ibid., 106, p. 143-4.
\(^{50}\) Ibid., 116, p. 161.
\(^{51}\) See, ibid., 116, p. 161.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., 116, p. 161.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., 117, p. 163.
"Here, in the unavoidable ordinariness of beings, be-ing is the most non-ordinary; and this estrangement of be-ing is not a manner of its appearing but rather is be-ing itself." 54

The leap is prepared for when one asks the grounding question; and for this it is necessary to know and unfold the guiding question, which for Heidegger encompasses the entire history of first beginning, from its beginning in Anaximander to its end in Nietzsche. Heidegger nevertheless sees patterns in the first beginning, where an essentially new perspective is reached in Plato (who prepares the grounding question), its development in Aristotle; followed by Christian theology, then a new pattern in Descartes to Hegel, and then onwards to Nietzsche. In the beginning the question is not asked in the form of an explicit question; the formulation comes with Aristotle, as τι το ov (ti to on: what is being? 55

The grounding question, is, by contrast; asked for, through and by a different domain:

In contrast to the guiding question, the grounding question commences with the question-form as a question framed, in order to leap out of it back into the originary and fundamental experience of thinking the truth of be-ing.

But the grounding-question, even as a framed question, has a totally different character. It is not the continuation of the version of the guiding question in Aristotle. For it arises directly from the necessity of the distress of the abandonment of being, that occurrence that is essentially co-conditioned by the history of the guiding-question and its misconstrual. 56

In making this momentous leap from the guiding to the grounding question, is involved a rejection of the falsity of being and the truth of be-ing. Be-ing is not the most general and the emptiest determination of beings; be-ing is not a superior being, be-ing holds sway as truth, and truth of beings. 57 A being always emerges from out of the truth of be-ing, and thus we can never make be-ing a common to beings. 58

Even more important is the change in Dasein in understanding his position:

In opening up the essential swaying of be-ing, it becomes manifest that Da-sein does not accomplish anything, unless it be to get hold of the counter-resistance of en-ownment, i.e., to shift into this counter-resonance and thus first of all to become itself: the preserver of the thrown projecting-open, the grounded founder of the ground. 59

51 Ibid., 117, p. 163.
55 See, ibid., 119, p. 164.
56 Ibid., 119, p. 165.
57 See, ibid., 120, p. 166.
58 Ibid., 139, p. 183.
59 Ibid., 122, p. 169.
What is the leap? In leap is the enactment of the truth of be-ing as projected-open, and in such a manner that there is an experience by the thrower of being the thrown, that is the thrower experiences itself as en-owned by be-ing. There is not an opening but an en-opening (opening determined in and through be-ing) in the projecting-open and through the projecting-open: this enopening of the openness of the projection enowned by be-ing is such that it only happens through the experience of being thrown and of a belongingness to be-ing. When the thrower is able to think from within the enowning of be-ing, he is under the sway of being thrown. It is in this enabling and enabled sense that Da-sein realises that he has not and will never accomplish anything.60

To think of refusal in the proper terms is the key for men—the select few—to feel the sway of be-ing; and to make the leap and be able to be in the other beginning. Be-ing en-owns everything, including Da-sein as the guardian of the truth of be-ing. The there or Da, the open ground in which Da-sein grounds itself; is en-owned by Being; which enquivers in the verve of this ground. The refusal of be-ing and its abandonment is the intimacy of be-ing, where it actually allots place to Da-sein:

Thus be-ing "is" the en-owning of en-ownment of the t/here [Da], that open within which it itself enquivers.

Be-ing must be thought all the way out to this extreme matter. But in this way it lights up as the most finite and the richest, as most of all holding to abground its ownmost intimacy to itself. . . . as refusal be-ing is not sheer retreat and withdrawal but the opposite: refusal is the intimacy of an allotting. In the enquivering the clearing of the t/here [Da] in its abground-dimension gets allotted. The t/here [Da] is allotted as what is to be grounded, as Da-sein.

Thus man is originary and differently claimed by the truth of be-ing (for that allotted clearing). By this claim of be-ing itself man is named as the guardian of the truth of be-ing (humanness as "care" founded in Da-sein).

Refusal is the intimate distressing of the most originary and again inceptual distress into the necessity of warding off distress.

The essential warding off of distress should not ward off in order to eliminate distress, but rather, by averting distress, warding off preserves distress and draws it out in accord with the broadening of enquivering.

Thus be-ing as the allotting refusal is the en-ownment of Da-sein.61

The enowning by be-ing of every sustainability, and especially the enowning of the grounding of the t/here is the essential sway of be-ing. There is an overflow in the essential sway of

60 See, ibid., 122, p. 169.
61 Ibid., 123, pp. 169-70.
being; neither a quantity, nor an attribute, because the sway is always an abundance. The swaying is the self-withdrawing of all estimation and survey.\(^{62}\)

There seems to be a reciprocal need between Da-sein and being: “Being needs man in order to hold sway; and man belongs to being so that he can accomplish his utmost destiny as Da-sein.”\(^{63}\) This need is not a need; the reciprocity is determined from within being. Precisely put: “This counter resonance of needing and belonging makes up being as enowning; and the first thing that is incumbent upon thinking is to raise the resonance of this counter-resonance into the onefoldness of knowing awareness and to ground the counter-resonance in its truth.”\(^{64}\)

This being is not God for Heidegger. It is needed by gods and enowns Dasein. Being is never more-being than being but is not less being than god.\(^{65}\) Heidegger talks of being as the midpoint of god and Da-sein, needed by the gods.\(^{66}\) Enowning itself is a “counter-resonance” between man and gods—this “between” and the “essential” swaying in the between is founded by and in Dasein; though in a Dasein as enowned. God is neither being nor not-being, and nor being. Man is also not being; being is the “between” that sways and en-grounds in Da-sein.\(^{67}\) That is, Da-sein is used by se-in “as the preserver of the site for the moment of the fleeing and arrival of gods.”\(^{68}\)

Nothing has always been crucial to Heidegger. It persists importantly enough in the Contributions. The first discussion of nothing comes up when Heidegger draws up a crucial enquiry: does Da-sein become intimate with being from that which alone holds an equal rank with being; the nothing? The nothing is to be understood “As the overflow of pure refusal. The richer the “nothing,” the simpler the being.”\(^{69}\) Nothing is never a nihilation; understood so by logic and science. Nothing is intimate with being. As for example, in that being is not a being. And, even more importantly, that being is a refusal and an abandonment but nonetheless makes itself intimate from and within this refusal.\(^{70}\) Nothing is not be confused with not-being, a negative or a goal, “rather it is the essential enquiring of the being itself and therefore is more-being than any beings.”\(^{71}\) It is imperative to understand the distinction between nothing a(which is intimate with being) and not-being:

\(^{62}\) See, ibid., 131, p. 176.
\(^{63}\) Ibid., 133, p. 177.
\(^{64}\) Ibid., 133, p. 177, emphasis Heidegger’s.
\(^{65}\) Heidegger wishes to assert here that being cannot be more than itself; but it is also not less than God. God neither transcends being nor gives it its full meaning. Being is also not less than itself.
\(^{66}\) See, ibid., p. 172.
\(^{67}\) Ibid., 143, pp. 185-6
\(^{68}\) Ibid., 143, p. 186.
\(^{69}\) Ibid., 128, p. 173, emphasis Heidegger’s.
\(^{70}\) Cf., ibid., 129, p. 174.
\(^{71}\) Ibid., 145, p. 188, emphasis Heidegger’s.
Because the not belongs to the essential sway of be-ing... be-ing belongs to the not; that is, the actually nihilating [Nichtige] has the character of the not [Nichthafte] and is not at all the mere “nothing,” as when it is only represented by the representing of something, on the basis of which one says that the nothing “is” not. But the not-being holds sway and be-ing holds sway, the not-being holds sway in what is not-ownmost, be-ing holds sway as what has the character of a not.72

The nothing-be-ing relation also informs the being-toward-death of Da-sein; and the relation that inheres between being-toward-death and be-ing. Heidegger says, and we are reminded here of Being and Time; “In being-toward-death is the collision of necessity and possibility.” The “not” that is intimate with be-ing is behind the pristine importance of death:

On the one hand what is sheltered here is the essential belongingness of the not to being as such—which here, in Da-sein distinguished as grounding the truth of being, comes to light with a singular keenness.

On the other hand being-toward-death shelters the unfathomable and essential richness of “necessity,” again as the one cleft of being itself—again being-toward-death with Da-sein as its measure.73

One of the most important phenomena and which now stands to be considered is space-time. Heidegger speaks of space-time as the essential swaying of truth of be-ing: “Time-space as essential swaying of truth (essential swaying of the ground that holds to abground).”74

Time-space is to be understood as abground: we might like to take account of this in context of Heidegger’s understanding of temporality in Being and Time, where temporality informs Dasein and Dasein is a nothingness. We can further relate this to the intimacy of be-ing and nothing that Heidegger so keenly puts across. In an almost syllogistic fashion, Heidegger says that time-space is the abground and abground is the “originary essential swaying of ground,” and “ground is ownmost to truth,” therefore, “the belongingness of time-space to what is ownmost to truth is thereby enopened.”75

We need to however understand how abground is the originary essential swaying of ground, since abground is the staying-away of ground. How can the staying away of ground become essential to ground? We can understand this if we take account of the simple fact that it is the ground itself that stays away and thus becomes the ab-ground. Ground is the “self-sheltering-concealing,” or the “self-sheltering-receiving,” which sustains “what is to be

72 Ibid., 146, p. 188, emphasis Heidegger’s.
73 Ibid., 160, p. 199, emphasis Heidegger’s.
74 Ibid., 239, p. 262.
75 Ibid., 242, p. 264.
Ab-ground is the not granting of a ground; it is "originary manner of letting be unfulfilled, of letting be empty," which is a manner of enopening. It now becomes evident that abground brings emptiness into the open; that is, it discloses, unconceals emptiness. Thus there is an occurrence of a clearing but the occurrence is such that there is in it a manifestation of hesitating, since the ground has stayed away. But what is the "emptiness" being talked about? It is not the emptiness in terms of the ordinary space and time and spatial-temporal intervals. This is the originary emptiness of time-space; it is the emptiness when the ground self-refuses (that is stays away and yet is there, since it has not pulled or gone away). This "hesitating self-refusal" thrusts a "claim, a seeking, an intending-to-go-to." The staying way of ground (abground) is from another perspective, "the swaying of ground as abground." In this emptiness there is the hint of be-ing beyond the distress. Time-space as emptiness is the "moment of deciding;" that is, it is not an absence and refusal but a hesitant staying away in which Dasein has the clearing to be resolute towards be-ing. Emptiness is not a not-satisfying of expectation but the "site for the moment of deciding." Emptiness may also be understood as undecidedness in its fullness; this Heidegger definitely does not intend to be taken as something that lingers in a between, but something that hints at be-ing that stays away and yet intimates itself. In emptiness being abandons itself but also comes up as inexhaustible and unique. Be-ing and truth are sheltered as well as concealed in this emptiness. Dasein is holding on to abground, and this reflects on Dasein as a possibility.

To the other beginning belong the ones to come: "The ones to come: the lingering and long-hearing founders of this essential sway of truth. Those who withstand the thrust of be-ing." There must be a preparation for the ones to come. The going along that path which is the "reticent preparing for those who are to come" is what Heidegger defines as "going under." There is suffusion in those who are going under with what is coming and they sacrifice themselves to this coming and to the ones to come. They are "its future invisible ground." The ones to come are "the only ones to whom be-ing (the leap) comes as enowining, enowns them, and empowers them for sheltering its truth." There is a restrospection that comes to be involved here: the ones to come are retrospectively awaited. What how does one look back at what is future? By a traversing back into the present. The ones to come are already here; in

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76 Ibid., 242, p. 265.
77 Ibid., 242, p. 265.
78 Ibid., 242, p. 266.
79 Ibid., 242, p. 266.
80 Ibid., 242, p. 266.
81 Ibid., 242, p. 266.
82 Ibid., 248, p. 277.
83 Ibid., 250, p. 278.
84 Ibid., 252, p. 281.
addition to those who will come: "Today there are a few of those who are to come." This means that "the ones to come," does not relate to a coming in the future time, but a coming in terms of the other beginning; which in terms of the present beginning, is to come. That is why Heidegger can reveal that Hölderlin is one of them, in fact the preeminent among those to come:

Hölderlin is their poet who comes from afar and therefore the poet most futural of the ones to come. Hölderlin is the most futural of the ones to come because he comes from the farthest away; and coming from so far away, he traverse/s and transforms what is the greatest.

This is be-ing and the enowning of be-ing. Right to the end; Heidegger remains elusive about God, though not about be-ing:

Coming from a posture towards beings that is determined by "metaphysics," we will only slowly and with difficulty be able to know the other, namely that god no longer appears either in the "personal" or in the "lived experience" of the masses but only in the "space" of be-ing itself—a space which is held to abground. All heretofore "cults" and "churches" and such things cannot at all become the essential preparation for the colliding of god and man in the midpoint of be-ing. For, the truth of be-ing itself must at first be grounded, and for this assignment all creating must take on an other beginning.

2

Truth, Authenticity and Being

In Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, Heidegger stresses on the inevitability and pure necessity of understanding the true nature of truth in order to grasp be-ing, and reach the other beginning. He believes that the real nature of truth was hidden from the Greeks who however give the space to grasp truth in its real sense as "disclosure." Truth and real are coextensional and mutually inhering:

In the other beginning truth is recognised and grounded as the truth of be-ing and be-ing itself is recognized and grounded as be-ing of truth, i.e., as enowning which is in itself turning . . . to which belongs the inner issuance of the cleavage and thus the ab-ground.

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85 Ibid., 252, p. 280.
86 Ibid., 252, p. 281.
87 Ibid., 256, p. 293.
88 Ibid., 91, p. 130.
But much before Heidegger the ground was laid for thinking about truth; and it is aground to which Hediegger owes much. We need to understand this ground first, and take it on its great merit.

2.1
Truth in the Early Greek Thought:
Heraclitus and Parmenides

It is acknowledged by Heidegger himself that he learnt the notion of truth from the early Greeks, and as Ἀλήθεια (Alētheia), or Disclosure/Unconcealment. By early Greeks Heidegger obviously means Heraclitus and Parmenides, because with Plato, as we shall just discuss, Heidegger takes the concept of truth to have wandered into the notion of correctness.

Heraclitus asserts rather emphatically on his notion of truth:

Thinking well is the greatest excellence and wisdom: to act and speak what is true, perceiving things according to their nature.89

How are things perceived according to their nature? What is perceiving according to nature (φύσις: phusis)? Perceiving according to nature is to perceive an entity or the sum of entities as it is, or as it exists. In other words, it is to become aware of its Being. In other words, Truth is coextensional with Being. To be is truth, true entities are. The Logos is obvious and shared. It is manifest, where manifest is read as self-manifest, and, common to all, or in other words not differing from entity to entity but all-pervasive. In that sense, it is un-concealed, or dis-closed. At the same time, to the masses, it lies hidden in the sense that their mode of thinking (φρονήσις: phronesis) responds to reality in a way that becomes parasitical on the nature of things, seeing them as they are not (concealed/Hidden/enclosed). Reality, in a mode of “play,” “loves to hide,” and it is this “hidden attunement,” which is better than the obvious one. Thus truth has to be uncovered, disclosed, un-concealed. Truth is thus, as Heidegger rightly understood, “disclosure,” or “Unconcealment.” But there are no two realities, no two accounts, as we have already seen in trying to come to terms with Heraclitus’ dialectic in the previous chapter. Reality is one whether one searches for his own self ("I went in search of myself," or listens to others

90 Ibid., Fr. X/D 123.
91 Fr. LXXX/D 54.
92 Ibid., Fr. XXVIII/D101.
(In Priene lived Bias... who is of more account than the rest,"73 "Of all those accounts I have heard...",74) or others listen to him. Reality is one whether we look at the way up, or in an Einsteinean turn, redirect the way down.75 Thus, the truth is the truth of the Account, and the Account is of Being of beings. In other words truth is which unconceals the nature of a thing, ultimately showing it to be the nature of all. This in turn explains the need and importance of elusiveness, paradox and allegory, which will be discussed in the next section in detail. There is also a sense of self-revelation, self-sufficiency and self-awareness about the Account and Truth, and therefore also, Being. Heraclitus says that "The Wise is one, knowing the plan by which it steers all things through all."76 Thus the wise knows the monistic nature of reality, and the monistic nature of the way is governed by All. In other words the All governs itself. It can only do so if it knows itself by itself as itself. That is, at the apex, reality is aware of the truth of itself. That is why Heraclitus asks, "How will we hide from that which never sets?" This allegory gives two hints: one about "that which never sets," and the second, for us. It is clear that that which never sets, is eternally lit. Further, it is infinite, since only then can it not let anything escape. Now, conclusively, one can only be eternally and infinitely lit, if it is lit by itself. This is because an eternal, infinite thing cannot have an external source. It is thus also always revealed to itself—it shines like the Sun shines by itself and from itself. The second aspect is Heraclitus’ dictum that we can never hide from it. The hint is: why should we hide? The point is to understand the self-revelatory, all illuminating nature of reality—and since reality is one—of ours too. Thus the proposition, "how can we ever hide...?" rather than being damning is elevating, since it gives us the task of interpreting ourselves and the reality, and understanding us as one with all and all with the one.

In Parmenides, the Goddess reveals the way of Truth, but also the "beliefs of the mortals," or the way of seeming as we may call it. The two ways are declared in the first fragment itself:

O young man coming to our abode joined with immortal charioteers with the horses which carry you, welcome!, since it is by no means an evil lot that has sent you forth to travel on this road (for it is far from the wandering of men), but right and justice. It is necessary that you shall learn all things, as well as the unshaken heart of well rounded truth as the opinions of mortals in which there is no true belief. Nevertheless you shall

73 Ibid., Fr. LXII/D 39.
74 Ibid., Fr. XXVII/D 108.
75 Ibid., Fr. CIII/D 60.
76 Ibid., Fr. LIV/D 41.
learn these [opinions] also, how the appearances, which pervade all things had to acceptable. 97

The way of seeming is then introduced at the end of the ninth fragment:

Here I end my trustworthy account concerning truth. From now on learn the beliefs of mortals, listening to the deceptive order of my words; for they decided to name two forms, the unity of which was not necessary—in which they have gone astray—and they divided form contrariwise and established characters apart from one another; from the one the ethereal flame of fire, gentle and very light, everywhere identical with itself but not with the other; but that one too by itself contrariwise obscure night, dense in body and heavy. I tell you all the likely arrangements in order that the wisdom of mortals may never outstrip you. 98

What is the problem with the way of seeming? Why is it deceptive and going astray, away from truth? And, if so, what purpose does it serve in the account?

Let us look at the eighth fragment closely. It says that the error of the mortals occurs in their state of “belief.” That is, the error occurs when mortals are not in a state of knowledge; when what they know is a complex and intricate web of believing in postulations and propositions which are neither self-evident nor logical demonstrations from axiomata, neither necessary nor sustainable. They nevertheless create a whole system of terms, relations and predications, an intense labyrinth that is false and self-deprecating.

What is the fundamental error: simply, “that they decided to name two forms, a unity of which is not necessary.” The modality involved is crucial here. The two forms do not have a necessary unity; which therefore means that they are not united. This is because things are united only if they are necessarily united; any other unity, strictly speaking, is not a unity. As we have seen in Chapter II, Parmenides builds his whole argument through necessity, whether through self-evident axioms or inferences from these axioms. Only necessity and impossibility have a place in his system, the former by means of inclusion and the latter by means of exclusion. The beliefs of the mortals are built otherwise, and their non-necessary unity entails a duality. Their error consists in postulating more than one, while reality is "ευ one. This simple error is fundamental; it generates a whole catastrophe of un-truth. Sedley comments on this problem rather well:

98 Ibid., Fr. VIII.
The entire range of cosmic phenomena can be generated by allowing the intrusion of just one additional item—by starting out with two instead of one. . . . how can human beings have got things so catastrophically wrong? Actually the goddess is telling us, the step from appearance to reality is surprisingly small, a numerical mistake of one.⁹⁹

There is a mimetic side to the whole problem. Sedley observes, and rather rightly, that the way of seeming imitates the way of truth—as one of the instances, he cites the tenth fragment, "where the encircling heaven (is) bound down by Necessity to hold the limits of the stars," which mimics the "what-is held motionless by Necessity in the bonds of a limit." There is therefore an obvious pattern unfolding here—"the same sphere is being first correctly described, then in the cosmology incorrectly described."¹⁰⁰

I find it rather tenacious, as a counter argument; that Parmenides is constructing a false cosmology, albeit the best. I do not find any rationale behind a thinker who operates on a monism constructed with such rigor of modality, to uphold degrees of falsehood. One may say, if this argument has to be somehow upheld, that the cosmology discussed in the way of seeming is the best possible, though it ultimately collapses, owing it to its affirmation of more than one.

2.2 Heidegger and Truth: The Foregrounding of Disclosure

I discussed in the beginning of my work, the relation between philosophy and Being. The discussion will now be extended to philosophy, Being and truth. Heidegger's understanding of a necessary relation that inheres between philosophy and Being is obvious from his position that philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology. He extends this relationship to truth, as he postulates that "From time immemorial, philosophy has associated truth and Being,"¹⁰¹ and affirms it by reading a whole tradition from Parmenides and Heraclitus, and further down to Aristotle. Interestingly though, he leaves out Plato, even though Plato made Being, Knowledge and Truth as coextensical through the transcendental domain of the Forms; because it is precisely the concept of the Forms that Heidegger rejects, along with the notion of truth that he thinks the doctrine of forms entails.

Heidegger quotes Aristotle as concluding from the early Greek—especially Parmenides—thinking that "these thinkers carried on their researches

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 124.
Heidegger also rejects several senses of truth that have prevailed upon the history of philosophy, and including those that have been put forth by thinkers who have held Being as the first task of philosophy, philosophy as the preeminent science and truth and Being as correlates. Accordingly, Aristotle, Aquinas, Ibn Sina, Israeli and Kant are all declared as upholding in incorrect version of truth. The version that Heidegger upholds is that of truth as “Being-uncovering” or disclosedness, the ancient Greek Alitheia (Ἀλήθεια). In this Heidegger appeals to the early Greek thinkers, Heraclitus and Parmenides; the ancient Western culture and the primordial language of Dasein:

In citing such evidence we must avoid word mysticism. Nevertheless, the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein

102 Ibid., 44, p. 256.
103 See, ibid., 44, p. 262.
104 Ibid., 44, p. 262.
expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as pseudo-problems.\textsuperscript{105}

In order to understand what Heidegger proposes here, we must recall his definitions of phenomena and \textit{logos} given in his "Introduction" to \textit{Being and Time}, and brought to bear upon both philosophy and ontology. Phenomena as Heidegger understands from the early Greeks, is "that which shows itself in itself, the manifest."\textsuperscript{106} The Greek \textit{φαινόμενον} (phanomenon: phenomenon) in Heidegger’s reading, accordingly "signifies ‘that which shows itself, the manifest.’" \textit{φαινόμενον} comes from \textit{φαινεῖται} (phainesthai) "to show itself," which in turn is formed on \textit{φαίνω} (phaino), "to bring to the light of the day, to put in the light," which in its turn comes from \textit{φα} (pha), signifies something "that can become manifest, visible in itself."\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{Logos}, Heidegger understands as "discourse," with again a precise phenomenological-ontological signification. \textit{Logos qua "Discourse"} "lets something be seen," that is, "lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about."\textsuperscript{108}

There is thus, for Heidegger, a disclosedness involved in reality, and this uncovering-uncovered/uncovered/uncoveredness is what is the locus of truth and brings it to bear on the question of Being. Therefore, says Heidegger, "The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering."\textsuperscript{109} He upholds two senses of truth—the primary sense, "uncovering" belongs to Dasein, or one that uncovers. In the second sense, truth means being-uncovered. In other words, for Heidegger, there is only one entity, Dasein; that uncovers or discloses; and that is essentially related to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Not only is \textit{Dasein} that which uncovers or discloses, Dasein \textit{essentially uncovers or discloses}. Dasein is an entity that is in-the-world and alongside the entities in the world, and one of whose key \textit{existentiale} is care. These primordial modes of Dasein are the precise reason why disclosedness belongs primarily to it. Another constitutive factor for Dasein’s disclosedness is throwness; it is only because Dasein is thrown into a world, a “definite world and alongside a definite range of entities within-the-world,” that to Dasein disclosedness belongs. Dasein, however, is also one to whom fallenness belongs. Fallenness makes it obvious that Dasein also simultaneously belongs to un-truth. This brings us to the crucial fact that truth and un-truth belong equiprimordially to Dasein. For

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibd., 44, p. 262.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Ibd., 7, p. 51.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Ibd., 7, p. 51.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Ibd., 7, p. 56.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Ibd., 44, p. 263.
\end{itemize}
Heidegger, the very double nature of the Goddess' account in Parmenides is testimony to the dual possession of being in truth and un-truth of Dasein.\textsuperscript{110}

The simultaneous possession of truth and un-truth by Dasein is related by Heidegger to the very nature of logos, one of the richest words in Greek. He reads Aristotle as defining logos as "that way of Being in Dasein can either uncover or cover up."\textsuperscript{111}

Dasein is also essentially in the state of projection. Projection and facticity, and the very depth of possibility that Dasein is given unto, stand to mean that Dasein can understand itself in terms of a wide reference, from the world and Others to its ownmost self and its ownmost nature of existence. This leads us to the possibility of Dasein living out authentically or inauthentically. \textit{The most authentic possibility of disclosure is the disclosing unto Dasein the potentiality and truth of its own existence.}\textsuperscript{112}

There is a very important inference that Heidegger draws from his two prior inferences, namely, that Dasein is both in truth and un-truth, and that entities are uncovered. Dasein is in un-truth only because it is in truth: as there persists an impossibility that Dasein has absolutely no knowledge of Being, similarly there persists an impossibility that Dasein is without truth. For disclosure belongs essentially to Dasein. In effect, we can argue that though truth belongs to Dasein, but since through his falling un-truth also belongs to it, the uncoveredness of entities can never be a given. Heidegger, in fact, argues that this double relation of Dasein with truth, and this double expression of entities regards disclosure is the reason why truth in Greek has a privative expression, a-leteia:

\begin{quote}
Truth (uncoveredness) is something that must always first be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness. The factual uncoveredness of anything is always, as it were, a kind if robbery. Is it accidental that when the Greeks express themselves as to the essence of truth, they use a privative expression—\(\alpha\)-\(\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\alpha\). When Dasein so expresses itself, does not a primordial understanding of its own Being thus make itself known—the understanding (even if it is pre-ontological) of Being-in-untruth makes up an essential characteristic of Being-in-the-world?\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

If for Heidegger, Being and truth are coxtensional, and if Dasein is both in truth and un-truth, then it also stands to mean that the pre-ontological understanding is as much preserved in truth as in un-truth. For a pre-ontological understanding cannot be false, otherwise it ceases to be associated with Being, nor can it be wholly true, since then the pre-ontological has already

\textsuperscript{110} See, ibid., 44, p. 264-5.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 44, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{112} See, ibid., 44, p. 264.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 44, p. 265.
blossomed into the ontological. Heidegger expresses very much this same point when in his genealogical assertion on the tradition of ontology, he comments that:

*The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein's very understanding of Being—that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle.*

This is an observation on truth-untruth-Being in an individual as well collective; historical as well critical sense.

There are two very crucial problems with Heidegger's account so far. One is not convinced how essentially every Dasein belongs un-truth and falling. Even if one argues that every Dasein is given to falling and un-truth at the beginning of its existence, what can prevent a select few to transcend it, that is take the existential leap into the blossom of authenticity? Further, even if one adopts Heidegger's understanding of phenomena and man *qua* Dasein *qua* Being-in-the-world, one will have to make a qualification in terms of entities and truth. It is worthwhile to agree with Heidegger that entities cannot uncover, they can only be uncovered. However, entities can be essentially uncovered-in-themselves, and appear in their being or its false modifications to a human observer. This takes us back to Platonic *noumenology* and Husserlian phenomenology which seeks such an uncovering of the entities. Heidegger does not believe so, and takes a position of ontological anthropocentrism in *Being and Time*.

Heidegger's ontological anthropocentrism is not an easy one to come to terms with. For to do justice to him, Heidegger does assert that:

> Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities beforehand already were. Such uncovering is the kind of Being which belongs to 'truth'.

The line is not very clear in translation; but indeed Heidegger can be seen as asserting that Dasein uncovers an entity as-it-already-is. There is nevertheless too much of an insistence upon Dasein here. This is extended to the very being of truth itself:

> Dasein, as constituted by diclosedness, is essentially in the truth. Disclosedness is a kind of Being which is essential to Dasein. *There is* truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is, and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed. . . . Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth, nor will there be any

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114 Ibid., 44, p. 268.
115 Ibid., 44, p. 269.
after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness, cannot be.\textsuperscript{116}

This passage illuminates upon the problem of entities \textit{vis-a-vis} truth that I have been discussing. The dependence upon Dasein of truth is because Heidegger believes truth to be disclosure, and extends it to even the dependence of Being on Dasein that he hints at in \textit{Being and Time}, and cements my point on the question of truth of entities. It is however, not clear how Heidegger is supposed to justify this, given the fact that he does not disagree that before or after Dasein (and he clearly takes Dasein to be a contingent entity) entities will be. If there will be entities before and after Dasein, there will be a Being of entities. This itself is enough to justify that Being and Truth are independent of Dasein. I do not buy Heidegger’s assertion that “Being (not entities) is something which there is only in so far as truth is. And truth is only in so far as and as long as Dasein is. Being and truth ‘are’ equiprimordially.”\textsuperscript{117} It seems that Heidegger puts too much weight upon the fact that only one entity, Dasein can understand Being, and realize the truth of things and itself.

Heidegger does seem to express the weakness of his argument by concluding that we, as Dasein presuppose truth, but this presupposition means “that ‘truth’ is something for the sake of which Dasein is.”\textsuperscript{118} Presupposing is dependent upon truth:

\begin{quote}
It is not we who presuppose ‘truth’; but it is ‘truth’ that makes it at all possible ontologically for us to be able to be such that we ‘presuppose’ anything at all. Truth is what first makes possible anything like presupposing.\textsuperscript{119}
\end{quote}

This a-priori nature of truth and the a-priori and transitive relation of truth with Dasein does not seem to clarify Heidegger’s position but actually confounds it even further.

Nevertheless, Heidegger continued his interaction with truth and Being throughout his career. Among the landmark texts is “On the Essence of Truth.”\textsuperscript{120} Heidegger begins by discussing the problem of common sense and philosophy, regarding the nature of truth. Common sense is against the very nature of philosophy when it begins considering the question of Being, or for that matter the characterization of existence and essence, considering these questions as superfluous; but philosophy must and does regard these as indeed fundamental. Heidegger rejects the notion of correspondence- and coherence-theories of truth; but takes their

\begin{footnotes}
\item[116] Ibid., 44, p. 269.
\item[117] Ibid., 44, p. 272.
\item[118] Ibid., 44, p. 270.
\item[119] Ibid., 44, p. 270.
\end{footnotes}
claims in detail; in order to demonstrate why these claims are problematic and cannot suffice. They fail to suffice even more pitiably in terms of Being and existence—particularly human existence—and the relation of Being and Truth. Truth ordinarily comes to be seen in terms of actuality; this fails however, since actuality persists even when there is a counterfeit and thus a false phenomenon in question. (For example, a counterfeit gold coin, is in itself an actual coin.) Therefore, the more viable parameter for truth seems to be “accord.” Truth is what accords between statements and matter; and between matter and statements. In later developments, this comes to mean propositions and things in accord. This dual nature of accord: on one hand proposition-matter, on the other hand, matter-proposition, is illuminated by the traditional definition of truth: “Veritas est adaequation intellectus rei et intellectus,” which can be taken to mean, “Truth is the correspondence of the matter to knowledge.”

Heidegger rejects this view. The aim of the essay is to show how this view is erratic; what in fact the real accordance is and how truth is unconcealment. It is obvious in the first place that the accordance cannot be a literal accordance: there seems to be no accordance between the statement with the thing. In Heidegger’s example, the statement about the gold coin is not itself a coin:

How can what is completely dissimilar, the statement, correspond to the coin? It would have to become the coin and in this way relinquish itself entirely. . . . How is the statement able to correspond to something else, the thing, precisely by persisting in its own essence? Correspondence here cannot signify a thing-like approximation between dissimilar kind of things.

The relation, is however, of the presentation of a thing; and a presentation that says how that which is presented is disposed and says of the presented thing exactly in a manner in which it is. Presenting means letting the thing stand “opposed as an object,” whereby the object traverses an open field and also withstands itself as an object. This open region is not created by the presentation but the presentation comes to belong to it as a domain of relatedness. This relatedness is determined by a comportment; the comportment which stands in the open region

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121 Ibid., p. 138.
122 See, ibid., pp. 136-40.
123 Ibid., pp. 140-1.
and "adheres to something opened up as such." But this opening up of something, Heidegger finds as equivalent to what the ancients called "the present," Heidegger's term for Being. In other words, the presentative statement talks of an object but is determined in terms of the comportment adhering to an open region and the showing of beings as such, both of which determine it. In other words, "beings present themselves along with the presentative statement so that the latter subordinates itself to the directive that it speaks of beings such-as they are." And, "In following such a directive the statement conforms to beings." This in turn suggests that the accordance is an inner accordance and not related to proposition-thing coherence/correspondence. Whatever this correctness of statement/proposition is, its being grounded in comportment and openness, in turn brings to the fore the relatedness of truth to freedom. There is freedom for the openness and freedom of the showing itself of things in an openness. Thus, the essence of truth is freedom. If freedom is the freedom of the showing itself in an openness; which is expressing itself of beings; then freedom has to be conceived as "letting things be." Letting things be, is to let things show themselves, or the unconcealment of beings. Truth thus reveals itself as a-letheia (αληθεία: a-letheia) or disclosure. There is a very important point to be considered here, in terms of truth, freedom and disclosure:

To engage oneself in the closedness of beings is not to loose oneself in them; rather, such an engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are, and in order that presentative correspondence might take its standard from them. As this letting-be it exposes itself to beings as such and transposes all comportment to the open region. Letting-be, i.e., freedom, is intrinsically ek-sistent.

Ek-sistence or existence; standing out, means the allowing of beings to unconceal themselves and to stand out. This is truth and its essence freedom, and this allows us to reflect on what is it to be in truth, and why truth is related to being. The Dasein (which here seems to mean existence and not the term specific to human existence); is Da-Sein, or "Da," "there." "There" is the openness where beings disclose themselves and stand out: "Disclosedness is conserved in ek-sistent engagement. . . ." Heidegger says that only the "ek-sistent human being is historical." What does he mean? We know from Being and Time that man is existence, or as
expressed here ek-sistence. He is always standing out; man is rooted in temporality which is itself ek-statical. Human existence is a projection; and is thus deeply rooted in the futural; moreover, the three ek-stasis of time are always moving out into each other to make up temporality. Moreover, human being is always in and with a world. However, in an authentic sense; Human Being experiences its historicality when it asks “What are Beings?” and realizes the phenomenon of disclosure. 132

While human being becomes historical in the openness of beings or their unconcealedness; the fact that freedom is rooted as truth’s essence stands to mean that human beings can also not let things be. That is, not comport itself towards beings so as to let them show themselves in their presence or manifestedness. This indeed takes us back to falling as the essential part of “care” that makes up man. Therefore, the freedom of Dasein; which is the essence of truth and lets things be; is also what may not let things be. Therefore, there is an equiprimordiality of truth and un-truth. It must be noted here that one is talking of the concealment of beings as a whole, which is the primary-primal concealment and a mystery. This concealment is older than unconcealment and is conserved in the ek-sistence or Da-sein of human beings:

The concealment of beings as a whole, un-truth proper, is older than any openedness of this or that being. It is older even than letting-be itself, which in disclosing already holds concealed and comports itself towards concealing. What conserves letting-be in this relatedness to concealing? Nothing less than the concealing of what is concealed as a whole, of beings as such, i.e., the mystery; not a particular mystery regarding this or that, but rather the one mystery—that in general, mystery (concealing of what is concealed) as such holds sway throughout the Da-sein of human beings.133

The “concealing of what is concealed” is a mystery, and it is earlier than the letting-be. This highly inextricable passage may be attempted an interpretation nonetheless. Heidegger is definitely concerned first with the fact that man is given to falling as his primary condition along with existence and facticity. Thus, he is not first in unconcealment and then given over to enclosure; but first in enclosure itself. Second; the problem is of concealing of beings as a whole rather than a local being; therefore the concern is with Being and not beings ultimately. Third; the concealing of what is concealed is also perhaps a reference to the fact that freedom in letting-be conceals the concealment; that is, opens. Therefore, the primary mystery of Being and beings

132 See, ibid., pp. 144-6.
133 Ibid., p. 148.
is forgotten and Dasein takes refuge in the forgetting of the mystery. The ek-sistence and the in-sistence must both be understood:

As ek-sistent, Dasein is in-sistent. Even in insistent existence the mystery holds sway, but as the forgotten and the "unessential" essence of truth.

Dasein not only ek-sists (exists) but in-sists, that is, not only can stand in the face of the disclosure of beings, but also in their concealment taking it that beings are always and in themselves open. While man in a sense will always exist and stand out; it thus, in terms of this inauthenticity, stands-in. It also seems that Heidegger is not addressing himself to the situation where no being is disclosed to man and he lives in total concealment. The problem is the knowing of Being, the wholeness of beings and understanding the nature and essence of truth:

Humans err. Human beings do not merely stray into errancy. They are always astray in errancy, because as ek-sistent they in-sist and so already stand within errancy. The errancy through which human beings stray is not something that, as it were, extends alongside them like a ditch into which they occasionally stumble; rather, errancy belongs to the inner constitution of the Da-sein into which historical human beings are admitted. Errancy is the free space for that turning in which in-sistent ek-sistence adroitly forgets and makes itself constantly anew. The concealing of concealed beings holds sway in that disclosure of specific beings, which, as forgiveness of concealment, becomes errancy.

Human being is not given unto existence with the pristine notion of truth, nor is he given unto existence with only un-truth; he is given unto an equiprimordiality of both. This also illuminates the view that man can become authentic and come to terms with Truth and Being.

Truth is also widely discussed in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," but this essay is unconvincing for most part and Heidegger forces his own conviction of what Truth is into Plato. Thus keeping his doctrine of truth primary, Heidegger, consequently, finds a problem with Plato's understanding of truth. Heidegger's fundamental position is that truth is \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \iota \alpha (\text{aletheia}) \), and that Plato's cave simile can only be understood with reference to truth as \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) or unhiddenness and nothing else. But he simultaneously also attacks Plato for seeing truth as subservient to Being, and for making the notion of truth as correctness as superordinate to truth \( \text{qua} \) unhiddenness. There are several problems in this position not least of all that

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134 See, ibid., pp. 147-50.
135 Ibid., p. 150, emphasis Heidegger's.
136 Ibid., p. 150.
"unhidden" has been used equivocally and that the Platonic idea has been wrongly seen as essence, though it is both essence and existence.

Heidegger focuses in the essay on Plato's simile of the cave and focuses on Plato's account of truth through that simile. This is itself a little problematic because it is not unjustified to raise the objection as to why an essay on Plato's doctrine of truth should be limited to the cave simile. Nevertheless, Heidegger begins by his own translation of the cave simile in the Republic, alongside the original Greek. Heidegger focuses on the notion of παίδευσις (paideia), the turning about of the whole of human being, as he shifts from the visible world to the intelligible realm. Heidegger says that there is no readily available translation for this key word in Plato's text; he gives one possibility as "formation," while he also refers to the usual translation, "education."138

Παίδευσις means turning around the whole human being. It means removing human beings from the region where they first encounter things and transferring them to another realm where beings appear.139

In the simile, which is seemingly governed by the concept of paideia, Heidegger seeks to locate the concept of truth. Heidegger finds operational in Plato the transformation in human beings of the sense of manifestedness or unhiddenness, as they learn that the shadows are mere illusion and ascend to the outside world, the analogue of the realm of ideas and the highest Idea, the Good.

In the first place, this position is a problematic one. Would Plato agree to the notion of a manifestedness in the realm of the visible, given the fact that he saw the visible world as one that is between "is" and "is not?" The notion of unconcealment does not stand for an image or opinion; the unconcealed is an enabling, wholesome and thoroughly positive aspect. Actually, Heidegger is inserting, while reading Plato, his own understanding of a "thing." Heidegger says that "Whatever has been unhidden to human beings at any given time, as well as the manner of unhiddenness has to be transformed."140 Plato would at least have liked a qualification to be added here: whatever erroneously seemed unhidden. However, it does not seem that Plato could have used this term here; since unhiddenness is too enabling to be used in the context of prisoners under the spell of illusion. It is only that Heidegger must critique the Platonic transcendence.

138 See, ibid., p. 166-7.
139 Ibid., p. 167.
140 Ibid., p. 168.
Heidegger however talks of degrees and aspects of unhidden: hidden, unhidden, more unhidden and the most unhidden. He concludes that paideia can only be understood by reference to the sense of unhiddeness at work. He reads Plato’s sense of liberation working through the ascent to the forms which are unhidden in their “appearing”:

The most unhidden shows itself in each case in the whatness of a being. Without such a self-showing of the whatness (i.e., the ideas) each and every specific thing—in fact absolutely everything—would remain hidden. “The most unhidden” is so called because it appears antecedently in everything that appears, and it makes what appears be accessible.141

We know that in Plato the unhidden is the idea—to follow Heidegger’s term—and it makes the others (non-ideas) appear and be visible, even if to the carnal sight and way of Being. Heidegger talks of “attaining the unhidden by wresting it away,”142 that is, the idea is itself to be taken out if its hiddeness. This, however, is simply erratic. The idea is never hidden; it is we who cannot see the idea. Therefore, privation cannot be attached to the idea. This is again an insertion by Heidegger of his own philosophy; it is Heidegger who talks of truth as equiprimordial with un-truth and not Plato.

Heidegger attaches the notion of sun, sunlight and fire to truth and the ideas:

The “idea” is the visible form that offers a view of what is present. The ἰδέα is pure shining in the sense of the phrase “the sun shines.” The “idea” does not first let something else (behind it) “shine in its appearance” [erscheinen]; it itself is what shines, it is concerned only with the shining of itself. The ἰδέα is that which can shine [das Scheinsame]. The essence of the idea consists in its ability to shine and be seen [Schein- und Sichtsankeit]. This is what brings about presencing, specifically the coming to presence of what a being is at any given instance. A being becomes present in each case in its whatness. But after all, coming to presence is the essence of being. That is why for Plato the proper essence of being consists in whatness.143

In the first place, as I have already mentioned, idea is not whatness, but unison of whatness and thatness. Things are not that-it-is of which idea is the what-it-is primarily; idea is both the thatness and the whatness of which things are an image. Visible realm is a likeness of thatness and a likeness of whatness. Heidegger is therefore wrong in his understanding of the idea: “The ideas are what is everything that is.”144

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141 Ibid., p. 170.
142 Ibid., p. 172.
143 Ibid., p. 173.
144 Ibid., p. 175.
Heidegger concludes that the idea subjects unhiddenness to it; since unhiddenness is what is accessible “thanks to the idea’s ability to shine.” But the idea is what is always shining and hidden; the fact that the idea is hidden is because it is always shining in itself and is visible through itself and as itself, does not make a hierarchical relation between idea and unhiddenness. Moreover, there is a fallacy of equivocation here: this unhiddenness is clearly not the unhiddenness that Heidegger began with.

Heidegger also concludes that the question of transformation and the apprehending of the idea is related to seeing; one must be able to see correctly. The movement from one level to another is in the correctness of gaze; truth consequently becomes correctness. I do not see how a notion as weak as that of correctness applies to an inner transformation that Plato talks about. In Plato the ascent is ontological and epistemological; a movement to a higher, full and complete stage of being and knowing. One can reject Plato’s transcendent realm of the forms, but I do not see how correctness, howsoever read, can fit in the contemplative, metaphysical metamorphosis that Plato talks about.

2.3 Heidegger: Authenticity and Inauthenticity

In the beginning, Heidegger makes a very elusive kind of postulation for Dasein, but which gains a clarity and definiteness as the thesis proceeds. He posits that “the entity which in every case we ourselves are, is ontologically that which is farthest.” This is explained by the phenomenon of falling, and the lostness into the they-world, which we have by now considered elaborately. Further, it is care which is ironically responsible for the getting lost of Dasein and its sweep into inauthenticity. For care is constituted by existence and facticity, but also falling; and it is our close relation with the world and the entities in the world which leads to one’s being lost in the false but highly compelling aura of the Other. Therefore if Dasein’s everydayness follows the path of forgetting and ontologically condemning itself, a reverse path will set it into authenticity. Hermeneutics also ought to follow the reverse course to disclose the essential structures of Dasein and the real contours of its existence:

The laying bare of Dasein’s primordial Being must rather be wrested from Dasein by following the opposite course from that taken by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpretation.

145 See, ibid., p. 177.
146 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 63, p. 359, emphasis Heidegger’s.
147 Ibid., 63, p. 359, emphasis Heidegger’s.
This may require the doing of violence to the claims of inauthentic-everyday modes of interpretation which are erratic and damning to Dasein:

Dasein's kind of Being thus demands that any ontological Interpretation which sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality, should capture the Being of the entity, in spite of this entity's own tendency to cover things up. Existential analysis, therefore, constantly has the character of doing violence, whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation or to its complacency and its tranquillized obviousness.\(^{148}\)

Violence thus becomes the necessary aspect of hermeneutics owing to the deep and rather essential way in which Dasein is covered up and has the tendency of covering itself up. The fact that Dasein always has a pre-ontological understanding stands to mean that to be hermeneutic belongs essentially to Dasein. That is, Existence always interprets itself, even if in a very provisional manner.

Heidegger deems it judicious here to inquire into the ground by which, in the first place, it can be conclusively argued that Dasein gets lost from the primordial sense of itself, and must be wrested back from this lostness and into its true foundations. I fact, before the demonstration of the validity of this argument, it must be first discovered as to how it was deemed judicious in the first place that Dasein was lost, and that part of his essential constitution “falling” belongs. For Heidegger, the answer to both questions is Existence. “Existence” and Dasein as Existence is the ground which makes us argue Dasein's lostness and falling. We have ‘presupposed’ ourselves as Existence and also that we are in some way distinct and distinguished from entities that are “Real” and present-at-hand or ready-to-hand; along with the fact that each Dasein is its mineness and its ownness. But the conceptual space that has been forged for Existence and its distinction from Real is presupposed by the idea of Being itself. Hermeneutics comes back to the problem of the circle: The “ontologically clarified”\(^{149}\) idea of Being is said to be possible only on the basis of Dasein and Dasein's understanding of Being, but Dasein itself seems to be understood only on the basis of Being.\(^{150}\)

What is to be realized is simply that it is an inappropriate understanding of Dasein that leads to the erratic supposition that there is a vicious circularity involved. It is the placing of scientific-logical method at the apex of inference, and the attempt to use this scientific rigor to make ontological deductions that confounds the whole process. For Dasein and Being elude any such scientific deduction and measurement. Dasein is essentially projecting, and as Existence and Facticity is always and already ahead of itself: that is exactly why Heidegger refers to him as

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\(^{148}\) Ibid., 63, p. 359, emphasis Heidegger's.

\(^{149}\) Ibid., 63, p. 362.

\(^{150}\) See, Ibid., 63, p. 360-2.
Being-there, or there-Being. In this projection it always projects Being and Existence. It is neither that Dasein must begin to understand nor that at some point it begins to understand and not also that there is or can be a point that it never understands, Dasein is essentially in understanding, and never out of it; even in the deepest entrapments of falling. Even in falling it relates to and interprets entities, even when it does not know the nullity of its Existence it nevertheless projects, even when it does take cognizance of its facticity, thrownness and abandonment, it nevertheless is somewhere in itself anxious. Thus understanding is rooted in care, the basic constitutive element of Dasein. Dasein is always pre-ontological and always projecting: thus the circularity of Being and There-Being is actually a complex interplay that is Dasein.\(^\text{151}\)

If the circularity is wished to be adhered to, as a concept, we can posit that Dasein is essentially ontologically-circular. The circularity is not vicious, neither virtuous; it is rather essential and given unto Dasein from an indefinite why of its thrownness:

> We must rather endeavour to leap into the circle, primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we can make sure that we have a full view of Dasein’s circular Being.\(^\text{152}\)

There is an obvious difference between authentic and inauthentic existence; in fact a very wide chasm that separates these two ways in which Dasein may choose itself to be. Related to these, is authentic and inauthentic historicality. The inauthentic Dasein is lost in the they, and interprets the objects and nature with which it is concerned with, wrongly as presence-at-hand, “which comes along, has presence and disappears.”\(^\text{153}\) Not concerned with the fundamental question of Being and its own Existence, it cannot thus understand the Historizing and historicality either. It understands past as static, which must be either ignored or imitated, but never repeated. Dasein does not simply make wrong choices; it is lost in the “they” and “The ‘they’ evades choice.”\(^\text{154}\) Since Dasein’s does not understand the nature of possibility, it does not know what repetition of past is either. It only understands a static actual—a present-at-hand which is rejected or retained, and is at a certain moment lost forever. To put it precisely, Dasein has lost itself. It is dispersed and disconnected. If it wishes to come to itself, it must pull itself resolutely from the inauthentic possibilities, wrong choices and the fallacious comportment towards objects and nature; that Heidegger designates as “world-historical.” In pulling itself off from inauthenticity, in coming back to itself and its nullity and finitude, and in repeating its past, Dasein has recovered its connectedness. It is not that Dasein has to construct a connected-harmonized existence; it is

\(^{151}\) See, Ibid., 63, p. 361-3.

\(^{152}\) Ibid., 63, p. 363.

\(^{153}\) Ibid., 75, p. 441.

\(^{154}\) Ibid., 75, p. 443.
rather that in pulling itself off from its lies, and recovering itself, it realizes not only the authentic mode of its existence but also how this Existence is a connectedness. Thus authenticity is the disclosure of Dasein unto itself, as also if its historicality and its harmony:

In inauthentic historicality . . . the way in which fate has been primordially stretched along has been hidden. . . . Lost in the making present of the “today”, it understands the ‘past’ in terms of the ‘Present’. On the other hand, the temporality of authentic historicality, as the moment of vision of anticipatory repetition, deprives the today of its character as present, and weans one from the conventionalities of the ‘they’. When, however, one’s existence is inauthentically historical, it is loaded down with the legacy of a ‘past’ which has become unrecognisable, and it seeks the modern. But when historicality is authentic, it understands history as the ‘recurrence’ of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment of vision, in resolute repetition.155

Being-in-the-world is equiprimordial with Being-with (Mitsein) and Dasein-with (Mitdasein).156 Dasein is Being-with Others; he is a Dasein-with and the world is a with-world (mitwelt).157 It is crucial to understand these existentiale in order to understand Heidegger’s notion of Being which—at least in Being and Time—is inextricably bound up with Dasein. Dasein does not only find himself in a world and with things ready-to-hand; he is also with “Others” that is, with Other Dasein. There is obviously something distinct and far-reaching about this; since obviously Others have the same Being as Dasein though not in an individual but a generic sense. The Others that we encounter in the world are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; these Others “are ‘in’ the world in which they are at the same time encountered within-the-world, and are ‘in’ it by way of Being-in-the-world.”158 In talking about Others, Dasein does not see himself as an I isolated from similar Beings within which he stands out, but rather from whom he does not for the most part distinguish himself.159 It is here very important to note that Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; which means precisely that Dasein is essentially a Being-with and does not depend on this characteristic for a literal presence of other Dasein and does not loose it in the face of a total absence of other Dasein. The very possibility of a Being-alone proves the pre-existence of Being-with and its supervenience on the former.160

155 Ibid., 75, p. 443-4, emphasis Heidegger’s.
156 Ibid., 25, p. 149.
157 Ibid., 26, p. 155.
158 Ibid., 26, p. 154.
159 Ibid., 26, p. 154, emphasis added.
160 See, Ibid., 26, p. 156-7. Also note what Heidegger adds here: “On the other hand, factual being-alone is not obviated by the occurrence of a second example of a human being beside me or ten such examples” (157).
The sum total of attitudes that Dasein can have as Being-with are defined by the term "solicitude,"—Heidegger reserves the term "concern" for the way Dasein relates to equipment. This use of a special term for Being-with(-others) also signifies that Heidegger wishes to underline both the difference between Dasein's relationship with equipment and with another Dasein, but also the special nature of Dasein's encounter with the "other." There are various ways in which solicitude can be; from the efficient to the deficient, from the relating to the indifferent. For example, with or without another, Being-from, Being against, mattering and not mattering to one another, and so on. Solicitude is "guided by" considerateness and forbearance; these again can be deficiently addressed as inconsiderateness or perfunctoriness. Dasein's everydayness is characterised more by the indifferent and deficient modes. On the other hand, there are two extreme possibilities as far as the positive modes are concerned. Dasein can leap in for the other and dominate in the process, or leap forth and liberate.

In whatever way, whether efficient or deficient, Dasein's Being-with implies that he has a prior knowledge of the other; a "primordial understanding." This stands to mean that it is not through knowing the others that Dasein becomes a Being-with, rather, he is always and essentially a Being-with and it is this Being-withness that makes knowledge of the other possible in the first place. It is also extremely important to note that the fact that Dasein's Being-with is a relationship with the same kind of Being that Dasein possesses, can not in the least mutate Dasein's self-relationship or this very Being-with itself. In other words, the Being towards Others is irreducible; it cannot be reduced to Being-with-itself.

Having made the conceptual and existentiale structure clear about Being-with, we can now prepare ourselves to discuss the threatening aspect of this irreducible, primordial Being-with. This is precisely the fact that in Being-with, inauthenticity so pervasively dwells. Most of the time, Being-with "stands in subjection to the Others." It becomes the not of itself, and allows its Being to be taken away. In this dissolution of itself into the Others, the distinguishability of the Others vanishes. This is a slimy, parasitical mode of Being, which cuts across Dasein's individuality, person and authenticity. In fact, "The 'they' even hides the manner

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161 Ibid., 26, p. 157.
162 Ibid., 26, p. 158.
163 Ibid., 26, p. 159.
164 Ibid., 26, p. 158-9. In the dominating positive mode Dasein takes over from the other "that with which he is to concern himself," (157) while in the other mode, Dasein "leaps ahead of the other" to take away form him that which he gives back to him, but with the special difference that it is given to him authentically for the first time" (158).
165 Ibid., 26, p. 161.
166 See, Ibid., 26, p. 161.
167 Ibid., 26, p. 162.
in which it has tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly choosing (its own) possibilities. Some of Heidegger's passages in Being and Time are indeed revealing:

The "who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the "they" [das man].

In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find shocking what they find shocking. The "they" which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.

Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known... Every secret looses its force.

It 'was' always the "they" who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been 'no one'. In Dasein's everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that "it was no one."

The 'They-self, the average self of Dasein stands contradistinguished from the authentic self; and the Others to which Dasein surrenders, is a nobody. There is indeed a parasitical mode at work here; however, some explanations are needed to ward off ontological confusion and to avoid making harried and erratic conclusions. That the "they" is nobody does not mean that it is nothing. Further, the negative tendencies of "they" notwithstanding it is a positive constitution of Dasein and as much an "existential" as the other existential. Conclusively, then, "Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they'—of the 'they' as an essential existentiell."

While language and discourse are basic to Dasein and the access to Being, the parasitical modes of discourse have the opposite effect, that of closing off Being-in-the-world, covering up entities, corrupting our Being-with-Others, and condemning our case with Being. One such kind is idle talk which is parasitical on the very nature of talking, and its ability to open up entities as well as our relationship with Others. Genuine talk is a genuine relationship with the

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168 Ibid., 54, p. 312.
169 Ibid., 27, p.164.
170 Ibid., 27, p.164.
171 Ibid., 27, p.165.
172 Ibid., 27, p.165.
173 Ibid., 27, p. 168.
174 "Covering up" and "closing off" are phrases that Heidegger uses, see for example, ibid., 35, p. 213.
entity being talked about, and opens the means for a primordial appropriation of this entity, while idle talk is a dubious, superficial, baseless mode of discourse where not only is the entity covered up but the communication is effected by gossip and a "passing the word along." To any person sensitive to a human being's fundamental project, that of Being, the risk of idle talk is rather evident:

What is said-in-the-talk as such, spreads in wider circle and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so. Idle talk is constituted by just such gossiping and passing the word along a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness. And indeed this idle talk is not limited to vocal gossip, but even spreads to what we write, where it takes the form of 'scribbling'. In this latter case the gossip is not so much based upon hearsay. It feeds upon superficial reading. The average understanding of the reader will never be able to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle and how much is just gossip. The average understanding, moreover, will not want any such distinction, and does not need it, because, of course, it understands everything.

Idle talk does not have the kind of Being which belongs to consciously passing off something as something else. The fact that something has been said groundlessly, and then gets passed along in further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing into an act of closing off.

This is exactly the idolisation of banality and bland gossip that Heidegger believes to be so threatening to man variously, and including the closing off of Being. It is obvious that the relationship of idle talk, where nothing is discussed and everything is discussed, to the overpowering of Dasein with the "They" goes very deep. For idle talk is the dominance of the "public spirit" and the "public face" over the individual, and is effected when the individual is submerged in the force of the sweeping majority, the wave of fashion, the sense of public authentication and approval. The very existence of idle talk presupposes a society, and individuals who do not think for themselves, who have not given in to the primordial enquiry and the primordial way of life. Further, the very fact that idle talk is a perversion of discourse means that it occurs from the utter disruption of understanding, sundering the very relationship of Being-in-the-world with its world. This makes idle talk feeds upon Dasein's knowing of entities and its ability to flower out its pre-ontological understanding:

Idle talk, which closes things off in the way we have designated, is the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein's understanding when that understanding has been uprooted.

175 Ibid., 35, p. 212
176 Ibid., 35, p. 212. Translation of German words inserted by the translators in parentheses omitted.
177 Ibid., 35, p. 213. Translation of German words inserted by the translators in parentheses omitted.
But idle talk does not occur as a condition which is present-at-hand in something present-at-hand: idle talk has been uprooted existentially, and this uprooting is constant. Ontologically this means that when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is—as Being-in-the-world—cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in. Such a Dasein keeps floating unattached, yet in so doing, it is always alongside the world, with Others, and towards itself. . . . Far from amounting to a “not-Being” of Dasein, this uprooting is rather Dasein’s most everyday and most stubborn ‘Reality’. . . . while the particular Dasein drifts along towards an ever increasing groundlessness as it floats, the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden from it under the protecting shelter. 178

We have discussed the importance and uniqueness of death to Dasein; the very fact that it is its ownmost and the most authentic of its potentiality-for-Being, which is non-relational, not to be outstripped and insurmountable. However, in the sway of its falling, in its lostness in the “they,” Dasein evades death completely. It is not just that Dasein evades what is essentially insurmountable; it is precisely that in evading death it evades its uniqueness, the truth of its existence and its authenticity. Just as in the awe of the “public man” the contemplation of Dasein and one’s ownself is reduced to an everybody who is thus a “nobody;” in this evasion of death, one talks and faces death but death which is famished and reduced to anonymity. From an individual, unique occurrence; death becomes a public occurrence. This also signified, as Heidegger rightly discusses; into an evasion of death by making any discussion about it as either cowardly or pessimistic. Thus, “The they does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the fact of death.” 179

The bare truth, however, is that Dasein is a Being-towards-death in any and every case, and even in the wake of inauthenticity. Moreover, just as Dasein may or may not come to terms with the power of its anxiety, but it nevertheless pervades it through; there is always an issue about death, no matter how stubbornly evaded or how latently expressed:

Even in average everydayness, this ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped, is constantly an issue for Dasein. This is the case when its concern is merely in the mode of an untroubled indifference towards the uttermost possibility of existence. 180

It has been discussed elaborately enough, that it is conscience that brings back Dasein to its authentic and ownmost potentiality for Being, to its primordial question of its existence, and to an understanding of its nullity. We have also elaborated on the point that the understanding of Being-guilty and of being situated in a “not,” the being in anxiety that reveals the nullity and the discourse of reticence and silence is all distilled into the phenomena of resoluteness, central to

178 Ibid., 35, p. 214. Translation of German words inserted by the translators in parentheses omitted.
179 Ibid., 51, p. 298, emphasis Heidegger’s.
180 Ibid., 51, p. 299, italicization and boldfacing Heidegger’s.
Dasein's existential. Heidegger does not only read a falling into the essential structure of Dasein, he also infers why and how Dasein by appealing to itself can come out of this submergence into the quagmires of lostness and redeem itself existentially. When Dasein calls to itself in the silence of conscience, and further, when Dasein hearkens to the call, and acts on it; it leads to a genuine and far-reaching modification in the world, and in others. In other words the key relates of Dasein, namely Being-in-the-world, and Being-with are modified with regards to the direction and approach of Dasein.

What is the modification? The world and the Other are now revealed unto Dasein in their true potentiality-for-Being:

The 'world' which is ready-to-hand does not become another one 'in its content', nor does the circle of Others get exchanged for a new one; but both one's Being towards the ready-to-hand understandingly and concernfully, and one's solicitous Being with Others, are now given a definite character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-their­selves.

Resoluteness, as an authentic Being-one's-self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free floating “I”. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.  

The authenticity comes with freedom. It puts Dasein in face of its freedom even if it means free for its own nullity; it also frees Dasein for the world and for Others. The authentic Dasein is not one who will not relate to the others; but he will not relate to the notoriety of the “nobody.” Heidegger says that the resoluteness co-discloses a potentiality: “it leaps forth and liberates.”

We have discussed so far the notion of truth, truth-and-Being, and also the aspects of authenticity and inauthenticity that ensue from truth. In his writings that came towards the final stages of his career; something even sharper happens with Heidegger's intimacy with truth: truth which has always been truth equiprimordial to Being, now becomes the opening that is all determining. It becomes an event which lets man an access to himself and the entities. In fact, so committed does Heidegger become to truth, for example, in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” that he even denies it any other name than \textit{aletheia}. \textit{Aletheia} is no longer just the right notion of truth, only \textit{aletheia} must be used for what is the primary happening and clearing. A discussion of this demands, however, the discussion of creativity, language and thinking; within which we shall return to truth.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 60, p. 344, emphasis Heidegger's.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 60, p. 344.
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Language, Etymology, Hermeneutics

The relationship of hermeneutics to Being is a crucial one and so is the relationship between language and Being. Hermeneutics is the science of interpretation and as such it builds up several perspectives of interpretation. But if Being is held in preeminent esteem, and to know and interpret It the primary task of thinking and living; it can be argued that hermeneutics culminates in ontology. Phenomenology, at least in the sense in which Heidegger sees it, as the how to the Being of entities is also then the way to interpret Being. It is only imperative to discuss hermeneutics when discussing Being; it is not just that we interpret Being, but that “interpretation” itself is laden with the interpretation of Being. Thus hermeneutics becomes metahermeneutics; an ontological metahermeneutics. When hermeneutics is rightly turned upon itself; the inside out of interpretation takes out Being as it were form its concealment. This was above all an experience of Heidegger.

Language is intimate with Being; to use Heidegger’s key word. To speak and to be silent; to hear speech and to witness silence; when proper, is itself an intimation of Being. Language discloses Being; or takes us to the closest approximation.

3.1 The Legacy of Heraclitus

As with Hermeneutics, Heraclitus is not only the first Western philosopher to discuss ontology, but also ontology through language and etymology. In this he again anticipates, teaches and influences Martin Heidegger, who gives a glowing debt to his foundational predecessor. The \( \textit{logos} \) which is universal and monistic speaks to us in a language that we ought to understand.\(^{183}\) In fact, we come to be with this hermeneutical ability, which, however can be covered by our barbarism and inauthenticity, though paradoxically the latter is derivative and parasitical upon the former. The world order \( (\textit{kosmos}; \, \kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron) \) speaks to us, though we must understand the language. This language and this account is not obvious, even though evident to the initiated; it is not normally accessible even though it is the only thing to be accessed. Therefore, it is obvious why Heraclitus writes in an enigmatic, paradoxical, equivocational style; why he resorts to oxymorons and contradictions. This is so because our normal way of thinking and being, is actually parasitical on thinking and being itself. It is to awaken us from the ontological-epistemological slumber that

\[^{183}\text{Heraclitus, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments With Translation and Commentary, Frs., XIV-XVII/D 55, 101a, 107, 19.}\]
this heterodoxical turn is needed. Alternatively, reality is thus structured: it appears abnormal only to the uninitiated, who has been looking wrongly at the account and existence of things. So, the one who knows the logos, will not be shocked at statements like, “corpses should be thrown quicker than dung” or, “it rests by changing,” for they know the meaning and “account” of these propositions. In order to make this more clear, Heraclitus reflects on the “wise” and the “foolish”—the one who understands and the one who does not, the one who hears and the one who is deaf, and the one who thinks privately and the one who realizes the monistic-panpsychistic nature of the account. Thus, Heraclitus takes language, expression and communication to its extremes, stretching it to a point where it seems to turn against itself. But if in this turn, that the logos and the being is made visible, all pervasive and obvious. There is thus a very complex use of hermeneutics, even before the formal inauguration of the discipline. In this the understanding of the world-logos and the individual-logos; the activity of self-reflection and world-contemplation; the hearing of the Σοφοὶ (Sophoi: wise) by Heraclitus, of Heraclitus by himself and of Heraclitus by the other coincides. All these activities are coincident because they speak the one, monistic, transpersonal, common truth—that of Being. In other words the hermeneutics is circular and unisubstantial; since if we search or listen rightly, we will express and reach at the same account from any and all directions.

Heraclitus’ fragments are, in fact, metatextual: They are not only elusive and enigmatic, they themselves reflect on this elusiveness, and present it as an ontological necessity and fact:

He who does not expect will not find out the unexpected, for it is trackless and unexplored.\(^{184}\)

Men who love wisdom are good inquirers into many things indeed.\(^{185}\)

Nature loves to hide.\(^{186}\)

To understand this aspect clearly, let us subject certain parts of the fragments to careful scrutiny. The first selection deals with the nature of "ὑπονοια (hyponoia: hint/allegory).\(^{187}\) The fragments—at least many of them—are constructed in the nature of a hint, which must be rightly understood in order to get to the bottom of the assertion. Heraclitus seems to make it clear when he refers to the Delphic Oracle: “The Lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither declares

\(^{184}\) Ibid., Fr. VII/D 18.
\(^{185}\) Ibid., Fr. IX/D 35.
\(^{186}\) Ibid., Fr. X/D 123.
\(^{187}\) Ibid., “commentary on the fragments,” p. 123
nor conceals but gives a sign.” To the Greeks the enigmatic, elusive nature of the oracular message was but well known, as for example attested by Socrates in the Apology. Another viable example of this hint is the assertion that the really viable account is to recognise the “wise, set apart from all.” The wise man hangs over the whole mass of multitude, like Hermodorus. And the multitude in the very aggression of its ignorance drives this wise—set apart—from its dwellings. And the “motive which Heraclitus attributes to his fellow citizens,” to quote Kahn, “is a paradigm of human folly.” Why? Simply because they cannot understand the Logos: here Logos as “Ratio”—the Ratio of cosmic proportion. In terms of the cosmic proportion, the one thing (Wise) balances the all.

Then there are the paradoxes in Heraclitus, which are classifiable into several species, to borrow Aristotle’s phrase. To begin with, there is the paradox of identification: “all things are one.” In the first place this apparently conflicts with the ὑπόνοια that we have just considered: how are all things one, and how is one set apart from all at the same time? How can both statements be true? We have thus two paradoxes: one that seems to challenge the principle of contradiction, affirming both universal identification and cosmic separation, or monism and anti-monism, at the same time. The other is the paradox of identification itself. Let us first clarify the latter.

In what sense is all one? In what sense do we understand this crucial phrase, ἐν πάντα εἶναι (hen panta einai)? This monistic statement is for Heidegger the key for fundamental ontology as the early Greeks (read Heraclitus and Parmenides) saw it revealed. Heidegger thus comments:

The aner philosophos loves the sophon. What this means for Heraclitus is hard to translate. But we can explain it according to Heraclitus’ own interpretation. According to this the sophon means, Hen Panta, “One (is) All.” “all” means here, all things that exist, the whole, the totality of being. Hen, one, means, the one, the unique, the all-uniting. But all being is united in being. The sophon says—all being is in Being. To put it more pointedly—being is in Being. In this instance “is” speaks transitively and means approximately “gathered together,” “collected.” Being gathers being together in so far as it is in being, Being is the gathering together—Logos.

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198 Ibid., Fr. XXXIII/D 31-A.
199 Ibid., Fr. XXVII/D 108.
200 See Ibid., Fr. XXVII/D 108.
201 See, Ibid., “Commentary on the Fragments,” p. 78-79
202 Ibid., Fr. XXXVI/D 50.
Thus the paradox of identification is legible only to one who is accordant to the \textit{logos}, one who is in this precise sense, "\textit{Homologo(u)}" (=\textit{homolegein}). The one who understands as being coincident of the personal, universal, collective, similar and disparate. This, then, allows us to answer the apparent conflict between this monistic assertion and the previous one which claimed that all things are one. There are two ways of responding to the paradox. While all things are one ultimately, from the perspective of the discordant (individual or communal)—discordant that is to this \textit{logos}—things are distinct and the truth is hidden. Such entities are obviously overbalanced by the wise and wisdom. Secondly, since all things are one, and the ratio of harmony rules; it allows the one to overbalance the all. Among other paradoxes is the double paradox, used in Homer's riddle:

Men are deceived in the recognition of what is obvious, like Homer who was the wisest of the Greeks. For he was deceived by boys killing lice who said: what we see and catch we leave behind, what we neither see nor catch we carry away.\textsuperscript{194}

In the first place, the statement is beset with irony: It obviously does not mean the epithet, "the wisest of the Greeks," for Homer. This is clear from the fact that the \textit{wisest} is not able to understand the intellectual novice, the \textit{boy}. Homer, as Kahn insists in his reading of Heraclitus; is not able to see what is clearly visible, and is thus blind in the deeper sense, while unfortunately being blind in the physical sense too. There is a double paradox here: "denying the unexpected consequence of 'seeing and catching', and then affirming this consequence for not seeing and catching."\textsuperscript{195}

In addition to paradox and \textit{hyponaia}, there are other elusive and enigmatic elements in Heraclitus' language, that invite a hermeneutics of participation (of the "model" reader) and a hermeneutics of suspicion (towards the apparent simplicity of some fragments, and towards any hastily arrived at conclusion). Amongst these are the apparent banality of the fragments, the role of ambiguity and ambivalence, and the sharp iconoclasm of categories, judgments and roles accepted as natural by society and authenticated by tradition. In the thirty first fragment Heraclitus says, "Thinking is shared by all." There are several problems of interpretation that ensue: What is the need to suggest that thinking is shared by all? Is it to stress, in a manner of Descartes that man is a \textit{res cogitans}—that however, is problematic given the stress by Heraclitus

\textsuperscript{194} Heraclitus, \textit{The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments With Translation and Commentary}, Fr. XXII/D 56.

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., "Commentary on the Fragments," pp. 111-112, italics Kahn's..
elsewhere on the epistemological and ontological slumber of the masses. So it must call upon the fact that man is a rationis capax (capable of rationality) who must nevertheless use his rational faculty to interpret reality properly, and laterally. On the other hand, Kahn underlines the fact that "All" is ambiguous—Is "all" the accusative of men or beings in general?196 The former is rather banal, unless we elevate it by the interpretation just given, while the latter prepares us for a monistic panpsychism. The ambiguity of "all" is also present in the fragment, "[F]or all human laws are nourished by a divine one. It prevails as it will and suffices for all and is more than enough."197 Heraclitus overturns conventional wisdom by asserting that "It is not better for human beings to get all they want," further postulating that "It is disease that has made health sweet and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest."198 In addition to the ethical comportment of this assertion, it is obvious that Heraclitus is making a reinvention of the universally accepted negative terms (disease, hunger, weariness) and reading them as both positive and necessary. This prepares the intelligent reader towards an understanding of dialectic and logos. Moreover, it also prepares us for a monism, which in turn sheds light on the fact that Heraclitus' interest is ultimately ontological. Ontological, that is, in the Heideggeran sense of a logos of Being of beings. In turn, Heidegger has learnt this by turning towards, and participating in, the thought of Heraclitus. In asserting that "If there were no sun, It would be night" Heraclitus seems to be talking banality to its very essence. But the fragment demands lateral thinking in the nature of the Newtonian turn in physics. The point is not that the apple falls downwards but why does it fall thus? Why does it fall at all? Similarly, the point of the assertion is what it does not assert: Why is there the Sun at all? The answer lies in Necessity, defined by Heraclitus as Fates199 which govern the course of things, and the presence and course of the Sun. Put precisely to the ontological-causal/teleological level; things are not random, but ordered, though the order is amenable only through the hermeneutics of the hypnoia. This also calls to mind the dialectic, since one level leads to another: Our life to Sun, Sun to Fate and Justice, and this in turn to the wise one which steers all through all,200 or beings through Being. In other words the categories of reality, from quantity (plural/dual/uni-) to modality (necessity/impossibility/possibility) to knowing (flux/restricted order/order) are ultimately One. This One (Being) is also All (Being of beings),

196 Kahn’s exact statement is, “We meet . . . the ambiguous pronoun pasi: shared by all men? Or all things?” (Ibid., “Commentary on the Fragments,” p.119).
197 Fr. XXX/D 114
198 Fr. LXVII/D 110.
199 See, Fr. XLIV/D 94.
200 See Ibid., Fr. LIV/D 41., “The wise is one, knowing the plan by which it steers all things through all.”
or conversely the All is One. And, indeed, Heraclitus says: “Grasplings: wholes and not wholes, convergent divergent, consonant dissonant, from all things one and from one thing all.”

In addition to paradoxes and hints, there is another very noticeable and radical feature in Heraclitus. One of his typical strategies is to invest in certain things in a way that is wholly opposite to popular understanding—a glaring example is the ethically revolting remark that “corpses should be thrown quicker than dung.” Of course, the word “corpse” may be read as metaphorical, but there is no real ground to dismiss the possibility that Heraclitus means it in the literal sense. It is not that Heraclitus is insulting the person who died, or that he means that corpses should be desecrated. Like the above, this fragment too needs a very painstaking and atypical scrutiny. In the first place, corpses need to be done away with—this may seem painful but is nevertheless necessary. And, as shocking as it may seem, you may keep dung but not a corpse, owing to obvious hazards involved. In other words, what seems so shocking and objectionable, upon a calm and poised reading; is understood as necessary and even beneficial. Moreover, obsession with a corpse—that is, if we take the logical accompaniment of not doing away with a dead body—is the inability to accept bereavement. This stands to be an obsession with the transitory and the ephemeral, and the failure to recognize permanence. In other words, obsession with the dead is a futile attempt to preserve who and what is essentially ephemeral. What is needed is to move away from the corpse and celebrate the vitality—the one that is forever. When we read the fragment in such a manner, we realize again that it is not Heraclitus who is radical, but we are not able to see the root of things.

Public-Private distinction is very crucial to Heraclitus: he makes it clear that the Account (Ἀογός) is common (Συνος). It is, in other words, the common Account: Χυνός Λόγος (Συνος Αογός). In fact, that is why it makes sense for Heraclitus to observe that, “Although all things come to pass in accordance with this account, men are the untried when they try such words and works as is set forth.” Kahn rightly observes that to a reader new to Heraclitus it may seem strange as to how men are untried: how are all men supposed to have the experience in question anyway? This is because, “it is the experience of things that occur according to the ‘logos’ and these are all things, no one can be without this experience.” This anticipates Heidegger’s valid claim that Dasein always has a certain understanding of Being, notwithstanding how erratic or inauthentic a particular Dasein may be. The Logos is not One, that is; Heraclitus’ Account is similar to the Being that Heidegger talks about; nevertheless, it is coextensional with

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201 Ibid., Fr. CXXIV/D 10.
202 Ibid., Fr. LXXXIX/D 21.
203 Ibid., Fr. 1/D 1.
It. I have already observed that the Logos of Heraclitus illuminates Being, since it is the Account of all (Being of beings). In this way the Being-Human is always in a virtuous hermeneutic circle vis-a-vis Being. There is no possibility for man where he is empty of the ontological hermeneutic. Thus, Heidegger reworks Heraclitus when he makes understanding of being necessary to Dasein.

It also important here to note the crucial word, “polymathie” (πολυμαθη), which is the learning of many things. Heraclitus says: “πολυμαθη νον ου διδασκει”, or, “Much learning does not teach understanding.” In other words, mere information no matter how painstakingly collected and understood, leads to nothing. It may lead the seeker astray, or at least would not lead him to the account. This conflates with later assessments, from Plato and Aristotle, through Scotus and Ibn Sina to Heidegger, that account of Being (το λογι τω οντι) is a specific science, and a specific method, in fact, a specific way.

Thus Heraclitus is a great master at hermeneutics and ontological hermeneutics; and influences Heidegger highly. It is also true though that we owe a lot to Heidegger in understanding Heraclitus. At the same time, one cannot take anything out of Heidegger’s own brilliance and his intense relation with language and hermeneutics.

3.2
Heidegger’s Hermeneutics of Being and There-Being in Being and Time

I discussed in the third chapter that for Heidegger the “there-Being” is characterised by understanding and state of mind, both being equiprimordial with each other. A state of mind always has understanding, and understanding is always in some mood. Understanding is interpreted as a fundamental existentiale of Dasein which means that it is a basic mode of the Being of Dasein. For Heidegger, understanding is ultimately the understanding of Being; and is essentially related to meaning and projection. Heidegger underlines repeatedly that meaning “is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself,” and “signifies the “upon which” of the projection of the understanding of Being.” Taken together, these two postulations mean that to posit that an entity has meaning is to assert its accessibility in terms of its Being.

Understanding as a basic mode of Dasein is related to Dasein’s existence (its essence anyway is its existence). Dasein’s existence is in its possibility: to be or not to be; since “(Dasein)

205 Ibid., Fr. XVIII/D 40.
206 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 31, p. 181.
207 Ibid., 31, p. 181.
208 Ibid., 65, p. 370.
is primarily Being-possible." This possibility is an *existentiale*, and thus is different form and beyond logical and cognitive possibilities. In fact, for Heidegger, “possibility as an existentiale is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically.”

And this possibility is obviously related to understanding; that is, a Being which does not have understanding as its basic mode cannot also be primarily a Being-possible. Therefore posits Heidegger that “The kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in understanding.” And, if Dasein has been thrown into a world; that is, if thrownness characterizes Dasein, and further, if Dasein is characterized by existence and possibility, Dasein is actually a “thrown possibility through and through,” it is a “Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself.” The possibility cuts through to the very core of Dasein’s Being, in that Dasein’s possibility is ultimately the possibility for Dasein’s “ownmost potentiality-for-Being.”

How does Heidegger justify that understanding is always extended into a certain possibility? To the one route that I have discussed above, Heidegger adds another: understanding is pervaded by the existential structure of projection. Dasein as Dasein never begins projecting; it has always projected itself; as long as it is, “it is projecting.” This projection is related to the very thrownness of Dasein, and its facticity:

Projection in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it be as such. As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is possibilities through and through.

Because of the kind of Being which is constituted by the existentiale of projection, Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is, supposing that one might want to make an inventory of it as something-at-hand and list the contents of its Being, and supposing that one were able to do so. But Dasein is never more than it factically is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially. Yet as Being possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being, it is not yet.

In other words, *Dasein* cannot be encompassed in any factuality whatsoever; and one of the ways in which it eludes being held by the bounds of any factual limits is through its being essentially a *Being-possible*. However, since facticity amounts to the possibility that is *Dasein*, or, alternately, since *Dasein’s* facticity is filled through and through with its possibility; *Dasein* cannot be more or

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209 Ibid., 31, p. 182.
210 Ibid., 31, p. 182.
211 Ibid., 31, p. 182.
212 Ibid., 31, p. 183.
213 Ibid., 31, p. 185.
214 Ibid., 31, p. 185-6.
less than its facticity. This is because projection and possibility stand to mean that Dasein is always moving ahead of itself; this is exactly what facticity is.

Interestingly, understanding is not only possibility and projection; it also has its own possibility. Understanding has the possibility of developing itself. The development of understanding Heidegger names "interpretation." Heidegger gives four important postulates for understanding:

I. "In (interpretation) understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it." 
II. Understanding does not become something different in interpretation.
III. In interpretation understanding becomes itself.
IV. It is interpretation which is grounded in understanding and never the other way round.

It has been already demonstrated in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* that Dasein is a Being-in-the-world, as also a Being-with-Others. Entities are encountered as ready-to-hand and not as present-at-hand, and the entity or equipment is always accessible in terms of an equipmental totality. Further, if an entity in the world is seen, it is always seen in terms of a point-of-view, and never blankly. Further, there is never a *conceptionless* encounter with an entity. Heidegger terms this tripartite structure as the *fore-seeing, fore-having* and *fore-conception* of an interpretation: “Whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception. An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us.” This fore-having, fore-conception and fore-sight intimately informs the notion of meaning, where he brings to effect his theory of understanding and projection as also his distinct position that only one entity can have meaning—Dasein.

Heidegger defines meaning as “the ‘upon-which’ of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight and a fore-conception.” This definition of meaning very obviously allows Heidegger to infer that only *Dasein* can be in possession of it. Thus, when entities are encountered and understood, it is not their meaning

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215 Ibid., 32, p. 188.
216 Ibid., 32, p. 188.
217 See, Ibid., 32, p. 188.
which is understood but rather the entity or their Being.\textsuperscript{220} This in turn leads to the rather far-reaching conclusion:

And if we are inquiring about the meaning of Being, our investigation does not then become a "deep" one [tiefsinnig], nor does it puzzle out what stands behind Being. It asks about Being itself in so far as Being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein. The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities, or with Being as the 'ground' which gives entities support, for a 'ground' becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness.\textsuperscript{221}

It is here that we also seem to be blocked by the greatest impasse of hermeneutics and epistemology: the hermeneutic circle. Dasein is Being-in-the-world and thus the world is understood along with \textit{Dasein} or Existence, but at the same time, existence also understands itself in terms of the world. Secondly, interpretation is grounded in understanding and therefore presupposes it. However, we can only interpret any entity once we have understood it. Thus, in two ways Heidegger's inquiry seems to be threatened by a hermeneutic-epistemological circular regress. Heidegger shows why this talk of a vicious circle and an attempt to break it or harmonize its inherent conflict is an ontological-existential error:

But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understating has been misunderstood from the ground up . . . What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come to it in the right way. The circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself. It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.

Heidegger's interpretation is that what we understand as a circle and condemn as vicious is the most pristinely primordial aspect of ourselves and our ways of knowing. Thus to call it vicious is not only erratic but also makes us ourselves hide what belongs so intimately to us. The desire to get out of it is also an effect of our not being conversant with our primary existential aspect. The first way to get out of the impasse is to understand that this circle is not what we get into by some weakness of ours but is an expression of the way our existence expresses itself. That is, \textit{Dasein} is essentially a Being-in-the-world where his existence is absorbed into the world and its entities. We do not begin from any empty position where we begin to relate ourselves to objects; we are thrown into a world with its definite possibilities. What is understood otherwise as a

\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., 32, p. 192-3.
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., 32, p. 193-4.
vicious paradox of part-whole or as a vicious paradox of several structures is understood by Heidegger as a harmonious interaction of intimately interpenetrating and sometimes equiprimordial structures.

Equiprimordial to the understanding and state of mind is discourse. We may outline some of the key postulates of discourse as it is understood by Heidegger, and as a significant existentiale:

I. Discourse is the existential-ontological foundation of language.

II. Discourse is also "the articulation of intelligibility." 

III. Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility of Being-there and is thus an existentiale and a primordial one, of disclosedness.

IIIa. Since Being-in-the-world is constitutive of disclosedness, discourse comes to have a worldly character.

IV. Discourse is the existential foundation of language, which also means that language is the way in which discourse is expressed.

V. Language is a totality of words; this totality must have a worldly character if discourse which is its ontological-existential foundation is worldly.

VI. Worldliness is in terms of readiness-to-hand; and thus the totality constituting language must also primarily be a readiness-to-hand. Language and discourse must be understood in terms of its readiness-to-hand.

It is clear enough that Heidegger places discourse and language at the very core of his fundamental ontology. It is also obvious that Heidegger's theory of language is thoroughly oppositional to the kind of views on language that were current in and around at his time and which stressed on the conventional, scientific and constructional nature of language. For Heidegger, these aspects of language are the worst parasitical on the true nature of language and discourse; and at the best, derived from the latter. Discourse-language is the most intimate way in which Dasein is disclosed to itself, and allows the world to show up and be manifest. This primordial aspect of language and discourse was made clear by Heidegger in his very introduction to his Being and Time, where philosophy is conceived as phenomenological ontology;

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222 Ibid., 34, p. 203.
223 Ibid., 34, p. 203-4.
224 Ibid., 34, p. 204.
225 Ibid., 34, p. 204.
226 Ibid., 34, p. 204.
227 Ibid., 34, p. 205.
and in terms of the pristine character of *logos*, and phenomenon, and as the early Greeks understood it. This pristine character of *logos*, discourse and phenomenon is the access to the Being of entities; it is aimed at Being. The actual sense of language and discourse, for Heidegger, is not aimed at any theoretical postulation of any subject sundered from the world who relates to present-at-hand object. In fact, language and discourse is itself ready-to-hand.

Communication between two people does not take effect from the interior of one human being's mind to the interior of another human being, but comprises of a “co-state-of-mind” and a co-understanding. In fact, “Dasein is already essentially manifest in a co-state of mind and a co-understanding. In discourse Being-with becomes ‘explicitly’ shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated.”

Heidegger here develops one of his key discussions: that of hearing, talking and keeping silent. Hearing is a way for Dasein to be a “Being-open as Being-with for Others.” Since Dasein is a Being-in-the-world and a Being-with, this stands to mean that hearing is nothing less than one of the most potential ways in which Dasein opens for its basic potentiality, that of Being. Hearing is a primordial aspect of Dasein; and unless one is in an artificial frame of mind one never hears pure noise. While hearing is thus fundamental to Dasein, Heidegger also underlines as deeply the human activity of silence, and it is not difficult to see why. A person who is mature enough to know the importance of being silent, and can remain silent in an intense and deep manner, can effectively communicate and be with Others. Silence is thus not the same as being dumb; in the same manner as hearing excludes passive listening. Hearing and keeping silent are dynamic activities requiring a great sense of maturity and sensitiveness to true sociability. Silence and hearing are both based on understanding and fill our potentiality for Being.

Heidegger also establishes a relationship between hearing and keeping silent, in terms of the ontological sense of these activities; and when both are pursued in the pure, dynamic manner:

Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say—that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. In that case one's reticence makes something manifest, and does away with 'idle talk'. As a mode of discoursing, reticence Articulates

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228 Ibid., 34, p. 204.
229 Ibid., 34, p. 206.
231 Q.v., Ibid., 34, p. 208.
the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a Being-with-one-another which is transparent.\footnote{Ibid., 34, p. 208.}

There is thus a deep interrelation which seems to inhere between hearing and talking, and in which silence seems to be the deepest recess to human discourse and communication; which makes it simultaneously the most intricate to self-interpret and be interpreted by the Other(s). In other words, in silence lies the most enriched resource for understanding one’s self and the Other, and in which the way to Being lies so markedly open. This is where also the biggest challenge lies, since it is most difficult to remain silent; that is to give oneself to the depths of silence. The aspect of silence, investigated here by Heidegger has been much explored by thinkers since the earliest turn of time. For example, we looked at the silence of transcendence in Plotinus. I will also focus on silence in context of language and thinking in latter texts of Heidegger.

3.3
The Legacy Develops:
Heidegger in Post-Being and Time

Language becomes ever more important with Heidegger; in later works it holds great prominence. That the importance that Heidegger gives to language is pristine is evident form the fact that he says that language is the house, the tempium of Being. There are some very revealing passages in “What Are Poets For?”:

Being, as itself, spans its own province, which is marked off (temenein, tempus) by Being’s being present in the word. Language is the precinct (templum) that is, the house of Being. The nature of language does not exhaust itself in signifying, nor is it merely something that has the character of sign or cipher. It is because language is the house of Being, that we reach what is by constantly going through this house. When we go to the well, when we go to the woods, we are always going through the word “well,” through the word “woods,” even if we do not think of anything relating to language.\footnote{Martin Heidegger, “What are Poets For?” in Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Alfred Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 132.}

Being is understood as pure transcendence; and it is revealed in language where Being dwells. For Heidegger, if there is something unique in Dasein, there is also much unique in the fact that only Dasein among the creatures is endowed with language. To be poetic means in Heidegger to
be able to compose; to be able to compose in the sense of making something manifest. This affirmation, made in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” helps to understand why language has been called the house of Being. Being is Presence and beings are also presence; and this “whole sphere of presence is present in saying.”

But, everybody speaks and yet everybody does not speak Being. Heidegger himself says untiringly, though with a lament, that the age is one of destitution, distress and the madness of machination. How then is the affirmation of language as Being’s dwelling to be understood? Heidegger says that indeed everybody speaks, however, he also adds:

But then, those who are more venturesome cannot be those who merely say. The saying of the more venturesome must really venture to say.

Language is the house of Being, but it opens up in this way only to those who are intimate with language; those who realise the Presence that in language dwells. These are those who are authentic enough to give up the relation of standing against beings, and ruthlessly manoeuvring them; and understand the unity of beings which are ultimately gathered in Being. These say, and speak Being.

Heidegger also looks at language in depth, in an essay dedicated exclusively to its cause and thus rightly termed, “Language.” Heidegger looks at language in the way in which its innermost character becomes manifest. Therefore, he takes two propositions as the key to his thesis:

I. Language is Language.
II. Language speaks.

We notice that the first of these statements seems to be an empty tautology, and the second seems to be as trite an investigation. Through these propositions, that will be seen to hold the key to understanding language; Heidegger, from the very beginning of his essay, denies taking recourse to two prevalent readings of language. The first of these is that of the divine origin of language. The second is that of language as expression, activity and presentation-representation.

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235 Ibid., p. 13, emphasis Heidegger’s.
237 Ibid., p. 109ff.
238 Ibid., p. 109ff.
of the real-unreal. In fact, for Heidegger these two basic propositions hold the key for understanding language, and in a way that illuminates existence:

"Language is language." This statement does not lead us to something else in which language is grounded. Nor does it say anything about whether language itself may be a ground for something else. The sentence, "Language is language," leaves us to hover over an abyss as long as we endure what it says.

Language is—language, speech. Language speaks. If we let ourselves fall into the abyss denoted by this sentence, we do not go tumbling into emptiness. We fall upward, to a height. Its loftiness opens up a depth. The two span a realm in which we would like to become at home, so as to find a residence, a dwelling place for the life of man.

When Heidegger says that language is language, he is focusing keenly on the "is" or the presence of language; the way in which language is present and presences. The aim is to determine the nature of language with reference to its presence and with reference to man, in such a way that the basic character of human being is made visible. It is a momentous and extraordinary fact, and even more so in the context of Being and being-human, that language is not only unique to man, but makes him man. Heidegger says that "it is as one who speaks that man is—man." Language "belongs to the closest neighbourhood of man's being." Thus, a reflection on language, the neighbour of man, is to illuminate upon man:

To reflect on language means—to reach the speaking of language in such a way that this speaking takes place as that which grants an abode for the being of mortals.

But how does one understand and reflect on the proposition, "Language speaks?" What is this speaking? How is it to be encountered? Heidegger suggests that it be understood through what is spoken. He further asserts that speaking is kept safe in the spoken and is not exhausted; "speaking gathers the ways in which it persists as well as that which persists by it—its persistence, its presencing." This is so, even though we encounter speaking as residue of what was spoken long past. Speaking in turn is to be picked methodically, as "pure Speaking." And pure speaking is the poem: Heidegger for the moment takes this to be a bare fact which he presupposes.

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239 See, ibid., pp. 192-3.
240 Ibid., p. 191-2.
241 Ibid., p. 189.
242 Ibid., p. 189.
243 Ibid., p. 192.
244 Ibid., p. 194.
245 See, ibid., p. 194.
How does language speak? For Heidegger, language "names." It names in the precise sense of "calling." Calling is again to be understood in the precise sense of "calling into the word." The calling into the word brings what is called closer. This coming closer is in the sense of getting a presence into nearness. Thus, the relation of language to Being is sought by Heidegger:

What is this naming? Does it merely deck out the imaginable familiar objects and events . . . with words of a language? No. This naming does not hand out titles, it does not apply terms, but it calls into the word. The naming calls. Calling brings closer what it calls. However this bringing closer does not fetch what is called only in order to set it down in closet proximity to what is present, to find a place for it there. The call does indeed call. Thus it brings the presence of what was previously uncalled into a nearness. . . . The calling calls into a nearness. . . . The calling calls into itself and therefore always here and there—here into presence, there into absence.²⁴⁶

What Heidegger means is this: suppose we are talking about a poem (and indeed in the discussion he is talking about a poem by Georg Trakl). In the poem there is a say a prayer book named, and thus called into the word, the nearness of presence. It is indeed present in the call. But this prayer book does not fall among those things that are present in my study room right now, where I am writing this chapter. There are thus two presences being talked about; and Heidegger asks: "Which presence is higher, that of these present things or the presence of what is called?"²⁴⁷ What actually happens for Heidegger is that the calling not only brings the presence nearer, but it also bids the things to come. There is a place of arrival meant and called in the calling which is "sheltered in absence."²⁴⁸ Things are invited to come, and things come in a sense that as things they come to bear upon us. Things come to men bearing upon their thingness and gather in themselves the fourfold of mortals, immortal, sky and earth, or the world:

[Calling] invites things in, so that they may bear upon men as things. The snowfall brings men under the sky that is darkening into night. The tolling of the evening bell brings them as mortals to the earth. The things that are named, thus called, gather to themselves sky and earth, mortals and divinities. The four are united primally into being toward one another, a fourfold. The things let the fourfold stay with them. This gathering, assembling, letting-stay is the thinging of things. The unitary fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and divinities, which is stayed in the thinging of things, we call—the world.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 198-99.
²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 199.
²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 199.
²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 199.
Things and the world do not “subsist alongside” but penetrate into each other. The intimacy is not a fusion; Heidegger asserts that intimacy can only obtain within a difference. Perhaps what is intended is that if two things are thoroughly fused they are one; it is only when there is a difference as also a similarity that two phenomena can be intimate. The intimacy thus prevails through an interaction and separability. It is in the middle that the world and the thing traverse and are one. This middle is prevailing of the division and also the traversing of the thing and the world. This division is called “dif-ference.” This difference (dif-ference) is unique to the relationship of the world and the thing. It is not meant to be used for anything else. To stress on the division, presumably, Heidegger splits the difference in between. The dif-ference should be understood as a key concept:

The dif-ference carries out the world in its worldling, carries out things in their thinging. . . . Being the middle, it first determines the world and things in their presence, i.e., in their being toward one another, whose unity it carries out. . . . The dif-ference for world and thing disclosing/y appropriates things into bearing a world; it disclosing/y appropriates world into the granting of things. . . . The difference is the dimension, insofar as it measures out, appropriates, world and thing, each to its own. Its allotment of them first opens up the separateness and towardness of world and thing. . . . The dif-ference, as the

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250 Ibid., p. 200.
middle for world and things, metes out the measure of the presence. In the bidding that calls thing and world, what is really called is: the difference. 254

All this discussion has been elucidated by referring to Georg Trakl’s poem, quoted in full by Heidegger. In order to make sense of the following argument, it now needs to be quoted whole:

Window with falling snow is arrayed,
Long tolls the vesper bell,
The house is provided well,
The table is for many laid.

Wandering ones, more than a few,
Come to the door on darksome courses.
Golden blooms the tree of graces
Drawing up the earth’s cool dew.

Wanderer quietly steps within;
Pain has turned the threshold to stone.
There lie, in limpid brightness shown,
Upon the table bread and wine. 255

Heidegger reads the first stanza as talking about thing, the second as the world and the third the difference that maintains the separability, and in which the thing and the world traverse and are intimate. In the poem Heidegger focuses on the “threshold,” the threshold that has turned to stone. The threshold, bearer of the between is the one that maintains the separation and meeting of the inside and the outside; it is dependable and endures. In the first stanza is the bidding of the thing and in the second the bidding of the world; they are gathered in the third stanza where difference operates. The thing calls and the world calls; but the primal calling is the difference. 256

What is the relation of the difference to language? We begun by talking of language as the primal calling-naming and primal bidding that invites the thing, and thing consequently was understood to gather the unity of the fourfold to itself, thus unfolding a world. 257 We must look at this passage closely:

Language speaks. It speaks by bidding the bidden, thing-world and world-thing, to come into the between of the difference. What is so bidden is commanded to arrive from out of the difference into the difference. 258

255 Ibid., pp. 194-5.
256 See, ibid., pp. 203-6.
257 See, ibid., p. 206.
258 Ibid., p. 206.
When language speaks, names, calls and bids the thing to come and the thing gathers unto itself the fourfold of the world, the thing is obviously not diminished but the thing is "exalted into its own, so that it says world." But there is also a sufficing of the world in the thing. Thus there is a stilling, a stilling of the thing, into the world, and the world into the thing, by the difference. The stillness cannot be defined by motionlessness, but through rest. Heidegger defines the stillness-rest relation thus: "[R]est has its being in the fact that it stills. As stilling of stillness, rest conceived strictly, is always more in motion than all motion and always more restlessly active than any agitation." Actually the thing stills in its thinging and into the world and the world stills in its worldling and into the thing, and the two, thing and rest, are stilled in the difference. That is; the thing, the world and their traversing, rests or reposes and the thing and the world do not fall apart either in their individual natures or their interrelation. The difference is itself stillness; and ultimately all this is determined by language, which as Heidegger says, speaks. This intimacy, which is a separation and a meeting is like a rift, like a pain. That is why, Heidegger quotes from Trakl's poem repeatedly, "Pain gathers the threshold into a stone," where the threshold, as already discussed, is for Heidegger, the difference.

The stillness is a very crucial activity here; and there is thus a reason why Heidegger calls it as always being more in motion than all motion and more restlessly active than any agitation. Stillness reposes a thing in a thing and a world in a world; as difference it gathers thing and world. This gathering, in stillness and as a pain is a revealing of sorts:

When the difference gathers world and thing into the simple onefold of the pain of intimacy, it bids the two to come into their very nature.

The thing and the world are disclosed unto themselves. Happening primarily and primally through language; "Language speaks as the peal of stillness." Language as peal of stillness, has a special reference to the human being:

The peal of stillness is not anything human. But on the contrary, the human is indeed in its nature given to speech—it is linguistic. The word "linguistic" as it is used here means: having taken place out of the speaking of language. What has thus taken place, human being, has been brought into its own by language so that it remains given over or appropriated to the nature of language, the peal of stillness. Such an appropriating takes

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259 Ibid., p. 206.
260 Ibid., p. 206.
262 See, ibid., pp. 206-7.
263 Ibid., p. 207.
264 Ibid., p. 207.
place in that the very nature, the presencing, of language needs and uses the speaking of mortals in order to sound as the peal of stillness for the hearing of mortals.\textsuperscript{265}

Thus, human being is a happening, taken place and brought in its own self by language. Interestingly, language needs men to sound as the stillness-peal, and for mortals' hearing. This suggests the special relation of men and language and the uniqueness of men. However, there is no self-subsistence of the speech of humans: “it rests in relation to the speaking of language.”\textsuperscript{266} We would do well to keep in mind the way in which “rest” is understood here; it is that which allows something to gather and become itself.

The purest aspect of language is poetry. As Heidegger explains elsewhere, poetry is not a reference to literary genre, but a level in which language is most itself. Its opposite, therefore, is not the genre of prose, nor everyday speech: “Poetry proper is never merely a higher mode \textit{(melos)} of everyday language. It is rather the reverse: everyday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer.”\textsuperscript{267} This everyday language is not the language of everyday use, but a used-up language.

The language of humans is not self-subsistent; it is in relation to the “speaking of language” that human speech rests. It is well understood by now that Heidegger’s idea of language is not that of an ordinary conception, and that the way he understands speaking is in distinctively phenomenological-ontological conception. This fact is further strengthened when Heidegger makes a series of interrogations bearing upon men’s being in possession of language and language itself. Heidegger feels it imperative to inquire how we ought to place human speech and utterance in the wider and determining context of language as the speaking of the peal of the stillness of \textit{difference}. I break his statements wielded into a paragraph into separate assertions and interrogations, so as to suggest the urgency of these:

I. “any uttering, whether in speech or writing, breaks the stillness.”
II. “On what does the peal of stillness break?”
III. How does the broken stillness come to sound in words?”
IV. How does the broken stillness shape the mortal speech that sounds in verses and sentences?\textsuperscript{268}

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid., pp. 207-8.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid., p. 208.
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., p. 208.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid., p. 208.
Heidegger is enquiring the relation between the determining stillness that is the dif-

ference that in turn is the simplicity that maintains the interaction of things and the world; with the human speech. What is the basis on which this stillness is broken? How is it broken and shaped at the human level? There is a bracketing out of all current assumptions about “stillness,” “speech,” “silence,” “language” and human linguistic activity here. Heidegger does not propose an answer here; his interrogations however, itself mark a major new direction in the way of thinking language; a direction that destructs and constructs simultaneously, and envisions.

Heidegger does assert, however, that humans speak by responding to language. Humans speak because they listen. They listen and thus reply. The correspondence is thus twofold. The listening occurs even in the absence of understanding the call of language; the call that nears the presencing of a thing; that unfolds things to thingness and world to worldliness; and that commands and invites as the still difference, things and world “into the rift of its onefold simplicity.” Hearing, wherever authentic, is not just a listening and a replying; but a holding back. It appropriates and is appropriated to the peal of stillness by holding itself back; that is, responding with a “restraint that reserves itself.” The hearing is not listened to afterward and at a certain point, but also beforehand: an anticipating, reserved, restrained hearing.

The conclusion, is far drawn, and thoroughly so, even in the wake of being inconclusive:

It is not a matter here of stating a new view of language. What is important is learning to live in the speaking of language. To do so, we need to examine constantly whether and to what extent we are capable of what genuinely belongs to responding: anticipation in reserve. For:

Man speaks only as he responds to language.
Language speaks.
Its speaking speaks for us in what has been spoken.

Thus, Heidegger gives us enough ground to think about language; he in fact makes it rather urgent that we do so. By opening the relationship between language and Being; he reveals the intimacy of language to the very presence and presencing that is.

One would also talk with great respect about etymology in Heidegger, which he sharpened to a finesse very much his own. Nobody was more sensitive to language than Heidegger; why words meant a particular way than another, and how they stemmed in different

269 Ibid., p. 209.
270 Ibid., p. 209.
271 See, ibid., pp. 208-10.
directions within and across languages. We have noted the utmost sensitivity to “truth” in Heidegger, which he traces to the Greek αλήθεια (aletheia). In his Parmenides, there is a book-length survey of this key word. The Introduction is named, “Preparatory Meditation on the Name and the word ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ and Its Counter Essence. Two Directives from the Translating Word ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ.” Heidegger goes on to assert that:

In order for us to be in a position to transport ourselves into the realm of Greek word αλήθεια and so be able to speak this word in a thoughtful way, we must first become alert to and follow the directive provided by the translating word “unconcealedness.” The directive shows as it were the direction of the transporting. The directive leads, if we limit ourselves to its features, into a fourfold.

In many ways, then, Heidegger thought about and spoke language. To contemplate on language deeply and untiringly, to let it speak to us and for us; and not bulldoze our sense of language under naturalist assumptions; this, would be walk in the footsteps of Heidegger’s heritage, a heritage that began with Heraclitus.

4 Creativity

Language is intimate with creativity. Some of the best writings of Heidegger on language are those that are primarily on poets and artists. As we discuss creativity here, we will see how some of these great writings are such remarkable contributions to understanding language. We have in fact already witnessed this fact: the essays discussed on language essentially work through “poetry.”

Creativity was always important to Heidegger. We would do well to recall that the notion of care, foundational to Being and Time, was derived not from any technical, or even socio-anthropological framework, but through a fable, where cura (care), Apollo and Humus (Earth) fight over the custody of the “form” that cura has created out of earth. This form is of course revealed as man, and cura is given the custody of it, as long as man lives his finite existence. This life long attachment of care with man, which informs him at the infinite point where his being and before-being meet; is indeed what is Heidegger’s notion of care: the tripartite structure of facticity, existence and falling, given unto man and pervading him all through.

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273 ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ: Aletheia.
274 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, Int., p. 1.
275 Ibid. 1, p. 13.
276 See, Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 42, pp. 242-3.
In this fable, which Heidegger defines as a “pre-ontological document,”\textsuperscript{277} lies one of the sources with which to understand the human being and its relation with Being. We may also see that Heidegger’s focus on man’s relation with earth, and the deep sense of man’s mortality which informed the thinker through to the end, are so potently found in this fable. Further, we have already noted how Heidegger talks of poetry as the preeminent activity of man and how his complex views of language are formed from poets and poetically.

Heidegger had no need to look very far. The two philosophers he held in such esteem, Heraclitus and Parmenides, were as creative as they are philosophical. We might say that they were philosophical because they were creative. Heraclitus writes in a vein that is like a creative revelation of the account. That is why the song does not follow a logic of a neat assembling of axioms and theorems or postulations following one after the other; the logic is a hidden attunement, playing with itself. Parmenides’ account is the meeting ground of belief, Θεός (Theos), myth, logic and philosophy. It is the goddess’ song to the select, here given unto Parmenides.

4.1
Art and Being:
The Manifestation through Art

As time went by, Heidegger became only more engaged with creativity. In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” a lecture delivered in 1935,\textsuperscript{278} Heidegger focuses on the preeminent importance of an artwork. After a long discussion, Heidegger establishes that the artwork cannot be understood by recourse to what a thing or equipment is. In the first place, the “workly in the work, equipmental in the equipment and dingly in the thing”\textsuperscript{279} can only be understood with reference to the Being of Beings: in other words, the ontological is foregrounded in the understanding of the thing, the equipment and the work of art.

Heidegger foregrounds the ontological most clearly when he defines work of art as an occurring, a happening of truth at work.”\textsuperscript{280} To put it more precisely:

\begin{quote}
In the work of art the truth of an entity has set itself to work. “To set” means here: to bring to stand. . . . The being of the being comes into the steadfastness of its shining. . . . The nature of art would then be this: the truth of beings setting itself to work.\textsuperscript{281}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{277} Ibid., 42, p. 243.
\textsuperscript{279} Ibid., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid., p. 36.
How does Heidegger come to this conclusion? And where does he go from here? To understand this, we must go to the beginning of Heidegger’s lecture; where he makes an edifice of arguments only to show their inadequacy and also how at the same time to let the real aspect emerge.

Heidegger begins from what seems to be the most obvious about an art work: its thingness. This in turn is related to the question of the “thingness of a thing,” the very essence of being a thing. The first attempt at understanding the thing happened with the Greeks; who identified the core of the thing with that which is the very ground of the thing, or the ἑποκείμενον (hupokeimenon). Along and already with this hupokeimenon, the characteristics or συμβεβεκτα (sumbebekata) occur. This hupokeimenon-sumbebekata get translated and adopted as substance and accident in the Latin world. The second definition of a thing is to call it the “unity of a minfold given to the senses.” The third is the concept of a thing as hylomorphic or hylomorphic, coming from the "ολε (hule) or matter and μορφή (morphē) or form. Heidegger rejects all these three conceptions; in his view they neither do justice to understanding the thing, nor equipment and definitely not the thingness of the artwork.

In order to come to terms with understanding the work of art; Heidegger takes clue from equipment; which has an interesting relation to thing and artwork in that it lies between them: it is neither a raw thing nor a creative craft that art is. We must however be careful to note here that in understanding equipment as intermediate of thing and artwork, Heidegger does not relegate the other two as species of equipment or see them as standing in any sense of subordination to it.

As his example, Heidegger takes a famous painting by Van Gogh, a pair of peasant shoes. We already know from Being and Time that Heidegger understands equipment in terms of its usability and from the fact that one does not ever think in terms of defining an equipment but just uses it (“the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—equipment.”). The same applies to the pair of shoes as equipment:

The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field. Only here are they what they are. They are all them more genuinely so, the less the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she is at work, or looks at them at all, or is even aware of them. That is how shoes

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281 Ibid., p. 36.  
282 Ibid., p. 25.  
284 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 15, p. 98.
actually serve. It is in this process of equipment that we actually encounter the character of equipment.\textsuperscript{285}

The shoes painted by Van Gogh seem to do nothing of this kind. Yet, it is only through the painting that we are brought upon to realise the shoes as what the shoes are. The painting makes us see "the slow trudge" of the wearer through the field, the "loneliness of the field path," the vibration of the "silent call of the earth," the fallowness of the "desolation of (the) wintry field," the anxiety of bread, the "impending' childbirth and the shivering of the winter."\textsuperscript{286} This point becomes even more clear in the example of the Greek temple:

A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico. By means of this temple, the god is present in the temple. This presence of the god is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct. The temple and its precinct, however, do not fade away into the indefinite. It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people. . . . Standing there, the building stands on the rocky ground. This resting of the rock draws up out of the rock the mystery of the rock's clumsy yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so makes the storm manifest in this violence. The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet first brings to light the light of the day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night.\textsuperscript{287}

It is thus the artwork that makes the entity manifest. It discloses the equipment, the entity in its truth. In short, it discloses or "deconceals." It is in this context that one must understand Heidegger when he says that a sculpture of a god "is a work that lets the god himself be present and thus is the god himself."\textsuperscript{288} This unconcealment or disclosure is for Heidegger the truth in the way the Greeks knew it, or the Greek αλήθεια (aletheia). The other way to put it is what was quoted at the beginning of this discussion: "The nature of art . . . [is] the truth of beings setting itself to work."\textsuperscript{289} Here we would do well to note the coextensionality of Being and truth that Heidegger underlines again and again. In Being and Time, Heidegger took this position explicitly enough:

\textsuperscript{286} See, ibid., p. 34.
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid., pp. 41-2, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{288} Ibid., p. 43, emphasis Heidegger's.
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., p. 36.
Being (not entities) is something which 'there is' only in so far as truth is. And truth is only in so far as and as long as Dasein is. Being and truth 'are' equiprimordially.290

And, in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger reiterates his commitment to the mutual inheritance of Being and Truth:

What does the expression “real” mean here? To us it is what is in truth. The true is what corresponds to the real, and the real is what is in truth. The circle has closed again.291

The manifestation that was being talked about in terms of entities, is nevertheless a presencing that occurs in itself, and it is this rising-emerging that Heidegger understands to be the meaning of the Greek ϕύσις (Phusis).292

Heidegger posits that there are two things that a work does: it sets up the world and sets forth the earth. What is meant by “world” and “earth” here? How do we understand this “setting up” and “setting forth?” The world is understood as a dwelling in the midst of beings that are overt. In the “overtness of beings” the beings are. And this overtness can only happen to a human being; the other entities are worldless, “they belong to the covert throng of a surrounding world into which they are linked.”293 The “world worlds”294 and has a certain spaciousness. The world also opens up or dis-closes and de-conceals. Heidegger says that the Open of the world is opened up by the work of art. “The rock comes to bear and rest and so first become rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the words to speak.”295 While the equipment uses up the material and makes it perish; this perishing is a necessary aspect of the construction of the equipment; the work of art alternately makes the material shine forth.296

At the same time the work needs to set itself back; and this demands a sheltering, concealing element: this is the earth. The earth is set forth by the work in the very precise sense of moving it into the open of the world:

That into which the work sets itself back and which it causes to come forth in this setting back of itself we called the earth. Earth, self dependent, is effortless and untiring... In setting up a world, the work sets forth the earth. This setting forth must

290 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 44, p. 272.
292 Ibid., p. 42.
293 Ibid., p. 45.
294 Ibid., p. 44, emphasis Heidegger’s.
295 Ibid., p. 46.
296 See, ibid., pp. 46-8.
be thought in the strict sense of the word. The work moves the earth itself into the Open of a world and keeps it there. *The work lets the earth be an earth.*

Earth is the impenetrable, concealed and undisclosed; Heidegger calls it the "essentially self-secluding." Earth fails every attempt at penetrating into it and opening it. All things that are of the earth have a strange reciprocity in that they all are concealed and present in the "not-knowing-of-one-another." The clearing of earth is "to bring it into the Open as the self-secluding."

It is obvious that the world in being the Open and the earth in being the self-secluding are opposites; but their essential distinction is not a separation, nor is their interaction an "empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one another." The world is ground upon the earth, and earth "juts through" the world. The earth strives to push in the world and shelter it, while the world is averse to this closedness of the earth. This is how Heidegger wants us to understand the relation between the earth and the world where their mutual difference and mutual wants inhere.

When Heidegger proposes that the work is the setting up of the world and the setting forth of the earth; it is clear from this postulation itself that Heidegger envisages herein a relationship of need-in-antipathy at work. For the Open (World) needs to set itself in; and thus wants a closedness; and the closedness (Earth) can only express itself through an openness.

The work is the "instigating of the striving" between the earth and the world and the putting of truth itself into work. Truth is unconcealment or disclosure. But this unconcealment is not presupposed by humans; it is the unconcealment that itself makes the condition that "we are installed within and in attendance upon unconcealedness." Truth is the *aletheia*, the clearing or the open region in the midst of beings and encircling beings; and the pathway to beings and ourselves *qua* being:

[B]eyond what is, not away from it but before it, there is something else that happens. In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is a clearing, a lighting. Thought of in reference to what is, to beings, this clearing is in a greater degree than are beings. This open center is therefore not surrounded by what is; rather the lighting center itself encircles all that is, like Nothing that we scarcely know. . . . Only this clearing grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are.

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297 Ibid., p. 46, emphasis Heidegger's.
298 Ibid., p. 47.
299 Ibid., p. 47.
300 Ibid., p. 47.
301 Ibid., p. 49.
302 Ibid., p. 52.
303 Ibid., p. 52.
304 Ibid., p. 53.
Heidegger understands the clearing as a happening, an event. To this truth as unconcealedness there belongs a denial as double concealment; as a refusal of a being to disclose itself and as a semblance. The denial works as a limit, where we are only able to say of a being that-it-is. These postulations are clearly a reflection of Heidegger's working of phenomenological ontology. Only a phenomenological-ontological conception can make us understand the presentation of truth as an event. Truth is a clearing which is the way to entities; it also is coextensional with Being. Truth itself, then is the space in which method and content of the reflection on Being inhere. Moreover, truth is an event in the sense that to be in truth and to see beings in their unconcealedness is an experience and not a proposition or an axiomatic-deductive inference. To be in truth is to be in an extraordinary, enigmatic revelatory experience. Moreover, only because truth is a happening can it cohere with un-truth.

Heidegger is careful to guard off a grave misunderstanding of his position. It seems that since earth is self-concealed and the world an Open; the former corresponds to un-truth and the latter to truth. But this is to thoroughly misinterpret Heidegger. He notes that the world is a "clearing of the paths of the essential guiding directions" but this needs something not mastered; this not mastered is the earth "which rises as the self-closing." That is why, in finally commenting on Van Gogh's painting of the shoes, Heidegger says that in the "equipmental being of the shoes, that which is a whole—world and earth in their counterplay—attains to unconcealedness."

Truth is the conflict, play and counterplay between earth and the world; and is the opposition between unconcealing and concealment. This means that truth which is openness needs to establish itself, establish itself "within its open." Truth is itself to be established and itself is the establishing; there is to occur the self-establishing of truth. And that clarifies why Heidegger calls truth an occurring or an event. The openness needs to be cleared and there must be an establishment in this openness. This for Heidegger requires a being in which the openness clears and establishes itself and achieves its constancy. We now need to relate this self-establishing of truth to the understanding of work as truth setting itself to work:

[T]he impulse towards the work lies in the nature of truth as one of truth's distinctive possibilities by which it can itself occur in the midst of beings.

305 See, Ibid., p. 53-4.
306 Ibid., p. 55.
307 Ibid., p. 55.
308 Ibid., p. 56.
309 See, ibid., 57-61.
The establishing of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being such as never was before and will never come to be again. This bringing forth places this being in the Open in such a way that what is to be brought first clears the openness of the Open into which it comes forth. Where this bringing forth expressly brings the openness of beings, or truth, that which is brought forth is a work. Creation is such a bringing forth. . . . Truth establishes itself in the work. Truth is present only as the conflict between lighting and concealing in the opposition of world and earth. 310

There is thus a distinctive bringing forth in which the being is opened or brought to the open, by a truth self-establishing itself; this bringing forth being creation and that which is brought forth the work. Truth establishes a being in the Open, and thus establishes itself; and this “being itself occupies the Open of truth,”311 thus again underlining for Heidegger the inherence of truth and Being. This further clarifies how Heidegger seeks to understand that beings are opened and made manifest by the work itself. What is meant by saying that the being occupies the open of truth? It means that this being must also manifest the strife between the earth and the world. This in turn emerges as the “shape.” This shape is the creation at work, and the truth at work, because the “composed rift is the fitting or joining of the shining of truth.” 312

The existence of the work of art is unique. As such if anything is present to us, it is obvious that we note that that-it-is; but this noting remains constant and luminous only in the work of art:

And what is more commonplace than this, that a being is? In a work, by contrast, this fact, that it is a work, is just what is unusual. The event of its being created does not simply reverberate through the work; rather the work casts before itself the eventful fact that the work is as this work, and it has constantly this fact about itself. The more essentially the work opens itself, the more luminous becomes the uniqueness of the fact that it is rather than is not. The more essentially this thrust comes into the Open, the stronger and more solitary the work becomes. In the bringing forth of the work there lies the offering “that it be.” 313

And why is the work solitary, and in proportionality to its greatness as a work? In establishing itself through a being, the truth works in a work. The greater the work, the sharper the establishing; and the more individual the luminosity. Solitariness for Heidegger represents not the being-alone of something, but its distinctiveness.

The work, thus defined, needs its preservers. Heidegger makes a statement that apparently looks rather enigmatic: “Just as a work cannot be created but is essentially in need of

310 Ibid., p. 62-3.
311 Ibid., p. 63.
312 Ibid., p. 64.
313 Ibid., p. 65-6, emphasis Heidegger's.
creators, so what is preserved cannot itself come into being without those who preserve it."\(^{314}\)

However, it is not illogical and can be defended. The first explanation is given by Heidegger himself: the work is always "tied to preservers," and so much so that even if it submerges into oblivion; that oblivion is also a preservation rather than nothing.\(^{315}\) Moreover, we can argue that a creation at every stage needs to be preserved; to be maintained in order to be. Thus a creation is essentially tied to preservation. Man is a preserver of the work, though only few can be preservers. But how are we supposed to understand preservation? Preservation is not to be understood as a scientific, archaeological activity; it is related to being and disclosure. The meaning of preservation is preserved by Heidegger in phenomenological ontology; and this is what I sought to indicate in my explanation of why Heidegger posits that a work cannot itself come into being without those who preserve it. The preservation means knowing; knowing the magnificent luminosity that the work is; the illumination of Openness set in composition. It also means a transformation of the way we see, approach and comport ourselves towards the world, the earth and the entities; and ultimately, letting-the-work-be. This is related to Dasein or \textit{Existenz} itself:

Knowing that remains a willing and willing that remains a knowing, is the existing human being's entrance into and compliance with the unconcealedness of Being. The resoluteness intended in \textit{Being and Time} is not the deliberate action of a subject, but the opening up of human being, out of its captivity in that which is, to the openness of Being. However, in existence, man does not proceed from some inside to some outside; rather, the nature of \textit{Existenz} is out-standing standing-within the essential sunderance of the clearing of beings. . . . Preserving the work, as knowing, is a sober standing-within the extraordinary awesomeness of the truth that is happening in the work.\(^{316}\)

The preservers of a work belong to its createdness with an essentiality equal to that of the creators. But it is the work that makes the creators possible in their nature, and that by its own nature is in need of preservers. If art is the origin of the work, this means that art lets those who naturally belong together at work, the creator and the preserver, originate, each in his own nature. What, however, is art itself that we call it rightly an origin?\(^{317}\)

Art, then, is twofold as much as the preservers and creators of the work inhere and fold into each other intimately. Heidegger understands art both as the happening of truth at work, and the "creative preserving of truth at work."\(^{318}\) In art, truth \textit{becomes} and \textit{happens}.

\(^{314}\) Ibid., p. 66.
\(^{315}\) See, ibid., p. 67.
\(^{316}\) Ibid., pp. 67-8.
\(^{317}\) Ibid., p. 71.
\(^{318}\) Ibid., p. 71.
transformation which occurs in a work of art. Art flowers out an openness; and in this openness, in this illumination of disclosure, things are transformed extraordinarily. The entity becomes illumined and open and projects out to show itself in itself: this causes the entity in its ordinariness to become, or be revealed as unbeing. The unbeing as it were has lost to the light of openness: "This unbeing has lost the capacity to give and keep being as measure." It is this "lighting projection of truth," that works itself in art; and it is in this precise sense that art for Heidegger is quintessentially poetry:

*All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry.*

There is a distinct understanding of art, poetry and language at work here. Language is obviously not understood through a scientific mode as physiological or psychological phenomenon; nor is it approached by way of linguistics and semiotics, broken into an analysis of phonemes and graphemes and analysed as a product of human convention. Language is what brings things into the open, that is, to the light of disclosure from the darkness of concealment. Heidegger concentrates particularly on "naming" which he believes is nomination of beings to their being from out of their being. And this saying, this projective saying in which beings come to the open is poetry. Poetry says the clearing, poetry speaks of the earth-world conflict, poetry says the rift that wrests it:

Projective saying is poetry: the saying of world and earth, the saying of the arena of their conflict and thus of the place of all nearness and remoteness of the gods. Poetry is the saying of the unconcealedness of what is. Actual language at any given moment is the happening of this saying, in which a people's world historically arises for it and the earth is preserved as that which remains closed. Projective saying is saying which, in saying the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into a world. In such saying, the concepts of an historical people's nature, i.e., of its belonging to world history, are formed for that folk, before it.

What is the relation between poetry and language? Language, it seems, for Heidegger, is primordial with respect to poetry and yet intimate with it; since he calls language "the primal poesy," and is also what preserves poetry's original nature. Poetry is related to truth because it
is "the founding of truth."\textsuperscript{325} Founding is to be understood as threefold; as "bestowing," "grounding" and "beginnings," where each three is actualised by and a mode of "preserving." The work brings to open that which lies concealed. Man lives on the earth, in which all entities are; though concealed. Earth is itself the self-secluding and concealed phenomenon. The openness must be projected out of the closedness of the earth and yet set up upon it. The ground is thus the ground which does not actually hide, it bears the seed of openness. Creation is a "drawing up" but drawing up in what way? As \textit{water is drawn from a spring}. How do we take account of this metaphor? The water before drawn is not something else, it is water; and yet, it is in being drawn that it becomes water for us, it is thus projected unto itself. The ground freely bestows, and the founding is a free bestowal. In this bestowal and grounding; a beginning is made: a beginning of openness, a beginning where a manifestation occurs. This beginning is a projection in the truest sense: it is a leap that contains a latent end.\textsuperscript{326} The three modes of grounding are to be emphasised upon:

The founding of truth is a founding not only in the sense of free bestowal, but at the same time foundation in the sense of this ground-laying grounding. \ldots Bestowing and grounding have themselves the unmediated character of what we call a beginning. Yet this unmediated character of a beginning, the peculiarity of a leap out of the unmediable, does not exclude but rather includes the fact that the beginning prepares itself for the longest time and wholly inconspicuously. \ldots The beginning always contains the end latent within itself.\textsuperscript{327}

4.2
Poet as the Speaker of the Holy:
(Ab/Ur-)Ground, Venture, Attunement

Another very significant work by the later Heidegger which bears a lot of importance to his views on creativity, as also the relation between creativity and philosophy, is his extended essay, "What Are Poets for?"\textsuperscript{328} This essay makes a distinguished reference to the poets and their preeminent importance to philosophy: we might as well begin by looking at the title more closely and realizing that the "are" is not a mere grammatical entity here but the reference to Being which poets are intimate with. The fact that poets \textit{are}, is itself a momentous fact.\textsuperscript{329}

\textsuperscript{325} Ibid., p. 75.
\textsuperscript{326} See, ibid., pp. 75-6.
\textsuperscript{327} Ibid., p. 76.
\textsuperscript{328} Martin Heidegger, "What Are Poets For?" in Heidegger, \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought}, pp. 89-142.
\textsuperscript{329} That is why I have chosen to capitalize the "are" while mentioning the title, "What Are Poets For?" The "Are" is the mainstay of the essay. The fact that the poets are, is what matters in a foundational sense.
Heidegger begins by reflecting on the problem of destitution; and the greater problem of not understanding the destitution, by reflecting on a line from Hölderlin:

"... and what are poets for in a destitute time?" asks Hölderlin’s elegy “Bread and Wine.” We hardly understand the question today. How, then, shall we grasp the answer that Hölderlin gives? For Heidegger, Hölderlin’s sense of history defines the beginning of the end of the day of God: and end that occurs in the wake of the event of the death of Christ, and an end which began with the death of Herakles and Dionysus. This is for Hölderlin the “default” of God, or the fact that “no god any longer gathers men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocally, and by such gathering disposes the world’s history and man’s sojourn in it.” The extinguishing of the divine radiance in the world’s history is made all the more destitute since man cannot even realise “the default of god as a default.” There is an “Abgrund”, the abground or the ab-ground, the complete absence of ground; an abyss in which now man seems to hang. The hope, consequently, lies only in the complete, thorough and unequivocal turning away from this abyss. It is only then that the Gods will return, when there is an abode for them; when men have turned rightly and thoroughly. Heidegger quotes Hölderlin at this point:

The heavenly powers
Cannot do all things. It is the mortals
Who reach sooner into the abyss. So the turn is
With these. Long is
The time, but the true comes into
Its own.

It is here that we need to read Heidegger very carefully and understand what he wishes to say about the abyss. The abgrund is not the absence of Being in the sense of a being-without Being. That is impossible. The abgrund or the absence is determined from within by the presence. (We are reminded of Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning). Why is it that mortals reach the abyss sooner? And why is that Hölderlin does not speak of this reaching sooner into the abyss of mortals, in a pejorative sense; but as a statement that holds all hope for men? For Heidegger there is the whole game of absence-presence at stake here; a complex difference yet interaction

330 Ibid., p. 91.
331 Like the translator I prefer transliterating the original Greek spelling to its Latinized version.
332 Ibid., p. 91.
333 Ibid., p. 91.
334 See, ibid., pp. 90-1.
335 Ibid., p. 91.
between these two modes that defines among other things the enigma of human existence. Humans remain closer to absence but only because “they are touched by the presence.” It is presence that conceals itself and is the absence: the absence is the concealment, in fact the self-concealment of presence. I find this as one of the most interesting and fundamental insights of Heidegger. Heidegger partly learns it form Hölderlin and therefore quotes Hölderlin’s “The Titans”: “it [the abyss] is all perceiving.” The abyss cannot perceive if it is a vacuous, inert entity, informed throughout by a lack, an absence. The abyss preserves only if it is the concealed expression of presence.

Hölderlin remembers and celebrates Dionysus: the wine god; and remarks that the wine feast is the meeting point of the gods and men, and for the select men to trace the steps of the holy; the steps that are inconspicuous and subtle:

Poets are the mortals who, singing earnestly of the wine-god, sense the trace of the fugitive gods, stay on the god’s tracks, and so trace for their kindred mortals the way toward the turning. The ether, however, in which alone the gods are gods, is their godhead. The element of this ether, that within which even the godhead itself is still present, is the holy. The element of the ether for the coming of the fugitive gods, the holy, is the track of the fugitive gods. But who has the power to sense, to trace such a track? Traces are often inconspicuous, and are always the legacy of a directive that is barely divined. To be a poet in a destitute time means: to attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods. This is why the poet in the time of the world’s night utters the holy. This is why, in Hölderlin’s language, the world’s night is the holy night.

The poet utters the holy. He speaks the holy even in the night of the gods. That is why poets are so momentous, so intensely significant. It then becomes of preeminent importance to listen to the poets. The poets go as far as their allotted limit, but there is much to be learnt from that. Poetry and poets must be understood; but they can only be understood if one knows the nature of metaphysics and has experienced what it is to walk in the land of “the saying of Being.”

It is not only Hölderlin in whom Heidegger sees a poet who traces the holy, he sees a lot of light in Rilke; though Rilke comes only second to Hölderlin who is Heidegger’s preeminent poet. Heidegger makes a long but rather brilliant and revelatory reading of an improvised verse by Rilke. Since he reads the whole verse extendedly and in a manner of connectedness, I quote the whole verse, exactly in the way done by Heidegger, including the line numbering:

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336 Ibid., p. 93.
337 Ibid., p. 93.
338 Ibid., p. 94.
339 See, ibid., 98.
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1 As Nature gives other creatures over
2 to the venture of their dim delight
3 and in soil and branchwork grants none special
cover
4 so too our being’s pristine ground settles our plight;
5 we no dearer to it; it ventures us.
6 Except that we, more eager than plant or beast,
7 go with this venture, will it, adventurous
8 more sometimes than Life itself is, more daring
9 by a breath (and not in the least
10 from unselfishness) . . . . There, outside all caring,
11 this creates for us a safety—just there,
12 where the pure forces’ gravity rules; in the end,
13 it is our unshieldedness on which we depend,
14 and that, when we saw it threaten, we turned it
15 so into the Open that, in the widest orbit somewhere,
16 where the Law touches us, we may affirm it.340

What is the unifying thing that Rilke mentions here which gives none the special cover and is alike for all things, living and non-living, animal and man? This same is the ground of beings, the Being, within which the beings unite. This ground is Nature: “This is the incipient power gathering everything to itself, which in this manner releases every being to its own self.”341

Heidegger reads the Being of beings not only as Nature but also as will: “The will is the self-concentrating gathering of every ens unto itself.”342 Every being is as something willed, and as the mode of will. Heidegger reads closely into Rilke’s terminology; the source of not only understanding Rilke but of following him all the way into his saying of, and hearkening unto Being:

In the word Nature used here [by Rilke], there echoes still the earlier word phusis, equated also with ζωη, which we translate “life.” In early thought, however, the nature of life, is not conceived in biological terms, but as the phusis, that which arises. In line 8 of our poem, “Nature” is also called “Life.” Nature, Life, here designate Being in the sense of all beings as whole . . . Rilke calls the Nature the Urground, the pristine ground, because it is the ground of those beings that we ourselves are. This suggests that man reaches more deeply into the ground of beings than do other beings. The ground of beings has since ancient times been called Being.343

340 Ibid., p. 99.
341 Ibid., p. 100.
342 Ibid., pp. 100-1.
343 Ibid., p. 101.
This Being, the Nature and the Ground; is the “venture.” Put even more sharply, “Being is the venture pure and simple.” As venture, the Being of beings ventures out beings, that is gives them over to the “daring venture,” breaks them loose to it. This venturing is the same for all and none is granted any special privilege or “cover.” In this venturing, in this daring, in this flinging loose of the beings into the open by Being; the element of danger, of risk, of unshieldedness comes in. But what is this unshieldedness? The unshieldedness does not mean the abandonment of beings; and I think that this must be seen as paradigmatically related to the fact that the absence is governed by the presence itself and the will of beings is a mode of the Will.

To explain what exactly is the relation of beings to Being, and what precisely the terms of this “venture,” Heidegger takes recourse to the middle ages, where the word for balance, die Wage meant to risk or hazard. Beings are put to risk in as much as they hang in the balance. The Venture which ventures beings does not abandon them:

What is so ventured is, of course, unprotected; but because it hangs in the balance, it is retained in the venture. It is upheld. Its ground keeps it safely within it. . . . What is ventured is thus careless, sine cura, securnm, secure, safe. What is ventured can follow the venture, follow into the unprotectedness of the ventured, only if it rests securely in the venture. The unprotectedness of what is ventured not only does not exclude, it necessarily includes, its being secure on its ground. What is ventured goes along with the venture.

Being which holds all beings in the balance, thus always draws particular beings towards itself—toward itself as the center. Being, as the venture, holds all beings, as being ventured, in this draft. But this center of the attracting drawing withdraws at the same time from all beings.

Thus, the relation between Being and beings is not manifest directly. The relation of the beings to Being who apparently sway in the open, and in a most destitute time has to be understood by carefully following the traces. One needs to realize that there is a centre where Being holds its eminent sway; in this context Heidegger quotes from Rilke’s “The Force of Gravity”:

Center, you draw yourself out of all things, regaining yourself even from all things in flight: Center, strongest of all!
Heidegger, reading Rilke closely, calls "The unheard of center [as] "the eternal playmate in the world-game of Being." He also underlines the ambiguity in the term Venture—as both Being and as what is ventured (beings)—as valid, essential and unequivocal: "this ambiguity is not accidental, nor is it sufficient for us merely to note it. In it, the language of metaphysics speaks unequivocally."

That to which all beings that are ventured, are given over, is "the Open." The Open in being unbounded itself, does not set bounds; "it is the great whole of all that is unbounded." It is important to note that the Open is not the "primal lightening of Being," nor are the sky and air and space referred to as the Open; they are as much objects of the Open. There are two types of beings, human being and the others and the two have a different relationship with the Open, owing to the difference in the level of their consciousness. The plant and animal is in the Open, it sways with the drafting of the draft; Rilke terms them "the great accustomed things." Man is before the world; since in his heightened consciousness; he sees himself as an entity amongst other entities, sets himself up in front of the world; and thus the objects of the world turn "opaque" to him. Man is thus un-admitted to the Open. The other beings are "benumbed" and enjoy the "venture of their dim delight," they do not have the intense consciousness to see or posit things before or in front of them. In this, Heidegger understands Rilke as neither offering a critique of the other creatures nor saying that man's heightened consciousness is his problem. This is more a reading of the complex way in which man and the other beings happen to be—each in their own way—in the Open.

Man’s situation is extremely ambiguous. His heightened consciousness is his strength and the way to knowing Being; at the same time his strength, his consciousness also puts him in the grip of opposition, conflict and the forgetting of Being. Man positions, or rather "pro-positions" Nature and makes Open an object, along with Nature. This not only sets a tussle for Man (not for Nature or Open, of course) against them. The Open is essentially one that is unbounded and without barriers, but man makes barriers, bounds and hierarchies:

\[\text{Man places before himself the world as the whole of everything objective, and he places himself before the world. Man sets up the world forward himself, and delivers Nature over to himself. We must think of the placing-here, this producing, in its broad and}\]

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348 Ibid., p. 105.
347 Ibid., p. 106.
350 Ibid., p. 106.
331 See, ibid., p. 108.
352 Ibid., p. 107.
353 Ibid., p. 109, Heidegger quoting Rilke.
355 See, ibid., p. 110, and footnote.
Being as First Philosophy

There is a command both in the Will (Being) and will of being-human, but the will of man is the will of strife, of power, of subjugation; and of the reframing, redisposition, interposing, transposing, exposing of entities. The human will is oblivious of the fact that the Will wills all and is the unheard-of-centre.\(^{357}\) This technological age which is our contemporary age (and of Heidegger’s, though our more than of Heidegger’s) is the withdrawal of the character of things, of the end of the free expression of things, of creativity generally and of the “will to will.”\(^{358}\) It is not, says Heidegger that when Rilke writes of the age of technology as one of the withdrawal of Being and of the thingness of things, he is saying that his fathers were in a paradise of understanding Being (and indeed Heidegger even independently also never thinks so). It is that the age of commercialism, of commodification, of money and money-markets, and systems that make a fetish of the commodity; it is an age of the drawing into itself of the world in a very ruthless manner.\(^{359}\)

There is not only the peril that ensues from man loosing his spirituality, his wisdom and his metaphysical sensibility to production and commodity: that is, loosing “his selfhood to unconditioned production.”\(^{360}\) Man obstructs the open and “stands before it.”\(^{361}\) There is only an

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356 Ibid., p. 110.
357 See, ibid., pp. 111-2.
358 Ibid., p. 113, Heidegger quotes Nietzsche here.
359 See, ibid., pp. 113-4. Heidegger quotes a poem by Rilke here, which he terms as highly prophetic, both in terms of what ruthlessly led to withdrawal, and to the hint that it gives of the return:

The kings of the world are grown old,
inheritors they shall have none.
in childhood death removes the son,
their daughters pale have given, each one,
sick crowns to the powers to hold.

Into coin the rabble breaks them,
today’s lord of the world takes them,
stretches them into machines in his fire,
grumbling they serve his every desire;
but happiness still forsakes them.

The ore is homesick. And it yearns
to leave the coin and to leave the wheel
that teach it to lead a life inane.
The factories and tills it spurns;
From petty forms it will unconeal,
Return to the open mountains’s vein,
And on it the mountain will close again. (p. 114)

360 Ibid., p. 115.
361 Ibid., p. 115.
illusion of being happy with technology; man has forgotten Being, his being and the meaning of happiness itself. Heidegger believes (with Rilke) that on one hand, man forgets the unity of beings gathered in Being; and on the other hand, he illusively believes that he has ordered, brought into order everything, even as the “realm” that orders everything is destroyed.\footnote{See, ibid., p. 115-17.}

Heidegger reflects on the illusion of happiness and progress even more explicitly:

\begin{quote}
The essence of technology comes to the light of day only slowly. This day is the world’s night, rearranged into merely technological day. This day is the shortest day. It threatens a single endless winter. Not only does protection now withhold itself from man, but the integralness of the whole of what is remains now in darkness. The world becomes without healing, unholy. Not only does the holy, as the track to the godhead, thereby remain concealed; even the track to the holy, the hale and the whole, seems to be effaced. . . . The danger consists in the threat that assault’s man’s nature in his relation to Being itself, and not in accidental perils. This danger is the danger. It conceals itself in the abyss that underlies all beings. To see this danger and point it out there must be mortals who reach sooner into the abyss.\footnote{Ibid., p. 117.}
\end{quote}

There must be those who recognise the abyss and reach it, since this abyss is the sway of Being; and only by understanding the absence, can the presence be understood and seen. Heidegger quotes Hölderlin: "But where there is danger, there grows/also what saves."\footnote{Ibid., p. 118.} How do we become more secure? The “salvation” comes from the turn: the turn from technology and commodification to one’s spirituality and sense of and with Being. We have to “draw within the drawing of the whole draft,”\footnote{Ibid., p. 120.} sway with it, so as to be drawn to the centre of all things. What Heidegger seems to suggest is an active-passivity, that is, to understand the sway of Being in everything and to repose in receiving and in giving what one has received. From the will to power (which is nothing but the will to perish) we must will with everything and understand the Will that we receive everywhere without and within. It is to be like the seer, who understanding the pattern, ceases to act; \textit{and thus indeed acts}. This is also what brings us to understand the meaning and power of creativity:

\begin{quote}
To create means to fetch from the source. And to fetch from the source means to take up what springs forth and to bring what has so been received. The more venturesome daring of the willing exercise of the will manufactures nothing. It receives, and gives what it has received. It brings, by unfolding in its fullness what it has received. The more
\end{quote}
venturesome daring accomplishes but it does not produce. Only a daring that becomes more daring by willing can accomplish in striving.366

The turn whereby man begins to experience his will by receiving, remains as much in unshieldedness; it does not provide one with any shield or security. But it is this unshieldedness which now protects? How? It protects because the unshieldedness remains and yet changes. The unshieldedness changes as soon as the inversion occurs of the “parting against the Open,” so that the unshieldedness “turns toward the Open—and into it.”367 At the same time, it is the ground that determines ultimately our turning. Heidegger reads Rilke’s lines “so into the Open that, in widest orbit somewhere/where the Law touches us, we may affirm it” as meaning that “the Open must itself have turned towards us in a way that allows us to turn our unshieldedness toward it.”368

4.3
The Plenitude of Being:
Moving to the Other and the Inner

Heidegger is actually making an expanded assessment of the “orbit” in Rilke and traces it to Parmenides’ eighth fragment, reading both Rilke and Parmenides as affirming an unconcealed Presence, a primal presence that makes possible the presence or manifestation of beings. Interestingly, Heidegger also talks of “thinking” but not of thinking as ratiocinative, rational, logical, neuro-psychical activity, but a primal activity which is conversant with Being: this is again a tracing of things back to Parmenides who in the third of his fragments talks of a unicity of thinking and Being. This equiprimordiality of Being and thinking also reflects on a creatively intellectual activity in man determined by a primal presence that enables man to be intimiated with Being as primal presence. It is in this sense that man ought to, and in its real-primal turn does think; it is this sense that thinking is intimate with creativity; it is in this sense that we can affirm ourselves to be a thinking thing:

As thinking Beings we think back, of course, to the fact that the Being of beings has from the beginning been thought of with regard to the orbiting. But we think of this spherical aspect of Being too loosely . . . unless we have already asked and learned how the Being of beings occurs initially. The eon, being, of the eonta, beings as whole, is called the hen, the unifying One. But what is this encircling unifying as a fundamental trait of Being? What does Being mean? Eon, “in being” signifies present, and indeed present in

366 Ibid., p. 120.
367 Ibid., p. 121.
368 Ibid., p. 122.
the unconcealed. But in presence there is concealed the bringing on of unconcealedness which lets the present beings occur as such. But only Presence itself is truly present—Presence which is everywhere as the Same in its own center, and, as such, is the sphere. The spherical does not consist in a circuit which then embraces, but in the unconcealing center that, lightening, safeguards present beings. The sphericity of the unifying, and the unifying itself, have the character of unconcealing lightening, within which present beings can be present. That is why Parmenides (Fragment VIII, 42) calls the eon, the presence of what is present, the enukulos sphaire. This well-rounded sphere is to be thought of as the Being of beings, in the sense of the unconcealing-lightening-unifying. This unifier, uniting everywhere in this manner, prompts us to call it the lightening shell, which precisely does not embrace since it uncovers and reveals, but which itself releases, lightening, into Presence. 369

This is as clear an expression as Heidegger might have given of Being as Presence and unifying beings by releasing them into presence. This Being does not embrace since it releases, but indeed it is one which releases beings into their unconcealment, and they are held by Being in a Unity. At the same time, Heidegger does not find any scope of affirming that Rilke understood orbit in the sense of the sphere and the sphere as the Being qua lightening shell and primal presence. However there is nevertheless in Rilke something very revelatory for Heidegger and he compares the lines on the orbit with these in a letter written by Rilke on 6 January, 1923; where the metaphor is of the moon and the allusion to Being: “like the moon, so life surely has a side that is constantly turned away from us, and that is not its opposite but its completion to perfection, to plenitude, to the real, whole, and full sphere and globe of Being.”370 The globe is Being and the metaphor of the earth carries further the sense of ground, of gravity, of centre. As Heidegger rightly comments, the figure of the moon hidden away half from us is a comment on the “plenitude of being” that is the plenitude of beings in all their facets, that is, beings in their full manifestation. To know a being in all its facets is to affirm it in the proper sense; it is only thus that a being can be said to have posited itself before us, and we to and towards it. Fro Heidegger, these lines by Rilke call us to be positive to Being, that is, to be positing in positiveness and sans any negativity. This total affirmation, this celebration of the total plenitude of beings; is to affirm, to become attuned to the whole draft—the complete orbit—and to allow one to be drawn to the centre. We not only turn our unshieldedness towards the Open, but affirm it completely. 371

Most interestingly, Heidegger talks of death in a ever more positive manner. He reads Rilke again: “Death is the side of life that is averted from us, inillumined by us,”372 and comments that death and dead belong to the other side of all beings:

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369 Ibid., p. 123.
370 Ibid., p. 124.
372 Ibid., p. 124, source of the emphasis not declared by the author/translator.
That realm is “the other draft,” that is, the other side of the whole draft of the Open. Within the widest orbit of the sphere of beings there are regions and places which seem to be something negative, but are nothing of the kind if we think of all things as being within the widest orbit of beings. 373

Technology, for Heidegger, wards off death and considers it as a negative aspect, an end, an annihilation. Heidegger who always saw death as revealing, from Being and Time to the end of his life; advocates here an affirmation of death, a negation of the negativity of positing death. He believes that only a total affirmation is to face the Open thoroughly and totally. How is this affirmation to be possible? How are we to be intimated so as to be touched from within the widest orbit? What remains blocked off essentially, and what then touches us once we give up our objectifying, willing, power-hungry nature; is death. Death sets us thoroughly in tune with Life (Being).

In addition to the affirmation of death, Heidegger talks about the necessity to move beyond our consciousness, but in a sense within it. In the technological mode of living, which is in fact a mode of denial of our selves and our being; we present, or rather re-present an object in the mode of calculation, of consumption, of exploitation. In that sense do we really present an object before us? We must agree with Heidegger that “such representation knows nothing immediately perceptual.” 374 Thus, the object is invisible and what is seen is the “merely calculated product.” 375 In other words, if consciousness is what in front of which the objects stand, and the object is actually the calculated product; the world seen as a sum total of products is itself invisible and nonsensible. The objectivity of objects is inside and immanent to consciousness, which is the calculating power of the res cogitans; then the parting lies in consciousness:

What stands thus owes its presence to a placing whose activity belongs to the res cogitans, that is, to consciousness.

But if unshieldedness is the parting against the Open, while yet the parting lies in the objectification that belongs to the invisible and interior of calculating consciousness, then the natural sphere of consciousness is the invisible and interior of consciousness.

But since the turning of unshieldedness into the Open concerns the nature of unshieldedness from the very start, this conversion of unshieldedness is a conversion of consciousness, and that inside the sphere of consciousness. The sphere of the invisible and interior determines the nature of unshieldedness, but also the manner in which it is turned into the widest orbit. Thus, that towards which the essentially inner and invisible

373 Ibid., p. 125.
374 Ibid., p. 126.
375 Ibid., p. 127.
must turn to find its own can itself only be the most invisible of the invisible and the innermost of the inner.376

Thus, the correlation between unshieldedness, filling of the parting against the Open and consciousness leads us to find in the innermost of consciousness a beyond that lies nevertheless within it. Heidegger finds the clue to this in the work of Pascal, who talks of the heart by completely rejecting and bypassing logic, natural science and calculation. The heart is beyond the consciousness as also within it; it extends into infinity and is beyond any calculation or the produce/project/object of calculation. In the heart we find love which binds everything—from our ancestors to our yet-to-come descendants, varied aspects and all people—and all this sans any boundary or limit. Heidegger quotes Rilke here: “Existence beyond number/wells up in my heart.”377 That is, all beings are present in the heart, the “inner space” of the heart. Heidegger understands the inner realm of the heart as the world’s inner realm. Heidegger further reads through Rilke that if the conversion is to the inner space of the heart, that is, if one understands and seeks the inner-beyond of consciousness; then this inner space is where the unshieldedness protects us.378 The unshieldedness saves us in the innermost region, while it itself gives the clue towards this most invisible of the regions:

[1]his unshieldedness itself, having been turned about, safeguards us in the innermost and most invisible region of the widest inner space of the world. Unshieldedness safeguards as such. For it gives to man’s nature, as inward and invisible, the clue for a conversion of the parting against the Open. The conversion points to the innermost region of the interior. The conversion of consciousness, therefore, is an inner recalling of the immanence of objects of representation into presence within the heart’s space.379

In the inner space of the heart, the objects rest with and within themselves without bounds. It seems that Heidegger is suggesting that threatening occurs only in a will to power; when one is set against something. When we leave this ruthless will and convert towards the inner realm within us where all objects are with and within themselves in an infinite bound, the threatening goes away, and is realised to have come up in the first place by the illusion of power. Our aim is different from, in fact it is wholly excludes the setting up of power relations. Heidegger quotes Rilke: “We ceaselessly gather the honey of the invisible, to store it up in the great golden beehive of the invisible.”380

376 Ibid., p. 127.
377 Ibid., p. 128.
378 See, ibid., pp. 126-30.
379 Ibid., p. 129.
380 Ibid., p. 130.
4.4
Way and the Content of the Conversion
and the Daring: The Angel

At this juncture of his essay, Heidegger finds the discussion confronted with some questions: How does this conversion come to take place; this momentous conversion from the outer to the innermost? What kind of men—presupposing judiciously that very few today are capable—who go on to make this conversion? Finally those who dare—that is, among those who are ventured, those who understanding the terms and depth of this venture, do indeed venture in the true sense—what is it that they dare? Heidegger remained dedicated to the cause of Being and not beings, all beings and not one being. This commitment comes up beautifully in his reply to the problem:

In every case and in every respect, what is dared must be such that it concerns every being inasmuch as it is a being. Of such a kind is Being, and in this way, that it is not one particular kind among others, but the mode of all beings as such.380

There is however, an enigma that Rilke has talked about but not answered. We recall that Rilke says in the poem: "... adventurous/more sometimes than Life itself is, more daring/by a breath. . . ." Life in the poem is another name for Being. How are we to be more daring than Being?! The answer withheld by Rilke and given by Heidegger, expresses the latter's genius; and confirms the position that he began taking in Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning. It is Being which is the determining factor. This is also important because the revelations about the inner space given by Rilke, and affirmed by Heidegger, may cause one to believe that human heart is the preeminent aspect of the scheme of things. It is, however, Being that holds and holds itself majestically:

If Being is what is unique to beings, by what can Being still be surpassed? Only by itself, only by its own, and indeed by expressly entering its own. Then Being would be the unique which wholly surpasses itself (the transcendens pure and simple). But this surpassing, this transcending does not go up and over into something else; it comes up to its own self and back into the nature of its truth. Being itself traverses this going over and is itself its dimension.381
This something “more” belonging to Being is the wonderful fact that Being is present in a word: “Language is the house of Being.” If language is the house of Being then those that are intimated by it are able to reach the “is.” The men who are daring, consequently, dare language:

Thinking our way from the temple of Being, we have an intimation of what they dare who are sometimes more daring than the Being of beings. They dare the precinct of Being. They dare language. All beings—objects of consciousness and things of the heart, men who impose themselves and men who are more daring—all beings, each in its own way, are qua beings in the precinct of language. This is why the return from the realm of objects and their representation into the innermost region of the heart’s space can be accomplished, if anywhere, only in this precinct.

There is a metaphysics and a logic which prevails here. In the realm where will to power prevails along with the rules of production, there is a logic of calculation, of theorems and propositions. In the dismissal of technology and power, by illuminating unto us the innermost realm of the heart; we are attuned to the “logic of the heart (which) corresponds to the saying of the inner recall.” The point to understand is that both realms, the outer and the inner, are determined by logic and metaphysics; with the latter determining the former. The logic that one is talking about in the inner real is obviously not one of power, nor of propositions and theorems. But there is logic inasmuch the secureness is provided “out of unshieldedness itself and outside all shielding.” Thus prevails the logic and metaphysics:

This safekeeping is of concern to man as the being who has language. This is why the logos, saying qua organon, requires organization by logic. Only within metaphysics does logic exist.

Language is an organon; that is an instrument, a tool. In what way? Man has language, language is the house of Being; and language bears metaphysics. His language is like a something in hand, given unto him from the beginning: and thus this metaphysics gives logic which as a tool the logos requires.

What kind of being dares? What is the status of this special being? The being who dares because he understands the nature of this venture. He understands language as the saying, which names the holy since it is the house of Being. He understands the primal centre of presence. In the conversion or “transmutation” of the outer into the inner, this

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363 Ibid., p. 132.
364 Ibid., p. 132, emphasis Heidegger’s.
365 Ibid., p. 133.
366 Ibid., p. 133.
being understands the unity of the two as also the unity of all being gathered together in Being. He is thus secure in himself and secure in terms of the unity of beings. This being is intimate with Being and to him the unheard-of-centre is heard and it appears. Rilke calls such a being “the Angel,” and Heidegger affirms this special Being:

The more venturesome dare the saying. . . . Their saying, because it concerns the conversion, speaks not only from both realms but from the oneness of the two, insofar as that oneness has already come to be as the saving unification. Therefore, where the whole of all beings is thought of as the Open of the pure draft, the inner recalling conversion must be a saying which says what it has to say to a being who is already secure in the whole of all beings, because he has already accomplished the transmutation of what is visible in representation into that which is an invisible of the heart. This being is drawn into the pure draft by the one side and the other of the globe of Being. This being, for whom borderlines and differences between the drawing hardly exist any longer, is the being who governs the unheard-of-center of the widest orbit and causes it to appear. This Being, in Rilke's Duino Elegies is the Angel. . . . it is a basic word because what is said in it thinks the whole of beings by way of Being.  

The Angel balances the two realms; inner/outer, visible/invisible and thus exists in the “stilled repose.” Heidegger seems to affirm that it is possible for man to become an Angel. He talks of the passing on from man to Angel quoting Rilke, “When from the merchant’s hand/ the balance passes over to that Angel who, in the heavens,/ stills it . . . .” But the passage from merchant (to be defined here as one who lives in commodities and through exchanging one for the other, and all for all) to the angel is uncommon. It occurs “rarely and at the right time in an always unique instance in a unique manner.” The venture occurs in language; with those who really say understanding the intimacy of language and Being:

The more venturesome are those who say in a greater degree, in the manner of the singer. Their singing is turned away from all purposeful self assertion. It is not a willing in the sense of desire. Their song does not solicit anything to be produced. In the song, the world's inner space conceded space within itself.  

The more venturesome say in the manner of true saying; and say in the manner of singing. This singing, this song is of existence, is existence. Heidegger focuses on one line by Rilke in his Sonnets to Orpheus, “Song is existence.” The German original as Heidegger reveals has the word Dasein, which for Heidegger has always meant existence. Thus for Rilke one can sing only when

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387 Ibid., p. 134.
388 Ibid., p. 135.
389 Ibid., p. 136.
390 Ibid., p. 138.
can speak existence and one can speak existence only when one is aware of language as precinct of Being, as temple of Being, as a dwelling of Being. To sing is to illuminate for oneself the presence to enliven the presence. Heidegger reads Rilke to suggest, and rightly, that singing is not an easy matter. It is difficult, singular, momentous:

The word for existence, *Dasein*, is used here in the traditional sense of presence and as a synonym of Being. To sing [means] to belong to the precinct of beings themselves. This precinct, as the very nature of language, is Being itself. To sing means to be present in what is present itself. It means: *Dasein*, existence. . . . The hard thing is to accomplish existence. The hard thing consists not only in the difficulty of forming the work of language, but in the difficulty of going over form the saying work of the still covetous vision of things, from the work of the eyes, to the "work of the heart.". This song is hard because singing may no longer be a solicitation, but must be existence. For the god Orpheus, who lives in-finitely in the Open, song is an easy matter, but not for man.391

That is why Rilke says, as Heidegger notes; "When are we?"392 That is, when are we in the manner of truly being. For Heidegger poets are those who truly speak, intimate with language as the dwelling of Being. They recognise the distress, trace the steps of the Holy and understand holiness as an occurrence in the wholeness of Being.393

Hölderlin is for Heidegger the "pre-cursor of poets in a destitute time."394 For Heidegger, such a precursor, the poet, does not go into or vanish in the future; he comes from the future, the future comes to be with him. He can neither be overtaken nor can he perish.395

5
Thinking and Being

We have already witnessed the thinking that Heidegger affirms. It is a thinking mutually excluded, in fact sharply divorced, from the ratiocinative, scientific and logical thinking; which at the best is a species of, and subvenient upon true thinking. Thinking is the attunement of mind to Being, to the plentitude and fullness of Being.

5.1
Call, Withdrawal and the Pull

In his lecture, "What is Called Thinking?" Heidegger focuses on a very important though as intriguing aspect: "What calls for thinking."396 Heidegger begins by a series of inferences with a
view to illuminate the problem. The first observation and a very judicious one; is that man indeed is the one who can think, though in itself this does not allow us to infer that he indeed does think. One can think only if one is inclined to do so; but we are inclined towards something only when that inclines towards us, and holds us in our essential being. To hold is to keep in a protective heeding; but something can hold us only one we “keep holding to what holds us.”

How do we hold on to something? Obviously, by not letting it go off our memory: “memory is the gathering of thought.” We hold onto something and think about it because it must be thought about. But “What is thought is the gift given in thinking back,” given because we incline towards it; and only in so inclining do we become capable of thinking.

This highly enigmatic set of observations will emerge in retrospection as carrying the verve of the whole essay. In this Heidegger not only sets the tone of the essay; but illuminates the fact that the essay does not contain a treatise on thinking in the normal manner. But even more importantly, and again something that will emerge by and by; is the very far reaching observation that thinking cannot be thought about the way it is thought about. Heidegger in fact says that “Most thought provoking is that we are still not thinking...” This not despite, but perhaps because of the so-called flourishing of the sciences, and above all philosophy; and the supposed fact that philosophers are the greatest thinkers. There is just no thinking. Heidegger repeats this lament again, this time in a separate paragraph in itself; to give it all the more emphasis:

Most thought provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking.

Why are we not thinking? Heidegger here turns the argument: it is because, what is to be thought has turned away from man, and long ago:

That we are still not thinking is by no means only because man does not yet turn sufficiently towards that which, by origin and innately, wants to be thought about since in its essence it remains what must be thought about. Rather, that we are still not thinking stems from the fact that what is to be thought about turns away from man, has turned away long ago.

396 This indeed is the title that David Ferrell Krell gives to his excerpts from What is Called Thinking and which is studied here—Martin Heidegger, “What Calls For Thinking,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Ferrell Krell (London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 341-67.
397 Ibid., p. 345.
398 Ibid., p. 345.
399 Ibid., p. 345.
400 See, ibid., pp. 345-6.
401 Ibid., p. 346, emphasis Heidegger’s.
402 See, ibid., p. 347.
403 Ibid., p. 347.
404 Ibid., p. 348.
A grave problem seems to ensue here: how does one know anything about that which withdraws? How does one even know its name? What has withdrawn from the beginning is not even actual, so it seems. However, using Heidegger's ground-abground interplay in *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning,* and other essays, we can say that what withdraws nevertheless touches and intimates man, and this is precisely what man has to understand. Heidegger does indeed say this and uses the rather revealing phrase; "touches him in the surely mysterious way of escaping him by its withdrawal." This at the same time also reflects on another and even more revealing fact:

The event of withdrawal could be what is most present in all our present, and so infinitely exceed the actuality of everything actual.

What withdraws from us draws us along by its very withdrawal, whether or not we become aware of it immediately, or at all. Once we are drawn into the withdrawal, we are, somewhat like migratory birds, but in an entirely different way, caught in the pull of what draws, attracts us by its withdrawal. And once we, being so attracted, are drawing towards what draws us, our essential being already bears the stamp of that "pull." As we draw towards what withdraws, we ourselves point towards it ... this "being in the pull of" is in itself an essential and constant pointing towards what withdraws. To say "being in the pull of" is to say "pointing towards what withdraws."

The metaphor of migration is very crucial and informs Heidegger's way to and about thinking. How do we understand Heidegger's migration metaphor? Migratory creatures feel the force of the pull that calls them to migration. In the case of the migratory creatures, they are called out of home to the space that is the temporary site of dwelling. In case of man he is pulled from his hiddenness from thinking to the call of thinking, to the proper site itself. This migration is a counter-migration or a migration of return. And whereto does man return? He returns properly unto himself and his being. This migration of man does not involve any change of place or time, but a change of state in a most radical manner.

This pointing of and by man is a very basic and foundational pointing. For Heidegger, this is the determining factor for man, "His essential being lies in being such a pointer." In other words, it is not that one is a man first, and feels the pull towards the withdrawal. It is in being drawn to the withdrawal and pointing to the withdrawal that "man first is man." But this sign is an uninterpreted sign—Heidegger quotes Hölderlin, "We are a sign that is not read."
"we are a sign that is not read," is of the refrains that keeps on playing in the text.\textsuperscript{410} In fact, Hölderlin’s hymn the “Mnemosyne” from which this line has been quoted is seen by Heidegger as directly illuminating the problem of thinking. Mnemosyne, The Greek word, can be translated as memory. Memory gathers thought, and as Memory or Mnemosyne or the Mother of Muses; Memory is the gathering of thought, the first thought:

Memory thinks back to something thought. But when it is the name of the Mother of Muses, “Memory” does not mean the thought of anything that can be thought. Memory is the gathering of recollection, thinking back. It safely keeps and keeps concealed within it that to which at each given time thought must first be given in everything that essentially is, everything that appeals to us what has being and has been in being. Memory, Mother of the Muses—the thinking back to what is to be thought—must first be given in everything that essentially is, everything that appeals to what has being and what has been in being. Memory, Mother of the Muses—the thinking back to what is to be thought—is the source and ground of poesy. This is why poesy is the water that at times flows backward toward the source, toward thinking as a thinking back, a recollection. . . . Poetry wells up only from devoted thought thinking back, recollecting.\textsuperscript{411}

Not only does Hölderlin’s poem poetically disclose the problem of withdrawal of thought and man’s attraction towards that which withdraws—\textit{We are a sign that is not read}—but also as a poem reflects on poetry and its relation to thought. Thought is gathered by memory; memory is itself the mother of Muses, Muses are the patrons of poetry. That is why, for Heidegger, poetry recollects, goes back to the primal source.\textsuperscript{411} Hölderlin himself is an example that that shines forth among poets and men:

Hölderlin’s word, in turn, because it is a word of poesy, may summon us with a larger appeal, and hence greater allure, upon a way of thought that tracks in thought what is most thought provoking.\textsuperscript{412}

Poetry comes to occupy a central place in the search for thinking—“on our way towards thinking, we hear a word of poesy.”\textsuperscript{413}

What is most thought provoking—to repeat one of the few refrains in Heidegger’s essay, is that \textit{we are no longer thinking}. This in its turn relates itself to the fact that what is most thought

\textsuperscript{410} Introduced first in ibid., p. 351; and repeated at pp. 353, 359.
\textsuperscript{411} Ibid., p. 352.
\textsuperscript{412} Ibid., see, pp. 351-2.
\textsuperscript{413} Ibid., p. 353.
provoking has withdrawn and “turned away from man.” A proper drawing towards the withdrawal stands to mean that man is thinking. Heidegger brings to bear this discussion on the question of withdrawal to the question of speaking, writing and silence. It is the ability to listen, to learn and to let learn; to be silent and experience the sway of silence that comes to be recognised as crucial to thinking. The most thought provoking thing has turned away from man long since; but what must be understood is that what withdraws in this sense, “keeps and develops its own incomparable nearness.” We have learnt this from Heidegger’s conception of the abground in Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, the staying away but never the pulling back of the ground. Once we relate ourselves thus to the withdrawing, we are drawn to and into it. And understanding the pull as such and drawing into it thus, man thinks, and thinks even though the withdrawal remains veiled still. For Heidegger, such a quintessential figure is Socrates:

All through his life and right into his death, Socrates did nothing else than place himself into this draft, this current and maintain himself in it. That is why he is the purest thinker of the West. This is why he wrote nothing. For anyone who begins to write out of thoughtfulness must inevitably be like those people who run to seek refuge from any draft too strong for them. An as yet hidden history still keeps the secret why all great thinkers after Socrates, with all their greatness, had to be such fugitives.

Socrates escaped the lure to write and express himself, and thus became the purest thinker of the West. It is not that Heidegger believes that writing and expression are only counter productive—he after all holds Hölderlin in such esteem as a poet-thinker—but it clearly seems that he recognises as the highest ability to keep oneself in silence, a silence that is intimated with the ability to allow oneself to be drawn fully and freely with the withdrawal. A silence is closely intimated with speaking of a different and higher kind; withdrawal, the moment it is understood in its sway, intimates its presence that stays away and yet pervades. It is possible that Heidegger understands that Socrates got this intimation. It is also obvious that Heidegger must have affirmed to himself that Hölderlin wrote and spoke in intimation and interaction with this silence.

The relation between going with the free sway of the withdrawal and silence, will appear to be less enigmatic once one realizes the full force of Heidegger’s understanding of what is called thinking from the perspective of the call. There is a call involved in thinking, and language is always a calling, a naming, which definitely manifests itself in silence. The silence of Socrates

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414 Ibid., p. 358.
415 Ibid., p. 358.
417 Ibid., p. 358.
may be hearkening to the call of thinking; and thus involved in thinking, one transcends the need to fugitively speak and express.

The question of What calls for thinking, is related to our very being:

If the question “What calls for thinking?” is asking what is it that first of all directs us to think, then we are asking for something that concerns ourselves because it calls upon us, upon our very being. It is we ourselves to whom the question “What is called thinking—what calls for thinking?” is addressed directly. We ourselves are in the text and texture of the question. The question “What calls us to think?” has already drawn us into the issue of the question. We ourselves are, in the strict sense of the word, put in question by the question. The question “What calls on us to think?” strikes us directly, like a lightning bolt.418

A lightning bolt will shake us to the very roots of our consciousness, and may even annihilate us. What does Heidegger mean then with this metaphor? To those who are pulled by this question; feel the immensity of its force, which shakes and overturns them. They are thus annihilated in being turned from within. This is a paradigm of the movement to the inner of consciousness, to the innermost heart; where one finds the verve of thinking.

What does the call stand to imply? One answer is that the call connotes “command.” But not necessarily; it may also imply “an anticipatory reaching out for something that is reached by our call, through our calling.”419 Reading by the Greek and Sanskrit roots of the word “call,” Heidegger locates call as not so much involved with the command than with “invitation,” a “letting reach.”420

This is not to dismiss the meaning of command, but command must be read in its proper sense. “Command,” as Heidegger sees it, is not to give an order, but “to command, entrust, give unto self-keeping, to shelter.”421 This itself clarifies that call as command appeals commandingly and is a letting-something be-reached. This is letting-something-arrive and come to its presence. In this way the calling to thinking, even if a command; is to commend thinking to man, to entrust it to its safekeeping, to shelter it with it. This is an enjoining unto our being to think, to let arrive, to let thinking arrive in its presence.422 I believe that this observation descends from the notion of abground in Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning. This also explains why Heidegger says that “Thinking is man’s simplest and hardest handiwork.”423 Heidegger asserts that only man has a hand, and in that sense only he has the ability for handcraft: “only a being

418 Ibid., p. 362.
419 Ibid., p. 363.
420 See, ibid., p. 363.
421 Ibid., p. 364.
422 Ibid., p. 364.
423 Ibid., p. 357.
who can speak, that is, think, can have hands and can achieve works of handicraft.\footnote{424} Hand is here not meant as a mere grasping organ; only a being who thinks has hands, hands which reach, receive, extend, design and create. Hand signs because man is a sign. Thinking is rooted in language: man thinks because he speaks; and this stands to mean that the foundation of hand and handicraft is language. Language is not limited to thinking; hands run everywhere we speak, most when we are silent.\footnote{425}

Is this understanding of thinking, however, only very appealingly ingenious and nothing else? Is it not a forced reading and thus with justice a thesis that appears strange? Heidegger says that this understanding of what thinking is appears strange because we do not know what language is, how language is to be lived in. We do not understand the nature and appeal of the call.\footnote{426} Forgotten in the quagmire of commonness—and to use the existentiale of \textit{Being and Time}, \textit{everydayness}—we have forgotten the meaning of language. At the same time, it also not that the common is all and only an error; but the commonness is an usurpation on the truth of language.

In fact, Heidegger does consider the "common" meaning of call, "to name," and says that "The current meaning of the word cannot simply be pushed aside in favour of the rare one, even though the rare signification may still be the proper one." \footnote{427} And why not? Heidegger continues with the answer; "That would be an open violation of language."\footnote{428} In any case, naming is related to the call. By its nature naming is calling, a commendation, a command, a letting-reach.

Once again we ask the question: What calls for thinking? Why \textit{does it call} for thinking?

"What is it that calls on us to think?" What makes a call upon us that we should think and, by thinking, be who we are?

That which calls us to think in this way presumably can do so only insofar as the calling itself, on its own, needs thought. What calls us to think, and thus commands, that is, brings our essential being into the keeping of thought, needs thinking because what calls us wants itself to be thought about according to its essence. What calls us to think demands for itself that it be tended, cared for, husbanded in its own essential being, by thought. . . . And what [the most thought provoking] gives us to think about, the gift it gives to us, is nothing less than itself—itself which calls us to enter thought.\footnote{429}

Heidegger does not say so directly—but perhaps this silence is intended. That which is most thought provoking and enjoins us to thought or itself, is Being.

\begin{itemize}
\item \cite{Ibid., p. 357.}
\item \cite{See, ibid., p. 357.}
\item \cite{See, ibid., p. 365.}
\item \cite{Ibid., p. 365-6.}
\item \cite{Ibid., pp. 366.}
\item \cite{Ibid., p. 367.}
\end{itemize}
5.2
From *Being and Time*
to “Opening and Presencing”

The relation between Being and Thinking is made even more clear, if at the same time also more radical and elusive, in the brilliant essay, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.”

What does Heidegger mean by end of philosophy? Does it mean the completion or perfection of philosophy? Or its transcendence? Or its dissipation and dissolution? The *End of Philosophy* as Heidegger sees it, is the completion of metaphysics, but a completion in philosophy being collected into its extreme possibility: “The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of philosophy’s history is gathered in its most extreme possibility. End as completion means this gathering.”

Philosophy’s end is understood by Heidegger in the usurpation of science and its domination of humanity. Sciences which have paradoxically enough, risen from philosophy and long separated themselves are now effecting the end of philosophy itself. Heidegger’s highly critical attitude to philosophy manifests itself in all his writings, and so notably in the essay that has just been considered: “What Calls for Thinking?” In this essay, Heidegger makes a terse, shocking statement, laden with immense repercussions on the architectonic structure of humankind:

Science does not think.

He himself adds

This is a shocking statement. Let the statement be shocking; even though we immediately add the supplementary statement that nonetheless science always and in its own fashion has to do with thinking. That fashion is genuine, and consequently fruitful only after the gulf has become visible that lies between thinking and the sciences, lies there unbridgeably.

If there is an unbridgeable gap, then this actually means something quite radical:

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431 Ibid., p. 375.
433 Ibid., p. 349.
There is no bridge here—only the leap. Hence there is nothing but mischief in all the makeshift ties and asses' bridges by which men today would set up a comfortable commerce between thinking and the sciences.\(^\text{434}\)

The sciences have come to dominate man who now thinks in terms of commodity, will to power and manipulate, in terms of calculability of everything, and in terms of cybernetics and technology. Sciences are both the rejecting the sense of wisdom as also taking over from philosophy, what is philosophy's domain; that is, the investigation of the regional areas of being;

However, the sciences still speak about the Being of beings in the unavoidable supposition of their regional categories. They just don't say so. They can deny their origin from philosophy, but never dispense with it. For in the scientific attitude of the sciences, the document of their birth from philosophy still speaks.\(^\text{435}\)

This is a gloomy picture if considered thus in isolation. Is this the destiny of philosophy? Is this last possibility, the only one for thinking? However, Heidegger, predictably enough, does not take this matter in isolation nor does he take even the faintest recourse to pessimism. There is the first possibility from which thinking and thinking of philosophy would have to start, a possibility that was not taken; neither experienced nor adopted.\(^\text{436}\)

This task of thinking is rather grotesque. Does it mean that in not giving unto philosophy and metaphysics, "a thinking which can neither be metaphysics nor science,"\(^\text{437}\) philosophy has fallen short of the parameters of thinking and thus fallen? However, no such conclusion is intended to be drawn here by Heidegger. Thinking will always be led to review the whole of philosophy in reviewing itself; and remains less than philosophy; and "short of the greatness of philosophers."\(^\text{438}\) Thinking cannot predict the future; but must speak to the present that which was said at philosophy's beginning and to it; but never thought in an explicit manner.\(^\text{439}\)

What then, is this momentous truth hidden form the very beginning of philosophy? The truth is the "openness" and the power of this opening:

Whenever a present being encounters another present being or even only lingers near it—but also where with Hegel, one being mirrors itself in another speculatively—there openness already rules, the free region is in play. . . . We call this openness that grants a possible letting-appear and show "opening."\(^\text{440}\)

\(^{431}\) Ibid., p. 349.
\(^{432}\) Ibid., p. 377.
\(^{433}\) Ibid., p. 377.
\(^{434}\) Ibid., p. 378.
\(^{435}\) Ibid., p. 378.
\(^{436}\) Ibid., p. 378-9.
\(^{437}\) Ibid., p. 384.
Heidegger goes to language to explicate this further: The German word *Lichtung* is derived from the French *Clairiere*, and related to the old words *Waldung* and *Feldung*, which mean foresting and fielding respectively. This gives Heidegger the way to understand and clarify upon the phenomenon of "opening." In contrast to the dense forest, there is the opening; the clearing which is free of any vegetation. This is the kind of clearing or opening sought to be explained and experienced here. This openness is primal to light (which makes a present as such) and darkness, time as well space. Quoting Goethe, Heidegger calls openness the "primal phenomenon." The openness is the primal phenomenon, the primal occurring. Thus, Heidegger says:

Accordingly, we may suggest that the day will come when we will not shun the question whether the opening, the free open, may not be that within which alone pure space and ecstatic time and everything present and absent in them have the place which gathers and protects everything. In Greek language, one is not speaking about the action of seeing, about *videre*, but about that which gleams and radiates. But it can radiate only if openness has already been granted. The beam of light first does not create the opening, openness, it only traverses it.

As Heidegger sees it, philosophy has not realised this "opening," only concerned with present, and the "presence of what is present." But not only presence but also absence depends upon the opening: "What is absent, too, cannot be such unless it presences in the *free space of the opening*." The opening, then, prevails but is unthought.

This opening is the *αληθεία* (*Aletheia*). Heidegger quotes the Goddess in Parmenides who calls it the "well rounded sphere," in the first fragment. Heidegger concludes that *aletheia* is called well rounded sphere because unconcealment is thoroughly balanced and uniform. Heidegger also focuses on Parmenides' phrase "untrembling heart of unconcealment," because unconcealment is a disclosure which is still and "gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to begin with." It is opening that is the granting to Being and thinking:

We must think *aletheia*, unconcealment, as the opening which first grants Being and thinking and their presencing to and fro for each other. The quiet heart of the opening is

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441 Ibid., p. 385.
442 See, ibid., p. 383-385.
443 Ibid., p. 383.
444 Ibid., p. 386.
445 Ibid., p. 386.
446 See, ibid., pp. 385-6.
447 Ibid., p. 387.
the place of stillness from which alone the possibility of belonging together of Being and thinking, that is, presence and apprehending, can arise at all.448

It is this *alētheia* that is the primal occurring that was never realised even though named at the very point where philosophy begins. Why is this *alētheia* forgotten? This is because not only within the opening opposites like present and absence, darkness and light inhere but also that *alētheia* has λητή (λήθε) as belonging to it. The unconcealment self-conceals itself.449

Consequently, Heidegger culminates this discussion with four questions:

Is it the *eukukleos* Aletheie, well-rounded unconcealment itself, thought of as the opening?
Does the title for the task of thinking then read instead of *Being and Time*: Opening and Presence?
But where does the opening come from and how is it given? What speaks in the "There is/It gives"?
The task of thinking would then be the surrender of previous thinking to the determination of the matter of thinking.450

It seems that Heidegger is downgrading Being to Unconcealment or Opening. But this is not so. We must read the third of the questions carefully: What gives the Opening? Having read Heidegger in the *Contributions*, we can assert that the opening is en-given by Being.

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Heidegger worked painstakingly and consistently towards the disclosure of Being, though that disclosure could not be said to have reached him. The most important is the vision given in *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning* where we are told that we must make the leap on to the "other beginning." In fact Philipse holds that even in *Being and Time* what is working in Heidegger’s mind is Husserl’s phenomenology, whereby meaning of anything can only be ultimately elucidated by acquaintance with its referent. And thus being must also have a supposed referent. Thereby, Heidegger concludes that the referent of “being” must have been an event in the past, now forgotten.451 Thus, Heidegger’s phenomenology was interwoven with his ontology, as he asserted indeed; and it aimed at a disclosure of Being.

For Heidegger, and more so as he approached his later years; the key to this disclosure lay in creativity; in the poet who traced Being in a time of destitution. Poetry was also interwoven with language and thinking deeply. Even thing came to reveal in later life the unfolding of the

448 Ibid., p. 387.
449 See, ibid., p. 392.
450 Ibid., p. 392.
fourfold. Language itself became the precinct of Being, and thinking had to become millennial by moving to the first, un-thought, forgotten beginning, the opening whereby and wherein everything is in play; and all opposites move in together.