CHAPTER - III

US AND INDIA: POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES
The US and India are the two largest democracies in the world. However, the political and military relations are strained and remain at a low key. Both the countries have had differences and misconceptions about each other. The main thrust of the US was to contain communism, whereas India’s concern was to struggle against colonialism and imperialism. The US wanted to counter communism through the united action of the US and the non communist nations like India and Pakistan. It persuaded India to be part of a military alliance i.e. South East Asian Treaty Organisation in 1954 and Central Treaty Organisation in 1955. India refused and preferred to remain non-aligned. The US was dissatisfied with India’s stance. India wanted to follow an independent line of action in its foreign policy. The US, which sought to become a global power, could not tolerate India’s independent stance. Pakistan acquired with the proposed military alliance. Pakistan was projected as the only alternative, through which the US could secure its objectives in the region. Pakistan thus became an ally of the US. The US began to treat India as an adversary. However, the US supported India in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

Its intention of supporting India was to uphold democracy and to contain communism in South Asia. In this chapter an attempt is made to analyse the US policy towards India with reference to the political issues of Kashmir and Goa. Also the military issues involving the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and 1971 have been examined to understand the US stance in this regard towards Pakistan. Moreover, the inconsistencies and misconceptions in the relationship between India and the US have been comprehensively analysed.

POLITICAL DIMENSION

Since its independence in 1947, India was preoccupied with two issues i.e. Kashmir and Goa. The US did oppose India on these issues due to its attachment with Pakistan and Portugal. However, the Goan issue was resolved in December 1961, but the Kashmir issue still remains unresolved.

1. KASHMIR

The Kashmir issue started as a dispute between India and Pakistan during 1947. At the time of partition (in 1947) Maharaja Harisingh, the ruler of Kashmir, decided to remain independent. However, Pakistan felt that the majority of the people in Kashmir were Muslims and hence wanted it to accede
to Pakistan. In an attempt to force Kashmir to become part of it, Pakistan sent tribal raiders on 22 October 1947 to Kashmir to counter the Maharaja. The Maharaja felt that it would not be possible for his forces to retaliate and sought the assistance of the Indian government (initially India did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Kashmir) to confront the invaders. However, the government of India felt that, without Kashmir acceding to the Indian Union, it could not send the Indian troops to Kashmir. At this juncture, the Maharaja wrote to Lord Mountbatten, the last British Governor General, on 26 October 1947 that he wanted his State to accede to the Indian Union. The Maharaja thus agreed to accede Kashmir to the Indian Union and signed an agreement with India on 26 October 1947. Under the terms of the agreement, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was conferred special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Thus, Kashmir became an integral part of India. It must be noted that Kashmir was not a part of British India but was a princely State under the rule of Harisingh till its accession to India in 1947. It could not, therefore, be given to Pakistan under India’s Independence Act of 1947. Contesting the accession of Kashmir to India, Pakistan, in 1948, claimed that India annexed Kashmir by force. According to Pakistan, since the ruler of Kashmir State was a Hindu, made his State a part of India on his own. Pakistan argued that Kashmir was important for it in

2 Ibid.
3 Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in his letter wrote "... with the conditions at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally, they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your government". Cited in Michael Brecher, The Struggle For Kashmir (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p.37.
4 Article 370 provides for temporary provisions in respect of the State of Jammu & Kashmir (J & K). It confers special status on J & K. As a result the powers of Parliament to make laws for J&K are limited. Consequently the laws passed by the Parliament are not directly applicable to the State of J&K unless adopted by the legislature of that State. However, the President is empowered to declare that Article 370 shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with certain exceptions or modifications. For details of Article 370 see The Constitution of India (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1990), pp.111-112.
economic terms since the major rivers of Pakistan have their source in Kashmir, it wanted to annex Kashmir to its territory.\(^6\)

India too claimed Kashmir was important to it for strategic reasons.\(^7\) If the Kashmir valley was under Pakistan, it would be difficult for India to send troops to Srinagar and from there to Kargil and Leh.\(^8\) Consequently, it would have forced India to leave a vast area in Laddakh for the Chinese and would have as a result, brought the Chinese closer to New Delhi.\(^9\) India brought the issue to the UN Security Council on 1 January 1948.\(^10\) The Indian representative sought justice from the Council under Article 35 of the UN Charter and sought Pakistan’s withdrawal from Kashmir.\(^11\)

**US INVOLVEMENT**

The US became involved in the Kashmir issue since the matter was brought to the notice of the UN Security Council on 1 January 1948. In the beginning, the US wanted to settle the problem peacefully because its interest

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\(^6\) Sir Zafrullah Khan, *Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations*, Pakistan, commented on the importance of Kashmir: "The possession of Kashmir can add nothing to the economy of India or to the strategic security of India. On the other hand, it is vital for Pakistan. If Kashmir should accede to India, Pakistan might as well, from both the economic and the strategic points of view become a feudatory of India or cease to exist as an independent sovereign State" cited in Brecher, n.3, p.48.

\(^7\) Strategically, Kashmir is vital to the security of India, it has been so ever since the dawn of history. Its northern provinces give direct gateways to the North-Western province of Pakistan and Northern Punjab. It is India’s only window to the Central Asian Republics in the North, China on the East and to Afghanistan on the West. Out of the five gateways opening into the geographic entity called India- Quetta, Gomal and Kuram Valleys, Khyber and Chitral - the last one, in Kashmir is the most easily accessible and at the lowest altitude". Cited in *Ibid*, p.46.


\(^9\) From Laddakh to New Delhi the distance would be 400 to 500 miles. *Ibid.*


\(^11\) Indian Representative sought the UN assistance to (1) prevent Pakistan government personnel, military and civil, from participating or assisting the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State. (2) urge other Pakistani nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, and (3) to deny to the invaders: access to use of its territory for operations against Kashmir. *Ibid.*
necessitated maintaining friendly relations, both with India and Pakistan. Friendly relations between India and Pakistan were necessary to secure a barrier against the expansive communism in the South Asian region. To this end, it called upon both the parties to solve the issue amicably. Warren Austin, the American representative, explaining the US policy on Kashmir in the UN Security Council on 4 February 1948, Stated that the sovereignty of Kashmir no longer vested with the Maharaja but was vested in India and exercised by it and therefore India petitioned the UN Security Council as Pakistan illegally entered Kashmir. Further, the United Nations Council on India Pakistan (UNCIP), on its own, on 13 August 1948 submitted a draft resolution to the Council. India felt unhappy with this resolution, as the Council did not criticize Pakistan for its aggression on Kashmir. It called upon both the parties on 17 January 1948 to cease hostilities. However, it is significant to note that the US considered Kashmir as a disputed territory and did not justify the accession of Kashmir to India. The US opined that Kashmir should become either a part of Pakistan or India, and were reluctant to recognise it as an Independent State. In fact, Sheikh Abdullah, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir (1948-1953), went to the UN Security Council in 1948 as an Indian representative to discuss the issue. He told the American Representative to the UN, Warren R. Austin that whichever side Kashmir decided to become a part of through a plebiscite, the other side would definitely resent the outcome, with the result that Kashmir would be a "bone of contention" between India and Pakistan. Austin said that Abdullah felt "it

13 Part I of the resolution contained the provisions for a cease fire. Part II of the resolution dealt with the principles of a Truce agreement which stated that the Pakistani army should withdraw from the State and India should reduce its forces with the approval of the Commission, to maintain law and order in the State. Part III of the resolution was important and it stated: "The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined according to the will of the people. To that end, upon acceptance of the Truce agreement, both governments agree to enter into consultations with the commission to determine fair and equitable conditions where by such free expression will be assured." UNSCOR, Fourth Year, Special supplement No.7, 1949, S/1430, pp. 21-23.

62
would be much better if Kashmir were independent and could seek American and British aid for development of (the) country (Kashmir).  In other words, Abdullah wanted to make Kashmir an independent State. His proposal was rejected by the US. The reason behind its refusal might be the proximity of Kashmir to both the Soviet Union and China. These two communist countries might not have allowed Kashmir to be independent. Notwithstanding this stance, the US maintained that a plebiscite recommended by the UNCIP should be conducted to solve the dispute. India's condition for a plebiscite was a withdrawal of the Pakistani invaders in toto, before it could be held. There was also a feeling in the US that the problem could be solved by dividing Kashmir on the basis of religion. The US became suspicious of India's commitment on the issue when, on 13 August 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India told Henderson Loy, the US Ambassador to India, that he did not want "moralistic advice" from the US or from any country on India's external and internal policies.

President Harry S. Truman in August 1949 sent letters to both Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan urging them to accept UNCIP's proposal in the interest of their respective nations and in the interest of the world community. India rejected the proposal as the acceptance of any type of arbitration would not be in its interest. Pakistan, unlike India, welcomed Truman's desire to push through the UNCIP's Proposal and appreciated his interest in the issue. The Pakistani leaders approved the proposal since it would augment the US support to its own stance on Kashmir.

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17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Nehru was not prepared to budge an inch on Kashmir, he would "hold his ground even if Kashmir, India and the whole world would go to pieces" FRUS 1949, Vol.6 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 1732.
20 See UNSCOR, n.13, pp.21-23.
22 Ibid.
On 14 March 1950, the US along with the UK, Cuba, Norway, called for
the de-militarization of Jammu and Kashmir and for self determination through
an impartial plebiscite.  
India rejected the plebiscite proposal on 15
September 1950 on the following grounds:

1. Pakistan was an aggressor and it would mean a surrender to aggression to
allow it to take part in the plebiscite;
2. The provision relating to the UN administration would mean that the
government of State would be superseded, and it went beyond what was necessary
for the purpose in view;
3. Participation of people belonging to the State of Jammu and Kashmir alone
has to be ensured in the "campaign" over plebiscite; and
4. The security of the State would be in jeopardy.

In October 1950, the ruling party of Kashmir i.e., the National
Conference designated Sheik Mohammed Abdullah as the Prime Minister. J & K
declared in 1947 that its goal was to convene a Constitutional Assembly for
Kashmir to decide the future of Kashmir. This decision was against the UN
proposal which had tried to decide the future of Kashmir through a plebiscite.
In January 1951, at the Conference of the Common-Wealth Prime Ministers at
London, the Kashmir issue came up for discussion. At this meeting, the
Australian Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies suggested three possible measures
to de-militarize Kashmir. Pakistan approved these terms but India rejected
them. As a result, the UN Security Council appointed Senator Dr. Frank P.
Graham, Democrat (North Carolina), Defence Manpower Administrator in the
Department of Labor in Washington, as a mediator on 30 April 1951. India
rejected it outright and claimed that the Council was partial towards
Pakistan. Pakistan on its part also began to suspect the US. It claimed

23 UN Year Book 1950 (New York: Department of Public Information, UN 1951),
p.308.
24 Ibid, p.312.
25 The Australian Prime Minister Proposals were:
1. To bring outside military forces to assist in demilitarization and police
the State during the plebiscite period.
2. Joint Indian - Pakistan force for conducting plebiscite.
3. To introduce forces recruited locally by the Plebiscite Administrator with
officers chosen from outside. Cited in FRUS 1951, Vol.6, Part II, 1977,
p.1707.
26 UN Year Book 1951, p.344.
that the US and Britain were not serious in pressurising India to agree to a plebiscite. The New York Times, commenting on this Pakistani assumption, wrote "India's tactics in blocking an immediate plebiscite in Kashmir have been received with too much indulgence by the Western Powers."\(^{27}\)

**SOVIET UNION INVOLVEMENT**

In 1952, for the first time, the Soviet Union raised its voice against the US - UK policy on Kashmir. On 17 January 1952 Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative to the Security Council, claimed that the Anglo-American policy was not directed towards solving the problem. Instead it held that the West wanted to keep the issue alive, so that it would be possible to convert Kashmir as their protectorate. Interestingly, he put forth his country's view on the issue by stating that the future of Kashmir needed a solution by the Kashmiris themselves through their own Constituent Assembly. India made it clear in response to Malik's statement that it had nothing to do with his statement and it did not want the Kashmir issue to become a part of an ideological conflict.\(^{28}\) It also did not want the issue to become a part of the Super Power divide as they were ideologically opposed to each other. It contended that the Soviet stance stemmed from the need:

(a) to support communists in India who supported independence for Kashmir,

(b) to widen the gap between India and Pakistan which would lead to a further delay in solving the problem;

(c) to develop animosity in India's mind towards the US and to work for a communist coup in Kashmir.\(^{29}\)

In January 1952, Girija S. Bajpai, the Secretary General of India's Ministry of External Affairs, put forth to Chester Bliss Bowles, the US ambassador to India (1951-53 and 1963-69) a proposal which "would give Azad Kashmir to Pakistan and Jammu to India outright, with the plebiscite confined to the valley."\(^{30}\) The US did not favour such a limited plebiscite. Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State in the Harry S.Truman administration (1947-1952) felt that such a proposal, if acceded to by the US, would be

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\(^{27}\)New York Times, 15 September 1951.


\(^{29}\)Ibid.

\(^{30}\)Ibid. p.1234.
tantamount to the US working towards divorcing the Kashmir issue from the UN orbit. However, in 1953, the US State Department advised the US President Dwight D. Eisenhower to send a proposal to India and Pakistan to divide Kashmir between them. As a result, Eisenhower sent Paul Hoffman, President of the Ford Foundation, to the sub Continent in April 1953. However, the visit was a failure. Later, there were three rounds of talks between India and Pakistan without any mediation in 1953. The third meeting which was held between them at New Delhi from 17 - 20 August 1953 resulted in a joint communique in which both parties urged for a quick settlement.\textsuperscript{31} They felt that the problem should be settled according to the wishes of the people of that State. Admiral Chester Nimitz from the US was designated as the Plebiscite administrator by the UN in 1953. India opposed Nimitz appointment as an administrator because the administrator according to it was to be designed from a small and not a big one.\textsuperscript{32} Pakistan, on the other hand, rejected India's plea to replace Nimitz as the administrator. Pakistan diplomatically supported the US appointee and thus came closer to the US. This was one such which act of Pakistan led the US to trust Pakistan.

Chester Bowles criticized the American support to Pakistani involvement in Kashmir in the name of self-determination for Kashmir. He argued that if the US give due respect for self determination, then why the US fought a civil war to prevent the Southern States from exercising self determination.\textsuperscript{33}

On 28 March 1958 Frank Graham of the US Ministry of Labour and the US representative in the UN, submitted his report to the UN Security Council. The report contained five recommendations envisaging direct negotiations between India and Pakistan, these were:\textsuperscript{34}

1. A renewed declaration in line with the UN resolution of 17 January 1948 and part I of the UNCIP resolution, according to which the two governments were to appeal to their respective people to assist in the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable for further negotiations and to refrain from making

\textsuperscript{31} Gupta, n.1, p.270.
\textsuperscript{32} Huque, n.15, p.50.
\textsuperscript{33} Bowles, n.8, p.505.
\textsuperscript{34} UNSCOR, 13th yr, supplement 1958, S/3984, pp 41-42.
statements and taking actions which would aggravate the situation;
2. Reaffirmation of respect for the integrity of the cease fire line;
3. A prompt study under the auspices of the UN representative to work out the modalities of administering the territory evacuated by Pakistan pending final solution; consideration of stationing UN troops on the Pakistani side of Kashmir;
4. An agreement between India and Pakistan on conducting plebiscite in the contested territory; and
5. Convening a conference of the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan at the earliest possible date.

Pakistan approved this report but India did not.\(^{35}\) Notwithstanding India's opposition to Graham's proposal, Bowies asked the State Department not to pressurize India on the issue as he wanted to maintain cordial relations with India. He was worried about the possibility of Soviet involvement and the opportunity it would gain to be friend of India. Therefore, he did not desire the US to interfere at that juncture. Putting forth India's position at the UN Security Council, the Indian representative to the UN, V.K. Krishna Menon on 3 May 1962 stated "Accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India was final and complete, its status could be altered only by the Government of India, and the Government of India could not permit secession of any unit of the union".\(^{36}\) Menon contended that the conduct of plebiscite in Kashmir would be irrelevant. Further emphasising that the UN Security Council was meeting for the 104th time on the issue, he said "you can hold 200 meetings, we will come here and every time you ask us, but on no condition shall we trade our sovereignty. On no condition shall we sell our heritage. On no condition shall we open the door for the disruption and the disintegration of India, which would be a calamity not only for the Indian people but for the whole of that part of the world..."\(^{37}\)

Disregarding and negating India's stance on Kashmir, the US representative to the UN Security Council, on 15 January 1962 called for a

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\(^{35}\) India did not approve the report because it equated both India and Pakistan. It did not mention that Pakistan as an aggressor. See \(\text{UNSCOR, n.13, p.23.}\)
\(^{36}\) \(\text{UNSCOR, 17th yr, 1009 mtg, 3 May 1962, pp.13-14.}\)
\(^{37}\) \(\text{Ibid, p.68.}\)
free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted in Kashmir. Reacting to the manner in which the US reacted to the issue on 22 June 1962, Menon noted in the UN Security Council that the Initiative in the debate was taken over by the US from the day the present sittings began. In other words, he said that the US was interested in being involved in the Kashmir issue. The US was very uncomfortable with Menon's words as it expected India to show loyalty or gratitude towards it, more so as it was a recipient of economic aid from the US. Further during the Chinese attack on India in 1962, the US had showed sympathy towards it. In 1962 it did not discuss the Kashmir issue. Its concentration was on the Sino-Indian war. However, Pakistan then did not support India, but supported China. There were anti-Indian posters in Karachi. It sought US pressure on Kashmir. The US initially refused to do so because India was faced by Chinese attack. John Kenneth Galbraith, the ambassador to India (1961-63), at a press conference on 28 December 1962 at New Delhi said "the US military assistance was in no way contingent on an India - Pakistan agreement on the Kashmir problem.... When our friends are in trouble, we are not doing business that way." The US President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) too refused to ask India to settle the Kashmir issue because he believed that Kashmir for both countries was "more important... than the struggle against communists."

However, due to the pressure from the State Department, President Kennedy pressurized India to enter into negotiations with Pakistan towards solving the Kashmir problem. Consequently, Nehru had to agree to the negotiations with Pakistan on 29 November 1962. There were six rounds of talks from 27 December 1962 to 16 December 1963 but it did not result in an agreement. When the issue was again discussed in the Security Council on 5 February 1964, India's representative, M.C. Chagla, the Minister

38 UNSCOR, 17th yr, 1016 mtg, 22 June 1962, p.4.
42 The first round of talks was held at Rawalpindi from 27 to 29 December 1962. The second round took place at New Delhi during 16-19 January 1963. The third round was held at Karachi between 8 and 10 February 1963. Fourth at Calcutta from 12 to 14 March 1963, fifth again at Karachi between 22 and 23 April and sixth and last round of talks were held at New Delhi from 15 to 16 May 1963. Cited in Gupta, n.1, pp 353-354.
for Education (1963-1966), reiterated India's stand of "not allowing the unity, integrity and the solidarity of the country to be sacrificed and made it clear that Kashmir had already become an integral part of the Indian union."

The unresolved issue in the UN Security Council turned into a war in 1965 and further intensified the strains in Indo-Pakistan ties. Since then the Kashmir issue remains unresolved. The US, over the years, accorded support to Pakistan on the Kashmir question essentially because of their strategic linkages. On this score, India's stance did not get the support of the US, more so due to its non-aligned stance. India's refusal to be a part of the US sponsored military alliances, led the US to support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.

GOA ISSUE

Goa, Daman and Diu situated on the Konkan-Bombay coast, occupies 1562 sq miles of area. It became a Portuguese possession in 1510 and it remained a colony of Portugal until its liberation in 1961. After independence, the Indian government wanted to bring the Portuguese and French colonies in Indian territory under its control. However, the Portuguese authorities refused to consider India's plea. On 27 February 1950 India invited Portugal for negotiations but the latter did not co-operate. On 12 June 1951, the Portuguese government adopted an amendment regarding its overseas territories in India and de-notified them as part of its provinces. Goa was accorded provincial status by the Portuguese to forestall efforts by India to incorporate it into its territory.

Portugal was unwilling to negotiate the matter with India, and India on its part was unable to convince Portugal about the legitimacy of its demand. As the momentum towards Goa's incorporation with India intensified during January 1955, a group of unarmed people from the Indian mainland tried to cross the Goan border, but were not allowed to do so and were fired at by the Portuguese directed police. The police firing resulted in the death of

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43 UNSCOR, 19th yr. 1088 mtg, 5 February 1964, pp.4-5.
fifteen people. The government of India in retaliation for this act of the Portuguese police broke its diplomatic relations with that country on 19 August 1955. India demonstrated patience and tried to reason with Portugal in order to get back Goa peacefully but it proved futile. Nehru’s commitment to deal with the issue of Goa effectively could be understood from the statement he made in the Rajya Sabha on 16 August 1961, he said “I have no intention of passing away before Goa is liberated”. He cautioned Portugal that India would attack at any time. Speaking in this regard in the Lok Sabha on 17 August 1961, he said “if I am asked at the present moment to give any kind of assurance that we shall not use armed force in regard to Goa, I am not in a position to give it”. Further, he pointed out that India’s use of force would be for defensive and not offensive purposes. On 18 November 1961, the Indian steamer ‘SS Sabarmati’ was hit from the Portuguese island of Anjdev (near Karwar) by the Portuguese force. The police under Portuguese administration killed one Indian fisherman. Such provocation by Portugal, compelled India to resort to military action. Indian army operations began on 18 December 1961 and it lasted for 24 hours and the very next day at 6 a.m. the Portuguese military surrendered to the Indian army.

US INVOLVEMENT IN GOA- A CASE OF DOUBLE STANDARDS

John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State during the Dwight D. Eisenhower era (1953-1961) became the champion of Portugal’s cause regarding the Goan issue. In a joint statement issued on 2 December 1955, at Washington with Paulo Cunha, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Eisenhower stated that Goa was a Portuguese province and not a colony. Later, on 6 December 1955 Dulles reiterated and defended Eisenhower’s stance. He contended that since Goa was ruled by Portugal for about 400 years, India had no right over the former.

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46 Ibid.
47 Lok Sabha Debates (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat), Vol.56, nos. 1-10, 17 August 1961, col.2775
49 See Roy, n.41, p.66.
Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev (1952-1971) during his visit to India in December 1955, criticised Dulles statement saying that if Goa belonged to Portugal because it was grabbed 400 years back, then the US should have remained a British colony.\textsuperscript{52} The US and the Western countries did not criticise Portugal on the Goan issue. They reiterated their stand that both parties should peacefully settle the problem. This was because of the fact that Portugal was a part of NATO and the US was in a way sympathetic to its claim on Goa and kept the issue alive.

Portugal brought the issue into the UN Security Council on 18 December 1961 and claimed that the Indian military build up near Goa posed a threat to peace. It called for international observers to be sent to the border of Goa to assess the strength of Indian forces present there.\textsuperscript{53} On 18 December 1961, Adlai Stevenson, the US Representative, participating in the discussion in the UN Security Council, stated that India could not lawfully use force against Goa because it was under Portuguese authority, specially when the peaceful means in the UN charter had not been exhausted.\textsuperscript{54} In response to this statement of Stevenson, India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, C.S. Jha, in the UN Security Council on 18 December 1961, stated that there could be no question of aggression against Indian people, who were for freedom.\textsuperscript{55} The Indian representative criticized the US representative’s view as it was not in tune with the merits of the issue. Stevenson on the one hand supported Portugal and on the other called upon both parties to solve the tangle peacefully. He, however, made three statements at the Security Council in this regard.\textsuperscript{56} The US, as a nation committed to anti colonialism, instead


\textsuperscript{54} Stevenson also expressed "it is the question of the use of armed force by one State against another and against its will, an act clearly forbidden by the Charter". Cited in Department of State Bulletin (DSB) (Washington D.C.: US Govt. printing office), Vol. 46, no.1178, 22 January 1962, pp.145 & 148.

\textsuperscript{55} UNSCOR, 16th yr., 987 mtg., 18 December 1961, p.11.

\textsuperscript{56} Stevenson’s first statement was made in the Security Council on 18 December 1961 when he said "the Charter promised ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ and pledges its members to ‘practice tolerance and live
of adopting an anti Indian stance in this regard, should have felt extremely happy that colonialism in India was being vanquished. Stevenson termed India’s action in Goa as invasion and not an act of liberation. There was no logic in Stevenson’s argument. There were certain dissenting voices condemning India’s violation of the Charter and also voices that supported India’s stance on the Goan issue. 57

The Eisenhower administration reckoned Goa as an integral part of Portugal. During the crisis, the US did not help India to confront the Portuguese rule in Goa because of its close linkages to Portugal.

MILITARY ISSUES
1. SINO-INDIAN WAR (1962)

China is the largest country in Asia and the most populous nation, with a population of over 1000 million. It is bordered by the Mongolian People's Republic (north), the Soviet Union and North Korea (north-east), the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea (east), and the South China Sea (south-east). Its boundary is shared on the south by Vietnam, Laos, Burma,

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57. Goa is a colony, no matter what legal fiction has been contrived in Lisbon, and if the Goans agreed, it should have been amicably transferred to India years ago as were the small French enclaves that remained on the Indian soil after India became independent. Goa does represent a thorn in India’s flesh... colonialism of the old style is dying rapidly in Africa. And there is no longer any logical room for colonialism in Asia either”. Cited in New York Times, 18 December 1961.

72
India, Bhutan, and Nepal; on the south-west by Pakistan, and on the west by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.^[58]

India and communist China maintained cordial relations since China emerged as an independent nation on 1 October 1949. Even prior to independence, they did not have strained relations.^[59]

After World War II, the world was divided into two blocs. The US and the USSR became powerful with different ideologies i.e. capitalist / democracy and communism respectively. At this juncture, communist China became independent, and sought to strengthen its influence in the world, particularly Asia. Consequently, it was keen on expanding its territory. Its Constitution required it as per Article 141, to protect the interest of its people in other countries.^[60] In other words, China set plans for developing its influence in other countries.

India, being a non-aligned country, could not visualise the danger from China. Nehru opined that by being non-aligned no one would attack India. With this impression he did not pay much attention towards strengthening India's defense establishment. India was the only country in the region which supported Chinese entry into the United Nations. The Peoples Republic of China was kept out of the UN framework until 1971. The legitimate place of China was occupied by Nationalist China backed by the US for over two decades. India, since the years of its entry into the UN, had been consistently supporting the Chinese cause for membership in the world body.

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^[60] Article 141 of the Constitution of the Republic of China envisages: The foreign policy of the Republic of China to be in accord with the spirit of independence ...and on the basis of the principle of equality and reciprocity, good neighbourliness with other nations and respect for treaties and the United Nations Charter. This was imperative to protect the rights and interests of overseas Chinese nationals, promote international co-operation, advance international justice, and ensure world peace. See Amos J. Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), p.529.
China was admitted as a member of the UN on 26 October 1971. Hence the US, which opposed Chinese entry as a member, was unhappy with India at that juncture.

**SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE**

Peking raised the border dispute for the first time in January 1959. In a letter on 23 January 1959, the Chinese Premier Chou En Lai wrote to Nehru that China had right over large chunks of Indian territory in different sectors of the Himalayas. But Nehru rejected the Chinese claim over Indian territory. However, the border question was not raised in 1954 when negotiations were held between China and India for the Agreement on Trade and Commerce.

The beginnings of Chinese military intervention into Indian territory could be traced in 1954. In June 1954, Chinese forces entered the Barahoti area (Uttar Pradesh, near river Sutlej). In April 1956, some armed forces entered Indian areas-west of the border Shipki Pass (Himachal Pradesh, near river Sutlej). In 1958, they occupied the Khunak Fort, about one and half miles within Indian territory in Laddakh. In July 1959, a Chinese armed forces entered the Spanggur area (Kashmir, near river Indus/ Pangong lake). In August, Chinese forces crossed the Thagla Ridge, Khinzhemane, and Migylitun area in North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). In November 1959, they entered sixty miles west and another forty miles western Laddakh by September 1962. By their attacks in September and October 1962, they occupied another 2,500 square miles of Indian territory in Laddakh and NEFA area. From then onwards

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61 Roy, n.41, p.83.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid, p.84.
65 Ibid.
67 Ibid, p.64.
68 Ibid, p.65.
70 Ibid.
the conflict between India and China took a serious turn. Chou was willing to accept the Mc Mahon line as the border line between India and China in 1956 changed his stance. In a letter to Nehru, on 8 September, he stated that the Chinese government absolutely did not recognize the so-called Mc Mahon line. India expressed its unhappiness to China regarding the maps published in 1956 which claimed 12,000 square miles of Laddakh region and 50,000 square miles in NEFA area as belonging to China. China adhered to the stance of the maps being those of the national government of Chiang kai-Shek and assured India that it would be rectified. Nonetheless it did not do so.

It was not prudent to trust a country which indicated a large chunk of Indian territory as its own. Nehru should have realized the dangers surrounding the border dispute in 1950 itself when China sent troops to Tibet and forcibly occupied it. On 29 April 1954 India and China signed an agreement on Trade and Commerce between Tibet and India. India recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Nehru, in retrospect, appeared to have miscalculated. India which emphatically voiced its protest against the US activities in Korea and Vietnam did not protest when China attacked Tibet in October 1950 and definitely erred on this account. The stance that it adopted against Chinese attack over Tibet, indicated that it was not keen about protecting Tibet but was more concerned about China's entry into the UN. This was indeed an ironic situation.

71 Mc Mahon line: In 1913-1934 the representatives of Britain, China and Tibet met at Simla, in October 1913, in a conference and discussed about the demarcation of the boundary between Tibet, on the one hand, and India and Burma, on the other. The demarcated line which was agreed was called as the Mc Mahon line. After the name of British representative at the Simla conference. The government of China did not ratify the convention because it opposed the proposal for the zonal division of Tibet, separation of Tibet or a great part of it from China. See M.G. Gupta, Encyclopedia of Contemporary International Affairs, Vol.2 (Agra: Y.K. Publications, 1987), p.39.


73 Ibid.

74 Nehru, n.59, p.314.

75 The Peoples Republic of China proclaimed independence on 1 October 1949. The Western countries opposed China's entry into the UN. India supported the representation of China in the UN on the principle of universality upon which the UN should be based. India supported the Chinese representation in the UN
On 22 October 1962, the Chinese troops attacked Tawang and Khinzemane in NEFA.\textsuperscript{76} Chou En-Lai on 24 October sent a letter to Nehru urging a peaceful settlement of the dispute.\textsuperscript{77} However, this proposal was rejected by India. On 26 October, 10,000 Chinese moved from Tawang in NEFA towards Tezpur in Assam.\textsuperscript{78} Till 19 November they continued to seize the main posts of India.\textsuperscript{79} It, at the same time, asked India to respond to its proposal for peaceful negotiations.\textsuperscript{80} It is important to note that the Soviet Premier, N. Krushchev informed Nehru that the Chinese offer should be accepted.\textsuperscript{81} Both the suggestions were rejected by the Indian Prime Minister. Finally, China unilaterally decided on a cease fire on 21 November,\textsuperscript{82} the reason being the US help sent to boost the Indian army against the Chinese attack and the US involvement in the crisis.

even in 1962 when it had a war with China.
\textsuperscript{76}For details see Neville Maxwell, \textit{India's China War} (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1970), p.358.
\textsuperscript{77}The letter of Chou contained mainly 3 proposals:
1. armed forces of each side should be withdrawn 20 km from the "line of actual control",
2. if the above proposal was accepted by India, the Chinese army would withdraw from the Eastern sector of the border to the north of the "line of actual control".
3. to settle the conflict, talks between Prime Ministers of China and India was necessary. See \textit{Ibid}, p.373.
\textsuperscript{78}\textit{Times of India} (Bombay), 27 October 1962.
\textsuperscript{79}One of the most important Indian army post was the post of Daulat Bag Oldi at the Southern end of the Karakorum pass which facilitates entry into Kashmir from the Sinkiang province of China. On 16 November 1962, Chinese labour started building a road from the Tibetan Plateau to Tawang which would provide access to dump equipment from China. Another post, Walong, which was important to India was also captured by Peking on 18 November. Through this post China could approach the Digboi oil fields in Assam. On 19 November 1962 it captured Se La pass in the eastern region of the North East Frontier Agency & Bomdi- La in the western sector of the east. See \textit{Facts on File}, Vol.22, no.1151, 15-21 November 1962, p.411.
\textsuperscript{80}On 4 November 1962 the Chinese Prime Minister in his letter to Nehru mentioned that the Mc Mahon line was still the line of actual control as existed between the Chinese and the Indian sides on 7 November 1959. The Chinese proposal was to allow Chinese forces about 100 kilo meters deep inside Indian territory in the western sector, eastern sector, and central sector, which would jeopardize Indian position. For details see Surya P.Sharma, \textit{The Chinese Recourse to Force Against India: A Case Study in Peaceful coexistence} (New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Government of India,1966),p.30.
\textsuperscript{81}See Sorensen, n.40, p.663.
\textsuperscript{82}See Maxwell, n.76, p.417.
The Chinese perhaps decided to launch this attack due to the following reasons:
1. Being a large country, China, could not accept India as the largest democracy not only in South Asia but in the whole of Asian region;
2. Its desire to assert its supremacy in Asia;
3. Its desire to stifle the democratic experiment in South Asia;
4. The weak Indian defense was an opportunity to be seized upon; and
5. India's mild response to the Chinese invasion/occupation of Tibet.

US INVOLVEMENT IN THE SINO-INDIAN WAR- 1962

In the beginning, the US did not wholeheartedly support India in the Sino-Indian conflict. Christian Archibald Herter, the Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, on 12 November 1959, also expressed doubt whether the US had any clear evidence regarding who was right or wrong in the dispute. However, President Kennedy supported India's position regarding the territory dispute. The US concerned was that if India ever passed behind the Iron curtain, if its efforts to maintain democracy failed, the cause of freedom would have an adverse affect not only in Asia but all through the underdeveloped world. Thus the US was ready to help India if there was a war with China. This development was unpalatable to Pakistan. Its President Mohammed Ayub Khan (1958-1969) cautioned the US about the latter's sympathy

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83 India did not concentrate on defense under Nehru's administration because India felt that since it was a non aligned country, none would attack it and hence it neglected its defence and was concentrating more on economic development. For details of difference between India and China in terms of military capability in 1964 see Military Capability of China, India, and Pakistan in 1964, Appendix.VIII, p.A-18.
84 The US feared adverse implications for the US that its involvement in the issue might divert the focus of the US from its main opponent- the Soviet Union and it might also drive Pakistan into Red China's arms. See Sorensen, n.40, p.663.
85 In addition to these, India's support in the UN for Chinese admission, its difference with the US on Cuban crisis (When the influence of the Soviet communism was deep in Castro government, the US decided to overthrow his regime. The US provided the Cuban exiles with arms and encouraged them to invade Cuba. India expressed its sympathy for the Castro government and treated the invasion as intervention), and the US unhappiness with India's non alignment policy further made the US reluctant to support India.
86 Cited in Rao, n.52, p.24.
88 Ibid.
towards India. He also pointed out that "Pakistan was re-examining its
continuance in the military pacts formed under the US aegis and that she would
adopt neutralism as it was the only way of safeguarding its security". However, Kennedy stated that Pakistan did forget the fact that the US alliance
with Pakistan was aimed to contain communism and not India. He further
pointed out that India also wanted to strengthen its defense against China. He
regretted that both Pakistan and India considered the Kashmir dispute more
important than fighting the communists. Chester Bowles (Ambassador to India
during 1951-1953 and 1963-1969 and the Under Secretary of State in the John
F. Kennedy administration in 1961) promised India that the US would support
India if there was an attack against it. The columnist C.L. Sulzberger
supported India.

US MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The US started supplying arms to India on 3 November 1962 and continued
it till 10 November 1962. India asked for transport planes from the US and
the latter agreed to give further assistance. However, it declined to supply

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88 In this regard Ayub Khan stated that the US military aid to India would
bolster India's strength in the region which he opined could result in a
89 Ibid.
90 Sorensen, n.40, p.663.
91 The Times (London), 23 October 1962.
92 Sulzberger wrote: "Washington recognizes Pakistan's loyalty to the two Asian
alliances arranged by the Eisenhower Administration and rather less
enthusiastically endorsed by Kennedy. But we also recognize that Pakistan
represents only 20 per cent of the Subcontinent and is divided into distant
halves. The sole hope of establishing a viable competitor to China is in
India. So our affection for an ally is tempered by geopolitical reality". Cited in C.L.Sulzberger, "The Kashmir Talks: An Important Parley", New York Times,
93 The jet planes which were carrying infantry weapons and ammunition flew from
Frankfurt (US-German Air Force Base) to Calcutta on the first day 3 November
1962. The mountain artillery needed by the Indian forces came from Turkey,
through the arrangement made by the US and the first phase of transporting
arms to India was completed by 10 November. Facts on File, Vol.22, no.1149,
1-7 November 1962, p.388.
machinery for the production of some weapons due to various reasons. It considered India's plea as "unrealistic".

In the second phase of the war, on 19 November 1962, China attacked the important posts (Bombi la, Longju, South of Walong near the border of Burma) and took them under its control in NEFA. Nehru again requested Kennedy to send arms to India. In the last three weeks of November, the government of India submitted five lists of requests for American weapons. Three of the request lists sought small arms worth $5,000,000. The other lists requested artillery, road building equipment and transport planes. Kennedy sent W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs (1961-1963), on a fact-finding politico-military mission to India in November 1962 to assess the extent of US aid required for India. While he was in New Delhi, Harriman stated that in giving aid to India Americans were protecting Pakistan as well as India. In other words, he meant that the US was protecting both from the expansionism of China. He felt that indirectly US was helping Pakistan from a possible Chinese attack. In reality, Pakistan was closer to China and it never had any war or conflict with it. Harriman reported to the US government that the border conflict would be long and hard and the US would have to take a decision on the amount and type of military aid to be supplied to India.

CHINA ENDS WAR

China unilaterally announced its cease fire on 21 November 1962. One of the reasons for the Chinese cease fire was the US help sent to beef up the Indian army to withstand the Chinese menace. The commitment to help India was a part of the US foreign policy objective to contain communism. One of the major fall out of the US aid to India during the Sino-Indian conflict was, Pakistan's misgivings about growing Indo-US friendship. It threatened the US that this relationship would force it (Pakistan) to look elsewhere to protect

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94 Reasons: Constant pressure from Pakistan, Nehru's pro-Moscow stand even when the Soviet Union did not support India on Sino-Indian conflict.
95 Sorensen, n.40, p.663.
98 Ibid.
itself. However, in an explanation to Pakistan regarding US aid to India, Harriman noted "We are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan .... Chinese incursions in the Sub-continent are a threat to Pakistan as well as India, and both have a common interest in opposing it. We have urged this point on both governments. Our help to India in no way diminishes or disqualifies our commitment to Pakistan". 99

India agreed not to use the military equipment given by the US except against Chinese attack, and it implied that it would not use US weapons against Pakistan. 100 However, due to the opposition in the US, Kennedy was forced to postpone agreeing to India's request. Bowles criticised the US action. In a meeting with the US President in late April 1963, he opined "If the US was not ready to help India, at this time, India would be compelled to look to the Soviet Union for military equipment". 101 The President understood his argument and agreed to give military aid to India. Despite strong opposition from the State Department and the Pentagon, it was Chester Bowles who played a significant role in convincing the White House to show interest in helping India in terms of military aid. With the active role played by Bowles, a tentative agreement between India and the US was signed in October 1963. Under this agreement, the US agreed to provide $75 million as military aid annually for five years. Unfortunately, this did not materialise because President Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November 1963 in Dallas, Texas, four days before the National Security Council meeting was scheduled. 102

Lyndon B Johnson was sworn in as the thirty sixth President (1963-1964; 1964-1968) of United States on 22 November 1963. Despite Pakistan's consistent opposition, he finally agreed to sign an agreement with India. The agreement was scheduled for 28 May 1964 in the White House. This too did not materialise because Nehru died before the scheduled date on 27 May 1964. Though the White House staff continued to regard the proposal as tenable, the officials in the South Asian Bureau of the Pentagon and State Department persuaded the President and the two Secretaries that the wisest course was to

100 _DSB_, Vol.47, 3 December 1962, p.838.
101 Bowles, n.8, p.440.
102 _Ibid._, p.481.
delay until the dust had a chance to settle.\textsuperscript{103} Bowles failed to convince the US to provide sophisticated planes to India. He argued that when the US was contemplating supply of supersonic jets to Pakistan in order to promote peace in the region, why did the US fail to think in similar vein as regards India? The US officials explained that the supply of supersonic jets to Pakistan was part of a long term CENTO agreement.\textsuperscript{104}

In May 1964, Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan (1962-1966) visited the US to convince the Johnson administration, the need for military aid but this was in vain.\textsuperscript{105} Later, on 28 August 1964, he visited the Soviet Union and discussed the need for aid with the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Rodin Malinovsky. As a result, on 11 September 1964 an agreement was concluded between them.\textsuperscript{106} Under this agreement, Moscow agreed to provide India 35 supersonic Mig-21 fighter jets and some tanks, as also to build 3 Mig-21 plants and to provide parts to assemble additional Mig-21s.\textsuperscript{107}

WHETHER NON ALIGNMENT POLICY?

Nehru did not seek help from outside to counter the Chinese. Apparently he did not realize the fact that India's military was inferior to the Chinese military.\textsuperscript{108} He initially rejected seeking military assistance because he felt that would mean joining an alliance. Morarji Desai, the Finance Minister (1958-1963) on 23 October 1962 informally requested Kenneth J. Galbraith, the US Ambassador to India (1961-1963) for American arms.\textsuperscript{109} Chinese invasion of

\textsuperscript{103}Bowles, n.b, p.483.
\textsuperscript{107}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108}India's army consisted of 12 divisions (each division consists from 1000 to 1500 men) only, against the 150 standing divisions plus the massive militia cadres maintained by China, see Helph J. Hetzalff, "India a year of stability and change" Asian Survey (Berkeley), Vol.3, no.2, February 1963, p.97-98.
India was, already expected by Indian leaders. In March 1962, General Brij Kaul, Chief of the General Staff of the Indian Armed Forces, met Chester Bowles at New Delhi and expressed that he expected an attack from China in between July and October 1962\textsuperscript{110} and discussed the possibility of the US help to counter it. It was learnt that Kaul and B.K. Nehru, the Indian ambassador to the US (1961-1968), discussed the matter with Jawaharlal Nehru in November 1961 also. However, due to political and financial reasons, Nehru refused to seek military aid from other countries.\textsuperscript{111}

The British Prime Minister Harold Mac Millan was willing to give military aid to India and started sending weapons to the Indian army in the last week of October 1962.\textsuperscript{112} India did not directly request the US for assistance. India perhaps felt that the US like UK would help India by sending military equipment. The US on the other hand did not intend to send any aid unless and until it was requested by Nehru. The Indian Prime Minister wrote to all heads of States on 26 October 1962 explaining the border conflict and seeking sympathy and help from all the freedom loving people. B.K. Nehru, the Indian Ambassador to Washington, explaining the situation to the US President, John F. Kennedy, stated that the Prime Minister (Nehru) found it difficult to make a direct request for armaments from the US. He told him that Nehru was expecting support on the basis of sympathy.\textsuperscript{113} The US President's reply to B.K. Nehru was that he was not interested in taking "advantage of India's misfortune to coerce her into a pact".\textsuperscript{114} Consequently Ambassador Galbraith met Nehru on 29 October 1962 and handed over President John F. Kennedy's letter. In the letter, Kennedy expressed his country's sympathy for India. Thus the process of "sympathy and support" was transformed into military assistance to India from the US. Galbraith, made an appeal to the US government to give assistance to India because India was a country opposed to communism.

\textsuperscript{110} Bowles, n.8, p.474.
\textsuperscript{111}India politically had been opposing the military alliance and if it obtained weapons, it had to spend more money on it, instead of spending on economic development. About assistance from other countries Nehru said "it is up to the friendly countries to render assistance but the extent to which they might help is a matter for them to decide." See Times of India, 29 October 1962.
\textsuperscript{112} See Maxwell, n.76, p.385.
\textsuperscript{113} See Sorensen, n.40, p.663.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
Opposition to communism was one of the principles to qualify for securing military aid from the US. However, Galbraith also stressed that any request for military assistance should be from the Prime Minister and not any other source. In fact, he was instructed by Kennedy that he should discuss this matter with India's Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon. He told Prime Minister that the American people would consider a request from him and not some one else because he was loved in the United States- as no one else from India. On 20 October 1962, India for the first time requested the US, for military assistance. Nehru explained that the assistance had nothing to do with the policy of non-alignment. The reason why Galbraith stressed that the request should come from Prime Minister was to show the other non aligned nations that Nehru had compromised on non alignment. Walter Lipmann (columnist of the Washington Post) wrote "the Indian policy of non alignment... has broken down and the proof is that Nehru has openly appealed to the United States for military aid." Apart from the US government, there was a strong support from the people in the US. They were ready to give donations and were willing to work as volunteers in the army.

The US government wanted to point out to others the difficulties faced by a country if it continued to remain non-aligned and also wanted to show them that capitalism was indispensable to fight all types of threat to sovereignty. Their purpose of giving aid to India was to entangle it in a military alliance. Addressing the State Information Ministers at New Delhi on 25

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115 Galbraith, n.109, p.444
117 Washington Post, 1 November 1962.
118 Prem Bhatia, a renowned Indian journalist, who was on a lecture tour of the US during the conflict said, "From the very early days of the fighting, and especially after 20 October 1962, private offers of assistance began to flood the Indian embassy in Washington. Apart from donations in cash, cheques and clothing, hundreds of Americans wrote to ask if they would be accepted as volunteers in the Indian armed forces. The donations were accepted but the offers of volunteers were politely turned down. One of the means for enlisting public support then considered was paid advertisements in the American press. Other men and women of good will were also organizing themselves in large numbers and one formed the impression that the Indian embassy was not adequately staffed to answer hundreds of queries that were flowing in". Cited in Times of India, 28 November 1962.
119 "One of the most common popular reactions to the abrupt shift in India's policies as a result of the Chinese "invasion" was an insistence that Nehru
October 1962, Nehru stated that he and his government were living in a world of dreams. This statement was interpreted as India's realization of the necessity of a military alliance. David Lawrence, a columnist (New York Herald Tribune) in an article reminded the other non aligned countries that they should learn a lesson from Nehru who realised the realities of the current world.

American columnist A.M. Rosenthal too wrote in the New York Times that India was under a false sense of security, that it would not be attacked by China and hence, would not need any aid from the West. Both these beliefs were proved wrong. He was of the opinion that one day, the Soviet Union would also dis-prove India's belief that it would support the latter.

In spite of all the above statements, it is true that India reiterated its stand to remain non-aligned. Further, no other non aligned country changed its policy and no one was ready to become a part of the military alliance. In fact, Nehru in his first speech over the All India Radio after the war commenced stated: "I believe in that policy (non alignment) and we shall continue to follow it. We are not going to give up our basic principles because of the present difficulty. Even this difficulty will be more effectively met by our continuing that policy". Hence, it was wrong to conclude that India gave up its policy of non alignment.

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now must prove that he was really ready to face realities by aligning India with the west and by dropping his opposition to military alliances. See Norman D.Palmer, South Asia and United Policy (Boston: Houghton, 1966), p.268.

For details see P.C. Chakravarti, "Indian Non-alignment and United States policy", Current History (Philadelphia), Vol.44, no.258, pp.129-134.


Rosenthal in an article entitled "Nehru's Two Battles", wrote: India's policy in a day - to - day practice was a three legged stool. Two legs are gone, the belief that Peking would not really attack, and belief that India could defend herself without aid from the West. Now the Prime Minister teeters on a third leg - the hope that one day the Soviet Union will be able to shake off its commitments to Peking and back India. Cited in New York Times, 12 November 1962, p.13.

2. INDO - PAK WAR 1965 AND US

Rann of Kutch is located between India's western State of Gujarat and the Sind region of western Pakistan along the Arabian Sea coast. In early April 1965, Pakistan claimed that since the Rann of Kutch (consisting 8,400 sq. miles of land) remains under water for about half of the year, the boundary line between India and Pakistan must be drawn through the middle of the Rann. India rejected Pakistan's demand and claimed the Rann to be under its control. Consequently, a war started between them in August 1965. Pakistan first launched an attack on the Rann. Consequently India opened a diversary move in Kashmir. India's army units attacked the Pakistan forces at the Hajli pir pass, which was the major infiltration route for Pakistani guerrilla forces entering Kashmir. Further, for the first time, India opened a front in the North by penetrating into Lahore. The 1965 war between India and Pakistan became an irritant to the US which had a vital interest in the region. It's assistance to both countries had become counter-productive when both were pitted against each other, all the time.

The US wanted to settle the issue amicably. Its representative to UN Adlai Stevenson, on 14 February 1964, maintained that a dispute "can only be settled... by agreement and by compromise, taking into account the free expression of the will of the people concerned." On 8 September 1965, the US announced the suspension of military aid to both countries. This was a big jolt to Pakistan. This embargo did not affect India much, as it was less dependent on the US for arms. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, the US representative to the UN, commenting about the embargo stated on 17 September 1965 "... I should like to emphasize that we have suspended arms shipments to both countries, since we want support for the Security Council's resolutions calling for a cease fire, to help bring about an end to this conflict and not to escalate it. It is the sense of the Security Council's resolutions that there be a prompt end and not an intensification of hostilities".


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On 20 September 1965, the Super Powers concurred in the Security Council to call for a cease fire. They understood that further escalation would prove advantageous to China. They felt that Pakistan would incline towards China and the latter might get involved in the war and pressurise India. Both the countries did not want China to become dominant in the region.

China warned India that it must bear the responsibility for all the consequences of its criminal and extended aggressions on the Sino-Indian border in Sikkim.\textsuperscript{126} It also blamed 'the US imperialism and the modern revisionists for their alleged backing of India ...'\textsuperscript{127} China sent an ultimatum to India on 17 September 1965 that it would attack India in case India did not demolish the alleged Indian military installation on Chinese territory and return to the Chinese border authorities the 800 sheep and 59 yaks which were kidnapped by India.\textsuperscript{128} It extended its ultimatum to India on 19 September 1965 by three more days.\textsuperscript{129} On 20 September 1965 the Security Council called upon both the parties to cease hostilities within 48 hours.\textsuperscript{130} Pakistan and India acceded the call on 21 and 22 September 1965 respectively. The Indo-Pak negotiations began and both sides agreed for a cease-fire and the Chinese ultimatum was ignored by India. It was estimated that nearly 3,000 people were killed on each side. It was also learnt that Pakistan used US weapons against Indian soldiers. Every Indian who had fought in the war had been felled or

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{126}Cited in Huque, n.15, p.148.
\textsuperscript{127}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128}See Asian Recorder (New Delhi), Vol.11, no.41, 8-14 October 1965, p.6715.
\textsuperscript{129}China alleged that India had constructed military installations on the Chinese side of the Sino-Sikkim border. The deadline put by Chinese government for demolishing the alleged Indian military installation on Chinese territory was 19 September 1965. Besides this the Chinese government asked the Indian government to return to the Chinese border authorities, 800 sheep and 59 yaks which had been kidnapped by India. Further it asked Indian government to assure the cessation of all intrusions and harassing raids across the border in the future. On 20 September Chinese troops fired at some places in the Laddakh border and in the Sikkim region. They fired at Dumchele, about 50 miles south-east of Chushui on the Laddakh border. In the Sikkim region, they fired at the Indian positions in the Nathula area and also near Ding Chula, about 3 1/2 miles south-east of Jelapla further down the Chumbi valley. They moved forward their forces to Daulet Beg Oldi, hot springs, Dumchele and Demchok in Laddakh and quite close to all the mountain passes on the Sikkim border along the Chumbi Valley. On 21 September it occupied 300 yards into Nathula. See Ibid, p.6715.
\textsuperscript{130}Huque, n.15, p.131.
\end{footnotesize}
injured by "an American bullet, an American shell or an American hand grenade."131 Thus Eisenhower's promise of the US arms to Pakistan not being used against India was negated by Pakistan.

If the US wanted to contain Soviet and Chinese influence in the region, it could have given Pakistan equipment for fighting in the mountainous terrain. The nature of military equipment supplied to Pakistan viz. tanks, motorized artillery etc. could be used only on the plains of North India. Interestingly Pakistan made it clear that it did not have any quarrel with either the Soviets or China. In other words, its primary target was India. Thus, the people of India concluded that the US was against India.

The US economic and military aid given to check communism helped both the countries indirectly to confront each other. The 1965 war proved that the US goal of military aid for containing the expansion of communism had failed, at least in the context of South Asia.

3. CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN—EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH

In the national elections held in Pakistan in December 1970, the Awami League led by Mujib-ur-Rehman, won 158 seats out of 160 allotted to East Pakistan and secured the required majority in the National Assembly of 300 members. Rehman, the leader of East Pakistan, demanded complete autonomy for East Pakistan. However, Yahya Khan, the President of Pakistan (1969-1971), refused to accede to Rehman's demand. Consequently, the East Pakistanis formed themselves into the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force). Yahya Khan could not tolerate the movement and started sending his army to suppress the movement. As the conflict intensified several East Pakistanis entered into the Indian territory. The persistent inflow of East Pakistanis evicted by the Pakistan forces posed a direct threat to India's security. India felt that the presence of millions of refugees (10 million) would create tension in States bordering East Pakistan.

INDO-US VIEW OF CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN

India and the US viewed the crisis from different perspectives. While India supported the Mukti Bahini, the US sided with the government of

131 Huque, n.15, p.131.
Pakistan, which was continuing brutal genocide in the East. India requested the US to pressurise Pakistan to agree for a political settlement which would allow the refugees to return home, as their continued presence was a threat to the Indian economy, as also the stability and security of India. However, the US treated the problem as an internal affair of Pakistan. India stressed the need for a political settlement of the crisis. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, participating in Lok Sabha debate on this issue on 24 May 1971 stated "We are convinced that there can be no military solution to the problem of East Bengal. A political solution must be brought about by those who have the power to do so.... The great powers have a special responsibility. If they exercise their power rightly and expeditiously then only we can look forward to durable peace on our Sub continent."  

India refused to comment on the crisis till 26 March, 1971. Soon after East Pakistan declared its independence on 17 December 1971, India announced its support to the freedom fighters of East Pakistan and accorded military support.

In November, Indira Gandhi visited several countries essentially to persuade US, Britain, France, West Germany and others to pressurise Pakistan to accept negotiations with Mujibir Rehman, but her trip was futile, as India failed to convince the US to adopt an objective stance on the issue.

Pakistan troops commenced operations in early November 1971 in the eastern sector. However Pakistan alleged that Indian armed forces launched an attack, on 21 November, on the south eastern sector of East Pakistan.

The issue was brought into the UN Security Council by the US. George Bush, the US ambassador to the UN, on 4 December 1971, accused India of its...

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132 Cited in Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.2, no.5, 24 May 1971, col.188.
133 The External Affairs Minster, Swaran Singh, on 20 July 1971 in the Lok Sabha declared: "If the Mukti Fauz succeeds in liberating the territory in Bangladesh and Pakistan uses it as a pretext for an attack on us, then I must make it clear that we are ready to defend ourselves." Ibid, Vol.6, no.42, 20 July 1971, col.26.
135 See UNSC, 1606 mtg, S/PV, 4 December 1971, pp.42,74-75.
Involvement in the East Pakistan crisis. He proposed a cease fire.\textsuperscript{136} The USSR opposed the proposal. The US called for another meeting of the UN Security Council on 12 December. At this meeting Bush observed 'In view of India’s defiance of world opinion the United States is now returning the issue to the Security Council. With East Pakistan virtually occupied by Indian troops, a continuation of the war would take increasingly the character of armed attack on the very existence of a Member of State of the United Nations...'.\textsuperscript{137} He called upon India and Pakistan to take measures for an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of troops. However, the USSR opposed it.\textsuperscript{138}

Richard Nixon, after the failure in his efforts to end the Indo-Pak conflict ordered the Seventh Fleet (\textit{USS Enterprise})\textsuperscript{139} on 10 December 1971 to enter into the Bay of Bengal to threaten Indian activities. A ten ship naval task force was dispatched on 10 December from the US Seventh Fleet off South Vietnam toward the Bay of Bengal in order to support the territorial integrity of West Pakistan. In response to this mis-adventure, a list of Soviet ships moved from Vladivostok towards the Bay of Bengal. On 5 December one Soviet mine sweeper and two destroyers entered into the Indian Ocean. On 7 December it sent two combat ships, a cruiser armed with surface-to-surface cruise missiles (SSM) and an anti-ship missile armed submarine. On 13 December three additional armed Soviet ships, a cruiser, a destroyer, and a submarine sailed for the Bay of Bengal.\textsuperscript{140} Sending of the Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal did not affect the Indian stand on the crisis. Thus sending the Seventh Fleet became a mere political and not an effective military measure adopted by the US. Indian armed forces continued their march towards Dacca. Commander General A.A.A.Niazi of the Pakistani troops realised the strength of Indian army and sought a cease fire. On 16 December he along with 80,000 soldiers

\textsuperscript{136}See \textit{UNSC}, n.135, pp.42,74-75.
\textsuperscript{137}Cited in \textit{UNSC}, 1611 mtg, S/PV, 12 December 1971, p.11.
\textsuperscript{138}See \textit{UNSC}, 1613 mtg, S/PV, 13 December 1971, pp.118-120.
\textsuperscript{139}The Enterprise, the largest aircraft carrier in the US fleet and the only nuclear-powered one in operation, carries about a hundred fighter-bombers, bombers, fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters and small cargo planes. See \textit{New York Times}, 13 December 1971.
surrendered to Indian army. Indira Gandhi on the same day ordered a unilateral cease fire. Thus the war ended on 17 December 1971 and Bangladesh was liberated from the Pakistan's military rulers.

The US recognised Bangladesh in April 1972 and commenced its diplomatic relations with it by 18 May 1972. The US supported Pakistan (West Pakistan) for various reasons. The US under Nixon administration sought to develop friendly relations with China to counter Soviet expansionism. Pakistan did the favour of getting Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State (1973-1977) to China to cultivate rapprochement with the Chinese government in 1971. It supported Pakistan since it was its military ally and it needed to convince China that the US was a reliable ally.

India signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union on 9 August 1971 at New Delhi.\(^\text{141}\) In this context India pointed out that friendship with the Soviet Union or any other country did not prevent India from maintaining friendly relations with any third country. The friendship treaty was altogether different from military pact or alliance.

INDO-US RELATIONS–INCONSISTENCIES AND MISCONCEPTIONS

The Indo-US relations suffered on account of several misconceptions in their approaches in international relations. For instance, India refused to enter into a military alliance and when India opted to be non-aligned, the US began to treat India as an adversary. It could not comprehend that India was equally unwilling to join the Soviet camp. India felt that by entering into an alliance, it would not be allowed to pursue an independent foreign policy. The alliance would result in a war. It's concern was to struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, did not show any interest and did not undertake any effort to contain communism. He believed "the Soviets and Chinese leaders were nationalists first and communists second and not basically aggressive."\(^\text{142}\)

\(^{141}\) For Indo-Soviet treaty see Foreign Affairs Report (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs), Vol.20, no.9, September 1971, pp.201-203.

\(^{142}\) For details see Ross N. Berkes, "India and the Communist world" Current History (Philadelphia), Vol.36, no.211, March 1959, pp.146-152.
India disapproved of the US policy that overemphasized on the cold war. It regarded the US as the exponent of imperialism in Asia, as the US in several ways supported its European allies to perpetuate their rule in their respective colonies for a long time. Though India's economy and military power were not of much relevance to it, the US sought its friendship because of its vast population and moral leadership among the Asian countries. However, India preferred to pursue non-alignment. The US was dissatisfied with India's stance.

India on its part adhered to the concept of non-alignment. Nehru felt that a military identification with either bloc would be most degrading and humiliating to any self-respecting people or nation. To this end, Nehru observed "It is an intolerable thought to me that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage only to degrade themselves in this way".143 As India wants to pursue an independent policy— in its foreign policy— it out rightly rejected military alignments, as such a policy would negate its independent stance and make it subservient to the powerful. The US did not reckon the concept of non-alignment as a credible policy. Equating it with neutrality, it reckoned it as immoral. India, however, rejected the Western views on non-alignment.

When India was attacked by China in 1962, the US expected India would give up the idea of peaceful coexistence and neutralism. It expected India to follow realistic doctrines, however— consequent upon the Chinese aggression— India refused to give up non-alignment and it even did not go along with the idea of permitting foreign troops on its soil to counter the Chinese troops.144

143 Nehru's remarks to the Bandung Conference in 1955 as reported in Hindustan Times, 28 April 1955.
144 An Indian diplomat in Washington stated "India wishes above all to keep the communist Chinese attack from escalating into a major war. Hence India is refusing Britain's offers of specialized troops and is avoiding anything like bombing raids into China... (Indians) also strongly reject any talk of resort to nuclear warfare, including the use of tactical atomic weapons... assuming these should be offered by the United States." See Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 2 November 1962.
Pakistan, however, agreed to the US proposal and became part of SEATO and CENTO in 1954 and 1955 respectively. The US began to support Pakistan. The US security perspectives in South Asia was to bolster Pakistan. This not only upset the balance of power in the region but also indirectly drew India and Pakistan in the cold war between the US and the USSR.

When the US decided to give military aid to Pakistan in 1954, it led to the build up of anti American sentiment in India. But the US aid given to Pakistan seemed to be logical, because Pakistan was its military ally due to its membership of CENTO and the other military linkages between the two. This was in direct contrast to India's policy of non alignment.

India has always followed an independent line of action in its foreign policy. The US which sought to become a global power could not tolerate India's independent stance and its efforts to be autonomous in its foreign policy. In the next chapter an attempt has been made to analyse the US military presence in the Indian Ocean and its effort to further strengthen and widen its interests in the region.