CHAPTER - II

US AND SOUTH ASIA-POLICY APPROACHES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MILITARY ALLIANCES
The US did not have any particular policy towards the South Asian Region because it did not attract the attention of the US in terms of economic interests (investment or trade). As the US had no deep cultural and historical ties with the region it paid little attention to South Asia in the early part of its post-independence period. This attitude was further magnified by the geopolitical locus of the US. Its interest towards the region commenced in 1950s due to the rise and thrust of communist expansionism. To counter the communist menace and promote its national interest (i.e. to uphold its strength in the region), the US began to take interest in South Asia.

In this chapter an attempt is made to analyse the US policy towards South Asia, its ineffectiveness in containing expansion of communism and its failure to bring India and Pakistan together to pursue its long term policy towards South Asia. The role of the Congress and the executives views on South Asia are also examined.

The US policy towards South Asia was "inconsistent, confused and reactive rather than calculated, long term, and innovative." Its policy fluctuated and this has to be comprehended in terms of the cold war situation prevalent between the Super Powers. In other words, its interest in the region has been a bi-product of the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. In the broad US policy objective, the South Asian region merited low priority.

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2Myron Weiner in his article entitled, "Critical Choices for India and America" stated "Unlike the Middle East, Indonesia or Nigeria, it (South Asia) has no resources vital to the American economy. Unlike Latin America it is not a region with substantial American private investment. Its geopolitical position raises no fundamental problems for American security.... Unlike China... India is seen as a regional not (an) international power. South Asia has no deep cultural or historic ties with the United States, and unlike the countries of Western Europe, Israel and Greece, no significant segment of the American population originates from nor has an enduring association with South Asia. In short, none of the elements exist that would attract the daily concerns of the President, Congress, the Press or the Foreign policy publics". Cited in Myron Weiner, "Critical Choices for India and America" in Arthur G. Rubinoff (ed), Canada and South Asia: Political and Strategic Relations
South Asia remains an area of peripheral and derivative interest to US. For the South Asian States, US South Asian regional policy was more important than its global pursuits. The US did not rely on South Asia for its resources, its investment and trade in the region was marginal. Its interest in South Asia stemmed from its global pursuits and its desire to contain communism in the area. Till 1960s, the US thrust was to contain international communism but after the Sino-American rapprochement in 1971, it centered on Soviet expansionism. South Asia became important to the US because it provided access to the strategically important gulf region. The oil embargo in 1973, revolution in Iran in 1978, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to a threat to the smooth supply of oil to the US and the West. In the light of these developments, the US decided to take an active role in this region. In its objective of maintaining regional stability, it aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. Further, it sought support for military alliances and succeeded in forming the following military alliances: South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954 and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955.3

Most of the countries of South Asia attained independence after World War II and as such were newly independent States and the US wanted to maintain good relations with them to prevent them from coming under the influence of communism. The economic assets of the region was less important, almost insignificant to the US.4 However, the US has always been a major factor in the defense and security policies of South Asian countries. For instance, on 5 March 1959, the US had a bilateral agreement with Pakistan.5 Its

3SEATO was signed by eight States in Manila, Philippines, on 8 September 1954. The members were: Pakistan (withdrew in 1972), the Philippines and Thailand from the Asian area, Australia and New Zealand from the South west Pacific and three western powers- Britain, France and the US. See Encyclopedia Americana, Vol.25 (New York:Encyclopedia Americana Corporation, 1976), p.34. The members of the Baghdad Pact were : Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain. In 1958 Iran withdrew from the pact. The organisation was renamed CENTO in 1959. It was dissolved in 1979. The US, although not an official member, had been associated with CENTO since its inception. See Encyclopedia Americana, Vol.6, 1976, p.187.

4See Weiner's article in Rubinoff, n.2, p.65.


(Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992), p.65.
Involvement in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, its decision of a military embargo on both India and Pakistan in 1965 when both the countries were involved in a war and its support to Pakistan in the 1971 war over East Pakistan are few examples of US military involvement in the region.

All countries in South Asia, except Maldives share a border with India. India's size, population, resources, and economy are greater than other States. They perceive domination by India in the region. The US did not seriously attempt to solve the intra-state conflicts in the region but its design was always aimed to foreclose the influence of USSR and China spreading in the region. The US concern about possible Soviet penetration in the two neighboring regions of South Asia i.e., South-East Asia and South-West Asia as also the Indian Ocean region led the US to accord importance to South Asia.

Although the US interest in the South Asian States did commence in 1950s, the smaller States of the South Asian region, Sri Lanka and Maldives, did not merit much attention from the US because these countries were not important in terms of geo-politics, or economy.

However, Nepal one of the autocratic countries in the world, which was opposing democratic freedom in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, did receive the attention of the US. The US wanted to develop its contacts with Nepal to foster democracy as opposed to the stance of the erstwhile totalitarian Soviet Union. It felt that the widening of Soviet and Chinese interest in the Himalayan periphery would attract Nepal to the communist world and thereby pitch it against its interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union /communist countries.

Thus, India and Pakistan prominently figured in the US agenda towards South Asia. In its formative years, both India and Pakistan merited the attention of the US. It tried hard to settle their differences amicably, so that the two together could counter the possible spread of communism in Asia. However, this did not materialise, as the two countries failed to sort out their differences especially with regard to the problem of Kashmir.

US AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA

After World War II, the US felt that global peace and security could be maintained only when the expansion of communism was checked. The US
believed that the threat from communist bloc could be monitored by the united action of the US and the non communist countries. With this in mind, it tried to persuade India to enter into a military alliance. However, India wanted to avoid the influence of the great powers in the region. Based on its experience in World War I and II, the US rejected the concept of neutrality. The US was unhappy with India's decision to remain a non aligned country. India's refusal to join the alliance, projected Pakistan as the only alternative available to the US through which it could secure its objectives in the region. Pakistan welcomed the membership of the military alliance—and enrolled in the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central

6 (i) Nehru, as head of the Interim government, enunciated India's foreign policy in a Radio broadcast on 7 September 1946. He said: "we propose, as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even faster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. For details see A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations 1947-1972, Vol.1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.3.

(ii) India's policy vis a vis military alliance was further elaborated by K.P.S. Menon, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India (1948-1952). Expressing his view in an article stated "our general policy is to avoid entanglement in power politics and not to join any group of powers against any other group. The two leading groups today are the Russian bloc and the Anglo-American bloc. We must be friendly to both and yet not join either..." cited in K.P.S. Menon, "India and the Soviet Union", in B.R. Nanda (ed), Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1976), pp.134-135.

7 (i) John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State (1953-1959) speaking at Iowa State College said "Except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception". Cited in New York Times, 10 June 1956.

(ii) At a press conference held on 12 June 1956 he stated "countries which denounce security pacts are seeking to promote a somewhat wrong view of neutrality". Cited in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Neutrality: varying Tunes", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.35, no.1, October 1956, p.65.

(iii) Charles G. Fenwick, International Jurist, wrote "neutrality...was an inherently illogical and paradoxical system which had neither the facts of history to justify nor the logic of practical politics, that it led inevitably to the situation where the neutral must surrender certain rights not worth fighting for and prepare to defend others which were too vital to surrender". Cited in Charles G. Fenwick, American Neutrality Trial and Failure (New York: New York University Press, 1940), p.5.

8 For details see South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEATO) (Manila), 8 September 1954, Appendix-1, pp.A-1-3.
Treaty Organisation (CENTO)\(^9\) in 1954 and 1955 respectively. These alliances enabled it to strengthen its capability vis-a-vis India.

**US AND PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE**

The strategic location of Pakistan in the overall context of Asia gained relevance in the US foreign policy calculations, more so to secure for itself, strategic air bases for defensive/offensive purposes. Sir Olaf Caroe, the Governor General of North-West Frontier (1947), drew the attention of the US policy makers early in the 1950s to the importance of an alliance with Pakistan. Though he recognized the importance of India in South Asia, he reckoned Pakistan to be of greater relevance than India, because the latter refused to join the US sponsored military alliance.\(^10\)

**MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAMME**

The US proposed a Middle East Defense system in 1952 to counter Soviet expansionism. This proposal was supported by Iran, Iraq, and Turkey besides Pakistan. On 22 May 1953, Mohammed Ali Bogra was appointed as Prime Minister of Pakistan. On 7 April 1953, he declared the importance of an alliance system between US and Pakistan.\(^11\) Defending Pakistani willingness to have an arms agreement with the US, Bogra, stated that such agreement would also help to protect the security of India.\(^12\) In reply, Nehru opined that he had no fear about any attack from any country. Simultaneously he felt that having an alliance with power blocs would bring insecurity and instability to the region.\(^13\) On 9 December 1953, he wrote to Bogra about his country's

\(^{9}\)For details see Pact of Mutual Cooperation between the Kingdom of Iraq, Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Pakistan and Kingdom of Iran (Baghdad Pact), 24 February 1955, Appendix-III, pp.A-7-8.


\(^{11}\)Mohammed Ali Bogra stated “We believe in the principle of collective security through the U.N. Until that is firmly established, nations situated as we are, would naturally be interested in measures designed to promote collective security on a regional basis. Pakistan is both a Middle Eastern and South Asian country. We have an abiding interest in the security of the countries in the Middle East. Like wise, we should be interested in any measure likely to promote political and social stability in South and South East Asia. Cited in *The Dawn* (Karachi), 23 May 1953.

\(^{12}\)Ibid.

\(^{13}\)Lok Sabha Debates (New Delhi:Parliamentary Secretariat), Vol. 10, no. 29, 23 December 1953, Col. 2977.
Opposition to the US aid to Pakistan. He mentioned that it was difficult to talk about demilitarization in Kashmir more so when Pakistan was ready to get military aid from the US. The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles (1953-1959), visited Pakistan on 23-24 May 1953 on a two day tour, and held a series of discussions with the Pakistani leaders. He felt that the Pakistanis were capable of countering the expansion of communism. However, on his part the US ambassador to India, Chester B. Bowles (1951-1953 and 1963-1969), tried to convince the US not to have an alliance with Pakistan. He conveyed to Dulles, that the proposal for an arms agreement with Pakistan would bring instability to South Asia as well as lead to severe complications in the future relations of US with the countries of the region.

The US government on its part felt that its economic aid to India would reduce India’s opposition to the military aid given to Pakistan. Further, due to its vulnerability in terms of territory, military and economic conditions, it felt, Pakistan was not equal to India and hence there was no question of a threat from Pakistan to India. Thus, despite the opposition from James William Fulbright, Bowles and others, the Eisenhower administration overcame it with the assumption that to counter communism, it was essential to have an alliance system. In this light it included Pakistan as a member of the new world sponsored alliance system for Asia. Thus, Pakistan became the member of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955.

In a separate development, the US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1952-1960), officially approved the arms agreement with Pakistan on 8

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14 Appadorai, n.6(i), p.254.
15 Dulles opined: "one of my clearest impression was that of the outstanding and sincere friendship which the leaders of Pakistan feel for the United States. I was greatly impressed with their understanding of world problems ... they will resist the menace of communism as their strength permits". Cited in Janki Sinha, Pakistan and the Indo-US Relations (1947-1958) (Patna: Associated Book Agency,1978), p.118.
18 For details see Baghdad Pact, Appendix.III, pp.A-7-8.
September 1954. Eisenhower informed Nehru, about his decision to extend military aid to Pakistan and stated that if India required military aid the US would also be willing to accept. Justifying the US military aid to Pakistan, he stated "regional groupings to ensure security against aggression constitute the most effective means to assure survival and progress. No nation can stand alone today". He assured India that the alliance with Pakistan was not directed against India. The Indian government reacted sharply to this US decision of entering into a military agreement with Pakistan. Nehru on his part criticized it, and said that it was an "anti-step, a step towards war not peace, a step which will bring war or the threat of war to our frontier, a step that would bring the cold war to India's own border*. Nehru felt that the incorporation of Pakistan into the alliance tended to encircle India and thereby threatened its security. Nehru addressing the Indian parliament on 1 March 1954, criticized Eisenhower's offer of military assistance to India. Eisenhower had no idea about the commitment and sincerity of India, against all military alliances. In direct contradiction to this stand of India regarding alliance per se the world over, the US felt that the collective system of defense was important to check the expansion of communism. Although it realized the fact that it alone could not attain the said objective, it believed and showed interest in military alliances. Dulles also pointed out the necessity of military alliance and worked for it. In his writings, Dulles

20 Appadoral, n.6(1), p.262.
21 Appadoral, n 6(1), p.263.
22 Eisenhower assured India and stated ... if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action, both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression*. Cited in Peter V. Curl (ed) Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), p.374.
23 Bowies, n.16, p.479.
24 For details see Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, 1947-64 (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1966), pp. 94-96.
25 Nehru said "In making this suggestion the President (Eisenhower) has done less than justice to us, or to himself. If we object to military aid being given to Pakistan we would be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists to accept such aid ourselves*. Ibid., p.267.
upheld the necessity of an alliance system in the bipolar world.\footnote{\text{26}} Though the US failed to attain a collective defense system with the Asian States, on 19 May 1954 it entered into a bilateral agreement with Pakistan, termed the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact, at Karachi. In terms of this agreement the US committed itself to provide military training as well as military equipment to Pakistan.\footnote{\text{27}}

**SOUTH EAST ASIAN TREATY ORGANIZATION (SEATO)**

SEATO was signed by eight States in Manila, Philippines, on 8 September 1954. The members were: Pakistan (withdrew in 1972), the Philippines and Thailand from the Asian area, Australia and New Zealand from the South west Pacific and three western powers—Britain, France and the US.

India was invited to attend the Conference which was held at Manila from 6 to 8 September 1954 by the US to discuss about the military alliance encompassing the States of South East Asia and US, but it rejected the invitation. The Conference led to the formation of the South East Asian Treaty Organization on 8 September 1954.\footnote{\text{28}} Dulles called the treaty an "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine."\footnote{\text{29}} He further expressed that the US had "profound satisfaction" with the pact and called it "a major step in building security" for South East Asia.\footnote{\text{30}} Its main purpose was to contain Chinese expansion.\footnote{\text{31}} Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who attended the Manila conference, declared: "Pakistan was less exclusively concerned with the

\footnote{\text{26}}Dulles argued that no nation could sustain itself and achieve security on its own. Collective security/defense, he maintained, was the cornerstone of security for the free nations. He felt that the US without the cooperation of allies could not retaliate against war. For detail see John F. Dulles "Policy For Security and Peace", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol.32. no.3. April 1954, p.355.

\footnote{\text{27}}See U.S-Pakistan Mutual Defence Agreement, Appendix.II, pp.A-4-6.

\footnote{\text{28}}For details see SEATO, Appendix.1. pp.A-1-3.


\footnote{\text{31}}*Ibid.*
possibility of communist aggression than the other signatories. For Pakistanis, the danger of being conquered by a communist power was very remote, compared with the immediate and continuing danger of forcible merger with India.

The members of SEATO pledged to protect themselves from an attack and prevent any activities directed against their security. Pakistan wanted the bloc to take action against aggression from any quarter. The US, however, stressed that the provisions in the pact would apply only to communist aggression. Both of them had divergent views in their approach to the pact. During the deliberations on the pact, Pakistan attempted to raise the Kashmir issue but the US rejected all moves of Pakistan to encompass Kashmir on to the agenda of SEATO. The US, perhaps, understood the Pakistani game i.e. linking the Kashmir issue with SEATO.

THE BAGHDAD PACT (CENTO)

The US considered the Middle East as a barrier between the East and the West. Having witnessed the Chinese communist success in overrunning mainland China during 1949; the North Korean attack over South Korea in 1950, the US felt that communism was a major threat to the US interests in Asia. In the beginning, the US did not extend a formal invitation to Pakistan to be a part of the proposed Baghdad Pact, because of consistent Indian opposition. However, the US proposal was not acceptable to all Arab countries. It was left to Pakistan to decide whether it wanted to be a part of the Pact. The Baghdad Pact was entered into in 1955. Pakistan, which was angling for an alliance partnership welcomed the proposal. The radical Arab States opposing US support to Israel, sought help from the Soviets to contend with the rising Israeli State. Iraq's pro-West policy was supplanted by an anti-Western stance, with the coming to power in Baghdad of a radical government (Iraqi

32 The Hindu (Madras), 30 July 1954.
35 For details see Baghdad Pact, Appendix.III, pp.A-7-8.
Communist regime) led by Abdul Karim el-Kassem in 1958. The new government under Kassem withdrew from the pact on 1 June 1959 and consequently, the pact was renamed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

The US was not a member, but the chief sponsor and a member of the Economic Committee of the pact. This pact was mainly to counter the Soviet Union and protect the US interests in the Middle East.

India was unhappy with all types of military alliances and opposed the pact. Nehru expressed India's stance to Dulles who was in India in March 1956 that the US military aid to Pakistan would compel India to spend more on defense instead of economic development. Dulles, however, stated at the news conference held in New Delhi on 10 March 1956 that the "US did not see why Pakistan should not be armed to resist communist aggression just because she was involved in a dispute with India". Dulles always opposed non-alignment and supported alliance systems. Equating non-alignment with neutrality, he argued that this policy was "an immoral and shortsighted conception". The US sought to achieve peace through military alliance, and India security through peace. India opposed military alliances. At this juncture, it is significant to note that a majority of the Americans during the 1950s felt that India was against the US as it refused to be a part of the alliance system mooted by the US. Instead of understanding the Indian legacy, they misunderstood it and labelled it as an enemy and a pro-Soviet entity. The Americans could not understand India's policy of non-alignment. It was only the US Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles (1961-63), who rightly understood India's constraints which foreclosed its becoming a part of any military alliance system. In the US Congress there were others who endorsed Bowles thinking on South Asia. Senator John Sherman Cooper (Republican-Kentucky-US ambassador to India-1955-1956), on 25 March 1958, presented India's case to the US government in the light of the need to uphold democracy in Asia and its

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38 For details see *Baghdad Pact*, Appendix.III, pp.4.7-8.
41 For Bowles' views, see Bowles, n.16, p.471.
importance to the US. He warned that if India failed to remain democratic it would endanger US stability. India's failure, he argued, would be a failure of democratic institution and methods which could endanger US stability. As a Senator, John F. Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts, 1953-1960), opposed US military aid to Pakistan. Speaking in the Senate, on 25 March 1958, he stated that India with a 400 million population—with China as its neighbour—should not be subjected to a policy of antagonism by the U.S; more so because of its policy of non-alignment. He cautioned that friendship need not be equated with military alliances. A US expert on South Asia, opined that the US aid to Pakistan would not be used by the latter against the USSR but against India.

US-PAKISTAN BILATERAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT

On 5 March 1959, the US and Pakistan signed a separate bilateral defense agreement. This agreement provided that in case of an aggression against Pakistan, the US would take action, which would include the use of armed forces against the aggressor. This agreement did not aid reduction of tension in the sub Continent. Instead, it aggravated the situation. The US maintained that its military aid would not be used against India but to contain communism in the region. Subsequently it changed its military policy and maintained that threat from any quarter upon Pakistan would merit its assistance. Given the geopolitical situation of South Asia, it was obvious that war would take place only between India and Pakistan more so due to the

42 Cooper stated that India was the largest non-communist nation in Asia. It was the most powerful country in the South Asian, Middle East and African region in terms of resources and present economic development. South Asia was confronting with the experiment of communist China—to advance by totalitarian methods, with the massive aid of Russia. If India failed to maintain its democratic methods, there would be a grave danger to democratic institutions in Asia. The democracy in India was in accord with the US national security, and was in harmony with US goal of sovereign, democratic nations. See in Norman D. Palmer, "India as a factor in United States Foreign Policy" International Studies (New Delhi), Vol. 6, no.1, July 1964, pp.65-66.


45 For details see U.S.-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement, Appendix XVI, pp. A.36-37.

46 See K. Ramachandra Rao, India, United States and Pakistan: A Triangular Relationship (Bombay: Himalaya Publishing House, 1985), p.95
recurring tensions between the two countries on 'Kashmir'. In fact Kashmir has remained mired in controversy since 1947. Prof. H.J. Morgenthau writing in Commentary in May 1964 correctly assessed the tenor of the US aid to Pakistan. He contended that "The alliance with Pakistan has from the outset been a useless and counterproductive instrument of American foreign policy; it could truly be called a diplomatic act against nature. For the military forces of Pakistan, built up with our (US) massive support, have as their primary target not the Soviet Union or China, but India..."  

US INVOLVEMENT IN 1965 INDO-PAKISTAN WAR AND 1971 EAST PAKISTAN CRISIS

India and Pakistan were involved in a war in 1965. This irritated the US which wanted to contain communism with the help of these two countries. Despite the military alliance with Pakistan, the US placed a military embargo on India and Pakistan in 1965 due to this war. In this conflict, the latter suffered more than the former because it was comparatively more dependent on the US. B.R. Bhagat, the Minister of State for Defense (1967) said in the Lok Sabha on 19 May 1967 that till September 1965 aid to Pakistan from US amounted to $1500 to $1700 million whereas India received only $76 million from the US. In 1966, the US wanted to reconsider the military embargo placed on both the countries since 1965. The Pentagon, the apex defence established of the US, felt that Pakistan, as an ally, should not suffer in terms of military aid and it urged the Lyndon B. Johnson administration (1964-1968) to relax the embargo and sought to provide military aid to Pakistan. In 1966, the US government partially lifted the embargo and allowed both India and Pakistan to purchase spare parts for non-lethal military equipment previously supplied by it. Pakistan was not happy with the US relaxation and wanted to secure the regular flow of equipment. The ban was further lifted in 1967. John A. Hooper, the US Defence Adviser (1966-1968), on 20 April 1967, testifying before Senate Sub-Committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, explained the reasons for the 'partial lift' he stated that US main objective in taking

Johnson became the President when John F. Kennedy, thirty fifth President (1961-1963) was assassinated on 22 November 1963. He was elected to a full term in 1964.
these steps was to promote stability and arms limitation on the sub
Continent. India, not withstanding these arguments of the US spokesman,
raised its voice against the lifting of the embargo, because it felt it would
spur Pakistan against India. M.C. Chagla, Indian Minister of External Affairs
(1965-1967), stated in the Lok Sabha, on 29 May 1967, that the lifting of the
embargo would create tension between Pakistan and India. He also maintained
in the Rajya Sabha that the US military aid to Pakistan compelled India to buy
arms from the USSR to match the arms which Pakistan was receiving from the
US.

In 1971 during the crisis in East Pakistan, the US supported the
Pakistan government and provided economic and military aid to it. It also
sent the US Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal to demonstrate its support to
the Pakistani military regime and thereby sought to rein in India's activities. This was the first time that the US directly supported Pakistan in
a war with India. In the 1965 war, though the US did try to stop the war, it
could not succeed. It did so in 1965 since its intention was to contain
communism and not to augment confrontation between India and Pakistan.
However, this equation changed in 1970s. Its rapprochement with China in 1971
made India no longer important to the US to contain China. The US and China
targeted against the USSR and India. It is in this context that the US
supported West Pakistan government in 1971.

US-AFGHANISTAN CRISIS

The US interfered in South Asia when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in
1979. On 27 December 1979, about 25,000 to 30,000 Soviet forces entered
Afghanistan which brought about a shift in the US military assistance

[50] See U.S. Senate, 90th Congress (Washington, D.C.), 1st session, Hearing
before Senate Sub committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 20 April


[52] Rajya Sabha Debates (New Delhi: Parliamentary Secretariat), Vol.61, no.5, 28
July 1967, cols. 1283-1284.

[53] Afghanistan fell under the communist control in April 1978. Nur Mohammed
Taraki became the President of Afghanistan in April. The Soviet Union
supported the Taraki's rule and the two countries signed a Treaty of
Friendship in December 1978. The newly established Marxist State was not
popular with the Muslim tribal communities and they were soon in revolt. There
was also fighting in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
programme to Pakistan. It extended its military aid to Pakistan to contain the activities of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The US association with SEATO, CENTO, its involvement in the affairs of South Asia especially its military alignment with Pakistan in 1950s, its military aid to Pakistan, its economic aid to India, its containment policy, its involvement in 1962 Sino-Indian war, 1965 and 1971 Indo-pakistan wars, and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were some of the examples for US involvement in the region. South Asia became important to the US when it confronted the USSR or China. Thus, the US relationship with South Asia should always be perceived in the context of its global security policies. The US policy towards the region was shaped more by the circumstances of the cold war. Pakistan's importance to the US was in the context of the Middle East and China, and India's importance in the context of USSR.

The relationship between the South Asian States (India and Pakistan) and the external powers (China, US and USSR) has changed. When India was close to China, Pakistan did not show interest in developing cordial relations with China. When the US supplied arms to India in 1962 war, Pakistan cultivated ties with China, which became one of its main arms supplier over time. When India refused to enlist in military alliances sponsored by the US; Pakistan agreed to do so and became a part of SEATO and CENTO. Thus, Pakistan systematically cultivated its relationship with the US essentially to offset the Indian state. Over the years the US became its major arms supplier. Similarly India cultivated relationship with the USSR to counter the growing linkages between US-Pakistan and later China. In no time the USSR became the major arms supplier and provided economic aid to its industries in the public sector for which support was not forthcoming from the West. The Soviets also supported India politically on issues like Goa and Kashmir, especially in the UN.

Taraki was ousted from office and replaced by the Premier Hafizullah Amin. When Amin was suspect to crush the native insurgency, the USSR intervened and invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979. Amin was killed and the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal as President on 2 January 1980. See Encyclopedia Americana, Vol.1 (Danbury, Connecticut: Grolier Incorporated, 1984), p.104.
South Asia is a region with inter-state conflicts and intra-state problems that create instability in the region. However, the US involvement in the region could not create stability in the region and it created more problems than it resolved.

**US CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDE TOWARD SOUTH ASIA**

The role of Congress in the pursuit of US foreign policy is significant. The members of Congress translate their perceptions into policy. The US policy toward South Asia was marginal because the latter did not attract the attention of the US in terms of economic interests and also as the US had no deep cultural and historical ties with the region. Despite this, some of the Congressmen recognised the importance and showed interest toward South Asia. Majority of the Congressmen show greater interest towards Pakistan than India.\(^{54}\) The Congressional influence over the executive authority on policy issues vis-a-vis South Asia i.e. supply of arms and the nuclear issue, is examined in the coming section.

**ARMS TO PAKISTAN**

The US’s induction of arms into the South Asian region in the 1950s and 1960s was to contain communism. In 1965, both India and Pakistan were involved in a war. The US supplied arms to Pakistan to contain communism and not for use against India. However, as Pakistan resorted to the use of military equipment which it received from the US in 1965 against India, the thirty-sixth President Lyndon B. Johnson (Democrat, 1963-1968), declared in 1965 to enforce a military embargo on both India and Pakistan. Richard Nixon, the thirty-seventh US President (Republican, 1969-74), who came to power in 1969, was inclined towards Pakistan. The Nixon administration decided to supply arms to Pakistan. The State Department on 7 October 1970 announced a one-time waiver to the arms embargo imposed on Pakistan by the erstwhile Johnson administration. In terms of this waiver, a package of military equipment amounting to $40-50 million was given to Pakistan.\(^{55}\)

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\(^{55}\) This package included 300 M-113 A1 armored personnel carrier, 4 maritime patrol aircraft, 7B-57B Canberra bombers, 6F-104s and with the option to
Senator William Bart (Republican– Ohio), in the Congress, criticised Nixon administration decision of 7 October 1970 to supply arms to Pakistan. He questioned the credibility of Pakistan being reckoned as a co-crusader in fighting anti-communist battles. He reminded that Pakistani leaders announced that there was no threat from the USSR or China. He argued that any decision by the US to supply arms to Pakistan was bound to intensify the arms proliferation in the region, and India and Pakistan would divert their resources to procure arms.

In the East Pakistan crisis of 1971, the Pakistani government sent its army to suppress the movement for liberation in East Pakistan. India and the US viewed the crisis from different perspectives. While India supported the liberation movement, the US sided with the government of West Pakistan. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee however passed a resolution on 6 May 1971, in the Senate, calling for the suspension of all US military aid to Pakistan. It opposed Pakistani government killing innocent people. Due to this Congressional opposition, arms aid worth $3.4 million which was supposed to be given to Pakistan was canceled.

The opposition in the Congress was spearheaded by Senator, Edward Kennedy, on 7 July 1971. He opposed the supply of military equipment to Pakistan, because Pakistan procured arms from other Countries (China, the USSR and UK) which was in turn used in crush the autonomy movement in East Pakistan. The movement for autonomy in East Pakistan during 1971, ultimately purchase 14F-5A/B fighters. For details see statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, James H. Noyes, 20 March 1973. US, House, 93rd Cong. 1st sess, Committee of Foreign Affairs, sub Committee on the Near East and South Asia, Hearings, US Interests and Policies towards South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp.92-93.


57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.


60 Congressional Record, Vol. 117, part 18, 7 July 1971, p.23842.
led to the break up of Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh. Senator Charles Harting Percy (Republican, Illinois), on 11 September 1973, questioned in the Senate, the US arms policy towards South Asia and criticised induction of arms in South Asia. 61

Senator, Stuart Symington (Democrat, Missouri), introduced a resolution in June 1976 in the Senate. This resolution was known as Symington Amendment. It provided that the US economic and military assistance was to be withheld till Pakistan places all nuclear facilities under the international safeguards. 62

In April 1979, the US administration terminated US aid to Pakistan because the latter was involved in nuclear activities. However, due to the hostage situation in Iran 63 and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, 64 the US lifted its arms embargo on Pakistan from 1980 onwards.

Under the Public Law 97-113, 65 President was allowed to waive the Symington amendment 66 to give military aid to Pakistan due to the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In 1987, the Republican administration announced $4.02 billion assurance to Pakistan over six years, provided that the President certifies that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. 67

61 US, Senate, 93rd Cong, 1st sess, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger as a Secretary of State (Washington, D.C), 7,10, 11, & 14 September 1973, pp.141-142.
63 In 1978 the dissidents in Iran opposed the Shah's region which was under western influence. On 4 November 1979 several Iranian youth seized the US embassy in Teheran and took 66 members of the staff hostage, demanding the US return the Shah, who was then in New York. See Henry F.Graff (ed), The Presidents: A Reference History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984), p.670.
64 See Encyclopedia Americana, n.53, p..104.
65 Public Law 97-113 was passed in December 1981 in the Congress. This provided President to authorise appropriations for development and security assurance programmes. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C), Vol.37, 90th Cong, 2nd sess, 1981, p.F-7.
In 1981 Ronald Reagan (Republican) assumed office in the US as the fortieth President (1981-1988). Like Nixon, he showed keen interest in Pakistan. He realised the importance of Pakistan not only to counter Soviet expansion but also to facilitate access to oil of Middle East. He announced on 15 June 1981 $3.2 billion aid to Pakistan and agreed to sell 40 F16 aircraft to Pakistan under the $3.2 billion package. These aircraft were to be delivered in two phases i.e. 6 aircraft in first phase in June 1983 and remaining in the second phase by the end of 1984.

Mark Hatfield, the Republican Party Senator and Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee (97th-99th Congress) did not support his administration's decision. He recalled the incident of 1979, in which the US government facilities at Karachi and Lahore were destroyed and the US embassy in Islamabad was burnt down. He observed that the Mohammed Zia-UL-Haq regime took more than five hours to respond to the incident. He questioned "...can anyone seriously believe that these same individuals can be trusted to defend American interest".

In 1984, Senators Alan Cranston (Democrat, California) and John Glenn (Democrat, Ohio) adopted an amendment, in the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, that US should not give aid to Pakistan unless the President certified that Pakistan does not attempt to obtain a nuclear explosive device and desists from acquiring any material or equipment for a nuclear programme.

Selig S. Harrison, a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, D.C.), in his article, pointed out that F16 aircraft were not suitable to meet the Soviet challenge on the Afghan frontier. He argued that F-5C would be more suitable to operate on the

mountains. He advised that instead of developing animosity between India and Pakistan, the US should have concentrated on cooperation between them.\textsuperscript{72}

Representative Stephen Solarz (Democrat, New York), Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Sub Committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, reduced the waiving of the Symington amendment for six to two years.\textsuperscript{73}

In July 1987, Arshad Pervez, a Pakistani-born Canadian citizen, was arrested for allegedly trying to buy 25 tons of a special steel alloy for using in nuclear programme in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{74} In this connection, Representative Solarz and Senator Larry Pressler (Republican-South Dakota) jointly introduced a resolution in the Congress -that the US should cut off aid if the President found that Pakistan was involved in making nuclear weapons.

Senator John Glenn, Chairman of the Government Operations Committee (100th Congress), disclosed that Pakistan was possessing the components and the means for assembling a working nuclear explosive device.\textsuperscript{75} But due to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, most of the Congress men were reluctant to suspend aid to Pakistan. In spite of this, Solarz and Glenn sought to suspend aid. Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (98th-100th Congress), requested Reagan to suspend military aid to Pakistan until the issue resolved itself. The Reagan administration was not able to convince Pakistan for nuclear inspection. Congress in September 1987 suspended aid to Pakistan for six weeks.\textsuperscript{76} In 1985, Larry Pressler introduced an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1985, which denied foreign aid to any country that attempted illegally to obtain US material or technology to


\textsuperscript{73}See Rubinoff in Gould and Ganguly, n.54, p.168.


build a nuclear weapon. The amendment required that the President suspend all aid if he determined that Pakistan had possessed nuclear weapon. 77

The US was not able to put pressure on Pakistan due to the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. As Glenn told his colleagues that if the US wanted to concentrate only on Afghanistan, then it would end up with arms race in South Asia. 78 The Senate adopted, on 11 December, to give Pakistan a six year waiver of the Symington and Glenn amendments on the condition that the President should certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device. On 17 December 1987, the President certified that Pakistan does not have a nuclear bomb. 79 The 1987 episode illustrated that the Afghanistan crisis compelled Congress to overlook its concern about Pakistan's nuclear activities.

NUCLEAR ISSUE

The US reckons the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programmes as major threats to regional as well as global stability. The issue has become a main concern of Congress and the administration. 80 India tested a nuclear device in 1974. Majority of the Congressmen opposed India's test and sought to stop supply of fuel to the Tarapur Plant. 81 However, there were few men who did favour fuel supply to India. The Congress man Richard Ottinger (Democrat-New York), on 1 May 1978, Introduced House Concurrent Resolution 599 to oppose the export of nuclear fuel to India. However, the House rejected the resolution. 82

79 See Rubinoff in Gould and Ganguly, n.54, p.172.
81 The US and India concluded an agreement in Washington on 8 August 1963 for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy. This came into force on 25 October 1963 and it enabled India to secure enriched uranium from the US for its Tarapur Atomic Power Plant. For details see India-Atomic Energy Cooperation for civil uses, Appendix XV, pp. A-29-35.
The House approved the sale of the nuclear fuel to India on 12 July 1978, by a vote of 227 to 181.\textsuperscript{83}

Jimmy Carter, Democrat, assumed office in January 1977. He was sympathetic towards India. India being the largest democracy in the World, he wanted to strengthen the US ties with this South Asian State to promote stability in the region. He also tried to persuade India to accept non proliferation goals by supporting fuel to India. President Carter in June 1980 approved nuclear fuel shipment to India. The House rejected his proposal by 298 to 98 votes. The Senate which was more powerful supported the President’s decision by the narrow vote of 48 to 46.\textsuperscript{84}

In the Senate, a serious debate on the shipment of nuclear fuel to India took place on 23, 24 July 1980. Majority of the members did not support fuel supply to India. However, Senator Charles H. Percy supported the motion to supply fuel to India.\textsuperscript{85}

Joseph Nye, the Representative, in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on 23 July 1980, said that if US rejected fuel supply to India then it would breaking its contract to supply the fuel.\textsuperscript{86}

Thus there were few Congressmen keenly interested in maintaining cordial relationship with India.

**US PRESIDENTS’ VIEW ON SOUTH ASIA**

In the post World War II, Harry S. Truman (thirty third President, Democrat, 1945-1953) felt that peace could be maintained only when the expansion of communism was contained. He felt that the communist expansion could be monitored by the united action of the US and the non communist countries. He tried to persuade India to enter into a military alliance but

\textsuperscript{83} See *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 95th Cong. 2nd sess, Vol.34, 1978, p.371.
\textsuperscript{84} See *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol.36, 96th Cong. 2nd sess, 1980, p.338.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, p.2136.
It declined to be a part of the alliance. Dwight D. Eisenhower (thirty fourth President, Republican, 1953-1961) could not convince India to enter into a military alliance and projected Pakistan as the only alternative available to the US. However, the US President, did continue to support India in terms of economic aid so that it did not fall under the communist bloc. John F. Kennedy (thirty fifth President, Democrat, 1961-1963), continued to support India to use the latter to counter Chinese expansion in Asia. He helped India during Sino-Indian conflict (1962). Lyndon B. Johnson (thirty sixth US President, Democrat, 1963-1964, 1964-1969), also gave importance to India to counter the Chinese influence in South Asia. However, when Richard Nixon who assumed office in 1969 as the thirty seventh President, 1969-1974, he was not interested in promoting India. He gave importance to Pakistan more than India. Nixon had personal experience in South Asia during his trip in 1957 as a Vice President. Indians did not give importance to him where as Pakistani people gave importance to him. Speaking about the relationship between the US and Pakistan, Nixon, who visited Lahore, Pakistan, on 1 August 1969 stated that the US sought to restore a relationship of friendship based on mutual trust which was essential to good relations between the two countries. The US had rapprochement with China in 1971. India became no longer important to the US to contain China. The US and China aimed at the containment of USSR and India. The US’s confrontation with India during Nixon administration was at its peak. During Bangladesh crisis in 1971 the US under the Nixon administration supported the West Pakistan government and provided economic and military aid to it. This was the first time that the US directly supported Pakistan in a war with India.

When the US decided to move positively towards China, it became clear that it could not become a guarantor to India if attacked by China. Nixon did not show importance to South Asia in general or India in particular. His involvement in the region was the result of global concerns. Nixon felt that India could neither help nor hurt the US because India was far away from the US and of low priority compared to other parts of the world.

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87 See Appadorai, n.6(ii), p.3.
89 See Baldev Raj Nayar, American Geopolitics and India (New Delhi: Manohar Book Services, 1976), pp.33-36.
Nixon resignation from the Presidency, due to his involvement in Watergate, was seen as a positive development by the Indians. India was not happy with Nixon because he was inclined towards Pakistan and China. His successor Gerald Ford (thirty eighth President, Republican, 1974-1977), unlike his predecessor, showed interest in developing friendly relations with India. However, when the government of India proclaimed an Emergency in 1975 it was a set back to friendly relations between the US and India. Ford postponed a scheduled trip to India in 1975 and expressed unhappiness over the sad development in India.

The Republicans handed the Presidency over to Democrat Jimmy Carter in 1977 (thirty ninth US President, 1977-1980). The Carter administration sought good relations with India and Pakistan, unlike Nixon who was more inclined to Pakistan. The new democrat administration wanted to reduce tensions in South Asia. During 1-3 January 1978, on his visit to New Delhi, in an address to the Indian Parliament, Carter referred to India as evidence that authoritarian government was not requisite to less developed countries' achievement of economic and social progress.  

Though Carter was sympathetic towards India, he adopted a tough stance on the nuclear issue. Under his administration Nuclear Non Proliferation Act 1978 was introduced. The Act imposed on the non nuclear weapon States the following conditions:  
1. accept IAEA safeguards for their nuclear facilities;  
2. refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear explosive devices;  
3. refraining from reprocessing of US supplied spent fuel.

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90 On 17 June five burglars were arrested in the Democratic Party Head quarters in the Watergate office in Washington. The White House arranged to steal documents from the Democratic Party Head quarters in the Watergate office building. Nixon tried to cover up the scandal. But these activities were found by the Supreme Court and on 24 July announced that his impeachment was certain and he resigned. See Henry F. Graff (ed), Reference History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984), pp.633-636.  
India did not concur with this Act. However, Carter, in 1978, issued an executive order authorising the export of 7,368 kg of low enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant. He justified his decision by stating that Indian government assured the US that it would not use imported fuel for military purposes. He felt that non-supply of fuel would undermine his efforts to persuade India to keep its nuclear facilities under the full scope safeguards.

On 27 December 1979 the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan, which brought about a shift in the US military assistance programme to Pakistan. Due to this new development, the US had to review its military stance towards Pakistan. Thus, consequent to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration announced on 12 January 1980 $400 million aid to Pakistan to counter the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan rejected the offer. There were two factors which influenced Carter to limit the aid up to $400 million:

a. resumption of arms sales to Pakistan would be a major blow to the Carter administration's non-proliferation policy and

b. he did not want to jeopardise relations with India.

The Carter administration noticed the anxieties caused in India by its offer of arms to Pakistan. In January 1980 Carter sent his adviser Clark Clifford to India to assure India that supply of arms to Pakistan was not to confront India.

In 1981, Ronald Reagan assumed office as the fortieth US President (1981-1988). He, unlike his democratic predecessor, demonstrated his interest to expand both economic and military assistance to Pakistan. He realised the

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93. Noorani, n.92, pp.413-416.
96. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the Reagan administration, Jane A. Coon stated that the US intended to construct a new relationship with Pakistan in a measured way, to fulfill the best interests of both countries. She added that Pakistan deserved the US support and the latter would protect it from any attack from the Soviets. For statement by Jane A. Coon, 27 April 1981, see U.S, House, 97th Cong, 1st sess,
importance of Pakistan not only to counter Soviet expansion but also to facilitate access to oil in the Middle East. He announced a $3.2 billion aid to Pakistan. He also agreed in July 1981 to supply F-16 aircraft to Pakistan without placing any constraints. The US supply of 40 F-16s hamstrung India's position as the dominant power in the region. Reagan overlooked criticism regarding the supply of arms to Pakistan. Pakistan had become more important to the US strategic interest due to its political proximity to the Persian Gulf and China, than India. It stands as a barrier between Soviet ambition and the Indian Ocean approaches to the Persian Gulf. The US arms sale to Pakistan was thus a cornerstone in strengthening "the defence of vital oil routes through the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean." Reagan administration's interest in the South Asia was more realistic in military tenor than that of Carter's.

American Presidents viewed India as the emergent regional power and as an alternative to China (except Nixon) but no one regarded India as an alternative to Pakistan as long as the latter remained an ally of the US. It was difficult to conclude that the Republican Presidents favoured Pakistan and Democrats favoured India. It was the Truman (Democrat) administration that laid the ground for the security relationship with Pakistan and the Eisenhower (Republican) administration which recognised India's dominant regional role. The Ford (Republican) administration did not desire to have strained relations with India. Though the Carter (Democrat) administration was inclined towards India, it imposed restrictions on India as regards nuclear cooperation. The US Presidents adopted policies towards South Asia depending on the events that took place all over the world. South Asian region merited low priority in US objectives. The US interest in the region had been a by-product of the rivalry between it and the USSR.

98 Facts on File, n.69, p.886.
99 This statement was made by Jeane J Kirkpatrick, US ambassador to the UN, during her visit to India 24-27 August 1981. See Facts on File, Vol.41, no. 2129, 4 September 1981, p. 631.
In the following chapter an attempt has been made to analyse the US Policy towards India with reference to the political issues viz. Kashmir and Goa and the military issues—the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, and the US stance in this regard have also been dealt with.