CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICS OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN: INDIA'S RESPONSE
Pakistan, since its entry into US sponsored military alliance became dependant on the US for its security requirements. For Pakistan, the alliance was mainly to counter India and for the US to contain communism. In other words, both had divergent objectives for the military alliance. The US needed allies in South Asia whereby it could strengthen its influence in the Middle East, encompassing the Islamic countries. It is in this context that Pakistan became strategically important to the US.

The US military stance vis-à-vis Pakistan made India skeptical about its intention. The US motive in giving aid was associated with the exigencies of the cold war and the ideological divide between it and the USSR and this can be further explained in three words: necessity, opportunity and responsibility.

India received more economic aid from the US than Pakistan; but this did not help them to improve their relations. Pakistan, on the other hand, was

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1 Pakistan enlisted into the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later known as CENTO) in 1954 and 1955 respectively.

2 It was regarded as necessary to forestall the newly independent countries falling under the Soviet control, which would weaken the Western world. It was also reckoned as an opportunity to augment markets for the US goods, increase US investment abroad leading to more jobs at home and better business outside. Aid was also necessary to help the allies to protect their security and indirectly promote the security of the US. For further details see Roger W. Tobby, "Is Foreign Aid Really Necessary?" U.S. Department of State Bulletin (herein after DSB) (Washington D.C.) Vol. 46, no. 1163, 19 February 1962, p. 301.

3 US Foreign Aid to India and Pakistan 1962-1987. (In million Dollars)

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In 1988 the US economic aid to India was nil and Pakistan was $215 million, and military aid to India was nil and Pakistan was $230 million. See
successful in cementing its relations with the US except for a short period (there was embargo on Pakistan and India during 1965-1971 and Carter did not want to give more than $400 million to Pakistan to counter the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 1979). This chapter analyzes the role of military linkages in fostering cooperative relations between the US and Pakistan. These military ties led to one of the strongest bonds with Pakistan. This was in sharp contrast to existing economic ties of the US with India. The US’s induction of arms into the region in the 1950s and 60s was to counter the emergence of communism. In 1965, both India and Pakistan were involved in a war.\(^4\) At this juncture, the US supplied arms to Pakistan to contain communism and not for use against India. However, as Pakistan resorted to the use of military equipment which it had received from the US in 1965 against India, the President of US Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1964, 1964-1968), decided to enforce a military embargo on both India and Pakistan.\(^5\) This had minimal effect on India, because only a portion of its defense equipment was forthcoming from the US, which in fact was limited to the US supply of arms during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. The impact of the embargo on Pakistan was devastating because Pakistan depended exclusively on the US for its defense requirements.

NIXON’S POLICY

When Richard Nixon, came to power in 1969, the new administration was favourably inclined towards Pakistan.\(^6\) Towards this end, in the same year the

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5. The US placed an embargo on Pakistan and India, it had accorded military aid to India in 1962 to counter the chinese attack and started giving aid to Pakistan, since the latter became the member of the SEATO in 1954.

6. President Nixon speaking about the relations between the US and Pakistan stated on 1 August, 1969 at Lahore, Pakistan: "There have been some strains in our relations over recent years... What we intend to do on this visit is to restore a relationship of friendship based on mutual trust which is essential to good relations between two countries" Cited in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Richard Nixon, 1969, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p.597.
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1973-1977) met Yahya Khan, the President of Pakistan (1969-1971), at Lahore on 24 May and discussed the US arms supply to Pakistan. Consequently, on 8 November 1969 the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee recommended to the Nixon administration reconsideration of the Johnson administration imposition of an arms embargo on Pakistan. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused. In October 1970, Yahya Khan visited Washington and tried to convince the Nixon administration to obtain electronic equipment which were not under the category of "offensive weapons". He said "no country in the World today can hope to win a war without a thorough use and knowledge of modern electronics". The State Department representative on 7 October 1970 announced a "one time exception" to the arms embargo on Pakistan by approving a package of military equipment amounting to $40-50 million.

Senator, William Bart Saxbe, (Republican-Ohio) criticized the Nixon administration's decision to supply arms to Pakistan. He questioned the credibility of Pakistan being reckoned as a co-crusader in fighting anti-communist battles. He reminded the Nixon administration that in 1968, Pakistan had forced the US to close down the U-2 base in Peshawar. He cited Chester

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9 The Tribune (Chandigarh), 28 October 1970.
11 William Bart Saxbe, Senator in this regard stated on 9 October, 1970: "It makes no sense for us to kindle the sparks of conflict in the South Asian Sub Continent. India disagrees with us on some issues, but is friendly and has been helpful in difficult international problems. India has done no harm. It is the world's largest democracy, it is a peaceful country and it has a special position of its own in Asia and in the world. It makes no sense for us to make an enemy of this friendly democracy by futile efforts to please and placate Pakistan which is hard to please. Further Pakistani leaders openly state that there was no threat from the Soviet Union or from China. Pakistan had been obtaining arms from both these countries. "Any US decision to supply arms to Pakistan on any scale is bound to generate not only an arms race in
Bliss Bowles’ (the ambassador to India from 1963 to 1969) termed the decision of shipment of military equipment to Pakistan as an "abysmal error." 12

The US Congress criticized the Yahya Khan administration and the Nixon administration came under severe attack for supplying arms to Pakistan. Subsequently, the US State Department suspended the sale of arms and stopped renewal of licenses and placed in abeyance the one time exception to the arms embargo on Pakistan. 13 With this, arms aid worth $35 million to Pakistan was stopped. 14 On 6 May 1971, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution calling for the suspension of all US military aid to Pakistan, until the internal conflict in East Pakistan was resolved. East Pakistani people protested against the West Pakistan rule and led a movement to obtain independence. The Pakistani government sent its army to suppress the movement for liberation of East Pakistan. The criticism was that by continuing the supply of arms, the US was aiding in killing innocent people. In September of the same year, arms worth $3.4 million sanctioned earlier under the package of $40-50 million one time exception was cancelled. It also placed restrictions on third party deliveries. 15 In spite of the restrictions, the Nixon administration decided to support Pakistan to suppress the movement in East Pakistan. Nixon persuaded another US arms recipient in the region, Iran, to supply arms to Pakistan to avoid criticism from the Congress. 16

The Sub Continent and force both India and Pakistan to divert their much needed resources from the tasks of economic development but also subject the Indian Government to internal pressures for securing atomic weapons*. Cited in Congressional Record (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office), Vol.116, part -27, 12 October 1970, p.36218.

12 It was first accepted as just another bureaucratic blunder which did not represent United States policy. However, in the last few days there is evidence that this was not an accident but a deliberate decision. If this is in fact correct, the United States, once again, has committed an abysmal error in Asia, one that historians may find even more difficult to condone or excuse than the debacle in Indo-China. see Chester Bowles, "South Asia: The Appraisal of Tragedy", New York Times, 6 July 1971, cited in Congressional Records, Vol.117, part 18, 7 July 1971, p.23842.

13 See Noyes, n.10, pp 92-93.
16 Ibd.
party supplies were made on the authorization of the White House. Nixon might have done this to please Pakistan and also to secure its help to defreeze the frozen Sino-US ties. Further, on 4 August 1971, at a news conference, Nixon made a statement on the East Pakistan crisis and gave an indication that the US would be giving aid to Pakistan to bolster its position vis-a-vis India. Notwithstanding the Pakistani genocide in its Eastern wing during the last week of March 1971, Nixon authorized the sale of military equipment to Pakistan. The Nixon administration did not concern itself with the merits of the Pakistan government policy. It was essentially governed by its perception on strategic goals and objectives in the region.

Subsequent to the Nixon administration's clearance of arms delivery to Pakistan in March 1971, at least three Pakistani ships carried military equipment from New York to Karachi. In July 1971, Senator Frank Bradford Morse, (Republican, Massachusetts) disclosed in Congress on 8 May, that a ship called the Sonderbans was reported to be carrying parts for armoured vehicles and other arms for Pakistan from New York in May. On 22 June, another ship S.S. Padma, was believed to be carrying eight aircraft, parachutes and tons of spare parts and accessories for aircraft and military vehicles and on 2 July, a third ship, S.S. Kaptal also left for Pakistan. He also stated that four or five more ships were scheduled to leave for Pakistan in July and August. However, the items carried by these three ships were mentioned in the documents as "skids and parts". Replying to questions about the arms delivery to Pakistan, the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers (1969-1974), on 6 April stated that the sale of non lethal military equipment since 1967 were

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17 After World War II, the US and USSR, the two Super Powers were divided into two blocs-Capitalists and Communists. China which is a communist country had become adversary to the US since 1945. But later when Nixon came into power, he wished to improve relations with China. In 1971 the US had rapprochement with China, where Pakistan played a role in bringing them together.


20 Ibid.

"under review".22

The State Department on 20 April 1971 informed the Democratic Party Senator, Edward Kennedy, who had opposed the supply of military equipment to Pakistan, that the arms obtained from other countries including China, the USSR and Britain were also used in crushing the autonomy movement in East Pakistan. Three days later, the Department informed Senator James William Fulbright that some M-24 tanks and F-86 aircraft were used in East Pakistan. The supply of arms to Pakistan was "to bring about a political accommodation in Eastern part of Pakistan".23 Another reason given by the administration was to discourage Pakistan from depending on other suppliers.24

RELAXATION OF ARMS EMBARGO

Nixon sought to improve cordial relationship with China which was treated as an enemy since its independence. The Nixon Administration realised that since Pakistan maintained relation with China, it could play a significant role as a mediator to bring the US and China closer. Consequently both the US and China re-established contact in 1971. Nixon, in his State of the World Message to Congress on 24 February 1971 reiterated "(this) modest exception should not upset the military balance in the area and accelerate an arms race".25 His administration justified its decision stating that the arms were not given but were sold to Pakistan.26 On 14 March 1973 the US State Department sanctioned $14 million worth of military assistance to Pakistan, it also notified that it would give $83 million worth of economic assistance to India.27 Pakistan was not happy that the US military assistance was confined to spare parts. In September 1973, Z.A. Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan (1971-1977), visited the US and contended that Pakistan was not interested in

22 Congressional Record, n.19, p.23842.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
26 Times of India (New Delhi), 16 March 1973.
27 The embargo imposed by the US on supply of military equipment to India and Pakistan in December 1971 was lifted on 14 March 1973. The US decided to supply non-lethal equipment and spare parts to India and Pakistan. See DSB, Vol.68, no.1763, 9 April 1973, p.417.
obsolete spare parts, but in red-hot weapons. However, the US did not want to accede to his demand and lift the arms embargo on Pakistan as it wanted to bring about reconciliation between India and Pakistan, to obtain peace and stability in the region.

The arms embargo imposed on Pakistan and India in 1965 could not serve the US purpose of influencing both the countries, as Pakistan and India started receiving arms from China and Soviet Union respectively. Though Pakistan pleaded with the US to lift the arms embargo, the US held on to its earlier stance till India's explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974. Bhutto felt that the US did not have any justification or reason to impose an embargo. When India was receiving military assistance from other countries including the Soviet Union, Bhutto maintained that Pakistan should not suffer due to the US embargo. He reminded the US authorities that there was a disparity between India and Pakistan in military capability.

However, the US did not agree that there would be a threat to the strategic balance in the region, as an agreement between the US and Pakistan in 1959 encompassed the assurance that the US would protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. Therefore the US felt that Pakistan should not worry about its security.

The Nixon administration commenced rethinking on its arms policy to Pakistan consequent to India's nuclear explosion in 1974. Prime Minister Bhutto, on 10 September, 1974, urged the US to lift embargo on Pakistan, because India, Afghanistan and Iran were arming themselves. He warned the US

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29 See statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, James H. Noyes, n.10, pp.81-82.
33 After the US, the USSR, Great Britain, China and France, which were nuclear powers, India tested its first nuclear device at Pokhran in Rajasthan on 18 August 1974.
that Pakistan would quit the Central Treaty Organization if the former refused to supply arms to Pakistan. In 1975, Kissinger expressed the US concern about India's nuclear explosion at Pokhran. India affirmed its policy not to develop nuclear weapons and to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The US was of the opinion that if it did not provide arms to Pakistan, the latter would also develop nuclear weapons.

SHIFT ON ARMS EMBARGO POLICY

Gerald Rudolph Ford Jr. was sworn in as the US President in August 1974, on Nixon's resignation consequent to his indictment in the Watergate scandal. Ford served until January 1977. At a White House dinner on 5 February, in a joint statement with Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, who made an official visit to Washington during 4-7 February 1975, Ford assured the Pakistan that his administration would protect "the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of a strong, secure, and prosperous Pakistan as a fundamental element in maintaining regional and World peace". Bhutto explained at a news conference on the same day that he sought to get "exclusively defensive weapons" from the US. He also stated that he would be ready to place all his nuclear reactors for international inspection to prevent the clandestine manufacture of nuclear weapons, if the US supplied exclusively defensive weapons to Pakistan. However, he was not ready to give up the nuclear option.

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34 Facts on File, n.33, p.84.
35 Kissinger contended that the Indian nuclear explosion (1974) raised a new specter of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons in which any local conflict risks exploding into a nuclear holocaust. This would give an additional incentive to many countries to seek their security in the development of nuclear weapons. See DSB, Vol.72, no.1875, 2 June 1975, p.707.
36 On 17 June 1972 five burglars were arrested in the Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate office in Washington. The White House arranged to steal documents from the Democratic Party Headquarters in the Watergate office building. Nixon tried to cover up the scandal. But these activities were found by the Supreme Court and on 24 July announced that Nixon had connection with burglars. He realised the fact that his impeachment was certain and he resigned, Henry F. Graff (ed), The Presidents: A Reference History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984), pp.6335-6336.
39 Ibid.
The US stance underwent a change under Ford when the State Department spokesman, Robert Anderson, announced on 24 February 1975 that the US had agreed to lift the ten year embargo on Pakistan as well as India. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for political affairs (1974-1976), on 23 February, justified the US decision as necessary to correct 'a rather anomalous situation'. He said that when India was getting weapons from the Soviet Union; Pakistan, as an ally of the US was denied this. According to a State Department report on 24 February 1975, during the period 1964-1973 India obtained more than $1.273 billion worth of military equipment from the Soviet Union and Pakistan had purchased arms worth $312 million China and $214 worth million from France. In other words, the justification was that to maintain the strategic balance, the US wanted to give military aid to Pakistan. The US decided to provide military equipment on payment and not as aid. It also revised its earlier policy and was prepared to sell any type of weapons including sophisticated lethal weapons. The following reasons influenced the US sale of arms to Pakistan:

1. It wanted to maintain good relations with Pakistan;
2. to discourage Pakistan from its nuclear option; and
3. to strengthen its military presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan wanted sophisticated arms which had a better strike capability such as the M-60 tanks, F-5 jet fighters, sub marines, TOW anti tank missiles, Hawk and Red-eye surface- to-air missiles. The US did not agree to provide such sophisticated arms to Pakistan due to pressures from India. Pakistan was disappointed on this account. Despite denying Pakistan the weapons it

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
45 Washington Post, 10 March 1975.
46 The reasons for the disappointment of Pakistan can be summed up as follows: while the United States agreed to lift the embargo, she remained reluctant to provide Pakistan with heavy weapons and decided on 100 million dollars as the
desired, the US reiterated that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan continued to be the main concern of the US.  

Pakistan, consequent to India's nuclear explosion, intensified its nuclear programme. Despite the constant pressure from the US, Pakistan signed a bilateral agreement with France on 17 March 1976 to purchase plutonium for a reprocessing plant. By this agreement, the US felt, Pakistan was trying to attain nuclear parity with India which it contended would lead to an arms race in the region and would reverse the US attempts at nuclear non-proliferation. This led the US to pressurize both the parties to cancel the contract. It persuaded Pakistan not to attain nuclear weapons capability as it was ready to fulfill the demands of Pakistan for conventional weapons. Kissinger, before the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the CENTO (26-27 May 1976) in London on 25 May 1976, stated that the US continued to retain its interest "in the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan". He further stated that it would continue to strengthen its cooperation with Pakistan bilaterally and also within the CENTO framework. The US President promised to consider the supply of A-7 aircraft to Pakistan if the latter gave up the deal with France to purchase plutonium for its reprocessing plant at Kahuta (Chasma) near Islamabad. Ford

upper limit for the sale of arms to Pakistan. The limit was imposed to placate Pakistan without antagonizing India. Besides the limited lifting of the embargo, little else was done to increase Pakistan's sense of security, the CENTO pact was not strengthened and a guarantee against nuclear attack was not offered”. Cited in Zalmay Khalilzad, "Pakistan and the Bomb" Survival (London), Vol.21, no.6, November – December 1979, p.246.


48 Pakistan’s purchase of plutonium even before India’s peaceful nuclear test indicated its interest to develop a nuclear plant. After India’s test, it tried to justify it and contended that
a. a threat might come from India;
b. it was not satisfied with the supply of arms from the US; and
c. there was no guarantee that the US would safeguard its nuclear reactors.


50 Ibid.


52 Pakistan possessed nuclear reprocessing facility at Chasma and Rawalpindi and
threatened Pakistan that the US would cut off military and economic aid, if Pakistan did not cancel the French deal.\textsuperscript{53} Thus the US adopted the carrot and stick policy. On the one hand it threatened to stop aid and on the other, offered 100 A-7s light attack aircraft to Pakistan to cancel the deal with France. However, Bhutto did not agree to the American deal. Later in August 1976 in Paris, Kissinger asked the French Premier Jacques Chirac to cancel the deal. However, France refused to concur.\textsuperscript{54} The US threatened Pakistan that aid would be stopped under the Symington Amendment.\textsuperscript{55} Pakistan termed this amendment as discriminatory. Prime Minister Bhutto on an official visit to Canada during February 1976, stated at a press conference—on 20 February 1976 in Ottawa "No Individual or State had a right to dictate (to) another sovereign and independent State like Pakistan".\textsuperscript{56} Pakistan reminded the US that it should not object to an ally and there was no argument since, Pakistan already agreed to subject all its reactors to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards if India agreed to do so. It also contended that the US continued to supply fuel to India which tested a nuclear device in 1974. It may be noted that India was getting nuclear fuel for its Tarapur plant (Trombay) from the US under the 1963 agreement.\textsuperscript{57}

The US State Department denied Bhutto's allegation. On 29 April 1977, the


\textsuperscript{54} The French Premier Jacques Chirac criticized the US involvement on bilateral issues. He said "It is an agreement between France and Pakistan. It is not for third Party States to interfere in what concerns two sovereign States. There is no question of accepting Dr. Kissinger's proposal to settle with the United States an affair which concerns only France and Pakistan" comments of Chirac in a radio interview in Paris, 11 August 1976 as cited in \textit{National Herald} (New Delhi), 12 August 1976.

\textsuperscript{55} Senator Symington introduced a resolution in June 1976 in the Senate. This resolution was known as Symington Amendment. The Amendment provided that the US economic and military assistance was to be withheld till Pakistan placed all nuclear facilities under international safeguards. For details see Symington Amendment, Appendix XIV, p.A-28.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{The Dawn} (Karachi), 26 February 1976.

\textsuperscript{57} For details see \textit{India- Atomic Energy: Cooperation for Civil Uses}. Appendix XV, pp.A-31-37.
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance (1977-1980), wrote to Bhutto stating that public criticism could only damage US-Pakistan relations and that the US was ready to discuss with Pakistan and clarify its doubts. Pakistan maintained that the deal with France was approved by the IAEA and hence, there was no danger of nuclear proliferation.

Pakistan's Martial Law Administrator, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, on 5 July 1977 overthrew the government of Bhutto and imposed martial law in the State. He dissolved the National Assembly, State Assemblies and removed State Governors from office. All political parties were banned. Zia-ul-Haq like Bhutto expressed the Pakistani stand by stating that it would agree to place all nuclear facilities under safeguards. It was clear that he took such a diplomatic stance to obtain US sympathy and support to stop aid to India if the latter did not place its nuclear reactors under similar safeguards.

Jimmy Carter, the democrat defeated Ford, and became the thirty ninth President of US in 1977. He was a Liberal and did not want military intervention in the underdeveloped countries. He stressed the importance of cooperation between India and Pakistan in order to promote security and stability in the region. However, he did not rule out the possibility of military assistance to its ally i.e. Pakistan if the situation so required to uphold US interest in the region.

58 The Dawn, 5 May 1977.
59 Ibid.
Election for National Assembly was held on 7 March 1977 but the Pakistan National Alliance charged that the election was rigged. It attempted to reverse the results of the elections. Bhutto and the PNA negotiated since 3 June to solve the crisis but could not come to an agreement. Regarding the political situation as hopeless, the military decided to intervene See Shiri-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1982), pp.67-68.
61 For details see Khalilzad, n.46, p.249.
CARTER'S POLICY

In a major policy pronouncement, the Carter administration, on 19 May, 1977 put forth its policy on arms supply to its allies based on two principles:

a. arms transfer as an exceptional foreign policy instrument in order to protect its national security interests and

b. arms transfer to its allies and to those who favour nuclear non-proliferation. 62

Thus, even though the Ford administration agreed to supply A-7 aircraft, the Carter administration modified it and offered an alternative i.e. the harmless A-4e 63 or the limited range of F-5s. Pakistan rejected Carter's offer. Yet the US continued to influence Pakistan on its nuclear policy by a proposal sent through under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Lucy Wilson Benson (1977-1980), who visited Pakistan in November 1978. She went with a package offer that included 70 F-5s, 64 Hawk ground- to- air missiles, armed helicopters, and anti-tank weapons costing about $ 500 million to be supplied over a period of three years. Pakistan rejected this proposal because it felt that this package was not sufficient and thus Benson's trip to Pakistan was not fruitful. Pakistan nursed a strong feeling that Carter was pro-Indian and gave importance to India even while offering military aid to Pakistan. Carter, perhaps, was to an extent sympathetic towards India. 65


63 A-4: "A single-engine, turbojet attack aircraft designed to operate from aircraft carriers, and capable of delivering nuclear and/or non-nuclear weapons, providing troop support, or conducting reconnaissance missions. It can act as a tanker and can itself be air refueled. It possesses a limited all weather attack capability and can operate from short; unprepared fields". Cited in Dictionary of Military Terms, n.51, p.324.

64 F-5: "A twin-engine supersonic turbojet, multipurpose tactical fighter/bomber. This is employed in the air-to-air/close air support roles. Some models are air refuelable and some are used for training. See in Ibid, p.151.

65 Carter had given importance to India due to its predominance in the sub Continent, its size, economic and military capabilities, and its respect for democratic values and human rights.
Warren Christopher, Carter's Deputy Secretary of State (1977-1981), had a series of discussions with the Pakistani leaders in Islamabad in March 1979. He stated that the US was willing to sell military equipment to Pakistan, provided the latter gave up its nuclear programme. The US become aware that Pakistan was trying to build nuclear enrichment facility. The US however, did not get any assurance from the Pakistani President Zia that his country would not involve itself in the nuclear programme.

The US failed to persuade Pakistan to place all its reactors for international scrutiny. On the one hand, US recognized the strategic importance of Pakistan and on the other, it wanted Pakistan to adhere to nuclear non-proliferation. In August 1979, the Carter administration established a Inter Agency Task Force, under the direction of Gerard C. Smith of the State Department which put forth the following three options for stopping the Pakistani nuclear programme:

a. extension of advanced conventional arms;
b. imposition of economic sanctions and mobilization of American economic power to pressurize Islamabad; and
c. sabotage or covert operations, including commando action by para-military forces against the uranium enrichment facility of Pakistan at Kahuta. 66

Reacting to the Inter Agency Task recommendation to the US administration, Pakistan sought an explanation from the US about the proposed covert action to prevent Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons. In response, the State Department officials pointed out that since Pakistan was on the verge of developing an atomic bomb, its overall policy toward Pakistan was under constant review. 67 Pakistan reiterated its stand that its nuclear programme was meant for peaceful purpose. The US decided to cut off military and economic assistance to Pakistan starting from April 1979.

Pakistan did not desire to give up its nuclear option, though it assured the US that it would not develop a nuclear weapon and it would not transfer sophisticated and sensitive technology to other countries. Agha Stahl,

Foreign Affairs Adviser to President Zia (1977–1988) stated that national interest was vital for Pakistan. \(^6^8\) President Zia also maintained that "Pakistan would never compromise on its sovereignty". \(^6^9\) He ruled out compromising on issues of national interest and stated "we shall eat crumbs but will not allow our national interest to be compromised in any manner what so ever". \(^7^0\) However, the Carter administration could not stop its military and economic assistance to Pakistan due to Soviet Union's involvement in Afghanistan in December 1979.

**AFGHANISTAN CRISIS - A SHIFT IN ARMS POLICY**

On 27 December 1979, about 25,000 to 30,000 Soviet forces entered Afghanistan, \(^7^1\) which brought about a shift in the US military assistance programme to Pakistan. Due to this new development, the US had to review its military stance towards Pakistan. Thus, consequent to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration announced on 12 January 1980 $400 million ($200 million economic aid and $200 million military aid) to Pakistan. \(^7^2\) However, Pakistan felt that this amount of military aid would not be sufficient to confront the Soviets if attacked. Carter tried to convince Pakistan that there was no need to worry about the acquisition of arms by Afghanistan from the USSR. The US, he stated, would take the responsibility of upholding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan if there was any threat from the Soviet Union. Zia criticized the US attitude and stated that in the absence of cooperation from the US in terms of military aid.

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\(^6^9\) Ibid.

\(^7^0\) Cited in Ibid, p.135.

\(^7^1\) New York Times, 31 December 1979.

\(^7^2\) DSB, Vol.80, no.2037, April 1980, p.62.
Pakistan would be forced to seek alternatives.73

Carter maintained that the US would take steps to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan as long as the latter's troops were stationed in Afghanistan. However, President Zia felt that when there was a threat from Afghanistan, practical steps needed to be initiated rather than issuing mere statements.74 In this regard, Zia in an interview on 17 January 1980 reacted to Carter's offer of $400 million aid and termed it as "peanuts",75 and rejected it on the following grounds:

1. The aid offer lacked durability and credibility;
2. No guarantee on the part of the US to strengthen Pakistan's security as per 1959 agreement;76
3. Pakistan's Nuclear Programme being subject to constraints thereafter;
4. Inadequacy of the aid package for its increasing defense needs, as Pakistan considered the following items were required for its defense requirements:
   a. an integrated aid defense system along the Western border, including sophisticated radar systems, surface to air missiles (SAMs), anti aircraft artillery etc;
   b. aircraft to counter air mission, especially F-16s;
   c. anti-tank guided missiles (ATGms); self-propelled guns, light field artillery, armed helicopters with anti tank capability;
   d. night vision equipment, sophisticated C3 (command, control and communications measures) systems; and
   e. tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs).77

However, the Carter administration rejected Pakistan's demand. Thus, neither did the Carter administration acquiesce with the Pakistani demand nor

73 Zia said in an interview to Shirin Tahir-Kheli, an academician at Temple University (U.S) that Pakistan would look towards China and the Islamic nations for support. See, Kheli, n.68, p.101.
did Pakistan accept the US offer. Earlier Pakistan had obtained a large quantity of arms from the US and China during the period, 1969-1979. With the Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan in December 1979, the Carter administration decided in 1980 to lift the arms embargo on Pakistan, but instead of giving aid, it wanted to give arms on a "cash and carry" basis. Carter did not want to give aid beyond $400 million. He offered this aid to keep the Mujahedeen resistance alive in Afghanistan against the Soviet troops and to stop any Soviet entry towards the south through Baluchistan. However, Pakistan rejected this offer outright. This act of Pakistan appeared like a diplomatic ploy to obtain more aid.

There were three factors which influenced Carter to limit the aid up to $400 million:

a. It was adequate to meet the needs of Pakistan.  

b. Resumption of arms sales to Pakistan would be a major blow to the Carter administration's (non) nuclear policy. 

c. He did not want to jeopardise relations with India. 

RONALD REAGAN'S APPROACH

Ronald Reagan, who initially was a liberal democrat, began to change his political belief in the late 1940s and 1950s. He felt that expansion of

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79 For details see the statement by Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser in United States Information Communication Agency (USICA) Official Text (New Delhi), 1 January 1980.


81 Ibid. p.44.

82 Clark Clifford was sent as special Presidential Emmissary to India in January 1980 with the express instruction that he should explain to the Indian authorities about the American aid to Pakistan. Clark Clifford stated, "We purposely kept the amount of the arms and the type of arms in relative simplicity so as not to cause difficulty in the area, particularly with reference to India" cited in Thomas Perry Thornton, "Between the Stools? U.S. Policy towards Pakistan during the Carter Administration", Asian Survey (Berkeley), Vol.22, no.10, October 1982, p.971.
communism in the world was a danger to the US security and sought a radical shift in the US policy towards containing communism. He enlisted into the Republican Party in 1962 and began working for the party. Since the early 1960s Ronald Reagan saw the USSR as a threat to the US as well as to the world. He, as a Commentator on Public Policy (1975–80), opposed Strategic Arms Limitation Talks–II (SALT–II) which was initiated on 21 November 1972 and supported large scale military build up. He wanted to make the US a powerful nation in the world. He favoured American involvement and viewed that the weak policies of the government were responsible for US failure in Vietnam. He criticised Carter’s failure in obtaining the release of US nationals arrested by the Iranians on 4 November 1979. Several Iranian youth seized the US embassy in Teheran and took 66 members of the staff as hostage on 4 November 1979 demanding the US return the Shah, who was then in New York. Carter did not take any military action but tried to solve the issue through diplomatic channels and economic pressures. However, it became difficult for him to solve the problem.

In 1981 Ronald Reagan, assumed office of the President in the US. He, unlike his democratic predecessor, demonstrated his interest to expand both economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Like Nixon, he realized the


84 In Iran the Land Distribution Program started in 1950. The Muslims opposed the Shah’s programmes as destructive of the basic tenets of Shiite Islam. By 1976, public demonstrated against the Shah. The students, Leftist extremists, and members of the major opposition party i.e. National Front, revolted against Shah’s government. Several riots occurred in the Capital on 5 November 1978. The Shah appointed a military government to restore order and retain his throne. At the end of 1978 he appointed Shahpur Bakhtiar (opposition leader) as a Head of the government. Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Shiite Muslim leader, who was in France opposed this. On 16 January 1979, the Shah left Iran. Khomeini, came from France to Iran on 1 February and 5 February declared a provisional government with Mehdi Bazargan as premier. On 11 February, Bakhtiar was overthrown by Khomeini’s armed men and on 1 April he declared the new Islamic Republic of Iran. See Encyclopedia Americana, Vol 15 (Danbury, Connecticut: Grolier Incorporated, 1984), pp.385–386.

On 4 November 1979 Iranians had seized the American embassy and taken the Americans as hostage. They refused to release them until the US returned the Shah, who was in New York hospital. See Henry F. Graff (ed), The Presidents: A Reference History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1984), p.670
importance of Pakistan to counter Soviet expansionism. In tune with this policy, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discussed the arms embargo imposed upon Pakistan and approved on 14 May 1981, the administration's request for $100 million in Economic Funds for Fiscal year 1982 and $600,000 million for the International Military Training and Educational programme (IMET) for Pakistan. There were four rounds of discussion (in April, June, July and September 1981) between the US and Pakistani officials over the US aid to Pakistan. Finally, on 15 September 1981 Pakistan agreed to obtain aid from the US. On 20 November 1981 the Reagan administration's military package of $3.2 billion for a six year period, to Pakistan was approved by the US Congress.

Pakistan agreed to receive the $3.2 billion aid offered by the Reagan administration, though earlier it had rejected the $400 million military aid offered by the Carter administration. Thus, Pakistan, finally succeeded in getting more aid from the US. The Reagan administration did not place any constraints as regards the supply of lethal weapons to Pakistan. It was willing to give any type of weapons demanded by Pakistan, unlike the earlier administration. James L. Buckley, the Under Secretary for Security Assistant, US Department (1981-1982), justified the US decision to aid Pakistan.

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87. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Agha Shahi (1978-1982), visited Washington in April 1981 and James L. Buckley, the Under Secretary of State, visited Pakistan in June 1981. This was followed by a visit of a Pakistani military delegation to the US in July, Buckley made a second visit to Pakistan in September 1981.


89. See, DSB, Vol.81, no.2056, November 1981, pp.84-85.
Buckley also justified the supply of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. This supply he maintained, would not upset the overwhelming qualitative and quantitative superiority which India enjoys in the region. 90 Stephen P. Cohen, a specialist on South Asia also maintained that India obtained great power status in the sub Continent and Pakistan could no longer obtain strategic superiority in the sub Continent, even with the aid of a major external arms supplier. 91

The Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown also in a report to the Congress described the importance of arms supply to Pakistan. 92 The Reagan administration’s package of $3.2 billion to Pakistan included forty F-16 aircraft.

The Reagan administration agreed to sell 40 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan under the $3.2 billion package. 93 These craft were to be delivered in two phases i.e. 6 crafts in first phase in January 1983 and remaining in the second phase by the end of 1984. 94 Jeane J. Kirk Patrick, the US Ambassador

ii) Also see DSB, Vol.81, no.2056, November 1981, p.84.

91 Cohen, n.40, p.63.  
92 Harold Brown stated: "In the present international and political security environment, security assistance serves the American interest by strengthening the ability of our allies and friends... by assisting other nations in meeting their defense needs, we in turn strengthen our own security". Cited in George H. Quester, American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus (New York Green Wood, 1982), p.111.

The F-16 aircraft is a one-engine plane built by General Dynamics Corporation(US). It could carry a variety of weapons, which included side winder, sparrow and sky flash air-to-air missiles and also the television guided Maverick air-to-surface missile. It was also built up with a 20 millimeter multi barrel cannon in the port wing. The plane has a range of 2,415 miles (3,860 kilometers) and its speed was more than twice that of a sound. It has a wing span of 32 feet 10 inches (10 meters) and a length of 47 feet 7 inches (14.6 meters). The F-16 aircraft is the most suitable fighter aircraft for a local level to a medium intensity regional conflict. See Facts on File, Vol.41, no.2127, 21 August 1981.p.592.

94 However in the first phase reached on 15 Jan 1983 to Pakistan and in the second phase 34 air craft were to be delivered as "an expedited basis". See
to the UN, during her visit to New Delhi, 24-27 August 1981, stated that the deal was a cornerstone of the Reagan administration's policy, because it would strengthen the defence of vital routes through the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{95}

The Reagan administration's decision of providing military aid was mainly to "bolster South West Asia's security against the growing threat of Soviet interventionism".\textsuperscript{96} It justified its decision for supplying F-16s to Pakistan on the following grounds:

a. The sale of F-16 would be a deterrent to the Soviets till the turn of the century;

b. It was necessary to supply these craft to Pakistan to resist Soviet involvement in Afghanistan;

c. It would enhance the US nuclear non-proliferation policy by assisting Pakistan.

d. Non supply of these equipment to Pakistan would place the credibility, sincerity and concerns of the US in jeopardy;

e. F-16 would not change the military balance in the sub Continent, since India was superior to Pakistan in terms of military capability;

f. It was necessary, as Pakistan faced a twin threat i.e. from the Soviets on the north and Indians in the south;

g. The US could not convince Pakistan to drop its nuclear programme by denying it supply of F-16s.\textsuperscript{97}

There was also a discussion about the sale of F-16s to Pakistan in the Congress.

US CONGRESS AND SALE OF F-16S

On 17 November 1981, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Sub Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs voted in favour of

\textsuperscript{96} Facts on File, Vol.41, no.2129, 5 September 1981, p.631
\textsuperscript{97} Times of India, 19 April 1981.

the Reagan administration's proposal to sell Forty F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. Senate Committee voted by 10 to 7. However, the vote held in the House sub Committee was dead - locked at 13-13.

It is interesting to note that the Republican Party's Senator and Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee Mark O Hatfield (97th-99th Congress) did not support his administration's decision. He recalled the incident of 1979, when the US government facilities at Karachi and Lahore were destroyed and the US embassy in Islamabad was burnt down. He observed that the Zia regime took more than five hours to respond to the incident. He questioned "... can anyone seriously believe that these same individuals can be trusted to defend American interest?" Selig S. Harrison, a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, rightly pointed out that F-16 and 155 mm howitzers were not suitable to meet the Soviet challenge on the Afghanistan frontier. He maintained if the US was serious in providing defense to Pakistan vis-a-vis the USSR, it should have offered F-5 G which is a defensive aircraft designed to operate on the mountains and hence, this was more suitable. He advised the administration "instead of increasing animosity between India and Pakistan, the US should have worked for cooperation between them." By providing arms to Pakistan, the US was aiding arms proliferation in the Continent. He further stated that the Reagan administration's decision was a "self-defeating blunder", and said that the US should not supply F-16 to Pakistan.

The opposition by the Congress men to the supply of F-16 air crafts stemmed from the following reasons:
a. the sale of aircraft escalated the arms race between India and Pakistan. Pakistan's possession of the F-16, an aircraft technologically superior to any

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99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid.  
103 Ibid, p.84.  
104 Ibid.
other aircraft in the sub Continent, made India also decide to obtain Mirage-2000 aircraft from France;
b. the security perception of Pakistan was mainly centered on India and not on
the Soviet Union. One third of the Pakistan army was stationed on the Western
Indian border. These sophisticated aircraft could easily penetrate into Indian
territory, resulting in the possibility of another war between India and
Pakistan;
c. F-16, a fighter plane was not suitable to counter a Soviet attack. The
interceptor planes or surface to air missiles would serve Pakistan's defense
needs vis-a-vis the Soviets;
d. supply of aircraft would reverse the Indo-US relationship and would make
India dependent on the USSR for military supplies.
e. supply of F-16 was an indication of the US support for Zia's dictatorship.
However, if Zia's government was overthrown like Shahs regime in February 1979
In Iran, there was a possibility of another regime coming closer to the
Soviets and also aligning with radical Arab States. Under such circumstances,
the supplied F-16s would be under the control of elements antithetical to the
US;
f. there was no guarantee that Pakistan would give up its nuclear option on
the receipt of the F-16s;\textsuperscript{104} and

g. the policy decision of Reagan would not serve the purpose of US foreign
policy interests, i.e. to contain communism.\textsuperscript{105}

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs sub
Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs on 17 November 1981, decided to provide

\textsuperscript{104} Shankar, n.97, pp.509-510.
\textsuperscript{105} Senator William Bart Saxbe, stated that between 1954 and 1963, the US had
given military aid worth nearly $2 billion i.e. hundreds of tanks about 700
artillery pieces, around 20 squadrons of F-86 sabre jets and F-104 aircraft
and a variety of other equipment to Pakistan. He asked "What did this ally do
for us? Where did it join in fighting anti communist battles? In 1968, it
forced the US to close down the U-2 base in Peshawar". He also reminded that
the Pakistani leaders openly announced that there was no threat from the
Soviet Union or China. Pakistan was also getting arms from both. He quoted New
York Times, article entitled "Arms for Pakistan" dated 11 October 1970 that
Pakistan had been receiving arms from both the Soviet Union and China in
recent years. See Congressional Record, no.11, p.36218.
military aid to Pakistan. Along with F-16, the US agreed to supply Harpoon missiles to Pakistan. This missile to be deployed in the South of the Arabian sea had nothing to do with Soviet troops in Afghanistan but was a threat to the Indian forces. Notwithstanding this dimension, the US did not seek assurance from Pakistan that the US equipment would not be used against India.

PAKISTAN'S RATIONALE FOR CHOOSING THE F-16

Pakistan felt that the F-16 aircraft were the key stone of the US aid package. Pakistan believed that F-16 was the most suitable aircraft and could function for a number of years. Pakistan was of the opinion if it sought a different type of aircraft, it would complicate it's (logistic) operations. It would require different 'supply trails' and spare parts inventories. On the basis of these various variables, Pakistan opted for the F-16 aircraft and rejected the various alternatives suggested by the US.

PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR UPGRADED F-16S

On 30 November 1982, Pakistan refused the first delivery of six F-16 fighter craft because they were not equipped with the most advanced 'state of the art' electronic equipment. It expected that the planes would be fitted with an advanced system for detecting enemy ground and airborne radar.

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106 See Congressional Quarterly Almanac, n.98, p.172.
107 Francis R. Frankel, "Play the India Card" Foreign Policy, no 60, Spring 1986, p.160.
109 The US offered the F-5E but Pakistan rejected it because it felt that the F-5E was of an older technology. As regards supply of the F-5G, Pakistan rejected it also because it could not afford to be a "guinea pig" for a "drawing board" plane which did not have comprehensive aircraft systems tests. F-16 / J-29: though it was identical to F-16A, its fuel in efficiency would give less acceleration than the F-16 A. It felt that this was inferior and inadequate to the F-16 A. See Ibid. p.72.
110 Pakistan on 30 November refused to accept delivery of the first six planes because they were not equipped with the most advanced electronic equipment. See New York Times, 1 December 1982.
December, both the US and Pakistan settled the dispute over the first consignment of six F-16 fighter craft supply to Pakistan purchased as part of a $1.1 billion plane deal.\footnote{However, on 6 December Pakistan accepted to receive first six planes and the remaining to be supplied by the end of 1984 with sophisticated radar detection system. For details see New York Times, 7 December 1982.} Under this agreement, the first six planes fitted with the advanced equipment were to be delivered to Pakistan in January 1983. The remaining F-16s were to be supplied by the end of 1984 inclusive of the sophisticated radar detection system.\footnote{Ibid.} The US on 15 January 1983 delivered first three of the total forty advanced F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan.\footnote{Facts on File, Vol.43, no.2210, 25 March 1983, p.217.}

On 18 May 1983, the House Appropriations Committee deliberated the military aid to Pakistan. The Committee approved $200 million as military loan to Pakistan for the fiscal year 1983, as part of a six year, $3.2 billion package granted by the Reagan administration on 15 June 1981. He requested another $75 million for Pakistan in 1983. However, the Foreign Operations Sub Committee disapproved this request, but as a compromise move, the Committee unanimously approved $38 million as against the $75 million.\footnote{John Felton, "Committee compromises in Foreign Aid Appropriation 2-21 May 1983", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (Washington D.C.) Vol.41, no.20, 21 May 1983, p.991.} Reagan was interested in giving F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan despite virulent criticism from the Congress because, according to Jack Anderson, a journalist, President Zia was committed to provide access to US aircraft in Pakistan. He also agreed to allow the US weapons to be sent to Afghan rebels through his special forces.

DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF US AND PAKISTAN IN THE CASE OF ACQUIRING AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM

In 1986, Pakistan demanded Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) from the US. AWACS is a system for surveillance, information gathering and air battle management. Despite India's protest against the AWACS supply, the Reagan administration was keen to supply it because deployment of AWACS in Pakistan would enhance its monitoring capacity vis-a-vis the Soviet military...
capacity. With the deployment of the AWACS, the US could encircle the Soviet Union with electronic surveillance measures. Pakistan wanted to obtain AWACS within the $1.8 billion arms package for the next six years. The package, however, was worth $2.3 billion, and because of these differences, the US did not agree to this supply.

On 27 October 1986 President Reagan certified – to the Congress – that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. This certification was required for the administration to continue supplying $562.5 million in military and economic aid to Pakistan in fiscal year 1987. However, the Washington Post reported on 4 November 1986 that the administration and Congressional sources confirmed that the Reagan administration issued the certification in spite of US intelligence reports that Pakistan obtained nuclear technology required to develop a nuclear bomb. Pakistan, however, continued to deny that it was manufacturing nuclear weapons.

The Reagan administration used arms aid as a weapon for its global strategy and to bolster the region as one of its strategic political pillars. Pakistan, on its part both as an ally of the US and as a friend of China, procured weapons from these countries to compete with India’s military capability.

INDIA’S MILITARY ACQUISITION

India, larger in size and population than Pakistan required to strengthen its military capability in view of the developments in Pakistan. India realised the importance of a strong defense when it was attacked by China in 1962. Consequently it increased its acquisition of military equipment since

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115 The Tribune, 7 November 1986.
116 The Hindu, 7 November 1986.
117 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 For details see Arms Supply to Pakistan and India from US, China, and USSR respectively during 1980-1988, Appendix XVII, pp.A-38-43.
India increased its arsenal by obtaining arms from the Soviet Union. In fact since 1979 from the time when the Soviet Union sent its troops into Afghanistan, the US commenced furnishing sophisticated and sensitive equipment to Pakistan. Consequently India also started procuring arms from other countries to balance its military preparedness to meet any eventuality from across borders and seas.

**INDIA'S REACTION TO US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN**

India, unlike Pakistan, refused to enter into military alliances. The US in its defense policy in South Asia consistently considered Pakistan as a significant State for serving its interests in the South Asia and in the Middle East. Its primary goal in giving military aid to Pakistan was to contain communism till 1960s. Later, it modified its policy and concentrated upon checking the expansion of Soviet Union. Ironically the US began a policy of opening up to China - despite China being a communist State since the early 1970s. The US President John F. Kennedy in 1962 supplied arms to India to meet the challenge from China. Later in the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the US placed a military-aid embargo on both the countries. The US did this, despite its alliance with Pakistan and the democratic aspirations which it shared with India. This was essentially because it did not want the two to battle each other. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, considered the Nixon administration as pro-Pakistani. When Nixon came to power (1969) he did not hesitate to state that Pakistan was more important to the US than India. He also gave greater credence towards building a new relationship with China. Such a trend obviously invited anti-US sentiments among Indian people in general and Indian government in particular.

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123 For details see Arms Supply to Pakistan and India from the US, China, and USSR during 1970-1979, Appendix XVII, pp.A-38-43.

124 For details see Ibid.

125 For details see Ibid.
India voiced its protest against the sale of armoured personnel carrier, aircraft, bombs and fighters to Pakistan in 1970. It felt that these arms would disturb the peace and stability of the sub Continent. It was unreasonable to believe that the US was not aware about the existent state of relations of Pakistan with Peking and Moscow. The US argument was that its supply of arms to Pakistan would be stopped as soon as they found evidence of the latter's involvement in a nuclear programme. India was not happy because these aircraft had a range of 400 nautical miles and could be directed right up to Delhi from any Pakistani base. Referring to the US military assistance to Pakistan, the Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee (1977-1979) declared in Lok Sabha on 22 February 1979 that any attempt by the US to rearm Pakistan would only increase instability and create new tensions in the region.

However, India's concern with regard to US military assistance to Pakistan was low key till Carter was in power, because, he, unlike Nixon, recognised India's importance in the region. After Reagan became the President, he was inclined to supply arms to Pakistan, and was ready to supply all types of equipment to Pakistan. He realised the importance of Pakistan to counter Soviet expansionism. He offered a $3.2 billion aid package to Pakistan which made India feel uncomfortable because the US's decision could disturb the balance in the region.

The supply of such sophisticated equipment in the sub Continent placed India "a decade behind in Weaponry". The F-16 fighter aircraft had far greater technological superiority over the Indian fighter bomber and brought a number of Indian cities within its striking range. The deployment of F-16s

126 See Noyes, n.10, pp.92-93.
128 See Coon, n.85, p.5.
129 The Reagan administration agreed to give forty F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. India was more concerned about the supply of these aircraft because they were sophisticated and sensitive weaponry. India could not believe the US assurance that the weapons which were given to Pakistan would not be used against India. See Jain, n.86, p.139.
130 Ibid.
131 The plane had a range of 2,415 miles (3,860 kms) and its speed was more than twice that of sound. For details see Facts on File, n.95, p.592. For major
could destroy India's airfields, oil and nuclear installation and military depots. India was not interested in victory in a war but its intention was to avoid war in order to maintain peace and stability in the sub Continent. It also opposed the US's proposal to sell four E-2 Hawkeye airborne aircraft to Pakistan.

US STAND INCOMPATIBLE TO REALITIES IN SOUTH ASIA

The US supply of F-16s hamstring India's position as the dominant power in the region. India reckoned that the US by placing such sophisticated weapons system in the hands of its enemy was threatening India's status and the forty F-16s could neither counter Soviet's aggression nor domestic insurgency. It questioned the rationale of the US in waiving the embargo on Pakistan. However, it maintained that being confident of its military potential, it was not afraid of a threat from Pakistan but its irritation was due to the irrational induction of US sensitive and sophisticated equipment in the sub Continent. Reagan overlooked India's criticism regarding the supply of arms to Pakistan. Pakistan had become more important to the US strategic interest due to its political proximity to the Persian Gulf and China, than India.

Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, participating in a press conference at Udhampur on 3 March 1980, stated that the US was interfering in the region and economic targets in India within range of Pakistani Mirage III and Mirage V and F-16 aircraft, see Major Economic Targets in India by Pakistan Appendix XVIII, p.A-44.

132 On 7 June 1981, Israel destroyed the Osirak nuclear plant of Iraq by using the F-16 aircraft.

133 E-2 is a "twin turboprop, multi crew airborne early warning and interceptor control aircraft designed to operate from aircraft carriers. It carries a long range radar and integrated computer system for the detection and tracking of airborne targets at all attitudes. For details see Dictionary of Military Terms, n.51, p.164.


135 The US decided to place an embargo on military and economic aid to Pakistan in April 1979, because the latter was involved in a nuclear programme.
encouraging Pakistan to procure arms. The supply of arms to Pakistan was dangerous to the security in the subcontinent as it would be used against India. The induction of arms to Pakistan could transform the South Asia region into a theatre of great power confrontation and threaten the security of India. The government of India expressed its concern that the supply of arms had "a potential of accelerating the process of normalisation which the governments of India and Pakistan had fostered in the spirit of the Simla Agreement. One of US officials concurred that the F-16 could be used against India.

The F-16 were an advanced aircraft based on late 70s technology and operational capability. The F-16s were at least three times greater (in

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136 Indian Express, 4 March 1980.
137 In 1965 Pakistan used military equipment which were supplied by the US against India. Ibid.
139 Further, Rao, while discussing about the US decision of supplying F-16 to Pakistan, in the Lok Sabha, on 25 March 1981 opposed the US supply of F-16 to Pakistan. Rao asserted: "such escalation from one side immediately invites a response from the other side, and (leads to) consequent dangers of confrontation. There is also the danger that littoral States might find themselves drawn into this competition with the likelihood of exacerbating tensions wherever they already exist in the region..." Cited in R.K. Jain (ed), U.S. South Asian Relations 1947-1982, Vol 1 (New Delhi Radiant Publishers, 1983), p.542.
140 In an interview with Hafeez-ur-Rahman of the Associated press of Pakistan, on 6 June 1981, Rao said that supply of arms to Pakistan would lead to super power rivalry in the region. At the same time, he justified the supply of MiGs to India by the USSR. He said that purchasing arms from the USSR was being done for a long time, and India was also purchasing from some other countries. The supply of arms from the USSR was not fulfilling the Soviet goals but was purely to meet India's needs. Thus the supply would not induce any super power rivalry into the region. For details see Ibid, p.548.
141 Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, President of Pakistan met at Simla on 2 July 1972 and signed agreement called as Simla agreement. They agreed "to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them". For details see Foreign Affairs Reports, Vol.21, no.6, June 1972, pp.101-110.
143 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi Speaks on Foreign Policy 1981 (New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Government of
strike capability) than that of the MIG -21. India suspected that the F-16s would never be used against the Soviet Union or Afghan people. The amount of weaponry Pakistan was getting (after the creation of Bangladesh) was more than the amount they were getting earlier. India was not worried about the weaponry acquired by Pakistan but it felt that it was unnecessary. The US in the past, especially the 1950s, gave assurance to India that the arms supplied to Pakistan would not be used against India. However, while deciding to supply F-16 it was not prepared to do the same and said that it was not necessary to give assurances.

Replying to the question raised by Steve Patton of US News & World Report (New York) on 15 February 1982 in New Delhi regarding India's opposition to the US supply of arms to Pakistan, Indira Gandhi said that in 1954, Pakistan assured the US President Eisenhower that it would not use the US supplied arms against India. This time it did not give any assurance and India was convinced that the guns could be placed in any direction to attack India.

India 1982), p.36.

142 Ibid.

143 For Indira Gandhi statement in the Lok Sabha on 19 August 1981 regarding the Pakistan procurement of arms, see Lok Sabha Debates, n.140, col 4

144 Ibid.

145 Henry G. Barnes, the US ambassador to India, in an interview with Indian News agencies, on 9 June 1982, regarding assurance to be given to India, said The purpose of our assistance has to be seen in the context of the Soviet invasion and continuing occupation of Afghanistan.... Secondly, ...people say, you gave guarantees before, but were they of any use? ... We believe that by responding to Pakistan's needs in light of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan that we are creating the sort of relationship with Pakistan whereby Pakistan will understand the purpose of that assistance, and that's the best guarantee that the assistance will be used as we intended". He further said "the basic point is that a good understanding between United States and Pakistan is the best assurance that our assurance will be used as intended. If the relationship is not any good, then verbal or written assurances are not likely to have much in the way of impact ....What the United States is trying to do, to the extent it can, is to have an influence in the area which contributes toward a more stable and more secure situation". Cited in USICA Official Text (New Delhi), 11 June 1982, pp.1-3, 5, & 12.


Regarding the arms which could be projected against India, the US ambassador to India, Harry G. Barnes, on 28 February 1982 at the press club of India made three points:

a. the US would exercise control over its supply of arms to Pakistan

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She questioned the rationale of supplying F-16 to Pakistan by bypassing the Symington amendment when there was an allegation that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons. India had no objection to Pakistan procuring arms for defensive purposes but opposed the US decision of supplying F-16 which could be used for offensive purposes. The US, however, maintained that its decision of supplying arms to Pakistan was because Pakistan had become a front line State against the Soviet Union. The US maintained that its military aid to Pakistan would not disturb India's military superiority in the region. However, the Indian government informed the US that such assessment was not true, since (without supplying arms in the region) Indian and Pakistani forces on their common frontier were approximately "at par in quantum as well in terms of sophistication". The sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan would cover vast areas of India, within former's range of attack. The supply of F-16 would upset the natural balance in the region.

India could not remain silent over the induction of sophisticated aircraft in the sub Continent. Though India was stronger than Pakistan in military capacity, its superiority was being challenged by the acquisition of F-16 by Pakistan. The 155 mm howitzers which Pakistan obtained from the US could not be used in the mountains but in the plains against India. The F-5-G, a sophisticated interceptor, would have been better suited to Pakistan's air defence against Soviet border probes. This aircraft would not have enhanced Pakistan's capability against India, as the F-16, and thus would not

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b the US guarantee or expectation was that the relationship the US was building with Pakistan would be "sufficiently important in Pakistan's own interest" that Pakistan would not misuse the arms which US supplied.

c the US did not have any evidence that Pakistan had any intention of using arms against India. Even the people in Pakistan claimed that India might attack Pakistan. But the US did not believe such allegation. For details see USICA (New Delhi), 1 March 1982, pp.25-26, & 34-35.


148 Ibid, p.28.

149 Indira Gandhi's Interview to Indiana University News Paper, Penn, in December 1982, See Times of India, 2 January 1983.

have aroused a violent reaction in New Delhi.\textsuperscript{151} With this scenario India had to procure military equipment to match the US supplies to Pakistan. Thus India obtained the Mirage 2000 from France and the MiG-31 and MiG-33 from the Soviet Union in 1983.\textsuperscript{152} When India opposed the US supply of F-16 to Pakistan the Reagan administration also offered the same to India. The Deputy Secretary of State, Walter T. Stoessel Jr. (1982-1983), disclosed to reporters in Washington on 23 July 1982 that the US was willing to sell F-16s to India. But India rejected this offer as it was criticizing the US for supplying F-16 to Pakistan, it would not be prudent on its part to procure the same from the US, even on payment.

India's concern was the increased potential of the US interference in the region with the supply of F-16. It's concern also stemmed from the fact that if Pakistan possessed highly sophisticated weapons, aircraft such as F-16, India would be compelled to increase its budget allocations for defense. This act of the US did disturb the natural balance of power in South Asia. The supply of arms to Pakistan was reckoned as "offensive" rather than a "defensive" action because these were deployed on the north western part of Indian border rather than on the Afghanistan border.\textsuperscript{153} Selig S. Harrison supported India's concerns and observed that Islamabad sought to use the

\textsuperscript{151} Harrison, n.150, p.A23.

\textsuperscript{152} Indian Defense Minister, R. Venkataraman (1982-1984), justified India's purchase of these aircraft. He assured the Lok Sabha on 5 April 1983 that the Mirage 2000 aircraft which was being acquired by India was the answer to Pakistan F-16. The Mirage 2000 was being bought to give confidence to the Indian Air Force, he stated. He stated in the Lok Sabha "we have something which is a match to what the others have". Cited in Lok Sabha Debates, Vol 36, no.26, 5 April 1983, col.369.

\textsuperscript{153} Selig S. Harrison, a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Congressional testimony early in 1983 said that the Indian public would be able to understand the sale of F-20 (F-5G) interceptors, light tanks, anti aircraft (guns), helicopter and 105 and 120 millimeter howitzers which would serve to fight against Afghanistan. The sale of arms, such as F-16s, M 48 tanks, 155 millimeter howitzers, TOW missiles, tank recovery vehicles, and Huey Cobra assault helicopters forced India to suspect the US's intentions. For details see Selig S. Harrison in testimony to the Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, \textit{United States Assistance to Pakistan}, 9 March 1983 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), pp.5-6.
Afghanistan crisis to bolster its power position vis-a-vis New Delhi.\textsuperscript{154} The US comparison of the defense requirements of India with those of Pakistan, was like comparing the defense needs of the US with those of Cuba.\textsuperscript{155}

Pakistan played along with the US anti Soviet strategy to get US weapons for use against India. Pakistan never tried to impress upon India that the arms procured from the US would not be used against it. It was the US, which tried to impress upon India that its commitment to Pakistan was limited i.e. only to confront Soviet aggression.\textsuperscript{156}

If the US was interested in solving the Afghanistan crisis, it should not have concentrated on enhancing arms aid to Pakistan, as it was practically not possible for Pakistan to counter a Soviet attack. The US could have tried to settle the problem through negotiations.

India's acquisition of arms had been to balance the Chinese and Pakistani arms build-up. Its purpose of arms acquisition was not to become a military power but to protect its territory, integrity and sovereignty. If its intention was to become a military power, it would not have neglected its defense procurement from 1947 to 1962; and it would have become a part of the military alliance systems in the region.

The US should have worked towards containing communism in the region by extending cordial relationship with both India and Pakistan instead of inducting arms into the region. The US was to contain communism, but Pakistan did not use its aid to contain communism. So the question arises was it directed only against communism as the US continued its military linkages with Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{154} The Tribune, 24 January 1980.
\textsuperscript{156} James L. Buckley, Under Secretary of the State, in a statement to Committee on Foreign Relations, see DSIS, n.90, p.30.
The US felt that the disadvantage of being geographically distanced from the region could be compensated by structured military alliance and the defense - build up in the region with an ally viz Pakistan. The security which Pakistan was searching since 1947 was security against India and it was least concerned about communist expansionism.\textsuperscript{157}

The US, which lost its foothold in Vietnam in 1975 should have realized the fact that the regional affairs should not be globalised by intervention. The US, however, did not seem to have learnt any lesson with its Vietnam experience and became indirectly involved in the Afghanistan crisis by supplying arms to Pakistan.

The US military aid to Pakistan was never used against the former Soviet Union but was used against India. The purpose of giving aid was to contain communism but Pakistan’s thrust was directed against India in the subcontinent. India felt that the US’s military aid to Pakistan was targeted against India. Further India suspected that the US tried to prevent India from becoming independent in its nuclear programme. In the following chapter an attempt has been made to analyse and examine the issues involved between the US and India on the nuclear issue in South Asia.

\textsuperscript{157} India’s population in 1988 (807,432,000) was more than five and half times greater than the population of Pakistan (106,686,000) and its industrial potential also greater than Pakistan. If India’s procurement of military aid threatened Pakistan’s security, it did not express a threat from China which was far greater than India in military strength.