Southeast Asia is a region full of security challenges both from external and internal sources. The region has borne the brunt of colonialism, followed by Cold War politics. It still continues to be plagued by regional problems like territorial disputes and internal ones especially a variety of non-military threats ranging from political stability, ethno-religious strife to natural disasters, from economic crisis to terrorism, from narcotic trade to the spread of infectious diseases, the list can still grow longer. As new security challenges continue to spring surprises for Southeast Asia, it has become extremely difficult to compartmentalise security challenges into stereotypes, thus to put it in a sentence both the territorial and human aspects of security are threatened. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on August 8, 1967 with an expressive identity of a socio-economic organisation, but its transition into a politico-security community over time, is a testimony to the non-receding security challenges of Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, despite the gradual evolution of the ASEAN as a regional organisation and its relentless efforts to address all the security complications, the organisation seems to have failed to establish itself as the promoter of mutual faith and trust. Let alone outsiders, even the states within the region do not trust each other. Until there is a sense of familiarity and congeniality solutions to security problems is a distant possibility. Bilateral disputes create a sense of suspicion and apathy among member states of the region. In an environment of mutual apathy and suspicion reinforced by deep rooted differences between states, bilateral disputes can hardly be solved. Thus states are caught in a vicious circle that alienates problems from solutions. It has been the sustained efforts by the ASEAN to promote multilateral cooperation and enhance trust but precisely because states act as sovereign units with a prerogative to look after own national interests, their attitude has become the biggest obstacle for the organisation. It therefore becomes necessary first, to build up an environment of trust and confidence about fellow regional states and second, to evolve another supportive track of interaction that, at the least, would create a situation where solutions can be discussed.

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1 See, “What ASEAN is and what it stands for by”, Speech by Rodolfo C Severino, Secretary of ASEAN, Asia Policy Lecture, Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific University of Sydney, Australia, October 22, 1998.
These two processes are Confidence Building and Track II. The scope of this chapter includes a detailed introduction to both these concepts, their definition, nature and evolution. It makes a summarised presentation of the kinds of security threats endemic to Southeast Asia, the responses through the organs of ASEAN especially the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The chapter also provides a brief idea of the of Track II processes already in progress that can provide crucial support to the official counterpart. It also attempts to justify the need for Confidence Building in Southeast Asia through the Track II channel.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, Confidence means, "firm trust; a feeling of reliance or certainty". The level of confidence explains a state of relationship between two persons embedded in trust and faith. However, in the international arena, one view (realism) finds a similarity in the relationship between human beings and Nation States. Perhaps the only prominent difference is that the Nation States involved are much larger. Otherwise, relationships between states, like in human relations, are based on calculated moves based on perceptions of self interests and a desire to prove supreme to other fellow beings. States operate within the international political framework premised on certain considerations – national interests, world leadership power, competition, etc. Naturally, the nature of relations between these units is not always peaceful and balanced; confidence continues to be an optional element in such relations. The history of modern international politics is marred by two World Wars and numerous small wars testify for the basis of this observation.

Under such circumstances, there has been a relentless effort to instil confidence in the state of relationship between two or more states. However, the term Confidence Building has been of recent usage. It has gained popularity with such efforts acquiring institutional manifestation during the Cold War period in the European Continent. Perhaps because of its young and evolving, it has been difficult to define in exact terms as to what Confidence Building means. Andrew Mack, referring to John Mackintosh's observation in this context, reiterates that Confidence Building is a

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3 In the six principles of political realism where Morgentheau finds the roots of political realism and in turn International relations in basic human nature. See, Hans J. Morgentheau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp.4-15.
concept notable for the imprecision of various attempts to define it. As it aims at sowing seeds of confidence into relationships it may be defined as a whole set of procedures and mechanisms devised for the purpose. On the other hand, 'Confidence Building' may reflect a process like the Helsinki Process. It may be also defined as a psychological process aimed at reducing wrong readings or misperception of one's intention towards the other. Again Confidence Building need not imply that differences in perception of this concept are irreconcilable; on the contrary, it may very well prove to be a partial reflection of a single string of thought.

James Mackintosh has tried to bring about the point that Confidence Building involves both a process and a procedure. For simple of understanding one may look at the concept in a reverse way a procedure and then a process. As an amalgamation of various procedures, Confidence Building attempts to make clear to the concerned states their intentions. Here procedures qualify intentions. Confidence Building as procedures can be best explained by drawing instances from the conferences that prescribe measures that may fall into one or more of the courses of action described below:

- Exchange of information resulting in increasing communication between parties;
- Establishing certain norms, rules, for a section of military operations;
- Permission of observation and inspection and exchanging of personnel for the purpose;
- Applying restraints on operations and military readiness; and
- Restraint in deployment of arms and personnel so as to prevent misconceptions of one's intentions by the other.

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Drawing from courses of actions, it is possible to draw countless number of Confidence Building procedures through permutations and combinations. We now call them CBMs (CBMs). Moreover such measures may be suitably applied according to needs and circumstances. Subsequently, a wide range of CBMs are now active in state to state relationships addressing complex security issues. These could be sighted through a systematic survey of historical illustrations in the form of treaties, agreements, negotiations, besides specific measures to the effect of confidence building. The best example of the latter is the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and later the Stockholm Document (agreed upon at the 1986 Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe 1986). Details of these conferences will be discussed in the later part of this chapter.

These procedures or measures assume the dimension of a process when they achieve success to a considerable extent in reducing and eliminating misperceptions about the potential of threat from another state based on an approximation of the latter's military capabilities and activities. Therefore the process dimension of Confidence Building attempts to focus on the way misperceptions are handled and reduced. Mackintosh goes further and describes Confidence Building process as a satisfactory state of relationship whereby there has already been a reversal in the psyche of the actors (or at least in some of them) who once did not enjoy good relationships. As defined by him, “Confidence Building is a psychological process involving the transformation of decision makers’ beliefs about the nature of the threat posed by the other formerly antagonistic states primarily entailing a shift from a basic assumption of hostile intentions to an assumption of non-hostile intentions.”

From the above attempts at defining Confidence Building as a process a few things are clear. First, CBMs are actually a set of procedures that enhance Confidence Building as a process. Second, theses procedures or measures must have attained considerable recognition and acceptance amongst the members by means of which it becomes institutionalised as a process. Third, Confidence Building as a process ensures a psychological reconciliation whereby the antagonistic states shed their suspicion about each other’s hostile intentions. As a fourth observation a new

7 Op. Cit, no.3, p.84.
dimension that can be added is that a whole set of measures which have gained considerable recognition and acceptance amongst the members have not only unfolded a process of Confidence Building, it has also helped establish a regime which is the core element of this process.

Regimes are specific set of rules for the purpose of ensuring adherence and discipline in any vital multilateral activity. According to Stephen D. Krasner, “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectation converge in a given area of international relations.” Most of the regimes are specialised each playing its own part in bringing about systematic compliance towards peace and stability. Mackintosh identifies two specific potential Confidence Building Regimes concentrating on specific aspects – the first one being the “monitoring regime” and the second one being as “defence transformation regime”. As may be easily understood, from the term, the first regime provides for extensive monitoring of an entire region on a bilateral or multilateral basis with adequate facilities for transparency like the Open Skies proposal by the Eisenhower Administration. Technically it may be similar to verification, but there is a substantial difference – while verification comes as technical compliance seeking a method to a broader set of agreements viz a regime, which may go a long way in implanting confidence, a monitoring regime would itself work as a Confidence Building Process – a special Confidence Building Regime to deplete misperceptions and misreading about each other.

The other Confidence Building Regime is a defence transformation regime which aims at reversing the defence posture of nations from a pre-emptive and offensive one to a less offensive, defensive one. A range of supplementary measures may be derived for the purpose such as pre notification, inspection, Mutual Balanced Forces

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10 The ‘Concept of Mutual Ariel Observation’ was initially proposed by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1995 in course of his meeting with Soviet Premiere Bulganin. The Treaty eventually signed was an initiative of US President George Bush in 1989. Negotiated by the then members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Warsaw Pact, the agreement was signed in Helsinki, Finland in 1992. The Treaty entered into force on January 2, 2002 and has more than 23 signatories to it. Until 2002, the Treaty was supported by the Defence Threat Reduction Agency. Since 2002, in accordance to the provisions of the Treaty, a number of observation (monitoring) flights have been taking place involving the signatory states.
Reduction (MBFR). In fact a defence transformation regime may be holistic Confidence Building Regime bringing within its means a vast range of mechanisms to make possible transformation and subsequently change in a state’s defence posture provided that it is not done in hustle and over zeal. An ideal step would be to supplement defence transformation regimes with monitoring regimes to initiate a Confidence Building Process.

In the present context, a new dimension has been added to the definition of confidence building. Given the complexity of the contemporary security problems of the world, security is no longer only a military or strategic affair but has assumed wider connotations. We speak of Human Security which in turn is comprised of economic security, environmental security, etc. Likewise CBMs are now applied to both military and non-military sectors. In case of the former, they are identified as Confidence and Security Building Measures or CSBMs and for the latter, as CBMs which have a wider scope dealing with both conventional military and non-military issues. They are also known as Military CBMs and Non-Military CBMs respectively. A detailed discussion on this particular aspect is given in the latter part of this chapter. At present, it suffices to say that recently a more holistic approach to Confidence Building is being preferred keeping in mind the nature of the emerging security threats.

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11 The Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction (MBFR) Treaty was signed on July 10, 1992. The talks on this Treaty opened in 1993 at Vienna between the two Superpowers and agreed on an initial mutual decrease in the military strength in Central Europe and Benelux countries, East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In 1986, NATO proposed a new form of reduction of forces not only for Europe but for a non-European region. In 1989, MBFR and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiation began The Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE was signed in 1999 at Istanbul. It allowed national and territorial ceilings on conventional arms and equipments instead of the original block limitations and allow State Parties to temporarily exceed the established limits on deployment and military exercises. Verification is important. States are to allow inspection of 20% of their objectives of verification, provide bilateral and quarterly reports are presented to the before the other members. See, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), available at, http://cns.mis.edu/inventory/pdfs/cfe.pdf.

Theorising Confidence Building

Unlike the other established concepts constituting strategic matters or even international relations, in general Confidence Building is different and peculiar because the circumstances under which it took birth and the way it has been evolving, it is difficult to formulate a theory of Confidence Building. To start with, the origin of Confidence Building is context bound, and often arises from idiosyncratic historical cases. Therefore, no certain explanation can be provided of what it entails in general and how they ought to function. Every state is not at one on whether to consider Confidence Building as only a set of mechanism or as a process. It must be kept in mind that attempts to theorise CBMs came earlier to its conceptual explorations. It all began in Europe and what may be vaguely called as ‘theory’ of Confidence Building has been changing as Europe changed its mechanisms and views according to their needs. We therefore, have no general theory of Confidence Building that can be applied to all circumstances and to all the nation states.

In order to seek a better understanding of how Confidence Building has come to attain its present status, we must trace its origin; in the process we may also look at its theoretical underpinnings. The term CBMs entered the diplomatic lexicon following the negotiations of some modest measures during the 1975 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), it is also called the Helsinki Conference.\textsuperscript{13} Subsequently the measures adopted then came to be known as the first generation of CBMs of Europe. Thus CBMs began in Europe, but included US and Canada. The steps include:

- Notice of military manoeuvres that involved more than 25,000 soldiers at an advance of 21 days or earlier;
- Invitation of observation to these manoeuvres;
- Pre-notification of smaller manoeuvres and major troop movements; and
- Decreasing military confrontation and promoting disarmament.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} The Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe was established in 1972 providing a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation. One of its most outstanding achievements has been establishing a series of CBMs starting with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. They were further expanded at the Stockholm Conference in 1986, then consecutively in 1992, 1994, 1996. Since 1994 CSCE has been given an organisational character and is now known as Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe with a comprehensive programme of CBMs. The Lisbon Conference in December 1996 adopted a “Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century.”

What was sought to be achieved through the first generation CBMs was dissolution of tension, promotion of cooperation to ensure security and stability of the region and reduction of the danger of armed conflict arising out of misperceptions and calculations. However, apart from the desired goals it was expected to achieve, there was more to the urgency behind devising such CBMs. It must not be forgotten that Europe was always one of the most active arenas of Cold War. The CBMs crafted can be in a way viewed as instruments of Cold War strategy aimed at the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Similarly, the urge to strive for security was not from an indigenous cooperative impetus but was premised on two different political considerations by the two camps – US and USSR. While for the West it meant not only enhancing own security through cooperation commitments, it also meant some kind of security against the red bastion cordonning East Europe. On the other hand, for the east represented by the Soviet Union who laid the original proposal for such a conference, it meant a way of seeking legitimacy for itself and its allies in Eastern Europe amongst the Europeans. So for their respective reasons, the Conference represented a meeting forum for the West and the East. Marie-France Desjardins has observed that most of the measures were decided upon in consent with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Earlier attempts at establishing a Confidence Building framework had also been initiated within the NATO as a part of the MBFR negotiations. However, it was the CSCE CBMs that were successfully negotiated. An equally active NATO launched its own ambitious attempt at modulating the CBMs laying bare the fact that a East-West reconciliation or a long lastiing détente was the last thing in mind. Much of the theorisation was thus accommodated on the basis of the needs of the European security as propelled by the NATO. Though at the initial stages the military potent of the CBMs were totally denied, at a later stage a theoretical explanation was given that these kinds of CBMs could go a long way in reducing surprise attack. Often benign activities were misinterpreted. So to prevent pre-emptive action, proper dissemination of information regarding military activities including transparency for intentions was required. The West thought that by forcing the Soviet Union to announce its

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'exercises' in advance, it would be able to constrain Moscow's ability to dominate the neighbours – a step to deter communist advance into western Europe.

At a later stage, European theory of Confidence Building dwindled between 'input' and 'output' strategies. As 'arms control' came to be viewed as a vital part of confidence building, stress was put on considering force levels of different countries automatically shifting attention to 'input' considerations – men, tanks, missiles. However, it was considerably difficult to bring to light classified facts and 'reduction of forces' continued to be reserved topic. As an alternative, less demanding measures were aimed at gaining more knowledge regarding the level of competition, location or activities of the forces. The focus thus gradually shifted from 'input' to 'output' side of military activities; it comprised matters like surprise attack, pre-emptive nuclear strike, etc. The aim was to restrict military activities. In the words of Christoph Bertam, "[b]ecause it concentrates explicitly on what the other side can do rather than on what military quantities it has at its disposal, this approach represents a fundamental change, a change from a focus on the military output – surprise attack, pre-emptive strike and nuclear strike."

Perhaps from this, CBMs became a support to structural arms control. Therefore a part of the theorisation on Confidence Building began to be associated with arms control. It is a complex relationship – through the 'input' perspective, arms control may be considered as a Confidence Building Mechanism. However, as arms control in itself became an institutionalised process, it takes help of many conventional measures – transparency, exchange of information, verification, inspection, reduction of deployment etc. Nonetheless the outcome of the process is to generate confidence. They are as Desjardins points out complementary to structural (or traditional) approaches to arms control that generally concentrate on the size and the composition of the arsenal. Subsequently, a number of steps were considered to be a part of arms control and confidence generating measures, such as hotline; prevention of incidents at sea and Open Skies. A new theoretical outlook thus gave Confidence Building a

16 Ibid, pp. 10.
18 Ibid, pp. 11.
very accommodating status whereby any relevant theme including arms control could become a part of CBMs.

By early 1980s CBMs began to expand its ambit. With it the new problem that came into the horizon was the exportability of Euro-Centric CBMs and Confidence Building theory to other regions. It had different interpretations which was more expansive and positive. While for the West CBMs would help in eliminating or reducing fears of specific military threats, the developing countries on the other hand considered Confidence Building as a process, that which could instil confidence within inter-state as well inter-sectoral relations. The developing countries are of the opinion that CBMs need not remain confined only to the military sphere. They were of the opinion that in order to generate international confidence, CBMs were to instil international confidence particularly between states – in all sectors of inter-state relations. Subsequently, in the 1980s a group of experts under the UN, forwarded some recommendations based on the needs of the developing countries which they wisely termed as Political Measures. Such Political Measures were more of a non-military nature.

Meanwhile the ‘second generation’ CBMs were then theorised as Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) signifying two things – first that conflict reduction argument had not yielded much results and second that the security of Europe was still not free from threats. The reversal of the European Confidence Building outlook helped a long way in making CSCE a useful forum and later it evolved into an ideal process. Their quick formulation and steady implementation went a long way in easing the suffocation within the East-West relationship. Inspite of the credibility of the CSCE as an ideal Confidence Building Process, one need not forget that the success of the Conference was a result of the compromise between a falling Eastern Camp and a triumphant Western Camp.

During the post Cold War period Confidence Building as a process has gained relative currency and the European efforts had a gone long way in making this possible. After the Stockholm Conference, the Vienna Document adopted in 1990 contained a new
set of CBMs stressing on transparency, verification and evaluation. It had been the next building block of the European Confidence Building Process. This was the culmination of the Helsinki Final Act giving Confidence Building Process true recognition to become an inspiration for others. They are also known as the third generation CBMs. Though Europe had inspired others to believe in the utility and good charms of confidence building, there are more than minute differences on the exportability of this process in an unabridged version.

So what is the present status of Confidence Building theory? At first it must be acknowledged that Confidence Building theorisation should now encompass a ‘process’ perspective. It has not fixed theoretical tenets but contains some general views on confidence building:

- Confidence Building as a process has positive contribution in changing perception regarding security implications between two or more states;
- CBMs are all integral components of the same phenomenon such that Confidence Building (process) may be well defined as a complex and all encompassing process aiming at an outcome in which state is no longer considered a threat;
- CBMs include non-military spheres (economic, political and social). An adjacent outlook suggests that cooperation is founded in one of these fields the foundation is built for higher systems of confidence building. At the initial stage moving along non-controversial lines seemed plausible, dealing with non-controversial issues would help move into more complex domains. In other words, the ‘incremental approach’ would be by far productive.
- Last but not the least point is to qualify process not only as institutionalised systems of activity like the Helsinki Process, but as a new ‘comprehensive’ mechanism that encompasses both core and peripheral security determinants. This reflects certain shifts from hardcore closed military issues to more flexible non-military yet vital matters.

19 Several sections of the Vienna document bore testimony of the need for transparency – Chapter II on Defence Planning, Chapter III on Risk Reduction, Chapter IV on Contacts, and Chapter VI on observation of certain Military activities in Chapter VII on Annual Calendar. Chapter IX Compliance and Verification, See, Vienna Document 1990 of the Negations on Confidence and Security Building Measures, adopted by OSCE, FSC Doc/99.
Relevance of European CBMs to the Other Regions.

While the European experience proved that some positive steps could help reduce tension, there still remained doubts on how far the European process can be applied to non-European regions. To start with it is necessary to take account of certain observations regarding European CBMs:

- It cannot be forgotten that Europe was the heart of Cold War where both sides tried their luck using both political and military tactics. Thus, it was virtually impossible to conceive of a ‘context free’ CBMs in Europe. Mackintosh in this context chooses the time frame of '74-'86 where he identified at least three determinants conditioned by Cold War that animated efforts to formulate a Confidence Building Regime – Offensive Military Doctrines of either side; force deployment on either sides; and their proximity.

- The utility of Confidence Building in Europe apart from the expected had far fetched designs in relation to the Cold War. Lodgaard identified some apparent functions of the European CBMs:
  a) Re-assurance of non-aggressive intent;
  b) Reduce the scope for biased perception of regular military activities and their potential misinterpretation;
  c) Reduction of scope for political intimidation;
  d) Reduce the likelihood of inadvertent escalation; and
  e) Disarmament and arms control.

- More than a positive tone, most of these functions bore a negative insight stating two things indirectly – firstly that the prevalent circumstances was plagued by tension and animosity and secondly, the aim of these Confidence Building mechanisms was to bring upon (indirectly) the other side a burden of obligations so as to bind its first strike capacity;

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• Therefore CBMs in Europe, [later particularly known as Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM)] were clearly and highly relevant to military security. As Jonathan Alford defined CBMs as “measures that tend to make military intention obvious.” CBMs have been seen as having considerable strategic utility.

• The CBMs in the post Cold War gave it a new outlook. The shift from the 'second generation' CBMs to the then upcoming third generation CBMs had given it unprecedented recognition. CBMs were equated to a process — both substantially and procedurally. In the former aspect Confidence Building was identified as complex and an all encompassing process aiming at an outcome that yielded a general sense of trust so that states no longer consider each other a threat to their security. This implied a complex network of CBMs in almost all fields, viz economic, political and social. The new outlook particularly stressed on spin off and spill over effect that would ultimately establish a 'web of cooperation'. The spiral effect perspective gives Confidence Building a broader scope and responsibility. Procedurally, Confidence Building involves active debating, consultation, negotiation, formulation, regime formation and its implementation. The emerging 'new outlook' of CBMs once again from the European context, had accounted for its popularity and has gained recognition since the 1990s. Despite its shift in outlook from a mere (negative) military security perspective to a more (positive) cooperation enhancing outlook, it is still debatable on how far the European model can be exported to other regions of the world and be accomplished successfully.

In order to discuss the non-European context a few significant points become important. First, determine the definition especially with regard to the non-European regions of the world; second, take note of the changes in the post Cold War situation; and third, understanding the emerging security scenario. Studying these three separate points need not mean that they are separate issues; on the contrary they may be very well drawn into a single discussion. There is a substantial change in how one defines

security – from the Eurocentric conventional definition of security that stressed on containing enemy military capabilities, reducing first strike chances and considering pre-emptive strategies to a far more non-military, broader understanding of security that considers politico-socio, socio-economic and politico-economic factors of life. General M.S. Merafhe, thus pointed out, “I refer to security in this regard to encapsulate political and economic considerations.”

Under such circumstances, there arises questions on the application of a purely context bound (East West rivalry during Cold War) European model of confidence building. Lars Norberg asserted that the complex CSCE process cannot be transferred and subsequently transplanted to any other region neither its particular elements.

It is equally important to take note of the fact that the end of the Cold War had several implications. It heralded the end of the bipolar structure of international politics, but the present structure oscillates between unilateralism and multilateralism. The power denominations and power centres all underwent change as a new set of actors, not necessarily state centric began to assume a bigger role. Under such circumstances vital changes continue to take place in the strategic matrix of the non-European countries. Even in Europe a new politico-security environment emerged that was responsible for the new CSCE outlook. John Chipman observed, “[t]he end of Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War did not usher in a new international system without resemblance to its predecessors...But a number of trends that affect the capacity of individual states to implement changes at home and abroad were given greater impetus by these events and these trends need to be absorbed by strategists.”

The understanding of the post Cold War situation has in fact given a new impetus to Confidence Building giving it a comprehensive character. The stress on a more abstract ‘inter-state cooperation’ reflects indirectly this insecurity and uncertainty of the post Cold War phase.

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The contemporary phase is marked by both opportunities and uncertainties. New forms of conflict have emerged in place of bipolar rivalry that characterised the Cold War. It has become quite difficult to identify with certainty friends from foes. With changing sources of threat, risks of conflict have to be viewed in a totally different perspective. For one, internal elements as much as external factors are sources of security concern. Moreover, the end of Cold War has brought to attention areas where long term enemies remain on the verge of conflict. CBMs of a more comprehensive nature may be applied to these regions to reduce the animosity of the belligerents. In this context, we may consider Michael Krepon's suggestion of a three tier incremental approach to Confidence Building in the post Cold War era in these conflict ridden areas – starting from conflict avoidance to Confidence Building and ultimately to a far more ambitious plan to establish peace.27

All over the world, there are areas plagued by constant animosity – starting from the Middle East to Africa, to South Asia, Asia Pacific and even Latin America. Although, all of them have been inspired by the European process and have adopted measures and some instances have been drawn from the CSCE like arms control and arms register, agreements on reconciliation, non aggression, information exchange and cooperation; however each have their unique position and own characteristics that can be best handled by building indigenous models of confidence building. Inter state cooperation would yield best results should they be left to be designed at interstate level. However Yasushi Akashi has identified certain basic trends noticeable in the non-European region that makes adaptability of European CBMs difficult – no consensus on the (un)reasonableness of arms transfer and rising arms manufacture, lack of proper communication resulting in misperception of threat estimates to one's own security.28

27 Michael Krepon views Confidence Building as a result yielding process in the post Cold War period what he terms as Post Cold War Growth Industry. Inspite of its many short falls it is particularly useful for its regional variations, flexibility and creativity. For further details see, Michael Krepon, “Conflict Avoidance, Confidence Building and Peace Making”, in Michael Krepon, Khurshid Khoja, Michael Newbill and Jenny Drezin (eds.), Handbook of CBMs for Regional Security, Henry L. Stimson Centre, September, 1993, pp. 1 -13.
Keeping this context in mind, we now would deal with the region of Southeast Asia as the area of concern. Southeast Asia has been one of the most interesting and active regions in international politics. During Cold War it was a very volatile region turmoiled by proxy war whereby the two super powers tried to establish their supremacy over the area. Here it must be kept in mind that the region by itself never got involved in the Cold War, on the contrary, the Cold War arrived in the region with the arrival of the superpowers. The US-Vietnam War gave enough reasons to the US to settle their scores in the region with the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet rift justified Soviet and Chinese involvement in the regional Cambodia-occupation issue. So apparently a ‘neighbourhood problem’ assumed menacing proportions with the involvement of the Cold War actors.

Inspite of the waning of the Cold War, Southeast Asia continues to remain one of the hot spots of the world where a new set of complex web of security problems have replaced the old ones. They may be studied differently from various perspectives, but in order to deal with them somewhat systematically, they can be divided into military and non-military ones. The military ones have both an external and an internal dimension. However at present, Southeast Asia faces the critical challenge from ‘non-military’ problems that bear heavily upon this region. The non-military challenges will be discussed before dealing with direct military threats. Instability is the chronic problem of the region – both in politics and economy. Periodic leadership transitions and the continuous friction between democratic and authoritarian forces have shaken the credibility and stability of the political systems of this region. The unprecedented economic boom that suddenly crashed in the late 90s had taken the region almost to the pre economic boom period. Since then, the region is slowly regaining its economic health. However it has not resulted in an egalitarian transition, it has resulted not only in the polarisation of wealth within societies. It has also created haves and have-nots within the nations of the region. The socio economic scenario as it stands now, all the governments sense the need to ensure that their citizens are provided with economic and social welfare that ensures legitimacy of the government. Unfortunately the political apparatus functioning in these countries are not enough to sustain or provide further security for the process especially in terms of harnessing the power of integration in tune with national economies.
Within the social framework of the region heterogeneity has bore heavily upon the stability of the region. A region highly diversified in terms of demography has been witness to the politics of inclusion and exclusion manifested through negative nationalism. Countries like Malaysia where racial compartmentalisation have been evident in the ways the national parties were formed and functioned United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), Malay Indian Congress (MIC) and the Malay Chinese Association (MCA), the racial riots of 1969 is prominent in Malaysian political history. Of recent in 2007, Malaysia has been witness to demonstrations by Indians against the discriminatory policies of the Malaysian government. The government came down heavily upon the Indians to thwart these demonstrations. Nathan observes closely linked factors when he states that, "Thus the whole notion of individual group and security is closely tied to the communal character of the Malaysian political system."[^29] He further adds that "[i]n Malaysia as in virtually all ethnic societies, ethnic politics is a means to an end: political stability, regime security, economic growth and multi racial peace and harmony – all regard as key values in the preservation and promotion of national security."[^30] The unsuccessful Singapore-Malay Federation inclusive of Singapore had led to tensions between both the sides. The vast Chinese population is spread throughout the Southeast Asia and control a major portion of the economy; it is a source of racial tension resulting racial riots like those in Malaysia and in Indonesia. Again Nathan opines that the role of Singapore as a predominantly Chinese populated state along with its geopolitical consideration provided food for insights into the ethnic-oriented perceptions of Malaysian national security.[^31] The game of inclusion and exclusion has acquired a religious dimension, the recent spate of killings in Indonesia in the Malaku Islands, in the context of the riots between Christians and Muslims bears the testimony to such an observation. Separatism, regionalism have become very closely involved with religious fundamentalism which in turn has got involved with international terrorism. Very old and sustained demands for separate identity and region are noticed in Southern Thailand and the Philippines. However what is alarming is that recently these movements have acquired a fundamentalist colour. For instance the Moro National Liberation Front (MILF) is complemented with the activities of the Moro

[^30]: Ibid.
[^31]: Ibid, p.525.
Islamic Liberation Front (MNLF). Similarly in Southern Thailand, separatist demands are being supported by Islamic Fundamentalists. In addition, Southeast Asia has become a hub of international terrorism, the dreaded of Al Qaeda has spread its influence over vast spans of this region – Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. It coordinates and supervises within the region as well as across the world.

Apart from these vital factors there are other non-military security issues that include economic recessions and meltdowns, migration and displacement, repatriation problems health hazards, natural disasters, environmental degradation, and resource crunch that have resulted in competition for the same and to which Ralph Cossa adds that it might resurrect historic rivalries.32

Moving into the complex domain of direct military threats one needs to consider the two dimensions mentioned before – external and internal (regional and domestic):

A. External – it is uncontested that the end of the Cold War helped register positive effects by bringing to an end the set of old adversarial relationships but at the same time created a peculiar situation called ‘power vacuum’. In the context of such a situation there arises the necessity to assess the future role of powers external to the region. Probable actors will be the US Russia China, Japan, and India; these are the states that may bring upon consequences in the light of their future actions in the region. Relations between these states as well as between them and the states of Southeast Asia would make significant impact on the future of the region. Chin Kin Wah had pointed to some of these relations – Sino-Japanese relations, US-Japanese relations, and Sino-US relations.33 Not discounting the importance of all the other actors, the countries that are likely to make most of the impression are China and Japan.

China has been the most important actor, because of its physical contiguity, it would not be considered as a major actor but regional power also. Ever since Deng Xiaoping had introduced the ‘Four Modernisation Programmes’ since the late 1970s, Chinese

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32 Cossa adds a list of conventional (military) and non-conventional (non-military) sources of threat to East and Southeast Asia that spans from territorial conflicts to disputes over human rights. For details see, Ralph A Cossa, “Asia Pacific CBMs for Regional Security” in Michael Krepon, Khurshid Khoja, Michael Newbill and Jenny Drezin (eds), Op.Cit, no.24, pp.15-39.

state and society has undergone epochal change. However great uncertainties revolve round the future course of action, but already China is a formidable power. Chinese strategic actions interests in this region had been revealed through its intense involvement in the Cambodian crisis. Another important factor is that the Chinese concept of security is inseparably linked to its idea of territorial integrity. China therefore thinks Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea to be an inseparable part of their territory. With its evident readiness to enforce its claim by force and with its formidable military capabilities for local offensive operations as in the Spratly Islands, the Chinese threat looms large in Southeast Asia.

Japan may be known as more of a predominant economic power but that does not erode its potential to play a political role to commensurate its economic prowess. Japanese involvement in the Cambodian peace keeping process indicated the beginning of an active Japanese role in international politics especially in the region. Japan does not rule out the chances of renewed politico-security engagement in the problems of the region. Yoshide Soeye sights the National Defence Programme Outline which carries the message to this effect, "[w]hile the possibility of a global armed conflict has become remote, complicated and diverse, regional conflicts are taking place in the Asia Pacific and new kinds of dangers such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are on the increase. In the areas surrounding Japan the possibility of a situation which could seriously affect the security of Japan cannot be excluded." 34 The major element in Japanese security has been the US-Japanese alliance that had been interpreted as a balancing act for both the countries as a part of the US-Sino-Japanese configuration. In addition, Japan is associated with the US billion dollar Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Nonetheless, Japanese response to the Cambodian issue may be taken as an indication of a developing independent status beyond the maze of defence or security treaties – a development that ought to be of utmost concern to the strategic policy makers of Southeast Asia.

Under such circumstances, it suffices to say that the American presence may serve vital to the balance of power of this region. Though there has been no unanimity on

this, a whole lot of prospects and consequences must be taken into account before concluding for US re-engagement in this region. As for the rationale behind US interests in the region, it involves economic and strategic factors. In so far as China and Japan are concerned a sense of uncertainty and challenge does not leave the US with much choice except to continue to show interest towards the region. The Vietnam-Cambodia turmoil and the display of Japanese prowess during WW II have proved the capacity of both the countries to play and play successfully the role of formidable regional players. In the post-Cold War situation, both the countries (Japan and China) particularly China have adjusted and adopted themselves to assume the role of regional guardians. The political challenge flowing from China and the economic strength of Japan are matters of vital concern to the US. Realists like Schlesinger and unilateralists like Charles Krauthammer are of the similar opinion that US considers it her prime concern to maintain her unilateral position in engaging in any part of the globe especially where power is likely to get diverted towards contending power clients. The presence external powers make the security of Southeast Asia as much as its stability volatile.

B. Internal (regional and domestic) – The problems within the region present a complex picture. Primarily Southeast Asian countries are concerned with threats to their internal stability. However use of military force to address issues that destabilise internal stability of a country will be the last option. It shall be used only in extreme situations. Such imperilled situations generally arise from ethno political and ideological challenges to the state. The social dissensions have been discussed. Ethnic movements that have evolved into secessionism coupled with religious fundamentalism in the present have been challenging various states of Southeast Asia – Pattanis in Southern Thailand, Moros in Southern Philippines, the various ethnic tribes in Myanmar. Ethnic tensions and conflicts have a spill over effect causing inter-state tensions. It is precisely here that military security gets threatened. For instance the exodus of Achenese refugees to Malaysia and their repatriation is a source of tension between Indonesia and Malaysia. The Philippines harbours suspicion against Malaysia that the latter supports the Muslim separatist in Southern Philippines. In a

similar line Thailand is unhappy under the impression that the Pattani Muslims from Southern Thailand are receiving a lot of help and sympathy from Malaysia. The recent terrorist attacks and the kidnappings of Westerners around the Philippines have brought to focus the new emerging challenges from Islamic fundamentalism and transnational terrorism. Especially kidnappings have brought to focus another problem of such identity and separatist movements – it not only disturbs the relations between countries of the region, it may also lead to souring of relations between ASEAN and the world outside.

Disputes over borders and territorial claims are quite common in Southeast Asia. Overlapping claims have earlier resulted in conflicts between states. The most recent example is the tension between Thailand and Cambodia over the jurisdiction of the temple of Preah Vihar located on the disputed Thai Cambodian border. Such flare-ups are feared to visit and revisit the region time and again as the region is full of such disputed territorial and marine claims. South China is an open wound that can infect the bilateral relations between the claimants to that area. Clashes between China and Philippines have taken place for quite a number of times. Overlapping claims and territorial disputes deteriorate bilateral relations and military confrontations disturb the regional equilibrium as a number of South Asian states are involved in the South China Sea dispute. Adding to the complexity of territorial claims and bilateral disputes is the large amount of weapons procurement by the states of Southeast Asia. The increase in arms procurement has a multiplier affect on the volatility of the region.

As we perceive Southeast Asia, at the crosswords of its own history and recent developments, the need for cooperation and interdependency is well established. What is needed is an urgency to reinforce mutual trust and confidence about each other’s purposes, intentions and policies. This calls for a set of CBMs. In certain cases CBMs are also referred to CSBMs in the Asia Pacific region. Ralph Cossa in response to the complex nature of the security scenario in Southeast Asia thinks that the usage of the

term CSBM is suitable since they vary from narrow (almost exclusive military measures) to much broader interpretations encompassing almost everything that builds confidence. The CSCAP Working Group was constituted as CSBMs and not on CBMs. They put forwards their definition of CSBMs as “both formal and informal measures, whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, that address, prevent, or resolve uncertainties among states, including both military and political elements.” However in course of Confidence Building, CSBMs and CBMs are used in the same spirit. Keeping in mind the enormous potential of CBMs in bringing down the almost insurmountable obstacles, the process of Confidence Building could be achieved in two probable areas –

a) Working both within the military and non-military areas.

b) Operating both at the official and unofficial levels.

The establishment of ASEAN is in a way testimony to the growing importance of Confidence Building in the region. Although during the birth of ASEAN, there was nothing like confidence building, Chintamani Mahapatra writes that a psychological atmosphere in the second half of the sixties prevailed with the growth of the feeling that the problems of Asia could be solved better through an ‘Asian Way’ of crisis management. This helped in the birth of ASEAN. Ralph Cossa has linked the birth of the organisation with CSBMs; thus he thinks that organisation is a “classic” CSBM. ASEAN posed as a socio economic organisation yet it was clear that it could not totally insulate itself from the political security of the region. In the founding document of the ASEAN also known as the Bangkok Declaration “promoting regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region is a testimony to ASEAN’s inalienable relation with the politics and security of the region.” The ASEAN Charter signed in 2007, is a substantial step in consolidating ASEAN’s responsibility in achieving peace and stability; it also provides for various methods of contacts

between anyone who has stakes in ASEAN. It is to help infuse a sense of confidence and trust between members, between the people of the region. It is expected that the gradual warming of such ties will result in the weakening of tensions and animosity between the ASEAN states. Interactions are intended to provide a measure of assurance amidst the uncertain environment managing conflicts among the member states and enabling them to utilise increasing proportions of their physical and intellectual resources in pursuit of their long-term security and welfare.

The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was agreed the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference, which were held in Singapore on 23-25 July 1993. The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. In this meeting a substantial step towards addressing the political and security issues of Southeast Asia was taken. The Chairman in his statement asserted the need to “foster a habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern.” This is turn are considered the prime objectives of the ARF. ARF’s Concept Paper clearly accepts the existence of challenges that imperil the security if the region. More important the Concept Paper clearly lays down the need for CBMs and further speaks of mechanisms to develop preventive diplomacy and some indigenous conflict resolution mechanism. ARF accepts two complementing approaches towards the implementation of CBMs. – first by including steps which are not directly related to CBMs but draw more from ASEAN’s experience – its conventional practices of consultation and consensus (based on the Indonesian style of musyawarah and mufakat), regular exchanges of high-level visits among ASEAN countries. It also attempts to achieve those conditions approximating the Declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and its essential component Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) and emulate the principles expressed in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia. The second, approach is based on direct implementation of the CBMs enlisted under two lists – immediate

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measures, and medium and long-term measures.\textsuperscript{47} Conflict resolution remains the ultimate goal of the ARF if they aim to promote and maintain regional peace and cooperation.

Unfortunately, ASEAN continues to face a series of problems. One of its main problems germinate from the conflict between such an institution conceived more ideally as a purposive corporate body with an identity and intention beyond the above the mere sum of its membership and as an institution conceived as a political market place where the states with a higher bargaining power can get their interests furthered at the cost of the others. The reality of ASEAN makes it quite difficult to look beyond the national interests of the member states and forge a true integrated view of common purpose. Furthermore, the organisation is handicapped by a number of inhibiting factors:

- ASEAN's nature is not easily discernable. In the initial years it declared itself as a socio-economic organisation promoting cooperation in these spheres; but very soon it began to display political interests particularly in relation to the security issues of this region. ASEAN does not claim to be a security organisation. Yet its activities day in day out takes it in that direction. ASEAN has now taken a route that will establish the identity of the organisation as a security community. At the Ninth Summit in Bali, ASEAN adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), which stipulated the establishment of an ASEAN Community resting on three pillars: an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. However the success of this venture will be tested through time. ASEAN will need to decide whether to prioritise politico security issues over socio-economic ones.

- So long as the member states continue to think themselves as sovereign states conducting their foreign policies on the basis of historical experiences and age old complications, they will fail to find the common chord of harmony essential for regional bonding. In harmonious coexistence, states must find the mean between various differentials characterising inter-state relations so that a minimal mode of cooperation can be ensured. Unfortunately that seems an

\textsuperscript{47} See Annex A and B respectively for these measures in Ibid, pp.19-22.
insurmountable challenge as states of Southeast Asia do not see eye to eye on
the various issues within the region; what may be viewed as central by one
state may be of peripheral concern to the other. Hence acting in unison may be
a little difficult than usual. Difference in perception is because the states have
no true love lost for each other. On the contrary, they have come together
under adversarial conditions. The best example is the Cambodian crisis during
the Cold War when US and China came together to counter Soviet Union and
Vietnam. In the post-Cold War period the inclusion of Myanmar is an example
of constructive engagement whereby states of the military-authoritarian kind
are kept under modest vigil and not because the states of Southeast Asia were
very supportive of the political developments in Myanmar. Moreover the
economic crisis had laid bare the underlying animosity between states.48 Based
on distrust and suspicion, some states continue to plan against potential threats
by acquiring arms and ammunition. Under such circumstances, Confidence
Building will be a challenging job.

Given on the one hand an idea of the drawbacks of the organisation, the adversarial
complex matrix in which it continues to function and on the other hand the new series
of complex problems that is on the rise, the vital task of Confidence Building
becomes an uphill task. In this, the efforts go beyond ASEAN and its official units.
Taking into account the varied relations between nation states a prominent perspective
is that the task of building confidence need be more active outside the organisation’s
parameters – at an informal level – something we often refer as the Track II Channel.

Track II has been the catch word used to portray a huge variety of structures and
strategies pursuing various goals in almost all the spheres of human existence. Its
diversity and ubiquity deprive the Track II of any concrete definition. The term had
been coined by a US Foreign Service officer, Joseph Monteville meaning, “unofficial,
non-structured interaction. It is always open minded, often altruistic and strategically
optimistic, based on best case analysis. Its underlying assumption is that actual and
potential conflict can be resolved or eased by appealing to common human

48 See the discussion in J.N. Mak, “The ASEAN Naval Build Up Implications for the Regional Order,”
capabilities to respond to good will and reasonableness. Montville identifies two basic processes of Track II diplomacy, through workshops that facilitate personal relations and to try and affect public opinion. The idea is to reduce the sense of victimhood of the parties and humanising the image of the adversary. The objective of Track II has been the reduction or resolution of conflict within countries or between countries, by lowering the mutual fear that exists through improved communication and better understanding of each other's view.

Although Track II diplomacy is a term of recent origin, historical traits of this nature of diplomacy can be traced back to Europe. The origins of the unofficial diplomacy can be traced to the French revolution where a distinction was sought between diplomacy, anti-diplomacy and neo-diplomacy. Diplomacy was defined as a state-to state relation underlined by the rules of state craft and an on rational bargaining power. Anti-diplomacy typifies the relation between state and society; it emphasises the kind of relation between state and society that are an anathema to modern diplomacy including dissidence and resistance movements and for instance in the case of revolutionary France, the anti-diplomatic pressures came in the form of the bourgeoisie push for political power. Therefore in certain cases anti-diplomatic forces are threatening of existing inter-state relations, in the long run international status-quo. Neo diplomacy suggests alternative forms of mediation practised by non-official diplomatic agents that may either prove either instrumental or detrimental to the purposes of diplomacy. The diplomatic agents that emerged were representative of not only the political aristocrats (as diplomatic activity during the French Revolution period was carried out by the aristocrats), it also encouraged state-to state diplomacy as much as diplomacy based on people-to-people contact. In fact neo-diplomatic forms like the people-to-people diplomacy are not at all new because they have in existence for long. However as the study of the French Revolution during the period shows that neo-diplomacy was short lived and it was co-opted by the old style

51 Ibid.
diplomacy such that the former came to be deployed in diplomatic discourse as well as other related discourses in the service of the *raison-de-etat* (state of reason).\(^{54}\) Going by the French history, neo diplomacy presupposes that in order to make relations between states healthy it ought to be based on the relations of individual citizens.\(^{55}\)

Therefore while Track I is rooted in the age-old state to state diplomacy, Track II’s historical roots are found in neo-diplomacy during the French Revolution. Differences between Track I, and Track II are quite prominent. Generally, Track II is meant to distinguish non-governmental or non-official meetings from official and formal diplomatic dialogues and discussion forums referred to as ‘Track I’ activities. Yet one can go a step further to distinguish between Track II and track three dialogues. While Track II dialogues serve as a second line of communication between states and seek to bridge the gap between official government positions through informal interactions between diplomats, bureaucrats and state officials, Track Three is principally the “people to people” initiative that seeks to build and enhance transborder links between citizens.\(^{56}\) All these dialogues have made possible the expansion of multilateral channels for exchanges on security cooperation. A new concept has evolved out of this great complex of interactions – Multi-Track Diplomacy, a term coined by Dr. Louis Diamond.\(^{57}\) It is considered as a multi pronged and more prompt way of conflict resolution.

Track II dialogues emphasise on the growing importance of civil society. Gerard Clarke underlines the utility of a civil society in being able to fill up the gap or distance between the most prime unit of the society, the family and the most advanced organisation of society, state.\(^{58}\) It may be acceptable to see civil society as a conglomerate of different individuals – citizens, intellectuals, specialists, businessmen and media. Diamond and McDonald have identified nine tracks of contact between

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\(^{55}\) Sang Tan, op.cit. no.2, p. 374.

\(^{56}\) Navnita Chadha Behera, Paul M. Evans and Gowher Rizvi, *Beyond Boundaries*, University of Toronto – New York University, Joint Centre For Asia Pacific Studies, 1997, p.4.


various sectors. However, they have not consciously tried to prioritise tracks – one or two in conflict resolution. In pursuit of their spirit, it can be said that Track I, Track II and Track III need be well connected and arranged into a system that they term as Multi-track diplomacy. Yet Multi-Track Diplomacy is not synonymous to multilateral diplomacy. Whereas Multi-Track Diplomacy focuses on the plurality yet coherence of the various means conducting inter-state interactions, multilateral diplomacy is an institutional form of well coordinated negotiations and policy formulations involving two or more states where there may or may not be some established ways of conduct. Therefore, ‘multi’ in multilateral diplomacy qualifies number of participants and more important as it applies to all the tracks of Multi Track-Diplomacy – I, II and also III.

A growing popularity of Track II process is underlined by a number of factors:

- There is a general disenchantment in a post modern climate with the state performance. People are therefore showing greater interest in better performers, mainly non governmental organisations – both within the state and beyond it.
- There is growing feeling that institutional weakness of the state administration ought to be compensated by alternative institutions preferably those that don’t imitate the state.
- The new idea of thinking global and acting local i.e. ‘glocal’ has furthered the cause of elements and actors outside the official arena. Epistemic communities, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and private organisations are not clobbered by vested national interests and can thus think altruistically for the cause of the human society and act in their own capacity to do the needful. Thus they are better performers than State institutions.

The functioning of the non governmental actors has made substantial contribution in ensuring and expanding the active participation of the masses and at the same time has a restraining effect on the authoritarian trends of the state. This trend has been interpreted by various thinkers in various ways – while some interpret in terms of

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democratisation process (Gerard Clarke), others see it as another dimension of class struggle (Gramsci). There are still ways of considering the Track II Process as a kind of movement that is highly effective in influencing policy makers and when required resisting major policy decisions (Joan Mencher).

As discussed in Multi-Track Diplomacy, Track II works as a supplement to the Track I process. Given the pressure of the demands faced by the state administration, there is an increasing need for a supportive channel. This sets the mood for decentralisation of power, institutes a nascent form of pluralism with the State as its pivot. Thus the idea is to encourage complementary relationship between Track I and Track II channels. The technical qualities help Track II become more successful. Participants interacting through this channel are free to express their opinions without being put on record for some comment or some opinion expressed by them. The 'personal factor' i.e. personal relationships and acquaintances go a long way in finding solutions, or at least bring solutions closer to the problems. This is particularly possible when specialists and experienced statesmen with experience and in-depth knowledge of the problems participate in the Track II interactions. Track II can therefore create conditions and situations that will lead to solutions to protracted conflicts and prolonged problems.

The aforesaid discussion prepares the background for establishing the rationale for the need for Track II initiatives in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is a region known for its unpredictability and volatility. Some of it has been already discussed but that which directly threatens the security and balance of the region is the problem of overlapping claims in the South China Sea. It is important because of several reasons, first because of the dispute involves as one of the parties, the most formidable neighbour of Southeast Asia – China. Second it highlights intra state conflict within Southeast Asia; countries involved are Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei. Between all the claimants, there have been clashes between China and

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61 Ibid. pp.9-12.
63 There are other security problems that need to be addressed through Confidence Building—there is a need to restrain arms procurement, mutual suspicion regarding defence preparations and modernisation strains bilateral relations, and recently rising non-conventional threats like terrorism, transnational crimes, illegal migration need to be addressed through appropriate CBMs.
Vietnam in the eighties; inter state clashes between Malaysia and the Philippines have also taken place in the nineties. Vietnam is particularly vehement about its claims. It has produced elaborate research notes stabiling its claims on the Spratly and Paracel Islands.\(^{64}\) Third, the region is likely to remain a hotspot in Southeast Asia because of the oil resources available in the South China Sea and other marine resources available in the continental shelves. The situation in South China Sea is likely to remain conflict prone because the countries party to the dispute are well equipped with sophisticated weaponry. It increases the chances of physical confrontation. These circumstances call for serious conflict management initiatives by ASEAN. In response to China's publication of the Law on Territorial Sea\(^{65}\) and the Contiguous Zone in 1992 that emphasised its claims on the South China Sea, ASEAN in the same year made a Declaration on the South China Sea. It “urged (sic) all parties concerned to exercise restraint with view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes.”\(^{66}\) The ASEAN Regional Forum since its inception has been trying to address this issue through its mechanisms. In its Concept Paper as a Confidence Building Measure, ASEAN has emphasised the need to establish zones of cooperation in South China Sea.\(^{67}\) In order to see Confidence Building as a success, ARF continues to assert the need for the exercise of self restraint in South China Sea, since the session in 2000, the ARF has made some distinction between Confidence Building and Preventive Diplomacy (PD).\(^{68}\) Yet the success of the South China Sea situation depends on the goodwill of the parties to the dispute especially with China, most of the ARF deliberations on South China Sea, reports and statements by the Chairman of the ARF, have emphasised on the consultation between China and ASEAN centred on the formulation of a Code of Conduct. The Declaration on the Code of Conduct 2002 is the first political document jointly issued by ASEAN member counties and China on South China Sea issues. It itself reiterates the need for

\(^{64}\) See, *White Paper on the Hoang Ha (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly)*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Saigon, Republic of Vietnam 1975.


\(^{66}\) *ASEAN Declaration On the South China Sea*, Manila, the Philippines, November 22, 1992.


\(^{68}\) Provision 4, of the *Chairman's Statement, of the Seventh ASEAN Regional Forum*, Bangkok, Thailand, July 27, 2000.
Confidence Building in South China Sea; it will establish a conducive environment for solving overlapping sovereignty claims over disputed territories in South China Sea.\(^{69}\) The Code emphasised that Parties to this Code also undertook to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means without resorting to the threat of use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations.\(^{70}\) Informal workshops are also important, and since 1990, a very important effort has been the organisation of Workshops on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea. Besides South China Sea, there is a plethora of issues and security concerns that are being addressed through the Track II initiatives. They include, trans-border crimes, like smuggling, piracy, natural disasters, peace keeping, and immigration and of late, terrorism. Joint discussions and exchange of views and opinions take place, involving defence personnel, present or retired statesmen, and the academicians.\(^{71}\) A cursory look at the records of the ARF will show the activities of Track II channel – Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia and the Pacific (CSCAP), ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), and various seminars, conferences between members of epistemic communities and defence specialists. Track II activities provide valuable inputs in strengthening ARF's Confidence Building efforts.

The economic credibility of Southeast Asia was challenged by the Asian financial crisis. It had put to test the basic credibility of the organisation. The crisis had started a debate between the institutionalists and realists.\(^{72}\) The realists took the forefront as the crisis laid bare age old differences between states and pushed to the rear the utility and credibility of multilateral bodies, ASEAN being the most prominent in Southeast Asia. At that vital point when multilateral institutions representing states were faltering, the scope of Track II as the supporting force was enormous. With that, the

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\(^{70}\) Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, November 1, 2002.

\(^{71}\) Here it is essential to qualify that there is a prevalent opinion that here are three levels of interaction – Track I which is official, Track 1½ where approved by the ARF scholars and officials interact in their personal capacity, and Track II where members of the intelligentsia interact with a view to improve structured official interactions; this is called 'people to people' contact. However this study will keep the distinction as mentioned earlier as Track I (purely official), Track II (involving officials in personal capacity) and Track III (people to people and here people need not remain confined to academicians or defence specialists only).

rationale for Track II in Southeast Asian security was well established. It is not to establish Track II as the alternative to official interactions, but at least create a congenial atmosphere that can ensure successful official interactions. At present, ASEAN is a complete family of ten members, the security issues have multiplied as members have internal problems as well as bilateral problems pending solutions. The organisation’s hands are full. At the same time its dialogue partners are far beyond the region, especially in ARF such members are fifteen in number. ARF’s activities include all these members. In this context Track II provide a vital channel of interaction; needless to mention that it supports ARF’s official processes also. Long and sustained efforts through Track II would instil a sense of confidence; where official interactions are beset with challenges from politics, Track II can act as the effective antidote. As realists would argue that total security is virtually unachievable, the need for confidence is well established. In Southeast Asia official interactions are not considered to be good repositories of confidence therefore an alternate one – Track II could become a viable alternative.

Track II initiatives at Confidence Building can also enrich the three concepts of Comprehensive security, Cooperative Security and Common Security. Comprehensive Security was a term coined in Japan during the 1970s as an alternative to the concept of national interest. Used as a policy framework Comprehensive Security would imply embracing different functional areas of security (economic, military and political) as well as embracing various levels – domestic, regional and international. The central premise of Comprehensive Security is that security must be conceived in a holistic way – to include both military and non-military threats at all levels. This is very desirable of the Southeast Asian security scenario and is complementary to the needs of Human Security. Within Southeast Asia this concept is fairly developed in certain countries like in Indonesia (national resilience) and Malaysia. In general ASEAN tries to embrace a broader security agenda dealing with almost every aspect of non-military threats. They wish to negate the utility of alliances both regional and extra-regional states and limit the scope of external intervention in the region. Yet it may be difficult to actually limit the role of extra regional states. For instance, South China Sea involves China as one of the party states to the dispute. In that case Confidence Building is expected to enhance the scope of Comprehensive Security. It can also help establish regional version of
Indonesian national resilience. While national resilience is an inward looking concept, regional version of it is like a chain that derives all its strength from all of its constituent parts. It is a rather complex task demanding successful cooperation all levels and on all aspects of security. As Track I governmental agencies have their own priorities and interests, genuine cooperation based on a comprehensive security agenda may not be that easily forthcoming. It is here that Track II institutes can set an example by encouraging regular interactions amongst themselves. Such an initiative is urgently necessary to thwart the challenge of terrorism in the region as much as to respond to the threat of environmental degradation.

Cooperative security as a term is often used rather loosely in the international relations literature. The term often simply means that states will work together to solve common problems, and is often used synonymously with collective security—that is, to mean simply that states work collectively together. It was originally conceived in Canada with an intention of replacing the bipolar Cold War structure with a multilateral process and framework that would address both military (conventional) and non-military (non-conventional) elements of security. Cooperative Security envisages a very gradual way of developing security cooperation. It is a flexible arrangement that recognises the value of existing bilateral state of relations and the importance of balance of power in a given situation and allows multilateralism to develop from a more loosely arranged structure to a gradually institutionalised form of multilateralism. Track II processes in Southeast Asia follows such an approach. If we look at the challenging job of solving the South China Sea situation, then such an approach has been taken by the Track II initiatives. In this context, the APR and the Informal Workshop on South China Sea have already set good examples. It aimed at extensive Confidence Building though dialogues that could pave the way to an amicable solution. Successful Confidence Building can also address problems of a security complex. If South China Sea can be conceived as a security complex which is based on geographical contiguity and commonality of

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interests, then Track II institutes have set a high benchmark of cooperative security by sustaining the dialogue on the problems of the disputed region. One of the positive outcomes of consistent dialogue exchange on contentious issues like the South China Sea is the Agreement between Southeast Asian countries and China on the Code of Conduct in 2002. Cooperative security may be particularly useful to address contentious bilateral and contentious issues of the region because cooperative security recognises the primacy of state interests, that they are competing and even at times conflicting and the increasing interpenetrability of states, other actors within the region and of global politics. More important, it realises that enhancing one's own sense of security need not be seen in a zero-sum perspective. This approach may be particularly important to solve territorial security issues.

Common Security was a concept that found first mention in the Palme Commission Report entitled, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival that emphasised need to reduce the risk of war, limit arms and move towards cooperation in order to resolve disputes. There is a strong belief that consistent interactions between politicians and academicians can gradually reduce the "security dilemma" that increases chances of direct conflict. Although Common Security was particularly applicable to the nuclear context during the East-West struggle, its importance in the non-nuclear situation in Southeast Asia has been recognised. Track II institutes following the informal style of consultation and dialoguing can help promote exchange of views within Southeast Asia and across the Asia Pacific so that consensus can be achieved on long standing disputes like the South China Sea, bilateral border disputes and on the issue of disarmament. Further, Track II efforts at Confidence Building will be complementary to Common Security will require cooperative endeavours; genuine cooperation is


76 Security dilemma or Spiral model is a term used in international relations and refers to a situation wherein two or more states are drawn into conflict, possibly even war, over security concerns, even though none of the states actually desire conflict. Any attempt a state makes to increase its own security will cause the other to act in kind thereby actually decreasing its security. The Term was coined by John H. Herz in his 1951 book Political Realism and Political Idealism. A frequently cited example of the security dilemma is the beginning of World War I. Supporters of this viewpoint argue that the major European powers felt forced to go to war by feelings of insecurity over the alliances of their neighbours, despite not actually desiring the war. See, John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951.

expected to lead to the final stage of Common Security. Activities of the CSCAP are as reflective of the fact that Track II institutes have taken the agenda of Common Security seriously. Track II activities is not only related to the larger Asia Pacific framework of conflict-reduction and cooperation, but also find ways and means of ensuring extra-regional, basically non-Southeast Asian powers’ involvement in this region in constructive manner.

These security approaches are complementary to the concept of Human Security. The basic approach of Human security is that while in the classical formulation of security is the protection and welfare of the state, whereas what is central – or should be central is the protection and welfare of the individual citizen or human being. Track II initiatives go a step further by not only trying to respond to the various non-state centric Human Security problems, it also does so through non-state centric approach through the informal mechanisms. To that extent the postulates of the Human Security approach and the Track II processes look complementary to each other. Confidence Building involves mechanisms that will help these agencies address the needs of Human Security.