Chapter One
INTRODUCTION

Since 1990 rapid but profound changes are transforming the world. It began with the end of the Cold War that ended the hitherto bipolar structure of the international system. The 1990s were marked by the Gulf War followed by the balkanization and war in Yugoslavia. The following decade saw the attacks on the World Trade Centre in the US followed by the US war against terror in Afghanistan, and intervention in Iraq. Southeast Asia was a victim of Cold War politics. As the Cold War came to an end, there was a lot of speculation regarding the future of this region. For instance, in Southeast Asia, security concerns have evolved from an apprehension over US hegemony as it displayed its might in the Gulf War to a relatively cooperative posture towards the superpower as it carried out its global war against terrorism. This change in perception can be corroborated by the closure of US bases in the Philippines in the post-Cold War years to its reopening as a part of the revitalized US-Philippines security ties in wake of terror attacks in the Philippines. Therefore, scholars and politicians have scope to analyse the present state of international affairs and predict future of politics and security in Southeast Asia.

Universal to all the regions striving for stability, is the concern for security. The understanding of the concept of security has undergone an epochal change - the conventional one-dimensional perception of security confined to strategic-military issues have now further expanded to include the 'non-military' factors. Subsequently, with the broadening of the contours of strategic thinking, a number of new concerns have emerged that include political stability, economic strength and security, social considerations, environmental security, terrorism, transborder crime, and health security.

It is also being realized that all these factors are related to one another in more than one ways and therefore, the new approach towards security is not only more inclusive but also inter-related wherein one factor has a substantial impact on the other. As the world has recognized the rising phenomenon of interdependency, most of the perceptions on emerging security priorities have also acknowledged its justification especially in relation to all the new security related factors. Thus, comprehensive
security has become the new focus of attention for strategic thinkers and politicians alike.

As in rest of the world, these observations are also applicable to Southeast Asia. The region has been a stage to one of the most expensive (not only financially, but also in terms of human life, economic and political upheavals) ordeals of Cold War friction. In addition the region had borne the consequences of an East-East tussle (between China and the Soviet Union) being superimposed on the region and later enmeshed with the East-West Cold War. In the cases of Vietnam and Cambodia, especially in the latter case, where the Cold War contention had become such internationalised, the line of distinction between external and internal problems had almost ceased to exist. The path towards conflict disengagement had proven not only to be protracted but rather cumbersome. It was not until the withdrawal of the Soviet support to Vietnam that the latter came to terms with China. As a result, the Cambodian problem was assured of a peaceful solution and peace returned to the region.

The end of Cold War has undoubtedly registered a positive effect to end the old adverse relationships within the region. For the region, the end of Cold War implies the disappearance of only one dimension of its security problem, i.e. the intervention of outside Great Powers. However the role of the extra-regional powers are likely to continue. 1 To describe its present state of affairs, it can be said that apart from facing the critical challenges of being a developing region striving towards self sufficiency and prosperity, it is continuously facing threats from internal strife and political turmoil. As a result, Southeast Asia continues to remain one of the most volatile and sensitive hot spots of the world. In fact there has been hardly a year that has gone without tension and friction either between an outside power and a member of the region or because of internal turmoil due to weak domestic structures and intricate political issues. With the end of Cold War, a new series of anxieties have sprung up, stemming from various political and non-political issues. We can identify some of these tensions.

(1) With the disappearance of Soviet Union and the subsequent withdrawal of the American pressure, there appeared a power vacuum into which emerging powers were

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perceived to interlude with their forms of diplomacy. Despite the waning of the bipolar intrusion in to the region, Southeast Asia is expected to see a number of actors in the region with some uncertain security implications:

a) Of utmost concern to Southeast Asia is China whose land and sea frontiers border the region. Great uncertainties accompany the future evolution and its actions. China is already a formidable power and has always shown its interests in the happenings of the region by involving itself indirectly as in the Cambodian crisis, or directly by supporting the military junta in Burma. The Chinese living in different countries of the region are the prosperous section of the population controlling the major part of the economy thus leading to tensions between them and the native population. It often culminates into riots like that in Malaysia, in 1969 and in Indonesia in 1997. This in tum leads to tension between China and the countries in the region. With its evident readiness to enforce its claim by force of formidable military capabilities for local offensive operations such as in the Spratlys Islands, China looms large as a regional threat.

b) Japan's predominance in the economic realm is accompanied by its readiness to play a political role to commensurate its economic prowess. With regard to the Cambodian conflict, Japan had evinced readiness to play a constructive role in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict including arranging the meeting amongst Khmer factions at Tokyo and an offer to finance the Peace Keeping Forces. Of late Japanese forces have also joined International Peacekeeping Operations. The main concern is regarding Japan's military role which has been defined, until now, much by the US-Japanese security arrangements and the prime consideration is whether Japan seeks to play an independent role beyond such defined security arrangement, especially with the gradual withdrawal of the US from this region.

c) Not until recently did India begin to figure in the larger Southeast Asian security framework. As the Indian strategic and military prowess has begun to get noticed worldwide, Southeast Asia has come to realise the urgency of including India within its 'strategic domain'. Also the continuing Sino-Indian tension could easily spill over into the region especially with concentrated impact on adjoining Myanmar and into
the waters of Bay of Bengal where already China has stationed its surveillance unit on the Coco Islands.²

If these states continue to show their interests in this region, then the US will also maintain its post in Southeast Asia. In fact as mentioned earlier, since 2001, US has increased its presence in Southeast Asia.

(2) Mutual distrust and fear of attack from potential belligerent states have led to a never ending arms race in the region. The irony is that instead of providing security, such massive arms build up and acquisition programmes have only aggravated the tension and suspicion about each others' intentions and course of action.

(3) The problems within the region present a complex picture. Primarily Southeast Asian countries are concerned with threats to their internal stability, because of the multifaceted problems in socio-economic and political dynamics of the region. We can look at some of the major areas of problems -

a. Tensions in relation to economic development - All the Governments sense (or ought to sense) the need to ensure that their citizens are provided with economic and social welfare that will continue to provide legitimacy for the government. This has become a difficult process despite the highly successful growth rate of some of the countries of this region.

The new economic policies of the region that have been contributing to the successful growth rates have also led to two substantive problems —

- While the region can flaunt a galloping economy striving towards higher growth rates the political apparatus that will sustain and provide further security to the process is by far less competent to harness such a stupendous process. This creates a tension arising from the disparity between the economic sector and political system in the country.

- The other challenge lies in the ability to continue sustained growth caused by integration of national economies into the world economy, thus, risking the chances of

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² Chinese activities in the Bay of Bengal region has been of utmost concern. The main concentration has been along the Burmese coast facing the Andaman sea and a Western intelligence satellite in 1992, detected a 50 meter radar antenna on Coco Islands which comes within Burmese territory (20 km north of Andaman Islands). The construction of the antenna has been done by Chinese personnel, thus allowing them to continue surveillance of the Indian waters.
subjecting the former to the vagaries of the latter. The Economic Crisis of 1997 is a case in point.

b. Crisis of Political legitimacy - tension between civil and military Governments. In most of the Southeast Asia the individual personal leaders look larger than party organizations, i.e. the story of post-WWII politics has been largely that of the personal role of nationalist leaders. This has later yielded unhappy results wherein concentrated power in the hands of one or a few persons has almost resulted in various forms of oppressive and authoritarian regimes. In addition, large scale corruption and nepotism has eroded the ethics of governance in the region.

In some of the countries, martial law had brought the army close to the government. Quite a few countries have witnessed a spectre of military intervention (Burma, Indonesia). The reasons for such a politically active army are not far to seek. Since independence, the need to meet the threat of Communist insurgency and dissident ethnic groups has led to substantial budgets and growth of relatively large military establishments in several countries like Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Particularly in countries like Burma where the army had played a substantive role, in maintaining political order and stability of the system, military leaders naturally ventured into the political domain and developed an early concern for the course of the nation's political development. Subsequently, the military came to have a direct hand in government administration in some of the countries where civil governments proved incompetent. Whether under military domination or in unsuccessful civilian rule, the result has been an unseen institutionalisation of authoritarianism; putting democracy into task. The spate of movements to replenish the systems through the reinstatement of democracy is evident of the problem of authoritarianism.

The crashing of the economic systems and financial markets all over Southeast Asia in 1997 has exposed the drawbacks of the developmental policies of the governments since this post-independence period. It also brought to limelight the cosmetic nature of treatments administered to the crisis ridden ailing society and politics of this region.

4 For an idea of the problems of Southeast Asian political systems, read, Peter Danvergue (ed.), Weak and Strong States in Asia Pacific Societies, St. Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1998.
through institutions and organisations. As the crisis has become a lesson of the potential dangers of economic interdependence in so far as any benefits of interdependence in the politico-security areas are susceptible to negative lashes of the forces of globalization, it had invigorated the dormant debate between Realists and Institutionalists. Realists had ample reason to push the Institutionalists to the back seat by pointing out that for all practical purposes, on face of a political crisis, the states resort to the age old balance of power system to ensure their survival. The volatile incoherent status of the political, economic or even social systems of the region had forced those who are concerned to evaluate and think of further avenues of regional cooperation.

c) Emergence of new security threats within Southeast Asia – New kinds of security threats have increased the list of non-conventional security threats to the region.\(^6\) They are new because their spill-over effects have reached far and wide affecting more than the state of the region. Natural disasters have increased in number – tsunami, cyclones and earthquakes have cost the states and society of the countries of the region quite dearly. Besides security threats like transnational crimes are constantly on the rise. Transnational Crimes are comprised of money threats like laundering, drug rackets, human trafficking, illegal arms supply, and contrabands. There are huge networks that span large parts of Southeast Asia; more often than not one crime nourishes the other. For instance, in order to buy arms from the illegal arms market many of the separatist groups encourage drug trade and smuggling of contrabands. Again profits made out of illegal activities are used to promote separatism, secessionism and terrorism. Religious fundamentalism along with terrorism has challenged the internal stability of individual states and imperilled the safety of citizens and foreigners alike. Transnational terrorist groups like the Al Qaeda have found Southeast Asian regional affiliates like the Jemaah Islamiyah who in turn encourage and support national fundamentalist radical groups in carrying out violent activities against the states. Therefore terrorism has victimized large parts of the region of Southeast Asia.\(^7\) Another dimension of non-conventional security threats in Southeast Asia includes the uncontrolled movement of masses, mostly illegal from one State to another. Migration of populations to various parts of Southeast Asia either for economic reasons, for political turmoil or due to natural

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disasters have spiralled into other security problems for the host States. Illegal migration is also associated with illegal labour activities and prostitution. What is to be noticed is that non-conventional security problems of Southeast Asia are so intricately related to one another in order to address such security problems, a holistic effort the regional level is required.

As we perceive, Southeast Asia at the cross roads of its own history and recent developments, the need for cooperation and interdependency (in order to overcome the present problems) is well founded. What is needed is an effort to reinforce the trust and confidence about each other's purpose and the intentions of their policies and actions. This would require the establishment of a complete structure of Confidence Building Measures (CMBs). Perhaps the single most important contribution CBMs can make is break and bring down the insurmountable barriers (constituting of several inhibiting factors) that divided the people of this region over decades.

The earlier concept of CBMs as a cosmetic and symptomatic therapy to improve the atmosphere of East-West negotiations has undergone a sea change as new patterns of cooperative actions have changed its earlier 'window dressing' image. Confidence Building now moves into core security concerns especially because of the substantial military build-ups that continue at various degrees in different parts of the world. However, in a region like Southeast Asia that is clobbered with mutual suspicion and tensions arising from them, Confidence Building would require a gradual incremental approach. For this CBMs must also influence political attitudes. It appears that:

i) The process of Confidence Building is fast entering the mainstream wherein its application is moving beyond military sectors to others, i.e. political, economic and social domains.

ii) The distinction between military CBMs and other i.e. political economic, socio-cultural measures are fast eroding. For academic understanding, we may name measures related to military sector as Security Building Measures and others as simple Confidence Building Measures. The combination of the two would thus give birth to

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what we call Confidence and Security Building Measures or CSBMs. Confidence and Security Building Measures can be achieved in two ways—

(a) At a much broader level wherein both military and non-military sectors are given equal attention, and

(b) At both an official and unofficial levels.

The establishment of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been a bold step towards an effort in implementing Confidence Building Measures.9 ASEAN is certainly the older organisation. Although ASEAN proclaimed itself to be a socio-economic organisation aimed at socio-economic cooperation, it was clear from the beginning that the real goals were related to politics and security because the centripetal force that was bringing the founding nations together was common security. ASEAN was intended to be a means of providing a measure of assurance amidst the uncertain environment. Until the Cold War, it was the only regional means of managing conflict among the member states thus allowing them to utilise increasing proportions of their physical and intellectual resources in the pursuit of long-term security and welfare. Whether it could live up to its role expectation is always an issue of debate10. At the end of Cold War ASEAN's weakness to deal with politico-security problems was supplemented by the ARF.

Thus ARF could not function well and continues to face challenges because of a number of reasons.11 All the problems germinate from the basic tension that arises from the conflict between such an institution conceived more ideally as a purposive corporate body with an identity and life above and beyond the mere sum of its member, and as an institution conceived as a political market place where the States with a higher bargaining power can get their interests furthered at the cost of others.

The identity of ARF dwindles between the two, especially if the reality of the political market place model is kept in mind, then the success of any venture in regional security

cooperation will depend largely on the government's desire to look beyond their national interests and forge an integral view of common purpose. It cannot be denied that ARF is under the aegis of the ASEAN and although it has a distinct agenda of its own, its style of functioning follows that of the ASEAN. Unfortunately, ASEAN is handicapped by certain inhibiting factors:

- To begin with, ASEAN has not defined its nature. It declared itself to be an organisation with the aim of promoting socio-economic cooperation, but very soon revealed its political shades with particular interest in the security issues of the region. Yet, ASEAN was also not a security organisation in the strict sense of the term.

- A common sense of sub-regional identity is not easy to promote because what may be viewed as central by one State may be of peripheral concern to the other. The basic difference in perception is due to a number of reasons -

  a. Its members have no true love for each other, but had only come together under adverse situations, within which they were not feeling secure individually. Moreover, the economic crisis has laid bare the ugly picture of age old enmity between various States on various issues.

  b. To aggravate the situation, the amount of distrust and suspicion amongst the members implies that some ASEAN countries will continue to plan against threats reflected through competition in arms acquisition. Under such circumstances, the hope of institutionalising Confidence Building Measures seems to be a challenging job.

Therefore, ASEAN was never in a position to excel in the art of building confidence. It is now ARF’s Herculean task to promote security to the extent of forging a region wide structure of relations based on Confidence Building. For quite some time contentious issues in security were discussed at a bilateral level, for instance China-Vietnam or China-Philippines negotiations on South China. It could be carried out between two states but Confidence Building is likely to work better at multilateral level as it will involve the participation and cooperation of more than two states. Therefore there are high role expectations for the ARF; it may be easy to live up to them.
This piece of research work would deal with the process of Confidence Building through the unofficial conduit, which is called the Track II Channel. The utility of the unofficial channel in bringing about a confident atmosphere of interactions amongst ASEAN countries is because of its inherent characteristic. To begin with, Track II is an informal channel wherein people interact with each other in their personal capacities, and therefore it is free from the complexities of formal interactions. Participants interact with each other within a liberal atmosphere without the fear of being officially put on record for any particular comment or action. Secondly, Track II Process brings together a lobby of experts and specialists together allowing for open discussion and in-depth analysis of the problems of the region. The 'personal factor', i.e. the influence of one to one relation between the participants brings the solution closer to the problem at the least, if not solving it completely. As a channel of interaction, Track II Process in this region can be made effective in two ways. It can bring about solution and make decisions happen or otherwise at least create a congenial atmosphere that can ensure successful official interaction. This is Confidence Building in the greater sense. ASEAN 10 is an organisation of ten different States of Southeast Asia with various interests and different strategic perceptions. If ASEAN desires to function as a 'ASEAN 10' concept, keeping in mind the challenges it faces - structural, functional and circumstantial, then utilising the Track II Channel is the most handy and prudent approach, it has within its reach. This piece of work would deal with the process of Confidence Building through the unofficial conduit which is also called the Track II Channel. Such a kind of work is useful in suggesting means of cooperation that this region needs beyond the Governmental parameters; it gives one other options beyond the general process of interstate cooperative relations.

Review of Literature

A number of books, articles in journals and reports have contributed to the understanding of the changing picture of security dynamics in the region of Southeast Asia after the Cold War. There is near unanimity on the observation that there has occurred vital changes in the strategic concerns of the region and the rationale to the need of Confidence Building Measures in this region has thus been confirmed.

Desmond Ball in his presentation “Post Cold War security in the Asia Pacific Region - An Australian View” (Indo-Australian Seminar, Federation House, Tansen Marg 1995) gives a comprehensive picture of the changing nature of the security environment in the Asia Pacific. The factors that have changed the security environment are both of an internal and external nature. R. Nagi in his book *Big Powers and Southeast Asian Security* (New Delhi, Lancers, 1990) has identified the power poles in this region and while analysing the role of three powerful countries he has stressed on the need for neutralisation in the region. Much of this neutralisation may be far fetched even to this day because, as Richard J. Ellings and Sheldon and S.W. Simon in *Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium* (New York, National Bureau of Asian Research, 1996) mention, of continued American interest in the region. Again those who think that the end of Cold War has finally brought peace to the region may take note of the new zones of tension rising out of uncertainty identified by Chin Kin Wah in his article “ASEAN: External Security concern in a Post Cold War Era” (*The Roundtable*, 1993). US-Japanese relations, China's regional role, Sino-Japanese relations, Russia's future, tension between dialogue partners. The internal aspect of this changing security picture of Southeast Asia has been taken into consideration by various authors in a number of writings. In order to understand the present state of political systems in Southeast Asia, the best way would be to fall back on its immediate history. Lucian W. Pye in his book *Southeast Asia's Political System* (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1974) gives a vivid picture of Southeast Asia's political dynamics drawing straight from its socio historical roots. Michael R.J. Vatikiotis in his work entitled *Political Change in Southeast Asia* (London, Routledge, 1996) has basically argued that the instance of Southeast Asia proves to be an exception to the general rule that economic development and momentum would flourish into political change within the system. This is basically because of the reason that the problems of Southeast Asia are far more deep seated into the history and germinate within the society. For instance 'ethnicity' is an important element in the policy of Southeast Asia. It has its roots deep in the demographic composition of the region and draws strength from its history. Clive J. Christie in his book *A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism* (London, New York, Taurus Publishers, 1996) begins his observation on the process of decolonization, its precedents and consequences from the perspective of separatist movements and insurgency that has its roots in the decolonisation process, springing from nationalist movements (Christie, 1996). He observes that ethnic consciousness may have given birth to nationalism but ethnicity
(negative ethnic consciousness) has helped nourish negative nationalism expressed through communalism, and separatist movements. And they still continue to exist because ethnicity has become the lottery ticket to the promotion of national interest and political mileage for both powers abroad and political rulers within.

A series of articles in the UN Topical Papers on Disarmament have discussed the changing nature of the security environment in general and in particular to the region and has thus rationalised the need for implementation of CBMs. Ravdangin Bold in his article “Implications of the Emerging Environment for the Asia and the Pacific CBM” (New York, United Nations, 1992) has identified the need to focus on political, social and other forms of non military cooperation. Thus, he advocates a much broader and far more inclusive concept of Confidence Building Measures. Mohamed Jawahar in his article “Implications of the Regional Environment for the Asia-Pacific CSBM Regimes” (New York, United Nations, 1991) has made use of somewhat different terms to describe the new type of Confidence Building where he makes a distinction between Confidence Building Measure as pertaining to confidence about military intentions and security building measures referring to enhancement of military security between parties involved. (Jawahar, 1996). However, he sees that Security Building Measures in non-military and non-strategic terms that can also encompass political, economic, cultural, social, human rights and environmental measures. Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs in their article “The Perils of Prosperity Security and Economic Growth by the ASEAN Region” (Jane Davis, UK Edgar Publications, 1997) have shown a two way relation between economy and security of the region. On the one hand, there are various ways in which economic growth of the ASEAN has helped increase regional security by diffusing tension. on the other hand, ASEAN's economic growth increased tensions in terms of unhealthy competition.

Even while discussing the contribution of ASEAN towards Confidence Building, Malcolm Chalmers in his article “ASEAN and Confidence Building: Continuity and Change after the Cold War” (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 1997) has acknowledged that the region's rapid economic development and the political and social change makes it possible and can help create the conditions for the eventual emergence of a mature security community (Chalmers, 1997). The role of ASEAN in Confidence Building has been exhaustively discussed by Chalmers where he looks at the 1976 Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation the various meetings between ASEAN officials, joint exercises and personnel exchanges that have encompassed all ASEAN armed forces in a complex web of relationships. At the same time military ties at a bilateral level between ASEAN forces have been also dealt with by J. Soeojati Djiwandono in his article “Defence Cooperation between Member-States of ASEAN” (Indonesian Quarterly, 1996) where he speaks of the efficacy of a sub-regional approach as a stepping stone to the regional or multilateral approach. Suggestions have also been made Chalmers to develop the spider-web of these bilateral links into an alliance (Chalmers 1997).

Paul Dibb in his article “How to Begin Implementing Specific Trust Building Measures in the Asia Pacific Region” (Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 1995) has discussed the contribution of the ASEAN Regional Forum in what he calls ‘Trust Building Measures’ (TBMs). Making a distinction between what he calls 'Go and No Go Areas', where Trust Building Measures implementation is possible and not possible respectively, he also advocates incremental implementation of TBMs.

The formation, functions achievements and drawbacks of ASEAN have been exhaustively dealt by Michael Leifer in his book ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London, Routledge, 1989). He gives an informative and evaluative account of the regional organisation in relation to the security picture of the ASEAN region. To begin with, ASEAN was an organisation with the ostensible purpose of promotion of economic, social and cultural cooperation that would reinforce the regional security of the region. Thus the true nature of ASEAN dwindled somewhere between a socio-economic organisation to a politico-security arrangement. Giving an evaluative appraisal of ASEAN, Leifer emphasized that ASEAN as an organisation that couldn't and still cannot function because he views ASEAN as any other intergovernmental arrangement was established for a common purpose, but bottlenecked by a central tension arising from the inability to identify a common sources of threat. It, therefore, could not even promote security to the extent of forging a region-wide structure based on common ideas and intents. Herein, lays the inability of ASEAN to implement Confidence Building Measures and promote overall Confidence Building.

Thus the logic for bringing into action the Track II Process in order to implement Confidence Building Measures is well founded. In their book Beyond Boundaries, A Report on the State of Non Official Dialogues on Peace, Security and Cooperation in
South Asia (Ontario, Toronto-York University, 1997) Behera, Rizvi and Evans has shown the drawbacks of the official channel in comparison to the achievements of the Track II Process and although this piece of work applies to the region of South Asia, we can get a clear picture of the basics of Confidence Building through Track II from here.

Track II Process in the Asia Pacific has also been discussed in Pauline Kerr's article "The Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific" (The Pacific Review, 1994) who observes that the Track II Process has begun since the 1990s when both economic and political forums and organisations were established and activated into action so as to further security cooperation. Some of the organisations discussed in this article include the ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). It has also shown how the ASEAN-ISIS has contributed to the formation of ARF thus trying to show the utility of Track II in helping and supplementing the official channel. In this article, while discussing on the activities of the various agents and organisations, Kerr has emphasized on two of the most important elements that may contribute towards Confidence Building – firstly, the process of communication and secondly regime formation based on certain normative principles — 'sharing of intellectual and political norms' (Kerr, 1994).

The literature surveyed provides a basic understanding of the security concerns and the ways of responding to such security issues. Yet the pertinent point is to look at the nuances of the security scenario of Southeast Asia. One is made aware of the role of the external powers yet it is necessary to go a step further and take a closer look at the dynamics of shifting alliances and relationships between major powers. The study will seek to look at the dynamics of the relationships between major powers – bilateral relationships tempered by trilateral relationships based on balance of power. Studies on the post-Cold War is based on the uncertainty of erstwhile Soviet Union, but at present, there is a need to revaluate Russia’s profile as a major player, so is the need to gauge the role of India as a South Asian player. Therefore, in looking at security issues, there is a need to focus on two facts. First, there is some sort of semblance to Cold War politics where the balances of power, structural relationships are relevant to the study of security in Southeast Asia. Second, the canvas of the post-Cold War security scenario is very large that stretches from Russia in the north to India in the South. It makes strategic forecasting more complex and challenging. Alongside this conventional security scenario, non-
conventional security issues have gradually seized the limelight and therefore they deserve academic attention.

Literatures in the post-Cold War period have focused on the uncertainty of the security scenario of the region like Chin Kin Wah’s article on external security concerns. Yet the domain of non-traditional security threats is far more complex and perplexing. It is not only because of the variety and multiplicity of the non-conventional security but because of their tendency to spill-over effects. Spill-over not only means in terms of transnational effects but also in terms of its ability to have a spiral effect on other aspects of non-traditional security. This study will focus on the need to bring forward the concepts of cooperative security and comprehensive security and show their relevance in Southeast Asia.

As far as responses to the security issues in Southeast Asia are concerned, the literature on Confidence Building provides a satisfactory idea on the meaning of Confidence Building with emphasis on the rationale of Confidence Building Measures. Scholars like Mohamed Jawahar Hassan and Ravadangin Bold provide a satisfactory idea on the two components of the responding process – Confidence Building and Track I Processes. This study seeks to go a step further and identify the kind of Confidence Building Measures that are actually functional within Southeast Asian security domain. It will lead to an exposure of the functioning of the official regional mechanism, the ASEAN. Leifer’s book on ASEAN and the Security of the region is undoubtedly a substantial presentation of the functioning of the ASEAN. This study would build on the ideas gained from it and focus on the role of the ARF as the distinct Southeast Asian security mechanism. It is an attempt to evaluate the role of the ARF as a Confidence Building Mechanism. It will also involve a critical estimate of the activities of the ARF. Herein criticism of the Track I Processes will be relevant. Behera’s, Rizvi’s and Evans’s contribution in bringing out the drawbacks of the official channel is well acknowledged. This study will try to present the rationale of an active Track II process in Southeast Asia.

Rationalising the need of Track II process will require an understanding the political situation of the region, but this study will try to proceed in a slight different manner. In making a critical estimate of the ARF, the political determinants of Confidence Building, the fetters of functional cooperation within the ARF will help lay the rationale for the
Track II Process. In addition the relation between the ASEAN and the ARF will be analysed. In this context it is necessary to keep in mind that Pauline Kerr's discussion provides a concise look at the Track II initiatives within the Asia Pacific. The study will focus on the region of Southeast Asia and show how Track II processes function as a support to the Track I process. It will also bring to the forefront the building blocks of Confidence Building right from the Track II interactions to its reach at the Track I level. It involves a vivid presentation of the activities of the Track II in Southeast Asia focusing on regional, multilateral initiatives. Two components of Track II have been selected here; first is under the auspices of institutions like ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP and the second is the institutionalized Track II dialogue processes within Southeast Asia, like the Asia Pacific Roundtable (APR) and the Informal Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts on South China Sea. The conclusion is based on the facts, observations and analyses of the study on Track II processes and it also takes an evaluative and prescriptive approach in Confidence Building within Southeast Asia. Thus the study tries to develop suggestions which may enrich Track II activities and make it more successful in devising effective measures of Confidence Building.