Chapter Seven
CONFIDENCE BUILDING THROUGH TRACK II PROCESSES

The previous chapter has attempted to give a sound idea of the official interactions related to security of Southeast Asia focusing on the activities of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ASEAN Regional Forum is responsible for addressing the political and security challenges of the region. Where there are critical problems, it tries to solve the contentious issues of the region. The ARF and its mother organisation ASEAN are the institutional manifestations of the growing needs of multilateral dialogue forums required to address the various security threats – military and non-military ones of the region. ASEAN is quite an old organisation and has proven its credibility as a multilateral dialogue forum over the years. After the Cold War, the ARF has furthered the spirit of multilateralism ingrained in the nature of ASEAN. Not only that, ARF has consolidated the process of multilateral dialogues by encouraging official interactions and also by incorporating the activities of the unofficial channels of interaction popularly known as Track II.

The rationale for Track II is not far fetched. A basic idea of its importance has been already provided earlier. There is a need to provide a glimpse of its rationale in the Asian context. The general perception is that Asian governments are reticent about sharing policy making responsibilities with elements outside the government. Government representatives are sceptical of the utility and efficiency of academicians and intelligentsia in sharing policy making responsibilities. In state dominated systems chances of contribution from Track II is further diminished. Yet Track II has its own significance in Asian systems particularly in Southeast Asia. Track II personalities have their advantages. Because of their independent roles they are not bound by governmental protocols, they are free to act without inhibition reaching out easily to target populations helping to crystallise opinion. For instance, until mid 1990s Indonesian bureaucracy was not in favour of open trade. APEC as a regional economic organisation was promoting free trade and investment. In 1994, C. Fred Bergsten, Chair of the APEC Eminent Persons Group convinced the former
Indonesian President Suharto to support free trade and investment in tune with the goal of APEC.¹

Track II members have considerable media exposure and can use it well to articulate opinions and influence decision making. Track II can be extremely important for supporting or for opposing Track I policy decisions. Charles Morrison thinks that, "To be sustained, government processes need appreciative audiences that help appreciate audiences that help establish and maintain a positive value for regional cooperation and reward politicians and policy makers for their efforts...support from large businesses, international policy networks provide a significant source of encouragement and reinforcement for Track I processes."² Track II is also considered to be a store house of innovations in policy formulations. Track I is in constant need of new ideas and perspectives in policy making. As Track II members generally comprise of intellectuals or ex-government individuals, they are in a position to table new proposals, flesh them and make them consumable for Track I units. The need for fresh policy inputs are required in foreign policy formulations especially where the issues of concern are complex and prone to disputes. Morrison here adds a subtle nuance to this aspect of Track II when he says that, "Track II (sic) participants also sometimes find that their ideas gain more visibility and weight through Track II than if they were at similar levels in Track I."³ However in certain cases, Track I institutes encourage Track II to be more supportive. A very relevant example is that of Singapore where both the permanent and non-political executives of the country are quite interested in introducing new ideas in policy making processes; it is quite encouraging for an international policy network that would provide a good repository of innovative ingredients essential for policies. Subsequently, Singapore government has established alliances with Track II institutes in the neighbouring region. Their alliance is however based on issues and not with regard to all the policies. Another State that encourages close relations between Track I and Track II processes is the Philippines. In Track II activities, the Philippines CSCAP conducts workshops that coincide with the ARF ISGs on the same topic, thus ensuring the relevance of its deliberations for the ISG meetings. Philippines acknowledges the fact that the Track

² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
II processes are in a position to carry out in-depth studies that officials cannot conduct because of lack of time and expertise. As an archipelagic state its main concern has been maritime security and therefore, it had urged the maritime working group to assist the ARF. The former ASEAN Secretary General Rudulfo Severino, commenting on the close association between Track I and Track II opined that, “CSCAP is most effective at the national level where a country’s own non-governmental experts can assist their governments in developing policy positions. This relationship has been particularly useful in CSCAP-ARF discussions on maritime issues in general and the South China Sea in particular.”

Track II processes have another advantage over governmental counterparts and that is the kind of expertise and institutional flexibility and support than can be available from these processes. In a place where political systems are marked by authoritarianism and state premierships that can last for decades, leadership to Track II positions and their functions are far more participatory. With an informal working ambience the members remain committed to their jobs. Senior, experienced members of Track II processes develop the expertise and coupled with the commitment they have an edge over Track I counterparts in producing sound policy alternatives. Track II process has been successful in expanding its networks. In fact in Track II institutes are not only significant by themselves, in certain cases, they have given birth to Track I institutes. The activities of the ASEAN-ISIS are a case to this point.

The informal channel has gained importance over the years in Southeast Asia. In the post-Cold War Period, it was recorded that unofficial meetings averaged around four per month. It is a proof of the growing acceptance of the Track II interactions as a viable option in dealing with security challenges in the region. Yet at the beginning it was not that smooth as countries were not sure of what kind of positive service Track II could provide to address the security concerns of the region. In the early 1990s the security situation was so uncertain that it was difficult to determine responses. There were two ways of responding to the uncertainty – either by multiplying defence

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preparations or by seeking cooperation. In the first case, defence preparations were likely to increase mutual suspicion amongst the States. It would lead to further uncertainty over the future of the region. In that case the other option was to encourage cooperation amongst States – it would enhance multilateralism in the region. It has resulted in growing enthusiasm in regional cooperation on security issues of the region. However Track II as a channel of multilateral interaction took some time to be accepted especially by powerful players who had played dominant roles in the region during the Cold War Period – US, Japan and China.6 By 1991, both the US and Japan had gradually begun to change their outlook, but it was China who took some time in accepting the importance of multilateralism as well as Track II interactions. Yet China has tried to keep up with the demands of the region by interacting with the ASEAN since the early 1990s. Slowly and gradually over the period of two decades, China has been trying to overcome its reservations on multilateral interactions and has also been participating in the Track II process.

Track II interactions in the Asia Pacific, in turn within Southeast Asia, is what Paul M. Evans describes, as ‘multilayered’ and ‘multifaceted’. He has identified four kinds of security interactions. First, there are the bilateral security arrangements common between the US and several partners around the Asia Pacific. The US-Philippine security treaty is an example of such a bilateral security arrangement. The second type of security arrangements are the situation specific ones, arrangements that have grown up around specific disputes like the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in South China Sea. A third channel constitutes those arranged for multilateral dialogues and security related interactions like the ASEAN Regional Forum. A fourth process deals with the kind of interaction between the regional and global ones especially in the arena of non-proliferation involving institutions like the United Nations.7 Evans has also identified a number of determinants that determine the nature of the security dialogues that are taking place. They include, definition of the region, degree of relevance, inclusiveness of membership, breadth of the definition of security, backgrounds of participants, degree of government spending and its direction, extent

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6 Soviet Union had ceased to exist and it must remembered it was Gorbachev who, at the famous Krasnoyarsk Speech 1988, for the first time put forward a proposal for multilateral dialogue in order to deal with the security problems of the region. If Russia had first introduced the idea of multilateral dialogues in the Asia Pacific, it can be deduced that Russia had no problem with Track II interactions.  

of original research and conceptualisation, strength and nature of participation, role of organised institutes and the venues of the interactions.\textsuperscript{8}

In the post-Cold War period, inspirations for Track II came from the economic arena. Track II activities between economic communities were carried out by organisations like the Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD)\textsuperscript{9}, the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC)\textsuperscript{10}, and the Pacific Economic Cooperation, later changed to Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC).\textsuperscript{11} PAFTAD, PBEC and the PECC are old organisations that came into existence in the Cold War. PECC and PBEC have been supporting the APEC by providing expert opinion. PECC and PBEC have been accepted as an observer in the APEC. Much of the current APEC agenda came from the PECC that were reiterated by the PAFTAD. These processes have managed to bring together several actors involved in regional cooperation – business representatives, academic experts. Like other non-governmental institutions PECC, PBEC and PAFTAD, rely on personal networks among the elites that facilitate cross-cultural cooperation and help convergence of ideas and opinions. Thus, it is the underlying contribution of the intellectuals to the larger discussion of regional economic cooperation that became the propelling force of the Track II. Ideas flowing from the Track II have enriched the APEC. The APEC is not necessarily concerned with micro-economic questions. It is there that expert opinions from the Track II institutions that provides valuable inputs. The credibility of these institutions rests on their ability to bring together representatives of the business community who have the ability to understand the needs of the time. Moreover, these institutions are the

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid, pp.127-129.
\textsuperscript{9} PAFTAD was organized for the first time by the Japanese Economic Research Centre in 1968. Its membership expanded from exclusively developed countries (USA, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand) to include Asian states.
\textsuperscript{10} PBEC was established in 1967. It is the oldest independent business association in the Asia Pacific region with members comprising of executives from economies bordering the Pacific Rim and beyond. PBEC has been the driving force in the region for the past few decades advocating environmental awareness, corporate social responsibility and transparency through working committees, policy advocacy and partnerships with organisations such as the US, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Pacific Economic Council (PECC) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It was the principal commercial component of regional economic cooperation that was formed on an interim basis, to a large extent as an extension of the Australia-Japan Business Committee, to encompass New Zealand and Canada with the first formal meeting took place in 1968. Originally an organisation of developed countries it has now both Latin American and European participants. The PRC joined in 1994.
\textsuperscript{11} Pacific Economic Cooperation Council is a network of member committees composed of individuals and institutions dedicated to promoting cooperation across the Asia-Pacific. PECC has 22 full member committees. PECC’s regional community efforts led to the establishment of the official APEC process in 1989.
platforms where intellectuals and business elites meet. These institutions encourage interdependence and help in improving political relations. John Crawford described the first conference of the PECC as supporting limited cooperation efforts to economic ones, but nevertheless saw as probable that improved cooperative efforts in the economic field would lessen political friction and political misunderstanding as well as strengthen the economic base of States of the region.\textsuperscript{12}

This credibility of Track II interactions in the economic field inspired Track II activities in the political and security fields as well. Unfortunately there have not been much Track II activities in this domain within the Asia Pacific during the Cold War Period. What existed were a number of research institutes in a number ASEAN member states. Since the mid-1980s, dialogues between these research institutes had started. Brian Job described their activities as “an ideational agenda of cooperative security.”\textsuperscript{13} In order to give the idea of cooperative security a concrete form, these institutes organised themselves into an institution known as the ASEAN-ISIS. Established in 1988, the institute comprised five then existing regional organisations – Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; the Institute for Strategic Development Studies (ISDS), the Philippines; the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore; Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia; and the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand. The ISIS put down its purpose as:

-To encourage cooperation and coordination of activities among policy-oriented scholars and analysts, and to promote policy-oriented studies of and exchanges of information and viewpoints on, various strategic and international issues affecting Southeast Asia’s and ASEAN’s peace, security and well being.\textsuperscript{14}

ASEAN-ISIS is a well organised expert network and also an avenue for research collaboration, exchange and joint projects among think tanks of ASEAN countries. In

addition, ASEAN-ISIS has built an extensive network of institutions that spans across Asia Pacific countries. The organisation has built institutional linkages with different research organisations and think-tanks from countries like Australia, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the US and also with countries beyond that, like India. Member organisations of the ASEAN-ISIS enjoy a considerable amount of independence in their activities, and are financially independent too. However, institutions belonging to state dominated political systems like Vietnam and Cambodia institutions may not be entirely independent but in rest of the states organisations are free to function. Amongst the institutions of ASEAN-ISIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia is the largest organisation. Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Thailand and Malaysia respectively are medium sized research institutes. While ISIS Thailand is supervised by Chulalongkorn University, ISIS Malaysia is one of the oldest (established in 1983) and most prominent organisations in that country.

These institutions are comprised of prominent scholars and experts who can assist the governments with their valuable opinion. Besides, these experts and government officials know each other well and can have informal dialogue among them. As Katsumata observes, “[t]hrough such channels, inputs are sent to the governments from these institutions. These informal yet close links are very important for an understanding of the ASEAN-ISIS activities in the region.”

ASEAN-ISIS has a prominent role in creating norms. In helping to create policy decisions, and providing guidelines to policy makers, they also help in crystallising norms first within the organisation and then at the regional level. Hyun Seog Yu describes crystallisation of norms as norm localisation. Drawing from Amitav Acharya, Seog Hu describes norm localisation as the “active construction of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices.” He

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has explained that ASEAN-ISIS as a local network of think tanks has performed the function of norms entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{18} As an organisation, ASEAN-ISIS has given birth to two organisations, each belonging to Track I and Track II process. In the case of Track I, ASEAN has played a very important role in the establishment of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and in the case of Track II, ASEAN has been instrumental in establishing the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).

The ARF was out born out of the ideas floated by the ASEAN-ISIS. ASEAN-ISIS met in Jakarta between June 2-4, 1991, in order to discuss the prospects of a Pacific Dialogue and forward it to the ASEAN heads of the governments. The proposal emphasised that the dialogue process would make the following contributions:

- The process of conflict reduction and resolution of contentious problems;
- The enhancement and enrichment of understanding, trust, goodwill and cooperation; and
- The effective management of the emerging international processes with a view to the establishment of a multilateral framework of cooperative peace.\textsuperscript{19}

In 1992, in Jakarta, a brainstorming session was held by the initiative of ASEAN-ISIS. It was under the initiative of Jusuf Wanandi that like minded and well meaning scholars met to discuss the new emergent security scenario in the post-Cold War period. Thus ASEAN-ISIS was actually planning to establish a network within Track I members as was already made possible amongst Track II institutes. ASEAN-ISIS had approached ASEAN as the only reliable Track I regional organisation that could support Track II initiatives. While the ASEAN was ready to go by the advisory proposals of the ASEAN-ISIS, it was not ready to provide a separate dialogue forum. Yet at the Singapore Summit of the ASEAN in 1992, the members decided that they agreed to, “use established fora to promote external security dialogues on enhancing security in the region as well as intra-ASEAN dialogues on ASEAN security.”\textsuperscript{20} The proposals of the ASEAN-ISIS also influenced external powers like Japan who proposed that the existing ASEAN mechanism could be the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC). In the following year, in line with the deliberations of the PMC the ARF was established officially endorsed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, they also acknowledged the contributions of the ASEAN-ISIS in the way

\textsuperscript{18} Amitav Acharya, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit}, ASEAN-ISIS, Jakarta, June 4, 1991, p.3.
they provided an alternative to common security – cooperative security. Hiro Katsumata interprets in another way by mentioning that ASEAN-ISIS has spread the influence of the ‘ASEAN Way’ across the Asia Pacific.21

In the context of the ARF, the ASEAN-ISIS Forum’s proposal was incorporated in the ASEAN Memorandum “A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit” that was published in Jakarta during the immediately after the post-Cold War period. This Memorandum was presented at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in 1991 at Singapore in 1992. The Memorandum could be seen as a glimpse of those issues that regional Track II institutes have been discussing. The common issues that were mentioned in great importance were common and cooperative security; the use of multilateral forums for discussing security related dialogues and the extension of the ASEAN style of diplomacy to such security dialogue forums.22 Its proposal for cooperative or common security is not far fetched. The concept of common security is devised under the influence of Europe which in 1991 introduced the concept of common security while proposing for Common Foreign and Security Policy. ASEAN-ISIS thought in tune with the European lines that the region acts as a single unity in terms of security. Cooperative security is based on realistic estimates of China’s threat potential to the region. This also perhaps draws a similarity from the European experience wherein erstwhile Soviet Union was incorporated into European security structures primarily due to the uncertainty in the immediate post-Cold War period. In need for a multilateral dialogue ASEAN was conceived as a viable regional organisation that for its greater security requirements would build relations with countries in the Asia Pacific. ASEAN-ISIS was only suggesting along same lines asking ASEAN to encourage dialoguing not only with like minded states like Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and, the but with not so like-minded states like, China, Vietnam, Burma, and North Korea. Looking at the various states with different threat perceptions, ASEAN-ISIS suggested a gradual and step-by-step approach that would allow its members to associate with the process at their own comfort. This gradualist approach in itself is a trust building measure especially for

those not like-minded States who did not see eye to eye during Cold War days or those states that stand on the other side of the liberal order. The ASEAN-PMC was selected as the basis for such dialogues and as the Memorandum mentioned, that such discussions would take place "at the end of each PMC" and that an "ASEAN PMC-initiated conference would be held." The seeds of the ARF were laid.

In relation to the founding of the ARF, one of the significant contributions of the ASEAN-ISIS is to project an idea of Track II institution that would be in harmony with ASEAN's basic principles. Initially, the members of the ASEAN were not comfortable with the idea of a multilateral dialogue process that would resemble the European Conference of Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). ASEAN members were particularly concerned with three specific points. First, ASEAN did not wish to be identified as a military-security organisation. Second, ASEAN was not opposed to the concepts of common security, but it was sceptical of the European version of common security for that would imperil the SEANWFZ. The SEANWFZ intends to keep at abeyance external influence and intervention in the region. Therefore ASEAN members were fearful of the idea of a European version of common security that would bind together ASEAN and external powers into one security framework. Third, ASEAN feared that its normative tradition, popularly known as the 'ASEAN Way' focusing on non-legalistic, informal means of security cooperation would become irrelevant. The European version of common security was based on formal mechanisms of arms control, and other Confidence Building Measures as provided in the Helsinki and Vienna Documents of the CSCE (CSCE is now known as the

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23 Ibid.
24 The CSCE Helsinki Document titled 'The Challenges of Change' described the goals of the organisation as a forum for dialogue, negotiation and co-operation, providing direction and giving impulse to the shaping of the new Europe. Members were determined to use it to give new impetus to the process of Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence- and Security-Building, to the enhancement of consultation and co-operation on security matters and to furthering the process of reducing the risk of conflict. In this context, they would also consider new steps to further strengthen norms of behaviour on politico-military aspects of security. Further they would ensure that their efforts in these fields are coherent, interrelated and complementary. In light of their goals, the Document provides elaborate legalistic measures on Confidence Building, early warning systems and conflict prevention including a forum for security cooperation for the CSCE and sections on various dimensions of human security. See, The CSCE Helsinki Document on 'The Challenges of Change', Helsinki, July 9-10, 1992.
Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe i.e. OSCE). The measures stipulated formal reciprocal and binding obligations including the permission of verification (in case of arms control).\textsuperscript{26} ASEAN-ISIS is credited for reframing the European concept of cooperative and common security and fitting it to the ASEAN norms and principles. Subsequently, it was the suggestion of the ASEAN-ISIS that CBMs be non-legalistic, non-intrusive (especially in the case of arms control regime). Amitav Acharya points out that the rejection of the idea of deterrence fitted well into ASEAN’s existing policy of not organising itself into a collective defence system. Yet ASEAN’s idea that security should be pursued multilaterally resonated well in Indonesia’s earlier effort to develop a shared understanding of security in ASEAN through the doctrine of ‘regional resilience’.\textsuperscript{27}

Not only in its creation, ASEAN-ISIS has been providing views in how to improve ARF’s activities. In the latest Asia Pacific Roundtable ARF was discussed as very important issue, and Carolina Hernandez, one of the ASEAN-ISIS founding members provided a detailed suggestion list as to how ARF can progress in its activities. ASEAN-ISIS had acknowledged ARF’s contributions in its Memorandum no.4/2007. ARF has been accredited as the “foremost inter-governmental security forum in the Asia Pacific”\textsuperscript{28} because first, “it has successfully engaged a growing number of important countries in the Asia Pacific region and beyond”.\textsuperscript{29} Second, “it launched a number of important initiatives including regional cooperation in counter terrorism.”\textsuperscript{30}

Based on the drawbacks of the ARF mentioned in the same memorandum that it has failed to produce concrete results in terms of Confidence Building particularly in the field of non-military security issues, Hernandez had produced a number of suggestions to update the mechanism as the only regional unit (A southeast Asian one) that has all the world’s major strategic players. These suggestions are also based on the observation that the 1994 Concept Paper for ARF has fallen short of the requirements of the present security scenario. Hernandez provides a number of

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} “Rethinking ASEAN Regional Forum”, ASEAN-ISIS Memorandum No.4/2007, cited in Carolina G. Hernandez, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Pathways to Progress – A View from an ASEAN-ISIS Founding Member”, Remarks for Plenary Session Four at the 22\textsuperscript{nd} Asia Pacific Roundtable, ISIS Malaysia, Hotel Nikko, Kulal Lumpur, June 2-5, 2008.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
suggestions (eleven). She feels the need to restrict membership and consider states relevant to the security requirements of the region. Decision making must be also restricted to core members. The ARF ought to switch over to comprehensive security as its basic security concept in order to accommodate traditional and non-traditional security concerns. Besides the three stages CBM strategy ought to apply only for inter-state conflicts and not for non-conventional security threats. CBMs need be more concrete; ARF also must have adequate mechanisms to conduct CBM and PD. Hernandez further suggests that ARF pay more attention to issues like global warming and counter terrorism measures. Official representations in the ARF ought to expand. At the structural level, changes suggested are the establishment of an ARF Division in the ASEAN and the convening of ARF Summits at regular intervals perhaps back to back with the APEC Summit.\footnote{Ibid.} Hernandez has in a way tried to ensure the centrality of the ASEAN and the ARF in the political security affairs of the region. She fears that Track I officials fail to see changes that are taking place in the security scenario. She is not very hopeful of the ASEAN Charter because she thinks, "It is a charter that consolidates the 'ASEAN Way' of doing things at its very core, one that does not empower the ASEAN institutions to make them more effective by ensuring compliance and by enabling decision making to be made other than consensus to the level of the Summit."\footnote{Ibid.}

This scepticism regarding the ASEAN Charter is a surprise considering the fact that ASEAN-ISIS had played a pioneering role in the formulation of the ASEAN Charter. In light of the decision to have a Charter for the organisation at the 11th ASEAN Summit 2005, an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was appointed. It was this body especially former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas who sought assistance from ASEAN-ISIS in preparing the charter. In response the ASEAN-ISIS convened two meetings in 2008, Singapore and in Bali. As a result of the brainstorming sessions, a Memorandum on the Charter was prepared. The Memorandum reached the EPG in 2006. The Memorandum provides a draft Charter in light of the growing responsibilities of the organisation and its need to establish the Community of Nations. Of the various concrete proposals made for the Charter, ASEAN-ISIS suggested an inclusive approach to decision making. It mentions that:

\footnote{Ibid.}
ASEAN should not be an elitist club or a club limited to government officials. Therefore, ASEAN should establish consultative processes that ensure the involvement of peoples and civil society, the businesses and Parliamentary representatives of ASEAN. These consultative processes should aim to enable these different sectors of ASEAN to contribute towards ASEAN's agenda setting, and help monitor the implementation of commitments made by the ASEAN Member States.  

Thus ASEAN-ISIS sought to institutionalise the role of Track II processes within the Charter, something that is already there within the ARF. Besides, ASEAN-ISIS has also suggested a roadmap for establishing the ASEAN Economic Community.

It is noteworthy that one of its old flagship programmes constitutes the ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights. It aims to establish Human Rights Mechanisms, as a principal goal and contributes through its dialogue process towards building a Human Rights regime. The ASEAN Security Community has already acknowledged the need of establishing a Human Rights Mechanism. Another flagship project is the ASEAN-ISIS People's Assembly (APA) that was recognised in the Vientiane Action Plan (VAP) as one of the regional mechanisms for the promotion of people-to-people contacts particularly to ASEAN's community building. The First APA was held on November 24-26, 2000 in Batam, Indonesia. It was a success in terms of bringing together members of civil society groups, track II institutions and even policy-makers from the 10 ASEAN member states. APA 2000 was followed up with the holding of the Second APA in Bali, Indonesia on August 30-September 1, 2002 with the theme "We, the ASEAN Peoples and our Challenges". The Assembly is conducted regularly with the hope of "enabling dialogue and Confidence Building between governments, think-tanks, and civil society groups in ASEAN on a range of political, economic, security, and social-cultural issues that affect the peoples and communities of Southeast Asia."  

Perhaps the most prominent flagship programme of the ASEAN-ISIS is the Asia Pacific Roundtable (APR). The Asia Pacific Roundtable began in the mid 1980s – the

first in 1984 at Seoul and the second at Manila in 1985. ASEAN-ISIS has played a pivotal role in a Track II dialogue process known as the Asia Pacific Roundtable. Until the late 1980s the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, was organising the Asia Pacific Roundtables. The ASEAN-ISIS has been conducting the APR since 1993. The APR is one of the most active Track II processes that have been trying to promote Confidence Building in the region of Asia Pacific particularly the sub-region of ASEAN. The majority of the roundtables have focused on the various issues related to Confidence Building in the Asia Pacific. In the early 1990s, the APR was more concerned with the emergent security scenario of the Asia Pacific. It tried to identify the factors that would determine the security scenario of the Asia Pacific. The Cambodian Conflict was a very serious issue of concern and given the Korean War in the 1950s, there were apprehensions regarding the future state of relations between the two Koreas. In light of the security concerns the APR discussed proposals for Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction Mechanisms for the Pacific and arms control and arms limitations in the Pacific. In fact, since the post-Cold War to the present, Confidence Building has been the most important issue of concern for the APR. By the mid 1990s the non-conventional security threats also received substantial attention. In 1994 APR participants were discussing ways to respond to globalisation especially because the future security of the region would also depend on the economic security of the countries. The participants also focused on other non-conventional security threats like narcotics, labour migration and pandemic AIDS. It can be said that Southeast Asian states were also beginning to realise the importance of non-conventional security threats. For example, the then Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi expressed his concern for human security and poverty at his keynote address at the 9th Asia Pacific Roundtable in 1995. He said:

In this vast hemisphere of 30-odd states and territories where two-fifths of humankind lives, we are indeed confronted with many serious challenges...Let me begin with the question of satisfying the legitimate needs and aspirations of the people. This must be surely the indispensable foundation upon which all true and durable peace is built. Obviously uppermost in mind in this regard will be freeing of our peoples from scourge of hunger and want...Peace cannot thrive in the midst of poverty...I would therefore think that in the interest of both security and larger concern for the human welfare, it might be befitting on the eve of our journey into the twenty first century, for all of us in
the Asia Pacific to rededicate ourselves to the speedy elimination of absolute poverty in our societies with single-minded purposes. 36

In the same gathering, the Chairman of the AEAN-ISIS expressed the need to sustain the economic success. He opined that, "To steam ahead with our economic success in a sustainable, long-term manner, I believe we must be able to sufficiently bring about cooperative security. The yawning gap between shared economic prosperity and the absence of corresponding security framework for handling conflicts may, indeed, be our paramount challenge." 37 Participants to the Roundtable have discussed both conventional and non-conventional security threats 38 as well as methods of implementing Confidence Building Measures to address both military and non-military security threats. 39 By the year 1997, it became apparent that the States of Southeast Asia had failed to sustain economic growth and development as the economic crisis victimised a number of States of the region. The Asia Pacific Roundtable that took place that year had expanded its outlook discussing various issues that constitute security threats. Regional developments and domestic developments received attention. In the keynote address Malaysian Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Anwar Ibrahim based his entire speech on the developments of efforts of the Pacific Rim Community. He expressed his fears of division within the Asia Pacific as much as the influence of such states in the affairs of the ASEAN. He said:

I fear that generally calm waters of our ocean are being roiled by the actions of some in the Pacific community and the increased rhetoric by others to accentuate our differences. Attempts are made to hold some us accountable to standards drawn up by those who appear to have short memories of their own history. Policies seemingly are influenced by the oscillating moods of the moment rather than a clear-eyed vision of the future. Criticisms of ASEAN members for admitting Myanmar into the grouping, together with Cambodia and Laos and talk of “containment” of certain Asian countries, for example demonstrates a

36 "Keynote Address by The Honourable Datuk Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia", Ninth Asia Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN-ISIS, June 5-8, 1995,
37 "Speech By Dr. Suchit Bunbogkarn, Chairman of ASEAN-ISIS (and the Chairman of the Institute of Security Studies, Thailand) at the Asia Pacific Roundtable", Ninth Asia Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN-ISIS, June 5,1995,
38 Some of the topics conventional security threats discussed include, Arms Acquisition in the Asia Pacific, South China Sea, non conventional security threats focused upon include, Sustainable Development, Environment and Security.
predilection to play to the gallery rather than the realities of the region.40

He had further disapproved of the movements for democracy, civil rights that he thought “threatens to derail the attempt by poorer Pacific nations to free their people from the chains of poverty.”41 His speech focused on the three objectives: maximisation of mutual respect and appreciation; strengthening and appreciation of mutual problems that is based on mutual respect; and fostering of mutual cultural enrichment. Minister Ibrahim also underlined the importance of people-to-people contact in building durable and profound peace in the Pacific region. The same workshop saw substantial discussion on non-conventional security issues like, domestic security in some of the countries of Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines), environmental disasters and responses to it, gender and security, labour migration and its ways to deal with its impact, terrorism, piracy in the seas and proposed counter measures and a new topic, the consequences of the expansion of the ASEAN. Conventional threat concerns focused on arms and military build up and ways to counter such proliferation, maritime cooperation that focused on South China Sea.

The APRs, in the twenty first century, address a wide variety of issues as Asia Pacific and Southeast Asia face the challenge of addressing complex traditional and non-traditional security threats. For instance, the 14th APR participants in 2000, discussed issues as varied as the relations between North and South Korea, the prospect of ASEAN Vision 2020, the future of East Asian Cooperation, between comprehensive security, human security and balance of power in the Asia Pacific (that actually focussed on the threat of arms acquisition and the need for greater transparency). The interesting fact was that even within the APR there was a conscious attempt to avoid very sensitive issues; the review report recorded, “[t]he most interesting sessions were relegated to the periphery. Plenary Sessions were generally dull with one or two notable exceptions. Sensitive issues were addressed in the corridors -- which as always was the scene of the most lively exchanges...the 14th Asia-Pacific Roundtable

40 “Keynote Address by The Honourable Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Malaysia”, 11th Asia Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, June 5-8, 1997.
41 Ibid.
balances formal with corridor discussions. 

As the US concentrated on missile defence in the wake of terrorist attack on their homeland, the APR became very concerned with this development and the growing reactions of China towards the missile defence. The US representative strongly defended the need of a missile based defence system as the US woke up to the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and they found it more dangerous than nuclear threat. As the United States Deputy Assistant Secretary for State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Skip Boyce, explained, “[t]he United States is examining all available options for effective defences. The new environment is also an opportunity for reduced reliance on offensive nuclear retaliatory forces. Our goal is to have the lowest number of nuclear weapons necessary for national security and to meet our obligations to our allies.”

On the other hand, Chinese response to the question of US defence preparations and its impact on Sino-US relations was surprisingly much matured. They wished not to be identified as strategic competitor to the US. Chinese strategic expert, Professor Dingli Shen of Fudan University, Shanghai brought forward the point that, at the top level, the Junior Bush Administration is not very experienced with China, which impedes its ability to handle China “sensibly”. Here he touched a responsive cord. He suggested that American China experts participate in Roundtable events and are well known personally. They were in a position to make contributions by providing practical suggestions and fulfil the lapses of the Bush Administration; they can build a very fruitful network with Chinese experts on US affairs. Unfortunately, there were not too many such experts’ representations at the APR. It was reflective of the lack of interest of the US administration in looking forward to a better relationship with China. In comparison to the traditional security issues, non-traditional issues did not gain such importance and some states like New Zealand were disappointed with in the way less attention was given to non-traditional issues and to their neighbouring region South Pacific. It was compensated in the 18th Asia Pacific Roundtable, 2004. That APR based its discussions on the views and recommendations of the EPG appointed by the Pacific Islands Forum (earlier known as South Pacific Forum). The threats that imperil the region are largely of a non-traditional nature. In addition, considering the

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political turmoil and unrest in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands, the Eminent Persons’ Group stressed on the inefficiency of the governments, and the Track I channel in dealing with these threats. Their concerns were clearly aired in their observations where they felt strongly that, “that government breakdown, insurrection and other emergencies demand rapid and effective management. Further, this engagement should involve a wider range of countries than is typically the case”. 45 Since states of the region are not well equipped to handle threats of these kinds or of any other non-traditional kinds, the case for Track II support is quite strong. The forum has already taken a step by becoming an observer in CSCAP.

The most recent Roundtable was the 22nd Asia Pacific Roundtable that discussed on very wide variety of issues. The Keynote address provided by the Prime Minister of the host country Malaysia provided a glimpse of the range of issues that was under the Track II scanner. Prime Minister Badawi introduced an element of inevitability as he spoke on human security, “We have no concerns but to recognise that human security should be among our greatest concern.”46 His concerns ranged from socio-economic aspects of human security comprising of economic self sufficiency such as food security to humanitarian crises brought about by natural disasters. He has suggested a more active role for the ASEAN in providing assistance to the victims of natural disasters. (the ASEAN Humanitarian Centre has been active since 2005). The Keynote address also took note of the security impact of major power relations like that between China and Japan, the US and China and major belligerent issues such as the nuclear belligerence of North Korea, the unresolved claims over South China Sea and territorial disputes between China and Japan. Prime Minister expects much out of the ASEAN Charter but more importantly, he has paid more attention to the need of cooperation and resolution of conflicts peacefully for the Prime Minister said, “[b]elligerent rhetoric begets angry resorts hostility and together they breed greater hostility.”47

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46 “Keynote Address by The Honourable Dato Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister of Malaysia”, 22nd Asia Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 3, 2008.
47 Ibid.
The 22\textsuperscript{nd} APR saw extensive discussions on a variety of issues but those which gained substantive attention were the ARF, the relations between ASEAN and Myanmar, Japan’s role in the region. Besides important regional powers and conventional and non-conventional issues were also discussed like terrorism, military modernisation, changes in Chinese foreign policy, strategic implications of a rising India, of rising Russia, and security issues of the South Pacific.

Proposals for a conglomerate of research institutes were afloat in course of the discussions at the Conference on the Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. It was organised jointly by four research institutes – Pacific Forum/CSIS, ASEAN-ISIS, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and the Seoul Forum. The first meeting was held at Hawaii in 1992, the second at Bali in April 1992. The specific concept of a Council to focus on promoting cooperation on regional security issues was voiced at the third conference at Seoul in November 1992.\textsuperscript{48} At this meeting on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, a statement was signed by directors of the ten research institutes of the region. The statement that was produced in course of the discussion gives a basic idea of what the future shape of things might be. It mentioned:

\begin{quote}
As representatives of non-governmental institutions concerned with the security, stability and peace of the region, we also feel that we have the responsibility to contribute to the efforts towards regional Confidence Building and enhancing national security through dialogues, consultations and cooperation.\textsuperscript{49}
\end{quote}

In light of the above statement, the Seoul Statement seems to have underlined the rationale of the CSCAP:

\begin{quote}
It is with this objective in mind that we propose to develop a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature. We propose that this process be named the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and that it be open to all countries to the region. The Council’s activities will be guided by a Steering Committee consisting of representatives of non-governmental institutions in the region who are committed to the ideals of regional security cooperation.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{48} Op.Cit. no.5, pp. 129.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
Another concrete proposal was tabled at the ASEAN-ISIS Steering Committee meeting at Kuala Lumpur on June 8, 1993 which later became the forum for all CSCAPs to meet and discuss their activities. This concrete proposal was the Declaration on the establishment of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (also called the Kuala Lumpur Statement). It also established four sub-committees responsible for four respective assignments – the drafting of the CSCAP Charter and By-laws; marshalling of financial support; establishment of CSCAP Working Groups; and membership issues including the accession on new members to the institute. The Declaration on the Establishment of the CSCAP recorded that the discussions at the meeting have clearly shown the need for more structured processes for regional Confidence Building and security cooperation. The meetings welcomed the initiatives at the official level to develop a formal and informal inter-governmental forum for dialogue on political-security forums. The provisions of the CSCAP Declaration were largely inspired by the Seoul Statement of 1992. For instance, the CSCAP Declaration underlined the role of non-governmental Institutions in the following words:

As representatives of non-governmental institutions concerned with the security, stability and peace of the region, we also feel that we have the responsibility to contribute to the efforts towards regional Confidence Building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultations, and cooperation.

The above statement is indicative of the role expectation of the CSCAP based on cooperation rather than on military balances. ASEAN-ISIS was presenting the idea of CSCAP as an instrument of cooperative security. This reinforces David Dewitt’s views on the relation between Cooperative Security and the role of Track II processes:

A key operational focus of the cooperative security has been ‘to establish habits of dialogue’ and to move towards inclusive participation. Out of this, and complemented by the burgeoning number of channels of trans-Pacific communications on a broad range of security-relevant issues, has been the emergence of what has

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52 Ibid.
become known as 'track II' diplomacy, whereby experts from the academic governmental, official, non-governmental and private communities can meet each in their individual capacity to converse about cooperative security.\textsuperscript{53}

The Kuala Lumpur Statement adds that it is with the objective of increasing interaction membership shall be open to all territories and countries of the region. The Statement also outlined the probable structure of the CSCAP. It is primarily to be guided by the Steering Committee that would be comprised of non-governmental institutions who are committed to the idea of regional cooperation. Each member state is to have a broad based committee constituted of members in their private capacities. The statement also proposed working groups which will be given the task of undertaking policy-oriented studies on specific regional political-security problems. In the future these working groups were to provide vital inputs to the ARF in its discussions on regional security issues.

The CSCAP was thus founded on the basis of the ASEAN-ISIS experience in 1993 bringing together a number of institutional counterparts to the ASEAN-ISIS. The founding institutes include the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, (Australia), the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, (Canada), The Centre for Strategic Studies and International Studies (Indonesia), Japan Institute of International Affairs (Japan), the Seoul Forum for International Affairs (Republic of Korea), the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia), the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (the Philippines), the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (Singapore), the Institute for Security and International Studies (Thailand), and the Pacific Forum/CSIS (United States). The establishment of the CSCAP in 1993 reinforces the institutionalisation of Track II processes in Southeast Asia along lines of security cooperation and Confidence Building between the states of the region.

The sub-committee on CSCAP Charter and bye-laws did its homework and at the meeting on December 16, 1993; the CSCAP Charter that included transitional arrangements from a pro-term position to a broader structure based on member committees were accepted. The meeting also established four working groups

assigned with four respective jobs – maritime cooperation in the Asia Pacific, enhancement of security cooperation in the North Pacific; address the various proposals for CBMs; and address the concepts of cooperative and comprehensive security.\(^{54}\) Another Working group on transnational crime has been formed taking the number of working groups to five. The Charter of the CSCAP adopted in December 16, 1993, defines the objectives and functions of the organisation. The provision of a Charter is surprising considering the fact that in the early 1990s ASEAN did not have any Charter, till present the ARF has no charter. It seems then that the CSCAP in the early 1990s was more of a statutory body than the ASEAN. One would remain curious as to why an organisation representing Track I activities, comprised of official representatives would not have Charter for a long time. In comparison, a council comprised of Track II representatives (research institutes) began its journey by adopting a Charter to guide its activities in the future. It is a proof of ASEAN’s reservations against legally binding documents. The member states feared that if they accepted a legally binding document like a Charter they may not be in a position to protect their national interests and may at times have to compromise their sovereignty. If one could imagine that if there was a binding provision or principle with relation to territorial claims and related disputes, then perhaps the South China Sea issue would not have been witness to so many conflicts. The 1967 Bangkok Treaty is not a binding document, very important principles like non-interference are thus successful largely on the members’ good faith to preserve such principles. In case of any violations, ASEAN is in no position to take punitive steps under the Treaty. Of late, the ASEAN Charter has been adopted in 2008 but it is too early to comment on its success.

In a very different case, since the founding members of CSCAP were not shouldering the responsibility of protecting national interests, it was easy for them to think of and adopt a Charter. There was no fear that a binding document would hamper their interests or impinge on their sovereignty. In fact the issue of sovereignty was of lesser consequence in CSCAP, experts of various research groups were mainly interested in protecting the security and stability of the region. The contents of the CSCAP Charter clearly project the role of the organisation. The Charter states the purpose of the

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organisation, "CSCAP is organised for the purpose of providing a structured process for regional Confidence Building and security cooperation among countries and territories in the Asia Pacific region." 55 The Charter stipulated seven functions for CSCAP. They are as follows:
(a) To provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private capacities;
(b) To encourage the participants of such individuals from countries and territories in the Asia Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;
(c) To organise various working groups to address security issues and challenges facing the region;
(d) To provide policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies on political-security issues;
(e) To convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative activities for the purpose of discussing political-security issues;
(f) To establish linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of the world to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area of regional political-security cooperation; and
(g) To produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes of the organisation. 56

The Charter has provided for a neat structure where the Steering Committee is the highest decision making body of the CSCAP. On the composition of this committee the Charter mentions that, "The Steering Committee shall be comprised of one formally designated representative from each Member Committee." 57 Chairmanship to this committee is a balanced affair – the committee would be co-chaired by a member ASEAN state along with a non-ASEAN member state. There is a secretariat of the CSCAP assigned with a number of administrative duties. 58 Working groups are established by the Steering Committee in order to undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional and sub-regional political-security problems. A proposal to establish a working group can be made by any member Committee or more than one

55 "Article II(1)", The CSCAP Charter, Lombok, Indonesia, December 16, 1993.
56 "Article II (2a-2g)", Ibid.
57 "Article VI (2)", Ibid.
58 "Article VII", titled The Secretariat, Ibid.
committee but in that case they would fund that particular group. There is a provision for associate membership whereby, such membership may be granted to institutions in a country or territory not represented in the Steering Committee and which have demonstrated interest and involvement in the stated objectives and activities of CSCAP. They may then participate not only in working groups, they can also participate in CSCAP general meetings as observers. Nowhere in the Charter there is any mention of working in harmony with the Track I activities. Here it is relevant to mention that in the newly adopted ASEAN Charter, CSCAP is not noted as an advisory group to the organisation. It is only the ASEAN-ISIS network that is identified as think-tank and academic institutions to the ASEAN.

The scope of the activities of the CSCAP is quite large as it embraces both cooperative security and comprehensive security. The term security cooperation has ample scope of being interpreted variously. The term can be used to qualify the nature and state of existing interactions between like minded members as much as it may seek to explain the rationale behind ambitious cooperative strategies that reach across ideological lines. At another level security cooperation may imply the range of conventional security issues on which States share their concerns and opinions. It is applied to select the cooperative mechanisms needed to address the emerging security threats including non-military ones.

The working groups together constitute one of the functional and structural pillars of the CSCAP mechanism. They are intended as the primary and fundamental units of the organisation's activities. Ideally, membership of a working group ideally should constitute eight members. Desmond Ball defends this number as he thinks that eight is the right number to ensure geographic balance and incorporate the full range of necessary expertise; he is also cautious to mention that any number above eight would lead to management difficulties and satisfying all the members would be a difficult task. But that would lead to the problem of competition for place in the working

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59 The Charter provides for non-member participation in working groups on the invitation by the chair of that working group and subject to the permission of the co-chairs of the working committee.
60 See Annexure 2 titled “Entities with the ASEAN”, The ASEAN Charter, Singapore, November 20, 2008.
group. In such situations inclusion and exclusion from the working group ought to be determined on the basis of relevance of the topic to be studied, expertise, resources and administrative capabilities. The selection of working groups is a little difficult because the primary job of these working groups is to carry out in-depth research and study on issues that are recommended by the member committees. It is difficult to determine the priority of studies as different States have different security perceptions. Besides, working groups function according to other determinants like availability of resources, management efficiency and coordination capabilities. Presently there are five groups who have been providing valuable inputs towards decision making through the Track I process. In order to acquire an idea of the kind of support they provide towards decision making at the Track I level, this study will take a look at the activities of at least three of these working groups. The groups which shall be discussed are the Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures, Working Group on Maritime Security and the Working Group on Transnational Crime.

The Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures is considered to be very active as it continues to make suggestions to the ARF particularly regarding a roadmap on the implementation of Preventive Diplomacy. A workshop on Preventive Diplomacy had been organised by the working group in March 1999 just before that year’s meet of the ARF ISG on CBM, members from the ISG were also invited to the workshop. The workshop came up with a number of suggestions on Preventive Diplomacy which taken together also constitutes valuable inputs for cooperative security. The inputs provided include:

- CSBMs cannot work in the absence of a desire to cooperate;
- CSBMs must be viewed in “win-win” not “win-loose” terms;
- CSBMs are most effective if they build upon regional/global norms;
- Foreign models do not necessary apply;
- CSBMs are stepping stones or building blocks, not institutions;
- CSBMs should have realistic, pragmatic clearly-defined objectives;
- Gradual, methodical, incremental approaches are best at work;
- Unilateral and bilateral approaches can best serve as useful models;
- The process may be as (or more) important than product;
With respect to Asia-Pacific CSBMs in particular the workshop suggested:

- The Asia-Pacific is not itself a homogenous region;
- There is a preference for informal structure;
- Consensus building is a pre key requisite;
- There is a general distrust of outside "solutions", and
- There is a genuine commitment to the principle of non-interference in another's internal matters. 62

These suggestions were provided with the view that CBMs could be initiated at small and non-controversial issues, experiences gained from non-controversial issues would ultimately help deal with the more controversial issues. Based on the suggestions of the Working Group, CSCAP's Second Memorandum on Confidence Building Measures in the Asia Pacific was published in 1999. Confidence Building Measures suggested were in accordance with the suggestions made by the workshop on Confidence Building. 63 It also reiterated its confidence in the ability of the ARF in promoting CBMs in the region:

In the multilateral area, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) seems particularly well-suited to becoming the consolidating and validating instrument behind many security initiatives proposed by governments and NGOs in recent years. The ARF is both a political Confidence Building measure in its own right and a vehicle for examining and promoting Asia Pacific CSBMs. Its support of such ideas as the UN arms register, military transparency, and other confidence and security building measures should generate greater support for, and provide greater focus to, efforts at both the official and track II levels to develop innovative new measures for dealing with potentially sensitive regional security issues. 64

The Working Group on CSBM after careful consideration provided two transparency measures – first, the application of the UN Conventional Register to the Asia-Pacific and second, the working has developed a generic outline for defence policy papers that could be followed by all the States of the region. The working group has also paid

attention to the issues of nuclear safety and non-proliferation in the Asia Pacific exploring the prospect of formalising a Pacific Atomic Energy Community.\(^65\) Caballero Anthony appreciated that the Working Group, “Started ground breaking work on the development of multilateral approaches nuclear safety and non-proliferation, to include the possible formation of an Asian or Pacific Atomic Energy Commission (PACATOM)”.\(^66\) The working group has already sponsored a Nuclear Energy Expert Group which has collaborated with the US Cooperative Monitoring Centre, their interactions and deliberations have resulted in the endorsement of a proposal to establish a Nuclear Energy Transparency Website.\(^67\)

A very important aspect of the Working Group on CSBMs is its attention to the issue of Preventive Diplomacy. It maybe recollected that since 1996 the issue of overlap between Confidence Building and Preventive Diplomacy has been an issue of concern. The ARF had called on the suggestions of the CSCAP. In response the working group arranged for a workshop on Preventive Diplomacy in 1996 and have continued to do so since 1999. Describing the workshop and its contributions Ralph A Cossa writes:

Politically sensitive issues relating to Preventive Diplomacy applications, principles, and definitions were debated by both independent security specialists and government officials (acting in their private capacity) in an open, plenary session. A select group of non-governmental specialists was then convened during the Workshop to draft a working definition and statement of principles based on the earlier presentations and debate. Their efforts was then reviewed by the group at large and, with minor adjustments, was subsequently forwarded to the co-chairs of the ARF ISG on Confidence Building Measures for their considerations.\(^68\)

\(^{65}\) Although in the Memorandum produced by this Working Group there is no mention of such a Community, various suggestions that stress on transparency measures, expressing support for global non-proliferation and other regional non-proliferation regimes, including group’s suggestions that CSBMs, especially in the transparency area, can be initiated unilaterally and Asia Pacific governments are encouraged to pursue those measures consistent with their own security needs is indicative of the fact that they were exploring possibility of an atomic energy community. See, “Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures” CSCAP Memorandum No. 2, Washington 1994, Singapore, 1995.

\(^{66}\) Mely Caballero Anthony, Regional Security of Southeast Asia Beyond the ASEAN Way, Singapore, ISEAS, 2005, p.176.


CSCAP opined that there were chances of overlap between CSBMs and PD especially in context of the prevention of conflicts and limiting their scope of aggravation. The workshops on Preventive Diplomacy have been developing a set of principles; the Concept Paper on Preventive Diplomacy has been nourished by the principles adopted at the CSCAP Working Group’s Workshop at Bangkok in 1999. The principles have emphasised that Preventive Diplomacy is also a form of non-coercive diplomacy that acts as preventive against inter-state disputes and stops existing ones from worsening into armed conflicts. Preventive Diplomacy becomes successful only when the parties involved in conflicts or disputes are interested in cooperating and contestants must agree to cooperate in accepting of the provisions of Preventive Diplomacy. If states do not agree to abide by the principles on count of national interest then it is difficult for Preventive Diplomacy to be of any help to the disputes. More important, Preventive Diplomacy must be juxtaposed along with the principle of non-intervention, there may be cases where the disputes arise from the internal affairs of a state. In such cases states may not be interested in diplomatic interactions, mediators have to be very careful that they do not violate the principle of non-interference. However it may be difficult to mediate where disputes lie within the domestic jurisdictions of a State.

The 1999 Workshop had made some additional suggestions like regular reporting by the ARF on existing political and security concerns (Self-reporting system), creation of an ARF Information and Research Centre that would disseminate such reports and serve as clearing house for additional information, creating a body of experts comprised of specialised persons who would be necessary for procuring information, and also help mediation, and that ARF build networks with institutes that specialise in


non-traditional security, and identify the limits of the application of Preventive Diplomacy. The ARF was also asked to evaluate its progress in implementing CBMs as suggested by the CSCAP.\textsuperscript{70}

Nuclear activity is another issue within the scope of the working group on Confidence Building. The group is concerned with the nuclear non-proliferation, but more precisely it is concerned with the security implications of nuclear energy. The reason why it does not directly involve itself with nuclear weapons is because it is a contentious issue and considered too sensitive. Therefore at best CSCAP discusses security implications of the rising use of nuclear energy in some of the countries of the region. The danger lies in the fact that nuclear materials and nuclear technology pose both short term and long term dangers in terms of nuclear wastes, nuclear accidents and upgrading and usage of nuclear materials for the production of weapons. Their apprehensions have been reinforced by the problems created regarding the disposal of Taiwan's nuclear wastes in North Korea,\textsuperscript{71} and the stockpiling of plutonium for nuclear reactors in Japan.\textsuperscript{72}

Its ambitious desire to replicate the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in Asia did not see the light of the day because the kind of sense of community prevalent in Europe is not present in Asia. At best, there was an agreement on the lowest common denominator for cooperation in the Asian context and that was the formulation of safety procedures like exchange of information, procedures to respond to nuclear accidents. Under the initiative taken by the US CSCAP, the US Department of Energy invited the CSCAP Working Group on CSBMs to visit the Cooperative Monitoring Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico in May 1998 to acquire a first hand experience on how cooperative monitoring might enhance transparency among Asian states using nuclear energy. Interactions between

\textsuperscript{70} For the list of these suggestions see, \textit{Chairman's Summary of the First CSCAP Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy}, Bangkok, February 28-March 2, 1999.

\textsuperscript{71} As early as 1997 Taiwan signed a contract with North Korea then facing the challenge of national famine to dump approximately 10000 barrels of nuclear wastes from its national power facility Taipower. It had originally planned to dump 20000 barrels but had later decided to half that number.

\textsuperscript{72} Japan currently sends spent fuel from nuclear reactors to Europe for reprocessing, mainly to separate out the plutonium, which Japan can then try to use as a new energy source. Until recently, Japan has insisted that it would not be deterred in bringing in 30 tons of plutonium in the next 10 to 20 years, an amount sufficient to fuel thousands of nuclear weapons. This is a source of serious concern for the states of Asia Pacific as plutonium can be used for nuclear weapons.
the members of the CSCAP Nuclear Expert Energy Group led to the launching of the Asia Pacific Nuclear Transparency Web Site.\textsuperscript{73} The Working also urged the publication of Asia Pacific Nuclear Energy Cooperation Handbook, which could include all current energy policies of member states as well discussions of future proposals. This Handbook would be funded by the Cooperative Monitoring Centre.\textsuperscript{74} These contributions have in turn become valuable inputs for the ARF.

The Working Group on Maritime Cooperation is a proof of the importance of maritime security in the Asia Pacific and certainly in the sub-region of Southeast Asia. The Maritime Working Group seeks consensus while arriving at guidelines on good management of the oceans that includes the question of law and order, on the issue of marine resource exploitation, dealing with maritime crimes and on the question of instruments for dispute settlement.\textsuperscript{75} The challenges of maritime management are not easy as a number of problems challenge the maritime security of the region. Challenges range from high political issues like offshore sovereignty, unresolved maritime boundaries, and potentially restrictive interpretations of freedom of navigation to issues of low politics like illegal fishing, illegal movements of

\textsuperscript{73} The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) convened a Nuclear Energy Experts' Group Workshop at the Cooperative Monitoring Centre (CMC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico to examine potential nuclear energy-related transparency measures for East Asia. The meeting was held under the auspices of the CSCAP International Working Group on Confidence and security Building Measures (CSBMs), as a continuation of the Working Group's PACATOM policy-oriented discussions of regional mechanisms for nuclear energy-related multilateral cooperation. The October 26-30, 1998 meeting was the first of two scheduled workshops to be conducted under the auspices of the CSCAP CSBM Working Group. The meeting aimed informing one another on any measures taken by power companies to reassure their neighbours as to the safety and security of their facilities, in order to identify precedents and norms for regulation, monitoring, and cooperation. The intent was to build upon these individual programmes and, through a careful assessment of available technologies, develop a generic system that can be adopted, in whole or in part, by interested nuclear energy facilities on a strictly voluntary basis. CSCAP Second Workshop of Nuclear Energy Experts' Group II on Nuclear Energy Transparency was held at Albuquerque, New Mexico, January 25-29, 1999. The second Workshop was aimed at examining and refining the generic system and prototype Asian Pacific Website. This website was launched during the first meeting. An Asia Pacific Nuclear Transparency Web Site was designed to serve as the primary vehicle for system demonstration and user interface. The Web Site, as provisionally constructed, details the rationale for nuclear energy transparency, shows various information-sharing technologies, and guides the user to available data. As a nuclear transparency device, the Web Site contains basic information on regional nuclear energy production facilities along with currently available monitoring data. To learn more, log on to, http://www.cscap.nuctrans.org/Nuc_Transllinks/experts.html.

\textsuperscript{74} For a better idea of the CSCAP's views relating to nuclear energy especially the pCATOM framework see, Ralph A. Cossa, "PACATOM: Building Confidence and Enhancing Nuclear Transparency", \textit{Pac Net}, no.42, Honolulu, Hawaii, Pacific Forum CSIS,October 30, 1998

\textsuperscript{75} "Introduction", in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds), \textit{Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia-Pacific Region}, (Canberra Papers on Strategic and Defence No.117), The Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1996, pp.1-7.
population though the seas, drug smuggling and piracy. As the states are very sensitive about high politics, it may not be easy to go about resolving those issues, but cooperative security could be more fruitful with regard to issues related to low politics issues of fishing rights, ocean pollution, and protection of marine resources. In order to meet the role expectations of the CSCAP with regard to maritime security the Maritime Working Group came up with guidelines on Regional Maritime Cooperation that is produced as the Working Group's Memorandum No.4. As a consequence of papers delivered and deliberations at the first two CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group meetings, held in Kuala Lumpur in June 1995 and April 1996, the concept (of guidelines) evolved from the possibility of a Regional Risk Reduction or Maritime Safety Agreement to the idea of more wide-ranging guidelines covering the full scope of regional maritime cooperation. A proposed draft of the Guidelines was considered by an ad hoc meeting of the Working Group, held in Jakarta in December 1996, and accepted for submission to the CSCAP Steering Committee. After subsequent comment by CSCAP members, discussion at the third Meeting of the Working Group held in Bangkok in May 1997, the Guidelines were ready for consideration and adoption in the region. The guidelines are reflective of CSCAP's comprehensive approach towards maritime security. The purposes of the guidelines had been broadly explained in the memorandum, they are as follows:

- First, they constitute an important regional confidence-building measure, laying down general principles for regional maritime cooperation in line with the ARF's long term objective of becoming a mechanism for conflict resolution. They should serve to dampen down tensions, particularly in areas of enclosed or semi-enclosed sea with disputed or overlapping maritime jurisdiction.

- Second, they serve as a step in the process of building an oceans governance regime for the Asia Pacific region based on UNCLOS and the inter-related nature of oceans issues, and devoted to the notion of integrated management of such issues.

- Third, the Guidelines should help promote a stable maritime regime in the region with the free and uninterrupted flow of seaborne trade, and nations able to pursue their maritime interests and manage their marine resources in an
ecologically sustainable manner in accordance with agreed principles of international law.

- Fourth, the Guidelines apply the concept of comprehensive security in the Asia Pacific region. They should provide a link between the various concepts and processes of comprehensive security and the various forums which are concerned with elements of comprehensive security.

- Last, the proposed Guidelines encapsulate the progress achieved in the Maritime Cooperation Working Group meetings and pave the way for further work within each of the maritime security issue areas covered by the broad principles for co-operation laid down in the Guidelines.76

The memorandum provides guidelines that recognise rights and duties of the States over their maritime zones - internal waters, territorial seas, archipelagic waters, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves but also reminds individual states of “the rights and responsibilities of other States as provided by the UNCLOS, other conventions, treaty obligations and general international law.”77 The guidelines stress on maritime cooperation where states are encouraged to join the UNCLOS so as to contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, cooperation, sustainable development and friendly relations. In the context of naval cooperation the guideline provides that Confidence Building benefits of naval cooperation, including increased personnel contacts and voluntary measures to promote naval transparency. The guidelines also urge that, “Parties may wish to consider a framework of bilateral or multilateral instruments on the avoidance of naval incidents that would be open to interested navies.”78 Suggestions for cooperation focused on issues like maritime surveillance, protection and preservation of maritime environment, marine scientific research, technical cooperation and capacity building and training and education. CSCAP pays substantial attention to non-traditional maritime security issues and stipulates both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in such matters. The guidelines are conscious of the kind of complications that characterise maritime security of the region particularly with regard to the pernicious issue of overlapping claims in the South China Sea. Thus, the guidelines also provide that, “Nothing contained in these Guidelines, or activities taking place there above, should be interpreted as prejudicing

77 Section 2, “Rights and Duties”, Ibid.
78 Provisions 18 and 19 under section “Naval cooperation”, Ibid.
the position of any Party in its claims to territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction over territory or maritime zones." The guidelines do not expect complete unanimity in so far as agreeing to these provisions are concerned. The provisions and guidelines appear to enunciate a form of minimal consensus on maritime cooperation and provide a roadmap of future inter-state maritime practices. The importance of consensus is reflective in the way Malaysian reservations against maritime surveillance were recorded. The Guideline on Maritime Surveillance underlined that, "Parties recognise that maritime surveillance may be conducted for peaceful purposes as part of the exercise of freedom of navigation and over-flight in areas claimed as exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and on the high seas. This should be conducted without prejudice to the jurisdictional rights and responsibilities of the coastal state within its exclusive economic zone or over its continental shelf, as provided for under UNCLOS." Since Malaysia had differences in the way the provision was phrased, its proposed provisions were recorded as, "Parties recognise that maritime surveillance may be conducted for peaceful purposes as part of the exercise of freedom of navigation and overflight in areas claimed as exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and on the high seas. This should be conducted with the agreement, and without prejudice to the sovereign rights, of the coastal state within its exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." Thus, even CSCAP has borrowed from ASEAN's principle of consensus while making decisions.

CSCAP has also been careful in not involving itself in potentially controversial issues. The reasons are not difficult to understand. As it is during the deliberations while drawing up the guidelines, China strongly disapproved of a multilateral approach to the issues of sovereignty. China continued to stand by its position and at the 10th CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation Vietnam CSCAP in March announced that a bilateral agreement had recently been concluded between Vietnam and China under the auspices of the Gulf of Tonkin set of agreements (that also covered demarcation and joint arrangements over resources on the Continental Shelf). The Maritime Working Group has compensated their inability to discuss on the South China Sea by producing papers that freely air their views on the same. For

79 Provision 30 under section "Non-prejudicial", Ibid.
80 Under section "Non-prejudicial" in Ibid.
instance renowned maritime policy analyst Mark Valencia had produced a paper in 1997 that proposed some ways to seek resolution to the Spratly Islands issue.\textsuperscript{82} His paper identified issues that need attention and cannot be ignored simply because they fall within overlapping maritime claims. The States involved in disputes are so devoted to the issue of territorial claims that they ignore the larger issues of ocean management like protection of marine environment, preservation and austere use of marine resources. The overbearing presence of defence personnel in the South China Sea makes it difficult to undertake cooperative endeavours within the disputed zones.\textsuperscript{83} Since it is beyond the scope of CSCAP to resolve the overlapping claims, CSCAP credits itself in reducing those irreconcilable perspectives that prevent cooperative activities like sharing information, drive towards transparency, protection of environment and development and sharing of resources. It is significant in coming up with "practical, innovative proposals on issues which they may have been either set aside by the ARF or be premature for it…"\textsuperscript{84}

In tune with the growing needs of maritime cooperation, a study group was appointed to facilitate Maritime cooperation in the Asia Pacific. The group underlined the role of the armed forces in this matter. The objectives of the group were

- Explore contemporary concepts of maritime security in the Asia Pacific Region and the implications for the roles of the maritime security forces;
- Discuss the implications of these concepts for cooperation between maritime security forces;
- Identifying existing arrangements for security cooperation between maritime security forces;
- Explore the contribution of maritime security forces to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance;
- Identify ways and means by which cooperation between maritime forces might be enhanced; and

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, pp.6-7.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid
• Produce a monograph of edited papers from the meeting.\textsuperscript{85}

This study group was mandated to hold two meetings. Interestingly, the second meeting was not held until April 2008. Although there was no meeting of this particular Study Group for nearly eighteen months, CSCAP momentum on regional maritime security was maintained by a special Study Group on Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits that held its meeting in Jakarta in September 2007. The objective was to as the report described, "develop principles or guidelines for maritime cooperation in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. This would include issues of functional cooperation, including joint management arrangements for particular functions. Without this cooperation, it is impossible to arrive at an effective management regime, or to reduce the risks of conflict or confrontation over disputed areas."\textsuperscript{86} The two meetings produced two memorandums – the first memorandum on Maritime Knowledge and Awareness: Basic Foundations of Maritime Security (CSCAP Memorandum No. 12), and the second memorandum constituted Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of the Asia Pacific (CSCAP Memorandum No. 13). Thus, CSCAP plays a vital role in providing valuable inputs towards maritime cooperation through the publication of such memorandums (other relevant guidelines include CSCAP Memorandum No.5 – Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea, February 2001 and CSCAP Memorandum No. 6 – The Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific, December 2002). They present a wide array of suggestions in the form of guidelines and roadmaps to ensure that at least some form of mutual trust and confidence can be instilled. Therefore all these meetings and publications are a part of the Confidence Building process. Their contributions enrich the Confidence Building processes in the Track I process – the ARF tries to incorporate the suggestions and ideas floated by the CSCAP. The success of the contribution would be discussed later.

The CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime was actually born out of a study group appointed on the same subject. It was in 1996, at the 6\textsuperscript{th} meeting of the CSCAP


Steering Committee held at Canberra, it was decided to form a CSCAP study group on Transnational Crime to explore the issues that could come under CSCAP’s scanner. The specific objectives of the group included:

- To gain a better understanding of, and reach agreement on the major transnational crime trends affecting the region as a whole;
- To consider practical measures which might be adopted to combat transnational crime in the region;
- To encourage and assist those countries which have recently become engaged in regional security cooperation, and which are concerned about the problem of transnational crime in the region, to endorse the United Nations and other protocols dealing with transnational crime, particularly in the narcotics area, and to develop laws to assist in regional and international cooperation to counter drug trafficking, money laundering and the like, and to encourage mutual assistance, extradition and other forms of regional cooperation.\(^{87}\)

In the following year at the 7\(^{th}\) CSCAP Steering Committee, the Study Group was changed over to a Working Group on Transnational Crime. The Group has been conducting regular meetings and interactions between themselves trying to address the various issues of transnational crime. In course of the discussions held in these meetings, the Working Group has been able to identify and prepare a list of the kind of criminal activities prevalent in the region. The list of these crimes include arms trafficking, particularly the trafficking in firearms; counterfeiting; drug production and trafficking, including amphetamines and ecstasy; international corporate/white collar criminal activities; money laundering, including property and business investment by transnational organised crime groups; smuggling of nuclear materials; and Technology crimes.\(^{88}\) The views of the working group have been published in the form of various articles and working papers. For instance after the third meeting at Manila in 1998, the working group published their views and opinions in the form of a compendium of working papers called Transnational Crime and Security in the Asia Pacific. Publications as these are not only circulated within the members of CSCAP but also find its way in the interactions of the ARF, where transnational crimes and


\(^{88}\) Ibid. p.5.
terrorism and very important issues of discussion. Again in 2007, the group on transnational crime produced a paper on human trafficking based on the reports of the study group on the same subject. The report made a few clear recommendations to the ARF. First, it recommended that ARF maintain a directory of anti-trafficking NGOs and increase the awareness among officials and agencies on the ground realities and the situation of the victims. Second, the ARF participants need to raise the priority given to human trafficking among law enforcement agencies. Third, the ARF initiates an awareness programme in liaison with regional NGOs in order to promote public awareness. Fourth, that ARF creates a regional clearing house of information (as much as a platform for discussion) where law enforcers, social workers, national/local government officials, members of academia, and victims of trafficking could freely exchange their opinions and share their experiences. Such a form of interaction would lead to the evolution of some very useful policy formulation advices for the ASEAN.89

One of the objectives of CSCAP Working Group is:

To encourage and assist those countries which have recently become engaged in regional security cooperation, and which are concerned about the problem of transnational crime in the region, to endorse the United Nations and other protocols dealing with transnational crime, particularly in the narcotics area, and to develop laws to assist in regional and international cooperation to counter drug trafficking, money laundering and the like, and to encourage mutual assistance, extradition and other forms of regional cooperation.90

In tune with the above mentioned objectives, the Working Group is supportive Governments’ endorsement of international acts and agreements against transnational crimes. There is a long list of such international acts and agreements91 and it is the CSCAP which advises individual states which treaties to access and when to do so. At the regional level, CSCAP endorses the initiatives taken particularly by the ASEAN.

89 “Recommendations”, in Human Trafficking (CSCAP Memorandum No. 11), 27th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 4, 2007.
90 Op. cit. no.84, p.4.
91 A list of these international acts and agreements is provided in John McFarlane, “International Co-operation on Transnational Crime: Second Track Mechanisms”, Paper presented at the Transnational Crime Conference convened by the Australian Institute of Criminology in association with the Australian Federal Police and Australian Customs Service and held in Canberra, March 9-10, 2000, pp.6-7.
In this context it is necessary to discuss, in short, ASEAN’s views on transnational crime. In the post-Cold War period, the first evidence of ASEAN’s growing concern towards transnational crime is found in the Joint Communiqué of their Ministerial Meeting of 1996. It recorded that, “[t]he Foreign Ministers recognized the need to focus attention on such issues as narcotics, economic crimes, including money laundering, environment and illegal migration which transcend borders and affect the lives of the people in the region. They shared the view that the management of such transnational issues is urgently called for so that they would not affect the long-term viability of ASEAN and its individual member nations.” In light of the above statement, ASEAN had made three important declarations against transnational crime. These are: the ASEAN Ministers’ Declaration on Transnational Crime, concluded in Manila on December 20, 1997; the Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime, concluded in Manila on March 25, 1998; and the Joint Communiqué of the 2nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, held in Yangon, on June 23, 1999, including the adoption of the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime. Apart from that, transnational crime was discussed at the Hanoi Summit of 1998 and the Hanoi Plan of Action stressed the necessity to “strengthen regional capacity to address transnational crime.” Other regional steps towards combating transnational crimes include the establishment of the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok in 1997, the establishment of the Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime in Manila in March 1999, the proposal by ASEAN Ministers to establish an ASEAN Centre for Combating Transnational Crime. The ARF has also proposed an expert body group on transnational crime, if it comes into being then CSCAP experts will certainly be in a good position to provide expert opinion. Since the first meeting the CSCAP Working Group on transnational crime has been discussing on various aspects of transnational crime. Issues that gained

92 There was a declaration in 1976 called The ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuses of Narcotics Drugs adopted in Manila on June 26, 1976, and led to some initial proposals. However, this Declaration did not yield any concrete actions as States were taken over by the Cambodian war. After 1976, this was the next prominent treaty against transnational crimes. After a gap of twenty one years, ASEAN turned its attention towards transnational crime, such a change of mind can be explained in light of the membership of states like Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam that are victims of serious crimes like drugs, illegal arms, flesh trade, etc. In order to deal with the regional implications of such crime prone states, ASEAN began paying serious attention to transnational crimes. “Para 44”, Joint Communiqué of the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 20-21 July 1996.


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attention were identity fraud, especially in relation to international travel documents, law enforcement cooperation in the region, cyber crime, (a sub group on cyber crime was formed. This Sub-Group came into existence because of the perception that there is a close connection between document and identity fraud on the one hand and new computational technologies such as scanning on the other). The Working Group has paid attention to more serious issues like the human trafficking, unauthorised movements of small arms, and migrant smuggling. Recent issues include terrorism and global warming.

Both ASEAN and CSCAP are aware of the growing threat of terrorism in the region of Southeast Asia and in this context there is an attempt to trace the links between terrorism with transnational crimes. A memorandum espousing the relationship between terrorism and transnational crime gives an idea of CSCAP’s perception of this problem. Two facts underline the relationship between the terrorism and transnational crime. They are:

- terrorist activity is itself a criminal activity and may impact on more than one jurisdiction; and
- terrorist groups commit other transnational crimes in advancing their objectives.\(^4\)

The memorandum, while considering responses to the problems, focuses on the importance of the human security. It points out that, “a fundamental principle of a credible and sustainable international response to both terrorism and transnational crime will rely on observing principles of human security whilst upholding the rule of law.”\(^5\) It further adds that:

Human security advocates a holistic state and civil society approach that targets the actual problem, crisis, or threat rather than the rhetoric of the dilemma. An appropriate response, in keeping with a human security perspective, may involve the military, may even involve ‘war’, but will be most mindful of the long term security and wellbeing of citizens and broader communities...Understanding linkages between terrorism and transnational crime is of more than theoretical importance. If the links are not acknowledged, there is a risk of nations approaching terrorism in a way that will not be in the interests of human security, and risks duplicating efforts between the significant


\(^5\) Ibid.
resources already existing in criminal justice systems and those special agencies established to specifically counter terrorism.96

In accordance, CSCAP makes its recommendations on dealing with terrorism and transnational crime. Recommendations emphasise the need to follow and adhere the international treaties and agreements under the UN.97

Memorandums are CSCAP’s crucial contributions towards policy making through Track I processes. Since 1994, the organisation through its working groups and study groups have published no less than thirteen memorandums that produce a number of recommendations on wide array of issues on Asia Pacific security. Perhaps the most number of memorandums that have immediate policy recommendations came from the Working Group on Maritime Cooperation and next from the Working Group on Transnational Crime. However it is important to note that these are recommendations and the Track I interactions especially the ARF have the freedom to accept them or not. For instance, Simon Sheldon interviewed Sam Bateman, Australian Chair of the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group (MCWG), and found that when the MCWG first prepared a memorandum on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation in 1998, the ARF’s ISG on Maritime Cooperation rejected it, apparently because a US naval officer on that ISG believed that any commitment to new maritime regulations would hamper America’s freedom of naval action.98 Another significant contribution is the Memorandum on Guidelines on Cooperation in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed areas and Similar Sea Areas in the Asia Pacific. It is expected to act as, “as a basis for Preventive Diplomacy, constituting an important regional confidence-building measure that lays down general principles for regional maritime cooperation in line with the ASEAN Regional Forum’s (ARF’s) long-term objective of becoming a mechanism for conflict prevention.”99 However as these recommendations are not binding for the memorandum reads that, “They set down broad principles of cooperative behaviour, and do not create legally binding

96 Ibid.
97 There are about 12 terrorism related agreements identified by the UN and four agreements against transnational crime. Interesting to notice that the while the states of Southeast Asia have signed terrorism agreements, their support for the anti-transnational crime acts have been the least. See, “Annexure A”, in Ibid.
98 Op.Cit. no.61, p. 31.
obligations between states."\textsuperscript{100} It will depend on the members of the ARF to accept the recommendations of the CSCAP. The most complex maritime dispute in Southeast Asia, the South China Sea is still due any solution because the concerned states especially China seems not keen to agree to multilateral solutions. Thus CSCAP’s recommendations will only be accepted so long as they do not impinge on the Chinese perception of sovereignty in South China Sea. The CSCAP of course does not speak of jurisdictional claims on South China Sea, but limits itself to guidelines on cooperation on non-controversial issues only. To that extent, CSCAP’s recommendations are in tune with ARF’s position that jurisdiction disputes and related bilateral disputes within South China Sea are beyond the scope of any regional discussions. At present, the Working Group on Maritime Cooperation is involved in producing a memorandum that grapples with the interpretations of uncertainties found in the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty It pays attention to issues not explicitly explained in the Law like the issues of fisheries and international navigation. Sheldon observes that the big powers like the US and China have so much of reservations on maritime issues that it is likely to be difficult to achieve some amount of regulation and expect them to accept them.\textsuperscript{101}

CSCAP has limited itself to producing only one memorandum on Confidence Building and another on Comprehensive Security. The Memorandum on Comprehensive Security makes valuable contribution to the development of the idea of comprehensive security that is relevant for this region – Asia Pacific including Southeast Asia. The Memorandum defines comprehensive security as the pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military, and environmental) in both the domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{100} "Guidelines on Cooperation in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed areas and Similar Sea Areas in the Asia Pacific", CSCAP Memorandum on No.13, adopted at the 29\textsuperscript{th} CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 2, 2008.

\textsuperscript{101} Sheldon, based on his interview with J.N. Mak of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs, pointed out that while the US was not interested in regulations on international navigation because they believed in freedom of the seas, China objected to any international involvement with territorial claims because they would not welcome any suggestions on South China Sea. See, Op.Cit. no.31, p. 32.

The Memorandum de-emphasises the importance of traditional notions of security like the balance of power and collective security and puts forth the importance of comprehensive security:

Neither collective security nor balance of power approaches are of themselves adequate organising principles for the region because security of vital interests and core values extends beyond the military sphere and comprehensive security can only be attained through cooperation based on common interests. Collective security and balance of power therefore need to be complemented, or at times superseded, but comprehensive security approaches.  

The Memorandum suggests that comprehensive security cannot be achieved through a single process or organisation. Therefore, comprehensive security is likely to increase the network of organisations both at the official and unofficial levels. Increasing interactions between Track I and Track II itself encourages Confidence Building as much as interactions within the both the tracks. The memorandum has great expectation on the ARF and considers it as a reliable instrument for the promotion of Confidence Building in the region. The Memorandum says that, “Multilateral organisations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum are encouraged to place CSBMs high on their future agenda and to endorse and promote the study of strategic or security issues on a multilateral basis.”  

The relation between the CSCAP and the ARF is extremely important for they give an idea of the state of relations between Track I and Track II in Southeast Asia. Recommendations made by the CSCAP Working Groups in the form of Memorandums are policy advices to the ARF. The CSCAP not only provides policy recommendations to the ARF but also to individual states on several issues and as Simon Sheldon emphasises on Preventive Diplomacy. The states are assisted in two ways, first, by Track II organisations within the states; they comprise academicians and intellectuals who provide valuable insights and opinions before state makes policy decisions. Second, from the regional level through the ARF; in this case CSCAP provides crucial information and suggestions to the ARF, they can also make suggestions to individual states. ARF has acknowledged the importance of Track II activities; CSCAP is considered to be the most important unofficial counterpart of the ARF. Herein the question is whether CSCAP should lead the ARF agenda or follow

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103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Op.Cit. no.61, p.12.
it. A look at the ARF’s views and records on Track II activities would enable one to understand that the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes.

The ARF has always taken note of the contributions of Track II processes in Southeast Asia. Within a very short period of its inception the ARF proceedings have been acknowledging the importance of seminars and conferences held by academics and intellectuals. Their official documents have been publishing reports of these Track II meetings. For instance, in 1997, ARF documents published the details of the ARF Track II seminars on Preventive Diplomacy and Non-proliferation. In the following year, ARF noted the report of the ARF Track II Conference on Preventive Diplomacy. In course of time CSCAP has taken on to the agenda of the ARF seminars – Preventive Diplomacy in particular. In this context it can be said that, the CSCAP’s scope is consonance with the Confidence Building stipulations of the ARF Concept Paper – Confidence Building (phase I), Preventive Diplomacy (Phase II), and Conflict Resolution (Phase III). CSCAP had formed working group on Preventive Diplomacy and has held a number of workshops on this subject. In 2001, the 8th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) agreed on the Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy (PD), drawing heavily from a document provided to the ARF by the CSCAP Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).

The 9th ARF (2002) took note of the CSCAP Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy in 2001 that produced a paper entitled “ARF in the 21st Century”. The Meet agreed to “provide substantive follow-up to the Paper on Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy adopted [the previous year]” as part of the set of agreements constituting

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106 ARF Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy was sponsored by the Institute Francais des Relations Internationales (Paris, France) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia), Paris, France, November 7-8, 1996; ARF Seminar on Non Proliferation sponsored by the CSIS, the peace Research Center (PRC,Canberra), Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik (SWP, Munich), Jakarta, Indonesia, December 6-7, 1996.

107 3rd ARF Track II Conference Preventive Diplomacy jointly sponsored by Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, Singapore), International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS, UK); the Republic of Singapore; the United Kingdom and the European Union, Singapore, September 9-11, 1997.

108 The CSBM Working Group met twice in 1999. On February 28-March 2, 1999 meeting in Bangkok, the CSBM Working Group, in cooperation with the United States Institute of Peace, conducted a Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy, immediately prior to and in coordination with an ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Support Group (ARF/ISG) Confidence Building Measures Meeting. The Workshop included case studies and a practical exercise examining previous examples of Preventive Diplomacy both from within and beyond the region. Participants developed a Working Definition and Statement of Principles of Preventive Diplomacy which were subsequently tabled and discussed at the ARF/ISG meeting.
the Future Direction for the ARF. At the 13th ARF in 2005, the group "looked forward to the development of concrete measures in PD" Since then discussions on Preventive Diplomacy have become quite open and flexible.

ARF had in 2000 considered the proposals by the CSCAP to enhance contacts between Track I and Track II making a number of suggestions to strengthen the relationship between the two channels. Based on these proposals, the Concept Paper on Enhancing Ties between Track I and Track II in the ARF, and between the ARF and Other Regional and International Organisations was endorsed at the 13th ASEAN Regional Forum 2006. This Concept Paper paved the way for participation of CSCAP representatives at the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD. Following this endorsement, cooperation between CSCAP and ARF has been greatly advanced and suggestions by the CSCAP on Preventive Diplomacy are under consideration. The CSCAP Working Group on Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of ASEAN Regional Forum held its one-off meeting in 2007. It discussed a wide array of issues that related to Preventive Diplomacy including clarifying the ambiguities surrounding the concept of PD. PD does not function in contravention to the precious principle of non-interference. On the contrary voluntary action is the starting point for PD. As identified in the key principles of PD adopted by the ARF in 2001, PD "is employed only at the request of the parties involved or with their clear consent." Several suggestions have been provided on two aspects. The first set of suggestions is directed towards making PD more relevant and responsive to the non-traditional security threats. It also intends that PD can be applied to conflict situations at all the levels including intra-state problems. Participants pointed out that, apparently, the ARF is disabled by the exclusion of intra-state conflicts in the existing working definition of PD and unavailable to the involved disputants as a third party in the peace processes.

110 Chairman’s Statement of the Twelfth ASEAN Regional Forum, Vientiane, Lao PDR, July 29, 2005.
112 "A Concept Paper on Enhancing Ties between Track I and Track II in the ARF, and between the ARF and Other Regional and International Organisations", The Thirteenth ASEAN Regional Forum, Kuala Lumpur, July 28, 2006.
113 "8 Key Principles of PD, drawn mainly from the discussions in CSCAP", ASEAN Regional Forum Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy, adopted at the 8th ASEAN Regional Forum, Hanoi, July 25, 2001.
of Aceh and Mindanao. Based on the presentations on individual cases in Southeast Asia, participants provided certain suggestions on PD in relation to intra-state conflicts. They include:

- recognition that each situation is distinctive and there is no single model to deal with conflicts;
- intervention can only be successful when parties directly concerned want a solution;
- willingness to compromise is essential on the part of all concerned parties;
- strong, bold leadership is often required;
- negotiation is an ongoing process that requires continual effort and mechanisms to ensure that disagreements do not scuttle talks;
- agreement is not enough; implementation of a deal is usually the toughest part;
- agreements are living documents that require tending and adjustment to new circumstances;
- similarly, failure in negotiations need not be final;
- nongovernmental organizations can and have played a useful facilitating role and can be helpful during the implementation phase, but the real work must be done by the involved parties themselves.

The second set of suggestions is directed towards the role expectation of the ARF. Participants feared that if ARF would not respond to non-traditional issues then it may become irrelevant. PD also need pay attention to new threats of the region. Participants were of the view that ARF has not paid not much attention towards PD, it is confined to CBMs and CBMs cannot be a substitute for PD, ARF must move on to the next stage of Confidence Building of PD. The Filipino representative of the CSCAP, Raymund Quilop also suggested a new guideline for ARF like a counterpart to ASEAN 2020, ARF Vision 2020. It incorporates a number of changes including

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116 ASEAN 2020 was adopted in 1997 by ASEAN with the goal of making the organisation a more relevant one for the 21st century. It aimed at evolving politically as a concert of nations, socially a community of caring societies and economically stressed on partnership in Dynamic Development. It also aimed to make ASEAN as an outward looking organisation playing a pivotal role in international fora and forwarding ASEAN’s common interests. See, *ASEAN Vision 2020*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December 17, 1997.
a change in the definition of PD as provided in 2001 Concept Paper. Structurally, he endorsed proposals to strengthen the ARF chair (delinking it from the ASEAN chair if needed), to create an ARF secretariat, to name an ARF secretary general, to fully utilize the Expert and Eminent Persons Group, and to strengthen ties with Track II organizations and non-state actors. Over the longer term, he suggested annual defence ministers’ dialogue and an annual heads of States or heads of governments meeting. Some of these suggestions, like the annual defence ministers’ meet have been implemented. A concept Paper for the establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting was prepared in 2004 which became the basis for ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting. The Annual meeting of Defence Ministers was inaugurated at Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia in 2006. Tang See Seng from CSCAP Singapore, expressing dissatisfaction over ARF’s progress in PD made a long list of suggestions, some very new ones like the need for issue and region specific PD. Some of the other suggestions include, pursuing thematic and problem-oriented agenda; establishing comprehensive, systematic, multi-pronged PD mechanisms, at local and regional levels; developing both early prevention (peacetime) and late prevention (crisis-time) modalities; allowing for meetings on emergency basis and a “consensus minus x” principle in decision-making.

In tune with the remarks and suggestions on Preventive Diplomacy of the 2007 CSCAP Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy, the Co-Chairman’s Report on CSCAP made a number of submissions on PD. These findings and recommendations include:

- The ARF should develop a 2020 Vision Statement to refine and further clarify ARF objectives and provide specific benchmarks for progress;

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117 PD, in the Concept Paper is defined as a consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties to help prevent disputes and conflicts arising between States that could threat regional peace and stability; to prevent such disputes from escalating into armed conflicts; and to minimise the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the region. Op.cit.no. 111.
119 Chairman’s Report (Final), CSCAP Study Group on Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, October 30-31, 2007.
• While the current Working Definition and Statement of Principles of PD serve as a useful starting point, it should be recognized that, in practice, PD has also to be applied within States, as long as it is “employed only at the request of the parties involved or with their consent”;

• Effective PD requires effective early warning, which could be accomplished through the establishment of a Risk Reduction Centre (as envisioned in the ARF Concept Paper);

• The Expert and Eminent Persons’ Group (EEPG) could be given an early warning mission, and a more standardized ASO which focused on emerging security challenges could serve as a vehicle for providing early identification of potential challenges;

• Other general suggestions include: clearer definition of the role of the EEPG, ASO, Friends of the Chair¹²², and the expanded role of the Chair itself; increased willingness to examine more sensitive or controversial regional security issues; examination of the “responsibility to protect” principle and how this affects the long-standing principle of non-interference; provisions for the calling of emergency meetings to respond to impending crises or conflict; examination of a “full consensus minus x” approach for routine ARF decisions;

• Suggestions toward further institutionalization of the ARF include: creation of an ARF Secretariat (through elevation of the ARF Unit); appointment of an ARF Secretary General with clearly defined role and mission; eventual establishment of a Regional Risk Reduction Centre; and the establishment of a regular ARF Summit, perhaps back-to-back or rotating with the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting, East Asia Summit, or other high-level gatherings.

A look at the report Co-Chairs on the CSCAP in 2008 provides an idea of the activities of the organisation and its relation with the ARF. The Report provides

¹²² In July 2000, The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Alexander Downer, proposed the formation of a Friends of the ASEAN Regional Forum Chair at the ARF meeting held in Bangkok. At the 12th Meeting of the ARF it was decided to establish the Friends of the Chair and welcomed the Philippines’ offer to draft the terms of reference for this concept with the understanding that such an ad-hoc group shall have an advisory role to assist the ARF Chair and be flexible in terms of its membership. See, Chairman’s Statement of the Twelfth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Vientiane, July 29, 2005.
information of the activities of its working groups, study groups and Expert bodies. They are:

- The Study Group on Asia-Pacific Cooperation for Energy Security (established in 2006) held its fourth meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, on 8-9 July 2008 and discussed the prospects for cooperation in ensuring the security, stability and sustainability of energy supplies. The Study Group has completed its workshops and is now in the process of compiling selected papers for the publication of a CSCAP monograph. The Study Group is also finalising a draft memorandum for approval by the Steering Committee.

- The Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia-Pacific (established in 2004) held its seventh meeting in May 25-26, 2008 at Vietnam. The seventh meeting of the Study Group drafted two chapters of the proposed Asia-Pacific WMD Handbook and Action Plan - one on the threat posed by WMD and the other on global treaties and compliance mechanisms. A draft was submitted to the ARF ISM on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament following the December 2008 WMD Study Group meeting in Bangkok. Among the Study Group's recommendations is the suggestion that ASEAN consider establishing an ASEAN Reprocessing and Enrichment Free Zone as a complement to its SEANWFZ.

- The CSCAP Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG) was established at the 22nd CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting in December 2004. The Study Group held its fourth meeting in Manila, the Philippines on August 25-26, 2008 and produced a XCXG Working Document expected to be tabled at the ARF-ISG meeting for its information. It recommends specific measures involving legislation, licensing procedures, enforcement practices, and industry outreach that the Experts Group believes is essential to an effective strategic trade management system. It also encourages the ARF to create a

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123 The above information has been largely obtained from the Report of the Co-Chairs of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), Prepared for the ARF ISG Support Group on Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention, October 9, 2008.
pool of technical specialists and make financial resources available to help member states strengthen capacity building in strategic trade management.  

- The Study Group on Multilateral Security Governance in Northeast Asia/North Pacific was established at the 28th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting in December 2007, it is due to hold its first meeting. The initial focus of the Study Group is to consider an institutional design that could promote peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula through the coordination of several existing institutions of varying memberships and purposes. It also aims to provide Track II support to the Six-Party Talks process and to any ARF effort to develop a sub-regional grouping focused on Northeast Asia security affairs.

- The Study Group on Naval Enhancement in the Asia-Pacific is to be co-chaired by CSCAP China, CSCAP India and CSCAP Japan making it a high profile chairmanship. Meetings of the study group have not begun but plans to convene two of them in the future. The meetings would address policy issues, including regarding Confidence Building and Preventive Diplomacy, arising from the enhancement of capacities/capabilities of maritime security forces (both Navies and Coast Guards) in the Asia-Pacific region. The Study Group aims to produce a CSCAP Memorandum covering the entire ambit of naval enhancement in the region, and also an edited book of the papers presented at its meetings.

- The Study Group on the Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations in the Asia-Pacific will be co-chaired by Australia CSCAP, CSCAP Malaysia, and CSCAP Singapore. The Study Group will convene a one-off meeting in Kuala Lumpur, possibly at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) in early 2009, to address cooperative activities and common interest issues arising from the fact that most regional countries have some involvement in the offshore industry. The Study Group intends to produce a CSCAP Memorandum that provides policy guidelines for cooperation in the provision of security and safety for offshore installations. It will also highlight the benefit of promoting relations between CSCAP and

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the private sector. The Study group is an example of the growing importance of non-traditional security issues in the region.

- The Study Group on the Establishment of Regional Transnational Organised Crime Hubs in the Asia-Pacific will be co-chaired by Australia CSCAP, CSCAP New Zealand, CSCAP Philippines, and CSCAP Thailand. The group seeks to support the ongoing efforts initiated from the establishment of the "Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime" at Kuala Lumpur on May 17, 2002. The Study Group will convene its first meeting in Bangkok Thailand, in May 1-2, 2009 in order to identify criteria for predictive modelling of emerging crime hubs in the Asia-Pacific region in order to identify strategies and opportunities to counteract such threats to regional security. The Study Group will produce a publication and a CSCAP Memorandum on the topic. It will also seek to forge closer links to Track I (ARF and ASEAN) through identification of new critical issues that warrant CSCAP and Track I attention.

ARF's responsibility in addressing security issues of the region becomes increasingly challenging as traditional security issues are being overtaken by non-traditional ones. It does not imply that ARF has done commendably in addressing traditional issues, the lingering problem of the South China Sea and other bilateral border issues still await solutions. In the case of weapons acquisition also, the ARF seemed to have achieved little; after a short lull during the Asian economic crisis, countries have again indulged in acquiring weapons in substantial amounts. ARF has merely tried to address the issue of transparency by asking for an arms register in the region. It does not prevent states from acquiring weapons often irrationally (in the absence of any real threat perception). In this context John Garfano points that, "[b]ecause there are several very different reasons for weapons acquisition, including government prestige, concern with long-term Chinese capabilities, and professionalizing the military, it is unlikely that mere transparency will get to the heart of the problem."\textsuperscript{125} He adds, "CBMs have not yet accomplished anything that would prevent or even deter such acquisitions."\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{125} John Garfano, "Can Security Communities be Constructed/ The ARF Test Case" a paper prepared for Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, June 2001, p.7.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
It is in this context that CSCAP is in a position to provide crucial assistance to the ARF through its research, its workshops and its publications. However, CSCAP is a voluntary organisation based much on the goodwill of the members. The utility of the organisation depends on the active cooperation of its members both in terms of qualitative participation and financial contribution of the member states. In terms of positive participation, Paul Evans comments that "membership is eclectic composed of "insiders and outsiders, generalists and specialists, those close to government and those more independent in their orientation..."\textsuperscript{127} The consequence is that there is lack of continuity and consistency in policy decisions. CSCAP has financial challenges as member countries have to arrange for funds. Wealthier members have larger membership and have larger grants while smaller countries have less financial power and may have to depend on richer members for financial assistance for participation. Sheldon adds that certain members have to depend on government assistance to be a part of this CSCAP process and this blurs the distinction between Track I and Track II.\textsuperscript{128}

Notwithstanding this weakness of the CSCAP, its Working Groups have provided support to the ARF especially with regard to issues which were discussed in the ARF because they are considered too sensitive to be placed in Track I agenda. The Confidence and Security Building Measures Working Group has paid considerable attention to the issue of nuclear threat. The CSBM Working Group has produced a prototype of a Defence White Paper that could be followed by member states while producing their own white papers.\textsuperscript{129} It was based on an extensive review of existing documents and discussions on provisions that provide for transparency and reassurance against irrational use of weapons. In the case of nuclear power, the working group has also focused on transparency related to nuclear safety procedures.

\textsuperscript{127} Paul M. Evans, "Assessing the ARF and CSCAP" in Hung Mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng (eds), \textit{The Security Environment in the Asia Pacific}, Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2000, p.165.
\textsuperscript{128} Op.Cit. no.61, p.11.
\textsuperscript{129} This was known as the \textit{Asia Pacific Security Outlook}, its first edition was published in 1997. See, Desmond Ball, \textit{The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), Its Record and its Prospects}, Canberra, Australian National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2000.
The Working Group has managed to set up a website on nuclear energy transparency at the Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque.\textsuperscript{130}

The Working Group on transnational crime also makes valuable contribution by discussing issues on various crimes that involve issues of narcotics, illegal population movements, small arms smuggling and piracy. CSCAP discusses issues with relative ease than at the ARF. Issues of this kind presuppose intervention in the domestic affairs of the states. At the official level ARF follows the ASEAN principle of non-intervention and therefore it often restrains from addressing these issues and leaves it more to the CSCAP to deal with such sensitive issues.

The most important instance of positive symbiosis between the CSCAP and the ARF is found in the procedures leading to the Preventive Diplomacy Concept Paper accepted by the ARF in 2001. It was on the request of the ARF that CSCAP convened meetings to discuss on Preventive Diplomacy and produced a working definition. A working definition does not entail the complete implementation of the concept. Moreover, it cannot be denied that the concept of Preventive Diplomacy also presupposes involvement in the domestic affairs of the concerned states. The CSCAP is expected to play a crucial role in bringing about a definition on Preventive Diplomacy that will be acceptable to all and be in harmony with the principle of non-interference.

The CSCAP is expected to make contributions towards ARF in providing early warning signals about impending problems and complications regarding sensitive political issues. It is expected so because the members of the CSCAP are said to be equipped with the knowledge, experience and expertise in the issues they deal. However there are drawbacks that need to be addressed. For example, CSCAP is more attuned to following the ARF lead rather than providing it. They are not yet used to see themselves as piloting the ARF in decision making. Members are not very innovative in their approach for they fear that innovation shall not be received warmly from their governmental counter parts; that may be true to a certain extent.

Governments would be rather happy to see their non-governmental counterparts discussing issues that are of immediate interest to them. In cases where funding crunch leads to government sponsorships of representation in CSCAP activities, the representatives take the government's lead than provide one. In semi-authoritarian or state controlled systems like Laos, Vietnam, China and Myanmar the division and distinction between governmental and non-governmental is in any case very less.

Under such circumstances, Sheldon thinks that CSCAP workshops are relatively better in addressing sensitive issues. He gives the example of the Seoul Workshop of 1999 that brought the ARF and CSCAP together to discuss a sensitive issue – humanitarian intervention. It resulted in a consensus on the conditions of humanitarian intervention. Though it was decided that humanitarian intervention will be subjected to the consent of the target government, the discussion was considered extremely relevant since the Workshop took place at a time when there were serious problems in East Timor and Aceh. The main objective of this meeting was to reflect on the principle of non-intervention in general and in particular, to get a better understanding of what this principle is and how it is applied in the Asia-Pacific context. The report recorded the support of the countries of the majority of the states of Asia Pacific (China has its reservations against acceptance concrete proposals on humanitarian intervention) and made distinctions between humanitarian intervention and other principles of ASEAN like constructive engagement and flexible engagement. It has identified the conditions for intervention – consent from the local people, support from the international community, there must be a clear and limited objective, and there should have a high probability of success.

The Workshop on Comprehensive Security was preceded by a seminar on humanitarian intervention in November 1999, at Scheveningen where a number of issues that were discussed on the criteria for humanitarian intervention, norms of such intervention. These discussions provided important inputs in the discussion in Seoul. At the Workshop, China had reservation against the Scheveningen Criteria and therefore could not allow concrete proposals to be taken up. In its place the conditions

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133 Ibid.
mentioned were decided upon. Over and above humanitarian intervention would be subject to the decision of the State(s) where such operations are to be conducted.

CSCAP is expected to provide early warning to the ARF or individual governments with regard to the new threats to security for instance on various transnational crimes. In fact, CSCAP has been instrumental in urging governments to broaden the security agenda to include transnational issues. The relative ease with which they can discuss on issues that have domestic aspects makes it less difficult for them to work on issues like drugs, illegal arms supply, contrabands, human trafficking, refugees, terrorism, money laundering and fraud. Publications on these issues are a kind of early warning process to the Track I apart from the fact that interactions, exchange of information and ideas, and mutual assistance between CSCAP members on these issues are an incremental approach towards building confidence. Therefore CSCAP’s task of early warning and sensitisation on issues that are pregnant with complications and controversies in a way encourages Confidence Building between countries. It also strengthens the relationship between Track I and Track II processes.

It can be inferred from the above discussion that CSCAP has an advisory role towards the ARF and even towards the individual states. The various reports and publications made available to the ARF are in advisory capacity. In meeting this role, the CSCAP does keep in mind that the advice provided by them have to be on matters that do not generate controversy and on which they do not have previous disputes. Working groups on maritime issues have made a number of publications which suggest means of cooperation and also provides words of advice on how to avoid incidents on seas, how to go about with the law of the seas. A glimpse of the success in CSCAP’s endeavours can be derived from the words of Desmond Ball, “... there has been considerable progress with development of maritime information data bases...a multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents produced by the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation, and submitted to the ARF in early 1998; and exploration of ‘the idea of joint marine scientific research’ and other aspects of ocean management...”135 Besides, the CSCAP has advised the ARF to initiate a

Regional Arms Register, to achieve means of arms control, to institutionalise mechanism of arms control. CSCAP’s contribution towards PD has been already discussed, but it must be remembered that CSCAP had held joint seminar along with the ARF to help reach agreement on the issue of overlap between CBMs and PD.\textsuperscript{136} Some of the components of the PD like the role of the ARF Chair, Register of Eminent Persons, and publication of an Annual Asian Security Outlook annually jointly suggested by both the sides. These activities of the CSCAP were endorsed and appreciated at the 2000 ASEAN Regional Forum. The Ministers acknowledged the role of the CSCAP in providing guidance in establishing relations between Track I and Track II especially through the enhanced role of the ARF Chair. CSCAP also provided invaluable service by giving guidelines on maritime cooperation and PD.\textsuperscript{137} In addition the ARF offered the Steering Committee to institutionalise the submission of its Working Group Meetings so as to generate CSCAP policy studies for ARF ISGs. At the 14\textsuperscript{th} Steering Committee Meeting, the CSCAP began considering reforms based on the suggestions by the ARF. Other proposals were born out of subsequent discussions between ARF senior officials and representatives from the CSCAP. Such proposals include, reciprocal briefings of the ARF senior officials and CSCAP officers, attendance of ARF senior officials at CSCAP meetings, participation CSCAP representatives (co-chairs) at the ARF meet, occasional tasking of CSCAP Working Groups by the ARF to develop implementation measures on issues of concern to it – Preventive Diplomacy, Transnational Crime, and Maritime Cooperation. In order to fulfil the assignments the CSCAP conducts seminars, workshops prepares papers and reports that help crystallise policy option for the ARF.\textsuperscript{138} Acceptance of these proposals strengthens the relation between Track I and Track II within the region.

\textsuperscript{136} In 1999 the United States and Thailand chaired an ARF ISG on confidence building. When the discussion turned to PD, China insisted that the discussion on Confidence Building was not exhausted. At this juncture Ralph Cossa of the US CSCAP suggested to the US ARF delegation that CSCAP could assist by convening a workshop to which the ARF ISG on CBMs would be invited. Focusing on developing a working definition of Preventive Diplomacy, the workshop concentrated on the qualities that would make it work in Asia. Led by Australian and Chinese delegates the workshop came up with a working definition and operating principles which were subsequently used by the ARF co-chairs in their ISG.

\textsuperscript{137} Chairman’s Statement of the Seventh ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, July 27, 2000.

\textsuperscript{138} Op.Cit. no.128, p.53, 82.
The ASEAN-SOM has proposed the ideas that could be dealt by the ARF for both long-term and short term considerations. In responding to ARF requirements, CSCAP has pushed for Defence White Papers as a short term initiative and its stipulations on Preventive Diplomacy did the ground work for the future that focused on definitions and methods of implementation. In this context, the publication of the Annual Security Outlook on a voluntary basis seems to have a substantial step towards bridging the gap between Confidence Building and Preventive Diplomacy. It also provides valuable inputs and information to the ARF and helps them make realistic assessment of the kind of security threats and prepare the right kind of responses. Besides, ASO can be considered as CBM in itself. At the same time it is necessary to take note of the fact that at the Track II level a consortium of institutions – the East West Center in Honolulu, the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) in Tokyo, and the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) have begun on a project since 1994 to produce an Annual Asia Pacific Security Outlook (AAPSO) comprising of both commissioned country studies and an introductory regional security overview. The consorting institutions stressed that:

The Outlook does not seek to develop a consensus view of regional security trends and issues. Rather it presents the distinctive national perspectives of most member countries of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in a form that facilitates comparison and the identification of areas where perceptions or interests differ. The objective is both to increase mutual understanding within the community of security analysts in the region and to help elucidate the key issues that will affect future regional security and stability.

This Outlook project involves interaction between members of the CSCAP Steering Committees, this has helped enhanced mutual trust and empathy for national security issues of individual member states. Beginning at the Fifth meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in June 1996, regular meetings of the findings of the

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140 Desmond Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific(CSCAP), Its Record and its Prospects, Canberra, Australian National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2000, p. 66.  
Outlook have provided valuable inputs to the Steering Committees.\textsuperscript{142} Thus the two separate publications respectively at Track I and Track II level is not only a means of providing a vivid and transparent picture of the security scenario of the region but is also a form of preventive diplomacy in the sense that knowledge about security threats is a means of countering such threats. By being aware of potential threats to their states and to their region states would be in a better position to strategise preventive and counter measures to eliminate such threats.

ARF has been enriched by the contribution of the CSCAP so much so that Surin Pitsuwan, Thai Foreign minister and ARF Chair in 2000 offered the services of the chair as a channel for CSCAP recommendations to the ARF. However, the South China Sea issue will be an acid test for both the CSCAP and the ARF. One option may be that since Taiwan, a claimant to the South China Sea is not a member of the ARF, CSCAP could invite Taiwan to participate unofficially since CSCAP is an Asia Pacific Track II organisation. However in this, CSCAP has to overcome Chinese opposition to Taiwan’s representation. CSCAP might have an edge over ARF in all this as it is a Track II process and ought not to succumb to political pressures. The ARF is to stay for all times to come and so is expected of the CSCAP. If they are to function symbiotically, fulfilling each other’s needs, then certain issues have to be kept in mind. First, security threats transcend countries and regions; sectors and sources cannot be easily compartmentalised. Second, there has to be some form of modification of the principle of non-interference in order to address non-military threats. Third, decision making must be made more flexible where rigid consensus principle may be replaced by ‘n minus 1’\textsuperscript{143} It would prevent certain states from opposing genuine attempts at resolving complex political problems. These changes will not happen easily or without challenges as states of the region are not particularly receptive of changes. In the meantime, CSCAP can provide the crucial support required to fulfil the security needs of Southeast Asia.

One of the crucial issues of Southeast Asia has been the South China Sea dispute. The experts were of the belief that in order to achieve economic growth and stability not only the Cambodian Conflict need to come to an end, but also the other potential

\textsuperscript{142} Desmond Ball, ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
conflict issues. The South China Sea they realised was one such issue that may snowball in to conflict between the claimants. It was more of a concern because one of the major claimants to the South China Sea was China. Given the record of China’s involvement in the Cold War of Southeast Asia particularly Cambodian Conflict, there was no doubt that a solution to the South China Sea was necessary. It was realised that solution seeking through the Track I process would be difficult as China was deeply suspicious of any multilateral discussion on its claims to the South China Sea, so were the other claimants within Southeast Asia. Realising the complications of the dispute, Track II Processes had been initiated since the early 1990s once the resolution of the Cambodian Conflict was in sight. Indonesia as the biggest and the most influential member of Southeast Asia took the front seat in arranging Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in Southeast Asia. It was assisted by Canada. On being asked why Canada was interested in South China Sea conflict, Chairman to the First Workshop explained that, “Canada has been chosen to help this endeavour (the holding of this workshop) in view of his financial capacity and political acceptability, being a non super-power but interested in the cooperative arrangements in the developing world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific Region.” In 1989, Indonesian diplomat, Dr. Hasjim Djalal and his Canadian Assistant Professor, John Townsend Gault visited the six ASEAN members to gather support for an informal mechanism. While the members supported the initiative they also suggested that participation be limited to the states involved in the dispute so as to avoid complications. Subsequently, it was decided that representatives would comprise of concerned ASEAN members but largely be experts, researchers, academics, defence specialists, former navy personnel and the meeting would be informal. The Workshop would be policy oriented so that they could assist Track I (basically governments) to formulate the right kind of policy. Thus in 1989 the First Workshop was initiated.

144 To learn more on Canada’s Rationale for supporting the informal Workshop, see, Yann Huei Song, Managing Potential Conflicts in South China Sea: Taiwan’s Perspectives, Singapore, World Scientific Publishing Company and Singapore University Press, 1999, pp.20-24.
146 Opening Remarks by Dr. Hasjim Djalal on the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in South China Sea, Bali Indonesia, January 22, 1990.
The two prominent intentions of these Workshops are constructive engagement of China and promoting cooperation among states especially with regard to management of marine resources, joint exploration of petroleum resources and protection of the marine environment. The Workshops were based on cooperative security and preference for peaceful settlement of disputes. In addition it was a forum where Taiwan alongside China could attend the discussions.

The first workshop realised that the solution to the question of sovereign jurisdiction was a time taking process and so in the meanwhile, cooperative arrangements could be worked out between all China Sea States (at that point of time Taiwan and Vietnam were not participants). It was agreed that the maritime disputes in the South China Sea area should be solved by peaceful means and that states should not resort to the use of force.147 At the same Workshop, an interesting concept was brought forward – that an issue of potential conflict could provide the platform political cooperation. This would be further easy if discussions were informal and carried out by Track II experts. In addition it was realised that it would be futile to hope that cooperation could come after solution to the South China Sea is at sight. On the contrary, the workshop felt that while the issues of jurisdiction await political solutions, cooperation could be started between the member states without waiting for the solution.148 In the second workshop, specific proposals of cooperation were recommended like “cooperation to promote safety of navigation and communications to coordinate search and rescue, to combat piracy and armed robbery, to promote the rational utilisation of living resources, to protect and reserve the marine environment, to conduct maritime scientific research, and to eliminate illicit traffic in drugs in South China Sea.”149 The participants reiterated their preference for peaceful settlement of disputes by declaring the renunciation of the use of force or threat of force to establish their claims on the South China Sea. They also stressed on peaceful settlement of disputes through dialogue and negotiation, renunciation of force in order to settle territorial and jurisdictional disputes, and the need to exercise self-restraint in

order not to complicate the situation. The statements of the Second Workshop were actually the precursor to ASEAN’s Declaration on the South China Sea. On its part the Chinese representative also claimed their commitment to peaceful settlement of the dispute in South China Sea by stressing the five principles of peaceful coexistence and their promise not to assert hegemonic intentions. However, this declaration of intention was in direct contradiction with the China’s declaration of claims to territorial seas in 1992 including areas including the South China Sea. Nonetheless, the Third Workshop took place in the same year and it strongly voiced the need to continue dialogue through the informal channel. The participants considered that such an exchange of views was important and therefore should be continued in order to increase mutual understanding and to identify areas where cooperative efforts in the area might be undertaken. Close to the mid nineteen nineties (1994), the Workshop had developed a two pronged approach – Confidence Building and prevention of conflict, and cooperation with regard to non-political issues. Workshops on South China Sea have been conducted annually in order to maintain the spirit of cooperation pending political solutions to issue of jurisdiction. By the Fifth Workshop held in Bukittinggi in October 26-28, 1994, cooperation through technical working groups had already begun.

Notwithstanding the efforts by the workshops there have been tense moments between China and Vietnam in the 1990s and also recently as in 2007; between China and the Philippines in 1995 and in 1996, 1997 and 1998. However, the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration of the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea is considered to be a big achievement as it concentrates on Confidence Building and freezing the claims of the disputants. However, the relevance of the South China Sea Workshop will
continue as the issue of jurisdiction awaits solution and as the joint endeavours especially between China, the Philippines and Vietnam have run into rough waters.\footnote{In 2005 China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU). The JMSU came into effect on July 1, 2005 and the contract was awarded to a Chinese company, China Oilfield Services Ltd. to begin the seismic survey. There has been severe opposition to the agreement within Philippines. The project is operation from 2008 and is expected to expire in May 2009. It has to be renewed if the project is to continue. Such renewal has not taken place till date. Ian Storey, “Conflict in the South China Sea: China’s Relations with Vietnam and the Philippines”, The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, April 30, 2008, available at \url{http://www.japanfocus.org/Ian_Storey-Conflict_in_the_South_China_Sea_China’s_Relations_with_Vietnam_and_the_Philippines/}.}  

Track II processes within Southeast Asia have made substantial contribution towards Track I processes by serving as a pool of ideas, knowledge banks, and as successful models for cooperation. The most vibrant regional organisation within Southeast Asia, the ASEAN, has its own informal mechanism of functioning including the ARF. Yet national interests would certainly influence the actions of the individual members in any form of cooperative interaction - economic cooperation, but more in the case of political and security cooperation. With formidable neighbours and where there are historical animosities between them and the Southeast Asian States as well as between states of the region, every state acts on realistic calculations of threat perceptions. Under such circumstances, Track II Processes can act as better models of interaction where genuine cooperation can be expected. Over a substantial period of time the region has become more open to dialogues within Track II processes. They have their own consequences – for instance, as the bond between Track I and Track II becomes strong, it may become difficult to determine which Track leads the agenda. Besides Track II processes have their own set of problems that prevent it from becoming the infallible channel of interaction. It will be the focus of the concluding chapter to look at addressing these issues.
The objective of the study was to focus on the Track II processes engaged in Confidence Building within Southeast Asia. A substantial part of the study focused on the various issues that challenge the security and the stability of Southeast Asia. Another major section of the study has been devoted to exploring the Confidence Building efforts of Southeast Asia through Track II processes. However, before delving into the Track II processes at Confidence Building, the study looked at the efforts at building confidence through Track I. Track I has its own drawbacks. In that context, the study has made an attempt to discuss the role of Track II activities in supporting Track I. It has also made an attempt to evaluate the role of Track II processes in improving the security scenario in Southeast Asia.

This study is premised on certain hypothetical assumptions. First, the security scenario in post Cold-War scenario in Southeast Asia is far from stable; the region is victim to internal conflicts, bilateral tensions making it one of the hot spots and volatile regions of the world. It requires serious cooperation and Confidence Building in order to prevent escalation of tension and in order to attempt at providing solutions to the various disputes and problems of the region. Second, in addition to the traditional security tensions those imperil the region, non-conventional problems challenge human existence at all levels - political, economic, and social. Confidence Building activities must take into consideration these non-conventional variables. Third, Confidence Building efforts through the official channel i.e. through ASEAN and particularly its security forum the ARF has lacked in success because of the complications arising from the socio-political dynamics of the region. Subsequently the security problems await proper attention. Third, Confidence Building is likely to be more effective through the informal channel i.e. the Track II channel as the latter functions more effectively in dealing with sensitive security issues and long standing disputes that have the potential to escalate into conflicts. Track II channels involve far informal and flexible means of interaction that helps reach solutions. Therefore, Track II channels can assist Track I activities function successfully in countering security threats in the region. The concluding chapter desires to evaluate the previous chapters in light of the above objectives and hypothetical assumptions.
The security concerns of the region: Since the end of Cold War, the ideology-driven wars that ravaged the region came to an end particularly with the end of the Cambodian Conflict. However, it did not imply the total recall of external powers from the region. The four Cold War time powers US, China, Russia, and Japan along with a rising Asian power India, are likely to influence the security threat perceptions of the region. Their influences over Southeast Asian security are based on two kinds of relationships. The first kind of relationship is between the major external powers and their associated tensions and power tussles that mark their relationships. The region's security is propelled on bilateral relationships between these states – US-China, US-Japan, Sino-Japan, Russia-China, and Sino-Indian. These bilateral relationships are likely to play prominent roles in maintaining the balance of the region. This is compounded with triangular relationships between US-Japan-China, US-Russia-China and China-ASEAN-India where one of the three parties to the triangular relationship serves as a balance to the relationship between the other two. For instance, Japan served as the fulcrum in the relation between US and China whereas ASEAN served as the fulcrum between the relation between China and India. The study has looked at the impact of these relationships on ASEAN. For instance it has been noticed that ASEAN still bear the vestiges of the Cold War days. There are states like Thailand and the Philippines that are not uncomfortable with US presence in the region, on the other hand, some states like Indonesia where the popular opinion has not been supportive of US war on terror in the region. On the other extreme, Myanmar is a state under considerable Chinese influence. This in turn has set the alarm bells ringing in India. India since the 1990s has embarked upon a policy towards Southeast Asia known as the Look East Policy. Apart from its desire to establish a long-lasting economic relation that will boost the Indian economy, India slowly and steadily hopes to wean ASEAN from the Chinese influence. Therefore the complex relationships between the foreign powers will continue to influence Southeast Asian security scenario.

In course of discussing the role of external powers the importance of Russia was also found prominent. When Soviet Union got dismantled, much was not expected from it, but since the mid 1990s Russian President Vladimir Putin made conscious efforts to carve out an image for Russia in the Asia-Pacific and certainly over Southeast Asia. The reasons are not only economical but also political as Russia is likely not to be
interested in giving US an upper hand in Southeast Asia. Much contrary to the US strategic calculations, Russia has buried its hatchet and has sustained its warm relation with China. The common points where the Russian and Chinese may come close together are the fear of US ambitions in the region. It is based on developments that have taken place over a period of time like the development of the US missile defence system that the US have tried to promote amongst it allies. Besides, there is a common apprehension that under the garb of fighting terrorism in Southeast Asia, US will expand their military presence in the region. In all this, what is prominent is that Southeast Asia may never be free from the balance of power calculations, in this case a Russia-Sino-US triangular relationship will also determine the security of Southeast Asia. Japan's presence adds another dimension because it is another Asian giant with an impressive capacity to influence the neighbouring region. But much of its decision making power is regulated by its relation with the US who has a long standing defence treaty with Japan. Subsequently China has viewed Japan as an ally of the US and sees it on the other side of the ideological divide. Herein the relation between China and Japan needs crucial attention and it is based on two realities. First, Japan serves as the fulcrum in the Sino-US relations. Second, this in turn determines the state of relations between China-Japan. China and Japan will remain serious contenders in Southeast Asia because both are close neighbours of the region; they have had historical ties with the region, and immense economic prowess. The security future of the region will be conditioned by the realistic estimates of the complex interplay between these powerful countries.

The second kind of relationship is that which exists between the outsiders and individual countries of the region. The external powers had bilateral relations with the Southeast Asian states since the Cold War days. ASEAN for long had been identified as a pro-western, anti-communist organisation. As Southeast Asia has expanded from a family of six to a regional organisation encompassing all the ten states of the region, its identity as an anti-communist organisation has changed. As mentioned earlier, all the states do not have similar perceptions of the security threats from external powers. Yet, irrespective of ideological shades, states of Southeast Asia, almost all of them are apprehensive of China. Their apprehension is based on Cold War history and Chinese aggressiveness that continues particularly in the case of South China Sea. It however does not imply that in order to balance the Chinese presence, the presence of another
powerful state like the US is desirable. However, events in the last decade has increased the scope of intervention by outsiders – four such events are the economic crisis of 1997, the traces of terrorist links in Southeast Asia in the post 9/11 period, the devastation by tsunami in 2004, and the super cyclone Nargis in 2008. So long as the states of Southeast Asia remain susceptible to external influences, bilateral relationships between the external states and internal members will continue to influence Southeast Asian security. Moreover so long as ASEAN states are divided over the issue of guardianship of their region between US and China, Sino-US relations and its tensions will continue to influence the security concerns of the region. Over and above it creates another trilateral relationship based on balance of power; this relation is between China-ASEAN and the US where ASEAN serves as the fulcrum between the other two States.

Another aspect of Southeast Asian security is the rise of non-conventional threats in Southeast Asia. Analysing security threats within Southeast Asia is a complex time taking task because a holistic analysis needs to look at the security threats within the states and within the region. One also needs to look at the conventional and non-conventional security threats of Southeast Asia. Irrespective of the orientation of political systems, most of the states of Southeast Asia are challenged by domestic political tensions and accompanying political violence. Political violence in certain countries like Malaysia, and Thailand are coupled with ethnic and religious tensions as is found in Myanmar, in the Philippines and in Indonesia. There are tensions between states of Southeast Asia – territorial disputes. Disputes over borders have resulted in sporadic clashes between the states of Southeast Asia. The most challenging case is the South China Sea that awaits solutions. Arms modernisation and arms procurement have spiralling effects and increases the fear of escalation of conflict.

It is quite difficult to draw lines of division with regard to non-conventional security threats. Unlike conventional security threats like bilateral border disputes or even multilateral territorial disputes, in non-conventional security threats, the spill over effects are so far reaching that it is virtually difficult to ascertain and adjudge such threats at the intrastate level or at the interstate level. For instance the environmental disasters or environmental problems are cases in the point; the Indonesian forest fires,
the tsunami, or the Nargis cyclones are natural calamities that have spill over effects well beyond national boundaries. In turn, they can also unleash a fresh set of non-conventional security threats. For instance, tsunami and super cyclones lead to health disasters, epidemics, hurt the productivity of the economy as local entrepreneurship is totally destroyed and unemployment increases, it also leads to forceful migration. Forceful migration may lead to economic pressures on the host countries.

Low intensity conflicts are common in Southeast Asia. In recent times, parts of Southeast Asia have fallen prey to Islamic fundamentalism accompanied by terrorism. It has imperilled the security of the states. Foreign visitors who come to visit the region have been made targets of terrorist attacks as was the case in Indonesia. Repeated explosions are feared to take toll on the tourism industry of countries like Indonesia. Islamic fundamentalism has also influenced the ethnic movements of Southeast Asia as has been the case in the Philippines, in Southern Thailand, and in Indonesia. It makes these separatist movements and challenging for the states.

Another important component of non-conventional security is economic security. Economic security of the region had been also challenged by the Asian economic crisis that hit the region in 1997. It not only victimised the economies of states like Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, it had its own social implications like the riots in Indonesia during that period. The economic crisis also resulted in movements against incumbent regimes in countries affected by the crisis as was the case in Indonesia and Malaysia.

The wide variety of security threats that challenge the stability and integrity of the region makes it almost impossible for the states to address these security threats through individual governmental efforts. It is for this reason that ASEAN as a regional organisation tries to address the variety of problems through the process of Confidence Building. Confidence Building within Southeast Asia is considered essential to the security situations of the region for a number of reasons. First, the states of Southeast Asia are not unified in their security perceptions because of their mutual tensions and historical animosities; Confidence Building is necessary to build a sense of mutual trust between the states. Second, Confidence Building will act as a tool of political cooperation between states. Third, Confidence Building is expected to
facilitate conflict resolution in an incremental manner. Thus the case of Confidence Building in Southeast Asia is well founded.

Confidence Building Measures in Southeast Asia through ASEAN: The birth of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was a multilateral response to the kind of vulnerability the states of the region were feeling during the Cold War period. ASEAN turned out to be a political response to the insecurity caused by the interventions of some extremely ambitious external powers – US, the Soviet Union and China. ASEAN’s response to the growing pressures of Cold War resulted in a number of agreements signed by the members of the organisation. The Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration 1971, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 1976, and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) 1995, are some of the substantive policy formulations reflective of ASEAN’s constant concern for security threats from ambitious and powerful states. These treaties did bear the message of Confidence Building, particularly the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation provided that, in pursuance of the purpose of this Treaty the High Contracting Parties are trying to develop and strengthen the traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation that bind them together and can fulfil in good faith the obligations under this Treaty. In order to promote closer understanding among states, the High Contracting Parties pledge to encourage and facilitate contact and interaction among their peoples. The other documents formulated during this period that is the ZOPFAN and the SEANWFZ were formulated with Cold War and military security threats in mind.

In the post-Cold War period, as the nature of security threats changed in the region, there was a need to change the way in which security issues were viewed. New threats challenged the security domain of the region. Security was now viewed as common, cooperative and comprehensive. These new concepts were introduced in acknowledgment of the changing security environment of the region. So long as the Cold War was there ASEAN tried to address the security challenges through the formulation of the treaties mentioned earlier. With emergent security threats that could not be addressed through the existing treaties or through ASEAN, it sought to establish a permanent institution to deal exclusively with the post-Cold War security scenario. Thus, it was a feeling of institutional inadequacy to deal with the emerging
security issues that led the members of the ASEAN to create an exclusive institution to address the security issues of this region and even of the greater Asia Pacific.

It was only in the post-Cold War period that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was formed. The Forum is concerned with security issues of Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific. Not only that, ASEAN has also remoulded its previous treaty the ASEAN Concord and set new ones like the ASEAN Vision 2020. The Concord reiterates its confidence in the TAC as the code of conduct between the member states of ASEAN and underlines the role of the ARF in dealing with the security issues of the region. Further, the Concord also reflects ASEAN’s support for Confidence Building, it mentions that, ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on matters of common concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security cooperation, the enhancement of defence cooperation among ASEAN countries, develop a set of socio-political values and principles, and resolve long-standing disputes through peaceful means.

In dealing with security issues of the region, ARF has primarily depended on Confidence Building Measures. In its Concept Paper designed in 1994, Confidence Building was considered as one of its prime objectives. The Concept Paper stipulated a three phase work plan to implement Confidence Building phase I, implementation of Confidence Building Measures; phase II, Preventive Diplomacy; and Conflict Resolution as the final phase of Confidence Building process. ARF has also acknowledged the role of Track II process in Confidence Building process. The ARF holds regular dialogue process that is held once a year. The Concept Paper had begun by suggesting a number of CBMs. In order to carry out the recommendations an Intersessional Group on Confidence Building (IGS on CBMs) has been established. Through its deliberation (at least twice a year) this group makes suggestions for strengthening Confidence Building and takes stock of progress in Confidence Building. Along ISGs the Concept Paper has made suggestion for Intersessional Meetings on issues like Peacekeeping Operations (ISMs on PKO). However it is the ISGs that have been relentlessly trying to further Confidence Building through its suggestions and recommendations. Since its inception in 1993 the ISGs have produced a number of CBMs that in turn are implemented through their own ISGs.
For example by 1997 ISGs had increased from one on CBMs to three, the other two are ISGs on Peacekeeping Operations and Maritime Search and Rescue respectively. By late 1990s the number of ISGs and ISMs started to gain momentum and began focusing on Confidence Building measures on non-conventional security concerns like disaster relief, transnational crime, terrorist financing, terrorism, etc. On the other hand CBMs on conventional security, measures have been under constant scrutiny including maritime security, arms control non-proliferation including a suggestion to publish an annual security outlook and an attempt to establish a regional arms register.

One very important issue that has been discussed consistently is the question of shifting from Stage I of Confidence Building to Stage II, Preventive Diplomacy. ARF accepted suggestions from Track II organisations like the CSCAP and from suggestions made by ARF supported Track II seminars. A number of suggestions have come from Track II interactions. ISG on CBMs has incorporated them and ultimately the Concept Paper on Preventive Diplomacy had been produced. Since 2006, as an acknowledgement to the kind of work done by the ISG on PD, the ISG was renamed as ISG on CBMs and PD. In fact, in terms of progress, it seems that the kind of CBMs presently under consideration or are being implemented, the ARF seems to have graduated to the next stage of Preventive Diplomacy although there are some debates on this issue.

**Challenges to Confidence Building through Track I Process:** As the only regional organisation in Southeast Asia that has been consistently working towards peace and security of the region, the ARF has been successful in instilling a sense of confidence among members and neighbours. The seriousness with which the ARF has been treating Confidence Building is because Southeast Asia is a region marked by deep historical animosity, political divisiveness and unresolved age-old disputes and rivalries. Under such circumstances, not only peaceful resolutions were a far cry, there was a creeping threat of escalation of conflicts. In this context the ARF can be given considerable credit in recommending and proceeding with the CBMs in a consistent and regular manner. Yet it is the very context of mutual distrust that has driven ARF to consider the business of Confidence Building seriously, has been challenging genuine attempts and Confidence Building in the region. Initially some very important powers have been reluctant in joining any form of multilateral
dialogue in security. For instance, US was not very keen on multilateral dialogues because it maintained bilateral relations with some of the countries of the region like Thailand, and the Philippines. Moreover in the post-Cold War period when the strategic picture in Southeast Asia was indecisive and the US was busy in other parts of the world, (in the Gulf War and also in the Yugoslavian crisis through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) it was not interested in immediately committing itself to multilateral arrangements. However it was with a desire to continue to play a role in the Asia Pacific particularly in response to the rising ambitions of China that the US became a part of a multilateral dialogue forum that was led by the ASEAN. Besides, ASEAN to the US was an organisation with a pro-western orientation but falls short of an alliance like the South East Asia Treaty Organisation. Therefore, the US in participating in the ARF was not dealing with an alien association. If this psyche functions within the US then there is enough reason to fear that US has its own agenda and expectations that it will try to fulfil through the ARF. For the US the four basic concerns will be limiting Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, engaging North Korea, encourage greater cooperation on the issue of terrorism and produce acquire some form of guarantee on the security of the sea lanes of the region. Under such circumstances one may wonder whether US engagement in the region is for the well being of the Asia Pacific or for the promotion and protection of US interests in the region. Luckily some of the interests of the US are common to that of the ARF and therefore the US and ARF can work in harmony towards Confidence Building.

China has been more uncomfortable with the idea of multilateral security dialogue process. This is so because China’s role in the Cold War period has always been a point of reference for all future relations between China and ASEAN. Therefore China is as uncomfortable with the ASEAN as ASEAN is apprehensive of Chinese motives in the region. China’s association with the region has it own complications. China has its own strategic calculations based on realistic perceptions of world order and regional security scenario. Chinese interests within the region include balancing US presence in the region. More important, China at present is party to a few volatile issues of the region – South China Sea, particularly to ASEAN’s interests and within Asia Pacific, the Taiwan issue. These two issues have two different implications for Confidence Building within the ARF. In the case of South China Sea, ARF’s efforts at Confidence Building is limited by the fact that on the core issue of jurisdictional
problems China has not agreed to discuss the disputes on jurisdiction at a multilateral level. Thus, in the case of South China Sea at least it can be said with a certain degree of certainty that Confidence Building with regard to South China Sea will fall short of conflict resolution. At present ARF can credit itself with the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea; this is not only a Confidence Building measure but a prominent step towards Preventive Diplomacy.

Preventive Diplomacy also requires some amount of interference in internal affairs of the state; China will cooperate so long as the Code of Conduct does not affect China’s decision making powers on South China Sea. In any case, the Code of Conduct does not have any binding obligation on the members. In the case of Taiwan, Confidence Building is hardly expected to lead to resolution of conflict because one of the major parties to the dispute, China, considers the claims over Taiwan essentially within its sovereign rights and will not be receptive of any suggestions or measures. In addition, Taiwan has remained a contentious issue between the US and China, ARF ought not to fall victim to power politics of external powers. The inclusion of India and Pakistan has its own problems; the rivalry between these two countries is very old and if ARF gets involved in Indo-Pak bilateral disputes, then the organisation may lose its focus. Besides Indo-Pak relations are so complex that at best they be limited to the bilateral level or at the least be taken up by the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Realists have always stressed on the fact that ARF’s role will be conditioned by the balance of power game in the region. Balance of power can be located at two levels. First level of balance that exists between big powers like US-China and the second level of balance exists between influential powers and ASEAN. Interestingly, ASEAN has been building sustained relationships with three big powers of the region – China, Japan and South Korea in a process called ASEAN plus Three but its success is conditioned by conflicting interests between these members particularly between China and Japan. If ASEAN plus three be considered a form of Confidence Building measure between ASEAN and influential states in its neighbourhood, then also ground realities like economic and political competition between its members may inhibit its success. Thus, balance of power politics of the region determines the success of ARF in addressing security of the region through CBMs.
ARF has its own functional weaknesses. It is an organisation with membership so disparate that ARF must be cautious about dealing with core security issues or with conflicts that involve more than two states. The ARF thus prefers to respond to the security issues through non-military means, through dialoguing, exchange of information, and publication of papers. These means will be successful only when the states act in unison or at least those who are parties to the respective disputes seek to cooperate with the ARF on their concerned problems and help it resolve conflicts. Till date, ARF has no single instance of successful conflict resolution. Within the academia disappointment is voiced on ARF’s inability to deal with serious security issues, such as terrorism. It is simply because resolution of conflicts will depend on the cooperation of the states in dispute to the extent that they would be ready to compromise the principle of non-interference. For now such a possibility seems remote.

The ARF is more than a decade old, precisely nineteen years old. It is considered as the only official institutional device of the ASEAN that looks into the security of the region. Yet as an institution with so many years of experience in dealing with various security issues, it is yet to acquire an identity of its own. Time and again ASEAN has reiterated the fact that it is the cornerstone of the ARF. The latter has adopted as its own the principles of ASEAN and functions according to them. Therefore, ARF as a device of Confidence Building thinks and acts like the ASEAN. However, ASEAN declares itself to be a socio-economic organisation and therefore how can ARF whose focus is entirely on politico-security issues follow ASEAN’s norms? Besides, ARFs are held in the context of ASEAN-PMCs. This also reiterates the fact that ASEAN will feature in the discussions on the ARF.

ARF will find it difficult to establish norms and rules of its own because ASEAN will continue to be the centre-piece within ARF. It may perhaps find it unwise to allow ARF to develop its own identity because ARF has more powerful members who have the capacity to control the political fate of Southeast Asia. Therefore, ASEAN tries to prevail over the ARF based on ASEAN’s realistic estimation of threat perceptions. Its effect on Confidence Building is that ASEAN norms of informality, consensus, and non-interference will prevail over all the Confidence Building efforts of the ARF.
CBMs are likely to be effective if there is some form of binding support at least at the levels of principles. Unfortunately, ASEAN's diplomatic and normative culture does not provide for such abiding principles. However ASEAN thinks it correct to follow this informal approach or else many states would not have become a part of the ARF and its process of Confidence Building. Notwithstanding such a pragmatic approach it cannot be denied that in absence of some form of binding capacity, there is nothing except the genuine desires of the members of the ARF in accepting the various CBMs suggested by it. In a region where inter-state tensions and balance of power are integral to the security of the region, states will give more importance to national interests, realistic threat perceptions rather than to good will essential to ensure successful Confidence Building.

Confidence Building through Track II Processes: Track II processes have been active in the region of Southeast Asia since the 1980s. The most interesting fact is that states of Southeast Asia have acknowledged the role of Track II institutions in policy making. The ARF in its Concept Paper has acknowledged the necessity of taking support from Track II institutions. ARF has conducted seminars and conferences with Track II institutions and has incorporated their observations and advices while formulating CBMs. Preventive Diplomacy seminars have been conducted by the ARF in liaison with Track II institutes not only from Southeast Asia but also from institutes from European states like France and the United Kingdom. Some seminars have also received sponsorship from like the state of Singapore and from European Union. By the turn of twenty-first century, ARF was seriously contemplating enhanced interaction between Track I and Track II channels. The initial proposal for this came from Track II. In pursuit of this proposal, in 2006 the ARF Concept Paper on enhancing ties between Track I and Track II processes was accepted.

The Track II Process began in the form of interactions between intellectuals, and academics at a dialogue forum called the Asia Pacific Roundtable (APR). The APR has been one of the largest Track II dialogue process since 1987. The main theme of this particular dialogue process has been Confidence Building in the Asia Pacific. This Dialogue Process was initially supervised by ISIS Malaysia, but was taken over by the ASEAN-ISIS in 1994. Track II activities in the economic arena had begun earlier than Track II dialogues seeking political and security cooperation. The APR
was a good start but the more concrete step was the establishment of the ASEAN-ISIS. ASEAN-ISIS can be seen as an institutional manifestation of cooperative security. Established in 1988, the institute was comprised of five existing organisations – Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; the Institute for Strategic Development Studies (ISDS), the Philippines; the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore; Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia; and the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand. The purpose of this Institute was to encourage cooperation and coordination of activities among policy-oriented scholars and analysts, and to promote policy-oriented studies of and exchanges of information and viewpoints on, various strategic and international issues affecting Southeast Asia’s and ASEAN’s peace, security and well being. ASEAN-ISIS is a Southeast Asian Track II organisation that is associated with five types of activities. They are, building and maintaining networks with other expert bodies of the region, creating norms, helping in forming security institutions like the ARF and also suggesting ways to reform it (including suggestions for new means of Confidence Building measures within Southeast Asia), birth of the CSCAP, and performing the duty of a think-tank that assists government policy decisions.

While the ASEAN-ISIS is an older Track II organisation, CSCAP is the largest Track II organisation in the Asia-Pacific and perhaps in the world. Although CSCAP’s geographical parameters are spread across the Asia-Pacific, ASEAN holds a central position in the whole organisation. Compared to the ASEAN-ISIS, CSCAP has a more visible structure and way of functioning that is based on the latter’s Charter. The scope of the activities of the CSCAP is vast as it embraces both cooperative security and comprehensive security. It implies that CSCAP tries to ensure security on the basis of cooperation between research organisations within its network. At the same time, CSCAP deals with security issues of both conventional and non-conventional nature. Its working groups and study groups deal with the issues that are relevant to the security situation of the region. Deliberations of the workshops and seminars conducted by these groups are published as CSCAP Memorandums and tabled at the Steering Committee which is the highest body within the CSCAP. These Memorandums are valuable inputs for the ARF. Some of the suggestions on ways of enhancing interaction between Track I and Track II channels, on Preventive
Diplomacy, enhanced role of the ARF Chair, an Eminent and Expert Persons Register, on Maritime Security and Cooperation, and on Transnational Crime have been suggested to and noted and considered by the ARF.

**Evaluation of Track II Processes:** The significance of Track II Processes and Confidence Building in Southeast Asia is well established. National Track II institutes have existed before the establishment of institutes like ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP. Since the late 1980s serious attempts have been made at networking these disparate research organisations existing within the boundaries of Southeast Asia. With the establishment of ASEAN-ISIS the concept of a regional Track II process was born; it boosted the concept of a Southeast Asian epistemic community. Peter Haas defines epistemic community as a network of professionals with an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within their domain. An epistemic community becomes necessary to provide expert opinion on complex security issues or where the government apparatus has fallen short of innovative ideas, and expertise is required to deal with deep rooted sensitive disputes. What the epistemic community is expected to do is to facilitate positive decision making and gradually help states on both the sides reach a mutually acceptable solution. Constructivists claim that such epistemic communities would provide new ideas and perspectives, it entails a process of new learning and discourse. Constructivists further claim that Track II institutes could help decision makers anticipate conflict of interests amongst themselves and respond to it by building coalitions that ameliorate such instances. Therefore, epistemic communities carry the expertise of PD. Logically policies formulated by Track I with assistance from Track II are expected to have already addressed the problem of an apparent chance of conflict of interests between states – they are based on some form of Preventive Diplomacy.

Institutes like the ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP have the capacity to help Southeast Asia move from the phase of cooperative security towards common security. It would perhaps seem an oversimplification to parallel this development with ARF’s shift from the first phase of Confidence Building measures to the second phase of preventive diplomacy. But the logic in connecting these two is that once the states begin to perceive security on the basis of commonality, it becomes easy to prevent conflicts and dissipate tensions. Regional Track II organisations like ASEAN-ISIS
and CSCAP would also move along the same trajectory of evolution. Their activities would be arranged accordingly, their research, studies, seminars conferences and publications would in semblance with the basic developments in the Track I channel. It is here that one has to keep in mind that Track II channels in Southeast Asia may have an advantage over the official process for its representations are without official tags, and follow informal methods of interactions, but they are not entirely free of political influences. Going back on a previous question whether Track II processes should follow the Track I agenda or follow it, the same challenge of political influence would come to the forefront.

When Track I and Track II work in close relationship with each other, it may be quite natural that one should adopt each other’s traits. When Track I accepts the traits of Track II particularly its functions, ideas and knowledge, it enriches Track I representatives and helps them make the right kind of decisions; but if Track II is influenced by Track I process, then Track II gets politicised. In addition, where Track II representations comprise government officials in their private capacities, there is an apprehension that Track II interactions will be taken over by the views and reservations of those officials and bureaucrats. For example, Herman Kraft mentions of a case where a statement drafted by some members of the ASEAN-ISIS and officials of the coup led by Hun Sen in Cambodia just prior to that country’s scheduled entry into ASEAN in 1997 was never released. Some members of the ASEAN-ISIS opposed its dissemination, arguing that it violated the principle of non-interference. While the document made its way to the desks of some foreign ministers of ASEAN, it was never formally released as an ASEAN-ISIS document. In the case of CSCAP, its singular failure is not being able to bring China to the tables to solve the South China Sea problem and on the question of the Taiwan Straits (the second issue is to be judged in the light of Asia-Pacific Security and not in terms of Southeast Asian security). The reason is not difficult to locate and it is that China would not join any process of interaction that would speak about the Taiwan issue or try to discuss the jurisdictional dispute of South China Sea. There is a basic similarity that both CSCAP and its official counterpart the ARF in that they would not address core security issues or issues that are too sensitive for discussion or that would violate the precious principle of non-intervention. Besides it also shows that Track II
organisations like the CSCAP must at times bow down to political pressures in order to ensure participation of the maximum number of states.

Scholars have begun to express concern that the trends in the Asia-Pacific, including Southeast Asia indicate that Track II is slowly moving towards greater alignment with the governments and their agenda. It has been discussed how financial dependency on their state governments especially in authoritarian or semi authoritarian ones may cost the autonomy of the Track II institutions. It will affect their ability to provide the right perspective on difficult and complex security challenges of the region. One must also take note of the fact that ARF has been arranging and supporting track II meetings by themselves. ARF sponsored Track II activities are likely to have better political support or even sponsorship. Under such circumstances, governments would expect that these ARF meetings should support and reinforce their opinions. At times, this makes one wonder whether ARF should incorporate the Track II process within its scope of activities. After all, it does leave the scope of apprehension that Track II may loose its autonomy.

Track II processes are supported on the ground that they can discuss a wide variety of security issues considered to be politically sensitive and can also focus on non-traditional security issues. Yet it is interesting to note that Track II processes have not produced a good track record in their ability to deal with non-traditional security threats. Neither the ASEAN-ISIS nor the CSCAP could provide early warnings on economic crisis nor were they adequately equipped to handle crisis of such a massive scale. The next challenge was the Tsunami, to which ASEAN woke up with a great shock. It was then that there was an attempt to prepare oneself to such disasters by promoting workshops on disaster relief. Track II processes are of relatively recent order and thus despite of their avowed adherence to comprehensive security, the security discourse of the region is yet to reach a stage where state centricity will reduce in importance. Security discourses in Southeast Asia are largely state centric and for states there is the traditional divide between high politics and low politics. The only testimony of the changing perceptions is ASEAN Vision 2020 and if it is to be achieved, then a bigger and active role of Track II institutions is desired.
Another drawback with Track II activities within Southeast Asia is that it promotes a form of 'group think' when they gather individuals with similar professional or academic backgrounds (with their own specialised jargon) as part of consensus building apart from the rest of civil society. Kraft herein had made a distinction between epistemic communities and civil society. So long as exclusive clubs debate on policy formulation, they have not much effect on the public opinion as such. Civil society presupposes basic amount of awareness and consciousness amongst its members, but that may not be forthcoming. In that case, Track II processes involving epistemic communities may not be participatory, they lack in their potential as a forum for broad participation. What matters is the ability of the states to make some impact on decision making, but if the method of opinion formation is not inclusive or participatory, then the contributions of Track II falls short of expectations.

Track I processes ought to be more well organised and self-sufficient in their activities. This is essential because of Track II institutes continue to depend on Track I for resources to sustain themselves; under such circumstances, it may be difficult to maintain its autonomy. In order to survive and perform consistently, a good resource pool has to be found from within the region. This pool of resources is not only in terms of finance but also in terms of professionals and intellectuals, new generation academics who can introduce new ideas into maturing institutes like the ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP. This is specially so in the case of CSCAP as it is a larger institution with substantial intellectual representation from big states. In order to make their presence felt, Southeast Asian institutes need to be represented by both older experienced professionals and academics and younger generation with fresh ideas and knowledge. Moreover their network needs to expand and to strengthen so as to nourish the idea of a cooperative and common security.

These kinds of networks available with regard to Track II Processes have been discussed. Besides these there are another set actors who have very limited influence on the policy making process but can play a very vital role through their capacity to build networks. They are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and such independent scholars who are not a part of organised Track II activities. They can form a fresh pool of resources. Track III generally represents the interactions between
civil society representatives, they can be a wide range of NGOs ranging from research institutes to social service organisations; different activist groups lobby on serious issues and often interact across the borders. This type of interaction often involves organizing meetings and conferences, generating media exposure, and political and legal advocacy for people and communities who are largely marginalized from political power centres and are unable to achieve positive change without outside assistance. A very distinctive characteristic of the Track III process is that they set targets and make recommendations for themselves as participants in the workshops and conferences. All these organisations, NGOs challenge the existing frameworks of looking at security issues. They seek to build constituencies for peace which can question conventional practices and beliefs and present alternatives to official positions. Their activities and the methods of their functioning are in association with those of activists and lobbyists. Scholars like Kraft have argued that even before unofficial, i.e. Track II, diplomacy became known in the practice of international relations, non-government groups have historically been organizing at both domestic and international levels around issues which the public would have otherwise either ignored or remained completely ignorant of. He identified certain activities of the Track III Channel. In 1994 an organisation called Peace, Disarmament and Symbiosis in the Asia Pacific held its conference. In 1997 Focus on the Global South, a group attached to the Social Research Institute of Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University in association with Forum-Asia organised a conference in 1997. People’s Forum an international agglomeration of NGOs people’s organisations and individual academics opposing APEC. It held parallel conferences whenever APEC held its conferences in 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999. Besides, various human Rights organisations have held Asia Pacific Conferences on East Timor (APCET) and organised human rights organisation networks like Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (AltSEAN). APCET has held conferences between 1994 1997; they challenge the standards of human rights in East Timor.

They may be viewed by more conservative sections within Track I as more radical and too demanding as activists intend on institutional change from the margins of national and regional politics. This is particularly because Track III substantiates their basic belief in people-centred-security approaches. In a place like Southeast Asia where states are not tolerant of a liberal democratic culture, and where Track II has
just begun to gain ground, Track III activities may be little ambitious for the region. However, it is not too far fetched an idea. Some Track II personalities are welcoming of Track III processes. Scholars hope that Track II and Track III can act together to generate new ideas for politico-security cooperation.

Track III processes are not too old or matured, but they have problems even if they are few compared to the other two channels. First, it is difficult to find, locate and coordinate such organisations and institutions that operate beyond institutional Track II processes. There are a number of independent NGOs and academics but incorporating them into a network looks quite an uphill task. Second, they need conceptual clarity regarding issues like human security; with so many organisations working on various issues, themes and sub-themes, it is difficult to reach a common agenda. So long as common themes and issues don’t emerge even on the principle of lowest common denominator, Track III will soon fall in the same trap as the other two counterparts – beating about the bush. However one needs to be pragmatic in finding the common concerns, it should not be like the ASEAN which has to cope up with too many institutional arrangements in its desperate bid to attain common security. Thus, both the channels other than Track I needs proper orientation of goals and purposes. They must avoid getting consumed in meaningless dialoguing which is a part of Confidence Building. If openness and transparency are indispensable parts of Confidence Building, then activities of Track II processes ought to be transparent also. Moreover, Track II processes are not there to outdo Track I but to make it more result oriented and more efficient. Track I representatives need not think it as its clearing desk or its back office; Track II processes are in a way evaluating agencies of official mechanisms. Whether Track III can evaluate both Track I and Track II Channels of interaction is too early to predict but for the time being the Track II can benefit from it. It can take inputs from Track III and strengthen its capacity to monitor Track I activities. Both these tracks have differences in their goal perception (Track II seeks to help governments in their policy making processes, Track III galvanises public support against government wrong doings and wrong policy decisions) but together if they can get their acts right, they can be establish a new level of interaction based on primary experiences and innovative ideas and skills. These put together, can produce some unique CBMs that will enhance the feeling of regional security and strengthen mutual trust and confidence.
Final Observations Southeast Asia is a complex region where security issues will always receive academic attention. During the Cold War period, unlike Europe where political tensions were associated with big power rivalry, in Southeast Asia, the picture was different. In Southeast Asia conflicts were noticed at two levels. At one level there were political contests and associated rivalries (like in Vietnam and Cambodia) and at another level the sources of rivalry were associated with ethnic ties and religious identities. In addition there were mutual animosities between states at the regional level and between groups at the internal level (within states). During Cold War the external powers exploited the political rivalries and inter-state tensions within Southeast Asia but never sought to address them. The ethnic tensions of the region remained outside the Cold War influence. Therefore, in the post-Cold War period, apart from the ideological tensions most of the security threats were thriving, at most in different forms. Besides, new forms of security threats like economic security and environmental security were adding to the complex security picture. Under such circumstances, it seemed ironical that Southeast Asia with all its complex security issues had a rather late start in Confidence Building. ASEAN was born in the 1967 and was a regional institution but it did not seek to address the security problems of the region through CBMs. It was not until the establishment of the ARF in the 1994 that Confidence Building was seen as a serious form of conflict management. Yet the truth is that in Southeast Asia Confidence Building had a modest start much before Track I institutions gave it a serious thought. Confidence Building was initiated through the Track II channel, through the interactions at the APR. Although the Roundtable became a discussion forum on security, it did not confine itself to the Southeast Asia; on the contrary, as the name suggested it expanded its scope to the Asia Pacific. Periodical discussions at the APR began in the 1980s and continue till present and it can be considered as a form of Confidence Building Mechanism. Therefore, in Southeast Asia, Track II had already proven its credibility as a befitting Confidence Building channel much before Track I began its enterprises. However, since the 1990s the ARF as a Track I agency had acknowledged the importance of the Confidence Building. It has become a subject of considerable academic importance. This in a way reflects the predominance of Track I over Track II in Southeast Asia.
This study has found two important Track II institutions in the region — the ASEAN-ISIS and the CSCAP. As their titles suggest, while the ASEAN–ISIS carries a strong Southeast Asian identity comprising of Southeast Asian research organisations, CSCAP has a larger canvas comprising of the Asia Pacific (it is reflected in its title). Confidence Building in Southeast Asia is a rather challenging act as Confidence Building is always conditioned by the nature of security situation it needs to address. In this context it has been found that Confidence Building suitable for this region is very different from the European predecessors. European Confidence Building was conditioned by Cold War politics and the processes were devised and enacted by Track I agencies. Cold War politics were based on predictable patterns of super power competition; Confidence Building would try respond to such predictable patterns of super power actions and reactions. In Southeast Asia, super power rivalry was never endemic to the region; at present Confidence Building Measures need to address a wide variety of security issues ranging from bilateral conflicts to non-conventional issues. Another challenging aspect of Confidence Building in Southeast Asia is that the strategic canvas is spread far and wide. It involves states who do not belong to the region, not only that, they do not even belong to the neighbouring region, like the United States. Moreover the complex pattern of non-conventional security threats, largely clubbed under the concept of Human Security, makes the task of Confidence Building quite difficult. The concept of Human Security is so vast and ever encompassing that it can never be easy to address them in a uniform manner.

Under such circumstances it is difficult to various security problems through one integrated pattern of Confidence Building. For instance, the ARF is the only security dialogue forum and it responds to all kinds of security situations; it is expected to respond to non-conventional security threats like natural disasters and terrorism. In the future it is likely to get over burdened as new forms of security threats would emerge. The study of Track II mechanisms, for instance the CSCAP, shows that they also deal with any of kind of security situation that faces Southeast Asia. But it is perhaps time to make clear divisions between conventional security threats and non-conventional threats because of certain reasons. First, because human security and non-conventional security threats need long term consistent response mechanisms and perhaps it will take much longer than expected to deal with them. Second, because conventional security issues particularly territorial claims, demarcation disputes need
serious and separate attention. It is interesting to note that the only territorial dispute that has received attention through the Confidence Building mechanism is the South China Sea. There are many other bilateral territorial disputes (like the Thailand Myanmar dispute, Thailand Malaysia dispute) which involve members of the ASEAN but they have never reached the dialogue tables. The only differing factor between the bilateral disputes and the South China Sea dispute is that the latter involves China. Then does it imply that ASEAN Confidence Building is likely to respond to conventional security threats only if it involves powerful outsiders? Or is it because the ARF has been paying considerable attention to the South China Sea for quite some time now and being the primary security forum of the region it has the prerogative to decide which security needs attention and when. Strangely ARF has not found it that urgent to look into the bilateral disputes within Southeast Asia with great earnest.

One important issue that will always seek debate is whether Track II institutes will follow the Track I pattern? For instance, similar to the ARF, Track II institutes like the CSCAP have never found it that necessary to look into bilateral problems within the region. It has been making contributions towards improving CBMs, suggesting means of implementing and improving PD, on maritime security, on improving the functioning of the ARF, but there is no substantial opinion on bilateral territorial claims. Moreover a look at the CSCAP publications (basically their memorandums) shows that their concerns for security are related to Asia Pacific. It has looked at the issue of nuclear disarmament but noticeable is that not a single ASEAN member has nuclear weapons. Therefore ASEAN’s position with regard to nuclear issue is largely reactive. In a nutshell, CSCAP is certainly inclusive of Southeast Asia but perhaps what is needed is exclusive attention towards essentially Southeast Asian issues.

In that case, a viable option is the ASEAN-ISIS. Interestingly, the organisation is older to CSCAP. This study has also focused on how ASEAN-ISIS has played a vital role in establishing the CSCAP. Its contribution in establishing the ARF is commendable. The institute has also been responsible in conducting to the APR. However, the APR shows that even ASEAN-ISIS, while dealing with security issues, has taken the larger canvas of the Asia Pacific. Its contribution towards Southeast Asia has been the strengthening of the ARF, providing it with valuable feedbacks. It focuses non-traditional security issues in Southeast Asia like Human Rights, ASEAN
Economic Community building, and the APA. Thus, ASEAN-ISIS too has not looked at core security issues within Southeast Asia and even perhaps within Southeast Asian states. Some attention should be given to the questions of social intolerance, recurrent political crises and accompanying violence. ASEAN as a Track I institute so far has not sought to interfere in domestic crises but that can be fulfilled by Track II institutes of the region like the ASEAN-ISIS. ASEAN-ISIS as a Southeast Asian institute should focus on Southeast Asian security at all levels. In order to suggest expanding its scope of activity more academic attention needed to be given to the organisation. Unfortunately at present, the amount of literature available on ASEAN-ISIS is hardly adequate. Therefore there is ample scope to research on this Track II institute of Southeast Asia. It will help such institutes enrich their perspectives on Southeast Asian security. It will also help them take the lead in setting the security agenda for Southeast Asia. Its role ought not remain limited to supporting and following Track I leads, its time that Track II institutes like the ASEAN-ISIS and the CSCAP set instances in security cooperation and especially give priority to long standing bilateral security issues. What is being suggested here is that Track II institutes concentrate on CBMs (as discussed earlier that CBMs deal with military security) as much it has been concentrating on CSBMs (that addresses the various facets of non-conventional security as Human Security). It is only then a Comprehensive Security agenda in Southeast Asia based perceptions of Cooperative Security can be created. Track III perhaps would flourish into a reliable mechanism of Common Security, but that is yet to attain maturity. Meanwhile, the idea is to have two very active and independent channels of security cooperation yet to work in harmony to improve the security of Southeast Asia in a holistic and participatory manner.