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The region of Asia-Pacific stands at the cusp of momentous change. The politico-strategic landscape of the region is being influenced by the strategic priorities of different countries, sub-regions, and regions, inhabiting the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, these priorities and foreign policy choices have exhibited trends not only toward convergence rather also divergence, revealing the elements of both cooperation and competition among the players. The divergent geo-political, strategic and economic interests have given rise to a variety of approaches to protecting and promoting interests in an ever-changing Asia-Pacific. Both India and Australia find themselves articulating and pursuing aggressively their respective strategic interests. Both the countries have adopted different strategies – long-term and short-term – towards accomplishing their foreign policy objectives. Southeast Asia forms an important juncture where the cooperative and competitive elements of the foreign policies are manifested. While India has approached the region through its Look East Policy, Australia has approached the region through the policy of comprehensive engagement.

The new-emerging strategic shift is best explained in terms of conventional power politics and represents more traditional security assumptions that include permanent institutions in world politics like diplomacy, alliance and war. The importance of the region lies on two basic issues - the changing notion of security itself since the end of the Cold War and the potential implications of the rise of China on the strategic balance of power for India and Australia. Viewed in this perspective, the rise of security concerns in Southeast Asia and the policy initiatives of India and Australia towards the region constitute the focus of the study.

In order to ensure their divergent security interests, ASEAN countries have relied on a variety of overlapping institutional arrangements – formal and informal, bilateral and multilateral. These institutional frameworks have enabled the ASEAN countries to safeguard their security interests as well as invite constructive responses from external
players towards regional security. (Emmers 2004) ASEAN’s relationships with Australia has followed bilateral trajectory that forms the most important part of Australia’s strategic engagement with Southeast Asia. (ASEAN ‘Vision 2020’, ASEAN Secretariat, Basic Documents, Manila) Coexisting with and complementing such bilateral links, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its region-wide initiatives have been at the core of the overlapping multilateral security structure. ASEAN has enhanced regional security cooperation and contributed to the conflict avoidance and management in the region. Rejecting legal mechanisms, its model of security cooperation has traditionally relied on (a) dialogue and consultation, (b) self-restraint and consensus and (c) the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference. (See Appendix 1)

Though the genesis of overarching security architecture within and beyond Southeast Asia forms an important aspect of the study, the importance of trade issues and economic relations have also been examined in the background of the 1997-98 Financial Crisis. The nature and dynamics of security arrangements in Southeast Asia in the Cold War and the post-Cold War era are based on the number of actors involved and to the degree in which such arrangements have been geographically concentrated or dispersed. ASEAN ‘Vision 2020’, (1997), ASEAN Secretariat, Basic Documents, Manila An institutional bargaining approach is applied to both periods to examine the process by which some of the security arrangements have been created and developed. Particular attention is given to their origins in conjunction with specific regional and external shocks—the Indonesian confrontation policy against Malaysian Federation, the Sabah claim by the Philippines, the Indonesian forceful occupation of East Timor, Vietnam’s attack on Cambodia are just a few examples during the Cold War period. The post-Cold War era witnessed the limited strategic withdrawal of the US from the region, the rise of China, the emergence of a confrontation equation between a rising China and Southeast Asia over the issue of South China Sea. The process of globalisation and the regional financial Crisis of 1997-98 have given birth to new sets of threats, such as transnational terrorism under asymmetric warfare. Previously confined to the low-intensity conflicts in the weak and failing states in the periphery, the terrorist attack at the World Trade Centre in September 2001 has underlined the global reach of these threats, making even the
Western heartlands extremely vulnerable. Southeast Asia witnessed the spectre of such threats when bombing incidents occurred in Indonesia in 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2009. Also it was established that the terrorist network had connectivity in the whole of Southeast Asia, a security menace which any country could not handle alone.

These and other threats faced by the region since 1991 have been pivotal in shaping the institutional security context of Southeast Asia today. The institutions being examined here include ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN + Three (APT), ASEAN Security Community (ASC) and the East Asia Summit. By highlighting key forces that impacted change, the attempt is to explore and assess these changes on the development of security arrangements within Southeast Asia and with external regional powers India and Australia. These variables will also take into consideration the US presence in Southeast Asia, China’s role in the region, and regional dynamics of Southeast Asia.

**Australia’s Security Interests in Southeast Asia**

The geo-political location of Australia has dictated its foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, which has remained in focus throughout various epochs of Australian history. For Australia, the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Lombok are the two most crucial maritime waterways in Southeast Asia. (Ho 2005) A sizeable proportion of Australia's maritime trade passes through the Straits of Lombok and Malacca. (Department of the Parliament Library: Canberra, Information and Research Services, Research Note No. 5, 2001–02) Moreover, new security issues, such as transnational terrorism and the state-failure have emerged during the Post Cold War era, necessitating new policy-initiatives from Australia towards the region. The Australian analysts and experts have debated over the importance of these security concerns, and have been voicing the need to accord greater priority and significance to the Southeast Asian region. (Jones and Windybank 2005: 5-27) The two key issues that are crucial to the security environment of Australia in the post-Cold War period are:
• The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Southeast Asia with Al Qaeda connections.
• The geopolitical implication of China's growing power and influence. 
(Defence White Paper 2009)

Australia's security environment is far more fluid and heterogeneous in the post-Cold War period, than it was during the superpower standoff that characterised the Cold War. It is felt that the new complexities needed a more flexible foreign policy approach. (Dalrymple 2003) The relative weakness of a few ASEAN countries demonstrates both historic pliability and ambiguity on the part of ASEAN players towards the major powers, competing for influence in the region. (Evans and Grant 1995: 207) At the same time, internal insecurity and separatist insurgencies in parts of Indonesia, the southern Philippines and southern Thailand, offers a fertile ground for transnational crime and terrorist networks to flourish. Despite growing economic interdependence, political tensions and strategic rivalry are rising between the region's two major economic powers, Japan and China. (Stackpole 2000). The Liberal assumption that closer economic ties between the countries lessens the risk of war, as the costs are too high, and economics triumphs over politics, history and culture — seem more likely to be tested in this part of the world than elsewhere. (Buchan 2002) Transnational threats are likely to respond better to a reassertion of sovereignty at home along with new partnerships and strengthened alliances abroad, than bureaucratic efforts to build a supranational regional architecture. (Acharya 2007, 629-52) The Australian government has retained a degree of policy flexibility and can mix and match responses to the diverse features of the security dilemmas it confronts.

Australia's foreign policy is driven by core national interest - the security of the Australian nation and the prosperity and well-being of the Australian people. The interplay between Australia's abiding interest in Asia, the basic Western make-up of its society and institutions and its wider international associations - particularly with North America and Europe - lie at the heart of Australian foreign and trade policy. (In the National Interest, Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper 1997) After the Second World War, Australia looked to the U.S., as a guarantor of its security needs,
which culminated in the signing of Australia, New Zealand, and the US Security Treaty (ANZUS) on 1 September 1951. It is curious aspect of Australia’s security perception that although it has not faced any direct threat since the Second World War, it has always felt insecure. Located in a part of the globe that has witnessed dramatic changes and turbulence, it is Australia’s geostrategic location that has guided its security policy. The cultural and ethnic differences of the people inhabiting its neighbourhood have only added to a feeling of isolation and vulnerability. (Ball and Kerr 1996) Post-Second World War Australian foreign policy consequently was dominated by the need to prevent potentially problematic states from gaining access to the region. Therefore, Australia inevitably entered into strategic partnership with the US, in order to ensure that threats from outside were neutralized or at least controlled.

Australia was one of the founders of both the United Nations and the South Pacific Commission (1947), and in 1950, it proposed the Colombo Plan to assist developing countries in Asia. In addition to contributing to the UN forces in the Korean War - it was the first country to announce it would do so after the United States - Australia sent troops to assist in putting down the communist revolt in Malaya in 1948-60 and later to combat the Indonesian-supported invasion of Sarawak in 1963-65. It also strongly opposed Indonesian President Sukarno’s attempts to oust the Dutch from Irian Jaya—a policy that increasingly came to be defined in terms of a radical, quasi-leftist ideology on nonalignment—and worked alongside the UK during both the Malayan Emergency (1948 to 1960) as well as the undeclared “confrontation” (konfontasi) between Indonesia and Malaysia (1963 to 1966). Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was created in 1955 as part of the Truman Doctrine of creating anti-communist bilateral and collective defense treaties and Australia was its founder member. These treaties and agreements were intended to create alliances that would contain communist power. Then in 1955, Prime Minister Robert Menzies put ‘Forward Defence’ doctrine as maximizing the influence of the countervailing power, viz., Britain or US to fight communist insurgency and confrontation in the region. (Fry 1991: 5) Formed in 1967, ASEAN is the primary regional institution in South-East Asia and a respected participant in global affairs. Australia became an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1974—the first
country ASEAN agreed to meet on a regular basis to discuss political, economic and functional cooperation. Australia is actively involved in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), with Britain, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore as members. It is a non-binding arrangement of 1971, which is still operational and has become a vehicle for Australia’s regional engagement. (Australian Treaty Series no. 21 1996)

Major changes in Australia’s Foreign Policy took place in 1972 with the coming to power of Gough Whitlam of Labor Party. It was perceived that Australia’s security and trading interests would be enhanced if it became self reliant and closely interacted with its neighbors. This new thinking continued to dominate the subsequent governments of Malcolm Fraser (1975 to 1983) and that of Bob Hawke (1983 to 1991). In January 1989, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke called for more effective economic cooperation across the Pacific Rim region. This led to the first meeting of APEC in the Australian capital Canberra in November, 1989 chaired by Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans. Attended by political ministers from twelve countries, the meeting concluded with commitments for future annual meetings in Singapore and South Korea. The initial proposal was opposed by countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which instead proposed the East Asia Economic Caucus which would exclude non-Asian countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The plan was opposed and strongly criticised by Japan and the United States. (APEC Meeting Document Database) The policy towards Southeast Asia was formally spelt out in a Statement of 1989 by the then Foreign Minister Gareth Evans titled “Regional Security”. (Australia’s Regional Security, Ministerial Statement by Senator Gareth Evans, December, 1989:1) This document clearly stated that, as Southeast Asia was of primary importance because Australia possesses a significant but non-aggressive military power contributes to the strategic stability of the neighbouring region and also use its military assets and presence in the region to help foster, in various specific ways, the gradual development of a regional security community based on a sense of shared security interests, therefore a policy of “Constructive Engagement” with the region, would be the main focus of Australian foreign policy. This policy was given a concrete shape vis-à-vis Southeast Asia by Prime Minister Paul Keating in 1991, reflecting a
regional foreign policy agenda that was both vigorous and proactive. Moreover, the Defence White Paper of 1994 stated Australia's engagement with Southeast Asia as "Look West policy". (Defending Australia, Defence White Paper 1994) Australia took a leading role in advocating the need to focus resources and attention to Southeast Asian countries. In addition, an effort was made to strengthen and consolidate meaningful people-to-people links, through the promotion of educational exchanges and tourism and by facilitating increased Asian immigration into Australia. A new regional security strategy regarding focus on Southeast Asia emerged by the end of 1995, which led the Keating Government to claim success was to issue mutually supportive announcements setting Australia on a "Look West" policy and securing for Western Australia the title of "Australia's gateway to the Indian Ocean". (Whitlam 1997: 71) In March 1995, Australia joined several other Indian Ocean states for preliminary talks that led to the establishment of IOR-ARC in 1997. Initially Australia was interested in promoting comprehensive security as an issue for cooperative action.

In March 1996, Liberal-Nationalist Party coalition led by John Howard replaced Keating's Government. Although Asian engagement was a main issue of the 1996 campaign, there was also a growing debate over commitment to bring the U.S. alliance back to the centre stage of Australia's foreign policy. However, the overall directions of Prime Minister Howard's government did not change substantially from the earlier government's policy towards Southeast Asia. The region continues to be viewed as a political priority, with the need to enhance regional security cooperation and stability in the region, which was (and continues) of great geostrategic importance to Australia. In emphasizing this stance, the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, specifically stated, "There is national consensus on the importance of Australia's engagement with Asia and a strong understanding that no side of Australian politics owns the Asian vision". (Downer's Speech, 'Seeking Asian Engagement' 1997).

The East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the East Timor Crisis saw Australia playing an important role in the regional strategic affairs of Southeast Asia. The 1997 White paper on foreign policy declared that 'Australians should have confidence in Australia's capacity to shape its future' with that of the economic growth of Southeast
Asia as its economic growth will continue at relatively high levels in the coming years. (In the National Interest, Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper 1997) The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) is responsible for the management of the development co-operation programmes and administers the Official Development Assistance. 'Better Aid for a Better Future' was set as an over-riding objective for the aid programme to “advance Australia's national interest by assisting developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development.” The policy reconfirmed Australia's support for the United Nations (UN) target for ODA of 0.7% of GNP, with the provision that Australia would maintain its aid at the highest level, consistent with the needs of partner countries and Australia's own economic circumstances and capacity to assist. Australia's Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 1998-99 is expected to be $1,480 million. (Australia's Overseas Aid Program Statistical Summary 1997-98)

In the case of Indonesia, its strategic significance to Australia is revealed by the fact that 60% of Australia's exports pass by its Northern approaches. Indonesia is also the most populous country neighbouring Australia, and is nearer by landfall to Australia than all countries excluding Papua New Guinea. (Australia-Indonesia Maritime Delimitation Treaty 1997) A Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the zone of cooperation in an area between the Indonesian province of East Timor and Northern Australia named Timor Gap Treaty was signed between the Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans and then Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas on December 11, 1989. It provided for the joint exploitation of petroleum resources in a part of the Timor Sea seabed which were claimed by both Australia and Indonesia. The Timor Sea Treaty replaces the Timor Gap Treaty which was no longer valid once the territory of East Timor ceased to become a province of Indonesia in 1998.

Papua New Guinea is the only country which shares land border with Southeast Asia and PNG is crucial to Australia's security. However, Indonesia's brutality and violence in East Timor and the subsequent end to the violence through the efforts of Australia-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999, there was a souring of relations between the two countries. The Defence White Paper of 2000
prioritizes cooperation with Southeast Asia emphasizing the strategic importance of the region. The ASEAN nations too, are looking at Australia as a strategic partner especially in their fight against terrorism and have signed various counter terrorism agreements with it. Australia had counter terrorism agreement with Indonesia in February 2002, with Malaysia in August 2002 and a Memorandum of Understanding on Counter-Terrorism with Thailand in October 2002. (Annual Reports, Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2002)

Australia’s White Paper of 2003, titled Advancing the National Interest reiterated that Southeast Asia was fundamental to Australia’s war against terrorism and close cooperation with ASEAN states was extremely important to the policy of active engagement. In order to further develop the need to engage Southeast Asia, Australia played a constructive and a leading role in providing both Track I and Track II multilateral diplomacy. Engagement with Asia and more specifically with Southeast Asia continues to form the basic objective of Australia’s Foreign Policy. Key components of Australia’s security strategy include a strong national defence capability; the security alliance with the United States; bilateral defence and security relationships with Asia Pacific regional countries; and multilateral security links, especially through the ASEAN Regional Forum. (Advancing the National Interest, Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper 2003) According to Mohan Malik, Southeast Asian countries have more bilateral military ties with Australia than with each other. (Malik 1999: 2)

India’s Security Interests in Southeast Asia

India had an ambivalent policy towards Southeast Asia during the Cold War era even though geographically, culturally, politically, economically and strategically it was always significant. India’s interaction with ASEAN in the Cold War era can be described as a tale of missed opportunities, as India remained disengaged from ASEAN due to many reasons and most important being the Kampuchean issue and India’s closeness to the socialist block. India’s foreign policy was burdened by its own hostile immediate neighbourhood and had entered into strategic cooperation with the Soviet Union thus alienating the pro-West countries of ASEAN. With the end of the Cold war and changing
environment in Southeast Asia, India’s security needs were seen linked with that of its contiguous neighbourhood.

India’s relations with Southeast Asia have a cultural and historical connection. Besides, the land and maritime connectivity for India is of geostrategic importance. India is the largest power in the Indian Ocean and has the largest navy and coast guard compared to any littoral state between the straits of Hormuz and Malacca. (Rumley 2001: 72) A thousand miles from its mainland, India has had a naval, air and coastguard presence in the Andaman and Nicobar group of islands, which is barely 90 nautical miles from the Indonesian province of Aceh. Of the 600-island cluster, over 300 are inhabited and are suspected of being used as transit points by gunrunners, smugglers (including drug smugglers) and poachers. The region is also notorious for acts of piracy. Recognising this, India has been coordinating its efforts to combat these threats not only with countries in the region but also with countries as far away as Japan. (Department of the Parliament Library: Canberra, Information and Research Services, Research Note No. 5, 2001–02)

The long spell of mutual alienation understandably gave way to mutual distrust and suspicion. While the realization that the idea of looking towards the east is as important as that of looking towards the west dawned in the latter half of 1980s. However, it was Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1991, who gave shape to the policy of forging links and enhancing cultural, economic, political and strategic cooperation with Southeast Asia. This important policy initiative culminated into the 'Look East' Policy. This policy coincided with Australia's 'Look West' Policy and made impressive progress in the field of economy, strategy and cultural relations between India and ASEAN nations. From the security point of view, the cooperation with Myanmar was assessed to be vital to India as it shares a long common border with the Northeast of India. Southeast Asia, which is geographically contiguous to India, is paramount to India’s security interests.

India became a sectoral partner of ASEAN in 1991, a full Dialogue Partner in 1995 and member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996 and a Summit Partner
through ASEAN plus one in 2002. All these efforts led to improve the pace of implementation of proposals and agreements. On 7 October 2003, ASEAN Business and Investment Summit, Prime Minister of India declared that India was working on eliminating trade and investment barriers and advocated a trade turnover of $ 30 billion with ASEAN by 2007 and the establishment of a Free Trade Area in a time frame of 10 years. (Acharya 2001: 28) It listed the strong points of the Indian economy, which included a rich pool of English speaking human resource, the information technology, the Indian financial services industry, pharmaceutical industry, entertainment business and the infrastructure sector. During the Summit, India signed the “Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation with ASEAN” which would help in establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) in a time frame of 10 years. The Framework Agreement envisaged a FTA in goods, in services, in investment areas and economic cooperation and an early harvest programme. The Framework Agreement was an expression of India’s will and determination to expand economic ties with ASEAN. An ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for cooperation to combat international terrorism was also adopted by the heads of state/governments of ASEAN and the Republic of India in 2003. The objective of this framework for cooperation is to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through the exchange and flow of information, intelligence and capacity building. India also acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which came into existence in the first Bali summit in 24 February 1976. It is a document which was essential to becoming a member of East Asia Summit. The TAC provides for basic political framework for regional cooperation and security by setting out principles of conduct for inter-state relations. It shows ASEAN remains crucial to any multilateral organization in the region. Accession to this treaty was essential for implementation of India’s Look-East policy.

Comparison Policies of Australia and India

On 14 December 2005, Heads of Government of the ten-member ASEAN met in Kuala Lumpur with counterparts from Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) as well as Australia, India and New Zealand, at the ‘East Asia Summit’ (EAS). ASEAN saw
this initiative, primarily as a means of expediting economic integration in the wider region, while mitigating great power tensions in East Asia. Australia was nevertheless anxious to participate in the EAS, which it saw as potentially important for advancing its interests in both economic and security spheres. The Opposition has criticised the Government for initially signaling it would not sign the treaty, which the ASEAN countries have stated is a pre-requisite to any country attending the first East Asia summit. (Sydney Morning Herald 28 April 2005) In July 2005, Australia had been reluctant to sign the treaty out of concerns regarding how it would affect Australia’s obligation under other treat arrangements including ANZUS. But Canberra announced that it would, despite misgivings that, sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) (which it did on the eve of the Summit in December 2005). At the same time, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer emphasised four ‘understandings’ (effectively reservations) that Canberra had agreed with its ASEAN counterparts: that signing the TAC should not affect Canberra’s existing security arrangements (notably its alliance with America), Australia’s rights and obligations under the UN charter, or Australia’s relations outside of Southeast Asia, and that ASEAN could intervene in disputes involving Australia only after an invitation from Canberra. Australia joined China, India, Japan, New Zealand and Russia as well as ASEAN’s members by signing TAC. (Media Release, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, 26 July 2005)

Australia and India share with ASEAN the self-declared goal of working towards a relatively stable transition to a multipolar Asia-Pacific. Both Australia and India (together with ASEAN) have been advocating multilateral dialogue process. India may not, on the basis of geography, be strictly an Asia-Pacific state, but since the end of the Cold War, it has come to be accepted as a regional security player. Most of the ASEAN members have, in the post-Cold War years, established closer security contacts with Australia. India and Australia Foreign Policies became vigorous towards Southeast Asia in the 1990s. Until the end of 1980’s, India’s Southeast Asia policy remained dominated by the Cold War perceptions and India lacked a well-strategic policy towards the contiguous region. (Grare and Mattoo 2001: 41) It is only in the 1990s, that the need to engage multilaterally and bilaterally with Southeast Asia was felt as the realization that
emerging China influence in the region was growing, and the economic integration with
the ASEAN was a necessity along with security considerations. That India views ASEAN
as an economic potential is a compelling factor rather than the subsidiary political aim of
containing China. India sees its interest in promoting regional cooperation through the
different forums and agreements such as the Asian Cooperation Dialogue, the
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMST-EC) and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC). (Asian Development Bank
Review 2005)

For Australia, Southeast Asia has always been strategically crucial and
importance. As already stated, the geostrategic location of Australia has been a
determinant in Australia’s formulation of its foreign policy. Its political elite have felt the
need to emphasize that peace and stability in the Southeast Asia is of paramount
importance to securing Australia’s security. Australia has a transparent and well-defined
strategy towards Southeast Asia, which has helped the former in building the trust. In
fact, both India and Australia adopted a closer engagement policy towards Southeast Asia
almost simultaneously; India with its “Look East” policy and Australia with its “Regional
Security” policy. Both acknowledge that regional cooperation is essential for maintaining
peace and stability and ensuring economic integration. The convergence of interests
brought both countries closer and the Cold war perceptions are no longer valid.

The main focus of Australia-India relations has been Trade. However, in the post-
Cold War period the interests of Australia and India converged on both trade and security
matters. This was mainly due to two key factors. First, India’s dialogue partnership with
the ASEAN in December 1996, and its membership of Indian Ocean Rim Association for
Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) brought both countries together in a region where they
have vital trade and security stakes. India acknowledged that its participation in the IOR-
ARC was inspired by the Nehruvian vision of Afro-Asian solidarity which included
Australia. Second, India’s “Look East Policy” and the liberalization of its economy
received encouraging response from Australia. Although the Australian government
maintained that it continued to have differences with India over nuclear tests and non-
proliferation issue, it emphasized that “our bilateral relationship is much deeper and
broader than one set of issues alone”. (The Hindu 20 March 2000) This shift in Australia's policy towards India was, according to some Indian analysts, due to the "Clinton effect", as well as Australia’s realization that there were better economic opportunities in India than in East and Southeast Asia. (Raja Mohan The Hindu, 13 April 2000).

A curious aspect of Australia’s security perception is that although it has not faced any direct threat since the Second World War, it has continued to feel insecure. This was due to its geo-strategic location which always guided its security policy. The cultural and ethnic differences of the people inhabiting its neighbourhood only added to a feeling of isolation and vulnerability. (Ball and Kerr 1999: 1011) The result is that Australia always looked for security as part of a larger entity. Its foreign policy in the post-Second World War period was consequently dominated by the need to prevent potentially powerful states from gaining access to the region. In the absence of sufficient military strength Australia had to inevitably enter into strategic partnerships with the USA.

Australia's security policy centered on keeping its "great and powerful friends” committed to maintaining their military presence in East and Southeast Asia. However there is an apparent shift in Australia’s foreign policy during the early 1970s. The Labour party, which came to power after twenty-three years of conservative rule, sought to put Australia on an entirely different path with regard to the Western Alliance system vis-à-vis its relationship with Asian countries. Unlike many countries that have been slow in responding to changed circumstances, Australia showed remarkable dynamism to adjust its security doctrine to the changing external environment. The fast-changing geopolitical strategic environment in Australia’s neighbourhood found expression in the 1987 White Paper and the 1989 Ministerial Statement by Senator Gareth Evans. (The Defence of Australia, Defence White Paper 1987; Australia’s Regional Security, Ministerial Statement by Senator Gareth Evans December, 1989) The Ministerial Statement laid the conceptual framework for Australia’s regional security doctrine in the 1990s and identified southeast Asia, the South Pacific and eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean as regions of primary strategic interests. The key elements of Australia’s regional security
policy were identified as a policy of "Comprehensive Engagement with Southeast Asia". The region responded favourably to the Australian initiatives, and a country which was once considered an "Odd man out" was almost accepted as an "Odd man in".

The Labour Government under Prime Minister Paul Keating (1991-96) was more outward looking in its engagement with Asia Pacific than before. Multiculturalism became the new policy through which Australia wanted to be accepted by Asian countries, (Perry 1994: 113-18) and engagement with Asia led to the announcement of the "Look West Policy". The Defence White paper of 1994 stated, "...a new strategic architecture will evolve as the structures of recent decades fade. Much will depend upon the policies of major Asian power – Japan, china and India – and on their relationships with one another and with other countries n the region." (Defending Australia, Defence White Paper 1994: 8) As a result, Australia's security perceptions and trade patterns started changing. While in the past it had mainly exported to the US and Europe, now East Asia with its booming economy became its main trading partner.

Economic relations with India also improved after the latter opened up its economy; (India became one of Australia's top ten trading partners while Australia became the fourth largest investor in India). Progress was made in all areas of bilateral interactions – trade, culture, tourism, education, sports and entertainment. Australia became increasingly aware that: India is the most under-rated of the likely great powers of the 1990s......its already significant military capability, which it the predominant power in South Asia will be followed by increasing strategic reach, including Southeast Asia. It sees itself as a great power and a major actor on the global scene. It will show greater interests in Southeast Asia, and will increasingly claim a voice there." (Fry 1991: 6-7)

The Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade prepared a detailed report on July 1990 titled "Australia-India Relations: Trade and Security". According to it, the relations between Australia and India were underdeveloped and despite recent initiatives, the past neglect of India by Australia had not been overcome completely. (Report by Senate Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs and Trade July 1990: 9) The government responded to the Senate Report by saying that the time was appropriate to approach the Australia-India relationship with a new vision and vigour.

In spite of Australia's strained relations with Indonesia over East Timor, the ASEAN countries accepted Australia as a significant player in the region; it was with their consent that Australia intervened in East Timor. At the same time if Australia wants to continue its engagement with Southeast Asia, its policy makers will have to take into consideration India's increased visibility in the area. Australia's efforts to enmesh itself in the region are an important aspect of its approach to security and the statement by Prime Ministers, both in past and present that Australia seeks security with Asia, “not from Asia”, offers a cogent summary of a central tenant of Canberra's security relations with Asia. (Malik 1999: 237-38)

**Literature Review**

The literature pertaining to the study of Indian and Australian security interests in Southeast Asia have two different approaches – the study of Australia's policy of Constructive Engagement and India's Look East policy in the context of its strategic relevance. The main focus of the study is on the converging security interests of Australia and India towards Southeast Asia.

Three significant works on Australia's security policy towards Southeast Asia, are by David Lee (1995), Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (1996) and Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr (1994). All three have analysed the complex geostrategic environment facing Australia and how it has generated challenges to the security and political culture of the antipodean nation. Lee (1995) in his detailed historical study, analyses the search for security pursued by successive Australian governments in the decade following the end of World War II. Dr Lee offers a major critique of two generations of postwar literature on Australian foreign policy from a political economy perspective. He demonstrates that Australia's foreign policy-makers in the early Cold War period were just as concerned with protecting Australia's global economic interests as they were with
protecting its political and security interests. Bruce and Cheeseman (1996) offer a diverse but comprehensive theoretical critique of the closed and introspective approaches, which define and determine contemporary Australian defence and security policy. They critically assess the basic assumptions of mainstream security thinking, challenging existing orthodoxies and means of framing reality. The key theme of Ball and Kerr (1994), is also related to Australia's regional security policy and engagement with Southeast Asia. They conclude that the Australian government's vision for regional security engagement lacks a strategy: one that is conceptually sound and consistent with the other dimensions of Australia's engagement policy and the requirements for the defence of Australia.

From broader and comparative perspective, there are writings which raise issues relevant to Asia-Pacific security, particularly from an Australian perspective. David Lovell (2003) edited book presents an overview of security issues in the region and its implications for the future of Australia and its neighbours. James Cotton describes and analyses the rhetoric of Australia's regional policy, Allan Behm discusses Australia's diplomatic and strategic posture in the post-Cold War period and the increased cooperative security embraced by China. Michael Wesley sees Asia-Pacific regionalism playing a mediating role in relation to the US dominated global order. Chen Dongxiao's assessment of constructivism and East Asian security raises the issue of multilateralism. Amitav Acharya (2003) observes and maintains that the Asian states are capable of developing their own form of multilateral institutions and processes that will enable them to localize universal principles of multilateralism via the "Asia-Pacific way". Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (2004) edited book aims at sketching the evolution of individual countries' security approaches from the end of the cold war to the time after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and after the Bali bombings. Nonetheless, William T. Tow (chapter 2), for example, advocates bringing together alliances and multilateralist institutions, calling this process 'convergent security'; in the same vein, from an Australian perspective Ron Huiskens (chapter 3) calls for a strengthening of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as a way to forge more concentrated multilateral security processes. Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack (1997) edited volume critically
examines a number of the key propositions, which have emerged from the growing literature on the relationship between economics and security. Issues analysed include the relationships between democracy, interdependence and security in East Asia, regional trade and communications structures and security. William T. Tow (2001), an Australian political scientist has blended a hard-edged realist approach with a liberal perspective to produce a detailed and thoughtful analysis of the strategic outlooks of all the important actors in the Asia-Pacific region. He analyses in great depth the considerations behind the foreign policies of each of the countries; while giving appropriate attention to all the hot spots that might be the causes of war; he arrives at an optimistic projection of a future based on what he calls "convergent security strategies." Stephanie Lawson (1996), edited book offers incisive and sometimes controversial analyses of Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evan's vision for peace and security in the post-Cold War era.

Alan Collins (2003) identifies and explains the security challenges confronting Southeast Asia. It addresses the full spectrum of security issues, discussing the impact of ethnic tensions and competing political ideologies, the evolving role of ASEAN, and Southeast Asia's interactions with key external actors (India, Australia, China, Japan, and the United States). He also explores how the region's security issues are reflected in two current cases: the South China Sea dispute and the war on terrorism.

The consequences of the emerging trends for the Asia-Pacific region have impacted on India's Foreign Policy especially with the end of the Cold War. From the Indian perspective, several issues have been raised by Indian authors regarding India's Look East policy and its strategic relevance in the current period. Frederic Grare and Amitabh Mattoo (2001), edited book examines the complementarities, coincidences and contradictions in economic, strategic and security policy between India and the ASEAN countries. Key characteristics of India's "Look East" policy are analysed, besides, the role of major powers, notably the U.S. and China, in the era of globalization and interdependence is examined. India's rise and influence in regional affairs in the context of regional cooperation are defined by the various authors of this volume. According to Daljit Singh, India and Southeast Asia interactions remained low due to India's geopolitical containment of China and Pakistan in South Asia. Man Mohini Kaul argues that
the Cold War mindset, over-enthusiasm with the policy of nonalignment and New Delhi’s diplomatic faux pas involving its stand on Kampuchea, Vietnam and Afghanistan were viewed by the ASEAN states with suspicion. The author is of the opinion that globalization and its effect on the nation-state system and security will shape future inter-regional interactions. Kripa Sridharan’s chapter is a discourse on how perceptions determine policies. ASEAN nations viewed India as a Soviet surrogate and did not find it critical to the region’s security and its economic paradigms. Amitabh Mattoo, argues that India’s engagement with ASEAN (although lacking the required momentum and institutional arrangements) is in India’s national interest. According to this view, India’s policy remains sensitive to the changes in the world security paradigm following the emergence of the U.S. and China as the only two remaining powers of consequence; globalization is both a threat and an opportunity. By comparison, Frederic Grare found India emerging on the “wrong side” at the end of the cold war, isolated and without partnerships of consequence. For Mak Joon Num, strategic rivalry between New Delhi and Beijing factored a low-key India-Southeast Asia interaction later to be replaced by expectations of India’s greater involvement, to prevent China from “poaching” in Asia. Sudhir Devare (2006), book reflects some of the comprehensive security issues of concern and interest to India and Southeast Asia. He argues that the issues of convergence or divergence can be understood better within the framework of cooperative security. He advocates that since both India and Southeast Asia have extensive maritime stakes and interests, it is advantageous for them to consult and cooperate regarding maritime security. He examines other key ingredients as well, as these reflect the complexity of India-ASEAN interaction. Prakash Nanda (2003), analyses in details the challenges and opportunities for better engagement between India and Southeast Asia. He studies in depth the dynamics of India’s foreign policy during the last two decades. He notes India’s efforts to ”rediscover Asia” in the light of New Delhi’s vigorous pursuit of "Look-East Policy". He contends that Southeast Asia, after decades of dependence on the West for strategic and economic needs, is engaging India enthusiastically in order to maintain a regional balance of power and develop a multilateral cooperation in the region. Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries (RIS), New Delhi has carried out a variety of work, related to India and
ASEAN. *India-ASEAN Partnership in An Era of Globalization Reflections by Eminent Persons* (2004), examines the historical, cultural, social, political, economic, strategic, as well as scientific and technological dimensions of the bourgeoning interaction between India and ASEAN. The eight principal essays focus on the challenges and prospects of developing a closer partnership between India as a rising Asian power and ASEAN as the centerpiece of regional consolidation in Southeast Asia. In another study of RIS, *ASEAN-India Vision 2020: Working Together for a Shared Prosperity*, (2004), proposes a long-term strategic roadmap for ASEAN and India, which would enable them to achieve long-term developmental goals and address the common challenges to comprehensive security. The eventual vision of the ASEAN-India Partnership is to promote Asian economic integration as a new engine of growth along with other East Asian countries (Japan, China and Korea).

Though this study will attempt to analyse the impact of the Cold War or great-power rivalry on the process of evolution of India’s Look-East Policy, the analysis is not solely guided by western theoretical tools, particularly the geopolitical theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder, James Fairgrieve and Rudolf Kjelien. Both Mahan and mackinder advanced what seemed to be contrary views on the relative importance of sea power and land power for global dominance. Basing his analogy on classical mercantilism and the clashes of autarkic empires competing for maritime trade, Mahan had proposed sea power as the gateway to national greatness. Mahan was sanguine about the recurrence of this phenomenon in the 20th century.

There is a need for a systematic and detailed study which analyses the convergence and divergence of Australia and India’s security policies towards Southeast Asia during the Post-Cold war period. However, some studies are available on the foreign policy of Australia and India’s “Look East Policy”, but the security dimension in respect to Southeast Asia has not received the required emphasis. Broadly speaking, most of the literature is concentrated on the Asia-Pacific security and none on the developments after 9/11 and its impact on the policies of the two regional powers in their efforts at curbing terrorism. This study deals with understanding the security interests from a wide spectrum of historical background to the Post-Cold War strategic shifts in Southeast Asia,
Australia and India. The chapters attempt to analyse the interests and policies of Australia and India in the ASEAN region, along with the developments which have resulted in the rise of China and the policies of global players like the United States and Russia and regional player like Japan. This study hopes to contribute towards filling the missing link regarding the ramifications of India’s “Look East Policy” and Australia’s “Look West Policy” through an analysis on the complex interplay of developments in the region since the end of the Cold War.