Chapter I

NATION BUILDING PROCESS: A THEORETICAL STUDY
In the post-Soviet phase, efforts are going on to consolidate both nation and state-building processes. The new political elite of erstwhile colonies tried to imitate their colonial masters in this regard. This movement started in the post-WWII phase. The colonial model tried to provide some sort of balance between “tradition” and “modernity”, as well as “westernization” and “modernization”. Writing about the significance of non-Western political process in 1960, Gabriel Almond stated, “The political scientist who wishes to study political modernization in the non-Western areas will have to master the model of the modern, which in turn can only be derived from the most careful empirical and formal analysis of the functions of the modern Western polities.” (Almond and Coleman, 1960, p. 64) Apart from the Western model, in the second World War phase an alternative model emerged, i.e., Soviet Model, which attracted colonial countries of Asia and Africa. (Young, 1994, p. 7)

Keeping this in view, the present chapter will discuss various theoretical concepts like nation, state, state-building, nation-building as well as approaches to this concept. Efforts will also be made to correlate the significance of all these approaches to Transcaucasian state of Azerbaijan.

NATION: MEANING AND DEFINITION

The modern concept of the nation crystallized in philosophical debates in the eighteenth century, and grew powerfully in expression and coherence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Though social scientists have distinguished between ‘ethnic’ (or ‘cultural’) nations and ‘political’ nations, a quite useful distinction, it is perhaps better in political geography to limit the term ‘nation’ only to groups that have achieved political recognition and have created their own sovereign state. Other groups that have not achieved that
status may best be termed ethnic groups or 'ethnies', even though many aspire to nationhood in the political sense. (Mellor, 1989, p. 3)

Earnest Barker, a leading political theorist, gives a useful and holistic view of nation. According to him, "a nation is a body of men, inhabiting a definite territory who normally are drawn from different races, but possesses a common stock of thoughts and feelings acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history; who on the whole and in the main, though more in the past than in the present, include in that common stock, a common religious belief; who generally and as a rule use a common language as the vehicle of their thoughts and feelings; and who, besides common thoughts and feelings, also cherish a common will, and accordingly form, or tend to form, a separate state for the expression and realization of that will." (Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001, p. 20) This shows that the essential ingredient for a nation is to exist and to articulate the desire among its members to ensure politically independent, autonomous or free from any control. Nation is a large social group integrated by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical and historical) and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. (Hroch, 1996, p. 79)

Marxist theorists and intellectuals have given a different viewpoint of nation. Joseph Stalin described nation as "a historically evolved stable community with four main features i.e. community of language, territory,

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1 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith opine that ethnic groups or 'ethnies', as they call them, have the following characteristics: i) A common proper name to identify and express the essence of community; ii) A myth of common ancestry that includes the idea of a common origin in time and place and that gives an ethnic group a sense of imaginary kinship; iii) Shared historical memories or shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events and their commemoration; iv) One or more elements of a common culture, which normally include religion, customs or language; v) A link or attachment with the motherland; and vi) A sense of solidarity on the part of some sections of the ethnic group. See Hutchinson, John and Smith, Anthony D. (1996) (eds.), Ethnicity, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 6-7.
economic life and a psychological make up manifested in a community of
culture.” (Tishkov, 1997, p. 230) Former Soviet scholars, who defined nations
basically in ethno-cultural terms, add another important element that is “a
feeling of common identity or national self consciousness.” (Tishkov, 1997, p.
230) The definition of nation found in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia is
slightly different from the one given by Stalin. According to it, nation is a
historic entity of people with its territory, economic ties, language and specific
culture and character comprising the whole of a nation’s features. (Tishkov,
1997, p. 230)

In modern times the nation-state, representing the sovereign state
apparatus and legal nationality of the dominant ethnic group in its territory, has
 superseded other forms of sovereign state such as that organised around a
dynasty. It is important to recognize that every individual has both an ethnic
nationality and a legal nationality, which usually but not necessarily coincide.
Peoples aspiring to political recognition as nations are in a sense sub-nations’, a
term not infrequently met, and often enjoy some measure of autonomy within
another people’s nation-state, although sadly some receive little separate
recognition or may even be repressed and persecuted. (Mellor, 1989, p. 3)

A nation may be described simply as comprising people sharing the
same historical experience, a high level of cultural and linguistic unity, and
living in a territory they perceive as their homeland by right. Each nation is
unique in the way its elements are combined, let alone how successfully they
have jelled into a durable identity. The most significant elements in nation
building are language, religion, and historical experience, but there are also
more unquantifiable ones such as custom and usage or the sense of
togetherness. Religion (especially through sectarian conflict) has played a
significant role in the emergence of many nations. Religion has played both an internal and external role in the development of nationhood.

The formation of every nation has arisen from a unique combination of factors, yet some themes are common, though occurring in many different guises. First, there is the recurrent theme of a fear of or a threat from outside pressures; second there is the frequent case of a desire to be rid of foreign domination, the desire to be able to do one’s own thing’; third, there is the play on the need for a separate identity because of ‘being different’. Although there is usually a cultural identity and other factors in common among those drawn into a nation, providing a common iconography, this is not absolutely imperative, for the first two cases may surmount any differences in culture and other fields, if the threat is strong enough. There must, of course, be a leadership and a focal point to weld the nation together, with centripetal forces stronger than centrifugal pressures. The role of such leadership is to define the common bonds and provide a national iconography. (Mellor, 1989, p. 23)

The idea of the nation as a separate community is very old and has no clear points of origin. It evolved slowly from notions of ethnic identity and religious community: there have been ethnic, territorial and quasi-national communities: there have been ethnic, territorial and quasi-national feelings and conflicts throughout recorded history. The ancient Hittites had already identified themselves as a nation. Much the same collective emotional force can be found in the Old Testament and the whole nation of God’s Chosen people.

Nation or state-building is the ultimate in political conduct. The challenge is as old as Plato, who, in The Republic, defined state as “individual writ large”. State-building is, therefore, not a matter of engineering or
constructing a machine or system. It is not a matter of science. It is a question about political philosophy and matters related to cultivating an organism. As Plato said, it is a question of “tending to the soul”. Statecraft is a means of Soulcraft. Nation-and state-building are the consummate political acts of man. (Mellor, 1989, p. 23)

**Evolution and Growth of Nation State**

The dominant institution of the political world has, for the last two or three hundred years, been the nation-state. Before the 17th century, most secular state forms in most parts of the world were empires or monarchies. They depended upon personal rule and territorial property; albeit usually within a dominant moral culture such as that of post-Chin dynasty China, the Muslim world or the ideals of Christian unity in the European world from the first millennium onwards. (Gelber, 1997, p.1)

The modern form of nation-state was very much a European invention. But ideas about the sovereignty of the people clearly depend upon deciding who or what belongs to “the people”, and who does not. It is here that the idea of the nation becomes cemented to that of the modern state.

The modern form of the nation-state was very much a European invention. But ideas about the sovereignty of the people clearly depend upon deciding who or what belongs to “the people”, and who does not. It is here that the idea of the nation becomes cemented to that of the modern state. The idea of the nation as a separate community is very old and has no clear points of origin. It evolved slowly from notions of ethnic identity and religious community. The ancient Hittites had already identified themselves as a nation. Much the same collective emotional force can be found in the *Old Testament*. 
Indeed, the link between religion and nationalism persisted, certainly until the 17th century and also exist, until today.

It was the enlightenment and the new principles of the sovereignty of the people, which rendered nationalism. Montesquieu regarded soil climate and environment as creating unalterable differences in national character. Each civilization had its own unique character and traditional ways of life. Human societies were not artificial constructs but, rather like biological organisms, had their own separate laws of behaviour and tended towards their own kind of ideal type. Johann Gottfried Herder saw nationalism as having to do with language, culture and history. He argued that men can only fulfill themselves as members of an identifiable group or culture with its roots in tradition, language, custom and history. The “Year of Revolutions” in 1848 made nationalism even more clearly political and furthered the idea that the state must be coextensive with the nation. (Gelber, 1997, pp. 4-5)

States are above all organisations for the management of power; and therefore also for the organisation, management and use of force. From the early 19th to the late 20th century, the nation and its state have played an impressive role in developing the organisation, the arms and the armed forces required to wage modern war. It was not only that nation-states, and they alone, possessed the generally accepted right to resort to arms. It was the whole development of conscription, of mass armies and of “nations in arms”: beginning with the armies of the French Revolution but continuing through the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian conflict of 1870 and particularly the run-up to World War I. For example, while Abraham Lincoln began the American Civil War with a call to maintain the union, by the time of the Gettysburg Address of 1863, he used the word “nation” five times. (Gelber, 1997, pp. 4-5)
National consciousness was created in the defence of the nation-state. Education and even language were officially organised to consolidate the nation in the service of the state. The new nation-state therefore transformed men's sense of identity, the way in which they waged war - hence also the very structure and institutions of the state - it made possible the transformation of the economy.

There were many intractable challenges to the idea of the nation-state: i) distortions which the development of capitalism itself brought to the state; ii) an endless succession of crises and wars. Given the devastation caused by modern methods of warfare, it was necessary to limit and contain states within a larger, more generous international or supranational system; iii) the proposition, especially in the second half of the 20th century that the nation-state was simply incompetent to deal with a growing number of increasingly important international and transnational issues concerning such things as financial flows or the global environment; iv) a growing feeling that the nation-state would have to be subsumed under some kind of international or supranational organisation if peace was ever to be secured; and v) the growing prominence, during the post-World War II decades, of technical, environmental and population problems with which nation-state failed to cope with. (Gelber, 1997, p. 12)

The dramatic changes of 1989-1992 in world politics clearly created major additional difficulties, and ones whose character and extent seemed to be poorly understood. In some respects, the new conditions simply overturned the world economic structure of the 1980s. The trend which interdependence in economics and finance had made compelling was becoming politically and strategically feasible: institutionalized transnational cooperation in ways which seemed to erode the power of the nation-state naturally, given the increasing
interdependence of the domestic economy with the external world, much higher levels of multi-national cooperation and regulation have become common place in economic and financial matters.

After 1945, there was a marked and generally accelerating expansion of global trade. It grew especially among the developed countries. By the early 1990, it also seemed likely that while previous predictions about the domination of the world economy by three large trading blocs would have some validity, that validity would remain limited. Blocs centering upon the US, the European Union (EU) and Japan would give their members the advantages of a large economic field and somewhat freer trade within it. Their formation might confer political advantages and, especially for larger corporations, a helpful measure of governmental support, and constraints on competition from outside the block. In these senses, globalization not only made the regulatory powers of governments more important, but strengthened rather than weakened governments, although sometimes in non-traditional ways. (Gelber, 1997, pp. 176-177)

PROCESS OF NATION BUILDING

Before analysing the process of nation building, it is imperative to discuss state-building process. State-building process is used to describe internationally assisted attempts to build, or rebuild, the institutions of state in weak, post-conflict or failing states. A recent UN report highlights state building in the following words:

"When wars have ended, post-conflict peace building is vital. The UN has often devoted too little attention and too few resources to this critical challenge. Successful peace building requires the deployment of peacekeepers with the right mandates and sufficient capacity to
deter would-be spoilers; funds for demobilization and disarmament, built into peacekeeping budgets; a new trust fund to fill critical gaps in rehabilitation and reintegration of combatants, as well as other early reconstruction tasks; and a focus on building State institutions and capacity, especially in the rule of law sector. Doing this job successfully should be a core function of the United Nations. State-building represents a belief that one of the weaknesses of many of the past UN peace-keeping missions had been an inadequate focus on the state that was left behind after the peace-keeping mission withdrew. Many of those missions were not able to create sustainable peace, with a high proportion of states returning to conflict when the peacekeepers withdrew, or emerging as weak and unstable states. The United Nations (through complex peacekeeping operations), the UN Development Program, the World Bank, and many bilateral donors have increasingly adopted state-building in their aid and development strategy (e.g. Haiti, East Timor, the Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan, Iraq). Nonetheless, some believe that while there needs to be a focus on creating legitimate and sustainable state institutions, strategies to achieve this have not yet been fully developed. Little of the state-building undertaken so far has been successful. Most state-building activities have taken place in failed, fragile or post-conflict states. These war-devastated states are frequently characterized by brutalized civilian populations, destroyed economies, institutions, infrastructure, and environments, widely accessible small arms, large numbers of disgruntled soldiers to be demobilized and reintegrated, and ethnically or religiously divided peoples. These obstacles are compounded by the fundamental difficulty of grafting democratic and human rights values onto countries with different political, cultural, and religious heritages.” (UN Report, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, p 3)
Nation building, different from state-building, refers to the process of constructing or structuring a nation using the power of the state. This process aims at the unification of the people or peoples within the state so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run. Nation building can involve the use of propaganda or major infrastructure development to foster social harmony and economic growth.

A recent study on nation building by the Rand Corporation of USA had the following findings:

- The primary objective of nation building is to make a violent society peaceful.
- Security, food, shelter, and basic services should be provided first.
- Economic and political objectives can be pursued once these first-order needs are met.
- Reform generates resistance, which can be overcome only through the skillful application of personnel and money. Objectives need to be scaled to match resources. Not doing so will lead to mission failure.
- Peace enforcement during active conflict is, on average, 10 times more demanding, in money and personnel, than an operation that begins with agreement among all local combatants to accept international peacekeepers. (Dobbins et al, 2007, Online: Web, p. 1)

Recently, nation building has come to be used in a completely different context, with reference to what has been succinctly described by its proponents as the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy. In this sense, nation building describes deliberate efforts by a foreign power to construct or install the institutions of a national
government, according to a model that may be more familiar to the foreign power but is often considered foreign and even destabilizing. Nation-building is typically characterized by massive investment, military occupation, transitional government, and the use of propaganda to communicate governmental policy.

That maxim certainly serves as a reminder of the challenges of nation building. Countries going from chaos to order need way more time than it takes for the ink to dry on a pact. Getting a country up and running requires years and many resources, including large sums of money from the international community. The basic structure of a country is the same: political, economic, taxation and judicial systems; infrastructure; cultural, educational, and medical institutions; and more. Because these are so interconnected, fitting them together into a unified, organic whole is a complex undertaking (Cabe, January 2002, Online: Web)

NATION BUILDING PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

The term nation building is both old and new. It has been fashionable in the 1960s, and it is making it back center stage right now. Nation-Building always has been a highly complex term, encompassing the description of historical experiences, a set of assumptions about “development” of Third World societies, and the policies of governments of North and South that were driven, among other considerations, by the desire to control and expand their own power.

The historical debate about nation building had been closely linked to decolonization, especially in Africa, and then spread to other areas and policies, like being applied to Vietnam during the Vietnam War. After the process of decolonization mostly completed, nation building lost its appeal, both
politically and academically. Now, after the end of the Cold War and the
disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union, the concepts and terminology of
nation building are experiencing a revival: states have been falling apart, not
just in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, while other states (and
nation states) are being created, reinvented and recognized. In quite a few cases
we are witness to processes that actually do build state structures or Nations,
often on the ruins of their predecessors. In other instances we observe states
and multi-ethnic or more homogeneous societies fall apart and break up,
sometimes resulting in situations of civil war and chaos: “failing states”. These
cases have brought about a new desire at nation building, both internally and
internationally. The term “failing state” has been applied to many countries
during the last decade: Haiti, Palestine, Somalia, Bosnia, the Kosovo, several
successor-countries of the former Soviet Union (e.g. in Central Asia),
Afghanistan, South Africa etc. are only well known examples.

The question of nation building, therefore, again is of importance -
either because it is taking place, or because the lack of it is perceived as a key
factor in creating chaos and war. The relevance of nation building for local,
regional and international political processes at the beginning of the new
century does raise a set of empirical, analytical and political questions that are
not easy to answer. (Hippler, 2002, Online: Web)

Aspects of Terminology

To avoid conceptual and terminological confusion our starting point
should be to clarify the several layers of what nation building can mean.

Historically, we can observe that out of several and quite diverse forms
of rule and governance along tribal, feudal, personal and other lines “modern”
states (and a corresponding state system) have evolved, which generally are
centered around bureaucratic rationality. This trend was linked to a tendency that transferred very diverse and localized societies into nations — that is, integrating groups and communities of people and societies into political entities. The preliminary result was the preeminence of the nation state as the model and norm of political organization. These processes of nation building have been emulated in most Third World countries in very different circumstances and with diverse strategies and results. It is important to study and analyze these different approaches to nation building to learn about their respective opportunities and dangers. This approach is focusing on historical and empirical study: nation building has been and often still is an ongoing process in numerous societies. It can take decades, or even centuries to be completed, and the process may be relatively peaceful or dramatically violent.

- An alternative approach to nation building is a normative use of the term. In this context nation building is perceived as a strategy, generally for “development”. Originating from the “modernization theory” of Third World development the high time of this approach was in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Its starting point was the assumption, that successful development (following the Western, especially European model) is linked to specific political preconditions, like a functioning national government and state as agents of change and development. Also seen as crucial was an integration of societies along “national” lines, and the overcoming of “pre-modern” or “primordial” communities, often sweepingly termed “tribal”. In this sense, Nation building was (and sometimes still is) a strategy to economic (and political) development. In recent years, nation building often is perceived not just as an strategy to economic development, but also to political stability, especially in post-conflict situations.
Finally, nation building can be an approach to political dominance. This often is an aspect of the two points mentioned before, but is brought up as a separate argument here for its political importance. Nation building may be used by internal actors to strengthen their own power domestically or to politically integrate reluctant sectors of society into an existent or would-be “nation”. It also is being used by external actors (e.g. foreign governments) to build or stabilized influence in foreign societies or states, by linking nation building with deciding on the models, structures and personnel. A foreign government that can shape the framework, direction and pick the ruling elites in another country’s nation building efforts, will generally exercise considerable influence in this country’s affairs. (Hippler, 2002, Online: Web)

The term nation building, therefore, is used in very different contexts and with quite different intentions. Any analytical attempt to deal with Nation building has to keep these differences in mind and never confuse the several aspects of terminology. Otherwise the term might become useless because of the resulting confusion. (Hippler, 2002, Online: Web)

The most influential efforts of conceptualization and theorizing with regard to nation building were a series of studies of political development by the Almond-Pye Committee of the American Social Science Research Council. These studies represented a persistent and systematic endeavor to identify the process of change from the traditional tribal polity to the modern ‘bureaucratic-participant’ state. The Committee has itself given increasing attention to the peculiarities of developments in Europe and made attempts to incorporate the variations within Europe in a broader model of political modernization. (Berger, 2003, pp. 421-448) A number of attempts have been made amongst which Reinhard Bendix’s work on aspects of state formation and nation building in Germany, Russia, Japan and India; Robert Holt and John Turner’s
comparative work of England and Japan, France and China; Barrington Moore's analysis of the economic basis of political development in England, France, the United States and Germany, Russia, China, India and Japan; Seymour Martin Lipset's attempt at a comparison of the early stages of nation building in the United States with the current efforts of integration and consolidation in the newest states of Africa and Asia; and, Samuel Huntington's work on contrasts in the timing of social and political modernization are important in this regard. (Rokkan, 1971, pp. 8-10) Some of the approaches to nation building are given in the following:

The Total Systems Approach

The Total Systems Approach focuses on the interaction among the four primary components: force, culture, law and economy. Each of the poles in the two-dimensional field cutting across the centre-periphery axis corresponds to a set of functional pre-requisites for the development and maintenance of a territorial system. This means that there must be some form of organization for the protection of the borders through the use of force, there must be some degree of acceptance of some common culture, whether expressed in linguistic terms, in religious terms, or both; there must be some minimal standards for the adjudication of disputes and the control of deviant behaviour through law; and all these organizations for the maintenance of external borders and internal order must depend on some sort of accommodation with agencies in the economy. However, these prerequisites cannot all be established and reinforced at the same time. One can discern time phases in the struggle to establish or reinforce each prerequisite and identify sequences of crises over such issues. (Rokkan, 1971, pp. 8-10)
Samuel Huntington was a vehement critic of this approach for its excessive abstraction. According to him, the functional paradigm is too general and it does not help to generate hypotheses about the sources of variation among concrete territorial system. Attempts to overcome the abstraction of the total-system approach, to him, have gone in two very different directions: i) towards the establishment of models for the analyses of processes of change in the subject peripheries, and ii) towards the formulation of generalization about conflicts and coalitions among elites active in the building of territorial centres. (Rokkan, 1971, p. 14)

**Centre-Periphery Approach**

Karl Deutsch focused on the centre-periphery approach to nation building, which was primarily designed to predict variations in the extent of territorial-cultural integration through the joint, but not necessarily parallel, processes of national standardization and social mobilization. His model assumes some initial level of state formation through inter-elite coalitions. (Rokkan, 1971, p. 14) These studies help to underscore the importance of the 'centre' variables for the understanding of contrasts in nation building processes. Nationalization processes in the territorial peripheries are clearly conditioned by circumstances of cultural as well as physical distance and by the possibilities of concerted mobilization of local resources against the standardizing agencies but the contents of the communications spread through the actual or potential national territory are primarily determined by the centre forming collectivities. No typology of nation building processes can be developed without an analysis of variations in the structure and the functions of the territorial centres.
Among recent attempts at classification of the above mentioned structures, two deserve particular attention: Samuel Huntington's analysis of the contrasts between the United States and what he calls 'Europe' - primarily England, France, Prussia and Sweden - and, Peter Nettl'e effort to identify dimensions of 'stateness'. (Rokkan, 1971, p. 17)

Realist Approach

The realists understand international relations as primarily struggle among the great powers for domination and security. Realists have a high regard for the values of national security, state survival, and international order and stability. The normative core of realism is national security and state survival which are the values that drive realist doctrine and realist foreign policy. The state is thus seen as a protector of its territory, of the population, and of their distinctive and valued way of life. Human society and morality is confined to the state and does not extend into international relations, which is the political arena of considerable turmoil, discord, and conflict between states in which the great powers dominate everybody else. The national interest is the final arbiter in judging foreign policy. To realists, the main point of foreign policy is to project and defend the interests of the state in world politics. But states are not equal and on the contrary, there is an international hierarchy of power among states. (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999, p.77)

Realism is a theory, first about the security problems of sovereign states in an international anarchy, and second about the problem of international order. The normative core of realism is state survival and national security. If world politics continues to be organized on the basis of independent states with a small group of powerful states largely responsible for shaping the most
important international events, then it seems clear that realism will continue to be an important theory of international theory.

Realists believe that the goal of power, the means of power, and the use of power are a central preoccupation of political activity. International politics is thus portrayed as ‘power politics’. The conduct of foreign policy is an instrumental activity based on the intelligent calculation of one’s interests against the power and interests of rivals and competitors. ‘Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determines the technique of political action. That is, they will have to organize themselves into a capable and effective state by means of which they can defend their interests. The states lead to international anarchy and conflict. (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999, p.77)

**Neo-Realist Approach**

Neo-realism, being different from theory of realism, makes an attempt to explain international relations in scientific terms by reference to the unequal capabilities of states and the anarchical structure of the state system, and by focusing on the great powers whose relations determine the most important ‘outcomes’ of international politics.

The leading contemporary neorealist thinker, Kenneth Waltz, takes some elements of classical and neo-classical realism as a starting point that independent states existing and operating in a system of international anarchy. He, however, ignores its normative concerns and tries to provide a scientific theory of international relations. Unlike Morgenthau, he gives no account of human nature and thus ignores the ethics of state-craft. Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979) seeks to provide a scientific explanation of the
international political system. His approach is heavily influenced by positivist models of economics. A scientific theory of international relations leads us to expect states to behave in certain predictable ways. In Waltz's view, the best international relations theory is a neorealist systems theory that focuses centrally on the structure of the system, on its interacting units, and on the continuities and changes of the system. In classical realism, state leaders and their subjective valuations of international relations are at the center of attention. In neo-realism, the structure of the system, particularly the relative distribution of power is the central analytical focus. Actors are less important because structures compel them to act in certain ways. Structures more or less determine action. (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999, pp. 84-85)

According to Waltz's neorealist theory, a basic feature of international relations is the decentralized structure of anarchy between states. States are alike in all basic functional respects in spite of their different cultures or ideologies or Constitutions or personnel. They all perform the same basic tasks. All states have to collect taxes, conduct foreign policy, etc. States differ significantly only in regard to their greatly varying capabilities. In Waltz's own words, the state units of an international system are 'distinguished primarily by their greater or less capabilities for performing similar tasks... the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system's units' (Waltz 1979:97). In other words, changes at the international levels occur when great powers rise and fall and the balance of power shifts accordingly. A typical means of such change is great power war. (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999, pp. 84-85)

As indicated, Waltz takes classical and neo-classical realism as a starting point and develops some of its core ideas and assumptions. For example, he employs the concept of international anarchy and focuses exclusively on states.
He also focuses on the central feature of anarchical state systems: power politics. He assumes that the fundamental concern of states is security and survival. He also assumes that the major problem of great-power conflict is war, and that the major task of international relations among the great powers is that of peace and security. Waltz also assumes that states are worth fighting for. That, too, indicates that neo-realism is imbued with normative values: those of state security and survival. (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999, pp. 84-85)

John Mearsheimer (1993) takes up the neorealist argument of Waltz (1979) and applies it to both the past and future. He says that neo-realism has continued relevance for explaining international relations: neo-realism is a general theory that applies to other historical situations besides that of the Cold War. He also argues that neo-realism can be employed to predict the course of international history beyond the Cold War. Mearsheimer further says that the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union ‘was principally responsible for transforming a historically violent region into a very peaceful place’. (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999, pp. 89-91) Mearsheimer even argues that the demise of the bipolar Cold War order and the emergence of multi-polar world will produce a highly undesirable return to the bad old ways of European anarchy and instability and even a renewed danger of international conflict, crises and possibly war. He further said, “The West has interest in maintaining peace in Europe. It, therefore, has an interest in maintaining Cold War order, and hence has an interest in the continuation of the Cold War confrontation.” (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999, pp. 89-91) Mearsheimer’s thesis seems to be confirmed by the outbreak of conflict in the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in Serbia) and in the former Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Chechnya).
International Political Economy Approach

International Political Economy (IPE) is an academic discipline within the social sciences that analyzes international relations in combination with political economy. As an interdisciplinary field it draws on many distinct academic schools, most notably political science and economics, but also sociology, history, and cultural studies. Most scholars can concur that IPE is ultimately concerned with the ways in which political forces (states, institutions, individual actors, etc.) shape the systems through which economic interactions are expressed, and conversely the effects that economic interactions (including the power of collective markets and individuals acting both within and outside of) have upon political structures and outcomes. ("International Political Economy", Online: Web)

Economic strength is an important basis for political power. If economics is about the pursuit of wealth and politics about the pursuit of power, the two interact in complicated and puzzling ways. It is this complex interplay in the international context between politics and economics, between states and markets, which is the core of international political economy approach. There is a complex relationship between the politics and economics, between states and markets which is the essence of international political economy. There are three main theories of international political economy: mercantilism, Marxism and economic liberalism, which would be discussed in the following.

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1. Mercantilist Approach of International Political Economy: This theory is intimately connected to the establishment of the modern, sovereign state during the 16th and 177th centuries. Mercantilism was the world view of political elites that were at the forefront of building the modern state.
They took the view that economic activity is and should be subordinated to the primary goal of building a strong state. The defining feature of mercantilist thinking is that economics is a tool of politics, a basis for political power. Mercantilists see international economy as an arena of conflict between opposing national interests, rather than an area of cooperation, coordination, mutual trust and mutual gain. In brief, economic competition between states is a zero-sum game where one state’s gain is another state’s loss. And states have to be worried about relative economic gain, because the material wealth accumulated by one state can serve as basis for military political power which can be used against other states. (Doornbos and Kaviraj, 1997, p. 11)

2. Marxist Framework for Study of International Political Economy: Marxists agree with mercantilists that politics and economics are closely intertwined. Both reject the liberal view of an economic sphere operating under its own laws. But where mercantilists see economics as a tool of politics, Marxists put economics first and politics second. According to this approach: (Doornbos and Kaviraj, 1997, p. 11)

a) States are not autonomous; they are driven by ruling-classic interests, and capitalist states are primarily driven by the interests of their respective bourgeoisie. It means that struggles between states, including wars, should be seen in the economic context of competition between capitalist classes of different states. For Marxists, class conflict is more fundamental than conflict between states.

b) As an economic system, capitalism is expansive, always on the search for new markets and more profit. Because classes cut
across state borders class conflicts is not confined to states; instead, it expands around the world in the wake of capitalism. Such expansion first took the form of imperialism and colonization, but it continues after the colonies have been granted independence. It now takes the form of economic globalization led by giant transnational and multinational corporations. The history of international political economy can thus be seen by Marxists as the history of capitalist expansion across the globe.

3. Liberal Economic Idea of the Market: The international political system provides the necessary framework for economic activities. Although economic forces are real and have profound effect on the distribution of wealth and power in the world, they always work in the context of the political struggle among groups and nation. This view is combined with the liberal economic idea of the market as an autonomous sphere of society, with possibilities for economic interdependence and exchange to be mutually beneficial for the parties involved.

4. A hegemonic and dominant military and economic power is necessary for creation and full development of a liberal world market economy, because in the absence of such a power liberal rules cannot be enforced. This is also known as the theory of hegemonic stability, which has subscribed to the economic aspects of mercantilism. But hegemonic stability theory is not pure mercantilism. There is also a liberal element: the dominant power does not merely manipulate international economic relations for its own sake; it creates an open world economy based on free trade which is to the benefit of all participating states. The version of the theory we present here was first set out by Charles Kindleberger (1973) and then further developed by Robert Gilpin (1987). Robert Keohane, a prominent scholar of this approach, has argued that
hegemonic power helped establish international cooperation in such areas as finance, trade and oil. (Doornbos and Kaviraj, 1997, p. 11)

International political economy approach also addresses the issue of sovereign statehood: the national economy is a crucially important resource base for the nation-state. When national economies are being integrated into a global economy in the course of economic globalization, the basis of modern statehood might be expected to change in significant ways. (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999, pp. 176-178) A growing level of economic interconnection between two national economies, for example in the form of more external trade or foreign investment, is one aspect of economic globalization. We might call it 'intensified interdependence'. But there is an additional aspect which signifies a shift towards a truly global economic system. Intensified economic interdependence involves more of the same, in the sense that economic intercourse between national economies increase. Cox finds that in the process of economic globalization nation-states have lost substantial power over the economy. They are of significantly diminished importance compared to non-territorial political-economic power. No longer is the nation-state a 'bulwark of buffer protecting the domestic economy from harmful exogenous influences'; rather, it has become 'a transmission belt from world economy to domestic economy.' (Doornbos and Kaviraj, 1997, p. 11)

**DIMENSIONS OF NATION BUILDING**

Lucian W. Pye has extensively talked about the different dimensions of nation building. The problems of nation building thus seem to reside in the political culture and which reflects both the historical evolution of the society and the psychological reactions to social change of the society's political actors. In transitional societies, the mixture of sentiments and modes of
calculation governing the flow of decisions and actions and providing the substance of the political culture is determined in part by the universal qualities of the modernization process and in part by the essence of the particular culture. This distinction between general processes and particular experiences, and the differing possible relationships between the two, points to the conflicting demands on the attention of the social scientists. They must show equal appreciation of both the universal aspects of the nation building process and the subtle realities of the particular context. (Pye, 1962, p. xvi)

Transition is a period of personal insecurity, for millions must make frightening adjustments in their personal perspectives on life. Never has the extent of basic social change touched the lives of so many, shaking the intellectual, moral, and emotional foundations of their individual worlds. In addition to suffering the pain and discomfort of being torn from the old and the known, they are confronted with the most basic of human issues, that of individual integrity and personal identity. The need for self-identity produces the need for a nation-state, and the need for reassurance of individual worth produces the need for a politics of status - and yet such a politics is inconsistent with the requirements of nation building. The problems of transitional societies - the interwoven political, social, and personal frustrations, the urge to press forward clouded by uncertainty, the lack of consensus or national coherence - possess the elements of a great historical drama, and the task of nation building in the new countries is widely recognized as one of the critical issues of the times. (Pye, 1962, p. 6)

The spirit of the new countries has not been unambiguously creative and positive; it has elements of fear and the sense of possible peculiar mixture of elation and anxiety, of hope and frustration, of aspiration and apathy. During the time of their subjugation, they could identify a single cause for all their
misfortunes: colonialism. Those who subscribed to such neo-Marxist views had the same expectations as the Western liberals: both believed that progress and national development would follow naturally and automatically upon the removal of the artificial restraints of colonial domination. (Pye, 1962, pp. 8-9)

The immediate problems of nation building are clearly a part of profound historical developments in which the spirit of traditional communities must give way to the ethos of modern forms for organizing human life, and their comprehension calls for a multidimensional and multidisciplinary approach. Although nation building is essentially a domestic process, it comes about in response to international forces. Societies throughout history have generated change, and cultures have mingled; the distinctive character of social change in the new countries of today is that it is occurring largely in response to the diffusion of what we may call a world culture based upon modern science and technology, modern practices of organisation, and modern standards of governmental performance. It is helpful to think of all of these elements of the modern world as representing a culture, for from the point of view of the society as a whole or of the individual personality they are related to each other in much the same coherent fashion as the elements of a culture are felt to be. The concept of culture is also helpful in that it suggests that there may be an inner logical to the process of change and that the act of becoming a part of the modern world is in essence a process of acculturation. (Pye, 1962, p. 10) This means that the process of nation building in the new countries is neither autonomous in its dynamics nor free to select at random its goals. The impact of the modern world on traditional societies has been a pressure in set directions. And this has become increasingly the situation as the gap in technology has widened between the participants in the world culture and the more tradition-bound peoples. (Pye, 1962, p. 11)
The transfer of sovereignty puts together an effective social system. Thus at the heart of the problem of nation building is the question of how the diffusion of the world culture can be facilitated while its disruptive consequences are minimized. Historically, the emergence of new nation-states has always been accompanied by more or less serious disruptions of the international system. Generally, there were disruptions which followed from new nations asserting the power and realities of their new sovereignties, but the international system can also be strained by the weaknesses of new states, by the legal recognition of new sovereignties involving peoples who lack many of the classic attributes of sovereign communities. (Pye, 1962, p. 13) Among the most powerful influences of the traditional order in any society in transition is the survival of a pattern of political relationships largely determined by the pattern of social and personal relations, with the inevitable result that the political struggle tends to revolve around issues of prestige, influence, and even of personalities, and not primarily around questions of alternative courses of policy action. (Pye, 1962, p. 16)

The lack of a distinct political sphere and the tendency for political parties to have world views together influence tend to be personal cliques. Thus, although general considerations of social status determine the broad outlines of power and influence, the particular pattern of political relationship at any time is largely determined by decisions made at the personal level. This is the case because the social structure in non-Western societies is characterized by functionally diffused relationships; individuals and groups do not have sharply defined and highly specific functions and thus do not represent specific interests that distinguish them from other groupings. There is no clearly structured setting that can provide a focus for the more refined pattern of day-to-day political activities. Hence, in arriving at their expectations
about the probable behaviour of others, those involved in the political process must rely heavily upon judgments about personality and the particular relations of the various actors to each other. It follows that the pattern of personal associations provides one of the firmest guides for understanding and acting within the political process, and that personal cliques are likely to become the key units of political decision making in most non-Western societies. (Pye, 1962, p. 16)

For this study, it is important to begin with that powerful tradition of Western social philosophy in which it is assumed that all societies can be classified according to a dichotomous scheme and in which all significant social and cultural changes are seen as related to the movement of a society from the one category to the other. There have, of course, been a host of labels for the two categories, each emphasizing different elements of the typologies: traditional and rational, rural and urban, agricultural and industrial, primitive and civilized, static and dynamic, sacred and secular, folk and urban, societa and civitas, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, communal and associational, traditional and modern. (Pye, 1962, p. 16) At the very dawn of the industrial revolution, some social thinkers recognized the fundamental changes taking place in their societies. In articulating the changes of their time, they provided us with the concepts, and even with many of the terms, that still dominate our thinking about the processes of social, economic, and political development. As early as 1861, Sir Henry Maine identified the two types of societies and postulated that all progress involved a movement from the "status" to the "contact" type. (Pye, 1962, p. 33)

In 1893, Emile Durkheim, the father of modern sociology, characterized the traditional order as having a "mechanical" form of solidarity which was based on the sharing of common attitudes and sentiment and in which legal
authority had to be “repressive”. Instead of the class struggle of Marx, Durkheim saw the diversity of the modern plural society as providing the individual with unlimited opportunities for self-development and the expression of individual genius. A central contribution of Durkheim to any theory of nation building was the proposition that a national consensus built on merely a common set of shared values would always be more fragile and more open to authoritarian rule than one built on the need to aggregate the diverse but intensely real interests of all the elements of a society. Durkheim thus pointed to the fundamental importance of social roles and their relationships in the development of the modern and more complex society, and to the fact that the differentiation of roles increases rather than decreases the solidarity of a society. (Pye, 1962, p. 35)

It remained for Max Weber, however, to bring together the stands in the tradition of dichotomous schemes of social development. In addition to elaborating, the distinctive qualities of the traditional and the rational-legal forms of authority, Weber identified the charismatic form of authority with its emphasis upon the affectual type of social action. But probably an even greater contribution was his suggestion that there is an inner coherence to all societies in the form of a systematic relationship among the social, economic, legal, and political forms of behaviour on the one hand and the non-rational spirit or ethos of the society, as best expressed in its religion, on the other. (Pye, 1962, pp. 35-36)

The story of the diffusion of the world culture has been one of countless efforts to establish modern organizational forms in traditional, status-oriented societies. Viewed in these terms, the apparently diverse activities of the Western businessmen and the Western educator, the colonial administrator and the missionary, and the activities of the leaders of nationalist movements and
the officials of new governments have a common element. For all of them in their separate and often mutually antagonistic ways have been endeavoring to build highly differentiated and formally structured organizations in tradition-bound societies, and thus all of their efforts represent the very essence of social change in transitional societies. (Pye, 1962, p. 38)

Nation building itself involves more than just the establishment of that most complex of modern organizations, the machinery of state; it also entails the creation of a host of organizations within the society. In the political sphere, these would range from organizations capable of articulating the various interests of the society to those capable of aggregating these interests in the form of public policies which can become in turn the directives for guiding the organization of the state. In the economic sphere, modernization involves the formation of a multitude of other types of organizations: firms and factories, systems of communication and transportation, and above all the sensitive market. (Pye, 1962, p. 39) Modernization entails the development of an array of organizations that can provide the individual with the necessary range of choices for association, so that whenever he steps beyond the family he can find opportunities to test his talents and to find his full identity as a social and a psychological being.

The main problem of nation building lies in the interrelationships among personality, culture, and the polity. A cardinal assumption running throughout Western theory and as strong today as it was with the classical thinkers is that natural and presumably self-evident connections exist between state and society which dictate that the shape and form of any polity are only a reflection of the basic characteristics of the society at large. According to this view each society or culture, according to its peculiar genius, produces its distinctive political institutions, and these institutions continue thereafter to take their life
from the dynamic forces which are in contention throughout the society. Although governmental actions in response to these pressures can, in turn, affect the development of the society, the dynamic element is usually assumed to lie permanently within the society. Thus the relationship between state and society is seen as an equilibrium system in which the social processes generate political processes, which become the “inputs” and make demands on the governmental processes, which constitute the “outputs”. (Pye, 1962, pp. 42-43)

The gradual diffusion of a world culture has touched and transformed the realm of politics in all societies, and the whole range of modern political roles - from the civil servant on the planning board to the administrator in the district, from the cabinet minister and leader of political parties to the local party organizer - have appeared in transitional societies not through response to the internal needs of the society itself, but in response to supranational and foreign concepts of the appropriate standards of modern governmental and political behaviour.

PROCESSES OF NATION BUILDING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES

The ‘nation’ was the product of a long and complicated process of historical development in Europe. It was a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. Many of these ties could be mutually substitutable. Some are playing a particularly important role in one nation building process, and no more than a subsidiary part in others. But among them, three stand out as irreplaceable: (i) a ‘memory’ of some common past, treated as a ‘destiny’ of the group or at least of its core constituents; (ii)
linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; (iii) a conception of the equality of all members of the group organised as a civil society. (Hroch, March/April-1993, pp. 4-5)

In the second case, the onset of the modern stage of nation building can be dated from the moment when selected groups within the non-dominant ethnic community started to discuss their own ethnicity and to conceive of it as a potential nation-to-be. Sooner or later, they observed certain deficits, which the future nation still lacked, and began efforts to overcome one or more of them, seeking to persuade their compatriots of the importance of consciously belonging to the nation. (Hroch, March/April-1993, pp. 5-6)

Nationalism later became a significant force in this region, as a type of power politics with irrationalist overtones. But the programme of the classic national movement was of another kind. Its goals covered three main groups of demands, which corresponded to felt deficits of national existence: (i) the development of a national culture based on the local language, and its normal use in education, administration and economic life; (ii) the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration, initially in the form of autonomy and ultimately (usually quite late, as an express demand) of independence; and (iii) the creation of a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group, including educated elites, an officialdom and an entrepreneurial class, but also- where necessary-free peasants and organised workers. (Hroch, March/April-1993, p. 6)

Any such explanation must begin with the prelude' to modern nation building that lies in the late medieval and early modern epochs, which was of great moment not only for the nation states of the West, but also for those
ethnic groups that remained or became dominated by ‘external’ ruling classes in the Centre and East of the continent, or elsewhere. In historical reality, there were many transitional cases between these two ideal types. A large number of medieval polities with their own written languages did not develop successfully into state-nations, but on the contrary, lost their autonomy partly or completely, while their populations generally retained their ethnicity. This was true of the Czechs, Catalans, Norwegians, Croats, Bulgarians, Welsh, Irish and others. (Hroch, March/April-1993, p. 6)

The legacy of the first stage of a nation building process often left significant resources for the second. These included, in particular, the following:

1) Very often, certain relics of an earlier political autonomy remained, though appropriated by members of estates belonging to the ‘ruling’ nation, and generated tensions between the estates and absolutism that sometimes provided triggers for later national movements. This pattern could be observed in many parts of Europe during the late 18th century - for example, in the resistance of the Hungarian, Bohemian and Croatian estates to Josephine centralism, the reaction of the nobility in Finland to Gustav III’s “new absolutism”, the opposition of the Protestant landowners in Ireland to English centralisation, or the response of the local bureaucracy in Norway to Danish absolutism.

2) The ‘memory’ of former independence or statehood, even situated far in the past, could play an important role in stimulating national historical consciousness and ethnic solidarity. This was the very first argument employed in the Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Finland, Bulgaria, and Catalonia.

In many cases, the medieval written language had more or less survived, making it easier to develop the norm of a modern language with its own
literature, as proved to be the case with Czech, Finnish or Catalan, among others. However, the contrast between cases of this legacy and its absence was much exaggerated in the nineteenth century, when it was sometimes claimed it corresponded to a distinction between ‘historical’ and ‘unhistorical’ peoples, whereas in fact its salience was limited to the tempo at which historical consciousness of the nation now arose. (Hroch, March/April-1993, pp. 8-9)

The most disastrous consequence of the classic national movements of the region was their role in helping to precipitate the World War I. Today, critics of the ‘new nationalism’ in Central and Eastern Europe warn of the dangers of a repetition of this fatal sequence. What they forget, however, is that it was the nationalist policies of the Great Powers which essentially brought about the War. The conflicts between small states and their nationalist politicians were little more than kindling used by these powers.

The basic precondition of all national movements - yesterday and today- is a deep crisis of the old order, with the breakdown of its legitimacy and of the values and sentiments that sustained it. In the case of the current movements, this crisis is combined with economic depression and the threat of widespread social decline, generating increasing popular distress. But in both periods, another crucial element of the situation is a low level of political culture and experience among the broad mass of the population. The coincidence of these three conditions-societal crisis, economic recession, political inexperience - is specific to the contemporary conjuncture, when its effects have been intensified by the great increase in the density and speed of social communication. (Hroch, March/April-1993, pp. 8-9)

Contemporary ‘ethno-nationalism’ is mainly a phenomenon of small ethnic groups or nations. 19th century and first half of the 20th century
witnessed the development of ethnic nationalism, the most prominent factors of which are features of ethnicity and their crystallization into ethnic communities and the impact of nationalist ideology. (Smith, 1993, p. 37) It envisioned the creation of the nation with the spirit of a cultural community based on common descent, language, religion, customs and history. (Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001, p. 30) Dawa Norbu described ethno-nationalism as a politicized social consciousness focusing on an ethnic identity born out of shared commonalities, seeking to achieve unity, autonomy and group interests by mobilizing ethnic based constituencies. (Norbu, 1992, p. 181) Central to this definition is a notion of ethnic identity which may be defined as an aggregation of race, culture, language and society, by which the ethnic group differentiates itself from others. (Norbu, 1992, p. 181) Basic social pre-requisites of ethno-nationalism as expressed by Dawa Norbu are:

- A complex yet unfragmented society that provides the social basis for national unity and integrity;
- Socially shared fundamental cultural values that form the psychological basis of general will;
- A common language or system wide symbols that facilitate social communication;
- Considerable stratification and literacy rate so that nationalist leadership may emerge;
- A pan-ethnic identity that transcends tribal or other particularistic identities. (Norbu, 1992, p. 205)

The current literature on ethnicity and nationalism emphasises the importance of national myths in cementing a would-be monolingual and
monocultural group as a solid cohesive community. Although some authors are optimistic that this task can be accomplished ‘without viewing the others as competitors and antagonists’, homeland myths in particular tend to be exclusive, squeezing out rival groups from the picture and delegitimizing their claims to the territory in question. Moreover, the more a group insists on its distinctiveness and peculiarities for the sake of stronger consolidation and solidarity, the more it tends to oppose itself to other ‘alien’ groups. In the modern world ‘difference implies hierarchy’ and ‘otherness ... implies a moral judgment’ more often than not. Previous rivalries are revived and catalogued in order to assess a group’s current state of security. As a result, a group either establishes hierarchical relationships between itself and others in order to take a superior position, or dehumanises the outsider in general. (Smith et al, 1998, pp.48-49)

NATION BUILDING IN TRANSCAUCASIA

The above mentioned theoretical understandings will certainly act as a model for Transcaucasian states, which are in a process of transition. The Transcaucasian Soviet Federative (or Federated) Socialist Republic was a short-lived (1922-1936) Soviet republic, consisting of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which were traditionally known as the Transcaucasian Republics in the Soviet Union. The capital of the Republic was Tbilisi. The republic's roots date back to the dissolution of the Russian Empire in 1917, during the Russian Revolution, when the provinces of the Caucasus seceded and attempted to form their own federal state called the Transcaucasian Federation. Competing national interests and war with Turkey led to the disbanding of the republic in April 1918. In the following years, the three constituent territories went through the civil war with heavy involvement of the Red Army, and emerged as Soviet Republics. In March 1922, the area was reunited as a union of Soviet
republics. It was reorganized as a single republic in December of that year. In 1936, the republic was dissolved and the three regions became the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan SSR respectively.

The most important task before these states is how to create a new identity for themselves in the post-Soviet space. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are commonly grouped together under a common label - “the South Caucasus.” But evidence of such unity is hard to find on the streets of the nations’ capitals. There are a few examples of the three nations-briefly coming together into a single political unit. There was a short-lived federation established in 1918, prior to Sovietization. Later, there was the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, which existed within the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1936. But it is also clear that in the post-Soviet years, the three countries have proved more different than alike. (Asatiani, June 2007, Online: Web)

Nation building efforts that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union led to increased emphasis on religious identities. This exposed differences among the three states, with Azerbaijan a primarily Muslim country, and Armenia and Georgia adhering to different branches of Christianity. Likewise, newfound nationalism led to intellectual disputes over cultural heritage. Ultimately, despite their geographic proximity, the three countries have generally fared poorly at interstate cooperation. Azerbaijan and Georgia have forged some energy-transport deals, and Baku provided much-needed energy supplies to Tbilisi during its standoff with Russia. But otherwise, relations in the neighborhood have not always been neighborly. Despite all the friction, however, the concept of a unified South Caucasus region is still widely held in international politics. Many analysts cite the states’ smallness and minimal global influence as reasons they are often bunched together. Another, according
to psychologist Gaga Nizharadze, is that taking a regional approach significantly simplifies things for outsiders. (Asatiani, June 2007, Online: Web)

The problem arises when national or ethnic identity is predicated on a form of imagined community that reifies the importance of national or ethnic boundaries to the detriment of the wider political community. In this regard, there is as yet only limited evidence to suggest that the post-Soviet borderland states are on the threshold of entering such a post-national era in which national and ethnic identities have been superseded by understandings of cultural difference based on a broader and more inclusive vision of political community diminished, national identities continue to be caught up in power struggles, leadership elections, legislative acts and the state distribution of social goods. In short, the ethnification or racialisation of identity politics remains an important ingredient of borderland politics and cultural life. If, as Simon During notes, ‘the post-colonial desire is the desire of decolonised communities for an identity’, then that identity in the post-Soviet borderlands is being shaped as much by the ethnic politics of exclusion and division as it is by inclusion and coexistence. (Smith et al, 1998, pp. 1-3)

Thus, in the most extreme cases, nation building has become caught up in a form of identity politics which is designed to produce and reproduce nationally defined contours of community and to reflect nationally defined interests and values predicated on fulfilling a normative concept of statehood in which nation and state should be spatially congruent. Such political practices have also resulted in members of national minorities being disadvantaged and in their informal exclusion form important spheres of public life.

There is now a commonly held assumption in the literature that the post-Soviet borderland states, having secured sovereign control over their national
homelands, have entered a new phase in their histories. While the centre was engaged in institutional state-building and creating all-union symbols of nationhood, one of the major paradoxes of the Soviet Union was that it provided the social space for nation building at the ethno-regional scale. Thus, in federalising what became the Soviet Union, Lenin in effect bequeathed to the ethno-republics the institutional space to carry out limited 'nationalising' policies. This was affirmed in the practice of encouraging the upward mobility of native within their own national homelands through affirmative action policies (*korenizatsiia*) that contributed to the indigenisation of the local political leadership and to the growth or consolidation of an indigenous intelligentsia through preferential access to higher education and to membership of the local Communist Party.

As a result of union republic status, each of the borderland republics was provided with a degree of institutional protection that enabled their native languages and cultures to flourish. Not only did such a form of institutionalised nation building facilitate the preservation and reproduction of established niches for incumbents drawn from the indigenous cultures, it also enabled nationality divisions to remain an integral part and reference point of native public life and an organisational basis for reinforcing local national identities. In some instances, notable in Central Asia, by federalising ethnic homelands into ethno-republics, the Soviet state actually created nations whose sense of nationness had previously barely existed. Moreover, this form of nation building encouraged nation builders to think of the ethno-republic as the identity-marker of their homeplace.

Where the centrally imposed federal map did not coincide with national boundaries, where ethnic minorities either found themselves on the wrong side of an ethnic border or found their ancestral homeland incorporated into such an
ethno-republic, such encouragement to selective nation building was to prove highly problematic following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In short, the nature of the federation exposes the post-Soviet nationalist myth that for the borderland states the process of nation building was interrupted by Soviet rule and could begin only in 1991. (Smith et al, 1998, pp. 5-6) In the post-Soviet period, Transcaucasia has been especially prone to inter-ethnic conflict, as communities have sought to redefine their relations with neighbouring localities characterised by a mosaic of interwoven communities whose understandings of sovereign space do not sit easily with the complex realities of ethnic geography.

Ethnogenetic studies began in Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1940s, but their starting points, goals and basic historical resources were quite different. First, the Armenian historiographical tradition can be traced back to the first millennium AD, whereas the Azerbaijani historiographical tradition was really established only in 20th century. Secondly, the Armenians can refer to the Kingdom of Tigran the Great (95-56 BC) as the cradle of their statehood, whereas Azerbaijanis have no real past polity to celebrate before the establishment of the Azerbaijan. Finally, the Armenians have been known as a distinct ethnic group with their own proper name since the first millennium BC. The consolidation of the Azerbaijanis as a coherent ethnic group took place only after the 1920s.

From the very beginning, ethnogenetic studies have had different meanings for Armenians and Azerbaijanis. For the Armenians, their purpose was to help recover from the genocide of 1915 and to provide psychological

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2 The Armenian Genocide, also known as the Armenian Holocaust, the Armenian Massacres and, by Armenians, the Great Calamity refers to the deliberate and systematic destruction (genocide) of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire during and just after World War I. It was characterised by the use of massacres, and the use of deportations involving
protection against the "Turkic threat", in part by identifying the Azerbaijanis indiscriminately and erroneously with the Turkish people. On the other hand, for the Azerbaijanis the purpose of ethnogenetic studies was to establish their own distinct national identity, as the Soviet authorities were deeply hostile to any manifestations of pan-Turkism.

In the case of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, scholars have talked about the historic grievances of both communities. The French historian Papin described in 1824 the 'state of perpetual hostility' in which the Abkhaz were living 'with their neighbours the Russians from Doudjouk-Kal and the Mingrelians'. Events such as the Caucasian war, which ended in 1864, the deportation of a large part of the Abkhaz population by the Tsarist regime in the wake of the failed uprisings of 1866 and 1877, the Georgian colonization of the country and the establishment of Soviet rule, are grievances still held by Abkhaz today. The subjugation of the Abkhaz by stronger powers such as Russia, Georgia or the Soviet regime failed to secure their loyalty even though it was usually enshrined in some kind of treaty. (Coppieters, September 1999, Online: Web)

At the end of 1991 Georgia was plunged into a civil war in which President Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted by his former supporters and later replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Foreign Minister. In Abkhazia the majority of the Georgian population had supported Gamsakhurdia, and was, moreover, involved in a severe conflict with the Abkhaz representatives. Explaining the roots of the conflict in terms of forced marches under conditions designed to lead to the death of the deportees, with the total number of Armenian deaths generally held to have been between one and one-and-a-half million. Other ethnic groups were similarly attacked by the Empire during this period, including Assyrians and Greeks, and some scholars consider the events to be part of the same policy of extermination.
legitimacy calls for the creation of a federative system - a 'common state', which would be based on the principles of liberty, equality and self-government for all major national communities. The negotiations on political status may be combined with the other two conflict resolution strategies - the development of a more civic approach to state and nation building and a neutral foreign policy. The creation of a pluralistic and democratic ethno federal system, accommodating the claims of all national communities, could prevent the destructive consequences of ethnic nationalism. (Coppieters, September 1999, Online: Web)

Owing to its national bias, the current historiography strains to fashion a coherent treatment of the past of heterogeneous Caucasus that has many differences. A comparison of several new versions of the history of traits, limitations and solutions to the ever-present dilemma of finding a suitable framework for preparing historical works that can satisfy the nationalising aspirations of the politicians while remaining true to the awareness of learned men and women about the reality of nation building that was undertaken by the Soviets in the recent past.

In firmly linking nationality to the notion of ethnic homeland, the practitioners of Soviet ideology, generated a belief system which held that each titular nation is indivisibly connected through its putative history to a particular territory that is the natural patrimony of that notion. In addition to acting as primary symbols of newly acquired sovereignty, an unwritten premise of the constitutions of the Transcaucasian Republics is to ensure the political pre-eminence of the titular nations and provide special protection for their cultures. This unwritten premise is manifest in certain formulations that set apart the titular nation from the citizenry at large. (Coppieters, September 1999, Online: Web)
The above-mentioned state/nation building models can be effectively applicable to Transcaucasus states as these states are in a transition. Building the nation requires more pragmatic approach, as conflict has to be resolved and different elements are to be assimilated. A closer look at the history of Transcaucasus in general and Azerbaijan in particular reveals such tendencies. Most of the Transcaucasus states have never shown the character of a nation state. One has to unravel those historical processes to have an understanding of present day nation building process in Azerbaijan.