CHAPTER -II
MULTI-DIMENSIONAL EFFECT OF POST-SOCIALIST
SYSTEMIC TRANSFORMATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The unpredicted demise of Soviet and east European socialist systems, the disintegration of bipolar international relations and the unification of Germany are now form parts of history. But these events have a range of long-term consequences which are quite natural subject of investigation by scholars and researchers. The ‘third wave of democracy’ sweeping across central and eastern Europe and their acceptance of market economy set in motion the evaluation of a distinct socio-political and economic system. The infant democracies have almost completed the phase of transition in the region and have been able to set in motion a variety of important ‘aspects’ of political development by the turn of the century.

During the primary phase of transition they all faced various problems related to the dismantling of non-democratic governments and party apparatus. Along with it they

---

15 The term Central Eastern Europe has been used to describe a complex of geographical, historical and political conglomeration of states of Europe which are positioned between Germany and Russia. These states are time to time subjected to the direct influence of these two countries (Germany and Russia). After the Second World War the USSR brought almost all these countries into his hegemonic sphere of influence. The scholars like Jerzy Tomaszewski (1989) in his work The Socialist regimes of east Central Europe: Their establishment and consolidation 1944–1967, Routledge: London and Gordon Skilling (1966) in his work The Governments of Communist East Europe, Thomas Y. Crowell Company: New York, defined the region, which has several historical common features. In the past, the major factor affecting this region was that, eastward of conventional borderline running along the River Elba and further up to Trieste. In this region serfdom predominated in the final stage of feudalism, and this resulted in feudal conditions that remain here longer than in most west European countries. They described almost all eastern Europeans shared in common backwardness of economic development that condemned most of them, whatever their nationality or location, to a life of hard work and poverty. In the interwar years, the continent was divided distinctly into what had been called ‘the two Europe, the farming and the industrial’. However, another group of scholar divided Europe into two parts after Second World War. Their division was become prominent after the division of Berlin which leads to creation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Despite the forced industrialization these countries remained as the European periphery in relation to the North-west core. But after the end of Cold War these countries tried to assimilate themselves to the European Union (EU) and the NATO respectively. Consequently, the countries preferably wanted to identify as part of Europe and occasionally mentioned in this thesis as Central eastern European Countries (CEECs). In this thesis the CEECs includes, the Hungary, the Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovakia, the Romania and the Bulgaria.
developed new constitutional order, electoral system, democratically-oriented bureaucracy, a multi-party system, a legitimate parliament and regular free elections. On the other hand, they tried to address problems rooted in the socio-economic history of the region, e.g., ethnic and religious conflicts and other regional problems. Now, these countries were almost assured to establish democratic tradition in matter of governance and practicing more or less all the standard democratic norms prescribed by the European Union (EU) and other intergovernmental organisations like the United Nations (UN) and the International Momentary Fund (IMF).

This scientifically implies that the ‘third wave of democracy’ flooded the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) with new democratic and liberal values. This indicated the end of ideological division of world; Communism was declared to be ‘dead’ and it ended the history\textsuperscript{16}, where capitalism had triumphed. All of the six countries of Central and East Europe almost finished their journey to ‘transition’ and performed satisfactorily in ‘consolidating democracy’ to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU. In the phase of transition they changed their authoritarian regime to liberal, non-democratic to democratic and economy changed from planned to market. The phase is full of volatility and institutions are in the process of flux. The period was critical to impending life of new institutions; their authority and especially in relation to their power sharing.

The interval between authoritarian regime and establishment of democratic governance has almost taken a finishing shape. The formal abolition of the party’s power monopoly is over and political pluralism is very much welcome. The establishment of electoral process and holding up of free election in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia was almost over by 1991. The joining of 10 countries in EU on May 1, 2004 that indicated democratic consolidation was deepening in this area. All these countries achieved the political criteria for accession, as laid down by the Copenhagen European

\textsuperscript{16} The phrase pronounced by Fukuyama is referring to the history of systematic thought about legitimate first principles governing political and social organisation. His argument is primarily a normative one. At the end of the twentieth century, the combination of liberal democracy and capitalism has proved superior in fact and morally to any alternative political/economic system and reason lies in its ability to satisfy the basic drives of human nature( desire for goods and wealth)
Council which need, ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’. By updating all the conditionalities and democratic necessities they almost updated themselves with political development parameters.

There were essentially few common causes which finally led to the demise of the communist socio-political systems. First, there was massive economic incompetence. It was clear that the planned economy had proved incompetent against capitalist economy prevailing in West. The intervention of state in production and distribution had created an artificial situation of growth and economic prosperity among all strata of society. Despite growth in heavy industry, science and space technology, Soviet and Eastern European economy lagged behind as compare to their Western counterparts. It was particularly, due to technological revolution and computerisation in mid-1970s occurring in the West. Second, there was a complete collapse of ideological legitimisation of Marxist-Leninist political system. It definitely meant that Communist party rule enjoyed limited legitimacy. For Marxists, liberal democracy was sham—ideological dressing mask of an oppressive bourgeoisie dictatorship. Thus, accordingly communist states neither nurtured any opposition or institution as an alternative to govern or uplift any institutions other than monopoly party apparatus. While establishing party as vanguard of workers the Communist states neglected the very essence of modern democratic nation-states, for example, multi party system, politics of checks and balance, delegation of power to federations and rule of law. The tendency for over centralisation and strong desire for party discipline gave no space for liberty and freedom.

Third, there was a structural incapacity to adjust to new problems due to lack of institutional device to adapt to the new situation. They denounced any market mechanism: supply and demand in production and distribution and specially individual to hold private property became the ricochet for the system to exist for long. Fourth, on the other hand, the socialist system long neglected the issue of human rights, especially the issue of civil and political rights, which were very basic for the growth of civic society. Finally, the conclusion of Helsinki Accord had posed the strong movement for human
rights and civil liberty in the environment. The ‘self-determination’ clause of it also open-
up the flood gate of ‘nationalist’ outrage to independent nationhood and recognition of
individual as citizen.

To understand the process of political transformation in Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, the chapter will analyse the factors responsible
for it. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part includes the external factors,
the so called Gorbachev factor, political and ideological factor, role of EU, NATO, and
the role of Western media and role of U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). The second part discusses the internal factors like the dissident movements,
role of nationalism and other historical factors responsible for it. The end of the chapter
deals with historical factors responsible for transformation and changes took place in
CEECs region till 2006.

There is a definite relationship between the changes in the Soviet Union under
Gorbachev and the development that happened in Central Eastern Europe during 1980s.
It is not possible to find a satisfactory explanation for democratic consolidation in central
and Eastern Europe without reference to the role of external factors.

II.1 The Gorbachev Factor
The Soviet interest in Eastern Europe can be described as closely related to the Cold War
era international politics which the world was divided in two blocs. In that time
assimilation of the Eastern European state to Socialistic bloc headed by Soviet Union was
their strength. These countries were geo-strategically located near the former Soviet
Russia and economically developed. So, primary Soviet interest was to protect the Soviet
Union from the Western incursions and include these countries into socialist bloc. The
27th CPSU Congress had proved itself as double bonanza for domestic and military
alliance of Soviet Union and their satellite states. In this Party Congress Gorbachev
rejected the use of force against any other state to protect socialism. He rejected the
Brezhnev doctrine\textsuperscript{17} and emphasised on the individual development of a socialist country. With this he emphasised on unconditional respect for the right of all people to choose their own path of development. Still he had not pronounced the end of communism or initiation of these East European states on capitalist path; instead he wanted to reform socialism which was loosing its foothold due to its lack of legitimacy and dying its own death due to its own inner contradictions. He pronounced domestic democratisation (\textit{perestroika} and \textit{glasnost}) which proved crucial for Eastern Europe to accept socialist state system with some amount of humanism and communism.

Introduction of these two tools geared up a new environment of change and brought forward acceleration in policy process of every state in central and Eastern Europe. The policy of \textit{Perestroika} was an attempt to break down the planned economy, creating a dependable and effective mechanism for acceleration of social and economic progress and giving society a new dynamism. The domestic democratisation in the Soviet Union has succeeded in ameliorating the international tensions and easing defense burden. This created a proliferating impact on political culture of the governing system of East European states. They were willing and shifting towards a plural, free thinking and tolerating state system.

The foremost interest of Soviet Union's takeover of Eastern Europe was to conclude all conflicts in the region between states, nationalities, ethnic groups and of religion which would have some domino effect in world politics. The establishment of Socialism had created a prolonged phase of peace in this region. Gorbachev was the first leader who emphasised the reform of socialism in Eastern Europe. He endorsed the learning of positive experiences of Eastern European reform socialism or socialism with human face. Gorbachev wanted to protect the 'euro-communism' in countries, such as German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia, and Poland, whose standard of

\textsuperscript{17} The doctrine was emphasising on socialist internationalism; means that each communist party was not responsible only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries, this implicates the sovereignty of individual socialist countries was of lesser importance than the world socialism. It is the positive duty of all socialist countries to protect and aid where socialism is in threat. In actual sense, it was limiting every state's individual 'sovereignty' over communist internationalism.
living was higher than that of the then-Soviet Union. It indicated that the economic
development was higher in the satellite countries than in the core that was Soviet Union.

In the 27th Party Congress in February 1986 Gorbachev emphasised the economic
growth, which he described as ‘the key to all our problems, immediate and long term,
economic and social, political and ideological, domestic and foreign’ and the only way in
which a new kind of Soviet Socialism could be built (White, 1990: 23). In practice he
was indicating towards socialism, with a human face or some type of reform socialism to
‘accelerate’ the stagnant economy. But introduction of ‘human factor’ brought about a
drastic change in internal policy matter within the power monopoly of the Party. He
argued the need for a ‘profound democratisation’ of Soviet society designed to ensure the
ordinary people once again felt themselves to be the masters of their own destinies (ibid:
24). This implied to give central importance to individual in its public and economic life.
The profound democratisation in domestic life in the Soviet population created a change
in electoral law, which intended to provide a degree of competition between candidate,
and a set of constitutional amendments which established a new state structure including
a full-time working parliament for the first time in modern Soviet history. A
constitutional review commission and in effect, a Constitutional Court, was also
established as a step towards what Gorbachev called socialist systems of check and
balance (ibid: 25).

The Soviet influence or authority was not the legitimate wish of the people of
Eastern Europe who never created a genuine support for the former. The establishment
was founded on the doctrine of democratic centralism, military intervention or
suppression of popular dissident. This type of intervention had created a type of rejection
among the people of Eastern Europe which has been time to time expressed through
events like the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Czechoslovakian Prague spring of 1968 or
Polish Revolution of 1980–89.

The process of ideological innovation and political and economic liberalization
initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev after 1985 led to the reemergence of liberalism as a
system of political thought in Russia. Gorbachev’s own contribution in the content of public debate created a more hospitable climate for intellectuals. Gorbachev expanded tremendously the permitted boundaries of public discourse by introducing many ideological concepts which had been forbidden previously by the official Soviet ideology (Brown, 1996: 121–9). In the mean time he tried to assign liberal minded people in prominent position in political leadership, cultural organisation and organ of mass media (ibid: 97–111). The whole bloc moved towards greater freedom of information and debate. Investigative journalism emerged in official media, many books and films were unbanned, and there was greater frankness about previously taboo subjects such as social problem, disasters and controversial aspects of Soviet history.

Furthermore, the limits of public debate were extended and there was considerable relaxation in official attitudes to dissent. Such was the impact of this trend that the Russian word ‘glasnost’ quickly entered international usages (Wright, 1989: 37). This created a spillover effect all across domestic and international sphere as the idea of socialism with a human face spread. The human face brought a dialectical change which facilitated individual essence over his social basis. Gorbachev in his first phase of reform wanted to change the patterns of planned economy which had proved stagnant and backward. To combine the essence of human factor with reform socialism he had given emphasis on individual creativity, technological innovation and a market based being responsive to consumer needs.

The introduction of market type economy challenged the decade-long classical ‘leninist’ model where, politics was inseparable from economics. It implied that the economy was overwhelmingly state owned and party directed through planning and control. Here party directly manipulated the market’s vital stimulatory—supply and demand. This communist form of dictatorship was very much different from dictatorship and authoritarianism of colonial regimes. In the later case, the governments had coexisted with market economy and a substantial degree of private ownership, though the state intervention in the economy had been quite extensive.
Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ brought some fundamental changes in international affairs too. He proposed a renewed world order with strong co-operation and de-idolisation between two blocs. He argued for disarmament and peace in the atomic age and recognised that all the people were living in ‘a vulnerable, rather fragile but interconnected world’. To him this dictated a ‘constructive dialogue’, a search for solution to key international problems, for area of agreement. All these pronouncements brought Cold War bipolar balance parity into an end in favor of America. So, by the end of 1990 the ideological division of the world had come to end and a ‘new world order’ had been established.

The reform initiated by Gorbachev deeply influenced the domestic policy of CEECs. It had created a different array of changes in external and internal policy process of every state. For the first time, the Soviet Union has promoted domestic democratisation and asked for popular legitimisation of the regimes. This not only introduced the spirit of freedom and liberty but decreased on overall tension among two blocs. Though the speed with which the changes took place was also unexpected, with change in one country having a domino effect elsewhere and accelerating the democratic process all over the region. This process had democratised the public life pulled the ‘iron curtain’ down.

The democratisation in the Soviet domestic politics had created a wave of changes in Eastern Europe. Firstly, the states like Hungary and Poland started decentralised planned economy and introduced market mechanisms. Second, in 1988 and 1989 both of these countries decided to bring multi-candidate parliamentary elections within the framework of existing party monopoly. These initiatives were later strengthened by the Soviet Union’s introduction of mandatory retirement ages and the duration of time any person could serve in a top party or government position. This routinisation of bureaucracy was aiming to reduce the rigidity of the existing system.

The reforms of glasnost and perestroika had been wholeheartedly accepted by countries like Hungary and Poland. The Soviet monopoly had been sporadically
challenged in Eastern Europe which can be visualised in events like the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Czechoslovakian Prague spring of 1968, Albanian withdrawal in 1961, etc. By the mid-1970s Hungary came up with economic reform which introduced some amount of private enterprises and market mechanism. This proved very positive in raising the declining living standard of people and the overall economic stagnation. The economic reform initiated by Gorbachev also borrowed some of the basic attributes of the Hungarian economic reform of 1968. This had created a confidence to bring more radical reform; political and economic, which they found inevitable to overcome the economic slowdown.

By the beginning of 1989, Hungary had openly come up with the Round Table Talks which initiated the introduction of multi-party candidate system and the holding of free election by mid-1990s. The crisis between the state headed by the Communist Party and the opposition led by the Solidarity and the Catholic Church in Poland created a situation of stability. The negotiation between the Communist Party and the opposition and intervention of Gorbachev brought this problem to an end. Keeping with the pace the Bulgarian Leader Todor Zhivkov brought the Bulgarian version of perestroika or restructuring known as Preustroisvo. Till 1988 the Bulgarian Communist Party wanted to reform socialism in the country but they also wanted radical changes in economics and politics. The essence of Perestroika has not positively prompted to bring changes in GDR. The GDR Leader Erich Honkcker was very critical about the changes and declared that, 'just because your neighbor changes the wall paper, it does not mean that you have to' change (Wright, 1989: 98). To conclude, it is important to note that Perestroika and change initiated by Gorbachev in domestic and international politics of Soviet Union had definite and diverse impact on the Eastern European states.

In Poland two years later, a Round Table agreement between the ruling Polish United Worker’s Party (PUWP) and Solidarity concluded to bring elections to bicameral legislature. This result proved devastating for the communist monopoly. In the Senate, where a completely free election had taken place, Solidarity won 99 of the 100 seats.
Senior PUWP ran uncontested for seats in other chamber, the Sejm. But, there too they met with stunning defeats, when many of them failed to receive the necessary 50 per cent of the valid votes. In several cases, party candidates received less than 5 per cent of the total ballots. As a result, PUWP was unable to form a government. In August, the two parties were unable to initiate any negotiation. This deadlock was broken when Gorbachev made a 40-minuets telephonic conversation to communist leaders urging them to join Solidarity—led government under Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

This was the first instance the communist monopoly of power was broken in Eastern Europe which was widely perceived as having been facilitated by Gorbachev (Dawisha, 1990:154–55). The pressure of society to bring economic prosperity and the ambition of Lech Walesa soon split the broad front of church and Solidarity into populists and intellectual wing. Walesa identified, with the populists and campaigned against his own party government, demanding faster economic reform. Jaruzelski was forced to step down and in the first direct popular election of the president; Walesa was elected by defeating all others. The first phase of transition had created some amount of instability in Poland. However, the case of Hungary was different as the dissident group won the election and constantly ruled till the end of first parliamentary election in 1994.

In comparison with other communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, Romania offered a very fascinating case of neo-Stalinist, radical nationalism headed by Nicolae Ceausescu. Both in his ideology and practicality Ceausescism represented a self-styled version of socialism, different from the Soviet type as pronounced by Gorbachev. This type of blatant nationalism and forceful industrialisation by Ceausescu in Romania had created an atmosphere of isolationism among all Eastern European countries. So, the legacy left by Ceausescu was one of complete excess, rigidity and insensitivity to the people's suffering. When he was overthrown, and ultimately shot, along with his wife, on December 25, 1989, he left a country without any institutions which had creditability or popular support (Dawisha, 1990: 184).
II.2 Political and Ideological Factors

Communism is based on the ideas and teachings of Karl Marx as modified by Lenin and host of other thinkers. At its most basics, the ideal of communism is a system in which everyone is seen as equal and wealth is distributed equally among the people. There is no private ownership of property. The state owns and controls all enterprises and property—all the means of production. The state is run by Communist party which was represented by dictatorship of proletariat or workers. The Soviet model of communism was based on these ideals. All opposition parties were banned as betrayal against party monopoly. All power was concentrated into the hands of the Communist party thus characterised as one-party state or one-party system. It is true that Communist Party had a different name in some country.

Free press and civil liberties were suppressed. Censorship and propaganda were widely used in favour of Communist party and their suppressive measures. The Communist Party invaded and controlled every aspect of political, social, cultural and economic life. It was a totalitarian state with complete Communist control over all facets of life. In order to maintain tight control, the governments imposed far reaching limitations on human rights such as freedom of expression, association, travel, etc. All these basic things create condition of suppression and lack of choice. This was the system that existed in the Soviet Union and Eastern European sates for several decades before they all came to an end during the period 1989–1991.

In the first place what contributed to the failure and eventual collapse of communism was the fact that the Communist party’s domination was illegitimate from the beginning (authoritarian and lacking in legitimate support of citizens who are the source of authority in modern democratic-states). To Lenin, liberal parliamentary democracy was sham—ideological dressing mask an oppressive bourgeoisie dictatorship. Therefore, he had not accepted any form of opposition and institution except dictatorship of the party. He was dismissive of pluralism in party
organisation which he called as useless and harmful toy: serious revolutionary needed party discipline. He always insisted on the ‘narrow’ as against the ‘open’ party, opposing every scheme which threatened its monopoly (Wayper, 1974:230). To him every party presented a particular class interest and any type of criticism or opposition with in the party was revisionism and betrayal.

The notion of power monism of Communist Party had developed the axiom of ‘democratic centralism’ which was central to all decision making. This principle lay at the heart of all Communist party; organisation and culture. This justified the leading role of Communist party and its monopoly in authority which had not given any space to democratic debate and critics within party working. So, Marxist-Leninism provided theoretical legitimisation to the leadership of the Communist party of the Soviet Union as vanguard of workers interest. Their right to rule was not accorded by democratic elections for though even the unreformed Soviet Union was declared by its leaders and propagandists to be a ‘socialist democracy’, the most elementary criteria of democracy — namely free and fair elections were absent (Brown, 2004: 8).

The theory of democratic centralism is simple: after a free debate decisions ratified by the Central Committee or Party Congress are binding on all members: the discussion is closed and the verdict must be carried out uniformly by every one, including opponents. In this theory there is nothing particularly anti-democratic about the procedure but it merely gives importance to consensus-building. In practice it suppresses any type of faction, opposition and criticism in the name of party discipline. This gives rise to elite party men involved in higher level of decision-making—the nomenklatura that may be authoritarian in nature. This theory had become heart of any Communist party working in Russia and Eastern Europe. The one party rule had created a crisis by not legitimising any other institutions and social forces to act in governing of the state. After gaining power the party tries to develop its monopoly control over national property and transformed members into—a new class.\(^\text{18}\) This class acts as the master over the worker in

\(^{18}\) The idea of new class has given by Milovan Dijilas 1957, (a politburo member of the Yugoslav League of Communists as critique of Communism) in his book \textit{The New Class: An Analysis of Communist}
contradiction to vanguard their interest. The leadership under Stalin also strengthened the axiom of democratic centralism and added new dimension by introducing 'personality cult' which made the former more authoritarian and oligarchic. Both Lenin and Stalin had exempted the basic pillars of Marxism—humanism and equality.

The growth of Stalin's dictatorship could be seen in the changing nature of the party. The Communist Party, while Lenin lived, enjoyed a considerable measure of freedom of discussion and even action. There was no such party freedom when Stalin became supreme. There no one dare proclaim himself an 'oppositionist' and ask for the right to criticise the policies of the government. Stalin proposed for the principle of hierarchical discipline against Lenin's unanimous decision making or unity. In this period, Stalin hardly preferred to report and consult the party while deciding on major policy issues. In difficult years of War and turmoil from 1918 to 1925 Party Congresses met annually. Since Stalin became all powerful the 15th Party Congress met in 1927 after a two years' interval, the 16th in 1930, the 17th in 1934, the 18th in 1939 and the 19th in 1952 (Wayper, 1974: 255–36).

He made another change to Marxist principle of state which was strongly supported by Lenin. Stalin virtually abandoned the classical Marxist theory of the State, according to which it was merely the repressive instrument of a dominant class which will disappear when classes were abolished. It was typical of him that in the 1936 constitution to which he gave his name the terms 'state' and 'citizen' had been brought back whereas in Lenin's constitution of 1921 the 'state' had disappeared as being bourgeois and is replaced by the word 'Soviet' while 'citizen' has became 'proletarian' or 'peasant'. Till that time Stalin was supporting the argument that the state would wither away and a stateless society would eventually emerge. In the meanwhile he argued that it was not happening because the Soviet state was encircled by the capitalist countries. But he agreed with both Marx and Lenin that the state becomes necessary for the internal

System. (London: Thames & Hudson. Dijilas was arrested shortly after completing the book, accused of 'spreading hostile propaganda against the state', and sentenced to jail on the charges of 'helping the enemies of Yugoslavia'. The book was subsequently banned in Yugoslavia and throughout the Soviet Bloc

39
situation. The state was indispensable to defeat capitalist encirclement and purge persons with bourgeoisie bias.

He adopted the doctrine of ‘Socialism in one Country’ which in a way enhanced totalitarian forces in Russia. The objective of this policy was to ensure the contribution of socialism in the Soviet Union even though it had not spread across the world. But this doctrine was contradicted with Marxist-Leninist’s view of communism as international fight against capitalist exploitation. After the death of Stalin a new model of Communist politics emerged which has allowed some amount of faction and pluralism in it. This was not a genuine pluralism, nor was it pure totalitarianism; it was rather a kind of imperfect monism in which party is powerful but not omnipotent. It might be called ‘pluralism of elites’, or to borrow Robert Dahl’s expressive term, a ‘polyarchial’ system, but oligarchical rather than democratic in nature (Skilling, 1966: 449). Particularly, Khrushchev’s denouncement of excessive criminal act of Stalin and then normalisation process throughout the bloc brought some inevitable change in the working style of dissident or opposition groups. Still, bureaucratic power and party were unchallengeable and asserting power in totality was the basis.

In this process, each party state tried to survive the ensuing internal and external political opposition, while Moscow wanted to maintain communist control and overall Warsaw pact19 cohesion. The contradictions and antagonisms between Communist supremacy and popular aspirations for political and economic freedoms continued to rise throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev era. The Hungarian Revolution, Polish October, Prague Spring and Poland’s Solidarity were the mainspring of opposition in post-Stalin Eastern Europe (Bugajski and Pollack, 1989: 5)

The period of 1985 to 1991 had brought a qualitative change in the scope and nature of political argument in Russia and their fraternal communist ruling states in relation to Marxist-Leninist theory of state. The ‘New Thinking’ proposed by Gorbachev,

---

19 Warsaw was a treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance between Soviet Union and its central and eastern European allies. It was established on May 14, 1955, in Warsaw, Poland. This treaty was in response to the NATO.
indicated new ideas which would bring new change in society. During the initial years, what Gorbachev wanted was hardly predictable. However the change in Russian state had increased the openness in public life, people accepted the change in economy; it ended the self-imposed iron curtain and lastly he entertained dissidents. The shift was especially dramatic between 1987–1990, which was of unprecedented consequences (civil unrest, hyper-inflation and mass-confusion).

First, Gorbachev wanted to separate the economic and political systems of Soviet Union which was intertwined closely since the Tsarist period. This proposition was against the totalitarian idiom of Marxist-Leninist ideology which approved the extension of state power over economy and society. Second, he was the first person who spoke of socialist state with ‘checks and balances’. This challenged Marxist- Leninist proposition of party monopoly. The ethos behind this was to limit the power of the party- as guarantor of law. So, he recommended a committee for the supervision of the Soviet constitution. Gorbachev especially wanted to delete Article 6, which had guaranteed the Communist party’s monopoly to assert power. The class interest of Marxist-Leninist ideology had been subordinated to universal human interest. To Gorbachev in ‘Nuclear age’ all human values had preceded over class value. So, class struggle which was the crux of Marxism had gone dismantled under the leadership (Brown, 2004: 11–26). Lastly, Gorbachev’s new thinking brought a drastic change when in his United Nations General Assembly speech in December stressed freedom of choice for all countries- presumably, including allegiance and development path (ibid: 199). This had created equalising relation between ‘fraternal countries’, which showed Soviet acceptance of diversity indeed a new idea in Soviet ideology.

Gorbachev in the beginning wanted to reform Marxism-Leninism which had failed to provide economic affluence and political equality to mass. He had ‘personally and courageously initiated a search for a combination of socialism and democracy, of plan and market, and of Soviet government and party rule with in a pluralism of opinions that still expected to remain within the boundaries of socialism’ (White, 1990: 219).
Lenin (NEP)\textsuperscript{20} he tried to bring economic reform through combining plan and market but he did not come up with coherent administrative apparatus to implement it. However, these changes had tried to ‘limit’ the influence and role of party in the society at large.

\textbf{II.3 End of Cold War and the Changed Role of NATO}

The policy of containment was the main strategy of the West against Soviet expansionism in Europe and other parts of the world. The notion had first been conceived by George F. Kennan for the US State department in 1947. This aggressive policy would interrupt the internal harmony of American society. So, he proposed for a firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionism and spread of communism. Subsequently, President Truman made Kennan’s assessment the cornerstone of American postwar policy. It was the essence of an American grand strategy which consisted of aid and assistance according to the ‘Truman doctrine’, in resisting Communist revolution and Soviet pressure.

The Marshall Plan was also initiated for rebuilding a free economy in Europe for international cooperation, and American back up for Western Europe’s political stability and security through NATO. At NATO’s founding on 1949, April 4, President Truman described the creation of the Atlantic Alliance as a responsive act taken by the countries deeply concerned of their shared heritage of democracy and freedom. Its goal was to establish a zone of peace in an area of the world that had been at the heart of two World Wars. Protecting this area, the president said, was an important step towards creating peace in the world\textsuperscript{21}. He predicted that the positive impact of NATO’s creation would be felt beyond its border with the migration of democratic value all over Atlantic.

\textsuperscript{20} Lenin introduced New Economic Policy (NEP) at 10th Party congress in 1921. This combined state ownership of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy—heavy industry, public utilities and financial system—with a free market and private ownership of small-scale industries and agriculture.

\textsuperscript{21} There are two models of explanation with democracy in relation to ‘peace’. First, institutional (structural) explanation which, explain, democratic institutional constrains or prevent democracies from fighting with each other (specially the checks and balances). In contrast to it normative model explains that out brake of war between democratic states is prevented by strong democratic norms that are deeply embedded in democratic political structure of these states. They would like to use other methods of conflict resolutions
In real sense, the containment reflected a dual strategy for one purpose: the establishment of Europe is political unity in response to Soviet-Communist expansion. The policy or political strategy lasted until the effective end of the active phase of the ‘cold war’ in the early 1970s. Its objective was achieved and Western Europe was safely on its way to political-economic integration with in the NATO through a consolidated US military presence. This resulted in the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe is (CSCE) Final Act of Helsinki in 1975 which is the first political agreement on security and cooperation in all of Europe including the USSR and USA as ‘European power’. This was what ‘the struggle for Europe’ had been all about: containing Soviet power in the East and consolidating Western Europe under strategic American military umbrella. However, after the end of Cold War NATO has set a goal to propagate Trans Atlantic values in relation to build a Europe ‘Whole and Free’.

After the end of Cold War and dismantling of Warsaw Pact (containment shifted with co-operation among the entire nation of Europe) the countries of central and Eastern Europe were keen to join NATO. They were mysterious about the role of ‘new Russia’ and its foreign policy of ‘near abroad’. The idea of joining could be traced back in the dissident movements in CEECs and their fight for democracy and national independence. The debate turned into the lap of the Clinton shortly after he assumed office in early 1993. It was he who personally set the tone with the administration by responding positively while confronted with the issue by Vaclav Havael, Lech Walesa, and Arpad Groncz—the presidents of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary—in the spring of 1993 (Asmus, 2002: xxvi).

Till that time NATO was serving as defensive alliance which maintained military preparedness in order to prevent war. It was an intergovernmental organisation, in which member states retain their full sovereignty and independence. The political task of

---

like, third party intervention, arbitration and bi-party agreements, etc. The normative explanation is known as the Wilsonian view of peace.

22 Article 5, is the core of the Treaty where by the member countries agree to treat an armed attack on any one of them, on either side, of the Atlantic, as an attack against all of them. It commits them to taking the necessary steps to help each other in the event of armed attacks.
NATO was to provide consultation on political problems, relevant to its members. The aim of all member countries was to achieve a just and lasting peace, accompanied by proper security guarantees and to defend the North Atlantic Areas. The Alliance was trying to achieve these purposes through a policy based on the twin principles of defense and détente. To this end the Allies were active in promoting political initiatives and arm control measures designed to ease East–West tensions (*NATO Hand Book*, 1982: 21).

After the demise of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact was dismantled but all the nuclear weapons went to Russia. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe were naive to develop any military capacity of similar kind. So, most of the central and Eastern European countries craved to join NATO and come under both security and political umbrella of it. After fifty years of its working in the shadow of Cold War NATO decided to establish a zone of peace and stability for Western to Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. It opened its door to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as part of a strategy to unite in to the post-Cold War Europe. By adding the former communist satellite states NATO has widened its area of security management. It wants to defend common Trans Atlantic values with unification of Europe as its endeavor.

The argument for increasing membership represent the post-Cold War, neo-Wilsonian foreign policy consensus in the West that international organisation, peace, democracy and trade are all mutually supportive. In response to it Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote, ‘To protect interests, we must take actions, forge agreements, create institutions, and provide an example that will help bring the world closer together around the basic principles of democracy, open markets, law, and a commitment to peace’ (1998: 53). Maintaining the same spirit, the Madrid Declaration in July 1997 also endorsed the importance of democracy by reiterating that ‘the consolidation of democratic and free societies on the entire continent, in accordance with OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) principles, is therefore of direct and material concern to the Alliance’.
The spread of democratic value by the NATO offered other benefits also. The member democracies engage in higher levels of trade with each other, democratic governments are less likely to violate the human rights of or commit genocide against their populations etc. It has also given shape to ethnic conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia. At its November, 2002, Prague Summit, NATO emphasised on further round of enlargement by including seven new members: the three Baltic countries, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. By and large both, the EU and NATO invited those CEECs to become member who progressed the most on the path of democratisation (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 4).

NATO headed by America initiated democratic consolidation through its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. PfP was a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual partner countries and NATO. It allowed Partner countries to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. It is based on a commitment to the democratic principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of the PfP to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Partner countries and NATO, as well as among Partner countries.

The formal basis for the PfP was the Framework Document, which sets out specific undertakings for each Partner country. Each Partner country made a number of far-reaching political commitments to preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfill obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states—to respect existing borders and to settle disputes peacefully. Specific commitments are also made to promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting to establish democratic control over armed forces, and to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. It’s obvious that PfP was the final key element which brought pro-American and implicitly pro-democratic central and Eastern Europe into existence. Individual Western states, other specialised
international organisations (like the Council of Europe and the International Monetary Fund), and Western NGOs equally contributed to the process in favor of democratic values and freedom; for which all the states were striving for.

After the fall of Communism, the international flow of democratic values and norms targeted the entire area of central and Eastern Europe. In the initial phase, all the former communist states adopted democratic constitutions with multi-party system; parliament or presidential form of government; the rule of law. In principles, all the presidents and parliaments are elected, the rule of law is unanimously accepted, citizen's rights and liberties are recognised by the constitution. But, the main phase of democratic consolidation brought into application with EU's membership agreements and NATO's PfP conditionalities. Both of the organisations facilitated democratic values and freedom of liberty which had long been denied under Communist Party rule.

In relation to NATO, all these countries, especially their states are constrained in making decision to join any war (being the member of NATO they have to respect the Article 5 of collective defense). In terms of agreement all the NATO members are granted the right passage to certain foreign troops within their sovereign territory. In relation to finance all the member countries were supposed to spend 2 per cent of their budget on defense. In general all these countries have recognized some amount of power sharing between ‘international organisations’ of these kinds (EU and NATO). They all delegated some power to organization of these kinds and taking the help of the parliament to take care of the legitimacy by approving amendments positively or negatively. Almost all these countries have appointed Constitutional Courts which are authorised to check the legitimacy of various agreements in relation to constitutional validity. So, by joining NATO and the EU the countries of Central and Eastern Europe entering into phase of ‘supra nationalism’ where sovereignty of member state were shared for general purpose of citizenry.
II.4 European Union and Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

Subsequently with the fall of communism, international organisations were greatly involved in the political and economic transformations in the central and Eastern Europe. Numerous states and international organisations took an active interest in promoting democracy and human right across the region. The impact of international organizations had been most obvious with the EU conditionalities. It has promoted human rights, liberal democracy, and rule of law which are the fundamental rules of statehood. By the mid 1989, the main objective of the EU’s policy had basically been to encourage and support reform programme in Eastern Europe, the aim of which was to create security and stability in the continent. To encourage reforms, community used its ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ approach towards Eastern European states. It has given some trade concessions and additional aid as conditionality to establish democracy, market economy and to protect human right.

The EU became the chief external agent which tried to establish democracy through various incentives—either through assistance or through institutional ties. EU’s most important assistance for Eastern Europe was called PHARE. In this scheme, it had offered technical and financial assistance for the transition to market economy and was later redesigned to support for democracy and human rights. Institutional ties range from trade and cooperation agreements through association agreements to full membership. These institutional agreements provide mainly the market assessment of EU and ability of states to invest the aid in democratic institutionalisation.

The EU conditionalities are mainly followed by a strategy which is known as ‘carrot and stick’ policy. According to this strategy the target government is rewarded with some perks or aids if it complies with the EU conditions or vice versa. Countries that failed to meet the criteria were simply denied assistance, association, or membership.

23 According to liberalist view capitalist, democratic and free- trading countries make better neighbours and pursue ‘peace’ all through.
The EU regularity had encouraged the states that it is their responsibility to create the conditions to be rewarded. The EU’s member states agreed to work out a common approach towards Eastern Europe. The basic objective was to support economic and political reform. So, trade and institutional ties placed the community in the ‘driving seat’ of policy making agent in post socialist reform states (Smith, 2004: 65).

From 1988 onwards, the community negotiated and concluded agreements with Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the GDR. Afterward the European Union had taken positive and useful steps by creating European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 1989, establishing in Poland/Hungary Assistance for Restructuring Economies (PHARE). This was the most popular economic programme later extended to other Eastern European countries.

By 1988, The European Community was managing larger trade and association agreement in Eastern Europe. With the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) agreement, the Commission was in a prime position to increase its involvement in these countries. It also negotiated trade and agreement with separate CMEA\(^{24}\) members. This established legacy of cooperation in relation with Eastern Europe had set precedents which could be expanded upon as communism collapsed (Smith, 2004: 42). In 1991, the community set up a separate programme to aid former Soviet satellite states of Central Asia through, a programme known as Technical Assistance for CIS or TACIS.

PHARE is the largest single source of aid for the East European countries. This has directed to several priority sectors, like in privatisation, agricultural restructuring, environmental safety, social safety net, infrastructure, education and training. It also includes other humanitarian aid and food security etc. The basic aim of it was to restructure the ravaged economic condition malfunctioning under communist rule. These programmes became the means to reach a political end, to create peaceful and stable

---

\(^{24}\) The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was established by the USSR in 1949 to coordinate the economic activities of its newly acquired empire of Eastern Europe. CEMA’s role in intra-Bloc relation has undergone significant changes since the death of Stalin.
democratic state. The aid has been directed towards the basic amenities of east European states which would take priority to enhance democracy and institution building there.

The political criteria for accession to EU, has laid down by Copenhagen European Council in June 1993. The council established that the countries most met the criteria of ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection for minorities’ as basic to achieve for integration. In its 1997 opinion on the application for accession and in its subsequent annual reports, the Commission has regularly evaluated the political condition of these countries. The Opinion of 1997 assessed Hungary positively which fulfilled some of conditionalities of Copenhagen criteria (like free, fair election of 1990 and 1994, opposition party working in and authorities are working in constitutional limits). However the Commission strongly remarked on the neglected condition of Roma minority and specially Hungarian Minority policy. Till this time, the conditionality mainly focused on democracy, human rights, reforming internal market and strengthening infrastructure of various kind.

From the 2002 Copenhagen European Council in December, conditionality became stronger and complex as the Commission evaluated the progress of the candidates every year through regular reports and targeted goals. During 1997–2004, the Commission focused on very sensitive areas to reform the administration, judiciary and took several anti-corruption measures. The Commission requested the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European Countries (SIGMA) group of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to develop criteria for administrative reform. The SIGMA promoted requirements for passing legislation establishing civil services in the region as independent professional bodies. The reforms mainly wanted to protect civil servants from various dismissals and extensive political interference. The model endorsed by SIGMA mainly included the features of Weberian neutral-rational model. The reform in civil service has always seen as ‘ability and capacity to implement the acquis’ (Schimmefenning and Sedlmeier, 2005: 80–81). It’s very significant to note that, the EU
has played very prominent role in facilitating democratic consolidation and economic liberalization in the region.

II.5 Western Influence through Media

The revolutions of 1989 to Weitman were revolutions for ‘liberty’ and freedom. The state drastically curtailed liberty of expression, belief and faith during the Party rule. These revolutions have been fought to achieve liberty: their moral force has come from its commitment to institution and guarantee as many rights and liberty as possible, which had been curtailed altogether by Communist state (Weitman, 1992:11–24). The discontent among the people of the Socialist countries was to get rid of severe censorship on media and press which was curtailing basic human value. So, Western countries tried to expose all these maladies by giving voice to the people who are legitimate source of any modern government.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, introduced extraordinary programs to reform the nation’s hopeless systems. He sought to safely dismantle structures he had identified as moribund and unsustainable. Media reform was foremost in this movement. In July 1990, ruling party restrictions on the USSR media were removed. Gorbachev saw clearly that media freedom was the key to a functioning modern society. In the mean time he tried to assign liberal minded peoples in prominent position in the political leadership, in cultural organisation and organ of mass media. However, the openness initiated by Gorbachev ended the Cold War and lifted the iron curtain through which Soviet and CEECs had given away with the affluence and advancement of liberal democracy.

25 The appointment of prominent liberal minded intellectuals to leading positions in the periodical press was of seminal importance for the fostering of the climate of openness in the public discourse. Thus, in the middle of 1986, Vitaly Korotich became the chief editor of the popular, mass-circulation journal Ogonek and Yegor Yakovalv was given control over weekly newspaper Moskovskie novosti. Both men turned their periodicals into leading forums of liberal opinion. In the specialist press, Gavril Popov became editor of Voprosy economiki in July 1988 and transformed the journal into a prominent voice for economic reform. A similar development occurred in literary journals, with prominent liberal writers Grigory Bakanov and Sergey Zalygin being appointed chief editors of the major literary journals, Znamya and Novyy mir respectively, in 1986 (Brown, 2004: 53).
The history of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty are the most fascinating chapters of Cold War era, which broadcast its programmes to Soviet-dominated countries of East Europe. These were the most influential politically oriented international radio stations used as weapons of containment in Cold War era. During the Cold War they were mainly reporting on forced party repressions, sabotage against opposition, murders, espionage, etc. The Radios were used as the agents of Central Intelligence Agency of America (CIA) as weapon of Cold War. In the beginning of 1985, with the change pronounced by Mikhail Gorbachev they mainly worked with the dissident groups of Central and Eastern European countries. Its audience increased into millions, and listeners ranged form ordinary industrial workers to dissident such as Lech Walesa of Solidarity to Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia. The dissident movement in East Europe and their high ranking leaders had used these media against the ruling Party regime. Radio Liberty had also huge audience in Russia including dissident luminaries as Andrey Shakharov and Alexander Solzhenistsyn.

RFE owes its existence to some of the hard core Cold War luminaries such as Allen Dulles and G. F Kennan, who denounced the Soviet aggressiveness and wished it to be contained through greater caution. This is the reason the American government was generously funding these broadcast stations as blatant form of interference inside the ‘iron curtain’. It was mainly an American Cold War strategy to weaken the Communist party monopoly over communication and free expression. They have performed a challenging job in undermining the creditability of the socialist use of force and suppression. They articulated their propaganda through perfectly administered news reports and plays.

The broadcasters’, reporters and writers working there had a definite knowledge of what was happening in the socialist countries. They wanted to articulate the problems of dissatisfied people and their link with the shortcomings of the system. They mainly discussed events and problems of East European listeners which had been ignored by the censored media of these communist countries. They empathise with the problem as being a problem of the system and focuses on the negligence of the governing authority. Apart
from it they broadcast different events of the West mainly of America. Thus, creating means of showing how people in the West lived prosperously and enjoyed the advantages of democracy and human rights.

The impact of human rights is the single most magnetic idea which acted as negatively for Communist regimes of East Europe. The endorsement of the basic human rights issues of United Nations Charter through the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 has opened the debate of ‘human value’ above any ideological and social implication. The historic act was recognised by all European countries along with two power blocs. This waged an ideological struggle for human existence through media and propaganda. During this period central and Eastern European countries managing the anti-Socialist propaganda along with the decline of socialist authority. Consequently in 1980s, the Western propaganda managed to influence more and more the opinion of this region’s people. In this period the RFE was mainly broadcasting in the region of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. RFE was not only radio working in this area but certainly exposed the various shortcomings of the system along with economic backwardness in relation to the Western countries. However, the exposers of short comings in the system and news about the western affluncy had expedited the demand for change.

Within the four decades, RFE unmasked the lies and deceit of Communist dictatorship by broadcasting information about the world behind the iron curtain. It was the spreading of the message of freedom, democracy, human right and the rule of law which has been long neglected by Party regime. With the demise of Communism as system, the RFE/ Radio Liberty (RL) have accomplished this new mission. It is the broadcasts that strengthen the foundations of democracy. It has mainly facilitated to reinforce democratic value, initiated debates and current affairs which are denied under communist regime. Meanwhile USA has demonstrated its commitment to democracy by supporting RFE but declared independences of it as an autonomous agency.²⁶

²⁶ To uphold its independence the media should focus on professionalism. It can play the role of fourth estate along with the other governing agents of state. However the media can perform this function only if
II. 6 USAID and its initiative for Democratisation

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has supported the efforts of the government of Central and East Europe to make the transition from an authoritarian political system and centrally-planned economy to a democratic liberal, market economy. It is designated as the lead implementing U.S. government agency, working in collaboration with other U.S. government agencies, international development agencies and bilateral donors. Almost all countries in the region like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria are making the transition with the assistance of USAID. Among them the U.S. assistance to Hungary was authorised under the programme of the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989.

The USAID employed the services of American contractors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who worked in partnership with the Hungarian government, private organisations and NGOs. From the start, transition programmes were planned to be of relatively short duration. Given the need for a rapid response and recognising that the political and economic transition process broadly involved the same basic steps, the USAID launched regional and multi-country projects to quickly provide expertise in key areas, especially privatisation and democracy. Funds were allocated annually on a sectoral basis with country-specific funding allocations, thus allowing the USAID the flexibility to provide and, when necessary, shift resources quickly to address the fast-changing situation in the region.

Together with Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the Hungarian opposition were generously funded by the USAID. Its goal was to assist Hungary and other countries in their transformation to a democratic society, a market-oriented and provided with several key characteristics of modern communication agencies. First, it should organize dialogue among various elements of society concerning every day problems, chiefly it should protect individual right against market. Second, it should initiate the revolution to protect human right which has been long neglected under the communist era. Finally, the media should alert the citizen on the corruption and imbalance in three governing branches—executive, legislature and judiciary.
private sector-led economy, and to integrate them into key international systems and Western institutions. Through 1993, initial assistance efforts focused on three broad Strategic Objectives (SOs): Democratic Governance, Economic Stabilisation and Transformation, and Quality of Life. In 1994, the USAID’s strategy and programme were revised to reflect a sharpened focus, new priorities and Hungary’s progress. The democracy and government focus remained; direct assistance to parliament and electoral processes was terminated; and greater emphasis was placed on strengthening local government. Assistance to NGOs and the media continued. The SO for Economic Stabilization and Transformation was revised and while assistance to privatisation continued, attention was also directed at the both banking sector and the promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). The SO for Quality of Life was revised to emphasize restructuring of government delivery systems and to develop the capacity of NGO social service delivery.

As part of the USAID reengineering process, the annual Results Review and Resource Request (R4) was instituted. This process formalised the use of Strategic Objectives, Intermediate Results and Indicators to measure the impact of U.S. funded assistance. In 1996, the USAID Country Strategy was again revised to reflect Hungary’s progress and to further sharpen the program’s focus. The overarching goal of the U.S. assistance programme remained unchanged: to assist Hungary in its national transformation to a democratic society, and a market-oriented and private sector-led economy, integrated into key international systems and Western institutions. This goal was elaborated in two sub-goals: a) assist Hungary in achieving sustainable economic reform; and b) assist Hungary in completing its democratisation process. In 1997, the USAID developed a detailed Closeout Plan that assessed the prospects for achieving the five SOs by September 1999, the target date for closing the Mission. The energy sector SO was found to be essentially achieved with only the completion and termination of activities to be done in 1998. All other SOs was on track and the expectation was that Hungary would graduate from the rolls of USAID recipients on schedule. In 1998, the Mission confirmed that Hungary would be able to complete the political and economic transition without USAID assistance after 1999.
U.S. relations with Hungary improved consistently in the 1980s. The Bush Administration launched an extensive U.S. aid programme for Hungary in July 1989 which emphasised private sector development and promotion of trade and investment. A Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund was established in 1990. Hungary April 1992 received unconditional Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status. Hungary also received substantial economic assistance under the SEED Act, over $217 million through September 1995. The United States has the highest levels of foreign investment in Hungary.

Hungary signed on to NATO’s PfP program on January 8, 1994. Prime Minister Gyula Horn visited Washington in June 1995. In September 1995, Defense Secretary Perry, on a two-day visit to Hungary, noted that Hungary was meeting the basic criteria for future membership in NATO. In December 1995, NATO opened an air base in Taszar, in southern Hungary, to reach Bosnia. President Clinton met Hungarian leaders during his visit to U.S. troops to Bosnia in January 1996. First Lady Hillary Clinton visited Budapest in July 1996 and lauded Hungary’s leadership in ‘brining democratic and economic reforms to Central Europe’. The State Department praised the signing of the Hungarian-Romanian treaty in September 1996 and called it a ‘significant achievement’ and ‘consistent with the purposes of NATO enlargement’. This is how in Hungary including other central and Eastern European countries the USAID played a definite role in democratisation and reform process. However, the USAID was very responsive to the model countries\(^{27}\) of transition like Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

\(^{27}\) Countries where, transition occur in peaceful manner. In Czechoslovakia it was so peaceful that it was named as ‘velvet revolution’.
II.7 Dissident Movements and Rising of Opposition in Eastern Europe

The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'dissident' as 'refusal to assent' but in Leninist regimes, the scope of this phenomenon much broader. According to Vaclav Havel it is 'the specter haunting throughout the Eastern Europe, and giving 'power to the powerless' which is recognised by West as dissident.

After the death of Stalin in 1953, Khrushchev was became the leader of the Soviet Communist Party. He denounced the criminal activities of Stalin era and proposed for de-Stalinization or normalisation, in the Soviet Union and throughout the bloc. In this process, each party state tried to survive the ensuing internal and external political oppositions, while Moscow wanted to maintain communist control and overall Warsaw Pact cohesion. The contradictions and antagonisms between communist supremacy and popular aspirations for political and economic freedoms continued to rise throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. The Hungarian Revolution, the Polish October, the Prague Spring and Poland's Solidarity were the mainsprings of opposition in post-Stalin east Europe.

Schapiro has offered a useful starting point for distinctions between 'dissident' and 'opposition'. Dissident group tries to assert their right to criticize the existing regime, to disagree with its policies, to remind the authorities of duties, obligations, and laws, and to advocate alternative policies for the government to pursue. Political oppositions, by contrast, seek to replace the existing government by some alternative administration, or to completely overhaul the prevailing political system. However, links between dissent and opposition are more complex and intertwined in practice than in theory (Bugajski et al, 1989: 35)

The terms 'dissent' and 'opposition' interchangeably used to indicate some form of individual or collective confrontation with the State. He proposed a five-fold

---

28 This is the spirit of Vaclav Havel's essay on dissident which worked as the Anti-Communist Manifesto of east European dissident movement.
classification of dissident and opposition in communist countries. First, the group of people who reject the system as whole and, attempt to overthrow it by all available means. This group he called the all-out rejection group. Second, he differentiated dissident groups to share power and factions within the communist establishment. It may happen at the central, regional or local levels. These conditions are endorsed by conditions of secrecy where it is difficult to obtain hard facts, and revolved around personal, ideological or programmatic differences.

Third, a variety of pressure and interest groups may struggle for influence within the jurisdiction of existing polity and pressurise party leaders to accept specific policies. Such groups are most often parts of the political establishment and may include leading elements of the police, army and Party or government bureaucracy. Fourth, the group is of ‘pragmatic dissenters’ which includes scientists, technicians, and experts in diverse fields. They primarily campaign for improved economic efficiency, technical progress, and financial support. Pragmatic dissent is dissent in the name of efficiency, material progress and military might. It demands rationality, freedom or legality. But rationality by its nature entails some of the very same conditions which are the result of freedom and legal order (Schapiro eds. 1972: 10).

Lastly, ‘apolitical dissent’, this group of dissenters have become particularly evident in recent years in the Soviet Union and have shown a remarkable capacity to survive- in spite of severe political repressions which include the confinement of some dissidents in lunatic asylums by means of co operation between KGB29 and subservient psychiatrists. This form of dissent is apolitical in the sense that its exponents do not for the most part advocate either the overthrow of the regime or the replacement of existing administration by another. They assert the right, which they claim derived from the Soviet law, to criticise freely illegal government acts and policies with which they disagree in moral grounds, and to demand the observance of the guaranties of civil rights which are embodied in the codes of law and in the Constitution.

---

29 It was an umbrella organisation serving as the Soviet Union’s premier security agency, secret police and intelligence agency from 1954 to 1991. On December 21, 1995, the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin signed the decree to disband KGB.
The catalyst for most post-Stalin dissent was provided by intellectuals and students in universities and other academic institutions during the mid-1950s. They helped to broaden the bounds of permitted open discussion, particularly in Poland and Hungary. They influenced other social strata and even penetrated the ruling parties. In many respects the university intelligentsia stood at forefront of political reform and criticism of official policy, and acted as spokesmen for Polish October and Hungarian revolution (Bugajski, 1989: 37). In Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, conflicts emerged early on between the ‘free intellectuals’ (including scholars, teachers, and various groups of technocracy) and the Party bureaucracy called as the apparatchiks. The humanist, artistic, and creative intelligentsia generally turn towards ‘anti-authoritarianism’ in their political learning, especially where they have been denied access to positions of influence. The growing political consciousness of Eastern Europe’s intelligentsia has therefore resulted in periodic conflicts with the Party’s ideological monopoly (based on Marxist-Leninist ideology).

The Eastern European dissent groups are especially concerned with extending civil liberties such as free expression, and promoting the pluralisation of political life. In their efforts to articulate new models, they represented the interest of workers and became vanguard of their interest along with the overall interest in society. In Poland the rise of Solidarity as an opposition trade union is example of this. By the end of the 1970s, political dissent had become a factor in the internal politics of several states, but all countries of Eastern Europe were equally affected by that development. However, the important issue is that it has subsequently persisted to grow as new element to one-party ruling states. Their reaction to regime opposition was expressed differently - they became more proliferate, open and generalised their appeal to protect human rights.

In line with this policy of openness, dissident activity in the 1970s concentrated on public release of various reports, statements and comments on the current situation. These publications were designed to inform the public about official abuses of power in all areas of public life and to suggest ways through which the citizens could defend their
rights and pressurise the authorities. Finally, they broke the official monopoly over public communication which was completely controlled and censored by the Party. Taken together, they provided a contrast with past experiences of protest and criticism of official policies that mirrored national patterns of centralist and exclusionary communist rule (Curry, 1983: 144).

During the 1970s, dissident developed their own patterns and programme of activity which was quite a bit different from the established social organisation, such as trade unions and youth associations. Most of the dissent groups pointed out the inefficiency and failure of policies initiated by the party. These groups mainly were defending human rights and civil liberty the origin of which could be traced in the Helsinki Declaration of August 1975. The declaration was widely publicised by Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). The wide range of publication created a formal obligation on the part of governments to respect basic human and civil rights.

The opposition groups in Hungary remained almost as an intellectual movement which stayed away from direct involvement in politics. During the 1970s the Kadar regime had taken strong steps to improve the sluggish economy with partial liberal reforms—New Economic Mechanism (NEM). This is how the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party was trying to manipulate and to discourage oppositional activities through some apparently responsive measure like NEM. The opposition emerged in January 1977 and sent letter of support to Charter 77 of Czechoslovakia. A variety of intellectual currents came together in this manifestation of opposition. They are mainly the younger members of the ‘Budapest School’ or had been involved in communist youth movement of Budapest University. They were mainly presenting liberals who do not have any Marxist background, students, religious activities, human right supporters and liberal economist. They all are coherently committed to democratic values which opposing the monopolistic claims of Marxism.

The political dissent in GDR revolved around individual critics of the government; these were consisting of political theorists, artists and other intellectuals
who might exert some influence over sections of intelligentsia but whose public exposure is extremely restricted and whose political programs carried little popular weight. The GDR regime dealt firmly with political dissenters. Either they were imprisoned or passed through severe harassment or forced to migrate. The official repression and intensive social controls serve to keep dissent in East Germany (GDR) largely disorganised and politically ineffective till mid-1970s.

The most prominent opposition to the process of destalinisation or normalisation had been the movement known as Charter 77. The movement took its name from the title of a document initially circulated within Czechoslovakia in January 1977. Originally appearing as a manifesto in a West German newspaper and signed by 243 Czechoslovak citizens representing various occupations, political viewpoints and religions, was later signed by 1,200 people. Charter 77 criticised the government for failing to implement human rights provisions of a number of documents it had signed, including the Czechoslovak Constitution, the Final Act of the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations' covenants on political, civil, economic and cultural rights.

The Solidarity came up as a trade union in August 1980. It brought the dissident group not only in intellectual but from the whole population as participating group. It had not given any space to the Soviet intervention. It brought change in popular behaviour and exceptions. The post-1976 dissident movement was also the first organised movement in post-communist Poland to have received the recognition of the church and Catholic humanist group. The dissidents were demanding for open and informed discussion of issues within the society as a whole. They were demanding the limiting of the authority of administration, the scope of bureaucracy. They mainly demanded end of inequality in the society caused by distribution of goods and services on the basis of ‘political’ criteria. They wanted some more rational and social basis of allocation of value. But to suppress this opposition Warsaw government declared ‘state of war’ in 1981.
In this manner Eastern European dissident movement was from time to time suppressed by the ruling communist state apparatus or secret police action. But by the end of 1989 all the dissident movements had come up as an opposition group with alternative solution to economic and political problems (democracy and market economy). However, learning from due to the repeated political insurrections in 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976, the Polish dissidents had combined into Solidarity Movement by end of 1980s (leadership given by Rupnik 1979, Walesa 1992). But in Hungary the revolution of October 1956 and 1968 reforms spiraled into a negotiated revolution of different kind. Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak Republics had benefited from Havel’s moral leadership.

II. 8 Rising of Nationalism in the early 1980s in Eastern Europe

Nationalism is an ideology that places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote the well being of their people along with unity among all of them. It is a goal-oriented ideology predetermined with some action plan for its members and their identity. In general, nationalism is understood as linguistic, racial or ethnic features of a group of people who want to preserve them through creating a separate state or policy.

Hobsbawm in 2004 defined ‘national question’ as situation where politics, technology and social transformation intersect with each other. It is a stage of technological and economic development (pg-10). Joseph Stalin had described nation30 where ‘it is historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in common culture’ (Smith, 2001:11).

In communism any type of nationalism is treated as presudo bourgeoisie tendency and negative phenomena to realise international unity. Nationalism before the Communist era had been a remarkable force in Europe. Specially Eastern Europe had

---

undermined the Turkish Empire and fatally weakened the Habsburg Empire. It created states which, though weak and unstable, survived till World War II. After the Communist took over the notion of nationalism or national ‘self-determination’ was manipulated in favour of ‘universalistic’ character of communism. The Marxist idea of proletarian international understanding always neglected any specific culture and identity over class. The ideology of communism had a created age of ‘fraternal socialist’ existence in the region till the 1980s. From time to time the Soviet Union has suppressed any type of national claim through sever use of force and bureaucratic command. The Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were example of some national discontent which had crushed through severe military intervention.

The Soviet Union was covering dozens of nationalities and ethnicities, and in the wake of its collapse, the politics of ethnicity within its former borders and throughout Eastern Europe had undergone tremendous changes after its collapse in 1989. To some writer’s like Joppke, nationalism could be ‘the most potent force in the break-up of communist regimes’ and ‘truly, the East European revolutions of 1989 have been a rebirth of nations’ (Joppke,1994: 553–54). As the Berlin wall crumbled down the artificial division of Europe came to an end. The vacuum created by the Soviet ideological withdrawal has surprisingly taken over by hidden but existing nationalism and ethnic issues. Scholars like Smith described this scenario as ‘proliferation of nationalism’ (Smith, 2001:121) in Europe. The new policies of perestroika and glasnost in former Soviet Union opened the floodgate of national cleavages and ethnic aspirations in Eastern Europe.

The rising nationalist idea could be traced to the dissident intellectuals who tried to intertwine the concept of human rights and civil society with national self-determination, acknowledged in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The agreement had given ‘the power of powerless’ and voice to the voiceless. For instance, Havel tried to evoke the legacy of Tomas Masaryk’s ‘working for the good of the nation’.\footnote{To know more about the president Tomas Masaryk rule on Czechoslovakia and how he protested communism there, see. Dawisha, 1990,pp59–63} In November and
December, Czechs commemorate the Velvet Revolution.\(^{32}\) It refers to a bloodless revolution in Czechoslovakia that saw the overthrow of the communist regime in 1989, and brought back democracy to Czechs after 50 years of lack of freedom. Underneath the plane, the tensions between the poorer Catholic regions of Slovakia and the more advanced and Westernized Czech society was continuing till 1992. This issue obtained final shape through peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia into two nations.

In Poland Solidarity stood for an authentic movement of national birth and hailed the Godansk Agreement\(^{33}\) of 1980 as the ‘Great Charter of the Rights of the Polish Nation’ (ibid: 554). Poland was a peculiar case where nationalism was overtly conflicting with Polish view of Catholicism and Russian Communist atheism. To Pole’s Catholicism was not just as a religion but as a eredo that set them apart and protected them from alien beliefs imposed by occupying powers (Dawisha, 1990: 67–76).

The case of Hungarian nationalism was very much deep rooted in their 1956 national uprising against Communist Russia. They declared the event as national revolution against an oppressive regime—Communism. In difference to it the Hungarian national objection towards Communist authoritarianism has always been expressed through its reformist economic application and promotion of welfare of the Hungarian nationals throughout Eastern Europe. This tradition of national sentiment had always been protected by forthcoming generation of politicians and statesmen. For example, the first post-communist Prime Minister after winning the election in spring 1990, described himself as the representative of 15 million Hungarians. This clearly indicates the desire to extend protection to all Maygers, regardless of their country of residence and citizenship.

In comparison with other communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, Romania offered a very fascinating case of neo-Stalinist, radical nationalism headed

\(^{32}\) Velvet Revolution is very special since revolutions usually go hand in hand with fighting. Because of its peacefulness it was named ‘Velvet’ as the revolution was as smooth as this material. To know more about Velvet Revolution and role of America see, Madeleine Albright’s biography *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*(2003), Macmillan Publisher,Pp109–23.

\(^{33}\) The agreement was an accord reached as direct result of strikes that took place in Godansk where, the workers along Baltic coasts joined the revolution of Solidarity during the month of August 1980.
Nicolae Ceausescu. Both in his ideology and practicality Ceausesism represented a self-styled version of socialism that stoutly refused to reform socialism pronounced by Gorbachev. He cold-bloodedly killed the peaceful demonstrators who wanted to reform socialism with human face. This was severely criticised by the Soviet media as 'Dracula—Ceausescu' (Dawisha, 1990: 245). He refused to accept the bloc wide division of labour pronounced by Soviet Union and existence of Romania in underdeveloped economic category. They further refused to accept Soviet hegemony in ideological or political matter, even withdrawn from integrated military command of Warsaw pact (Dawisha, 1990: 54). This type of blatant nationalism and forceful industrialisation by Ceausescu in Romania created an atmosphere of its isolation among all Eastern European countries.

In its final form, the internal cohesion of Soviet Communism was dissolved under the burden of economic backwardness, ethnic strife and rival nationalism. The process of openness had been accelerated by the democratic events in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, it led to dissolution of communism in the Soviet Union and created many nation-state on the basis of ethnicity or nationalism. However, by the end of year 1991, dissident movement helped to bring down the regimes in CEECs.

8.1 Historical Factors: The Case of Hungary

Rudlof L. Tokes had rightly assumed, 'Hungary's journey from totalitarian dictatorship to parliamentary democracy commenced on October 23, 1956'. Though the revolution itself considered as a failed attempt but perfectly a struggle of nation against socialist dictatorship, to Tokes (1996), the revolution of 1956 as Hungarian 'little October' embraced an agenda of national emancipation, rightly fought for human freedom, workers' self management and to establish previously existing parliamentary democracy. However, it was clear that the Hungarian October had given strong philosophical foundations of liberal democracy, modern nationalism, transnational citizenship and democratic socialism (pp1–14).
The revolution had brought unprecedented challenge to the Communist rule in Eastern Europe. It was mainly a frustrated outcry of ruthless Sovietisation and industrialisation in 1930s and 1940s in Hungary. It had almost pressurised the society and working class and rural agrarian class. In the other side, the suppression of revolution by the Khrushchev government was natural to protect any socialist system from crumbling down. Especially the Hungarian decision to withdraw from Warsaw Pact had shown as a severe attempt to destroy the Communist cohesion in the bloc. However, when Imre Nagy announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the pact and neutrality in world politics, the Soviet Union decided that there was ‘no comparison with Poland’ and ‘Nagy is in fact turning against us’ (Kramer, 1998: 8). It was at that time, Khrushchev finally gave up negotiations in Hungary and Operation Whirlwind was commenced. Thus, the massive and brutal Soviet military intervention in Hungary was the result of Hungary’s abandonment of Warsaw Pact and communist fraternal cohesion.

The whole political drama has lasted for 15 days, this is the reason why historians described it as ‘little October’. But the event had almost dismantled the whole Communist party regime. Meanwhile, the Soviet military intervention had successfully reinstalled the communist rule, headed by Janos Kadar. Kadar ruled as the party head for almost 30 years, through the regime he nurtured Hungarian politics with different reforms and innovations. Among them the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) was the most prominent that brought long standing impact on society.

The argument to prove Hungary as unique and the most innovative in Eastern European politics lies in its marketisation process that occurred in late the 1960s. Even more significant was the fact that the Soviet leadership did not oppose the economic reforms introduced in Hungary under the Third Five Year Plan. The new plan signaled the introduction of a socialist market economy which gave the producer considerable freedom in fixing prices and determining wages and salaries according to company profits. It also allowed workers’ participation in internal decision making on production targets and areas of investment, and the agricultural cooperatives were given greater freedom. In this course, the legal rights of the local party branches of Communist Party
were also enhanced in keeping with the aim of furthering the development of Socialist democracy. Democracy within the factories was to be strengthened and, in particular, the National Assembly's participation in the political decision-making process extended (Honesch, 1996:239–40). This is how, the tradition and working of reform Socialism had given space to market, freedom and participatory rights to the citizens of Hungary.

In this manner, it is right to assume that, Hungary's peaceful transformation from one-party state to multi-party parliamentary democracy could be traced back from landmark events of the October Revolution of 1956 and acceptance of NEM. The Hungarian revolution of 1956 posed significant challenges to Stalinist authoritarianism and non-democratic statehood. In the other hand, NEM had also made a serious attempt to introduce quasi-market mechanism, within planned economy. These market mechanisms had created a competitive environment of profit in state enterprises. Finally, it's clear that these reforms in the past had created a strong background for pro-market institutional environment in the 1990s.

II. 9 New Changes after the 1990s

In Central and Eastern Europe this period brought a new stage of political development with its own uniqueness. Almost all the state came up with some negotiation and compromise to bring new constitutions with liberal, democratic value added to it. In Poland and Hungary the 'negotiation' took place between oppositions through Round Table Talks (RTTs). But in Romania, the transfer of power took place by force. In Poland the RTTs included Communist party, Solidarity and the Catholic Church. The RTTs was very successful in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In Poland Solidarity had got almost 99 per cent of vote given in the first election defeated Communists decisivly. This brought a domino effect all over the region including Hungarian opposition. The changes after the 1990s brought forward the long denied freedom, constitutionalism and liberal market economy.
In communist practice the constitution hardly plays any role in state building. Almost all the power and authority were concentrated with the Party and its head. Meanwhile, there was no concept of institutions; power sharing or checks and balances to party authority. It mainly indicated that the states were lacking in 'rule of law' and spirit of constitutionalism. The new post-communist constitutions marked in many ways a complete departure from the totalitarian past. As a reaction to Soviet system, all these constitutions proclaimed the fundamental principles of liberal democracy, such as political pluralism; protection of civil and political rights and freedom; private ownership and free press. However, they removed all the problematic references to Communist value like, one party rule; integrated role of party to control economy, polity and society; party as source of law; and mainly the 'class' interpretation of state. The new post communist constitutions expressed that countries' will get rid of the past would enter into new era and establish a firm basis for new constitutional system, based upon principles of democracy and rule of law (Smith, 2003:15).

By the year 1992, almost all the countries of central and Eastern Europe changed their constitutions through amendment or by bringing completely new one. In Hungary, as noted, these changes were so extensive that it got entirely a new constitution. Alike Hungary, Czechoslovakia also revised it completely, but after division (Czech Republic & Slovakia), both adopted separated new constitution by 1992 (Elster et al, 1998: 70). Bulgaria got its new constitution in 1991 by establishing 'Grand National Assembly' (Albi, 2005: 23). Almost all the constitutions have protected citizens from any type of arbitrary regulations, against state intervention in personal life.

All constitutions established the parliamentary form of government (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia); presidencialism or semi-presidencialism

---

34 According to the class theory, the state comes into existence when society is divided into two antagonistic classes, one owning the means of social production and other being constrained to live on its own labour. Here state work as an instrument of the Dominant Class and an instrument of Class exploitation.
35 Hungarian President is indirectly elected therefore weak in legitimacy.
36 President is elected directly. It gives the office greater prestige and endeavor.
37 The President of the Czech Republic is the head of the state. Unlike some heads of state, such as British Monarch, however, the office goes beyond that of a figure head, conferring upon its holder a role in
(Romania\textsuperscript{39}). In majority of countries, the Presidents are popularly elected and thus can claim a mandate separate from the normal Prime Ministerial form of government. In the meantime, Presidents of CEECs were kept under the legislative supervisions. In general the Central and Eastern European states tried to construct a check and balance system that would limit executive power.

Almost all the post-communist constitutions have protected long neglected individual rights like, right to life, liberty and property. The Bulgarian constitution guarantees the right to life where it to protects human life and punishes any attempt to destroy human life. In the Czech and Slovak Republics the ‘human life deserves to be protected already before birth’. In Hungary also human life is protected before life, means abortion is strictly regulated by norms established by the Ministry of Health (Elster et al, 1998:81–82). Almost all the countries of central and Eastern Europe have accepted the right to property as the most central to protecting individual’s liberty to work and earn. Beneath this they all allowed market economy to persist in the state, which are excluded during Communist regimes.

This is how all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe given emphasise on tangible aspects of political development i.e.

a. Building nation-state (define it with citizenship and reorganization of minority)
b. Rule of law or constitutionalism (codification of law with limiting the power of authority)
c. Institutionalisation (codify rules, regulation and procedures of work for legislature, executive and judiciary). This could have similarity with Pye’s view of differentiation or specialisation on an ultimate sense of integration
d. Equality: Universal adult suffrage and recruitment to political office through achievement norms.
e. Rational administration (creation of competent civil service, relates to capacity of government)

\textsuperscript{38} After adoption of new constitution in 1993, President is directly elected but plays ceremonial role.

\textsuperscript{39} President is directly elected and charged with many authorities including protecting constitution and proper working of political authorities.
f. Existence of political forces (allowing multi-party system and civil society to create active citizenry).

Though the concepts like 'constitutionalism' and 'nation-building' are very much value laden but within the two decades after systemic transformation they all proved that democratic consolidation occurred in quite a positive way. All the states have almost successfully completed their national elections at regular intervals. Finally they all filled the criteria of democratic consolidation, rule of law and respect for human rights to join EU on May 2004.

9.1 Developments in Post-Communist Poland

Poland's political institutions first took shape as part of the communist reforms of mid-1980s and the rise of Solidarity movement. The Little Constitution of 1992 successfully established the Constitutional Tribunal, the ombudsman, new presidency, the constructive vote of confidence and a two-tiered legislature house, Sejm-lower house and upper house-Senate.

In the early 1990s, Poland made great progress towards achieving a fully democratic government and a market economy. In November 1990, Lech Wałęsa40 was elected the President for a five-year term. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, at Wałęsa's request, formed a government and served as its prime minister until October 1991, introduced world prices and greatly expanded the scope of private enterprise. Poland's first free parliamentary elections were held in 1991. More than 100 parties participated, representing the full spectrum of political views. No single party received more than 13 per cent of the total vote. After a rough start, 1993 Polish people voted for the second group of elections, and the first parliament to serve a full term. The Alliance of the

40The post communist constitution in Poland during 1992 was not very precise about the jurisdiction of President. The then constitution gave him a strong say in foreign and security policy. Wałęsa tried to expand his power to direct all major domestic reforms, economic and financial policies in particular. Above all, he successfully claimed the right to appoint important ministries as well as top bureaucratic and military personnel. In 1992, he even proposed to combine the offices of president and prime minister.
Democratic Left (SLD) received the largest share of votes. Also in the year 1993 the Soviet North Group of Forces finally left Poland.

After the election, the SLD and Polish Peasant Party–PSL formed a governing coalition. Waldemar Pawlak, leader of the junior partner PSL, became the Prime Minister. During this period, relations between President Walesa and the Prime Minister remained poor throughout the Pawlak government, with the President charging Pawlak with furthering personal and party interests while neglecting matters of state importance. Following a number of scandals implicating Pawlak and increasing political tension over control of the armed forces, Walesa demanded Pawlak’s resignation in January 1995. A crisis resulted and the coalition removed Pawlak from office and replaced him with the SLD’s Jozef Oleksy as the new Prime Minister.

In November 1995, Poland held its second post communist free presidential elections. SLD leader defeated Walesa by a narrow margin—51.7 per cent to 48.3 per cent. Soon after Walesa’s defeat, Interior Minister Andrzej Milezanowski accused the then-Prime Minister Oleksy of long-time collaboration with Soviet and later Russian intelligence. In the ensuing political crisis, Oleksy resigned. For his successor, The SLD-PSL coalition turned to deputy Sejm speaker Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who was linked to, but not a member of, the SLD. Polish prosecutors subsequently decided that there was insufficient evidence to charge Oleksy, and a parliamentary commission decided in November 1996 that the Polish intelligence services may have violated rules of procedure in gathering evidence in the Oleksy case.

In 1995 Kwaniewski (Poland in this phase got rid of instability due to coalition of parties, in the year 1997 they also kept 4 per cent threshold limit for every party) won the presidential election. During this phase socialists profited from widespread discontent with the economic results and social consequences of transformation which took place since the negotiated revolution of 1989. In Poland socialist like Kwaniewski presented themselves as modern, open-minded and mostly non-ideological reformers. They were oriented towards the West committing themselves to the values of Western society,
capitalism and pluralist democracy and tried to fulfill the basic criteria of the EU and NATO. The economic reform had quite successfully co-managed by the state and the population (though with a high rate of unemployment). The difficult task of adoption to EU *acquis communitaire* and negotiation to Europe is almost completed by the year 2004.

9.2 Developments in Post-Communist Romania

After 1990s, Romania took few determined steps towards democratic consolidation. Parliamentary and presidential elections in November and December replaced the heirs of former communist régime, including outgoing president Ion Iliescu (1990–96, 2000–2004), with a generation of young, pro-European democrats. This new government tried to break from the semi-authoritarian, anachronistic rule of its post-communist predecessors and emphasised on democratic principle as transparency and accountability. The most surprising outcome was the victory of Bucharest mayor Trian Basescu, chairman of opposition Justice and Truth Alliance (DA), in December 12 presidential election. Basescu unexpectedly defeated prime minister Andrian Nastase of ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD) by 51 to 49.

The PSD was known as Social Democratic Pole of Romani or PDSR, has its roots in the Soviet-era Communist Party. It has been the party of power for most of the period since the fall of communism. The PSD’s Nastase had appeared in position to win the presidency after his significant lead in the first round. But a revived Romanian civil society, encouraged by the Orange Revolution underway in neighbouring Ukraine, combined with disillusioned former PSD voters to provide the victory to the opposition candidate. Unlike Nastase, Basescu had a strong constituency in major cities, especially in Bucharest, where he is widely admired for his performance as the city mayor.

In the post-communist transition phase, the economic crisis deepened due to the lack of democratisation in Romania resulting in lowest per-capita income, the worst environmental standards and tax collection record, and highest infant mortality.
According to the Freedom House, the country’s most critical problem is rampant corruption which was criticised by erstwhile PSD administration but failed to bring about any change. During that period, the judiciary was neither independent nor was the media free from government censorship. Romania’s democratisation process has been slower than all the other post-communist countries in the region, with the exception of Albania and Yugoslavia. Romania’s effort at democratisation has drawn from its post-communist legacy-wide spread pessimism and political apathy by ruling government. This is the reason Romania was not granted the EU membership till 2007.

Besescu’s victory represents a significant departure from this legacy. It signals a rebirth of political dynamism and a hope for change, and it marked the beginning of democratic consolidation in Romania. In Basescu’s regime Romania restructured its economic patterns. Under the leadership of President Basescu and Prime Minister Popescu-Tariceanu, the new government focused on fulfilling its commitments to the EU, the NATO and the IMF. To that end, its priorities were: a) full transparency in government and legislative process; b) guaranteeing and respecting the independence of media, in particular that of state radio and television; c) raising pensions and salary; d) separating the judiciary from politics; e) recruiting the assistance of NGOs and reorganisations representing business in the struggle against corruption; f) implementing laws that would place the education system in line with European norms; g) enacting a law on the rights of national minorities; and h) eliminating compulsory military service by 2007 (Gross and Tismaneanu, 2005: 153).

This list of priorities was augmented to include some of the suggestions made in the EU Foreign Affairs Commission’s December 2004 Report on Romania. That’s report emphasised the need to: a) reform the police and the security service; b) improve the country’s control over the border; c) improve child protection; d) deals with the problems of state pensions; and e) combat discrimination against Roma minority, which remains widespread (ibid). This is how Romania has tried to establish democratic, transparent government through the implementation of the above-stated measures.
9.3 Development in Post-Communist Bulgaria

The first stroke of political conscience in Bulgaria on 16 January 1988, some 40 men gathered to create the first Independent Society for Human Rights. Their attempt to register in courts was failed due to Zhivkov’s extreme control over civil society and freedom. Zhivkovism was subjected to sever criticism by RFE, BBC and Deutsche Welle. Still at that time no one had proposed the abandonment of one-party rule in Bulgaria. On 17 November 1989, the National Assembly elected Mladenov to succeed Zhivkov as president of State Council. However, the civil society had no role and there was not single opposition to come up with any type of alternative government.

In beginning of January 1990, the Communist party offered the opposition to join in a national roundtable discussion to negotiate a settlement of the political problems in the country. Only representatives of the Union Democratic Forces (UDF) were included in these negotiations. Subsequently, the Agrarians in the government, having cut their ties with the communists, formed the third party at roundtable. After several meetings and some setbacks, the participants signed an agreement on 12 March (Raikin, 1998: 242). In between the leaders of two leading factions, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the UDF, reconvened the roundtable and signed a new Sporazumenie on 3 March 1991.

The new agreement affirmed the irreversibility of the reforms process, condemned any illegal pressure on the organ of the state, and set deadlines for adopting the constitution and a series of emergency laws. The constitution was promulgated on 13 July 1991. It stipulated that only political parties and groups’ receiving a minimum of 4 percent of electoral vote would be entitled to seats in the new parliament. The constitution had prohibited political parties organised on religious and ethnic bases, thus disqualifying the Muslim and Turkish party.

In October 1991, the UDF won, forming Bulgaria’s first non-Communist government since 1946. Power shifted back and forth between the pro-Western Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and the BSP during the 1990s. The economy continued to
deteriorate amid growing concern over the spread of organised crime. A new UDF government, led by Prime Minister Ivan Kostov, was elected in 1997 to overhaul the economic system and institute reforms aimed at stemming corruption. Progress on both fronts remained slow. As a result, the UDF lost the July 2001 election to the former king of Bulgaria, leader of the Simeon II National Movement41 (SNM). The new Prime Minister, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (Simeon II), had been dethroned 55 years earlier (at age nine) during the Communist takeover of the country. Bulgaria became a member of NATO in 2004. In 2005, the EU approved its membership for 2007, subject to the implementation of reforms, especially the cleaning up of corruption and organised crime.

In June 2005 general elections, no party received a clear majority, and a coalition government was formed with Socialist Party leader Sergei Stanishev as the new prime minister. In 2007, Bulgaria joined the EU and it is now a stable, democratic and liberal market economy.

9.4 Developments in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia

The post communist Czechoslovakia continued to be characterised by number of problems. Especially in Slovakia, growing disagreement with the results of economic as well as political changes led to increased degree of support for the Slovak National Party led by Vladimir Meciar that advocated independence for Slovakia. Following the June 1992 elections, a caretaker federal government was set up to administer the division of the country. Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar, the head of the republican governments of the two sides were to decide on the federal split and established the legal foundations for the Cezch and Slovak statehood. A time table of separation was agreed upon, and in September 1992, the federal cabinet approved a bill on dissolving the federation. Then both of the successor states gained independence with equal successor status.

41 It was founded in April 2001 after Simeon II (King) declared his choice to take part in the active political life of Bulgaria. The movement won 42.7 per cent of the popular vote and 120 out of 240 seats in the 2001 elections. It formed a coalition government with the Movement for Rights and Freedom. It is a liberal party.
During this phase the Cezch Republic was in a high rank of stability. The Czech constitution was adopted in December 1992. It proved to be a broadly liberal document which defined the Cezch Republic as ‘sovereign, unified, and democratic, law-observing state based on respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen’. In the economic front, foreign investment had been heavily concentrated in the Cezch Republic than Slovakia. Privatisation continued and, despite delays, a second wave of voucher privatization took place in March 1994. By July 1993, the private sector accounted for 23 percent of total employment. Unemployment continued to be less than 3 percent, though experts and government officials predicted that it would increase to 6 to 8 percent. The Cezch crown remained a very stable currency until 1997 when financial scandals and charges of corruption shook confidence in the crown (Rawet eds, 1998: 61).

The political developments also diverged in the two newly separated countries. In the Czech Republic, support for Prime Minister Klaus remained high until the late 1990. Social welfare reform, financial crisis, and corruption scandals eventually led to Klaus’s resignation and formation of new government in 1997. During this period, Czech Republic’s relation with the neighbouring states like Hungary and Slovakia had grown contentious. In both countries the treatment of Roma, gypsy and Hungarian minorities brought remarkable changes in domestic policy process.

The foreign policy of independent Slovakia reflected a good deal of former Czechoslovakian federation. Both the countries kept very normal relation with Hungary and Poland in accordance with Visegrad agreement. On another front, both the governments had joined NATO’s PfP. The differences between the two countries were highlighted in 1997. The Czech Republic was among the post-communist countries as part of the first wave NATO expansion. The country’s leaders were also invited to begin accession talks with the EU. Slovakia, by way of contrast, was not included in either group of countries. With Slovakia’s accession to the EU and NATO the democratic consolidation was almost over. However, the political development in Slovakia little differed from those of the states like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
To sum up, the process of political development in CEECs deeply inherited their historical legacy and varied from the state to state. The states had almost started their journey to democracy in the heyday of the Communist era—i.e., the 1970s. In almost every country, the former dissidents came to govern the state after the 1990s elections. For example—Vaclav Havel, Joseph Antall, Lech Walesha, Maciar and Klaus all are dissident leaders of communist regimes. At the same time they all aspired to join the EU and NATO. In order to join these international organisations, they drastically changed their domestic policies and institutional set ups. To become politically stable and economically independent they all accepted the conditionalities of the EU and the NATO. In this manner, they minimised the political instability and economic disturbances that usually strike any state in its making.