5.1 INTRODUCTION

Shoemaker explains phenomenality or the qualitative aspects of our mental states as a function of the special class of mental states called qualia. Qualia succumb to functional definition in terms of their consequences such as qualitative beliefs and objective beliefs in addition to their behavioural responses. Qualitative beliefs are identified with awareness of qualia, a subset of our internal mental states. On similar lines, objective beliefs are defined as awareness of objects in the external world. Since the latter are about the external objects, they can rightly be called intentional states. In the process of functionally defining qualia, Shoemaker grants ontological autonomy to three varieties of mental states: qualia, qualitative beliefs and intentional states, and assumes that they are distinct and separable states. Shoemaker does not present any arguments to establish this position. His strategy just assumes it. There are, however, other philosophers who advance arguments in support of this view. Nelkin, for example, argues that consciousness is not an indivisible, unitary state, but consists of three varieties of states: the phenomenal, the intentional and the introspective. In his opinion, each of the component states is dissociable from others and no one state has any more priority over others in being considered as the consciousness.\(^1\)

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I shall rehearse Nelkin's arguments for the disunity of consciousness and try

to bring out their basic defects. Nelkin's arguments merit due consideration because they are a *posteriori*. That is, they are based primarily on empirical considerations. The position that he advocates assumes significance because of his claim that the division of consciousness into introspective awareness, phenomenality and intentionality is the first step towards a viable scientific study of consciousness. The division, he argues, facilitates a proper inquiry into the salient features of each component and the way they causally interact among themselves.

The aim of this chapter is to defend the thesis that awareness, intentionality and phenomenality are conceptually interlinked and are inseparable features of each of our various mental states. However, there is a sense in which consciousness is divisible and it must be distinguished from the sense in which it is not. This will be pointed out with reference to Daniel Dennet's brilliant distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of description of consciousness. The talk about the unity of consciousness is a talk at the personal level. Nelkin's basic mistake is that he fails to take proper note of the above distinction and his division of consciousness into phenomenality, intentionality and introspective awareness emanates from the confusion of these two levels of talk. As against Nelkin I shall make an argument for the unity of consciousness at the personal level. Dennet's distinction between personal and subpersonal consciousness and my arguments for the unity of consciousness at the personal level constitute the subject matter of the second section.

In the third and final section, I shall sketch an outline of a theory of consciousness at the personal level which follows from my arguments for the unity of consciousness. The position defended here is that awareness states are basically intentional states, and that there is something it is like to have these intentional states. Hence there is no distinction between belief-laden kind of consciousness, described as purely intentional, and the so called qualitative or phenomenal consciousness. The qualitative consciousness is a species of, or a subclass of, intentional states. Hence, there are no qualia in the sense Shoemaker speaks of them. Moreover, there is no introspective mechanism which can report the existence of qualia or intentional states. The denial of an
independent introspective faculty would imply that there is no second order consciousness.

5.2 NELKIN'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE DIVISIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

As noted already, Nelkin conceives consciousness to be of composite nature with ontologically autonomous and dissociable states of intentionality, phenomenality and introspective awareness. To defend the independence and ontological autonomy of each of the above states, it must be demonstrated that the following three theses are plausible;

1. The intentional states can exist without phenomenality and without introspective awareness.
2. The phenomenal states can exist without being intentional and without being accessible to introspective awareness.
3. Introspective awareness can take place in the absence of both phenomenal and intentional states.

In what follows, I shall discuss all the three above. While Nelkin defends 1 and 2. he does not actually seem to be defending 3 inspite of his talk about the independence of introspective awareness. Rather he is committed to a thesis slightly different from 3. But if the independence of introspective awareness is to be conclusively proved. 3 above has to be established together with 1 and 2.

5.2.1 Independence of intentionality

By 'intentionality' we mean that feature of our mental states which consists in their "being directed at, being about, being of, or representing certain other entities and states of affairs"). And by 'independence of intentionality' we mean that there are some Intentional mental states which can occur or exist without other features like phenomenality and introspective awareness. The independence or the ontological autonomy of the intentional mental states is established without any doubt only if we obtain the conjunction of two theses: (a) Intentional states can exist or occur without awareness and (b) intentional

CONSCIOUSNESS; AWARENESS, INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENALITY

states can occur without phenomenality. According to Nelkin, there are empirical reasons that support each of these two theses. By citing empirical evidences Nelkin wants to show that the independence of an intentional state is not just a logical possibility but an actuality. We shall consider each of the two theses one after the other briefly stating the empirical evidence cited by Nelkin in support of them.

5.2.1.1 Intentionality without introspective awareness

Nelkin tries to establish this thesis by citing blind sight cases and cases of semantic priming and unconscious problem-solving. The victims of blind sight have large blind areas called scotomata in their visual field due to brain damage in the post geniculate region. However, given appropriate instructions these patients can make accurate judgments or draw accurate pictures with respect to the contents of their scotomata and in this they function very much like normally sighted people without there being anything experiential or phenomenally conscious going on in their scotomata. This, according to Nelkin, is sufficient to think that intentionality can occur without introspection. The forced guesses of these patients, in Nelkin's opinion, make sense only if unintrospected perceptual judgments have been made on the presentations of their blind field. Such judgments indicate that the patients see the object under some "aspect" or point of view. The phenomenon of completion associated with blind sight too corroborates the thesis of independence of the intentional states from the states of introspective awareness. Certain experiments have shown that if a semicircle is presented in the scotoma with another semicircle presented in the visual field, being attached to it, the patients reported that they saw a full circle. In Nelkin's opinion, the subjects saw a complete circle just because they saw a semicircle in the blind field the contents of which are not available to Introspective awareness. This means intentional processes are involved in the visual processing of the contents of the blind field, though one is not oneself conscious of these intentional processes.

3 See Nelkin, "What is Consciousness?". 421-426.
Semantic priming by the words shown in the scotomata and human creative thinking or problem solving are viewed by Nelkin as additional support to the separability of intentional states from awareness. Experiments conducted by Marcel show that if the patients were auditorily asked to associate the word 'bank' on the presentation of the word 'river' in the blind field, they tended to associate it more with a body of water than with money. Nelkin explains this fact saying that semantic or intentionality characterised processes took place in the blind field whose contents were inaccessible to awareness. Similarly it is a common experience that on having got stuck while solving a problem a person leaves it out for sometime just to find later, to his own surprise, that he has come out with a full-fledged solution. The solution is the result of semantic or intentionality characterised processes unavailable in awareness. This means that intentional states or process can exist or occur without awareness.

5.2.1.2 Intentionality without phenomenality

Let us now consider the second thesis namely, the intentional states can exist or actually do exist without phenomenality. By phenomenality we mean the qualitative aspects of our mental states: what it is like to have them. Like Shoemaker, Nelkin too believes that it is due to the existence of autonomous mental states called qualia that our mental states have phenomenal features. The feeling of pain or what it is like to have pain, for example, is due to the existence of the qualitative content or pain qualia. The intentional states, Nelkin thinks, can exist without any phenomenal aspects of the mental states usually associated with them. Therefore, intentional states are separable from the phenomenal ones. The blind sight cases discussed above themselves render support to this thesis. The processing of information with regard to the objects presented in the scotomata do not "look" or "appear" in any way to the subjects. The same could be said about the prepositional attitudes we humans possess. The intentional states like beliefs and desires do not feel to us in any way. We have, for example, introspective awareness of the content of the oocurrent thought that a Chiliagon has more sides than a figure with 999 sides. The fact that such thoughts do not "feel" to us indicates that
there could be intentional states without the accompaniment of phenomenal states.⁴

5.2.2 Independence of phenomenal states

To prove that phenomenality can occur apart from both introspective awareness and intentionality, Nelkin has to substantiate a conjunction whose conjuncts are the theses: (a) Phenomenal states can occur without introspective awareness; and (b) the phenomenal states can occur without intentionality.

5.2.2.1 Phenomenality without introspective awareness

Nelkin defends the first thesis as follows: There are indirect evidences provided again by cases of blind sight that buttress the view that there could be unintrospected perception which undeniably involves qualitative states. Colour discrimination is possible only if visual perception takes place and visual perception involves colour qualia in an essential way. The experiments conducted by Stoerig and Cowey showed that their blind sight subjects were able to make colour discriminations just as the normal perceivers do, though they denied seeing any colour. Since colour discriminations involve qualia in an essential way, these patients must have discriminated them on the basis of qualia that were unavailable to them in introspective awareness. Another evidence for the separability of phenomenal states from introspective awareness is based on the distinction between attention and introspection. Though paying attention and introspection are totally different processes. In Nelkin's opinion they coalesce in the case of sensation. Consequently, when attention is paid to a sensation, we become introspectively aware of the sensation. Our introspecting does not by itself seem to create the phenomenal qualities nor does it change their nature. The phenomenal qualities we discover through introspection are present all along whether we introspect them or not. Hence phenomenal states can occur and exist independent of introspective awareness.⁵

⁴"What is Consciousness?" 427.
⁵Ibid., 428-29.
5.2.2.2 Phenomenality with no intentionality

Nelkin, it seems to me, has not made a strong case for this thesis. Without sufficient support for this thesis it is not possible to assert the independence of phenomenal states. If it is true that intentionality occurs in blind sighted patients without being "felt" or "appeared to" in any way, then intentionality must be separable from phenomenality. But to prove the separability of phenomenality and intentionality in addition to the argument in section 5.2.1.2, we must produce an argument to the effect that phenomenal states can occur without intentionality. The colour discrimination occurring in the case of blind sighted subjects is interpreted by Nelkin as an instance of the occurrence of phenomenal states unavailable to awareness. If there are unintrospected qualia and if they occur in the case of colour discrimination in the blind sighted cases, then it can, in my opinion, be seen as an instance of the intentionality of phenomenal states. The qualia or phenomenal states if there are any, involved in colour discrimination must be of some entities, viz., coloured objects, if there are to be any discriminations at all. So we may conclude that Nelkin's empirical evidences are not sufficient to prove the dissociability of phenomenality from intentionality.

5.2.3 Independence of introspective awareness

To demonstrate the independence of introspective awareness from both intentionality and phenomenality, as in the above cases here too it must be shown that a conjunction of two theses is obtainable. The conjunction in question is: Introspective awareness can occur without intentionality and it can occur without phenomenality. Even if it is granted that both intentionality and phenomenality can occur without introspective awareness, it is quite possible that introspective awareness cannot occur without either intentionality or phenomenality or both. Hence, Nelkin must prove that the above conjunction is obtainable. However, he does not attempt to do it. Instead, he proceeds to provide an indirect proof for the independence of introspective awareness. Nelkin claims that he has already proved the following four theses,

1. Intentionality can occur without introspective awareness.
2. Intentionality can occur without phenomenality.
3. Phenomenality can occur without introspective awareness.
4. Phenomenality can occur without intentionality.

From (2) and (4) it follows:
5. Phenomenality and intentionality are distinct and separable.

Nelkin's argument is that 5 in conjunction with 1 and 3 entails the independence of introspective awareness. In other words, since intentionality and phenomenality are separable from each other and since either can occur without introspective awareness, one can be introspectively aware of phenomenal states without being aware of one's intentional states and one can introspect one's intentional states without being aware of one's phenomenal states. But the theses 1 to 5 do not entail the independence of introspective awareness. They only imply that introspective awareness can be exercised without either intentionality or phenomenality, though not without both. As Nelkin puts it: "Of course, introspectibility cannot occur apart from both the others, though we have reasons to think it can exist apart from each of the others." In other words, he is concerned only with the proof of the disjunction: Introspectibility can occur without intentionality or it can occur without phenomenality but not without both.

If introspectibility cannot occur without either of the other two features, then it depends on either phenomenality or intentionality or both for its occurrence. Both of them are not necessary but either of them is sufficient. So the independence of introspectibility that Nelkin speaks of is only a relative independence. From the theses so far discussed, it does not follow that the three features (intentionality, phenomenality and introspectibility) characterise different states of human beings, as Nelkin claims rather than being three features of a simple, non-composite state.

To prove the absolute independence of introspectibility, the conjunction 'Introspective awareness can occur without phenomenality and it can occur without intentionality' must be obtained. Nelkin has not provided an argument to this effect. The central thesis in Nelkin's argument is the separability of phenomenality and intentionality. Unfortunately, Nelkin has
not provided any valid reasons to suggest that phenomenality can occur without intentionality. These failures cast doubt on the thesis of the disunity of consciousness as Nelkin conceives it.

5.3 THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In this section, I shall make an argument for the unity of consciousness as against Nelkin's thesis of disunity. The unity thesis I defend here states that awareness, intentionality and phenomenality are inseparable features of our mental states and acts. Dennet has made an illuminating distinction between personal level talk and subpersonal level talk about consciousness. Since my argument for the unity of consciousness is centred on this distinction. I shall briefly explicate this distinction. This is followed by a brief discussion of Dennet's sub-personal theory of consciousness. The aim of this discussion is twofold: first, to show what a subpersonal theory would be like, and second, to show that the talk of the disunity of consciousness at the subpersonal level is consistent with the talk of unity of consciousness at the personal level. Finally I shall provide certain arguments for the unity of consciousness at the personal level.

5.3.1. Personal and subpersonal levels of explanation

By personal level of explanation Dennet means the explanation of the behaviour of an agent by appealing to his mental states and processes. The explanation is obviously couched in psychological vocabulary. The talk of the mental properties like awareness, intentionality and phenomenality belong to this level. Explanation at this level takes place by identifying the principles employed in the performance of actions. The principles appealed to are themselves constitutive of the action we intend to explain. The behaviour and other cognitive features of humans have a subpersonal level of explanation as well. This is basically a mechanical or causal explanation. "Subpersonal theories", says Dennet. "proceed by analysing a person into an organisation of subsystems (organs, routines, neurons, faculties, components — even atoms) and attempting; to explain the behaviour of the whole person as the outcome of the interaction of these
They tell us how the specific functions described at the personal level are realised in a mechanical structure. And, as Dennett rightly points out, every cognitivist - functionalist theory is a subpersonal theory.

Dennet observes that in an important but narrow sense, "the personal level of explanation is the only level of explanation when the subject matter is human minds and actions". Take, for example, our pain talk. It is basically non-mechanistic personal level talk. The explanation of pain at this level appeals to the occurrence of a sensation of a certain sort which is responsible for locating the pain and the production of pain behaviour. No further explanation of pain can be given in terms of unanalyzable pain sensations. If a more thorough going explanation is required as to how the sensation of pain and pain behaviour occur, we must switch over to the alternative model of explanation, namely, the subpersonal level of explanation in terms of events and processes in the brain. As a result, mental talk is replaced by physical talk which is about the organisation of the nervous system and the events and processes in the brain. But none of these events and processes which are said to realize pain is entitled to the name 'pain', as in the strict sense we cease to talk about mental states and processes at the subpersonal level. This thinking has an odd corollary: in an important sense, analysis of pain at the subpersonal level is not at all an analysis of pain.

Thus, for Dennet, abandoning personal level talk in favour of subpersonal level talk is tantamount to abandoning mental talk altogether. That is to say, mental talk does not make sense at the subpersonal level of explanation. Consequently, the mental does not seem to be identifiable with the physical. Then what is it that we explain at the subpersonal level? Dennet's answer is that at the subpersonal level we purport to explain the behaviour of the organism. However, the two levels of explanation cannot be two watertight compartments. The subpersonal level must somehow be continuous with the personal level of explanation. For it

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is not the case that there is absolutely no relation at all between pains and neural impulses or between beliefs and neural states. Our failure to bridge the gap between these two levels of description would end up in substantial dualism. Dennet is quite aware of this difficulty. His solution consists in construing the mental terms occurring in the personal level description as non-referential. That is, the mental terms like pain, beliefs etc. do not refer. The advantage of this move is that we do not have to bother as to whether mental states and processes are identical or non-identical with neural states and impulses.\(^9\)

Dennet's move is motivated by an ontological bias towards physicalism. The difficulty with this move, however, is that it implies that the mental states and processes described at the personal level have only the ontological status of fictional entities. Since it, in a sense, rejects the ontology of the mental, we are not in a position to say that the personal level of explanation is related to and is continuous with the subpersonal level. This way of dealing with the problem, I think, must be resisted. For people do feel pain, have beliefs, desires, etc. These states influence their actions, reactions and decisions. Hence the ontological status of mental states cannot be denied outright. So the question is not how personal level explanation can be replaced by subpersonal level explanation but rather how personal level description and subpersonal level description refer to the same state of affairs. In the case of pain, for example, it is true that at the subpersonal level we explain pain behaviour: how, for instance, a person withdraws his hand from a hot stove. But the talk of pain behaviour does not seem to be at the subpersonal level. The withdrawal of a hand from a hot stove makes sense and can be described as pain behaviour only at the personal level. Hence there is a need to identify the mental phenomena described at the personal level with the phenomena described in the physical vocabulary at the subpersonal level. I do not claim that such an identification must be a straightforward one-to-one identification. Corresponding to simple mental state type, say pain, described at the personal level, there may not be any single mental state type, say C-fibre firing, in the subpersonal

\(^9\)Content and Consciousness, 91-96.
vocabulary. This is not to say that the type identity theory is wrong. Rather, a mental state type like pain must be identified with the functional organisation of certain types of neural states and processes. Both the functional organisation and the kinds of neural states and processes are essential for providing subpersonal account of the personal phenomenon of pain. That is, as far as human minds and actions are concerned, the phenomena described at the personal level and those described at the subpersonal level are identical, though the terms of description vary.

5.3.2 Dennet's subpersonal theory of consciousness

The cognitivists or the functionalists try to explain the cognitive functions such as perception, problem solving, language use etc., by providing subpersonal theories. Since each such cognitive function is somehow linked with the concept of consciousness, the cognitivist must provide a theory of consciousness. Dennet takes up the challenge and tries to provide a cognitivist theory of consciousness.\textsuperscript{10} I shall briefly state his theory which, he claims, unifies and is continuous with the subpersonal theories of cognitive functions.

Dennet makes a distinction between personal consciousness and subpersonal consciousness. The personal consciousness is the consciousness proper or what we refer to generally by the term 'consciousness' in ordinary language. The key concept, according to him, in the definition of consciousness whether personal or subpersonal, is that of access. There is much that happens in and to a person which he has access to. What a person has access to is that of which he is conscious. Dennet calls this sort of access "the access of personal consciousness", and "the subject of that access (whatever it is) which exhausts consciousness is the person, and not any of the person's parts".\textsuperscript{11} Dennet distinguishes the access of personal consciousness from the access of subpersonal consciousness which, according to him, is nothing other than computational access. The computational access is clarified with the notion of a computer program baring

\textsuperscript{10} See Dennet. Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness." 149-73.
\textsuperscript{11} Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness." 150
subroutines. It is quite possible that the outputs or computational results of one subroutine function as the inputs of another subroutine which means that there is an information link between them. The access of a subroutine to the computational results of another subroutine for further computation is called computational access. There is no direct relation between personal access and computational or subpersonal access, as what is accessible to a subroutine is not necessarily accessible to the personal consciousness. The various parts of our nervous system, for example, may have access to very many things which are not accessible to our personal consciousness. That is, there are many things happening in and to us of which we have little awareness.

Making use of the subpersonal notions of access, Dennet proposes to construct "a full-fledged I" or a person out of the subpersonal systems specified by a cognitivist theory. According to him, a theory of consciousness must account for six functional areas or information processing components. They are: (1) the perceptual system, (2) problem solving system, (3) a buffer memory called M, (4) an attention system, (5) control or the higher executive, and (6) the speech centre known as PR (Print Routine). All these information-processing components are systems at the subpersonal level.

The functions of the various components are as follows. The perceptual system analyses the sensory stimuli. The analysis takes place in a series of different levels starting with the stimulation of the sense organs and culminating in highly interpreted information about the perceived world. The outputs of the various levels of information are accessible to the problem solving system as well as to the short-term memory storage M. The problem solving component receives inputs from both M and the perceptual system. The postulation of this component is necessitated by the fact that perceptual experience is not the only conscious experience we have. We are also conscious of our thinking when we set out to solve problems. M is a special hypothesized short-term memory location. It has an information link with the system for perceptual analysis, with the problem solving component, and with the higher executive or the control. The pool of information accessible to PR is from M. The information that reaches PR for communication is mediated through the control or the higher executive. The higher executive functions as
follows. It directs a question to the M and retrieves an answer. Once the answer is retrieved, it censors the answer, or interprets it, or makes inferences from it or sends it to PR as such without any further processing. The functions Dennet attributes to the executive suggest that it is basically a semantic system. Dennet does not, in fact, hypothesize a separate attention component. It is seen as one of the functions of the higher executive itself. It is roughly the allocation of "the available cognitive resources to the sensory modality or topic of most current importance". This notion of attention is only indirectly connected to personal consciousness as it grants unconscious attention. The PR or the speech centre is the output component. It takes input orders to perform speech acts and executes them. The command to express speech acts is executed either in phonological or graphological mode depending upon the intention to speak or to write.

The subpersonal systems described above provide for a theory of consciousness, because in Dennet's opinion, there is something it is like to be a system organised as he claims the mind to be. However, most of the working of the system would not be transparent to itself. What is accessible to the personal consciousness are the results of the processes of the subpersonal systems and not the processes themselves. These results which are the immediate products of perceptual analysis or problem solving, inhabiting M, constitute our experience. The results that reach M may be either final or intermediate products of perceptual analysis or problem solving. But by the time these results reach PR, they are prepositional in nature. The propositions or judgments are the intentions or the semantic content of our speech acts. We have access of personal consciousness only to the prepositional acts or the thoughts we make and not to the process of producing these thoughts. Our "prepositional episodes, these thinking that P, are our normal and continuous avenues to self knowledge," and "they exhaust our immediate awareness." It must be noted that on the theory discussed so far, there is nothing wrong or contradictory about the notion of unconscious or subliminal perception. Whatever enters M


13 Ibid." 165.
CONSCIOUSNESS; AWARENESS. INTENTIONALITY AND PHEMOMENALITY

constitutes the content of one's experience. The contents of $M$ may not always reach $PR$, for before reaching $PR$ they might decay. And what we have access to at the personal level is whatever is accessible to $PR$ from $M$: "One's access to one's experience is accomplished via the access relations between $M$ and $PR$".\(^{14}\)

We have the feeling of a special authority in offering introspective reports. It is generally attributed to the working of an introspective faculty. But Dennet does not think that the feeling of special authority is the product of an "inner eye" that scans the contents of our consciousness. Rather, it arises from the fact that we judge our verbal productions against prepositional episodes or semantic intentions. As a result, we can judge whether we have communicated our intentions correctly or not. The question whether we (as well as others) have consciousness or not, is not answered by examining whether we possess any introspecting faculty or inner light. What answers the question, in Dennet's opinion, is a consideration of our current capacities and past activities.

5.3.3 Arguments for the unity of consciousness at the personal level

Dennet is of the opinion that our study of the subpersonal account of consciousness reveals that consciousness is not just one feature of mind but several.\(^{15}\) The talk of several features or types of consciousness, in my opinion, makes sense only at the subpersonal level. In spite of the divisibility of consciousness at the subpersonal level, we can talk of the unity of consciousness at the personal level. In other words, the unity of consciousness at the personal level and the division of the cognitive faculty into various subsystems is consistent. The subpersonal systems interact among themselves to contribute to the overall functioning of the cognitive faculty and produce conscious states and acts. From the personal point of view each of these conscious states has three features: phenomenality, intentionality and awareness. These features are conceptually related to one another. Hence personal consciousness cannot be subdivided into awareness, phenomenality and intentionality. The

\(^{14}\)Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness," 170

\(^{15}\)Dennet, Content and Consciousness. 99.
results produced by each of the information processing subpersonal systems that reach the PR will have all these three features of personal consciousness. Nelkin's attempt to divide consciousness into three independent and separable states of awareness, phenomenality and intentionality results from the confusion of the two levels of explanation. In what follows, I shall provide an argument for the unity of personal consciousness.

To establish the unity of consciousness at the personal level, we must prove the contraries of the theses discussed by Nelkin. They are as follows:

1. Awareness cannot occur without either intentionality or phenomenality.
2. Intentionality cannot occur without phenomenality.
3. Intentionality cannot occur without awareness.
4. Phenomenality cannot occur without intentionality.
5. Phenomenality cannot occur without introspective awareness.

In what follows we shall briefly examine each of these theses and see whether we can meaningfully subscribe to the view that personal consciousness is unitary, with the inseparable features of phenomenality, intentionality and awareness.

5.3.3.1 The dependence of awareness on Intentional states or phenomenal states.

Let us for the time being assume that intentional states and phenomenal states are distinct and separable states, and the awareness we speak of is introspective awareness. On this model, introspective awareness cannot be exercised without the occurrence of either phenomenal states or intentional states. I am sure Nelkin would agree with this thesis, as it is a restatement of his view that introspective awareness occurs with either intentional states or with phenomenal states but not without both. The non-occurrence of awareness without intentional or phenomenal states shows that awareness is dependent upon either phenomenal states or intentional states for its occurrence. In other words, the occurrence of intentional states or phenomenal states is a necessary
condition for the occurrence of introspective awareness. Nelkin has already conceded that there is no evidence whatsoever for the occurrence of introspective awareness without one of the phenomenal or intentional states. From this we come to the conclusion that introspective awareness is dependent on either phenomenality or intentionality.

One could, however, adopt the following line of argument to save the independence of introspective awareness. Though introspective awareness may not occur without either phenomenal or intentional states, the former is an independent faculty of its own which depends upon the latter only for its exercise or functioning. In other words, introspective awareness exists as a capacity or a potentiality for summoning up intentional or phenomenal states that have been present in the mind all along. This position may be illustrated with the analogy of sight. Despite the possession of a normal capacity for visual experience, if no objects are presented in the visual field, one's visual faculty would never be called into action. From this it is illegitimate to conclude that the faculty of sight is dependent on external objects for its existence. Just as the visual faculty depends upon external objects for its exercise, either phenomenal or intentional states are necessary for the exercise of introspecting faculty. And neither intentional nor phenomenal states are sufficient for the occurrence of introspective awareness. In addition, an independent faculty for introspective awareness is to be granted. This view is characterised as the perceptual model of introspective awareness.

The perceptual model of introspective awareness is defective on two grounds. First of all, it conceives the introspective faculty as an inner eye which scans the contents of one's mind. It is viewed as a mechanism where the inputs are phenomenal states and Intentional states, and the outputs are qualitative beliefs and objective beliefs. If the internal states of phenomenality and intentionality are perceived with some sort of inner eye, the internal states produced by the Inner eye will have to be perceived by yet another inner eye and so on ad Infinitum, leading to an infinite regress. Secondly, the awareness states of the mind are acts or operations. So the state of introspective awareness is an act and not a potentiality. The human mind undoubtedly has a potentiality or capacity for such acts. But this does not mean that it is an independent faculty residing on its own. The above considerations suggest that the states of
introspective awareness cannot occur on their own and cannot be considered independent mental states. Since there is no introspective faculty, I conceive awareness as a feature of intentional and/or phenomenal states. Hence in the discussion that follows I shall not use the term 'awareness' in the sense of introspective awareness as Nelkin uses. For me awareness is the present capacity of mental states to reveal themselves.

5.3.3.2 Inseparability of intentionality from phenomenality

To show that intentionality could occur without phenomenality Nelkin has cited blind sight cases and the representational states of belief, desire, etc. Though the objects present in the scotomata do not 'look', 'appear' or 'feel' in any way, the subjects process information with regard to them and come out with judgments about them. The information processing, according to him, are intentional. The cause of blind sight, according to Nelkin, is a defective introspecting mechanism. Hence the objects presented do not 'look' or 'appear' in any way. However, blind sight can have a more plausible alternative explanation even on the model provided by Nelkin. The blind sight is the result of a defective perceptual system rather than a defective introspective mechanism. But the question is how the subjects are able to process information about the objects presented in the scotoma. This, in my opinion, is due to problem-solving on the basis of the information available to the subjects from the periphery of the scotomata and the verbal suggestions given to them. The information processing with regard to the content of the scotoma is not the perceptual type of information processing. Moreover, the thesis that perceptual intentional states can occur without quahtas contradicts Nelkin's own view that perceptual states involve qualia in an essential way. Even if we subscribe to the model of consciousness presented by Nelkin, intentionality is not separable from phenomenality, as intentionality in the case of perceptual beliefs is a function of qualitative or phenomenal states. In Shoemaker's model, for example, without phenomenal states and the relations of phenomenal similarity and difference, our perceptual states cannot have any intentionality. The mistake of Nelkin as well as of Shoemaker is that they consider phenomenal or qualitative states to be preceding and causally responsible for the production of intentional states. What it is like to have a perceptual
state, say seeing something blue, does not precede the perceptual state but is part and parcel of our visual experience. Hence the qualitative aspects and intentionality of our perceptual experiences are inseparable.

But what about our non-perceptual mental states like desire, hope, non-perceptual beliefs, etc.? In my opinion, these non-perceptual intentional states have their own phenomenality for there is something it is like to have such states. Obviously, there is something it is like to believe that water quenches thirst, that the earth is round, that $2+2 = 4$, etc. Such beliefs and desires do not, of course, feel in any way, just as the appearance of blue objects do not in any way feel to us. Our various beliefs and desires are not distinguished from one another on account of any felt qualities just as we do not discriminate colours on the basis of colour qualia. Our ability to discriminate colours, and to distinguish between various beliefs and desires is not analysable at the personal level of description. This does not mean that they lack phenomenality. They do have phenomenality. But what it is like to have a perceptual intentional state is different from what it is like to have non-perceptual intentional state.

5.3.3.3 Inseparability of intentionality from awareness

The thesis that intentionality cannot occur apart from awareness assumes much significance for two reasons. First of all. Its contrary thesis, viz., that there are unconscious mental states unavailable to awareness, has a long tradition since the time of Freud. Secondly, many contemporary philosophers, cognitive scientists, and linguists accept the existence of unconscious intentional states as an explanatory category In order to account for the verbal as well as non-verbal behaviour of humans Hence the thesis that that there is conceptual relation between intentionality and awareness has many implications for contemporary studies on mind.

The conceptual link between intentionality and awareness, I think, is convincingly defended by Searle. So in what follows I shall merely restate his position. But before we proceed, some terminological clarifications are in order. In his discussion of intentionality Searle uses the term 'consciousness' and argues that intentionality cannot be defined without reference to consciousness. Nelkin considers Searle's use of
'consciousness' as equivalent to his own use of introspective awareness. However, Searle denies that when he uses the expression 'consciousness', he speaks of introspective awareness. Introspective awareness, we have already noted, is not an independent state or faculty of its own but an inseparable feature of the phenomenal or intentional states. And I think when Searle speaks of the conceptual link between intentionality and consciousness, he means this inseparable feature of our mental states. In the discussion of Searle's thesis, instead of 'consciousness' I shall be using the term 'awareness'. By awareness I do not mean a system for scanning the contents of the mind, but an inseparable feature of any state worth the name 'mental state'. I think, my use of "awareness" comes at least very close to Searle's use of consciousness, if it is not identical with it.

For Searle, intentionality and awareness are inseparable because any intentional state is either an actual or potential state of awareness. The distinction between intentionality and awareness made in contemporary literature on the philosophy of mind and psychology implies that one could occur without the other. The postulation of unconscious beliefs, desires etc. is based on the separability of awareness and intentionality. The inseparability thesis means that there cannot be any unconscious intentional states in the strict sense. The intentional mental states, according to Searle, have two distinctive but related features their intrinsicality and "aspectual shape". By intrinsic intentionality Searle means the intentional features of mental states which are accessible to awareness. It is the intrinsic forms of Intentionality that are closely connected to the ideas of thinking and experiencing. The intrinsic form of intentionality is to be distinguished from the as if form of intentionality. Searle does this with the example of water flowing down the hill. This, he thinks, is an instance of the 'as If' form of intentionality. The water behaves as if it has intentionality it tries to reach the bottom of the hill, in doing so it seeks the line of the least resistance, and it does information processing in order to calculate the size of the rocks, the angle of the slope, the pull of gravitational force. etc., etc. If we consider water to be mental just because it possesses the
CONSCIOUSNESS; AWARENESS, INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENALITY

• as if form of intentionality. then, argues Searle, everjthing is mental. 16

The other distinguishing feature of intentional mental states is their "aspectual shape". The aspectual character of intentional mental states like beliefs, desires etc. is exhibited in the truth-functionally opaque nature of these states. That is, the intentional mental states represent their conditions of satisfaction under certain aspects. When I desire water, for example, this desire is under an aspect, and this desire is different from the desire for H2O even though there is no way to satisfy one without the other. The aspectual feature matters only to the subject of those intentional ascriptions. Hence aspectual shape refers to the subjective point of view from which an organism considers the content of intentional mental states. Only a subject can think of something as water without thinking of it as H2O. 17

There are two ways in which unconscious mental states can be conceived. First, unconscious mental states are those mental states which are never accessible to awareness. Second, though they are not actually accessible to awareness, the so called unconscious states are possible contents of our awareness states. If we take unconscious mental states in the first sense, then they do not deserve to be called mental. They neither possess intrinsic intentionality nor aspectual shape. Their inaccessibility to awareness forbids us to attribute intentionality to them, because we cannot say at which entities or states of affairs they are directed. They lack aspectual shape, because at the level of the unconscious there is no relevant subjective point of view from which their aspectual shape can be considered. The subjectivity of unconscious mental states does not make any sense because we do not know what it is like to have such unconscious mental states.

If we adopt the second conception of unconscious mental states as the possible contents of awareness or consciousness, then we can certainly make sense of the philosopher's talk of the unconscious. According to Searle, the talk of unconscious intentional states is meaningful only on this

17 Cf. Ibid., 199-200.
conception of the unconscious. An unconscious mental state, in order to be intentional, must preserve its aspectual shape. The unconscious intentional states are like "fish in deep sea:. Just as the fish underwater possesses exactly the same shape they have when they surface, the unconscious intentional states have the same aspectual shape as the ones accessible to awareness. Thus the unconscious intentional states are considered on the model of awareness states: "Our idea of an unconscious state is the idea of a mental state that just happens then and there to be unconscious, but we will understand it on the model of a conscious state in the sense we think of it as being just like a conscious state and as one that in some sense could have been conscious." So for Searle, the notion of an unconscious mental state is parasitic upon the notion of a conscious state. If there is an unconscious intentional state, such a state must preserve its aspectual shape. The only way to conceive the aspectual shape of an unconscious intentional state is to treat it as a possible content of our awareness state.

The above description of unconscious mental states allows us to speak of an ontology of unconscious mental states in terms of their relation to awareness: "When we describe something as an unconscious Intentional state we are characterising an objective ontology in virtue of its causal capacity to produce subjectivity." The moral of the story is obvious: intentionality cannot be defined or understood without awareness, for there is a conceptual relation between intentionality and awareness. Note that Nelkin's discussion of semantic priming, problem solving and blind sight cases do not contradict the inseparability of intentionality from awareness. The judgments made by the blind sight subjects on the objects presented in their scotomata, as we have already noted, can be conceived as the result of a sort of problem solving. The same is true of semantic priming as well. It is true that the roost processes of problem solving are inaccessible to awareness. However, what makes these processes Intentional is that their results are accessible to awareness.

18"Consciousness. Unconsciousness, and Intentionality." 195
19ibid., 202.
5.3.3.4 Inseparability of phenomenality from intentionality

When we say that phenomenality is inseparable from intentionality we mean that all our phenomenal states are invariably intentional states. This view is quite contrary to Nelkin's thesis that phenomenality can come apart from intentionality. However, Nelkin does not seem to provide any substantial evidence nor a convincing argument in support of his thesis. Let us grant (of course for the sake of argument) that in the blind sight cases there are phenomenal states unavailable to awareness. In such cases, there is absolutely no way at all to know whether phenomenal states occur with or without intentionality. Nelkin has cited blind sight cases in support of his view that phenomenal states can occur without being accessible to awareness. The same cases, I think, can be used to establish that phenomenality occurs only with intentionality. Nelkin's argument for the occurrence of phenomenal states without the feature of awareness is as follows. The phenomenal states of the blind sight patients are inaccessible to awareness. Yet they can make colour discriminations. Colour discrimination essentially involves qualitative states. Therefore, these colour discriminations must have been made on the basis of phenomenal or qualitative states unavailable to awareness. Note that I am not here addressing the question whether a phenomenal state can occur without coming to the awareness level. My point is that if the blind sight patients are to make discriminations, their phenomenal states though not accessible to awareness, must be of the coloured objects in the world. The object-directedness of the phenomenal states shows that they cannot exist independent of intentionality. This is true of any one of the so-called individual qualia as well. Take, for example, the colour quale, being appeared-blue-to. The occurrence of this colour quale is the same as the appearance of something blue out there. This, in a sense, blurs the distinction between phenomenal states and intentional states. What it is like being appeared blue to is the same as the appearance of something blue. This means phenomenal states cannot occur without having the feature of intentionality.

5.3.3.5 Inseparability of phenomenality from awareness

Are all phenomenal states awareness states? Nelkin answers this question in the negative. In his opinion, there are phenomenal states we
arc not aware of. The phenomenal states exist all along. In order to become aware of them, we need to just apply our attention and introspect (note that for Nelkin, paying attention and introspection coalesce in the case of phenomenal states). I am unable to make any sense out of this thesis. Take for example, the occurrence of pain. While having a pain, I am in a phenomenal state because there is something it is like being in pain, or being in pain is felt in a certain way. However, if Nelkin's view is correct, then pain can occur without my awareness of it. So in accordance with Nelkin's view if I feel pain and am aware of it, I do not have to go for any pain killers to alleviate my pain. There is another easy way. I need to just stop introspecting or paying attention to my pain! The pain might persist, but I will be quite unaware of it. But does it make any sense to say that I have a pain but I am unaware of it? If there is unconscious pain, there is no way to say whether I am in pain or not. Even if such an unconscious pain is accompanied by pain behaviour, I would not consider myself to be in pain. If pain occurs without feeling in a certain way characteristic of pain, then that pain is no pain. *Feeling In a certain way* is undoubtedly an awareness state. So my pain state cannot occur without my awareness. Similarly my other phenomenal states like being appeared-blue-to, being appeared-yellow-to, etc., cannot occur without my awareness. Being appeared-blue-to, for example, is nothing other than the appearance of something blue. But blue objects cannot appear to me without my awareness of them. If there can be qualitative or phenomenal states that we are unaware of, then there can be any number of such phenomenal states within us, and we will not be in a position to determine which qualitative state we are in. This makes the postulation of independent qualitative states vacuous with no explanatory power whatsoever.

We have already noted the similarity in the positions of Shoemaker and Nelkin with regard to the relation between qualia and awareness. Shoemaker, like Nelkin, conceives qualia as independent of awareness states. The production of qualitative beliefs, for him, is the result of the interaction between introspective awareness and qualitative states. Though both qualia and awareness states can exist independent of each other, if something is to be called a qualia or phenomenal state, it must, in Shoemaker's opinion, be accessible to awareness. So, according to
Shoemaker, qualia are defined only in relation to awareness or consciousness. However, he maintains: the requirement of accessibility to consciousness is not due to a special link between the notion of qualitative character and consciousness, but rather to a general link between the notion of consciousness and the notions of the family of folk psychological states with which the notion of qualia is intimately bound up.\textsuperscript{20} This means that the notion of qualia is only indirectly connected to awareness because of its connection with the folk psychological states which are by definition conscious mental states. That is, strictly speaking, qualitative states are not states of awareness. So Shoemaker thinks that we do not become explicitly aware of qualia, say the looks, feels, sounds etc. of things. However, we are implicitly aware of them. Had it not been so, it would not have been possible for us to adjust our perceptual beliefs in the light of information about our situation by using our tacit knowledge of the principles of perspective and the effects of lighting on the appearance of things.\textsuperscript{21} The judgments about the properties of things in the external world are sensitive to qualia, and the qualitative similarities and differences among our mental states.

The conclusion that we are only implicitly aware of qualia led Shoemaker to construe the notions of qualia and those of qualitative similarities and differences among them as theoretical concepts implicit in folk psychology. As theoretical concepts they are not contents of our states of awareness. They are used to explain the application of the concepts like 'looking the same' employed in folk psychology. Since qualia are not directly given to us in awareness, their existence is inferred from the judgments we make about the properties of things in the external world.\textsuperscript{22} Thus qualia are theoretical entities postulated for the explanation of our experience. They form part of the theoretical entities of our folk psychological theories.

Shoemaker’s conception of qualia or phenomenological states as theoretical entities is quite unacceptable. For qualia are not theoretical entities
entities that explain the occurrence of phenomenal experience. Rather they are part and parcel of our experience. How can one say that the concept of pain or the concept of the colour qualia, being appeared-blue-to is a theoretical concept? My having pain or something's appearing-blue-to me is an experience and not a theoretical entity. The qualitative character is a feature of our conscious mental states. The qualia are made theoretical entities by separating qualitative aspects from our awareness states. It must be noted that Shoemaker's intention was not to make qualia theoretical entities. He wanted to account for our phenomenal experiences and to provide a functional definition of qualitative mental states. But in the process, the explanandum or the definiandum has been turned into explanans or definians. By this move neither are qualitative states explained, nor are they defined. So Shoemaker's separation of phenomenality from awareness is quite unjustifiable.

Shoemaker does not consistently maintain that qualitative states are theoretical entities unavailable to us in awareness. He sometimes maintains that qualia are the potential objects of our immediate and uninferred knowledge. As potential objects of immediate and uninferred knowledge, they must be available to us in awareness at some time or the other. Or at least they must in principle be accessible to us in awareness. The potential objects of our immediate or uninferred knowledge can hardly be theoretical entities, for theoretical entities never become immediate objects of uninferred knowledge. Take, for example, the visual perception of a table. I see a table when I become immediately and non-inferentially aware of the existence of the table. Observable entities like tables, chairs, trees and on are not theoretical entities. Similarly phenomenal aspects forming part of our experience are not theoretical entities. In construing qualitative features of our experience which are self evident in awareness as theoretical entities. Shoemaker contradicts the well established methodology of science.

Shoemaker has an ambivalent attitude towards the relationship between qualia and awareness. On the one hand, qualia are theoretical entities unavailable to awareness, and on the other they are potential objects of

23"Qualia and Consciousness." 521.
immediate and uninferred knowledge or awareness. As potential objects of immediate awareness, qualia can be defined only in relation to awareness. Hence, for Shoemaker, there is a conceptual relation between qualia and awareness. A creature lacking states of awareness would lack qualia as well as belief states. Only creatures with full-fledged awareness will have full-fledged qualia and full-fledged beliefs. Bats, for example, argues Shoemaker, do not possess any consciousness worthy of the name. Hence they have only quasi qualia and quasi-beliefs. This observation of Shoemaker's that there is a conceptual relation between phenomenality and awareness contradicts his own position that qualia are theoretical entities unavailable to consciousness. The conflict in Shoemaker clearly indicates that he, like Nelkin, confuses the personal and subpersonal levels of description.

I have not proved that both intentionality and phenomenality are essential features of each of our awareness states. The thesis discussed in section 5.3.3.1 states that awareness occurs with intentionality or with phenomenality. But the discussed in 5.3.3.3 and 5.3.3.4 together with the one discussed in 5.3.3.1 entail that awareness states occur only with both phenomenality and intentionality. In other words, if phenomenality and intentionality are inseparable and if it is stated that awareness occurs with either of them, then it follows that awareness occurs with both phenomenality and intentionality. So each of our conscious mental states is a unitary state with the inseparable features of awareness, intentionality and phenomenality.

5.4 TOWARDS A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In the previous section, we have argued that at the personal level description, awareness, intentionality and phenomenality are inseparable features of our unitary conscious mental states. This view encompasses a theory of consciousness which I shall try to elaborate below. I shall elucidate the concepts of phenomenality, awareness and intentionality and how they are interwoven with one another. The exercise such as the one I undertake here is necessitated by the conception of the unity of consciousness argued in the previous section, because the way we understand the concepts of phenomenality, intentionality and awareness undergo a change with our talk of the unity of consciousness. A proper
characterisation of personal consciousness is necessary because without such characterisation we cannot have an adequate subpersonal theory that can account for it.

5.4.1 Phenomenality

According to a dominant trend in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenality of our mental states is a function of a separate set of pure phenomenal states called qualia. They are generally understood as the raw feel we undergo such as feeling of pain, being appeared-blue-to etc. One of my aims in this section is to renounce this view of phenomenality. When I say there are no separate independent phenomenal states of their own called sensations or qualia, I do not intend to deny the phenomenal features of our mental states. The talk of qualitative features do make sense at the personal level description of consciousness. Like Nagel, I take phenomenality to be what it is like to be an X. say a human being, a martian or a bat. So the expressions 'phenomenality' and 'what it is like to be an X' are synonyms or equivalents. However, my conception of phenomenality is different from that of Nagel's, for whom phenomenality Is a function of the secondary qualities or 'raw feels'. On the contrary I conceive phenomenality to be the function of an organism's conceptual system. So phenomenality is an essential feature of each of the cognitive mental states of an organism for whose production the conceptual system of the organism plays a vital role. Hence each cognitive mental state has its own phenomenal features.

Qualitative or phenomenal mental states, we have seen, cannot be separated from awareness and intentionality. So the definition of a phenomenal state is possible only in terms of awareness and intentionality. So we may define qualitative mental states as the awareness states of the qualities of the external objects or of our bodily states. Such awareness states are Intentional because they represent, or are directed at, certain qualities of the objects or bodily states. They are phenomenal because there is something that it like to have such states. To have a pain, for example, is to feel a pain and to feel a pain is to be conscious of a bodily sensation. Similarly when someone sees or seems to see a coloured object, one undergoes a visual experience. To undergo a visual experience, as Michael Tye observes, is to be conscious of something.
CONSCIOUSNESS; AWARENESS, INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENALITY

visually.24 A qualitative mental state is the awareness of a particular
goal. The goal may belong to the objects in the world or to our
various bodily states. My definition of qualitative states comes very
close to Shoemaker's understanding of qualitative beliefs. But there is an
important difference, Shoemaker defines qualitative state as the awareness
of an internal phenomenal state called qualia. My awareness of my being
appeared blue to, for example, is such a qualitative belief. In my
opinion, there are no such pure qualia which are the objects of my
qualitative beliefs. The qualitative state is nothing other than awareness
of a particular quality that belongs to the objects in the world or to the
various bodily states of the organism.

5.4.1.1 Phenomenality and belief-laden consciousness

Tye makes a distinction between two types of consciousness: "a
belief-laden kind of consciousness" and "a more primitive kind of
consciousness". The former is tied to our prepositional attitudes or
representational mental states. The latter is connected to our feelings
and sensory experiences and goes with the talk of what it is to be like.
This type of consciousness, he says, is transparent to introspective
awareness. This primitive consciousness could rightly be called
qualitative or phenomenal consciousness. The phenomenal consciousness
itself could be further divided into two types, one for perceptual
experiences and the other for bodily sensations.25

Tye admits that consciousness is intrinsic to our perceptual
experience and the phenomenal consciousness involved in our experiences is
always consciousness of something or other. That is, phenomenal
consciousness has representational contents. These contents are the
appropriate secondary qualities of the objects or our bodily sensations.
Various species of perceptual experience are differentiated on the basis of
their contents. If the object of our consciousness is something blue we
have the conscious mental state of being appeared-blue-to. The same is

24 Michael Tye, "Blind Sight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery
25 Ibid., 35. See also the footnote n. 23.
true with regard to other visual qualities as well as qualities pertaining to other sense modalities. Phenomenality here is explained in terms of consciousness and the representational content. Once we differentiate various species of consciousness on the basis of their representational content (i.e., appropriate secondary qualities), then Tye's proposal for a two-fold division of phenomenal consciousness — one for perceptual experiences and the other for bodily sensations — is not tenable, because the perceptual experiences differ on account of the differences in contents of the conscious states. They are not two different types of consciousness.

Belief-laden consciousness, according to Tye, is radically different from phenomenal consciousness because mental states like beliefs, desires etc. do not feel or appear in any way, as phenomenal consciousness is not intrinsic to them. Such beliefs may or may not be conscious. But when they are conscious they become conscious via formation of second order beliefs. Such second order beliefs, according to Tye, are not intrinsic to having perceptual experiences and bodily sensations. A simple creature, say a bat, does not have introspective awareness. Yet it has sensations and has them consciously without even having first order beliefs. There cannot be unconscious qualitative mental states because they cannot occur without phenomenal consciousness. But there could be unconscious non-qualitative mental states like beliefs for two reasons first, phenomenal consciousness is not intrinsic to non-qualitative mental states. second, we may not always have second order consciousness about first order belief and desire states. From Tye's strategy it is clear that second order beliefs are the products of introspective awareness.

In my opinion, the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and belief-laden consciousness is spurious. Hence I shall argue that there is no radical difference between phenomenal consciousness and belief-laden kinds of consciousness. Phenomenal conscious states are intentional states and are individuated on the basis of their representational contents. They

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26 Cf. "Blind Sight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of Consciousness," 36.
27 Cf. Ibid., 35.
cannot be unconscious as phenomenal consciousness is intrinsic to them. Though introspective awareness is not intrinsic to them, they seem to be transparent to introspective awareness. Given this, it can be seen that the belief laden consciousness is obviously analogous to phenomenal consciousness. Take, for example, any belief-laden conscious state, say the belief that the earth is round. Like phenomenal conscious states, the belief laden conscious states too are intentional. Hence they cannot differ on the basis of their object directed/less. Just like phenomenal consciousness, the belief-laden conscious states can only be differentiated on the basis of their representational contents. Just as we cannot have an unconscious phenomenal state because of the existence of phenomenal consciousness, we may say that there are no unconscious beliefs because of the belief-laden consciousness. But one could argue that there could be a difference between two types of consciousness on the following basis: we are conscious of the qualitative states, say perceptual experiences, whenever we have them, whereas we are not always conscious of the beliefs we have. The belief states could be dispositional states whereas phenomenal states like perceptual experiences are always occurrent states. But here too we cannot make a clear cut distinction because an intentional dispositional state is defined only in relation to consciousness, as Searle points out. On the basis of the accessibility to introspective awareness too, Tye cannot differentiate between phenomenal consciousness and belief-laden consciousness because he says that they are sometimes conscious and sometimes not conscious. So Tye does not clarify what exactly is the distinction between the two types of consciousness. He merely states them. In the light of our discussion on the similarities between two types of consciousness and the conclusion reached in the previous section that conscious mental states are unitary states. I conclude that there is no radical difference between the two types of consciousness.

However, one can maintain a sort of distinction between phenomenal consciousness and belief-laden consciousness. They are distinct not because the phenomenal consciousness is a more primitive consciousness and belief-laden consciousness is an altogether different type of consciousness, but because they differ in the kinds of representational contents. The representational content of the phenomenal states are
secondary qualities in the sense that they are directed at secondary qualities of objects. The representational contents of the belief-laden consciousness, on the other hand, are propositions in the sense that they are directed at the states of affairs represented by the propositions. The phenomenal conscious states like being appeared-blue-to, feeling pain, and so on differ on account of the difference in their contents. Similarly the belief-laden kind of consciousness differs from both perceptual experience and bodily sensations in that it has propositions as its objects and not qualities. Since belief-laden consciousness and phenomenal consciousness differ only in the type of their contents, we may say that there is only unitary generic type consciousness and that both the species of consciousness refer only to two major ways of modifying the same consciousness by their representational contents. One consequence of this view is that a person becomes aware of his beliefs just as he becomes aware of his pain. That is, in order to become aware of one's beliefs, the formation of second order beliefs is not required.

A closer examination of the distinction between belief-laden consciousness and phenomenal consciousness shows that strictly speaking even this distinction on the basis of the types of content does not hold. The basis of our distinction has been that the belief-laden kind of consciousness takes propositions as its contents whereas phenomenal consciousness takes qualities as its contents. But it is quite possible to construe that the representational contents of even phenomenal consciousness are propositions because of the intentionality involved in phenomenal consciousness. Take, for example, the phenomenal conscious state being appeared-blue-to. The appearance is always to somebody and of something. So being appeared-blue-to is an abridged form of the statement from the point of view of a person who is undergoing the visual perception of a blue object. It says: "I see (or seem to see) that there is something blue". It clearly shows that the representational contents of perceptual states or other phenomenal conscious states are propositions Hence there cannot be any radical difference between phenomenal consciousness and belief-laden consciousness, for the former itself is in the form of the latter.

If there is only one generic type of consciousness with each of its particular states having a proposition as its representational content, how
can we differentiate among the various cognitive states like seeing, believing, desiring etc? It is a brute fact that we can differentiate between them. But it is doubtful whether we can have any personal level criteria for differentiating them. The only personal level criterion we have for differentiating between believing and desiring seems to be that the objects of my mental acts of belief can be true or false, whereas we speak of the mental acts of desire not in terms of the truth conditions of their propositional contents but in terms of their satisfiability or non-satisfiability. My belief that it is raining now is either true or false. If I desire that it will rain in the evening, my desire will be satisfied only if it rains in the evening. This way of differentiating between belief and desire is not available with regard to the distinction between perceptual belief states and non-perceptual belief states. The propositional contents of both perceptual and non-perceptual belief states can be either true or false. The reason for this is that the perceptual belief states are a subclass of our belief states in general. In spite of their close affinity, we can and do differentiate between them. I do not think that we have a personal level description or account of this fact. So, for an explanation of this, we must resort to the subpersonal level of description. At the subpersonal level, we know mind has different information processing components like the problem solving component, reasoning component, perceptual system, desire system, memory, etc. Postulation of these various systems is not arbitrary but is based on very strong intuition regarding the differences in mental acts at the personal level. On this account those propositional acts which are the products of our desire system we call acts of desire. If the results are the products of other information processing systems, they are called beliefs. Perceptual beliefs are the results of the working of the perceptual system. The propositional acts produced by perceptual system are mainly about secondary qualities in the objects. The results of the working of the memory, problem solving, reasoning etc., we may call non-perceptual beliefs. The perceptual beliefs are generally considered to be simple. But they are in fact a complex of many beliefs both perceptual and non-perceptual. Take, for example, the perceptual belief: I see that there is a cat in front of me. The perception of a cat is not the result of a perceptual analysis alone; in its production other subsystems like problem
solving, memory etc. are involved. The perceptual belief that there is a cat in front of me is thus a cluster of beliefs whose prepositional components are: there is something grey; it has yellowy patches or stripes on it; it has four legs, a tail and a head with glowing eyes, etc.

The position that there is only one generic type of consciousness, and that perceptual beliefs and non-perceptual beliefs belong basically to belief-laden consciousness in the sense that they are prepositional in nature, has one important consequence. Both our non-perceptual belief states and our perceptual belief states have their own phenomenality. As various perceptual states have different secondary qualities as their intentional objects, their phenomenality also differs. The phenomenal aspects of colour experience, for example, would be different from the phenomenality of pain or pleasure. Similarly the non-perceptual belief states too have their own phenomenality. But their phenomenality is different from the phenomenality of perceptual belief states as the intentional objects of these states differ. It is true that my non-perceptual beliefs do not 'feel', 'appear' 'smell' or 'taste' in any way at all to me. Yet there is something that it is like to have these beliefs. With regard to the perceptual states of seeing the Taj Mahal, for example, we can meaningfully raise the question 'what it is like to see the Taj Mahal'. In the same fashion, we can meaningfully ask 'what it is like to believe that $2+2=4$' or 'what it is like to know that the earth is round'.

So far we have been trying to understand phenomenality in terms of intentionality and awareness. This sort of phenomenality we have seen is the product of our conceptual system. Our emphasis here has been on the intentionality of mental states. As the representational contents of our mental acts vary, their phenomenality too varies. This approach is totally different from the approaches of Shoemaker and Nelkin. For them there are independent phenomenal states which are involved in our perceptual states. According to them only our perceptual states or bodily sensation states have phenomenality and their phenomenality is a function of the existence and occurrence of qualitative states. Thus there could be two approaches to phenomenality: one in which qualitative states are given ontological autonomy and the other in which phenomenality is a feature of our awareness states which are intentional.
5.4.1.2 Two approaches to qualia

We are concerned here with the ontological status of qualia. Shoemaker, Nelkin and Tye would argue that they are independent phenomenal states. (We may note that for Tye the phenomenal states are conceptually tied to intentionality. But the intentionality of the phenomenal states is different from the intentionality of belief laden consciousness. Both these types of states are distinct from states of introspective awareness). On the other hand, our argument for the unity of consciousness denies any ontological status for qualia or phenomenal states. The question about the existence of qualia is akin to the question about the ontological status of mental images. Dennet maintains that there could be two approaches to mental images which are consistent with each other: a scientific approach and a phenomenological approach as he calls them. In line with Dennet's approaches to mental images, I shall argue that there could be a scientific approach and a phenomenological approach towards qualia. My argument is inspired by and is modeled on Dennet's strategy for dealing with mental images. So I shall briefly state his approaches to mental imagery prepare the ground for the discussion of the two approaches to qualia.

According to the scientific approach, the mental images have typical causes and typical effects. On asking whether an equilateral triangle is equiangular, a person may try to answer the question by forming mental images of triangles, instead of drawing them on a piece of paper. The formation of mental images has certain causal antecedents like hearing the question, understanding it, desiring to answer it, deciding not to draw diagrams, and finally attempting to form mental images. The causal ancestry ends in the production of the mental image. The mental image produced is itself the typical cause of certain sorts of effects. The most notable among them is the apprehension of the mental image which according to Dennet is a conscious act of the mind. One is said to have a conscious apprehension of a mental image only if one believes that the mental image has occurred and that it is in virtue of its occurrence that one apprehends it. Either the apprehension of the mental image can be identified with the belief that a mental image has occurred or both the apprehension and belief can be considered as separate mental acts. In the latter case, we may say
that the apprehension of a mental image caused the belief about its occurrence. In either case, the belief that the mental image has occurred is the typical effect of the occurrence of a mental image. The belief in question may give rise to further beliefs about mental images.

Dennet expresses the general scheme of his scientific approach as follows. Let the set of letters A, B, C, ... be the various variables standing for the causal antecedents of any mental image $\alpha$. And let $\beta$ be the manifold of beliefs about $\alpha$ caused by $\alpha$ itself. The scientific strategy is succinctly expressed by Dennet as follows:

$$A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow \alpha \rightarrow \beta.$$ 

Here '$\rightarrow$' stands for the expression 'causally produces'. $\beta$ manifold may consist of a number of beliefs, and people might disagree as to what particular beliefs constitute a given $\beta$-manifold. However, it is uncontroversial that the belief that $\alpha$ has occurred is undoubtedly a member of $\alpha$'s $\beta$-manifold. It is, in fact, the link between $\alpha$ and $\beta$. In the scientific approach we are interested only in this connection between $\alpha$ and $\beta$. Within the scientific approach, those who assert the existence of mental images (iconophiles) and those who deny them (iconophiles) differ regarding the nature of the occupants of a role. The iconophiles believe that the normal cause of $\beta$-manifold is an event having the nature of an image. So the occupant of the $\alpha$ role is an image in the literal sense of the term. The iconophiles, on the other hand, believe that the occupants of a do not have the nature of a picture. Whether the occupant of the a role has an imagistic nature or not, is in Dennet's opinion an empirical question, to be settled by scientific inquiry. Hence the image havers do not have any special authority about the nature of their own mental images.  

Unlike the scientific approach, the phenomenological approach is not concerned with the normal causes of the $\beta$-manifolds. Within this approach, the mental images are the intentional objects of the $\beta$-manifolds. They exist as specified by the $\beta$-manifolds. that is, with the very same features attributed to them by the image havers. So the image havers have a special authority with regard to the features of their mental images. But these

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28Cf. Dennet, Two Approaches to Mental Images.’ in Brainstorms. 174-80-
images are just logical constructs out of the $\beta$-manifolds.

The introspective declarations, avowals, confessions etc. of the image havers reveal the nature of the $\beta$-manifolds. The phenomenologist's function, according to Dennet, is to provide a phenomenological description of the $\beta$-manifolds by systematising the beliefs and specifying their logical structure. They try to provide a logical construction of the intentional objects of the belief-system. The phenomenological inquiry proceeds independently of any search for the causes of $\beta$-manifolds. Once the belief-manifolds are specified and systematized, a scientist might enquire into the normal causes of these beliefs. The belief-manifolds themselves might give clues to their normal causes. But it must be noted that the intentional objects of $\beta$-manifolds cannot be identified with their normal causes because the essential traits of the causes of the $\beta$-manifolds and of their intentional objects differ radically. While the phenomenologists would view mental images as the intentional objects of the $\beta$-manifolds, the image havers take these intentional objects to be real. In the process of systematization of $\beta$-manifolds by the phenomenologist some subjects (i.e. image havers) may alter their beliefs such that they no longer could be said to consider mental images to be real. Like the phenomenologist, they may also come to consider them as logical constructs or intentional objects of their beliefs. Within the phenomenological approach such subjects would turn out to be iconophiles. The $\beta$-manifolds are not uniform from subject to subject. They differ in their report regarding the nature of their imagery and have different theories about their mental images. All these, according to Dennet, suggest that the $\beta$-manifolds of various subjects differ in content. A change in the $\beta$-manifold, or the awareness that the $\beta$-manifold is composed of false beliefs may eradicate mental images from the phenomenological point of view.  

Parallel to Dennet's two approaches to mental images, it is possible to devise what may be called a scientific approach as well as a phenomenological approach toward qualia. In accordance with the scientific approach there are certain causal antecedents for the occurrence of qualia.

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Cf. "Two Approaches to Mental Images." 180-86.
Visual stimulation, for example, is a causal antecedent for the occurrence of colour qualia. Similarly tissue damage and the associated physical processes would lead to the occurrence of pain qualia. The occurrence of qualia has certain typical causal consequences too. We are interested in the most proximate causal consequence of qualitative states, namely, qualitative beliefs. The occurrence of qualitative beliefs seems to be uncontroversial among the lovers of qualia (qualiaphiles). Within the scientific approach we are interested in the nature of the occupants of the role of qualia and not in the qualitative beliefs. The question is whether the occupants of the role of qualia have the qualitative attributes and whether they deserve to be called qualia. We shall name the role played by qualia $\phi$ role and the manifold of beliefs caused by $\phi$ the $\psi$-manifolds. With regard to the nature of the occupants of the $\alpha$-role. Dennet maintains that it is an empirical question to be answered by scientific and experimental probing. In all probability, the empirical inquiry, it seems to me, would reveal that the occupants of the $\alpha$-role do not have an imagistic nature. I do not, of course, have any argument to this effect. My view is only intuitive: it is difficult for me to believe that in my various acts of cognition, my brain is inhabited by physical images of elephants, horses, trees etc. Well, my concern here is not with the nature of mental images but with the nature of the occupants of the role of qualia, the $\phi$-role. To determine whether the occupants of the $\phi$-role have a qualitative nature, we do not have to make an empirical inquiry. Philosophy is sufficient to do this job. And philosophy's answer is that the occupants of the $\phi$-role do not and cannot have the phenomenological or the qualitative characteristics we attribute to qualia. The answer Is based on the distinction between personal level and subpersonal level descriptions. The specification of the occupants of the $\phi$-role is done at the subpersonal level whereas the talk of qualia and other phenomenal aspects makes sense only at the personal level. Hence my point is that the scientific approach to qualia suggests the non-existence of qualia.

On the phenomenological approach, qualia are just the intentional objects of our qualitative beliefs. They are not the real cause of our qualitative beliefs but the logical constructs out of them. Consequently, any change in the qualitative belief would effect a change in their Qualitative content. On this view qualia exist but only as the intentional
CONSCIOUSNESS; AWARENESS, INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENALITY

objects of our qualitative beliefs. This account, it must be noted, does not permit a separate, independent existence for qualia. A slightly different but closely related proposal would be to consider qualitative beliefs themselves as qualia. The qualitative beliefs constitute qualia or in other words, qualia are the content of our qualitative beliefs.

The tension as well as the confusion between the two approaches to mental images, according to Dennet, leads to a "spurious third approach", a temptation that must be resisted. The third approach treats mental images as "both incorrigibly known and causally efficacious". They, it is supposed, inhabit a medium called *phenomenal space*. The objects in phenomenal space are taken to be better known than the objects in the ordinary physical space. The phenomenal space is considered to be more actual and concrete than the logical space of possible worlds and other logical constructs. According to Dennet, the third approach is illegitimate and the postulation of phenomenal space is unjustifiable. If the mental images are real, they can exist in the physical space in the brain. On the contrary, if they turn out to be unreal, they can reside in the logical space of intentional objects.\(^{30}\)

A spurious third approach to qualia or phenomenal states too is discernible in contemporary literature. Shoemaker's conception of qualia discussed in the previous chapter, I think, is the best instance. Following Quine, Shoemaker postulates a "quality space". The expression, however, is very misleading within the context of Shoemaker's discussion. I do not know how to make sense of this expression except by conceiving quality space as a space for qualia. So I take Shoemaker's "quality space" as the phenomenal space of qualia. Moreover, for Shoemaker, qualia inhabiting the quality space are causally efficacious in the production of qualitative beliefs, and their occurrence is known incorrigibly through these beliefs. Following Dennet's argument against mental images inhabiting phenomenal space, we may say that if qualia are the real cause of our qualitative beliefs, then they can exist in the physical space of the brain. If they are not real, they can exist in the logical space as intentional objects or logical constructs of our qualitative beliefs.

\(^{30}\)Cf. Dennet "Two Approaches to Mental Images," 186
Our discussion so far clearly suggests that there is no independent ontological status for qualia. On the other hand, Shoemaker and Nelkin, we have seen, grant ontological autonomy to qualitative states. On Shoemaker's account for example, we are able to make colour discrimination because of the occurrence of various colour qualia. But in accordance with the position defended here it is not on account of the awareness of various qualia that we can discriminate between colours. We just distinguish some sensation as the sensation of a blue coloured object. This capacity of ours does not yield to any analysis at the personal level. The same is the case with our identification and location of pain. We do not locate pain on the basis of pain qualia or the raw feels. We just locate them. However from the subpersonal point of view our ability to locate pain or to make colour discrimination is a very complex fact which can be further decomposed or analysed.

5.4.1.3 Qualia and perceptual experience

For Shoemaker, perceptual states are essentially qualitative states as without qualia no perceptual experience is possible. So in a sense qualia determine our perceptual states. This does not mean that there is a determinate qualia for the each type of perceptual state. Since qualia inversion is a logical (perhaps even an empirical) possibility, the qualia associated with the perception of blue objects may come to be associated with the perception of red objects and vice-versa. When Shoemaker says that qualia are essential for perceptual states, he means that the occurrence of some qualia or other is a necessary requirement for the occurrence of perceptual experience. Shoemaker conceives qualia inversion to be a consequence of the ontological autonomy of the qualitative states. We have seen that Nelkin also grants an independent existence to qualia and also concedes the logical as well as the empirical possibility of qualia inversion. From this he comes to the conclusion that qualia (he calls them sensations or raw feels) are the least important element in the perceptual experience. It is not the nature of the sensations that determines the perceptual experience. On the contrary, the nature of the experience determined otherwise, determines the nature of qualia. Since qualia are not essential for perceptual states or experiences, the perceptual states
I agree with Nelkin that the occurrence of qualia or sensations is not necessary for the occurrence of perceptual experiences. So qualia do not determine the nature of perceptual experiences. On the contrary, the nature of qualia is determined by the nature of experience. But I do not agree with Nelkin's conclusion that since qualia do not determine perceptual experiences, qualia are not essential to them and hence they can occur without being qualitative or phenomenal states. Nelkin is entitled to conclude only that occurrence of qualia is not a pre-requisite for the occurrence of perceptual experiences. From this it does not follow that perceptual experiences occur without phenomenality or qualitative aspects. In my opinion, perceptual experiences are essentially qualitative states in the sense that qualia are necessary accompaniments or collateral products of the sensory experiences. The qualia as noted above are just logical constructs or intentional objects of our qualitative beliefs. No qualitative beliefs can occur without its intentional objects. Qualitative beliefs are important constituents of our perceptual experiences. So perceptual experiences cannot occur without qualia which are intentional objects of our qualitative beliefs.

Cognitivists are of the opinion that qualia are program resistant. And I fully concur with them. But it is not because of any specific features of qualia that they defy functional definition. Rather it is because qualia or raw feels do not have any ontological status of their own that they defy functional characterization. Qualia are intentional objects or logical constructs. No such intentional objects can be functionally defined. Our perceptual processes are basically processes of information processing. Such processing is associated with qualia. Take for example, vision. Vision involves visual qualia. It is not humans alone who have vision. Birds, frogs, cattle etc. too have visual information processing. So one might argue that when they have visual experiences, they have the same visual qualia as we have. But this is not true. When they have vision, their visual qualia can be radically different from ours. Suppose

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a human being, a cow, and a butterfly see the same beautiful rose. It is highly unlikely that all of them have the same visual qualia. The visual experiences each of them has differ not because each species has certain raw feels that are radically different in kind from those of the others but because they differ in their conceptual structures. Due to the differences in their conceptual structures, the same flower produces in them radically different perceptual beliefs. And it is natural that the intentional objects of these beliefs of various kinds also will be different. Since qualia are nothing other than logical constructs of these various types of perceptual beliefs, the difference in the kind of perceptual beliefs implies a difference in qualia. Only creatures with sophisticated conceptual system can have sophisticated perceptual beliefs. Since qualia are logical constructs of our perceptual beliefs only creatures with our conceptual sophistication can have the kind of qualia we humans possess.

Our perceptual states are not just abstract cognitive states. Each of our perceptual experiences is a combination of a cognitive state, namely the perceptual belief, an affective state, namely liking or disliking, and an overt behavioural state. Following Nelkin we shall call this combination an attitude. Take again, for example, the visual perception of a rose. The belief that I see a rose is part of the visual experience produced in me. In addition to this cognitive state, an affective state and a behavioural state are part of my visual experience of the rose. The cognitive state gives rise to the affective as well as the behavioural states. The perception of a rose could induce in me a liking for the flower and the desire to detach it from the plant and offer it to the person I love most. The cognitive states in collaboration with the affective and behavioural states produce certain flower directed behaviour.

The perceptual belief which is the most important element of our perceptual experience is not an abstract belief. This is a belief with a particular content. While seeing a rose, I believe that I see a particular rose and not some rose or other. When I see a particular rose, I am aware of its specific colour, texture, size, etc. In other words, my belief that I see this rose is not a single belief but a cluster of beliefs which is a

32 Nelkin, "How Sensations Get Their Names." 326
series of inter-related beliefs about the particular rose. And what we call qualia are the intentional objects or logical constructs of these particular perceptual beliefs which belong to the cluster.

5.4.4 Pain states and qualia

In their discussion of phenomenality philosophers often cite pain as the classic model of a phenomenal mental state. So it is obligatory to give due consideration to the analysis of pain states before I conclude this discussion. Moreover one might argue that though qualitative aspects of other mental states could be explained as intentional objects of perceptual beliefs, this strategy is not available in the case of qualitative states of pain because pain is a raw feel — an unanalyzable brute fact. I do not agree with the view that pain is unanalyzable. On the other hand, I think that Nelkin is right in his observation that pain is basically an attitudinal state like a state of visual experience. It is a perceptual state, and like any perceptual state, pain is in fact a combination of cognitive, affective and behavioural states: the cognitive state gives rise to the affective state, i.e., a dislike for the pain and the desire to get rid of it. The cognitive and affective states together give rise to pain behaviour. As Nelkin observes, what is important in our analysis of pain is how we believe, feel affectively and act.33

Of the three elements of a pain state, the behavioural and affective states do not require much elaboration. Pain is almost always accompanied by certain behavioural manifestations. Even when such overt behaviour is suppressed, it is undeniable that we have a very strong tendency to produce pain behaviour. By the affective aspect of pain, we mean the hurt we feel, the dislike we have towards this feeling and the disturbances it induces in the normal functioning of the body and in the working of the cognitive mechanism.

A person who undergoes pain has a special authority with regard to the occurrence of the pain experience. This authority emanates from his awareness that he is himself in pain. This awareness we call pain belief.

The occurrence of pain belief shows that the pain state necessarily involves a cognitive state. The influence of cultural factors in our feeling of pain gives credence to the fact that pain belief is a necessary element in our pain experiences. As an instance of the influence of cultural differences, Nelkin discusses the case of Mediterraneans and Nordics. Certain experiments conducted on these cultural groups show that they feel pain at different levels of noxious stimulation. The level or the intensity of stimulation at which they become aware of the stimuli is the same. But they differ with regard to the level at which they consider their experiences to be painful. The Nordics feel pain only at higher level of noxious stimulation, whereas the Mediterraneans start feeling pain at a lower level. Nelkin cites another experiment which also establishes that the cognitive aspect is essential to the experience of pain. A group of people dealing with a word list was given mild shocks whenever they made mistakes. The subjects never found the shocks painful unless the word pain or one of its synonyms was on the list.

The idea that pain is basically an attitudinal state like other perceptual states led Nelkin to the view that pain qualia are not essential to pain experiences. The example, cited above, of the influence of cultural differences in feeling pain shows that both Nordics and Mediterraneans have the same qualia or raw feel. The fact that only one group finds them painful, according to him, confirms this position. Just as one can be in pain without having pain qualia, the occurrence of pain qualia does not entail that one is in pain. In support of this view, Nelkin cites the cases of two groups of patients those who have had prefrontal lobotomies and those who were administered morphine after the onset of pain. Both the groups report that they feel pain but it no longer hurts them. This, according to Nelkin is an evidence of the fact that pain qualia can occur without there being any pain. These results seem to be counter-intuitive but the root of this seeming counter-intuitiveness, in Nelkin's opinion, lies in the idea that one is in pain only if one has the

pain qualia or pain sensations. The knowledge as to how sensations or qualia get their names is the right antidote to this counter-intuition. The same qualia may occur with different attitudinal states and different sensations may occur with the same type of attitudinal state at different times. The sensation that is constantly associated with a given attitudinal state would come to be named after that attitudinal state. A pain sensation is one that is constantly associated with the occurrence of the attitudinal state of pain.36

Nelkin's view that pain qualia are separable from pain states does not seem to be a sound thesis. The morphine and lobotomy cases, in my opinion, do not prove that pain sensation occurs without pain. They only show that of the three elements of a pain state only the cognitive element is present. But it must be noted that this cognitive element viz., the cognitive belief cannot occur without pain qualia or sensations. The subjects themselves report that they feel intense pain but do not mind it. This means whenever we have pain beliefs, we have pain qualia. If pain belief and pain qualia are inseparable then Nelkin's argument that pain occurs without pain qualia is not true. Pain qualia do not determine or cause pain beliefs. On the contrary, it is the pain beliefs which determine pain sensations. In Nelkin's opinion, raw feels or bare sensations occur and they are interpreted as pain or tickling by the subject as his cultural situatedness or the cognitive state he is in determine. I do not agree with the view that there are bare sensations or raw feels which are causally responsible for our pain beliefs. Pain sensations or qualia are just intentional objects of our pain beliefs. Therefore no pain beliefs can occur without pain sensations. The idea that pain can occur without pain sensations is the result of a tacit assumption that our pain beliefs are abstract. When I undergo pain, I am not experiencing some general or abstract pain. There is no such abstract pain. On the contrary, I have a very specific experience on any given occasion of pain feeling. Hence my pain belief is a particular cluster-belief. The various members of this cluster are I am undergoing this pain, this pain is intense, it is awful, etc etc. What we call pain

36 See "Pains and Pain Sensations." 139-40; "How Sensations Get Their Names"
CONSCIOUSNESS; AWARENESS, INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENALITY

qualia are logical constructs out of this cluster-belief. The position defended here supports the view that the maxim esse est percipi holds in the realm of pain. Pain is not just the occurrence of pain belief. But it is the most essential element of pain. Pain may be conceived as pain belief plus whatever ensues from it such as affective and behavioural aspects.³⁷

According to Nelkin, the cultural differences of Nordics and Mediterraneans influence their feeling of pain. The sensation which is interpreted by one group to be a pain sensation is not a pain sensation for another. Hence a given sensation can be associated with different perceptual states. However, I think, there is a more plausible interpretation for the cultural differences in feeling pain. It is quite possible that, in spite of having the same level of noxious stimulation, only Mediterraneans feel pain or have pain sensations or qualia. It is not because they have interpreted the same sensation differently but rather that only Mediterraneans have pain beliefs, and the Nordics totally lack them. So they do not have pain sensations. Hence it is not true that both the groups have the same sensations or qualia and that only one group finds them painful.

Pain like any other perceptual state is an attitudinal state. This conception of pain state, according to Nelkin, accommodates a great deal of our common intuitions about pain. Moreover if pain is an attitudinal state, it can be dealt with as a functional/computational state, just as cognitive scientists treat the states of visual perception (pains and pain sensations). But the qualitative aspects of our pain states must be construed as the intentional objects of our beliefs, and as intentional objects they are essential features of our experience of pain.

5.4.2 Intentionality

We have been arguing that the phenomenality of our mental states can be explained in terms of their intencntinality and awareness. One point that emerges from the discussion is that intentionality is a basic feature.

³⁷See Dennet, "Why You can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain." in Brainstorms, 225-26.
of all our mental states. This feature is conceptually related to our states of awareness. In other words, intentionality cannot be conceived independent of consciousness. Philosophers are divided on the use of the word 'awareness'. For, some intentional states are first order conscious states and 'awareness' refers to second order consciousness. Others use the expression 'aware of' only in its intentional sense. Whenever we are aware, we are aware of something. Even if one grants second order consciousness, this consciousness or awareness is of something. So a second order conscious state or awareness state is understood only as an intentional state. The difference, however, is that the objects of the second order consciousness are certain mental states and entities, whereas the first order conscious states or intentional states are directed at various objects in the world or states of affairs. At the outset, let me state clearly that I do not subscribe to the existence of second order consciousness. In my opinion, even if one grants second order consciousness, such conscious states can be understood only as intentional states. So intentionality i.e., their object directedness or representational capacity is a basic function of the conscious mental states. It is not humans alone who are endowed with consciousness and intentionality. It is generally held these days that non-humans are also aware of and hence possess intentional mental states. The question whether dumb animals possess intentionality is judged from their reaction to the environment. A bird is said to possess intentional states, as it flies off on becoming aware of the cat about to spring upon it. Hence it is a fact that the bird becomes aware of the cat as we humans do. A pertinent question in this context, however, is whether the bird becomes aware of the cat as cat in the way we humans are aware of it. In my opinion, it is highly unlikely that the bird has become aware of the cat as cat. The bird is seeing the cat in all probability as some danger. In other words, though intentionality of the perceptual states of the bird and those of the humans are directed towards the same object, the propositional contents of perceptual beliefs formed by the bird and those formed by humans radically differ. The difference in the contents of the perceptual beliefs resulting from the perception of one and the same object can be accounted for only in terms of the difference in the conceptual systems of humans and of birds. We see a cat as a cat because of the sophistication
of our conceptual structure. The birds do not see it as a cat because they lack a so sophisticated a conceptual system as we humans possess. Consciousness and therefore intentionality — more specifically intentional content, is a function of the conceptual system. The degree of consciousness an organism possesses is directly proportional to the level of sophistication and complexity of its conceptual system. So the birds whose conceptual system is far inferior to that of humans possess only a lower degree of consciousness or intentionality.

According to Dennet, intentionality can be understood in two ways, — the intentionality of speech acts and the intentionality of behaviour. Intentionality of speech acts consists of what one can directly or non-inferentially report whereas the intentionality of behaviour is the awareness state which is a necessary condition for the successful direction of behaviour. Since all awareness states are intentional states, awareness states in both the above senses can be construed as prepositional attitudes. Making use of this construal Dennet defines the two senses of awareness or intentionality as follows:

1. $A$ is aware$_1$ that $P$ at time $t$ if and only if $P$ is the content of the input state of $A$'s 'speech centre' at time $t$
2. $A$ is aware$_2$ that $P$ at time $t$ if and only if $P$ is the content of an internal event in $A$ at time $t$ that is effective in directing the current behaviour.  

Dumb animals in Dennet's opinion, are only aware$_2$ that $P$ because they lack a speech centre whose input is a propositional content. Human beings, on the other hand, are aware$_1$ as well as aware$_2$ and hence possess both forms or grades of intentionality. Both awareness$_1$ and awareness$_2$. It seems, are used at personal level. However, their definitions, argues Dennet, bridge the gap between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation, for both awareness$_1$ and awareness$_2$ have subpersonal criteria.

We have already noted that there is a conceptual relation between awareness and intentionality such that they are inseparable.

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39 Ibid., 118-19.
philosophers very often sever the connection between intentionality and awareness. They often employ notions of tacit knowledge and unconscious beliefs in the explanation of human behaviour. Such states are certain dispositions unavailable to us in consciousness. But the intentional states of knowledge, belief, desire, etc., as we have already seen, can be understood as possible conscious states. If so, the only way to make sense of philosophers' use of the expressions like 'tacit knowledge', 'unconscious belief etc. is to construe them as metaphorical expressions. The referents of these expressions are just theoretical constructs for the explanation of verbal and non-verbal behaviour. These states are unavailable to us for reporting.

The view that intentionality is an inseparable feature of our conscious mental states is hardly uncontroversial. One might even argue that intentionality need not be mental and can be understood independently of consciousness. The intentionality of the linguistic expressions may be cited as the best of examples of non-mental intentionality. If language has an intrinsic intentionality of its own then it can be understood independently of consciousness. Philosophers agree that both language and conscious mental states are intentional. But they disagree as to which intentionality is primary: linguistic or mental? Some philosophers conceive the intentionality of language to be primary and take the intentionality of mental states to be derivative. This is Fodor's strategy, which we discussed in Chapter 3. An alternative strategy is to derive intentionality of language from the intentionality of conscious mental states. A sentence written on a piece of paper does not have any intrinsic intentionality of its own, for it is only a set of meaningless symbols. It acquires meaning and intentionality only in relation to a conscious organism, a language user who can read and understand the sentence. Similarly the so-called unconscious intentional mental states are intentional only in so far as they can become conscious. Hence it is not possible for us to understand intentionality apart from consciousness or awareness.

5.4.3 Awareness vs. introspection

The talk of the availability or accessibility of intentional states to consciousness or awareness is quite misleading. It deludes one into thinking that awareness is something like an inner light, and that intentional states can exist in the mind without being illuminated. As a result, philosophers talk of unconscious intentional states. But this does not go well with the conceptual relation between consciousness and intentionality defended earlier. One way of dealing with the difficulty would be to do away with the talk of the unconscious altogether. But this is not appealing, as we have a number of intentional states that are not available to us for report, that still somehow direct or influence our behaviour. A better alternative is to say that an intentional state not available for report is also a conscious mental state or an awareness state by virtue of its being intentional. The only difference between the conscious and the so-called unconscious mental states is that the intentional state unavailable for report is of a lower degree of consciousness. Thus consciousness or awareness admits of degrees. On reaching its highest degree, the conscious states do not cease to be intentional or phenomenal. On the contrary, their intentionality and phenomenality become much more evident at higher stages of consciousness.\footnote{The thesis that consciousness itself has degrees is not a new one. It has been advocated by philosophers like Kant. According to him, in order to have representations (sensations) there must be a certain degree of consciousness. If our representations are obscure, it does not mean that we do not have consciousness but only that we have a very low degree of consciousness. On the other hand, a given representation of ours is clear only if there is a high degree of consciousness sufficient to make us aware of the distinction of this representation from others. Since representations or sensations for Kant are empirical consciousness of objects, the same may be said about the intentionality of our mental states with regard to their obscurity and clarity. See Immanuel Kant, *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1980), 373, n. a.}

A similar position has been held by Dennet. He is of the opinion that consciousness as a capacity to become aware that \( P \) admits of degrees like any other capacities. If consciousness is taken as the present capacity to become aware that \( P \), then a person in coma is unconscious to a greater
degree and a person who is asleep, on the contrary, is unconscious only to a lesser degree. The latter can wake up, which, in Dennet's opinion, is a behavioural response to the incoming information. So if consciousness is understood in the sense of awareness\(^2\), then dumb animals, and people who are asleep or in coma, are conscious.\(^{42}\) In the sense of awareness\(^1\), however, only human beings who speak or possess the present capacity to speak are conscious. Since consciousness admits of degrees, I think. Dennet's awareness\(^1\) can be conceived as a higher degree of consciousness than awareness\(^2\). This would become evident if we look at the way Dennet defines awareness\(^1\) and awareness\(^2\). In both cases the object of awareness\(^2\) is a prepositional episode. In the case of awareness\(^1\), the occurrence of the prepositional episode can be reported but the object of awareness cannot be reported in the same way. We can conceive of prepositional episodes only in the case of animals that can report them. So when we say that P is the content of an internal event in a dumb animal, we only mean that if such an event were to occur in humans, its occurrence could be reported ceteris paribus.

Dennet's concept of awareness\(^1\), the highest degree of consciousness in humans, seems to be very narrow: one is aware\(^1\) that P only if one speaks. On this conception, a person having a visual experience of a book on the table but who does not speak is only aware\(^2\) that P. Similarly if a person is having a dream experience, then he is only aware\(^2\) that P. On the other hand, if he speaks while having the dream experience, then he is aware\(^1\) that P. Dennet's conceptions of awareness\(^1\) and awareness\(^2\) do not capture all our common intuitions regarding consciousness, especially those of our conscious experiences at the very moment of having them. Obviously there exists a difference between the person who reacts to the visual stimuli but does not speak and the dumb animal which too reacts to the same visual stimuli but cannot speak. The conscious experiences in these two cases are different and hence should not be categorised under the title 'awareness\(^2\)'.

In the same way, there is a lot of difference between the talk of a person in his sleep and his talk at waking moments. These differences do not permit us to categorise these two experiences under the name 'awareness\(^1\)'.
In my opinion, the criterion for awareness or the highest degree of consciousness is not the capacity to speak or to make verbal utterances but the capacity to report. While asleep, one may be displaying certain verbal behaviour but he is not reporting anything. Hence he cannot be said to be aware that P. But if a person who does not speak while having a dream experience is aware that P provided he is in a position to report his dream experience. It must be noted that in order to be aware that P, one does not have to report, but one only needs to possess the present capacity to report. In this sense, a person who is having a dream experience and a person who is undergoing a visual experience but does not report it are aware that P, for they possess the present capacity to report though they do not exercise it.

The thesis that consciousness as a capacity admits of degrees and that awareness is the highest degree of consciousness, leads us to conceive the so-called introspective awareness or the second order consciousness in an altogether novel way. What we call introspective awareness is nothing other than the highest degree of consciousness. Hence there is no independent status for awareness states as separate from phenomenality and intentionality. The mental states which are by their very nature intentional as well as phenomenal become sometimes more luminous and sometimes less luminous. It is this greater or lesser luminosity that we call degrees of consciousness. At the highest level or degree of consciousness our mental states become reflexive when an intentional mental state exhibits reflexivity at higher levels of consciousness, we call such states introspective states. Only reflexive states and acts are recorded in memory and are available for report and further examination later.

From the above discussion, I conclude that there is no independent introspective mechanism within one's mind — an information processing system which takes phenomenal states and intentional states as inputs and produces various beliefs as outputs. To state this in a slightly different fashion, there are no qualitative states independent of and separable from awareness which because of its interaction with them produces awareness of qualia or qualitative beliefs. In the same way, there are no sentence tokens or proposition-like mental objects which on account of their interaction with awareness produce Objective beliefs about the world. When
I believe, for example, that the earth is round, there is no proposition like the mental state 'the earth is round" which causes in me the corresponding belief. I do not mean to say that our reflexive intentional mental states are not prepositional in nature. I only just deny the dichotomy that is supposed to exist between the belief that the earth is round and the prepositional like mental state 'the earth is round'. There is only a unitary conscious state viz., the belief that the earth is round which may be considered as a particular modification of our consciousness on account of its intentional content. When such beliefs are of higher degree consciousness, their intentionality and reflexivity become much more evident.

The reflexivity of our conscious mental states means that we are aware of our own mental states. We may call this awareness self-awareness. Since the reflexivity of the conscious mental states is directly proportional to the degree of consciousness, there are degrees of self-awareness as well. As Kant says, the faculty of being conscious of the self also admits of degrees. Though one becomes aware of oneself in each of one's conscious mental acts, in the process the self does not get divided into subject and object. In the case of self-knowledge both the subject and the object of our knowledge is one and the same. This means that one does not become conscious of oneself in the way one becomes conscious of external objects. One becomes aware of oneself only in relation to one's objects of thought. That is, consciousness of oneself is necessarily bound up with the consciousness of things outside. As Kant rightly observes, "the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me". Thus in each act of thought both the subject and the object are revealed simultaneously. The objects are revealed because of the intentionality of

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43See Kant, *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 373

44Kant illustrates this point as follows One becomes conscious of external objects by summoning up their representations under certain categories or forms of understanding. But in self-consciousness there is no representation of the self or a manifold of inner intuitions to which categories are applied. One becomes aware of the self only when one becomes aware of an external object. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, 168-69

45*Critique of Pure Reason*, 245
our mental acts and the subject because of the reflexivity of these very same acts. On this view, there is no introspective faculty which perceives the internal representations in the mind. That is, mind is not divided into representations and a mechanism for their perception.

The view of consciousness emerging from the above discussion implies that there is no second order consciousness. The assumption that there is a second order consciousness has led philosophers to the view that there are second order beliefs. The belief that $P$ is a first order belief. But when such beliefs occur in me I sometimes non-inferentially believe that I believe that $P$. The latter kinds of beliefs are called second order beliefs. According to Nelkin, the second order beliefs are the products of second order consciousness or "attitudinal consciousness", "a scanning device which, on many occasions, is able to report back to the organism what prepositional attitudes the organism has, . . ."\(^{46}\)

Though second order beliefs are non-inferential beliefs caused by certain prepositional attitudes, they are, according to Nelkin, not infallible. It is quite likely that I mistakenly believe that I believe that $P$ whereas I do not in fact believe that $P$.\(^{47}\) 'I believe that $P'$ and 'I non-inferentially believe that I believe that $P$', in Nelkin's opinion, express two different propositions. This distinction is suggested by the possibility of unconscious beliefs. So if unconscious beliefs exist then I can believe that $P$ without at the same time becoming aware that I believe that $P$.\(^{48}\) In other words first order beliefs and second order beliefs are two different mental acts or prepositional episodes Consequently, the non-inferentiality and fallibility of the second order beliefs, according to Nelkin, do not go hand in hand. Consequently the second order beliefs can be false. That is, though I do not believe that $P$, it is possible that I believe that I believe that $P$.

Nelkin's distinction between first order beliefs and second order beliefs is not tenable. When I believe, my belief is an act of the mind

\(^{46}\)Nelkin, "Prepositional Attitudes and Consciousness " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1989) 429

\(^{47}\)Cf. Ibid., 425.

\(^{48}\)Cf. Ibid., 426.
Each act of the mind is the result of the information processing at the subpersonal level. Each mental act is a conscious act, though the processes that lead to the act themselves are unconscious. One of the characteristics of the conscious acts is that they are reflexive: we are aware of our own acts. When a belief that P occurs, it is because of the reflexivity of the belief that I believe that P. The reflexivity of my belief tempts me to think that there is a second order belief of the form, 'I believe that I believe that P'. Since there is no second order consciousness or introspective mechanism for scanning the contents of the mind, there is no distinction between 'I believe that P' and "I believe that I believe that P'. Both of them refer to one and the same mental act, Hence the conscious mental acts must be incorrigible.

I have various types of prepositional attitudes. I believe P, desire P, fear P, hope P, wish P etc. If I can have second order beliefs, then it is quite reasonable to hold that I can as well have second order hopes, desires etc. But the mental state 'I hope that I hope that P' does not make any sense at all. But one could argue that though there are no second order hopes or desires, there could be second order beliefs, hence the proposition 'I believe that I hope P' is perfectly sensible. I do agree that the mental acts of desire, hope etc. can be rendered in this form But such rendering only refers to the reflexivity of these mental acts So, 'I desire that P' and 'I believe that I desire P' are the same act

Since by second order beliefs, I mean only the reflexivity of our mental acts, Nelkin's claim that second order beliefs are not incorrigible is unacceptable to us. Because of the reflexivity of the mental acts, if I believe that I believe that P, then that I believe that P is undeniable. Moreover, it seems to me that the case of 'I believe that I believe that P' is analogous to that of 'It is possible that it is possible that P'. If the proposition 'it is possible that P' is false, then 'it is possible that it is possible that P' also must be false. Similarly, if 'I believe that P' is false then 'I believe that I believe that P' also must be false. From the incorrigibility of 'I believe that I believe that P' I do not wish to establish that there are second order beliefs, but only that our first order conscious mental states are incorrigible because of their reflexivity.
According to the theory of personal consciousness sketched above, consciousness cannot be divided into independent and separable states of phenomenality, intentionality and awareness. These are features of each of our unitary conscious mental states. All these three features must be construed as a function of our conceptual structure. All our conscious mental states are basically intentional states such that their occurrence can be conceived as propositional episodes. Since these reflexive episodes are our only avenues to self-knowledge, there is no introspective faculty within our mind that scans the contents of the mind. The denial of the existence of an introspective faculty is significant as it leads to the rejection of second order consciousness and hence second order beliefs. The advantage of this rejection is that it helps us overcome an infinite regress resulting from the confusion of personal and subpersonal theories of consciousness.