INTRODUCTION

The shift in the focus of the Western Philosophy to the analysis of language and related concepts of meaning, truth and reference looks at first sight slightly perplexing, since the concerns over the structure of language, meaning and what makes words and sentences true or false are all entirely new interests hitherto unknown to the practices and concerns of the traditional philosophy. But this perplexity gets evaporated when one dwells well on and plunge deep into the new way of doing philosophy and when one understands that the underlying aims of the practitioners of the new philosophy are one and the same with those of the traditional philosophers. The main concern of describing the structure of the world or reality we experience remains the core issue in the contemporary philosophy as in the traditional philosophy.

At the outset of the new trend of philosophical analysis of language, there were some notions involved, namely that structural features of the language are identical with the structural features of the world, that meaning and truth of the linguistic expressions depend upon the way those expressions relate to the world of experience, and that the newly developed formal logic could provide efficient tools to conduct proper analysis of the language. Logic of language, i.e., grammar facilitates the understanding of the world or reality, because of the representational nature of language. The question of 'what there is' or ontology is addressed and solved by the
grammar of the language, since linguistic categories are the categories of understanding. In other words, logic presupposes the a priori or logical categories of understanding which are primarily concerned with the necessary structure or logical form of the world or reality. The question in connection with the philosophical analysis of language by making use of the techniques of logic is: can there be an aprioristic or logical understanding of the nature of reality or 'what there is'?

Since language is the medium of representation of our thoughts about the world philosophers got divided among themselves, over the nature of language and as to whether it is a befitting medium. While one group believed, in the construction of an ideal language to represent the structure of the world of experience, others were optimistic in arriving at the result by analysing ordinary language. While the presupposition that logical structure of the ideal language constructed is identical with the structure of the world gave impetus to the ideal language philosophers, ordinary language philosophers believed in analysing the functioning of the ordinary language vis-a-vis the world of experience, for our experience of the world gets crystallised into different linguistic expressions. Inspite of the difference of approach, they too agree that language has a logical structure which is the rock bottom of the multifarious linguistic phenomena.

In the first chapter the nature of grammar and ontology in the philosophical systems of Frege, Russell and Carnap has been taken into consideration. All the three philosophers believed that understanding of the structure of the reality or the world is achieved through the construction of an ideal language which
would capture the structural features of the reality. Frege attempted to relate logic to reality by way of discovering an aprioristic structure of language whereas Russell proposed 'logical atomism,' based on sense-data, in which complex expressions are knocked down by logical analysis to get ultimate simples or atoms. While these simples are the ground on which complex expressions are built it exactly matches with the complex nature of the world. Carnap was to derive a conceptual scheme which represents or reflects the strucutre of our world of experience. To him, answers to the questions related to the existence of the outside world could be framed only within the structure and devices provided within the linguistic framework. In short, these philosophers arrive at an idea, in their respective philosophies, that though the concepts of ideal language implicate the categories of the world of experience, ultimately, they are given apriori and so are logical in their nature.

The second chapter takes into account ordinary language philosophy of Quine, Wittgenstein and Strawson. Wittgenstein replaces the representational conception of language developed in the *Tractatus* by the use of theory of meaning and the theory of language-games. He advocates a new way of accounting for our experience and understanding of the world which is essentially metaphysical in nature. Quine by his theory of language makes a similar move and advocates a behaviourist theory of meaning, but is committed to the idea that ontological specifications of a belief system are possible by using the logical method. Strawson, on the other hand, firmly believes that the ontology of particulars in a spatio-temporal world can be determined
through an analysis of ordinary language. In his view, subject-predicate logic is enough to understand the basic categories of our language and, hence, of the world. This is not achieved by any empirical investigation, but by the conceptualisation of the logical structure of our natural language.

The third chapter describes how the logical categories thus derived by different philosophers are the ground on which apprehensions of the nature of meaning and truth could be achieved. Grammatical or logical categories presuppose ontological categories. These ontological categories, in turn, provide the basis for semantics. Hence semantical considerations of language directly pave the way for deriving the structural feature of the language. This is possible by presupposing ontological categories, since semantics is ultimately about the world. In effect semantics is poised in between the structure of the language and the reality. Therefore, if we could derive the linguistic categories by semantics we are simultaneously deriving the ontological categories. It amounts to saying that the structure of language thus derived is the structure of the world.

Chapter four is an attempt to show that the realist-antirealist debate on the nature of truth and meaning in the contemporary philosophical arena has resulted in their respective conceptions on the semantical structure of the language. While the realist characterisation of language and the consequent world-view takes truth as a central notion to tackle the questions of meaning and language, the antirealists are not ready to accord such a perennial role to the notion of truth and, consequently, develop a theory of meaning based on the
notion of verification. The realist theory of the truth-conditions of language, which draws heavily from Tarski’s semantic theory of truth, and the verificationist theory of meaning based on the intutionistic logic are the grounds for their respective conceptions of language and the world.

In the final chapter an attempt is made to derive the apriori or logical character of the metaphysics arising out of the semantic and grammatical considerations. Metaphysics of realism envisages an independently existing recalcitrant world which our language tries to describe or represent aptly with its structural features. This independently existing world constitutes or characterises our conceptual system. Realism affirms the truth that conceptual system, language and the world are invariably related to account for our experience. Anti-realism opposes the view of an independently existing world totally outside our experience of it, because we are not equipped to know such a world beyond our recognitional capacities. Inspite of that, there is no denial of the fact that our conceptual system and linguistic practices are related to or functions vis-a-vis a world of experience. In our language the world of experience manifests, and the organisation of those experiences into language is done by logical grammar. Thus, organisation of our experience into language by making use of logical grammar ultimately amounts to that our world as we experience is the one fashioned by the language and its logical grammar.