Chapter V

THE APRIORI (LOGICAL) STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICS

Both realism and antirealism present competing metaphysics or world-view emanating from the respective characterisation of the nature of meaning and truth. As we have seen, though realism is based on truth-condition semantics the accruing world-views out of it do not have uniformity across the board. It resulted in different species of realism like epistemological realism, semantic realism and metaphysical realism. Epistemological realist claims that specified class of postulated entities really do exist independently of our knowledge of them. In this sense we are almost all realists about prime numbers and bacteria, but not about dragons and tachyons. In their articulation neither any particular conception of truth is involved nor any commitment to what the existence of the supposed entities would have consisted in.

Semantic realism is basically anti-reductionist, anti-verificationist, and anti-instrumentalist in nature. Semantic realist believes that there is a body of facts concerning the structure of the world, and that our endeavour is to discover this structure to formulate theories and provide evidence which will justify the belief that those theories provide a true description of that aspect of reality. Therefore, facts are to
be discovered by us and do not depend upon our methodology.

Metaphysical realist goes a little further to claim what it is for such irreducible theoretical claims to be true, specially that the concept of truth involves a primitive non-epistemic idea which Tarski-style disquotation scheme is not entirely able to capture. Hence a cognition-transcendent concept of truth motivates our standards of justification and our verification procedure.

In spite of the fact that different species of realism diverge considerably in their conception of truth and meaning and, consequently, their metaphysics, the core area or tenets of realism as traditionally conceived apply to all species. An independently existing recalcitrant world of which our language tries to describe or represent aptly with its structural features, an outside world or reality which constitutes or characterises our conceptual system, stands out in the realist picture. It affirms the truth that conceptual system, language and the world are invariably related to account for our experience.

Contrary to this, anti-realists have developed, as we have seen, their formulations of the concept of meaning and truth based on the notion of verification. Though anti-realists have articulated fully their semantics, it is yet to be seen properly what metaphysical consequences emerges out of it, or it subscribe itself, as a consequence of the meaning formulation, to any traditional metaphysics.

In this chapter an attempt is being made to derive the affinity character of the metaphysics arising out of the semantic and grammatical considerations.
1. METAPHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-REALISM

If we accept a concept of sense in terms of verification, McDowell points out, then such conception 'would require a novel, antirealist conception: if truth is not independent of our discovery of it, we must picture the world as our own creation or, at least, as springing up in response to our investigations. So verificationist objections to a truth-condition conceptions of sense would have far-reaching metaphysical implications.'¹ Dummett also accept this that conception of sense in terms of verification has serious metaphysical consequences. He writes, 'the whole point of my approach ... has been to show that the theory of meaning underlies metaphysics.'² Anti-realism has metaphysical implications as much as the realism has. Are the realist and anti-realist metaphysics competing with each other so as to provide a better perspective to map our world of experience? To see this is to see what metaphysics they offer. Realism put its metaphysics in a straightforward way as we can see this in its picture of the world. Platt's says, 'realism embodies a picture of our language reaching out to, connecting with, the external world in ways, that are (at least) beyond our present practical comprehension. It embodies a picture of an independently existing, somewhat recalcitrant world describable by our language in ways that transcend (at least) our present capacities to determine whether those descriptions are true or


² Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, p.xi
not. It embodies a picture of our language, and our understanding, grappling with a stubbornly elusive reality. Perhaps, with efforts, we can improve our capacities to understand that world, to know that our characterisations of it are true. If we succeed in doing so, we do not bring that world into being, we merely discover what was there all along. But that reality will always exceed our capacities. We can struggle to achieve approximately true beliefs about that reality, approximately true beliefs about entities and their characteristics which, independently of us, make up that reality. But we have to rest with the approximate belief, and ultimately resign ourselves to (non-complacent) ignorance: for the world, austerely characterised by our language, will always outrun our recognitional capacities. ³

In this realist conceptions it seems there is no reasonable way of explaining what someone believes about the world, except credit him with a realist conception of world and language in which the claims that objects existing independently of one's talk or experience assumes cardinal role. This 'independence' is the ground on which language acquires sense it does have. But when we consider carefully the intricate relation between language and the world, and, consequently, the way by which we could possess or establish that relation, then the realist picture falls short and creates a considerable gap in our understanding. Antirealism challenges the realist picture and tries to construct an alternative conception to the effect that no gap is created in our understanding of world and language.

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2. FROM ANTIREALISM TO RELATIVISM

It is generally perceived that cognitive relativism is the consequence of the antirealist stand with respect to truth and meaning, and cultural relativism, as distinct from cognitive relativism, does not follow from it. To put it the other way, while cognitive relativism is a distant consequence of antirealism cultural relativism is not.

The cognitive relativism concerns the infrastructure, the level of basic beliefs about the world, such as that there are perception--independent, reidentifiable and individually descrimimiable objects or events, occupying space and time. What underlies the cultural relativist approach is the presupposition of the existence of an alien culture that is different from ours. Therefore, our ability to recognize another culture, or a historical phase in our own culture, with respect to its differences means that we must have enough in common between our culture and alien culture to allow us that access. This aspect is properly made use of by Davidson to claim that conceptual scheme is a language or set of intertranslatable languages. The conceptual schemes are intertranslatable like the languages in which they are embedded.4

To accept Davidson's thinking is suicidal to the proponents of philosophical relativism since it runs contrary to the basic ideas of relativism, and hence, to the very idea of access itself. According to them the appearance of accessibility is misleading, because what we have done is, far from gaining entry

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to the alien scheme, merely re-interprets it in a systematic way into the terms of our own scheme and this is the best we can ever hope for because translation is not possible above a certain indeterminate level. By pointing out the impossibility of translation, relativists do not dogmatically assert the empirically false thesis that no language would be rendered into another. Rather they stand for a philosophical thesis that establishing synonymy relations is not possible beyond the level of stimulus-meanings of sentences. This is what Quine tried to establish with extensive articulation of the pattern of a native speaker's assent and dissent to the stimulus. This method directly points to the possibility of assimilating an alien language terms into our own, but with some reservations that we can never be quite sure which of the alternative translations of these terms exhaustively capture its sense, for its stimulus-conditions undermine what precise construction is to be placed upon it. Thus the word 'gavagai' in the native speaker's language might mean 'rabbit' or 'temporal slices of rabbithood' in English language. This ultimately leaves us with the impossibility of the elimination of the indeterminacy involved in the translation and hence the access to the supposed common conceptual scheme.

The idea of a conceptual scheme as a language or set of intertranslatable languages need to be supported by making a distinction between theoretical and observational terms. This distinction that we are in a position to maintain between theoretical and observational terms gives what the thesis of theory-ladenness has to say about meaning and ontology. Denial

5 See Quine, *Word and Object*, Chapter 2
of this distinction is the crux of the thesis of theory-ladeness. Positivist's debate on whether there can be an observational language or some form of theory-neutral description of experience resulted in the idea that there can be no such thing, precisely because the notion of observationality is itself theoretical, forming part of a theory of reductive analysis. The attempt to find whether there can be a neutral observational language into which different theoretical languages can be translated for comparison, or certain sets of theoretical statements can be reduced to observational statements is of no avail, since the distinction required to licence such translations rest upon the possibility of there being formal criteria of synonymy by means of which the translation can be effected. Precisely this possibility has been questioned by the antirealists of the present. Quine holds that there can be no such formal criteria of synonymy because any such criteria would be constructible only by reference to our knowledge of what things in the world the terms in question apply to, and therefore, cannot be independent of our theories about the world. In short, the distinction rests upon the concept of synonymy which, in turn, is dependent on the theories, hence appeal to it vitiates the reductive enterprise.

That the meaning of an expression in some natural language can be stated in some other natural language depends on the notion of synonymy. If it is denied then failure of translation amounts to radical relativism because conceptual scheme is the language.

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6 Quine, *Word and Object*, Chapter 3. This has been discussed extensively in Chapter 3.
These relativist considerations may appear to be the natural corollary of antirealism, since the antirealists assert that the sense of a term is fixed by its conditions of assertions. Hence, any changes in assertability conditions will have implication on the sense of the terms. Added to this is Quine’s argument that we can never have a determinate grasp of conditions for assertion of an expression other than our own. Of course, we can grasp an expression of other language but indeterminately. If these arguments are true, then each language will have its own conceptual scheme and speakers are locked permanently in their conceptual scheme. Apparently these considerations show that relativism is true at its face value and it quite naturally follows from antirealist theory of meaning.

But the following considerations cast doubt on the construal that relativism is the corollary of antirealist theory of meaning and truth. Indeterminacy involved in the process of translation of expression from one language into another is the backbone of the relativist constructions that one is sealed-off from an alien language or conceptual scheme. The very ‘understanding’ or ‘recognition of the existence of an alien conceptual scheme or language is backed by some sort of access to the same. This access is provided by a wide background of mutual comprehensibility and wide range of shared beliefs and assumption. In order to recognise differences as differences, whatever they may be, there must exist a common platform. This platform should necessarily not be a theory-neutral observational language, but something beyond language, say, some undifferential experience. The undifferentiated experience in
the course of time get approximated into conceptual scheme or onto the language. This runs against relativism and the idea that these very many sealed-off conceptual schemes and languages without access into each other. We can envisage that there is indeterminacy both in the translation from one language into another and within one's own language. But that should not give the room for the thesis of very many languages or conceptual scheme without any access into each other.

In short, a language is a conceptual scheme. If we recognize the language as a language, we must be able to recognise the presence of a certain range of beliefs underlying the speakers' employment of their language. The question what these beliefs are is very important, and then what features or elements of the language they reveal constitutes what enables us to recognise the language as a language.

Language organises or systematises the world over which our experience ranges, i.e., language is the medium in which our experiences get crystallised. This language i.e., conceptual scheme presents a pluralistic ontology since the features or devices of the language makes it possible. To capture ontology onto the language, it should contain or develop its devices, both individuative and predicative. These devices for concepts of individuals and concepts of properties are important as much for our own language as for an alien tongue. Co-extensivity of predicates between one's language and the alien language fulfils the criterion of languagehood. The criterion of languagehood is that if anything is a language it contains devices for individuation and for ascribing properties to the individuals individuated. These devices can be recognised as such in a way
exactly parallel to our understanding of the logical features of our language. This co-extensivity of devices in our own language and the alien language is the ground on which the possibility of translation rests.

On the face of it this possibility of translation between two languages rules out any acceptance of radical relativism. In Quine’s characterisation meaning of certain range of sentences, i.e., observation sentences which are situated at the periphery of the web of language can be grasped by pure ostension. He cites mass terms as good examples which we learn ostensively. For e.g., the meaning of the term ‘water’ can be learned ostensively by conditioning or induction. But this way of learning the meanings, according to Quine, restricted to those sentences or terms which lie at the periphery of the web of language. But there are serious hurdles in learning this way as far as other sentences and terms are concerned. Terms of divided reference cannot be mastered without mastering the principles of individuation governing them. In the case of the term ‘rabbit’ learning ostensively is not possible, for fixing reference, especially in connection with the radical translation of ‘gavagai’ in the native language. We are not able to decide that ‘gavagai’ picks out what among rabbit, undetached rabbit parts or temporal slices of rabbit. Hence, appeal to reference in grasping the meaning of ‘gavagai’ does not yield any result and the indeterminacy gets involved in our attempt to understand the meaning of ‘gavagai’. However, it leaves in fact the ‘stimulus meaning’ This is the only thing that enables us to get translation manual started.

This result is not satisfactory, for all that the stimulus
conditions for 'gavagai' tell us is that 'gavagai' is assertable when current stimulation includes a rabbit and that the native speakers never dissent when 'gavagai' is uttered in their presence. Assertibility conditions demand more than this. In case we broaden our perceptual field, 'gavagai' might mean, something like 'creature which yields white meat.' This ascription will include chicken also. Therefore what we need for a correct specification of the assertibility condition is for the condition denial, i.e., something to be 'not gavagai'. The denial depends upon the learning of certain negative options by a speaker. By this what a translator is left with is dissent to 'gavagai' where one gavagai left off and another began. Thus, the interpretation of any sort, if to get started, must have the required knowledge of the reference of the relevant terms, the reference of a term being just the object which use of the term picks out or individuates.

This gives us the idea that for translation to be possible across the languages references must be perspicuous; added to this is that there are simple predicates and the intersection of the extension of such predicates between languages is determinable. If referential scrutability is established, then enumeration of objects satisfying a predicate allows correct application of the predicate in both the languages under study. This paired expansion will have semantic features like pretheoretical grasp of language synonymy. This will guarantee that relations of this sort are obtainable between different languages in a more determinate way than Quine's framework allows. Note that what these arguments are upto is not an argument of interlanguage synonymy in which a complete
intersubstitutivity of terms is available in sentential contexts.

Statement synonymy in the positivist view consists in the fact that because the meaning of a statement is its method of verification, any two statements with identical empirical conditions of confirmation or disconfirmation are synonymous. This implies that for each statement there should be a unique range of sensory events which verify or falsify the statements in question. If this is to be said about statements those truth-conditions determine meaning, there are meaning determinations based purely on the sentential features as in the case of analytic sentences. Quine finds it highly objectionable and adopts a holistic view. Rather, it seems, what was objectionable to him is the analytic-synthetic distinction and the reductionist thesis. Stimulus meanings of observation statements, construed as the ordered pairs of assents and dissents, stands with an added advantage in the total scheme of statements. Hence the class of observation statements across the language qualify for a determinate translations.

The notion of statement-synonymy depends upon the fact that translator is in a position to avail the determinacy of reference and predicate extension. Understanding a sentence in both the languages invokes extra information of terms which warrant their use in the perceptual context. As noted early this is related to the option left out by the dissent or denial. But the 'option-closure' only provides the idea that use of the terms is inappropriate. Though the unique range of sensory evidences is available for the confirmation or disconfirmation of a sentence in the assertability-condition what the speaker
has to know is the circumstances under which the use is warranted.

In short, the devices of language make possible the determination of reference and predicate extension. This in turn provides the ground for translation across languages. This is possible only when language is equipped with the conceptual scheme. The relativist idea that each language is sealed-off from others and, therefore, the impossibility of a common conceptual scheme, is in contrast with the above arguments. Hence, antirealist thesis that assertability or verification conditions constitute the meaning of an expression does not provide ample ground for a realativist consequence.

3. IDEALISM AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ANTIREALISM

Anti-realist thesis of meaning and truth, some argue, assumes an idealistic nature when its world-view, is fully brought out. Idealism holds the notion that the world is in some sense dependent on being known or conceived by subjects of experience. The idea of world's existing independently of any thought of it is unintelligible. In contemporary philosophy of language, the sort of idealism takes its shape mainly from the epistemological consideration, especially from empiricist epistemology. Given the idealist construal that what can be known about the world rests on a foundation of empirical experience or in some way arises primarily from empirical experience, then what can be known is subjected to the conditions of empirical experience. Contrary to this, the realists argue that without involving essential reference to experience it is possible to know what the world is like or
constituted of. In other words, we can arrive at conclusions through epistemological considerations by transcending experience.

If the idealist thesis that reference to the empirical conditions governing the concepts we habitually employ and apply is inescapable, an antirealist attitude to language is inescapable too; for anti-realism is the thesis that sense of our discourse is determined by the empirical conditions of its acquisition and use. A minimally conceived idea of idealism, that the conception of the world's existing independently of any experience of it is unintelligible, appears to quite naturally follow from antirealism, for the antirealist attitude to language takes empirical epistemology seriously in determining what there is. In spite of these discernable consequence of relating idealism with anti-realist attitude to language, most varieties of idealism are strong theses which purport to establish the falsity of the view that there is an experience-independent world. Idealism makes it clear that a world is a collection of ideas or is a seamless and eternal whole ('absolute'). These strong theses should be kept away from our considerations while attempting an antirealist construal vis-a-vis idealism since the talk of the world makes essential references to experience.

Any conception of the world cannot get rid of the idea that empirical experience is in some sense centrally important. Justified beliefs about contingent matters could not be ascribed to epistemic capacities of rational agents without experience. This constraint compounds with the fact that our ordinary thought or talk is realist and unless we equip ourselves with an
operable distinction between what is objective and what is subjective in experience, there would not be any means to make sense of the concept of experience.

Kant's articulations of transcendental idealism, which he considered as a thesis equivalent to empirical realism, help in construing, it seems, antirealism as a specimen of idealism. Note that "transcendental" here differs from "transcendent" in talk of 'transcendent truth conditions', the former concerns what is 'within' the limits of experience, the latter concerns what is 'outside' them. Since the notion of experience in transcendental idealism of Kant sets limits to what the understanding can do, the connection with antirealism becomes obvious, for having a proof or verification procedure sets limits to what can be said, and acquiring and manifesting of language must be explained in terms of the constraints imposed by the methods available to us.

According to Kant, phenomenon is transcendentally ideal but empirically real, hence the ordinary distinction between appearance and reality is a genuine one but should be drawn within experience itself. This being the case, his transcendental idealism is not concerned with the familiar traditional epistemology which is concerned with the relation between perceptual experience and its objects. In traditional epistemology since empirical self-awareness is immediate the existence of objects has to be inferred from the immediate subjective data of consciousness. By contrast to this, Kant's transcendental idealism constitutes an empirical realism because of our experience of outer objects which are independent of our objective consciousness. This means that experience of objects
which exist independently of any particular acts of awareness of
this is a necessary condition of having experience.\(^7\)

Strawson's argument for the existence of other minds, i.e.,
persons goes very well with the claim that objects of experience
exist independently of any acts of awareness of them. He argues
that in order to doubt the existence of other minds the skeptic
employs the concept of other minds itself, which can be done if
he distinguishes between 'my state of consciousness' and
'other's states of consciousness' which in turn demands
existence of others, for identification of conscious states can
be effected by reference to particulars of special kinds, i.e.,
persons. One can talk of my experience only if one can talk of
other experiences. This is possible only if there are criteria
for distinguishing between persons. Since one does talk
significantly about one's own experience, then bodily behaviour
constitutes adequate grounds for ascription of states of
consciousness to others. Strawson's aim here is to show what are
the necessary conditions of a given conceptual scheme for the
identification of particulars, including persons, in a spatio-
temporal world. In a similar line the construal of object
existing independently and articulate the basis of our
understanding can be made available.\(^8\) If we think of the world
as a coherent spatio-temporal system of material things, then it
is a condition of having this conceptual scheme that we
unquestioningly accept the continued unperceived existence of at
least some of these things. To deny this is to accept that we

\(^7\) See Strawson's *The Bounds of Sense*, Methuen, London,
1966, Chapter 2.

\(^8\) Strawson, *Individuals*, pp.35-6.
never reidentify objects and, therefore, effectively committing ourselves to the notion that each new stretch of observations or experience ranges over discrete and independent spatio-temporal systems. Hence, being completely different spatio-temporal systems, identity of a material item in one system with an item in other never arises. If that is the case, in such systems the continued existence of material things unperceived does not make sense. In other words, skepticism arises only when two systems are not independent. Precisely this is the condition for a unified system that there should be satisfiable criteria for the identity of at least some material items in one system with some items in the other. Therefore, unperceived continuous existence of objects cannot be doubted.\textsuperscript{9}

Now, we have and employ the concept of perception-independent particular or objects. This argument does not establish continued existence of objects independently of any experience. Rather it is a condition of the experience that we are committed to believing objects continue to exist unperceived. To ask whether there are objects independently of experience is misguided. If it is a necessary condition of the coherence of our conceptual scheme that we must believe that there are perceptions--independent objects and if there is only one conceptual scheme, then the perception-independent existence of objects is a condition of experience in general. It seems that the contemporary realist wants to go beyond this and attempts to derive a result that objects exist absolutely independently of any experience. Talk of entities for whose existence nothing whatever could count as evidence, for its

\textsuperscript{9} Individuals,
being completely independent of experience, cannot make any sense. In this picture the contemporary realist approximates the characterisation as 'transcendental realist', in the Kantian sense, whereas antirealists are apt to be labelled as 'empirical realist'.

The question about what there is independently of any talk or experience is strictly unintelligible. The point is not that there is no world existing independently of experience, but that there is no intelligible way in which one can talk of a world lying beyond or outside experience. This is all and only the world as it is experienced or experiencable and nothing can count as sensible outside the limits which the conditions of discourse impose. From an antirealist point of view, realism is premissed on strictly unintelligible commitment to the existence of our experience-transcendent reality. But a denial of realist claims about such a reality is equally unintelligible. If the constraint that ordinary talk or thought is realist is to be taken into account, and the realistic idea of language-learning requires publicly available conditions, then pervasive realism of our every day conceptual scheme is to be accounted for.

The point of view that the world is independent of particular acts of awareness of it, or independent of the relation in which individual perceivers stand to it, has to be reconciled and accommodated within our conceptual scheme in a sensible way. It seems Wittgenstein's idea of 'grammatical proposition' would be helpful in tackling proposition like 'objects exist unperceived'. Grammatical proposition is one which it makes no sense to doubt and therefore, in an important way, there is no sense in asserting or claiming to know. Since
grammatical proposition has its own role in our belief system and overall picture of what our experience is all about, the best way to characterise grammatical proposition is to say that they constitute the presupposition of our thinking or talking and, hence, to doubt the presupposition is not only false but also unintelligible. It amounts to saying that belief in the existence of objects is a necessary condition of our thought and talk. If we put it in a realist perspective, it is tantamount to say that those beliefs are necessary to our conceptual scheme; we are bound to be epistemological realists, if our thought and talk is to be coherent. While we say that we are bound to be realists, we are not rejecting the antirealist claim, that the objects are nonetheless, internal to our conceptual system. Here lies the importance of such a belief of the existence of objects vis-a-vis both realist and anti-realist epistemology and its world-view; it amounts to saying that anti-realism in a Kantian sense, is an empirical realism.

4. IS TRUTH WELL LOST?

Anti-realist theory of meaning, as we noted earlier, envisages that the notion of truth is eliminable, if not completely, in the epistemological consideration of understanding and meaning. Inspite of this Dummett conceded the importance of the concept of truth in our understanding of deductive inference and, therefore, of the concept of indirect conclusive proof.\(^\text{10}\) If we take seriously Frege’s thought regarding a proposition that the sense of the sentence consists

in the grasping the condition for its truth and in order to assert an utterance the notion of force should be taken into account, then a concept of truth is required to keep a statement being true and someone's having grounds for taking it to be true. Dummett considers that a sense-force distinction is vital if we are to be able to give a systematic account of language, hence a concept of truth is required to understand utterances. The adherence to the verification principle forces anti-realist to conclude that truth is a matter of decision and strongly reject the realist idea of truth which transcends our cognitive beliefs. The principle of bivalence and the notion that truth is independent of human cognition are those classical realist tenets to which antirealist raises strong objection. The intuitionistic logic of antirealists holds a system of semantics and truth is placed within the limits of the semantics. But this verificationist dimension of truth described by Dummett\(^{11}\) specifies that truth is imminent to our conceptual scheme as the transcendent notion of truth supported by the realist does not justify our cognitive practices. This verificationist notion of truth makes Dummett hold that the meaning of a statement is not constituted by the truth-conditions, rather by its assertion-conditions.

But if we uphold the anti-realist thesis that truth and cognition of truth are one and same, then truth will be the product cognitive consensus and hence this deny will that truth is a substantial concept in our conceptual system. This result is not acceptable because "the antirealist idea that truth is

constructed rather than discovered does not hold good because it denies the fact that we do not manufacture truth whenever we apply it to the sentences we make. Semantically speaking, truth is a value granted to sentences only when there is a determinate way that sentence is related to the world. Since the world does not come into being the moment the sentence is made, it is evident that truth and reality are both independent of our cognition. If that is the case, the verificationist notion that truth is man-made and dependent on our cognitive practices falls short of our requirement. In contrast to the anti-realist approach to truth, metaphysical realist maintains that the concept of truth involves a primitive non-epistemic idea. Metaphysical realism stands in opposition to various constructivist theories of truth according to which the surplus meaning in truth is identified with some notion of verifiability. Again, the redundancy theory of truth denies the existence of surplus meaning and contends that Tarski’s scheme is quite sufficient to capture the concept. Truth is held to be a genuine property of certain propositions, a property we desire our beliefs to possess.

Metaphysical realist’s concepts of truth and truth conditions are unacceptable and obscure, even in their application to what we take to be decidable statements. Not only do they not give an account of what it is to know when a sentence would be true but also we have no right to assume that such knowledge would be maintained in a certain form of linguistic behaviour. Knowledge of truth accounts for all the

linguistic expressions or behaviour. Since the essential feature of the realist concept of truth is that it is a primitive notion and not to be explained in terms of verification it poses difficulties in answering the questions like in what does our knowledge of truth-conditions consist, and how does such knowledge produce linguistic skill? In Dummett's argument the idea that truth is a primitive non-epistemic notion is confounded with the idea that the truth may exist beyond our capacity to recognize it. But we need to separate the latter idea from the metaphysical realist idea of truth as a primitive non-epistemic notion because if we go with metaphysical realist prescription truth cannot be made comprehensible, there being no account of that in which a grasp of it or evidence of grasp is found.\textsuperscript{13} However, semantic realism like Tarski's provides truth-conditions of sentences which can be related to our linguistic practices.

In fact, semantic realism with its truth-conditional theory of meaning is compatible with a verification theory of understanding.\textsuperscript{14} A verificationist theory of understanding yields a modest commitment to realism about the world—a commitment to an ontology of objective, mind-independent objects and their properties. The assertability condition belie the commitment of the speakers to independent objects. Added to this, anti-realists argue that the language learning and understanding is explained solely in terms of justification conditions. Semantic realism has no trouble with these


statements. Realists agree that to understand a statement is to know under what circumstances that statement is warrantedly assertable, but disagree that meaning of a statement is exhaustively given by such circumstances. Instead the semantic realist finds reason to posit truth-conditions as the meaning of statements.

Semantic realists argue that mere assertability conditions are not sufficient to determine the meaning; we need to posit truth-condition with attention on justification—conditions so that we learn that property possession is not solely a function of current evidence. By understanding the nature of objective property possession, one understands that the state of objects is distinct from the evidential conditions required for justified assertion. With this distinction of knowledge of the distinctness of truth conditions and assertability conditions, semantic realist is warranted in claiming that the background theory to which use points is indeed a bivalent theory. The verificationists agree that this theory involvles the objectivity of certain features of the world. In spite of the trouble of deciding whether the background theory is bivalent or not, a semantic theory has to take into account the actual linguistic practice, so that semantic realism could embed the verificationist theory of linguistic understanding.

Putnam's internal realism is also critical about the realist idea of truth which entails that truth is independent of our cognition and, therefore, of our conceptual scheme. He stands for realism with a human face, i.e., truth and reality have to be characterised within our conceptual scheme. Our beliefs, knowledge and truth can be accounted for within human
conceputal system. Internal realism rules out metaphysical realist thesis that truth is a fixed and transcendental category and world consists of some fixed totality of man-independent objects. The ideal that all sciences and knowledge is a search for the independently existing truth provide thus to a complete description of the world is anathema to the internal realist. Instead of the realist concept of cognition-transcendent truth and reality the internal realist puts forward an idea of truth which "is some sort of (idealised) rational acceptability--some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences themselves represented in our belief-system--and not correspondence with mind independent or discourse independent "states of affairs."\(^{15}\)

Internal realism holds that epistemological and semantic notions are conceptually inseparable. But beliefs are not true simply because they are rationally warranted or rationally acceptable. No analytic or logical conclusions guarantee that the results of our best empirical methods will be true. Putnam does not agree with this realist argument and says that the realist or at least the hard-core metaphysical realist--wishes it be the case that truth and rational acceptability should be independent notions, while infact they are not.

Putnam's argument runs like this: suppose that truth and rational acceptability are independent notion, then it is conceivable that even an ideal theory could be false. Moreover, it is conceivable that such a theory could be false in the world having countably but not finitely many objects. But such an

ideal theory must be consistent. Since it is consistent it has a denumerable model. Therefore, there is an interpretation of the language of the theory such that the domain of interpretation is the set of actual objects, and the theory is true under interpretation. Therefore the ideal theory is true, the supposition is contradicted, and truth and rational acceptability are not independent notions.

It seems that internal realist articulation of truth and rational acceptability places the concept of truth and, consequently, reality within human conceptual scheme or conceptual history but tends to reject the notion that truth is the product of consensus. "Rational acceptability" thesis does not in toto reject realism, since it does not reject the concepts of truth and reality. The rational evaluation of beliefs necessarily presupposes that there is a reality which should get represented in our belief system. Putnam writes, "To look for any one uniform link between word or thought and object of word or thought is to look for the occult; but to see our evolving and expanding notion of reference as just a proliferating family is to miss the essence of the relation between language and reality. The essence of the relation is that language and thought do asymptotically correspond to reality, to some extent at least."¹⁶ This correspondence with reality assumes that eventhough truth is within our conceptual history and practice, those conceptual history, practice or human interest need to be appraised rationally. This appraisal is done against the background of that 'corresponds with

reality'. In the evaluation a standard or criterion is to be adopted with truth as the background concept. This standard is not a product of consensus but something substantial which helps us to evaluate our belief system, hence it transcends the relativist idea of truth being internal to the point of view of the people.
CONCLUSION

In philosophical analysis of language it is presumed that grammar ensuing out of such an exercise has representational nature. Since language functions vis-a-vis a world of experience, grammar captures the essential characteristic features of the reality. If language is the medium in which we express or articulate our thoughts and experiences, then grammatical structure of language and our conceptual scheme are invariably related. This relation between language and our conceptual scheme supports the thesis that grammatical structure is the structure of the reality, for our thoughts and experiences are the thoughts and experiences about the world.

The grammar discerned in the analysis of language delineate a world-view or metaphysics, since the essence of the language, i.e., grammar is the essence of the world. This metaphysics underlying in the linguistic analysis is essentially aprioristic or logical in nature, for those metaphysical conclusions are drawn within or derived from the logical grammar of language.

Irrespective of the differences of opinion as to whether there is an independently and continuously existing world with or without our experience of it, the existence of the world of experience or reality is beyond doubt. This world or reality is the 'bed rock' of all our experiences and justifies our truth claims in the semantics of language.
Ideal language philosopher's logical analysis presupposes that language has a definite structural pattern. This logical structure of language is construed as identical with the structure of the world. Therefore, logical grammar discerned in the analysis of language represents the structure of the world, or rather, what we experience about the world are those things and events given in or represented in the logic of language. Language is the only medium in which we conceive the world. Consequently, the logical grammar of language represents the essence of our world of experience. It presupposes one-to-one representational relation between the structure of language and that of reality.

Whereas ordinary language philosophers, since they were interested in studying the functioning of ordinary language vis-à-vis the world of experience, our experiences of world get crystallised into the different linguistic expressions. These linguistic expressions represent the content of our experience of the world. They too agree that language has a logical grammar and the ensuing ontology is posited by language and its logical grammar. In our language the world of experience manifests, and organisation of those experiences into language is done by logical grammar.

In all species of realism based on the truth-conditions semantics an independently and continuously existing world of experience is affirmed, for truth is a substantial concept which validates our linguistic practice. Though realists assert a world existing independently of our experience of it, our knowledge of it is limited to the cognitive capabilities. Our language with its logical structure approximates the world we experience within the limits of the cognitive activities and promises to capture fully the elusive reality once our own
cognitive apparatus is fully developed.

Antirealism does not question the claim about the existence of the world, and about the language as the medium in which the world is described, but it questions the claim of its existence independently of our experience of it. The notion of verification allows us only the claim that our understanding of the world is limited to, or dependent on, our cognitive practices; cognition-transcendant existence of the reality is ruled out. Truth as a primitive non-epistemic concept does not have any relevance in our linguistic practice. In their perspective truth is internal to our conceptual system. Our conceptual system and therefore language represent the world of experience. Beyond that we are not entitled to talk or claim anything. This metaphysics is the consequence of the internalism regarding meaning, truth and the reality.

Both realism and antirealism concede that our knowledge or understanding of the experience is determined by or couched in the semantical or logical structure of language. The metaphysics delineating the structure of the world is 'internal' or 'imminent' to the conceptual scheme and the linguistic practices. 'Rational acceptability' thesis of internal realism does not reject the concepts of truth and reality and therefore holds that our linguistic practices and conceptual scheme are bound to support a metaphysics which is aprioristic or logical in nature, hence, internal. The world we experience is the one fashioned by the language and its logical grammar. Therefore an aprioristic or logical world-view emanating from the philosophical analysis of language, can be construed as 'immanent' or 'internal' metaphysics.