Governments, which use international organisations to pursue national foreign policy goals, also get influenced by these organisations. The issue of South Africa was a major one in all international organisations. On the issue of South Africa, almost all international organisations used moral and diplomatic persuasion, sports and cultural boycott, assistance to liberation movements and various kinds of sanctions, with varying intensity.

Different groups countries—western countries having economic and racial links with South Africa, African countries, countries like India, which has substantial diasporic presence in South Africa etc.—responded on the South African issues in different ways in different organisations. Composition and nature of these organisations shaped their response. In order to understand the roles of different groups and actors in the Commonwealth, as well as limitations and the strengths of the Commonwealth as such, we need to have a comparative perspective of these players in different organisations.

This chapter examines that given their respective strength and weakness, how other international organisations like the United Nations (UN), the European Economic Community (EEC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Church and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) played their role in comparative terms. The idea is to examine the comparative effectiveness, success and failures of the Commonwealth in comparison of other international organisations.
UNITED NATIONS

The universal declaration of human rights of 1948 affirms that the United Nations (UN) is founded on the principle of equality of all human beings. Decolonisation was one of the major concerns of the UN and it was consistent in taking steps against it. A far-reaching commitment towards self-government emerged in Article 73 of the UN Charter. Later, it expanded the objectives of Article 73 through a new Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

The UN was seen as a broader forum to deal with the problems of colonialism and racialism. It provided an organised structure in which opposition to colonialism could be energised and in which new nations, emerging from colonialism, could be mobilised for a common cause. Moreover, its resolutions carried weight and sanctity. Through the General Assembly, dominated by formerly colonised states, independence has been identified as an immediate right of all peoples and international support of the struggle for self-determination has been organised.

The General Assembly took up the issue of South Africa and the efforts to ostracise South Africa, in order to bring about desired changes, were centred in the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, which co-ordinated world-wide efforts against the discriminatory policy. The Article 56 of the UN stipulates that all members pledge
themselves to act for the achievement of purposes set in Article 55E. India brought the issue of South Africa into the UN as early as 1946.

In 1962, the General Assembly requested member states to take specific measures, separately or collectively, in conformity with the Charter to compel South Africa to abandon its policy of apartheid. The General Assembly treated South Africa as a de facto colonial situation and the people under apartheid had the right for self-determination. In this the people under apartheid are entitled to contribute to their own emancipation and their national liberation movements were therefore granted observer status as authentic representatives of their people within the UN. It rejected the policy of Bantustan, which was totally dependent on Pretoria and was intended to perpetuate racist regime, as it could not be reconciled with the right for self-determination. In 1970, it accepted the view that resistance to oppression included armed struggle and proclaimed that the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movements by all available and appropriate means including armed struggle. The terminology of the General Assembly in its condemnation of apartheid kept changing.

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3 Article 55 E includes universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

4 From 1952, the wider question of racial conflict from apartheid found a separate agenda item. In 1962, the General Assembly started considering both the people of Indian origin and race conflicts as one combined item, namely the policies of apartheid of the government of the Republic of South Africa.

5 The measures were: breaking off diplomatic relations with the government of South Africa, closing ports to all vessels flying the South Africa flag, boycotting South Africa imports and exports, including all arms and ammunitions and refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to South Africa. UN Doc. A/1761(XVII), November 6, 1962.

6 It was pointed out that life is increasingly organised to serve the interest of the occupier and society is penetrated and administrated by the latter. Shanti Sadiq Ali, "United Nation's Role In South Africa", p. 226.

The General Assembly also declared that the apartheid regime had no right to represent the people the people of South Africa and that the liberation movement recognized by the OAU was the authentic representative of the overwhelming majority of the South African people. UN Doc. A/151G (XXV), December 14, 1973.

8 In 1966, the General Assembly condemned apartheid as a “crime against humanity”. In 1970, it referred the South Africa government as the “racist minority government” of South Africa. In 1972, it was referred as “a South African regime” while in 1973, it was “Apartheid regime”. Bhavani Dikshit, “United Nations Against Apartheid”, in Uma Shankar Jha ed., South Africa: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi, 1996), p. 99.
The 1973 Commonwealth meeting reviewed the efforts of the indigenous people of the territories in Southern Africa to achieve self-determination and independence. It agreed on the need to give all humanitarian assistance. The British Government however reserved its position fearing that assistance might be converted into military purpose. The 1975 meeting accepted armed struggle and reiterated their support for humanitarian assistance. The 1975 meeting took place in Kingston, Jamaica noted the determination of the African freedom fighters, supported by Africans and other states, to achieve their objective by peaceful means if possible. They recognised the inevitability of intensified-armed struggle, if peaceful avenues were blocked by the racist and illegal regime. The moral responsibility in those circumstances would be with the minority government and those who had chosen to sustain it. In 1977, the Commonwealth condemned the creation of homelands (bantuastans). It urged that recognition should not be given to these states by the Commonwealth countries and the international community. It also condemned the violation of the territorial integrity of Angola Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia by the Smith regime.

The General Assembly mobilised world opinion against apartheid and strengthened the anti apartheid movements. The African countries and Asian countries succeeded in condemning it as a crime against humanity. They also called for sanctions but for sanctions to succeed it had to be implemented by the Security Council. However, it was only in 1974 that the General Assembly decided not to accept the credentials of the representatives of South Africa and thus barring its participation in the General Assembly. In this sense, the first lead came from the Commonwealth as it virtually expelled South Africa In 1961, forcing it to withdraw.

One of the major events in the UN action against apartheid was the convening of a special session of the General Assembly on apartheid and its destructive

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10 The General Assembly gave a proposal to the Security Council recommending the immediate expulsion of South Africa from the UN in compliance with the Article 6 of the Charter. The proposal received ten votes in favour, but was not adopted because of the negative votes of three permanent members, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The UN and Apartheid: 1948-1994 (New York, 1994), p. 47.
consequences in Southern Africa from December 12-14, 1989. The meeting called for negotiations to end apartheid and laid down steps needed to create a climate conducive to negotiations. The General Assembly spelt out nine fundamental principles for a new constitutional order.\textsuperscript{11}

**Sports and Cultural Boycotts**

Sports and cultural boycott played a crucial role in sensitising the world opinion against apartheid. The General Assembly first called for sports boycott of South Africa in 1968. Later, it adopted a special resolution on apartheid in sports (1971), calling on all sports organisation to uphold the Olympic principle of non-discrimination.\textsuperscript{12} The UN appeal to deny visa-free entry privileges to South African nationals prevented South Africa athletes from participating in unpublicised sports events.

Though the isolated South Africa tried to restore contacts through propaganda, enticing foreign sportsmen and organising rebel tours, the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid (SCAA) publicised, denounced and successfully discouraged all sports exchanges with South Africa. SCAA also endorsed the 1976 declaration of the South African Council on Sports that there can be no normal sports in an abnormal society. In December 1977, the General Assembly approved an International Declaration against apartheid in Sports\textsuperscript{13} and a draft convention in 1985, adopted by the General Assembly

\textsuperscript{11} These related to a) South Africa becoming a united non racial and democratic state, b) common and equal citizenship and nationality for all, c) universal suffrage by secret ballot, d) the right to join any political party, provided that it was not in the furtherance of racism, e) enjoyment of universally recognised human rights and civil liberties under an entrenched Bill of Rights, f) a legal system guaranteeing equality of all before the law, g) an independent and non-racial judiciary, h) a economic order to advance the well being of all South Africans, i) a democratic South Africa respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries. Ibid., p. 419.

\textsuperscript{12} UN Doc. A/2775 D (XXVI), November 29, 1971.

\textsuperscript{13} In May 1976, a UN seminar in Havana endorsed the suggestion by Michael Manley of Jamaica for an international convention against apartheid in sports. However, the General Assembly-appointed Committee to draw up the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports and a draft declaration found drafting of the convention problematic. This was due to the apprehension about a legally binding provision on a third party boycott.
and opened for signature in 1986. The UN Register of Sports Contact with South Africa, initiated by SCAA in 1980, also effectively isolated South Africa.

It was Commonwealth that gave the lead in isolating South Africa that had been trying to achieve a measure of international respectability through its sporting contacts. Through the Gleneagles Agreement of June 1977, it tried to insulate South African sports through a very effective campaign. The Commonwealth placed the sporting contact issue in a wider context by referring to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles. Although it was not eliminated, the number of sporting contacts with South Africa diminished.

The Gleneagles Agreement came into effect after the Commonwealth protest of the New Zealand All Blacks tour of South Africa in 1976. In 1982, after New Zealand Rugby Union’s invitation of the South African team to tour New Zealand in 1981, the Commonwealth Games Federation adopted firmer measure in the form of the Code of Conduct at Brisbane. It provided for the suspension of a country that breaches Gleneagles Agreement, from the Commonwealth games. Although Britain and New

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14 The convention required states to prohibit the entry into their country of athletes who participated in competition in South Africa or athletes or administrators who invited apartheid sports bodies or teams officially representing South Africa. Within one year the convention was signed by seven states and ratified by twenty-one. By 1994, seventy-six states had signed and fifty-six ratified. UN Doc. A/4064G, December 10 1985.

15 The Register had a record of sports exchanges with South Africa and a list of athletes who participated in sporting events in South Africa. The committee agreed to delete from the register the name of any athlete who undertook not to play in South Africa again. Many African and other countries prohibited those on the register from playing in their country. UN Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents, no. 18181, May 1981.

16 The Gleneagles Agreement stated that “Sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the principles embodied in their Singapore Declaration.” The member governments agreed to “Combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical steps to discourage contact or competition by, their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised.” Gleneagles Agreement, Commonwealth Statement on apartheid in Sport, London, 1977, n. 9, pp. 198-99.


18 The code spelled out clearly the steps each had to take in event of a breach of Gleneagles so gross to threaten the games themselves. National Games associations were to require affiliates to give no support or facilities to sports men and women who had contacts with country’s practicing apartheid. If association became aware of impending or actual breach of Gleneagles they were to notify the relevant sporting bodies, the Secretary of their federation and their governments. Persons who breached the agreement would not be eligible to compete in the games. David McIntyre, The Significance of the Commonwealth 1965-1990 (Hampshire, 1991), p. 229.

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In 1963, the Security Council called for a non-mandatory arms embargo and it passed a non-mandatory resolution for arms embargo in 1970, with three permanent members—the UK, the US and France—abstaining from voting. However, with the situation in South Africa deteriorating and the nationalist forces in South Africa resorting to increasing militant action, the Security Council imposed mandatory arms embargo in 1977, under chapter VII of the Charter.

In 1975, Britain agreed in the Commonwealth to impose arms embargo against South Africa. The change of British Government—Conservative to Labour—resulted in the suspension of arms sale and termination of the Simonstown Agreement. The 1977 Commonwealth Summit urged the international community to take urgent action to apply an immediate and effective arms embargo against South Africa.

In October 1977, the Security Council directed South Africa to abandon its apartheid policy and to end repression of the Black people. It also called for the abolition of the policy of Bantustan and Bantu education. In August 1984, it rejected the new South African constitution of 1983 and the validity of the election that was to be held.

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24 Some countries had prohibited only arms for repression allowing sophisticated weapons for external defence, or else they had continued to sell dual purpose equipment which could be used for both military and civilian purpose. They also failed to abrogate earlier contracts for the supply of military material or licence for the manufacture of arms. It also requested the Secretary General to establish a small group of experts to examine methods of resolving the situation in South Africa.

25 In 1977, a committee consisting of all members was constituted to examine the progress and to recommend means for effective arms embargo. In the 1980’s when the situation in South Africa started worsening, the Security Council made further extension to the embargo; but they were not mandatory. In 1984, Security Council requested all states to refrain from importing arms and ammunition of all types and military vehicle produced in South Africa. In 1985 July it urged member states to adopt prohibition of new contracts in the nuclear field and of sale of computer equipment that might be used by the South African army and police. Ibid., pp. 50-52.

26 End violence and repression against the black people and other opponents of struggle. Release all persons imprisoned under arbitrary security laws and all those detained for their oppression to apartheid. Cease forth with its indiscriminate violence against peaceful demonstrators against apartheid, murders in detention and torture of political prisoners. Abrogate the ban on organisations and the news media oppose to apartheid. Abolish the Bantu education system and all other measures of apartheid and racial discrimination. Abolish the policy of Bantustanisation, abandon the policy of apartheid and ensure majority rule based on justice and equality. UN Doc. S/417. 1977.

In 1985, the Security Council acknowledged years of request by the General Assembly. It urged all member states to take certain measures including suspension of guaranteed export loans and new investments; and prohibition of the sale of Krugerrands, coins minted in South Africa, and sale of computer equipment that might be used by the South African army and police. However, these were not mandatory and the UK and the US abstained from the decision. This also fell short of the measures that Commonwealth undertook. On 19 February 1987, the UK and the US vetoed a resolution which sought to impose selective mandatory sanctions.

General Assembly, where the third world countries dominated, mobilised the world opinion and strengthened the anti-apartheid movements. But for the UN provision, that the Security Council had to adopt these resolutions to become operational, was a boon to South Africa. The Security Council members, who had large economic interest in South Africa, were reluctant to apply sanctions. The non-mandatory sanctions could not restrain the UK or the US who scuttled all plans for mandatory sanctions with their veto power.

In this sense, the Commonwealth was ahead of the UN in many ways. It was the first organisation to pressurise South Africa out of it. It applied arms embargo before UN, its sports boycott and sanctions were more effective as it could restrain Britain, which unlike the US, which was not restrained by a Senate.

**EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY**

It was mainly the European Political Co-operation (EPC) that dealt with issue of South Africa within the European Economic Community (EEC). Until the early 1970s, Southern Africa was the area where the European Community “tacitly agreed to follow national priorities rather than develop common European strategy”. With the first enlargement of the European Community in 1973 and the setting up of the Lome convention to embrace British post-colonial and Commonwealth

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responsibilities, there emerged a recognition that bilateral approaches to Southern Africa were no longer sufficient.

The European Community tried to continue with the economic ties while condemning apartheid. European Community policy had an economic and political objective. First, economic independence for the less developed Southern African countries from South Africa and secondly, the removal of apartheid. The economic ties between the European Community and South Africa were extensive. Between 1960-1980, there was ten-fold increase of European Community-South Africa trade. The European Community investment were justified by the excuse of the strategic importance of South Africa, the west's mineral dependency and the protection of employment both in the European Community and in the republic.

The strength of the EEC was that it was an economic organisation, of some European powers, which had huge investments with South Africa. If it took strong measures it would have seriously affected South African economy. The EEC, however, was not an organisation that was bound by any principles of racial equality that it should take measures against a minority regime that was profitable for them. Both the EEC and the Commonwealth had Britain, a leading member in both, and the difference was in the way Britain was dealt with.

The European Community policy was born out of the Soweto incident and was reactive in origin. The European Economic Community's first statement was on 28

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31 1960, the community imports from South Africa amounted to 549 million ECU and community exports to South Africa just 73 million ECU. By 1980, these figures were 6, 570million ECU and 5, 045 million ECU respectively. Holland, n. 30, p. 402.
September 1976, long after Commonwealth and UN had started taking measures. In 1978, the EEC issued a declaration on South Africa.

Between 1979 and 1982, twenty-four resolutions against apartheid were tabled in the EEC. Its policy on South Africa was that it, condemned apartheid, opposed the Group Areas Act and Bantustan policy and refused to recognise the so-called independent states within South Africa. They supported the arms embargo imposed on South Africa by the UN, supported the code of conduct for the EEC firms operating in South Africa, condemned incursions into Angola and the violation of that states' sovereignty, and supported the UN proposal for Namibia and the UN resolution 435.

Although there was a consensus on the need to abolish apartheid, there was no consensus on the means to achieve it. While the anti-apartheid countries like Denmark, Ireland and Netherlands favoured strict measures; countries like the UK, Portugal and West Germany wanted their investments to be protected. Faced with the difficult problem of deciding what action to take, the EEC decided not to discuss it.

In June 1977, the Africa Working Group issued a report and on 12 July 1977, the Code of Conduct was adopted as a measure. It was the first time that the EEC had taken joint action beyond its immediate environment of Europe and Mediterranean. The Code of Conduct for the EEC firms operating in South Africa established guidelines for employment practices designed to counter discrimination within the apartheid labour system. The Code's provisions were uniformly applicable to all EEC firms. From 1977 to 1984, the code covered six specific employment practices:

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32 This came when the Dutch President of the European Community Council of Ministers said at the UN, "False solutions to the problem of apartheid such as establishment of homelands and Bantustans as presently followed by the South African government promote rather than diminish racial discrimination... Apartheid has no future and constitutes an unsupportable violation of human dignity". *The European Community in Southern Africa, European Information DE 32* (Brussels, 1981), p. 3.

33 Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, reaffirmed while addressing the European Parliament on behalf of the Council of ministers, "the member states of the Community will not cease to urge South Africa to bring about a peaceful and rapid change in the system of apartheid." Holland, n. 30, p. 409.

34 Ibid., p. 409.


36 Ibid., p. 135.

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forum for black representation, migrant labour, rates of pay, wage structures and promotion, fringe benefits and desegregation in the work places. EEC firms were encouraged to recognise and negotiate through the emerging black trade unions. Minimum wage levels—at least 50% above the "minimum level needed to satisfy the needs of an employee and his family"—were advocated. The Principle of equality for equal work, job advancement, fringe benefits to black employees were promoted. 37

The domestic turmoil in South Africa in 1985 and the mounting international and anti-apartheid pressure led the EEC into the political necessity to act. In March and April 1985, the EPC issued statements condemning the internal excess of the South African military forces. In May 1985, Denmark took bilateral action outside EPC and prohibited all new Danish investments in South Africa. The French government suspended diplomatic ties and prohibited new investments in South Africa.

A tussle was on between those who wanted strict actions and those who did not. At a meeting on 10 September 1985, the EEC reinstated its political foreign policy objectives calling forth,

The lifting of the state of emergency, the immediate and unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, an end to detention without trial and forced relocation; a firm commitment by the South African government to end apartheid and to dismantle discriminatory legislation, particularly the pass laws and Group Areas Act and lastly real negotiations with the true representatives of the South African people, including those currently in prison. 38

To ensure this, the EEC decided on two—positive and restrictive—collective measures. 39 The positive measures were also known as the European Community’s

38 Holland, n. 29, p. 40.
39 The restrictive measures were rigorously controlled embargo on the exports and imports of arms and paramilitary equipment to and from the republic of South Africa, refusal to co-operate in military sphere, recall of military attaches, discouraging of scientific and cultural agreements, cessation of oil exports and sensitive equipment destined for police and armed forces, prohibition of all new collaboration in the nuclear sector. The positive measures included the creation of an assistance programme for non-violent anti-apartheid organisations, particularly the churches. Educational assistance for the non-white community, increasing contacts with all sectors of the disenfranchised population, and a programme to increase awareness among the citizens of member states residents in South Africa besides promising assistance to SADCC states. See “The division of Foreign Policy Authority Between the European Community and the Member States: A Survey of Economic Sanctions Against South Africa”. Boston College of Third World Law Journal (New York), vol. 12, no. 1, 1992, p. 112.
Special Programme for the victims of apartheid. The EEC funds were dispersed through four indigenous channels—the South Africa Council of Churches, the South African Catholic Bishops’ Conference, trade unions and the Kasigo Trust. It also gave humanitarian aid, legal assistance and support for the dependants of people detained by South African police. The code of conduct also underwent a change. 40

There was pressure from France and Scandinavian Countries for more radical measures. The moderate package was set up with the West German initiative. Britain did not agree even with this. British government stated that it would not commit itself fully at that stage and that it had reservations. It was only two weeks later that UK lifted its reservation.41 It was the British and West German attitude that prevented stronger measures. Moreover, Mrs Thatcher did not want stronger measures as it meant she would be more pressurised in the Commonwealth. Even then in the Commonwealth under pressure she had to agree to more sanctions than the EEC.

In the Commonwealth in the 1985 October meeting under pressure Britain had to agree to economic sanctions other than the military and diplomatic boycotts. Britain agreed to ban all new government loans to South Africa, import of Kruggerrands, government funding for trade missions to South Africa and Cultural and scientific events. This was more than that agreed by the EEC in September 1985.

The worsening domestic situation in South Africa in tandem with the Commonwealth sanctions package produced more unrest in the EEC. This made European Community make a commitment on June 1986 that over the next three months consultations with other industrialised countries for further measures will be undertaken. In the interim, Sir Geoffery Howe of Britain in his capacity as the President of the Council was to visit South Africa to initiate a dialogue. While Britain again postponed the EEC measures, in the Commonwealth 1986 Summit, Britain agreed to a voluntary ban on all-new investment and promotion of tourism.

40 Holland, n. 38, pp. 40-41.
41 The British government stated, the UK is able to support the general statement and the positive measures but wishes to give further consideration to the other measures proposed and believe it premature to come to a decision today on these matter. Nuttal, n. 35, p. 232.
On 15 September 1986, the community adopted economic sanctions effective as from 27 September. They were a partial ban on steel and iron imports from South Africa, new direct investments and import of Krugerrands. The European Council President was also to seek consensus on the ban of coal. However, this consensus never emerged. For the European Community, the adoption of sanctions served an end in themselves. After 1986; maintaining the status quo rather than extending sanctions was the principal task. In every meeting, the issue was raised; but nothing of substance was adopted. Moreover with the first sign from De Klerk EEC was ready to relax the sanctions. In 1990 the governments relaxed their voluntary ban on new investments and in 1991 lifted the ban on imports of gold coins, iron and steel from South Africa. This was criticised by Mandela and the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth was able to restrict Britain on racial equality, which EEC was not able to do. In the EEC while Britain was able to resist the pressure of other countries for economic measures in 1985 in the Commonwealth it had to give in to some economic measures. In the EEC while even the military and diplomatic measures were taken with reluctance in 1985 in the Commonwealth it went along to an extent. Moreover while the EEC had to go according to the British lead in the measures to be taken, the Commonwealth, was able to pressurise Britain. Later in 1986 even though Britain broke away from taking all the measures, the Commonwealth restrained Britain from forthrightly supporting South Africa.

ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) emerged in 1963 as the pan-African efforts to liberate the entire continent from the clutches of imperialism and the yoke of colonialism, to unite the emerging independent states and to create an atmosphere of brotherliness throughout the continent. The resolution adopted at the Addis Ababa Summit (May 1963) declared themselves to be "unanimously convinced of the imperious and urgent necessity of co-ordinating and intensifying the efforts of all the

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independent African states to put an end to the South African government’s criminal policy of apartheid and wipe out racial discriminations in all its forms.”

South Africa posed the major challenge to the OAU. In Zimbabwe the British could be called upon to reassert control while in Namibia, the UN had the legal responsibility. In the case of South Africa they were faced with an adversary who did not care for their resolutions and isolation strategies. Further, most of the African countries were dependent on South Africa. OAU also had to take into account the practical necessity of South Africa’s neighbours. Though the western countries did not have sympathies for the system of apartheid, they did not want a hostile left oriented power coming to power in South Africa nor a disruption in the society, as this would affect their economic interest.

The OAU has attempted to support the liberation through a variety of activities employing a variety of organisational structures. The principal activities the OAU has undertaken against the South Africa regime have been international denunciation and ostracism. More important has been the ability of OAU to define liberation as excluding the pseudo-independence of Transkei and other homelands. It is an achievement to the OAU that no other country in the world has recognised a homeland government. The rejection of homelands is anchored in the OAU’s firm defence of territorial integrity. This principle is specifically extended to South Africa by Lusaka declaration.

In the realm of international denunciation, the rhetoric and stream of formal resolutions served to intensify African commitment to liberation at least to the extent that leaders found it difficult to side-step the issue. This also kept the rest of the world from quietly allowing the liberation struggle to drop off the international agenda. OAU has also set norms of proper behaviour concerning liberation issues both for African states and for

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44 Apartheid and Racial Discrimination, Resolution adopted at the Addis Ababa Summit of May 1963.

the other countries. This has been primarily symbolic activity such as diminution of respect for those that deals too openly with the offending regime.

The OAU gave recognition to the liberation movements that have chosen active struggle as their method for liberation. This gave legitimacy to these movements in the eye of their followers and the international community. It also meant material assistance from OAU. It was not the most active militant movements that got recognition from OAU. It also depended on their efficiency, whether they have their head quarters in their own national territory, the location of their foreign headquarters, the influence of their patron states in the council, and their contact with external powers. The OAU established mediation bodies to resolve the disputes between rival factions of liberation movements and to persuade them to present a common front against the enemy. Assistance was co-ordinated by the OAU to the liberation movements. OAU set up the co-ordination committee of nine known as the Liberation committee. It was also to eliminate division and discord and to co-ordinate the actions of the liberation movements. However, the liberation movements could obtain aid from other sources also without having to go through the OAU.

The OAU has also fought the liberation battle in international diplomatic area. They have tried to persuade other nations to co-operate in economic, diplomatic and military sanctions against the racist regime. It urged the UN to grant liberation leaders a hearing and to extend recognition to these groups. It has championed the liberation cause in other international forums winning support and assistance from abroad. It put a sustained diplomatic offensive at the United Nations with two main objectives, a) to convince the members of the United Nations that the situation in South Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security, and that the Security Council should therefore resort to actions provided for in Chapter VII of the UN ranging from economic blockade to

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47 The Committee composed of Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, Congo, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, The UAR, and Uganda – to harmonise the assistance from African states and from abroad. In 1965, Somalia and Zambia were added to the Committee. Its headquarters was in Dar-Es-Salaam. In 1967-1968 & 1968-69, South Africa was given $120,000 and $86,400 respectively. Ibid., p. 254.
military intervention by the UN forces. b) To push South Africa into isolation from the international Community and to work for its expulsion from the UN.48

The OAU in 1965 was able to get the General Assembly to declare that colonialism and apartheid were both a threat to peace and a crime against humanity. The General Assembly invited all member states in co-operation with OAU to provide material and moral aid to liberation movements. They also requested the UN’s specialised agencies to increase their assistance to African refugees. OAU by performing the role of channelling money form abroad to the liberation movements wanted to help them to avoid any involvement on big power competition and their ideological differences and to increase their volume of aid. It developed a unified policy that enabled African government periodically to review their strategy for coping with colonial and racial problems in Southern Africa and to co-ordinate their activities more effectively. The 1963 Addis Ababa summit the OAU condemned racial discriminations, created a fund for concerted financial assistance and to co-ordinate concrete measures for sanctions. OAU appealed to all governments who still had diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa to break off relations and cease any other form of encouragement for the policy of apartheid.49

The problem of apartheid and racial discrimination from then has been a regular item on the agenda in the OAU. The African states with the help of the Non-aligned countries increased diplomatic pressures on the Western powers. OAU also helped in raising the morale of the liberation movements. The white minority government however continued and in 1964 OAU had to accept that their anti-apartheid offensive was virtually powerless.50 OAU tried to bring about change through various policies and acts.

49 It called for breaking of diplomatic relations or refraining from establishing such relations, closing their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag, boycotting all South African goods and refraining from exporting goods including arms and ammunitions, refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircrafts belonging to governments and companies registered under the laws of the Republic of South Africa. A. Ajala, Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects (London, 1973), p. 220.
50 In the 1964 Cairo summit, Diallo Telli, the OAU administrative Secretary General declared that the offensive did not have the slightest effect on the regimes in Southern Africa. He concluded that the South African government has progressively eliminated all avenues for peaceful and legal means to alleviate the intolerable conditions. A. Ajala, "Conflict and Co-operation in Southern Africa" in Timothy Shaw and Sola Ojo ed., Africa and the International Political System (Washington, 1981), p. 226.
OAU condemned those states particularly the United Kingdom, United States, France, Federal Republic of Germany and Japan for economic, political and military collaboration with South African regime. It also condemned the selling of arms to South Africa and warned the main trading collaborators particularly the three permanent members that the refusal to apply economic sanctions in accordance with chapter VII of United Nations Charter would only increase the threat of violent conflict in South Africa.\(^5^1\)

However the weakness of the OAU was that the consensus over the South African liberation movement was not united.\(^5^2\) Also the inability of the African countries to provide the amount promised to the liberation movements. Moreover many countries depended on the Western countries for assistance. This realisation resulted in a change of policy and to the Lusaka Manifesto.\(^5^3\) The OAU tried a policy of cooperation in the mechanism of power. With this the OAU committed itself to encouraging liberation groups to co-operate in the mechanics of peaceful transfer of power. This also led to talk of dialogue with South Africa. However, the majority of

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\(^5^1\) The resolution also regretted the fact that the Security Council of United Nation has failed to bring about an end to apartheid in South Africa because of the resistance of the main trading partners of South Africa including the three permanent members of the Security Council. Ajala, n. 49, pp. 233-34.

\(^5^2\) The consensus in OAU over got a severe jolt with Malawi violating OAU resolution on Colonialism and apartheid. Malawi established diplomatic relations with South Africa and had warm and cordial relation with Portugal and Rhodesia. OAU's image was further tarnished when Ethiopia under pressure led in the non-compliance with the unanimous decision made at an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers at Addis Ababa on 3-5 December 1965 after the declaration of the UDI. Here it was declared that if the United Kingdom does not crush the rebellion and restore law and order and thereby prepare the way for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia by 15 December 1965, the member states of the OAU shall sever diplomatic relations on that date with The United Kingdom. However when the time came, only nine countries honored their commitment.

\(^5^3\) This was formulated at the summit conference of thirteen East and Central African states. The Manifesto promised support to armed struggle but preferred to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. ... If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. The Manifesto accepted that many non-African states would not provide active assistance to South Africa's opponents of apartheid but asked them to ceases providing the comfort and support of human and commercial intercourse. Moreover, that South Africa should be excluded from United Nations...it should be ostracised by the world community. Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity Africa and the OAU (London, 1970), pp. 115-116.
OAU was against dialogue\textsuperscript{54} and adopted a Declaration on the Question of Dialogue.\textsuperscript{55} Mogadishu Declaration of October 1971 endorsed the OAU position and said that there remains no means of liberating Southern Africa other than armed struggle.\textsuperscript{56}

The OAU came to realise that the Western powers would not so easily let go of their economic stake in South Africa. This led to a more radical stand in the Rabat summit of 1972.\textsuperscript{57} More significant was the decision to change strategy and to accord priority to Portuguese colonies. The idea was to give priority to Portuguese colonies so that once these countries are independent attention could be shifted to Rhodesia, Namibia and ultimately South Africa.\textsuperscript{58} The change in strategy paid off and with the

\textsuperscript{54} The reasons given in support of dialogue were 1) the armed struggle has failed, 2) the African states do not have the military and economic resources to challenge South Africa decisively, 3) Meanwhile South Africa feeling itself threatened may be incited into taking the offensive, 4) The policy of political and cultural isolation will not eliminate apartheid instead isolation only seems to consolidate national unity and increase national resolve to maintain and defend the regime, 5) The trade embargo’s cannot succeed, 6) There are moderate forces within South Africa, black and white with whom contact should be made, 7) African states holding a dialogue with South African government will encourage moderate white opinion and influential business groups to seek an accord with the black majority for the purpose of changing apartheid policies. While the opponents felt that Pretoria’s motive in appearing to be willing were as 1) she wishes to neutralize the liberation movements 2) she is trying to break out of the increasing isolation from which she is beginning to suffer, 3) She seeks to gain respectability in the eyes of the world, 4) Her government must continue to reassure the white supporters in the country that it can guarantee them protection, 5) Her government must continue to reassure foreign investors that their assets are safe and ill remain safe, 6) She is seeking to diffuse the hostility against her so that she can build a market in Africa to meet the needs of an economy which is beginning to feel the strain of crampness. Mohamed A. El- Khawas, “Southern Africa: A Challenge to the OAU”, Africa Today (Denver), vol. 24, no. 2, 1977, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{55} The eighth summit conference of the OAU in 1971 adopted a Declaration This condemned the initiation of dialogue and engagement in any dialogue as an act that would undermine the OAU charter. The dialogue group however rejected this and Ivory Coast sent a delegation to South Africa, while President Banda of Malawi paid an official state visit to South Africa in August 1971. Lesotho convened a meeting of the dialogue group. Amare Tekle, “A Tale Of Three Cities: The OAU and The Dialectics of Decolonization in Africa”, Africa Today (Denver), vol. 35, nos.3&4, 1988, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{56} Widner, n. 45, p. 253.

\textsuperscript{57} The special liberation fund was to be increased by fifty percent. The representatives of the liberation movements were to be granted the right to speak at the meetings of the Council of Ministers on all matters concerning the liberation struggle, as well as the right to attend the closed session of the assembly. For the first time, the member states were called upon to give all necessary assistance to those states that might be attacked by the white minority regimes because of their involvement of the liberation struggle. The summit also set up a special committee to examine the ways and means to tackle the problem of Southern Africa. The committee’s recommendations were adopted as the Accra Declaration in January 1973 by the liberation Committee.Ajala, n. 43, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 13.
Portuguese coup of April 1974, the colonies were granted independence.\textsuperscript{59} With the independence of the Portuguese colonies and later of Zimbabwe attention shifted to South Africa and OAU tried to increase pressure. The front-line states were given a free hand to decide on the strategies to be used. It called on the international community for sanctions against the racist Pretoria regime.

The OAU being an African organisation had the freedom to apply the sanctions needed. But as they did not have the powers that had the economic interest in South Africa made it arduous. Moreover the African countries themselves were dependent on these western countries and South Africa. The OAU however succeeded in keeping the issue alive by voicing their concern in all organisations. But the lack of consensus among themselves put them in a predicament. In the Commonwealth they were in an advantageous position as they could influence Britain without Britain hiding behind its veto power and at the same time take the help of old Commonwealth countries to apply pressure.

**CHURCH AND SOUTH AFRICA**

Religion plays a distinct role in the society. The church, the mosque, the temple or the synagogue remains an important socio-religious institution. However, the church in the earlier days was not interested in the equality of races. With the independence of the colonies and the increase of the African members the church developed a new attitude. In the early day’s in South Africa there were a few notable exceptions like Archbishop Geoffrey Clayton, Bishop Ambrose Reeves, Rev. Michael Scott, Father Trevor Huddleston and Dean Gonville ffrench-Beytagh among the Anglicans, the Roman Catholic Archbishop Dennis Hurley, the Methodists such as C K Storey and Reverend Douglas Thompson. However, church as a whole, was still slow to respond to racial equality. In 1954, Fr. Huddleston, in an article entitled, “The Church Sleeps on”, castigated the church’s indifference.\textsuperscript{60}


\textsuperscript{60} “In God’s name, cannot the church bestir itself all over the world and act? Cannot Christians everywhere show their distress in practical ways by so isolating South Africa from contact with all civilized communities that she realizes her position and feel some pain in it?” Shirley Du Boulay, *Tutu: Voice of the Voiceless* (London, 1988), p. 122.
South Africa is predominantly a Christian country and the South Africa regime saw itself as based on the Christian principles. An overwhelming majority that is seventy-five per cent of the population is adherents of various Christian traditions and denominations. There are five leading churches in South Africa. They are the Dutch Reform Churches (DRC), which are only for Whites, the daughter churches of the reform traditions for the non-Whites, the Roman Catholic Church, the English speaking churches — Anglicans, Baptists, Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Congregationalists — and the black independent churches in the Ethiopian tradition.

The English speaking Churches form the nucleus of the South Africa Council of Churches (SACC) which was prominent in the struggle against apartheid. The SACC is a member of World Council of Churches (WCC).

Except for the hard-liners of the DRS, all other church denominations was directly or indirectly involved in the anti-apartheid movements. They launched non-violent struggle against apartheid and participated in the protests, boycotts, strikes and funerals of the victims of apartheid. Within the broader front of anti-apartheid movement, the churches were the only component, which was not totally banned. They contributed to create consciousness against apartheid on theological, social, economic, and political grounds. The churches emerged as a potent force to support those organisations that truly represent the people. The world-wide church organisations have openly taken bold initiatives against apartheid. There was interaction between the South Africa churches and the world Church organisations.

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62 There are three DRC churches. They are Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), Nederduitse Hervormed Kerk (NHK) and Geformeerde Kerk (GK). The Black Reformed Churches was were divided on the basis of ethnicity. they were the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika (NGKA) for blacks, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerk for coloureds and the Deutsche Reformed Mission Kerk (RCA) for Indians. *South Africa Year Book* (Pretoria, 1995), pp. 370-372.

63 Archbishop Desmond Tutu pointed out “In our country where many of the legitimate political organizations have been rendered impotent, the role of churches as the voice of the voiceless becomes much more obvious and urgent”. Abay Shrivastava, “Role of the Church”, *World Focus* (New Delhi), vol. 11, no. 6, 1990, p. 21.
South African Council of Churches

In South Africa the South African Council of Churches (SACC) was the principal large organisations where the blacks and whites could get together. It was almost the only forum through which the Blacks could air their views. SACC accepted that churches in the past have failed the people by accepting the colonial system and have allowed people to become homeless without protest. Having acknowledged this SACC made a commitment to resist forced removals in South Africa and to support those who resist them.64 SACC provided many services in South Africa.65

The SACC in 1974 supported Conscientious Objection as a valid Christian option. It refused to accept that the Christian has an automatic duty to engage in war at the demand of the state. It pointed out that primary violence was institutionalised apartheid and that South African military were being prepared to defend this unjust system. It deplored the use of violence and requested that a task force should study methods of non-violent action for change and called on the member churches that had chaplains in the armed forces to reconsider the basis on which they were appointed.66 The most crucial was the clause 2 of the preamble.67 In 1978 SACC laid down a minimum criterion for investment but did not call for a withdrawal.68

64 Till 1968 the SACC was known as the Christian Council of Churches. Before 1968, it had a membership of twenty-one churches and missionary. In 1968, the Christian Institute joined and in 1971, the South African Independent churches Association joined. In 1975, the daughter churches of DRC also joined the SACC. A. K. Shrivastava, Churches and Apartheid (Delhi, 1991), p. 176.

65 SACC comprised theological education, which give better training for black ministers, African Bursary fund to arrange scholarships for promising children in rural areas and ecumenical news service. It comprised of an ombudsman's office to help educate the poor in wise purchasing, inter-church aid to provide home industry work for waves of migrant labourers, the Asingeni relief fund to provide medical aid and legal defence for persons deemed to be wrongfully arrested. A dependants conference to perform the important and sensitive task of aiding ex-political prisoners to involve themselves in self help projects and of helping families of the imprisoned with small grant for their support. Ibid., pp. 173-174.

66 Shirley, n. 60, p. 129.

67 This said “the conference calls on its member churches to consider whether Christ's call to take up the cross and follow him in identifying with the oppressed does not in our situation involve becoming conscientious objectors”. Shrivastava, n. 64., p. 172

68 These included asking all businesspersons operating in South Africa to negotiate with the black trade union to extend the right of family life to all workers. It called for non-segregation of all eating, comfort and work facilities, equal pay and fair employment practises, programmes to train blacks for supervisory and technical position, recognition of trade unions, a voluntary two percent tax on gross profit to go in for education of blacks and refusal to invest in the manufacture of ornaments. Ibid., p. 173.
The increasing involvement of the church in politics was beginning to trouble white Christians as they came under growing pressure to take sides in the escalating racial confrontation. By the 1980s, Bishop Tutu emerged as one of the black South Africa who was both free and had a commanding position to speak against the government. Another was Dr. Allan Boesak. In 1982 he became the president of WARC; also a patron of UDF. His own church is the NGK. In 1983, Bishop Tutu urged the member bodies of the SACC to reject the new constitution. In 1984, he was awarded the noble peace prize. He saw it as a tremendous political statement and knew that award was a tremendous boost to the morale of blacks. He called for a withdrawal of investment. By 1985, he was defying government emergency regulation that would limit attendance at township funerals. The Bishop accused Botha of wanting to bludgeon blacks into submission with military force. In United States, he attacked the US policy of constructive engagement, which he described as unmitigated disaster for black people.

In October 1985, Debates raged as to whether or not Christians should take part in a National day of prayer and reconciliation organised by the National Initiative of Reconciliation which was demanding an end to the state of emergency. It was for the first time that whites were asked to participate in a work boycott. While all the multiracial churches supported the initiative, 150 more militant churchmen of whom 120 were blacks signed the Kairos document, which criticised the neutral stance of the main churches towards the national crisis. The document demanded all out Christian support for rebellion, civil disobedience and boycotts. They asked for understanding of violent acts Black youths and said, “the church should reject false unchristian reconciliation between the oppressors and the oppressed”.

By the end of 1985, Tutu became the Archbishop of Capetown, much against the wishes of South Africa Whites. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Runcie went to Capetown to

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69 He saw it as the recognition of the patient suffering of his people, a tribute to the significance of the church's contribution to their struggle, an affirmation of the justness of their case, a kind of sacrament, a wonderful symbol. Shirley, n. 60, p. 201.


71 The document said, “there we sit in the same church, while outside Christian policemen and soldiers are beating up and killing Christian children or torturing Christian prisoners while yet other Christians stand by and weakly plead for peace.” Ibid., pp. 97-98.
preach at Tutu’s enthronement and addressed an open-air service in Capetown and illustrated the support of the Anglican Church in the fight against apartheid. In October 1989, shortly after becoming President, De Klerk held talks with the three leading black churchmen—Tutu, Boesak, and Frank Chikane in a clear recognition of the roles the church had come to play in the process of attacking and dismantling apartheid.

**World Council of Churches**

Africa, having the largest Protestant percentage of any third world continent is important to the World council of Churches (WCC). African region has highest membership in the WCC with sixty-one churches as its members. The next highest is Asia with fifty-eight. On the importance of WCC to Africa bishop Manas Buthelezi of South Africa said.72

In the early days, the church was slow to join the struggle. The Sharpeville massacre of 1960 brought urgency and the WCC sent a fact-finding mission. This resulted in the Cottesloe Constitution held on December 7-14, 1960. It was attended by representatives of WCC and South African member churches including the white DRC synods of Transvaal, Cape Town and concluded in the deliberations “Apartheid could not be reconciled with the teachings of the scripture”.73 This resulted in the DRC leaving the WCC and criticising it as a communist organisation. However, it was in 1968 at Uppsala that it took a serious turn.74 By 1968 race had become a burning issue throughout the world. In the United States, the Civil Rights movement had heightened the consciousness of white and black alike. The independence of

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72 WCC assembly gives the churches in Africa a chance to meet other churches in the world. A political forum for the voiceless, It responds it specific ways to African issues, It provides a means to problems to which Africans may not have the solution, Makes the African problem an international issue.

73 In this consultation, WCC passed a resolution, which said, No one who believes in Jesus Christ should be excluded from any church on the ground of his colour or race... There is on scriptural ground for the prohibition of mixed marriage. We call attention, therefore, again to the disintegrating effects of migrant labour on African life... Any form of segregation based on race, colour, ethnic and origin is contrary to the gospel and is incompatible with the Christian doctrine of men and with the nature of the church of Christ. Charles Villa-Vicencio, “Twenty-five Years after Sharpville”, *Africa Report* (New York), May-June 1985, p. 63.

74 The fourth General Assembly min 1968 held at Uppsala condemned racism and said, “The Secretariat of race relations of the WCC needs to be strengthened to help the churches embark on a vigorous campaign against racism”. Adrian Hastings, “Christianity and Revolution”, *African Affairs* (Oxford), July 1975, p. 348.
African countries increased the membership of the church in the WCC and this in turn increased the race consciousness of the churches. The issue was made more poignant by the absence of a principal speaker at Uppsala, Dr Martin Luther King JR., who had been shot dead.

In 1969, WCC moved towards a more direct involvement with racism and the Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) was established. In 1970, a grant of $120,000 was made to liberation movements in Southern Africa. In 1971 a further $200,000 was distributed to twenty-four organisations. In this, the nine groups active in Southern Africa received a total of $130,000. In 1973 $200,000 was made to twenty-five groups of which $101,000 was directed to Southern Africa. 75

The grants were made for non-violent purposes: medical and educational. WCC has emphasised that its intention was not to support violent revolution as such; nevertheless by its action clearly recognised that in Southern Africa the option of violent action embraced by most of the movement in question, was a morally open one and that those who took it then needed the support of humanitarian assistance and should receive such assistance from the churches. Later in the 1980's, it started the disinvestment movement. The world wide church organisations have drawn the public opinion towards the evil of apartheid in South Africa and have created a public opinion about the struggle against apartheid. They have criticised and disproved the religious explanation of apartheid as totally unchristian and fundamentally against the principle of the Bible. The churches have given moral support to the liberation movements, provided humanitarian assistance for non-violent struggle. The churches also organised disinvestment movement to pressurise the South African government.

The strength of the Church was that it was a moral voice against apartheid. The apartheid practitioners had tried to justify that the policy had the sanction of Gospel. The struggle against the policy by the Church destroyed this. Further the church was able to create

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75 The movements in Southern Africa to whom grants were allotted were Patriotic Front in Rhodesia, FRELIMO in Mozambique, SWAPO in Namibia, the ANC & PAC in South Africa. Darril Hudson. "The World Council of Churches and Racism". *The Yearbook of World Affairs* (New York. 1975), pp. 161-162.
conflict in the minds of whites and put pressure on them to take sides on the racial conflict. In this the Church succeeded.

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

Though it was not an organisation like UN, OAU, EEC or WCC, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was an organised force with a structure and it played a very important role on issue of third world importance. Therefore, a discussion on roles and effectiveness of NAM on the issue of apartheid is important to understand the role of common players—Commonwealth and NAM. It helps us to understand how countries or group of countries like India, African countries etc. played their role in Commonwealth as compared to their roles in NAM on the issue of apartheid.

NAM was concerned about racial discrimination and apartheid from its early days. The draft agenda of the preparatory meeting for the first summit conference proposed respect for the rights of people and nations to self-determination, struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. In the early days, NAM had a tussle between the militants and the moderates on whether to give priority to colonialism or peaceful co-existence. Although the moderates had advantage in the first summit, militants gained in the second summit and NAM was to be a vehicle in the fight against racism in the forum of United Nations. In the Bandung Conference (1955), colonialism was proclaimed as an evil to be abolished and offered support for the fight for freedom and independence of the colonies. The colonial question was also indirectly raised in the declaration of Peace and Co-operation.76

NAM was the first international organisation to call for material assistance—financial and military—to the liberation movements. The first meeting in Belgrade took place in the background of the explosion of a nuclear device by the USSR. This brought the issue of peace to the forefront. In the Belgrade summit, only three colonial issues—Algeria, Angola and Bizerta—were mentioned. Despite African protest, all other colonial topics were lumped together in a call for the immediate termination of

colonialism. The first part of this Belgrade document establishes that imperialism is weakening and that colonial empires, other forms of foreign oppression of the people in Asia, Africa and Latin America are gradually disappearing from the stage of history. This was a sign of optimism after the success achieved in all three continents.

In the second meeting (Cairo) colonialism became prominent, although another question vied for attention. NAM called for sanctions as early as 1964. The Conference called to break off diplomatic, consular and other relations with South Africa. It called upon all states to boycott South African goods and to refrain from exporting goods especially arms, ammunitions, minerals and oil to South Africa. It also requested the governments to deny airport and over-flying facilities to aircraft and port facilities to ships proceeding to and from South Africa. The conference demanded the release of persons imprisoned interned or subjected to other restrictions because of their opposition to the policy of apartheid. Its denunciation of colonialism was coupled with the assertion that colonial people might legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of their rights to self-determination and independence, if colonial powers persist in opposing their natural aspirations. It also permitted ANC to address the preparatory meeting to the third conference held in Dar-es-Salaam.

The Third Conference in (Lusaka, 1970) condemned for the first time countries by their name for their political, economic and military collaboration with South Africa. The countries condemned were UK, US, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Italy. It stated, that “the forces of racism, apartheid, colonialism and imperialism continued to bedevil world peace.” NAM reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and condemned the practice of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment of the so-called prisoners and detainees. It called

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78 The conference regrets to note that Pretoria government’s obstinacy in defying the conscience of mankind has been strengthened by the refusal of its friends and allies, particularly some major powers to implement UN resolutions concerning sanctions against South Africa. “The Second Conference of Head of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries”. Cairo, 1964, Two Decades Of Non-Alignment, Documents of the Gatherings of the Non-Aligned Countries 1961-1982 (New Delhi, 1983), p. 15.
for substantial contribution to the special fund of OAU and increase support and material aid to liberation movements. It also denounced South Africa’s foreign policy and urged UK to reconsider the decision to resume arms sale.

The fourth summit (Algiers, 1973) took place in the background of the Bantustan policy. It censured the policy of Bantustan. It denounced the permanent economic, military and financial aid extended to some NATO powers, particularly the US, France, Germany and UK. It called on all states, especially the western powers and Japan to discontinue all scientific co-operations with South Africa and to refrain from granting patents and licences to South Africa. A significant assertion of this summit was an assertion to the effect that arms struggle was the only way to end racial discrimination. 80 Out of its thirteen final resolutions, eleven were on colonial, racial and other issues. The democratisation of international relations replaced the struggle for coexistence as the prime concern of NAM. The summit also decided to create a fund to support and strengthen the effectiveness of struggle of national liberation movements. It called for freezing all relations with Portugal and Rhodesia. It gave ANC and PAC observer’s status. It also declared for a move towards sanctions under the UN.

The Fifth conference (Colombo, 1976) declared South Africa racist, unrepresentative regime. It raised the Soweto massacre and condemned apartheid government for its acts of aggression against the neighbouring states. They commended Cuba and other states for assisting the attacked states. It again condemned the Western states and the activities of transnational corporations that assisted and collaborated with the racist regime of South Africa and profited from racism. The Colombo declaration called on the UN Security Council to impose mandatory arms embargo and urged countries concerned to take steps to prevent the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa. A resolution was passed on apartheid in sports, which included

80 "Having exhausted all peaceful means and faced with the tenacity of the colonial powers and the collaboration of their protectors including members of NATO (US, UK, France and Germany) the oppressed nation have no recourse other than armed struggle as a way of eliciting respect." Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Algiers, 1973, Ibid., p. 109.
endorsement of the proposal, by the Prime Minister of Jamaica for and international
convention against apartheid in sports.\textsuperscript{81}

At the Sixth Conference (Havana, 1979), the main emphasis was on trying to prevent
nuclear collaboration between western powers and South Africa maintaining the non-
recognition of bantustans, and ensuring compliance with Security Council’s
mandatory arms embargo. Following the Iranian government’s oils to South Africa,
there was now a possibility that the repeated calls made in the past for an oil embargo
could have a substantial impact even if only applied by the NAM countries.\textsuperscript{82} Another
new initiative was to back the idea of a joint OAU-UN sponsored conference in 1980
on economic sanctions against South Africa. The Summit also called for contributions
to the solidarity fund. One major omission in Havana was that ANC and PAC was not
even mentioned or endorsed.

The Seventh (New Delhi, 1983) summit called for cessation of all assistance to South
Africa by the IMF and other UN specialised agencies. It also called for the
unconditional release of Mandela and all other political prisoners. It condemned the
constitutional reforms introduced by the regime. The conference expressed its
solidarity with and strong support for the struggle of the oppressed people of South
Africa led by their authentic representatives, the national liberation movements, using
all means at their disposal. New Delhi summit condemned the US policy of
constructive engagement, expressed its deep concern over the increased action by the
South Africa regime against the neighbouring states of South Africa.\textsuperscript{83}

As the eighth (Harare, 1986) summit was held in the capital of one of the front-line,
states and more than half of the members were from Africa, South Africa naturally

\textsuperscript{81} Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Colombo, 1976,
Ibid., pp. 223-224.

\textsuperscript{82} At Havana, for the first time, there was a direct appeal to “non aligned oil exporting countries to
prohibit the sale of their oil to South Africa... to monitor the final destination of their oil...and to
penalise the oil companies guilty of supplying oil.” Peter Willets, The Non-Aligned in Havana:
Documents of the Sixth Summit Conference and an Analysis of Their Significance for their Global

\textsuperscript{83} Seventh Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, New Delhi,
occupied the centre stage. The decision to hold the meeting at Harare also indicated the support of NAM to South Africa liberation movements had not been diluted. The summit recognised that the fight against apartheid had reached a critical point and that an attempt to translate NAM’s past pledges to the people of South Africa into concrete actions was to be made. It accepted India’s proposal for “Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid Fund” (AFRICA Fund). With this, NAM moved to a more concrete and operational level. The third world countries made an attempt for the first time to collectively “reduce the burden of disadvantage imposed by history and geopolitics on the front-line states, the liberation movements of South and South West Africa.”

By the time the ninth (Jakarta, 1992) summit took place, there were numerous changes in South Africa. Mandela was released, the corner stones of apartheid were removed, and negotiations had started. This conference expressed the satisfaction on the progress. NAM had supported the African states in their fight against apartheid without any reservations.

There was a systematic assertion of the NAM in the issue of South Africa. While in the first summit (1955), the issue of colonialism was sidelined, in favour of peaceful co-existence, by the eighth summit (1992), the increasing African presence made sure that NAM contributed significantly in addressing the third world opinion to the dismantling of apartheid.

COMMONWEALTH AND SOUTH AFRICA

The Commonwealth has given high priority to the struggle to end apartheid in South Africa. It has played a leading part in the international campaign against apartheid. The ideology and practice of apartheid are the antithesis of the Commonwealth’s most fundamental aim: non-racialism. That South Africa should not be a member of Commonwealth was one of the conditions for some of the new countries to join the Commonwealth. The issue of South Africa has brought such tumult to

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Commonwealth that many remarked about the irony that South Africa outside the Commonwealth is as important to the future of the Commonwealth, as she would be if she were still a member.\textsuperscript{85}

In the early days, Britain had thought that in alliance with the Commonwealth she could project power more effectively. But the continued lack of change in South Africa, together with the growing suspicion of the Black states about the future of Rhodesia and what Britain intended to do had begun to smudge the issue in Southern Africa into an inevitable resistance to racism. The British-centric approach of the Commonwealth had begun to offend some of its newest members.\textsuperscript{86} In the 1964 summit, the African countries proposed the establishment of a Commonwealth Secretariat. Thus, the Commonwealth Secretariat itself was founded because of the happenings in the Southern Africa.

In 1964, the Presidents and the Prime ministers agreed that one of the most important issues of the day was race relation. They declared that the Commonwealth has a particular role to play in this.\textsuperscript{87} In the same meeting, they condemned the policy of apartheid practised in South Africa. Sanctions as a method to oppose apartheid was also debated.\textsuperscript{88}

The first full session of the Commonwealth in Africa took place in Lusaka in 1979. The Lusaka summit stressed that grave problem afflicting the Southern African region


\textsuperscript{86} At the 1964 Commonwealth summit Julius Nyerere said, "Millions are represented by the Commonwealth and not all of them see problems with the same view as the Western world... Change must come". Ali A. Mazrui, \textit{The Anglo-African Commonwealth: Political Friction and Cultural Fusion} (Oxford, 1967), p. 40.

\textsuperscript{87} As a community of many different races, the Commonwealth is itself an almost unique experiment in international co-operation among the peoples of several races and continents.... The Prime ministers affirmed their belief that for all the Commonwealth governments it should be an objective of policy to build in each country a structure of society which offers equal opportunity and non discrimination for all its people irrespective of age, colour or creed. "Final Communiqué", Meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, London, 1964, n. 9, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{88} Some Commonwealth Prime ministers felt strongly that the only effective means of dealing with the problem of apartheid was the application of economic sanctions and an arms embargo. It was recognised, however, that there was a difference of opinion among Commonwealth countries as to the effectiveness of economic sanctions and as to the extent to which they regard it as right or practicable to seek, to secure the abandonment of apartheid by coercive action, of whatever kind. Ibid.
stemmed from the racist policies of South African regime embodied in the system of apartheid. The Declaration of Racism and Racial Prejudice adopted at the summit added to the sense of Commonwealth triumph as it was the Lusaka summit that paved the way for the Lancaster House talks. After the Lusaka Summit Ramphal said that the role of the Commonwealth in the eighties should be to bring apartheid to an end in the decade of eighties. He warned Western nations that it is not possible to be an ally of South Africa and a friend of Africa.89

In the 1981 meeting, it was stressed that core of the problems in Southern Africa was apartheid. In the Summit, South Africa's three-fold sins were seen as apartheid, refusal to grant independence to Namibia and the policy of destabilising the Front Line States. In the 1981 report Ramphal said that the absence of Rhodesia from the agenda for the first time in nearly twenty years would change the content, but not eliminate the consideration of Southern African issues.

The 1983 meeting in New Delhi condemned the proposals for a new constitution by the racist regime and warned that their implementation could only lead to a rising tide of anger against the injustice of apartheid.90 This turned out to be true and by the end of June 1984 over 500 had been killed. A state of emergency was imposed on July 21, 1985.91 The violence gave urgency to the international actors. Most of the third world countries had already imposed sanctions. At the worsening situation in South Africa, many called for economic sanctions.

Ramphal condemned apartheid and was of the opinion that Commonwealth had an honourable record on combating the apartheid issue. It was the first international

89 Indian Express (New Delhi), 11 September 1981.
91 The South African government introduced the new constitution on September 1984. This resulted in a massively attended non-white community demonstration against the proposals. The regime arrested many including some of the UDF leaders. The increase in rent and electricity charges arbitrarily imposed by the local council under the effective control of apartheid regime led to revolt in the black townships. The government sent in troops to put down the protest by the use of force. About 150 people were killed. The protest continued and on March 21. 1985 he police fired into a crowd of mourners in Langa killing over 20 people. Report of the Secretary General, 1985 (London, 1985), p. 14.
organisation to make South Africa unwelcome. India had been the first country to ban all trade with South Africa. Commonwealth member states were in the front line against apartheid. The Gleneagles agreement had pioneered world action against apartheid in sports. He called for collective action against South Africa and to be in the vanguard of the final push against apartheid. This was the background when the Commonwealth conference was to take place in 1985.

**Nassau Conference and Sanctions**

In the 1985 meeting, the generality of the early years had begun to be replaced by point by point action. The Nassau Summit adopted the *Commonwealth accord on Southern Africa*. The declaration committed the Commonwealth to a six-point series of actions. The accord laid down economic measure which all were expected to follow and proposed eight more in the event the Eminent Persons' Group (EPG) failed. The accord laid down five specific policies to South Africa towards ending apartheid. The accord also decided to set up a group of eminent Commonwealth persons to facilitate dialogue. They agreed on a series of nine economic measures that signal their opposition to apartheid. The word sanctions was avoided and measures adopted. In case of the EPG, failure and adequate progress is not made in the South Africa situation seven Head of the Governments was asked to review the situation after six months and impose further measures.

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92 Ramphal said Year in, Year out, the apartheid regime has thwarted progress. It was the root cause of all the trouble of the region. *A Testing Time Introduction to the Secretary General Report* (London, 1985), pp12-15.

93 They were a) Declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled, specific, and meaningful action taken in fulfillment of that intent. b) Terminate the existing state of emergency. c) Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid. d) Establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the ANC and other political parties. e) Initiate in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government. "Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa", Commonwealth Head of the Government Meeting, Nassau, 1985, n. 9, pp. 267-69.

94 They were bans on a) all new government loans to South Africa, b) import of Krugerrands, c) government funding for trade missions to South Africa, d) sale and export of computer equipment, e) new contacts for sale and export of nuclear goods and technology, f) sale and export of oil, g) imports of arms and ammunition, h) all military co-operation with South Africa, i) Cultural and scientific events. Ibid.

95 They were a) a ban on air-links with South Africa, b) a ban on new- or re-investments of profits earned in South Africa, c) ban on the import of agricultural product from South Africa, d) the termination of double taxation agreements in South Africa, e) the termination of all government assistance to investments in and trade with South Africa, f) ban on all government procurements in South Africa, g) a ban on government contracts with majority owned South Africa companies, h) a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa. Ibid.
The Commonwealth wanted sanctions to be complemented by a process designed to facilitate real political dialogue within South Africa. The idea was to supplement the economic sanctions by encouraging a dialogue of change; the link itself demonstrating that sanctions were not an end in themselves - not merely punitive and the reality of sanctions in turn providing incentives for change. British resistance to sanctions meant an end to the adoption of substantial economic sanctions. A much smaller package of measures in which Britain will join and the proposal for dialogue, which was an Australian one, was adopted.

The idea was to facilitate a dialogue, which would then be supplemented with substantial sanctions if the dialogue failed. The Commonwealth thus decided to carry Britain along, who had the most economic investments in South Africa and at the same time to try for a dialogue with South Africa. The EPG was to provide a path to peaceful change. They were to talk with all South Africans. At first, there was scepticism from ANC and UDF and from the side of the South Africa government. However, EPG proved themselves to be serious; so serious that South African government thwarted them by bombing Lusaka, Harare and Gaborone on the morning the EPG was to meet the Cabinet Constitutional Committee for a final answer on its negotiating package.

The Eminent Persons Group

The Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) members consisting of Fraser, Obasanjo and Dame Nita Barrow made a preliminary visit to South Africa and the front-line states in February. The full group went from 2-13 March 1986 and left the negotiating concept. The two African members of the group visited the Head of Governments of Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe in April and the group returned to South Africa in May. The group held twenty-one meetings with South African government ministers. It met Nelson Mandela three times, an opportunity given to no other group. It met principal political actors in South Africa. It met ANC in Lusaka and the leaders of the frontline States.

The report of the EPG turned out to be an authoritative document and was recognised world-wide. The Stature of its members gave the report high international credibility. There were other missions (like the EEC) and other reports (including the one by the Advisory Committee to the US secretary of the State) but none made quite the impact of the Commonwealth report. Even the South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha though reluctant to accept it as a good report grudgingly accepted that “the EPG report was far better than any thing I have seen coming out of the United Nations in the recent years.” The verdict of the EPG laid the basis for the enlarged programme of sanctions in 1986. The EPG provided a ‘negotiating concept’ to all the parties. The Concept incorporated a framework of specific and meaningful steps on the part of the government and of the ANC and the others that the group believed could ensure negotiations and a break in the cycle of violence. It was evolved out after detailed process of discussion with all concerned. It represented the belief of the EPG that if the government were agreeable, consensus for it could be found.

The group called for from the government:

a) the removal of the military from the townships, providing for freedom of assembly, discussion and suspension of detention without trial
b) the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees
c) the unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the permitting of normal political activity

From the ANC and others, the group sought their readiness to enter negotiations and suspension of violence.

In submitting its negotiating concept to Pretoria, the EPG said, “It is our view that simultaneous announcement incorporating these ideas might be negotiated if the government were to be interested in pursuing this broad approach.”

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97 The Advisory Committee of twelve prominent Americans was established in December 1985. Its purpose was to examine and recommend to the Secretary of state what United States policy towards South Africa would most effectively influence peaceful change and promote equal rights in the country. It submitted its report on 9 January 1987. Ron Sanders, ed., *Inseparable Humanity: An Anthology of Reflections of Shridath Ramphal* (New Delhi, 1989), p. 230.

98 He however accused the group of trying to blackmail Pretoria into accepting conditions to which no self-respecting government could agree. *The Times* (London), 13 June 1986.

government was not interested and demonstrated it by bombing its neighbouring states. The group concluded that the South African government was not ready to negotiate except on its own terms, which was far short of reasonable black expectations. The South African government was not ready to face the prospect of end of white domination. Its quest is power sharing but without surrendering overall white control.100

The EPG succeeded in blowing away the smoke screen that Pretoria had put and behind which its apologists sheltered with the talk of reforms. EPG also made it clear that ANC, UDF, COSATU, PAC and at least some white community are serious about starting dialogue in the context of an end to apartheid and violence. It is the Pretoria government that refuses and so needs to be pressured to change. The EPG concluded that the absence of sanctions stood in the way of progress along the negotiating path. On sanctions they said, “it is already the case that their absence and Pretoria’s belief that they need not be feared, defers change”. They stressed that it is not sanctions that will destroy the country, but the persistence of apartheid and failure to engage in fundamental political reform. They posed to the Commonwealth the question, “Is the Commonwealth to stand by and allow a cycle of violence to spiral or will it take concerted action of an effective kind?” They looked to the Commonwealth for that “concerted action of an effective kind, which may offer the last opportunity to avoid what, could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War”.101

The Mini-Summit

The meeting of the seven leaders was unique in the Commonwealth history. A Conference of a representative group of leaders has never been held before. Also for the first time the host country did not chair a Commonwealth summit. This summit was seen as a continuation of the Nassau summit and was chaired by Lynden Pindling. Further

100 It is our considered view that despite appearances and statements to the contrary, South African government is not yet ready to negotiate except on its own terms. Those terms both in regard to objectives and modalities fall far short of reasonable Black expectations and well-accepted democratic norms and principles... The (government) is in truth, not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of White domination and White power in the forceable future. Its programme of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to give it a less inhuman face. Its quest is power sharing, but without surrendering overall white control. Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report (London, 1986), p. 140.

101 ibid.
Mrs Thatcher was the main protagonist on the South African issue and it would not be sensible. Mrs Thatcher also did not object. Of the seven three were from the old Commonwealth countries, India was the country without which the modern Commonwealth would not have been possible, Kaunda was the longest serving member in the Commonwealth and Mugabe represented the country whose independence was facilitated through the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth Head of the Government Review Meeting in 1986 accepted the EPG report and the failure of the group resulted in the announcement of sanctions. Until this meeting there was consensus in all their actions; but as in 1986 this was not so. Britain disagreed to the imposition of sanctions; the Commonwealth had to choose between credibility and consensus. The Commonwealth imposed the sanctions mentioned in its 1985 meeting and some additional measures. The British, however, did not join this and put their view in a different paragraph of the Communiqué. However, they agreed to impose two more measures.102 The consensus patched up in Nassau was now breached. More importantly the others were prepared to proceed without Britain. The Commonwealth hoped to be the first among the international organisations to apply an impressive list of sanctions and thus give a lead. The American legislators openly acknowledged the role of Commonwealth for laying the ground work.103

Vancouver Summit of 1987

Even before the 1987 summit there was speculation on the sanctions issue, the position of Britain and the possibility of a Commonwealth programme to protect front-line states from South Africa.104 In the meeting Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney as the

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102 The Commonwealth agreed on a ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to the public or private sectors, a ban on the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa, and the withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa except for our own national and nationals of third countries to whom we render consular services. Britain agreed to put a voluntary ban on new investments in South Africa, put a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, to accept and implement any European Economic Community decision to ban the import of coal, iron, and steel and of gold coins from South Africa. “Communique”, Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting, London, 1986, n. 9, pp. 291-93.

103 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990’s (Victoria, 1991), p. 21.

Chairman led and underlined the importance of seeking the widest common ground on the question of apartheid, which challenges the basic principle of our organisation. However, the frontline states did not push the issue further. The summit issued the Okanagan Statement on Southern Africa and Programme of Action. This was based on a draft prepared by Canada's minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark who headed an ad hoc committee of nine foreign minister including Geoffrey Howe of Britain. This represented an evolution and strengthening of the Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa started in Nassau through London and then Vancouver.

The Okanagan statement is a 29-point statement of Commonwealth positions on Southern Africa of which 24 constitute a programme of action to assist the region. On 23 of the 29 points there is unanimity. On six, Britain did not agree. The statement agreed that the desperate plight of South Africa's neighbours calls for a comprehensive response from the international community. It said that several Commonwealth countries are already providing substantial and invaluable help for South Africa's neighbours. However, the capacity of South Africa's neighbours to resist Pretoria's policy of destabilisation and destruction must be strengthened. It urged assistance from the international community both for security against South Africa aggression and to advance disengagement from South Africa's economy.

The leaders agreed for an enhanced programme of co-ordinated Commonwealth assistance to the region and particularly Mozambique- assistance directed to essential sectors as transportation, and communications embracing both their rehabilitation and their physical protection. Priority attention as given to Limpopo line and the Port of Maputo. It also proposed to examine the question of transit rights of the land-locked states in southern Africa. A special fund was to be established to provide technical assistance to Mozambique. Support was also to be given to the victims and opponents of apartheid within South Africa, in educational training, in human training, legal assistance

to detainees and their families, and increasing support to the trade movement and economic and social development.\textsuperscript{106}

The importance given to Commonwealth by the frontline states can be seen in the Mozambique request to attend as guest the Vancouver summit. Mozambique was given special attention as it was in an important geographical position in relation to the frontline states. The statement said that if requested, they would be ready to embark upon a process of consultation with a view to enabling those of our members in a position do so to make appropriate contribution to the security needs of Mozambique and other frontline states requiring such help.

On sanctions, also Commonwealth took measures but Britain abstained from some of the Commonwealth decision of sanctions. Britain also abstained from the establishment of a Commonwealth committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFMSA) to provide high level impetus and guidance in furtherance of the objectives of the Okanagan statement. In the Vancouver summit itself Edward Seaga the Prime Minister of Jamaica tabled a paper on the “Impact of Economic sanctions on the South African Economy”. The paper pointed out that in spite of record gold prices during 1979 to 1981, over the five years to 1985 South Africa’s Gross National Product (GNP) has not grown at all. It also said that the external debt went from 6.4 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 27.1 per cent in 1984. The mounting debt service burden and general State of uncertainty resulted in severe depreciation of the Rands resulting to a very high rate of inflation about 18 per cent in 1987.\textsuperscript{107}

\section*{Kuala Lumpur Summit of 1989}

The meeting was held in the background of the apartheid regime accepting a degree of peaceful political activity by the black majority and the release from prison of eight political leaders including Sisulu. However, the leaders agreed that the existing sanctions

\textsuperscript{106} "The Okanagan Statement on Southern Africa and Programme of the Commonwealth Head of Government Meeting of Action, Vancouver 1987", \textit{The Round Table} (London), no. 305, 1988, pp. 204-206.

\textsuperscript{107} It also pointed out that the potential annual loss of exports to South Africa from the measures taken by Commonwealth and other international community is likely to be about $1.3 billion or around 7.5\% of its total merchandise exports in 1985. Edward Seaga, “Impact of Economic Sanctions on the South African Economy”, \textit{The Round Table} (London), no. 306, 1988, pp. 136-137.
and pressures were not to be relaxed and were to be maintained. The meeting adopted *Southern Africa: The Way Ahead The Kuala Lumpur Statement*. In this meeting also, Britain dissented from the view that sanctions should be tightened. With the exception of Britain, the Commonwealth decided on some measures. Further, with the exception of the Britain the leaders endorsed the establishment of an independent agency to review and report on South Africa’s international financial links on a regular basis, and to gather and publicise information on financial flows and policies towards South Africa.  

The leaders reiterated their preference for negotiation and affirmed the continuing validity of the EPG’s “negotiating concept”. The British delegation immediately after the CHOGM agreed to the Kuala Lumpur statement issued another statement explaining Britain’s view: *Southern Africa: The Way ahead—Britain’s view*.  

**Summits of 1991 and 1993**

By 1991 lot of developments had taken place. Negotiations between South African government, ANC and other political parties had started. The Harare Summit of 1991 welcomed this and the Commonwealth was prepared to assist in the negotiating process in ways that would be found helpful by the parties concerned. The Secretary General was deputed to South Africa to explore with the principal parties concerned ways in which the Commonwealth could assist in the negotiating process. Commonwealth decided on the lifting of sanctions in phases related to the real and practical steps taken to end apartheid. It lifted the consular and visa restrictions, cultural and scientific

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1) to develop new forms of financial pressure on the Pretoria regime by seeking to intensity and extend financial sanctions by a) calling on all relevant banks and financial institutions to impose tougher conditions on day-to-day trade financing, specifically through reducing maximum credit terms to 90 days b) taking South Africa ‘off cover’ with official government agencies for official trade credit and insurance purposes. 2) To support the initiative developed by the CFMSA to strengthen the arms embargo and continue to pursue it at the UN. “Southern Africa: The Way Ahead The Kuala Lumpur Statement” 1989, *The Round Table* (London), no. 313, 1990, p. 102.


110 In an historic speech on February 1990 President De Klerk changed the South African scenario. The ANC, PaC and the South African Communist Party were unbanned. All political prisoners convicted of offences, which did not involve the use of violence, were unconditionally released and on February 11 Nelson Mandela was released after twenty six years in prison. On February 1991 President De Klerk announced the removal of the pillars of apartheid- the Population Registration Act, the Land Act and the Group Areas Act. *Europa World Year Book* (London, 1993), p. 2569.
boycotts, restrictions on tourism promotion and the ban on direct air links. Financial sanctions, economic sanctions and arms embargo was to be removed according to the conditions specified.\textsuperscript{111}

In October 1993 meeting in Limassol, Cyprus, it was agreed that a democratic and non-racial South Africa would be invited to join the organisation. They endorsed the removal of all economic sanctions against South Africa but agreed to retain the arms embargo until a post-apartheid democratic government has been established.\textsuperscript{112} The Commonwealth in 1992 despatched a Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa (COMSA), to help monitor and reduce the violence. It proved to be making such useful contribution that the main political parties and the government pressed for it to continue its work. The team included police, lawyers and politicians and spent time in places of violence particularly Natal, mediating, advising on policing and working at community level.\textsuperscript{113}

**Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers of Southern Africa**

The Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers of Southern Africa (CCFMSA) comprised of the foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and was chaired by the Secretary of State for External affairs of Canada. The committee’s first meeting was held in Lusaka in February 1988 and met twice yearly to monitor the effects of sanctions. It has examined the application of sanctions, an assessment of their impact and an identification of efforts to frustrate them. It focused on South African propaganda and censorship and what Commonwealth might do to counter act them. The committee focussed also on the South Africa’s campaign of destabilisation against its neighbours, Namibia and sanctions. The CCFMSA received three reports: An interim report on the evaluation of the application

\textsuperscript{111} Financial sanctions were to be lifted only when agreement was reached on the text of a new democratic constitution, unless a contrary recommendation was made by an All-Part Conference or by an interim government. Economic sanctions including trade and investment measures was to be lifted when appropriate transitional mechanism had been agreed upon. Arms embargo was to remain in force until a new post-apartheid South African government was firmly established with full democratic control and accountability.

\textsuperscript{112} *Africa South of Sahara*, p. 126.

\textsuperscript{113} Derek Ingram, “Commonwealth Update”, *The Round Table* (London), no. 328, 1993, p. 378.
and impact of sanctions against South Africa prepared by an independent expert group, the expert study on South Africa's relationship with the international financial system prepared by the officials of the Government of Australia, Canada and India, and a special report prepared by General Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria on the security needs of the front-line states.

Based on these reports the CCFMSA proposed measures against South Africa. It agreed to undertake diplomatic demarches to countries which had not adopted sanctions or whose trade practices been tending to diminish their impact. The CCFMSA agreed on certain financial, trade related measures, and arms embargo against South Africa.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{114} The Financial measures were:

a) To ask financial institutions to ensure that there is no expansion in trade financing;

b) To ask national bank regulatory authorities to ensure that in making provision for loan losses South Africa country-risk will be treated no more favourably than that of heavily indebted countries.

c) To ask banks to press for South African debt rescheduling arrangements which do not extend beyond one year at a time.

d) To press for an international ban on insurance cover by official export credit agencies for loans to South Africa.

e) To intensify efforts—through bilateral contacts and in international fora—to pursue more countries to follow the Commonwealth lead in restricting new lending to South Africa and To facilitate the flow of information among anti-apartheid and other NGOs to learn about ways to bring pressure on institutions dealing with South Africa.

The trade related measures were:

a) To press other countries to adopt the Commonwealth trade bans, priority attention being given to coal.

b) To implement procedures for stricter customs scrutiny and give higher priority to investigate sanctions violations.

c) To provide for heavier penalties for those violating sanctions an to publicise violations and consequent penalties.

d) To prohibit technology transfer which would enable South Africa to circumvent existing sanctions particularly in the areas of arms, oil and computers.

e) To clarify the definition of agricultural products to reinforce the scope of the ban of imports of such products from South Africa.

f) To increase information about companies which continue to trade with South Africa in violation of agreed sanctions.

g) To permit orderly actions of local authorities, private sector group and individuals in demonstrating their abhorrence of apartheid.

The Commonwealth advocated the following arms embargo measures against South Africa:

a) Arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war, or any article deemed capable of being converted into or assisting in the maintenance of repression in South Africa. E.g. Data-processing equipment and software, electronic and telecommunications software and four-wheel drive vehicles.

b) Materials, equipment and technologies designed or used for development, production or utilisation of the above.

c) Mandatory arms embargo by the Security Council on the import of arms and military goods from South Africa.

d) Establishment of the monitory unit with the UN to assist the Security Council 421 Committee to investigate alleged breach and publishes its findings regularly.

e) Consideration of measures to prevent foreign technologies and expertise from assisting the arms industry in South Africa and to prevent subsidiaries in South Africa of overseas companies from manufacturing or supplying any items which would enhance the capability of the military and security forces.

f) Strict application of the mandatory UN arms embargo relating to licences for arms production in South Africa with a view to terminating all licences.
Assistance from Commonwealth

A multi-lateral Commonwealth programme of technical assistance was extended in which technical assistance was provided in health, agriculture, housing, transport, and industry as well as secondary and higher education and in vocational training. The Commonwealth also provided help to the refugees of Zimbabwe and Namibia. The Commonwealth Programme for Zimbabweans was established following the Lagos Conference in 1966. This enabled about 4500 refugees to secure study places, scholarships or employment opportunities abroad. Over 750 of them were supported by the CFTC-administered Commonwealth Zimbabwe scholarships Fund (CZSF). Another 300 scholarships, previously supported by the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), were also administered by CFTC when the IUEF wound up.115

In 1975, the Commonwealth programme for Namibia was established. The Fellowship and Training Programme (FTP) provided over 1500 full-time awards for Namibians. The number of students, supported by FTP, rose from 228 in 1986/87 to 357 in 1987/88 and to 887 in 1988/89 with 21 countries providing them study places. Most of the students studied managerial, technical and vocational courses. In 1989, over 500 students were accepted on short intensive courses in areas such as customs and exercise, immigration control, public administration, banking and labour education. A distance learning programme for Namibian refugees in Angola and Zambia was launched in 1981 from Lusaka. This scheme was one of the worlds first to assist refugees in settlement to give distance-teaching techniques. This helped over 7000 students to pursue courses under the Namibian Extension unit (NEU) in English, Mathematics, Mother and Childcare etc.116

Later, South African refugees were also given the Commonwealth help. In 1984, the first Commonwealth Educational Scheme for South Africans was started in Tanzania to offer distance teaching. From 600 students in 1987/88 in Angola and Tanzania, it increased to 1350 by mid 1989 which included South African exiles in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 1985, at Nassau, full time Nassau Fellowships to help South Africa

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victims of Apartheid was launched. The awards were of two types. From 137 in 1987/88, it increased to 302 in 1988/89.

THE COMMONWEALTH VIS-À-VIS OTHER ORGANISATIONS

The international organisations have all gone through a strategy of persuasion in the form of resolutions, requesting South Africa to change its policies, though the strategy of isolation in the form of expulsion or suspension from organisations, cultural and sports boycott and finally, sanctions. However, the intensity of the organisations has been varied. The African and Asian countries have been intense in their fight against apartheid. The Western countries, on the other hand, have tried to ensure that their economic assets are not toppled. This was reflected in the actions of the organisations also. The OAU and NAM, from the beginning, have passed resolutions against apartheid. These organisations have included the African, Asian and some socialist states, which have always supported the fight against apartheid and decolonisation. The European Economic Community is more an economic organisation, while UN had western powers in its Security Council, which had the power to veto any resolution that it did not want to be implemented.

The Commonwealth, on the other hand, had a distinct composition. It included African and Asian countries, and at the same time, some western countries which could make a difference, which neither NAM nor OAU had. Moreover, Commonwealth included Britain, which in South Africa had a large economic stake. Commonwealth also recognised certain principles as racial non-discrimination and equality and could tie countries like Britain on it, which an economic organisation like European Economic Community could not do.

UN was seen as a broader forum by all organisations in the fight against apartheid. All of them worked on the idea that the UN will act strongly against apartheid. UN was able to mobilise world opinion and at the same time mobilise international organisations to act against apartheid. The problem with UN was that as long as the Security Council did not

117 Nassau Fellowships that are granted by individual Commonwealth Governments and Commonwealth Nassau Fellowships which are provided through FTP.
take up the resolutions and was not mandatory, it did not affect the Western powers. In the United Nations countries like United Kingdom, United States, and France (in the early period) who had the power to veto, was reluctant to support the otherwise broad consensus achieved in the UN. The Western countries had a dual policy. On the one hand they did not want to punish South Africa due to their own economic interest, while on the other, they have contributed financially and technical help to South Africa’s neighbours to make them independent of South Africa.

The NAM and OAU were able to keep the issue alive in other organisations and had the freedom to apply economic sanctions from the beginning. OAU was hampered by rivalries among the leaders and the lack of unity among themselves, which gave them difficulties. The failure of African states to make their promised annual contribution to liberation funds was also a setback. The setback as greater as military budgets of South Africa increased. Moreover, disagreements between African countries lessened pressures on South Africa, which in turn reflected on the international pressure.

The Commonwealth has provided many a lead against the fight against apartheid. It was Commonwealth, which had initiated actions against South Africa for disregarding the principle of racial equality. Commonwealth set an example with the exit of South Africa. South Africa was literally forced out of Commonwealth in 1961, while UN waited until 1974 to suspend it from the General Assembly. The irony was that South Africa continued to be a member of the General Assembly even after its policies were termed a crime against humanity. Even then, the Security Council used its triple veto to stop South Africa’s expulsion from the UN.

Another lead was in the area of sports. While OAU and NAM readily agreed to the international convention against apartheid in sports and third party boycott the fact remained that they did not have the countries who had sports contact with South Africa. The Commonwealth, with its Gleneagles agreement, restrained the countries like Britain and New Zealand from officially supporting sports contact with South Africa. The draft declaration of the UN had to wait until 1985 to open for signature. In the case of arms the Commonwealth by 1975 had agreed to an embargo including Britain.
Commonwealth has also played an important role in supporting the front-line states and in restraining Britain. It has acted as a channel for diplomatic and material support to the front-line states. The majority of Commonwealth members being sympathetic to the black cause in South Africa restrained Britain by exerting pressures, which otherwise could have shown an overtly pro-white stance.

In the case of sanctions, the Commonwealth has played an effective role. A principal outcome of the Nassau summit was the Eminent Persons Group (EPG). The EPG, led by two former Head of States, had an important status and its report was widely acclaimed. It is important to note that no other group, including the one of the EEC or that of United States Advisory Committee had so much of publicity and effectiveness. While the EPG could meet the important leaders of South Africa, and the neighbouring countries, the mission of the EEC, led by Geoffrey Howe, was not met by leaders like Tutu and was attacked by the leaders of the neighbouring states. The fact that South Africa resorted to arm attack against its neighbouring countries while the EPG was to meet the cabinet for talks shows that the EPG had made substantial progress to scare the white regime. It should also be noted that the UN did not send such a group to South Africa.

The importance given to dismantling apartheid can be seen by the fact that Commonwealth was ready to move forward even if there was no consensus. Up to the mini summit of 1986, the general Commonwealth approach had always been to achieve unity on controversial subject, which in practice meant not pushing an issue beyond a point. However, after the return of the EPG, the Commonwealth leaders were speaking for more sanctions whether or not Britain agreed.

All international organisations fought against the racist regime. However a unique utility of Commonwealth was in its ability to restrain Britain. While in the UN it could hide behind its veto power and in the EEC could make other members agree to weaker measures in the Commonwealth it had to face the pressure from others. While in the EEC Britain was reluctant to apply even the diplomatic and military boycott in September 1985, in the Commonwealth in October 1985 it agreed to apply some economic measures also. Though Britain by 1986 stand aside and not agree to what it
did not want to do, the Commonwealth succeeded in restraining Britain from being overtly friendly.

If the UN had taken mandatory sanctions under chapter 7, it would have been different, but it did not. United Nations was constrained by the veto power of its Security Council. While UN urged to adopt certain measures Commonwealth decided more than that. It was the Commonwealth decision that set the stage for widening international action to increase pressure on the Pretoria regime. The Commonwealth had many faults like its decisions were not binding and limitations as all decisions were taken only on consensus basis. Moreover they knew that without Britain sanctions would not be as effective as it wanted it to be. But Commonwealth decided to apply sanctions even if it meant breaking the consensus.