Chapter - IV

DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR FORCE IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF ECONOMY

Society is composed, not of classes with conflicting interests, but on the contrary of mutually-interdependent groups that have different and necessary functions in the division of social Labour. This is actually a quotation from Ataturk, commonly offered as the most succinct statement of his concept of populism, which became one of guiding principles of his party and was then incorporated into the Turkish Constitution.

Although few respondents recognized the statement's source, many of them, especially Labour leaders, commented that it was a widely held opinion and insisted that class antagonisms never had been a problem in their country. Although business and Labour leader endorse class harmony with near unanimity, our control groups are less enthusiastic in their support. Thirty percent of the students reject the notion that classes and class conflict do not exist in Turkish society.¹

The identical responses of the rival Labour factions are curious in view of their long and bitter debate over whether Turkish workers constitute a social class. The social democrats commonly boasted that they were more progressive and realistic than the majority faction in Turk-Is, who refused to refer to themselves as class representatives because of their lingering paranoia about being labeled communist. Yet, if the social democrats are more willing than the old guard of the Labour Movement to recognize class differences, they are nevertheless equally eager to appear respectable and responsible by disassociating themselves from the slogan of class conflict that is openly used by their more militant rivals in Disk.

Since each group performs a different function, the members of each social group should have different rights and duties. Here the responses of interests group leaders depart clearly from those of the control groups, with leaders endorsing the proposition and others rejecting it. Labour leaders especially seem to feel that the importance of their organizations and constitutes entitles them to privileges or rewards not accorded to others. Business leaders who already have many such privileges through their semiofficial chambers agree, but not as strongly. The trainee initiates to group politics and the students, however, disapprove of such attempts to legitimize unequal
treatment.²

The increasing extreme stand of the Turkish Left, within the trade unions, political parties and smaller groups, cannot be fully appreciated without a brief references to the activities of the communist party. Although banned by law (it still is), organized communism continued to work underground. Although its leaders were jailed and its publications seized, the Turkish Communist Party seems to have had a marked share in the Leftist activity in Turkey -- and its impact, originally of nuisance value only, has in recent years, found an echo in the doctrinaire pronouncements of other Leftist organizations.³

Although tiny in numbers, the Turkish Communist Party (TCP) has had a considerable influence on Turkish intellectuals and on their attitudes to politics and socio-economics. This is particularly true since the end of the Second World War. Official circles in Turkey as well as certain unofficial groups (such as the religious-minded or pan-Turk groups) have considered communism a serious danger. The authorities have kept up their surveillance of known or


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suspected communists, and brought many to trial, while private individuals and groups have published numerous anti-communist tracts.

The early history of organized communism in Turkey is fairly well known, thanks to two painstakingly written books published recently. Its later years, on the other hand, are not as well known, because of the natural reticence of an illegal party. In fact most available information is based on the inflammatory writings of the party's opponents in Turkey, or obviously partisan Soviet publications. 4

Even so, the latter are often disappointingly brief and all too frequently treat of the early period in the Party's history only. Somewhat more evenly balanced information about the TCP has become available recently and even this is incomplete and not always objective.

The early history of organized communism in Turkey in brief, beginning its activities on Turkish soil among Turkish emigres led by Mehmet Mustafa Suphi soon after the First World War, organized communism never became a mass movement or a potent force in Turkish politics. However, the role communism has played in Turkey for half a century,

although not impressive by the standards of an organized party struggle for power, has not been without consequence in its propaganda value. In a state conditioned for revolutionary reform by its leadership, communism has consistently had to compete with a strong nationalism which has been considerably more powerful. The Kemalist leadership watched communist activity closely in the early 1920's. A paragraph in the 1924 constitution, forbidding any change in the state's system of government, was probably directed against communism.⁵

In 1923 and again in 1925, after communism had reorganized in Turkey, the government decided to clamp down on it. As soon as the government felt secure enough, it banned the party, arrested its leaders and activists, and closed down the union of Turkish communist youth, continuing, nevertheless, its normal, even friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Again, although communism later reorganized, under various guises, its impact remained solely on the ideological level. Communist writings, such as the ably edited periodical Enlightenment perceptibly influenced some Turkish intellectuals and better-educated workers. Paradoxically, Ataturk's brilliantly conceived

reforms contained a framework for social change and therefore stole a good part of the Turkish communists thunder. On the one hand, and on the other hand, it kept alive an interest in further social reforms.\textsuperscript{6}

In his years of leadership Ataturk achieved a high degree of consensus among the Turkish elite in support of his socio-economic and political policies. For such ideologies as communism to the fringes of the elite, who were further weeded out by imprisonment or exile. In the late 1920's, and again in the 1930's, the TCP was again weakened by several leaders being won over by government offers for interesting, lucrative jobs, as well as by the more extremist factions carrying out purges repeatedly and splitting from the main body. If the Turkish Communist Party (TCP) continued to exist and carry on an uninterrupted precarious activity underground, this was for several reasons, the unflagging enthusiasm of the small core of active members, who kept up a skeleton-organization, branching out in tiny clandestine cells, support, the nature and extent of which are not quite clear, from the Soviet Union and the Comintern.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., pp. 356-60.

The slowdown of reforms after Atatürk's death in 1938, and particularly during the years of the Second World War. In that period and afterwards, Turkish Communist made a determined effort to monopolize the demand for socio-economic reform. In this, they were less than successful, at least in immediately measurable results. The main reasons appear to be the imprisonment of self-exile of practically the whole veteran leadership in the late 1920's and the surveillance by the Turkish authorities of the remaining cadres.

Ideological conflicts, personal rivalries, rift and purges within the Party played into the hands of the secret police. Clandestine activity, its romantic appeal notwithstanding, was rather a hindrance in propaganda work. This was particularly true since the police had tracked down many, if not all, of the cadres. After the Second World War, the TCP leadership seems to have decided on an all-out effort to enlarge the previous 'Anti-Fascist Front', which by now was called "The Front for the struggle against Fascism and profiteers" into an alliance of elements opposing the ruling party.8

While 'The Front of Progressive Democrats' which they

tried to set up in the summer of 1945 did not amount to much, the new detailed program presented by Degmer on July 31, 1945 for the projected 'Front' rates more than a passing mention. It was circulated not only among TCP members and sympathizers, but to various political personalities known to be in opposition to the RPP and its one-party regime. The program is important for three main reasons: It voices the general feelings and opinions of the TCP leaders at the time; it in the main points on which they hoped to obtain a consensus among other opposition personalities; and it influenced -- directly or indirectly -- other leftist ideologies in Turkey in the 1950's and 1960's, which bear a striking resemblance to the 1945 TCP program.

Throughout the period communist in Turkey continued their limited activity all the while on two levels, of which the legal one -- through several front organizations -- was more in evidence. In this way, the tiny TCP was able to afford its members and sympathisers an, opportunity for political action and expression that clandestineness would obviously have denied them, under the stronghanded rule of the Democrat Party. While the available data are evidently incomplete, it appears that communists infiltrated to a minor degree into some of the lower elections of the opposition parties, and to a greater degree, as we shall see they left an impact on the general development of leftism in
contemporary Turkey. This is true of the 1960's no less than of the 1950's.9

There is a striking similarity between the sprouting of Leftist groups in the post 1945 and the post 1960 periods. In 1945 communists and others, whose political expressions had been bottled up during the era of one party rule and tightened even further during the war years, came out in political groupings as soon as the law permitted the formation of new parties. The fact that not a few leftists found refuge in the newly founded Democrat Party left the rest even more resolute in pursuing their political struggle.

In 1960, after a decade during which the Democrat Party had effectively prevented any meaningful open Leftist activity -- very moderate trade unionism excepted -- several leftist groups entered politics of which the most durable was the Labour Party of Turkey. They used the new approach reflected in 1961 constitution which promised unhampered political activity to any group unless subversive.

The Socialist Party of Turkey was founded on May 14, 1946 in Istanbul, by such well-known Leftists as Esat Adil, Aziz Uctay and others. The suspicions of the authorities

9 Ibid., pp. 9-22.
that the founders were communists, and the Party's strongly-Marxist program brought about its official closed down in December 1946 by virtue of Martial Law. The founders were tried for communism and acquitted; the prosecution appealed, but the court of Appeals upheld the verdict. Consequently, in 1950, the Party was revived. The Party's program was much more socialist than those of the earlier mentioned parties, and was explicitly Marxist; this was, apparently, the first avowedly Marxist program of a lawful political party in Turkey.10

The Party claimed to be democratic, nationalist, socialist, internationalist and secularist. Its socialism was expressed in its demands for raising the level of the people's prosperity, culture and health doing away with economic and social injustice; and raising the dignity of Labour. Internationalism was expressed in the Party's stand for international cooperation and against so-called imperialist and exploiting blocs.

However, this was no mere matter of terminology. The whole Party's program, and much of its later writing, was suffused with passionate, yet purposeful, advocacy of socialist principles -- as interpreted by Turkish Marxists,

and reminding one of earlier communist propaganda in Turkey.\textsuperscript{11} Its attitudes and demands included: To develop the country; to guarantee that the state would pay workers compensation in case of illness, disability and old age; to have the state assume responsibility for the care and education of children, building of new hospitals and schools and enacting of a broad social security Law, forbidding the employment of children, guaranteeing freedom of expression -- in thought speech, printing strikes and demonstrations; to ensure that these freedoms would not be restricted by law to ensure full liberty of conscience, independence of religion, secrecy of correspondence and freedom of travel, to guarantee free and compulsory elementary education, to be conducted in the mother tongue, to secure help for the chronically-ill in body or mind; to form cooperatives with state support. The formation of the LPT in 1961 was firstly, the culmination of previously short-lived attempts at establishing legal socialist parties. Secondly, it reflected the more liberal mood towards political radicalism intimated in the 1961 constitution, for example its emphasis on the 'social' character of the second Turkish Republic.\textsuperscript{12}

The rise of the LPT should be understood not only in

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., pp. 30-65.

the light of its Marxist commitment, to be examined later, but also within the context of Turkish politics. Turkey's sprawling size, its more than 40,000 villages -- large and small -- as well as the special laws governing elections, caused each party after 1960 to intensify its propaganda, extend its local organization and strive to outbid its competitors, all of whom were seeking the support of very much the same type of people. Although political participation cannot be said to embrace the entire population, it steadily increased in the multiparty period after 1946, under the eager prodding of competing political parties. Like other political parties, the LPT has tried to infiltrate the civil service and many professional organizations. The fact that some, such as the chambers of commerce were practically closed to it, served to goad the LPT into intensifying its attempts to infiltrate, and even dominate, other institutions such as trade unions and student organizations.

In 1962 Aybar and a group of intellectuals with a Marxist philosophy, the LPT encountered difficulties in broadening its scope of action anywhere outside the larger towns -- in establishing branches and attracting the popular support - Not surprisingly, perhaps, many workers were wary of the new party, whose theorizing was often highbrow and
too complicated for their understanding.\textsuperscript{13}

The leadership set about organizing it on modern lines, setting up central bodies, founding branches and preparing for future elections -- after failing to take part in the general elections of October 1961. Aybar started work in 1962 by making an extensive tour of eastern Turkey, where he delivered speeches and founded LPT branches in six provinces. Only in the beginning of 1964 did the LPT leaders feel secure enough of their control of party to convene its first countrywide Congress, which met in Izmir and was quite an impressive affair. The delegates were so divided among themselves that the party officials had a decisive majority. Delegates were all members of the Central Executive committee and central control committee, or of the equivalent bodies in the Provinces; there was also one provincial delegates for every 1000 registered and paid-up members.\textsuperscript{14}

By then, the LPT had quite a few branches in the towns and districts but not in the villages - Since the Party Law of the Second Turkish Republic forbade it. In the convention hall there were some 200 guests from various

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 157-72.

political and other associations, reportedly including a fair sprinkling of secret police. After several welcoming speeches and congratulatory Messages the agenda of the congress was agreed upon, and Aybar delivered the opening address. His speech gave a sense of purpose and direction to the LPT in subsequent years.  

Characteristically, Aybar declared that the Party's task was to work to solve the neglected problems of the people. The most severe of these problems, as he saw them, were: the productive capabilities of the people were not being used; covert unemployment had reached five and a half million in agriculture and one and a half million in industry; until the Turkish Labour forces was gainfully employed, Turkey would remain a backward society; Turkey's balance of payments had a deficit of 430 million dollars; its system of taxation had grave deficiencies and discriminated against the workers, whose standard of living had hardly risen; although a fairly large number of workers were members of trade unions, they were only on the threshold of political awareness; despite the new constitution and its guarantees, only a hero dared to utilize the promised freedoms, such as that of expression -- because of the government's policies. Aybar then promised  

15 Ibid., pp. 154-60.
that the LPT would be alert in defending the constitution, demanded a just share of the national income for every citizen, called for immediate land reform and for Turkey's speedy industrialization.\textsuperscript{16} He maintained that victory in the war for political independence had been followed by defeat on the economic front, as expressed in the growing power of the large landowners. Aybar concluded by casting doubts on the government's sincerity in its avowed intention too bring about reforms, and pointed out that the budget had allocated nothing to this end.\textsuperscript{17}

In foreign policy, the Party Leadership could not reach a consensus over the Cyprus issue. A still more damaging conflict within the LPT Leadership occurred, however, in 1968, after the 'Czechoslovak spring' brought about the intervention of the Soviet armed forces. While accounts about what happened in the LPT vary, it is clear that no less than in Leftist parties elsewhere, the LPT was confused and shocked by the Soviet move. Aybar spoke out against the intervention of the Warsaw Pact forces. At the local convention of the Istanbul branch of the LPT in November 1968, he came out for a new ideology, a 'humane socialism' especially suitable for Turkey.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp. 154-60.

\textsuperscript{17} I. Giritli, "Turkey since the 1965 elections", Middle East Journal, XXIII(3), Summer 1969, pp. 357-360.
This is described as a 'Libertarian' Turkish socialism preserving the so-called 'bourgeois Liberties' Turkish socialism preserving the so-called 'bourgeois Liberties', by these terms, Aybar understood the separation of powers, etc. The more dogmatic LPT Leaders, Behice Boran, Sadun Aren and Cetin Altan, took a diametrically opposed view of socialism and of the Party's way, and accused Aybar of unscientific populism.18

The 41-member Central Control Committee supported Aybar in crucial votes over this issue, and he was re-elected Chairman of the LPT. In an extraordinary Party congress at the end of December 1968, the group led by Aren and his associates obtained 11 out of the 41 votes of the central control committee. This was still a victory of the Aybar faction, but his all-embracing authority had been undermined. The 13 member central Executive Committee dissociated itself from this vote and published a statement in which it maintained that it was not bound by what Aybar might say, unless the speech was first cleared with the Central Executive Committee. Murat sarica and several others worked for a compromise, but failed. The rift widened, several LPT deputies and local organizations of the LPT siding with Aren and Boran, even though Aybar for a while maintained his hold on the party.

18 Ibid., pp. 357-60.
The rift in the party leadership, and the fact that the rift became public knowledge, was probably the worst thing that could have happened to the LPT. Following the Party's failure in the 1969 elections and the strife within its Central bodies, Aybar resigned from his functions in the LPT on November 15, 1969, and next day Mehmet Ali Aslan was elected Party Chairman. He was soon after succeeded by the above mentioned Saban Yildiz then by Boran.19

The LPT Leadership grew increasingly aggressive in its pronounced Marxism. Perhaps in order to forestall further rifts - such as a group of self-styled 'proletarian Revolutionaries' who published an irregular bulletin in 1970, Oncu: News of the Revolutionary LPT. They strongly opposed what they termed 'The Boran-Aren clique" and later seceded from the party.20 Early in 1971, the LPT intensified its activities in, for example, its say no to fascism demonstrations. In February 1971 it was taken to court by the authorities, which demanded the party's shutdown. The charge was that in the LPT's Congress in October-November 1970 decision had been passed in favour of the Kurds and in support of communism.

19 Ibid., pp. 357-60.
Munro, Robinson, and shorter have examined Turkey's massive internal migration and pointed to its Long-term contribution to widening disparities in regional population structures and dependency ratios. Munro's analysis of the 1965 census reveals twenty-five major routes of migration, through more than 800,000 persons changed residence from one province to another. About 60 per cent of the migrants settled in Istanbul and about 25 per cent settled in Ankara. The particularly strong attraction of Istanbul is indicated by the report in the 1965 census that only 963,000 of its 2,155,000 inhabitants were born in that province.21 Although the majority of emigrants are agricultural day Labourers, the emigrant population also generally includes the most capable Labourers between fifteen and forty years of age, leaving the poorer region's work force with an even more burdensome dependent population.

The large urban centres -- principally Ankara and Istanbul -- are magnets for the more dynamic elements of the population elsewhere, namely, the ambitious, the wealthy the intellectual, the skilled, the politician, the creative the frustrated, even the criminal. The growth element is thus being siphoned off the rest of the country, and the

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disparity between these centres and the balance of the country widens.\textsuperscript{22}

The argument is that such migration particularly harmful in already depressed areas, since their dependency ratios are also rising as a result of higher birth rates. Consequently, he emphasizes the increased importance of family planning to prevent a further deterioration of savings and investment potentials in such regions. Moreover, the exodus of Turkish migrant Labour to Europe may also be contributing to a further deterioration in the regional distribution of income. This is so, because a majority of those who work abroad come from the richer provinces originally and also because a significant proportion of those from poorer areas have moved to richer ones on their return, taking their repatriated earnings with them.\textsuperscript{23}

While migration has reduced the ability of less developed regions to generate savings, the proliferation of local branches of national banks has encouraged the flight of capital. Savings accumulated in the less developed provinces are transferred to areas of greater profitability

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., pp. 10-11.

and lower risk, depriving the poorer regions of a large part of their own scarce and independently created capital resources. The Marmara and North Central regions enjoy an overwhelming predominance in terms of per capita credit and together receive about two thirds of all credit extended. When credits are compared with deposits, it is clear that the flow of funds through the banking system has been away from the poorer regions of the east and toward the more developed provinces of the Mediterranean, the black sea and north central Anatolia. The arguments that even much public investment tends to reinforced the "regional dualism" in Turkish economic development despite the increased emphasis planners are placing on geographically balanced growth.24

The characteristics of Turkish regional development policy as "vacillating and confused" and shows that during the 1960s public investment was concentrated in Istanbul, Ankara, and Zonguldak, while the poorest areas benefited very little. The numerous regional studies for planning "growth poles" and establishing concentrations of industrial activity in selected locations, but he finds this policy generally preferable to the still ineffective alternative of subsidizing the few private entrepreneurs who are willing to relocate. The kind of investment projects

24 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
that are planned for the east are those that are least likely to create substantial new employment, since they are primarily capital-intensive heavy industry.

More important, he claims that policy makers have become discouraged about regional development and that the actual implementation of these growth pole plans indicates a shift toward further encouraging industry in the three largest cities and in the booming East Marmara cities of Bursa, Izmit, and Adapazari in order to realize the highest short-term returns.25

The high concentration of economic activity can be appreciated by observing the relative contributions of Istanbul and its four Erst Marmara neighbours Kocaeli, Sakarya, Bilecik, and Bursa -- in several economic fields. In 1965 these five provinces included about 12 per cent of total population and only 3 per cent of the national territory. Yet they also accounted for about one quarter of the gross domestic product, about one third of total value added in trade, banking and insurance, and other services, and one half of all large-scale manufacturing. When the data on industrial activity are broken down by sector, the extreme concentration of private manufacturing in Istanbul

is particularly clear. Whereas Istanbul contains only about 15 per cent of state industrial activity, it accounts for one half of all private sector firms and workers and two thirds of private industrial output. 26

There is also some indication that the already enormous relative economic importance of East Marmara region has increased even further since 1960. Even before the construction of the costly and highly controversial suspension bridge over the Bosporus, the Turkish planners, in effect, had adopted an unannounced strategy of preserving and further dividing a dual economy.

By concentrating efforts in areas where development has already occurred, the poorer areas are further drained of their potential in terms of existing resources -- Labour and capital -- decreeing their perpetual backwardness. This corresponds to an overt policy of having two countries: one prosperous with a modern industrial sector: the other a primitive agricultural society. 27

Besides increasing disparities in regional levels of development, rapid urbanization and industrialization in

26 Ibid., pp. 934-965.
27 Schmitter, Philippe, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of societal change in Western Europe", Comparative Political Studies, 10 (April 1977), pp. 7-38.
Turkey also have been associated with a highly unequal distribution of personal income. Several nation wide studies of income distribution in Turkey since 1963 have concurred in estimating that the richest 20 per cent of the population received about 60 per cent of total income, while the poorest 20 per cent received only about 4 per cent.

It may be that inequality has, in fact, increased over the last few years as a result of rapid industrialization, urbanization and inflation, though no definite statements can be made regarding trends. But it is also likely that the proportion of the population below an absolute poverty line has, in fact, decreased as a result of economic growth, emigration and the government's social policies. 28

Income is far more unevenly distributed in the agricultural sector than in the nation as a whole, and is evidently becoming even more skewed in view of recent trends in the distribution of land ownership. In 1973 the largest land holders constituted only 3 per cent of all farm owners, but they controlled about 30 per cent of all cultivated land and received 33 per cent of total agricultural income. There is also some evidence of an increasing polarization of Large and small holders between 1963 and 1973. During this period there was a substantial rise in the number of

28 Ibid., pp. 7-38.
landless peasants and agricultural wage labourers, a clear
trend toward the fragmentation of small holdings under
twenty hectares, and a general concentration of medium and
large holdings over fifty hectares. Given the generally
close correlation between landownership and agricultural
income, it is very likely that inequalities of wealth are
growing among the rural population. However, the categories
of inequalities was lowest among public employees and wage
earners; higher civil servants earned about twice as much as
lower civil servants, and technicians and skilled workers
earned about twice as much as unskilled workers.
Inequalities was far greater among agriculturalists, with
operators receiving over four times the income of non
owners, and it was greatest among the commercial and service
occupations, with large businessmen and professionals
earning five to seven times.

It is difficult to determine with any accuracy long-
term changes in the relative status of these occupational
groups or the varying degrees to which they have benefited
from economic development. Even so, the wide disparities in
growth rates of different economic sectors since 1960 and

29 Ibid., pp. 7-38.
30 Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political
Development, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984,
the clearly differential impact of inflation and taxation make it possible to form some tentative conclusion about the kind of social restructuration that has occurred in the context of uneven development in Turkey.

Agricultural income probably has experienced the greatest relative deterioration despite persistent government efforts to maintain to improve its absolute level through low taxation and high price supporters. This is due to the substantially lower growth rates of real per capita output in agriculture relative to other economic sectors and the sharp decline in the terms of trade for agricultural exports during the periods of rapid inflation.31

Public employees have suffered from a recurrent pattern of periodic declines in real income followed by only partial adjustments of their fixed salaries to match the rate of inflation. This has resulted in a growing exodus of technical and professional personnel to the private sector and in demands for the right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining. The recent "reform" of the civil service structure has ignored those demands in favour of substantial pay raises, whose principal effect was to accelerate inflation further.32

31 Ibid., pp. 62-65.
The wage earners shared civil servants' vulnerability to high taxation and inflation but since 1960 they have benefited from new minimum wage regulations and the much greater bargaining power of Labour unions. Since 1963 the real wages of organized workers covered by social insurance have risen at about the same pace as productivity in manufacturing and slightly faster than inflation. Comparable data are not available for unorganized and uninsured workers, but they are very unlikely to have fared as well as their organized counterparts.33

The greatest relative gains in income probably have been among commercial and professional groups, since they have been the principal beneficiaries of the redistributive impact of inflation while also being most able to escape the redistributive effects of taxation. In the first place, Turkey's income tax structure is only moderately progressive taxing the poorest brackets at a rate of about 13 per cent and the highest brackets at a rate of only 20 to 33 per cent. In the second place, tax laws have always provided numerous loopholes and opportunities for evasion to entrepreneurs, self-employed professionals. It is perhaps most difficult to generalize about long-term changes in the relative position. Since the nature and composition of that

33 Ibid., pp. 62-68.
group has changed greatly with the recent advances and changes in Turkish capitalism. Even more than agriculturalists, appear to have become polarized between those capable of consolidating their enterprises on a larger scale and those who abandon their trades to become lower-level civil servants or wage earners. In the meantime, public employees and wage earners have been running fairly close races with inflation, in which poorly organized civil servants have tended to lay behind while better organized workers have been able to their own and make occasional advances.\textsuperscript{34}

As uneven development has reinforced imbalances and inequalities between economic sectors, social classes, and geographic regions, the perception of interest conflict has sharpened between groups on the rise and group in decline. This increasing perception of interest conflict has provided a major stimulus for the rapid proliferation of associational organization and counter organization throughout every economic sector and geographic area. Both increasing interest conflict and its greater expression in associational interest groups have encouraged a recent fragmentation and realignment of the national party system. This overview of Turkey's social and economic transformation

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., pp. 62-68.
will be concluded by summarizing the new long term strategy of economic development and indicating briefly how it is likely to increase the intensity of interest conflict during the next two decades and, therefore, to impose still greater strains on the political system.35

Despite the widespread acceptance of political labour force, the three major union factions continue to advocate conflicting strategies of collective action that limit the political effectiveness of organized Labour and inhibit coalescence on the Left. The conservative leaders of Turkey wish to preserve the confederation's formal nonpartisan stance while expanding its control over the existing system of collective bargaining. The more militant social democratic dissidents seek an electoral alliance and possible merger with the people's party that will allow them to achieve in the political arena and through state regulation the economic gains that they still cannot achieve in direct negotiations with employers. The radical leaders of advocate political unionism, not as a limited means to establish a welfare state, but as an indispensable weapon in class struggles against private capitalists who are seen as abandoning democracy while the workers embrace socialism.

Turkish unionists most commonly explain these persistent differences in degree of Labour militancy as the result of differences in the personalities, partisan preferences, and ideological orientations of individual Labour Leaders.

The principal causes of Labour factionalism, Turkish unionists generally identify themselves and their rivals as exponents of three different Models of western unionism and provide rather idiosyncratic descriptions of those models. The unionists virtually always speak of the importance of personal leadership skills and of the strengths of their partisan appeals, seldom mentioning the more objective historical and economic factors that would provide more and less favourable contexts for different kind of union strategies. 36

Conservative, social democratic, and socialist Labour leaders find their strongest support from different kinds of workers in different kinds of work places. There have been some notable instances in which union policy has depended on the ability of a strong leader to shape an organization according to his self-image and personal philosophy or on the timely intervention of a party during a power struggle. But variation in the relative appeal of the factions has depended more consistently and more directly on two other

36 Ibid., pp. 288-310.
factors that have structured the development of union competition. These are, first the early role of the state in providing key grants of precarious privilege to selected union leaders and, second, important differences in the objective characteristics and circumstances of various segments of the working class.

Conciliatory bread and butter unionism has been most prevalent in work branches where the state has been the leading organizer of production. Particularly in large public manufacturing and mining establishments, pro-business governments and paternalistic managers have selectively sponsored pliable and cautious unionists and allowed them to establish a series of representational monopolies. These unions, whose core constituencies make up the bulk of the state industrial work force, consistently have been the largest, best-financed and most influential organizations in the Labour Movement.37

Political unionism and Labour militancy have been most popular in sectors where the development of serious collective bargaining has been opposed by public and private employers and where it remains a very unpromising means for

improving wages and working conditions. Where workers had to struggle to be included in the bargaining process, where their rights of participation still are narrowly circumscribed, and where they have been incapable of translating formal legal rights into greater economic bargaining power, union leadership sooner or later has become militant and sought to build broader working class and Party alliances. In fact, the proportion of organized workers in this latter set of categories always has been large in Turkey and in recent years it has been growing rapidly. Since 1960 workers in such categories have become a much larger and more important segment of the labour movement as unionization has spread into previously unorganized or poorly organized work branches, skill levels, and regions. This has caused an important shift in the center of gravity of organized Labour's constituency from sectors in which unionists have a modicum of Leverage and confidence in collective bargaining to sectors in which unionists see mass-based political action as the most effective means for defending their members' long term interests.38

Thus what is commonly known in Turkey as nonpolitical unionism has received more encouragement from official state sponsorship and generous foreign aid than from the slow

38 Ibid., pp. 226-240.
expansion and Limited institutionalization of collective bargaining. Political unionism, in contrast, has received more encouragement from the objective economic circumstances of the majority of the working class than from the modest receptiveness of union leaders to the colonization of Left wing parties or the appeal of radical ideologies. The principal reason for the increased strength of political unionism has been the gradual enlargement and restructuring of the Labour Movement to encompass a far more diversified and economically disadvantage constituency.39 These changes have led to unionists' greater perception of the practical need and opportunity to compensate for isolation and weakness at the bargaining table by translating the strength of organized Labour's growing numbers into a new and decisive advantage in the political arena. The rapid growth and transformation of Turkish Unionism can be seen in long-term changes in the density and the distribution of union membership in various economic sectors. Particularly after 1963 more rapid economic growth and more liberal public policies toward unionization promoted an impressive upsurge in total union membership. Between 1960 and 1971 the proportion of non-agricultural workers enrolled in

Labour unions rose from only 6 per cent to nearly 50 per cent. 40

This expansion of the Labour force also involved important changes in its composition. Labour Union membership, which before 1960 was heavily concentrated in the public sector's large manufacturing and mining establishment, has become highly diversified and much more representative of the working class as a whole. In the last two decades the overall thrust of new union organization has shifted from the public sector to the private sector, from manufacturing and transportation to construction and services, from larger, concentrated work sites to smaller, more dispersed work sites, and from sectors employing permanent skilled or semiskilled workers to sectors with large surpluses of seasonal common labour and white-collar workers. 41

Despite the generalized acceptance of Labour force and collective bargaining in the state industrial sector, their diffusion into other areas of the economy has been very limited, uneven, and often highly conflictive. The


41 Ibid., pp. 290-300.
experiences and problems of unionists who have taken the lead in organizing more hostile sectors and work branches bear little resemblance to those of unionists whose organizations were already well established by the early 1960s. Older organizations in state industry have benefited enormously from paternalistic public policies encouraging unionists to form large representational cartels supported by mandatory dues and providing workers with wages and benefits that generally exceed private sector standards. 42

In order to approach what these unionists have gained through years of collaboration and negotiation with the state bureaucracy, their weaker counterparts in other sectors have had to pressure or confront employers by mobilizing support in the courts, in parliament and in the general public.

The tendency for the three rival labour union factions to represent different core constituencies for which different economic and political strategies would be effective can be seen by comparing the distributions of their memberships across economic sectors. The conservative unions originated in the state industrial establishments and then extended their influence by including many private

workers in their own organizations and by aiding newer and smaller unions in private manufacturing.43

Because of their continued concentration in manufacturing and mining, especially in the public sector, the distribution of membership for these unions resembles the profile of the labour force twenty five years ago far more than the profiles of the other factions or of the current Labour force as a whole. The socialist unions originated primarily in the private and foreign owned manufacturing sector, where the militancy of their early organizational tactics drew support from the Workers' Party. The social democratic unions originally differed from the other two factions by representing a more diverse constituency that was not predominantly industrial and not heavily concentrated in either the public or private sector.

The overall pattern of Labour Organization indicates that the three factions have pursued strategies of partition and segmentation more commonly than strategies of direct competition and confrontation. The conservative unions have focused on enlarging and asserting greater control over their core constituencies in state industry while leaving most of the newer organization in more difficult areas to others. Aided by the public sector's rapid adoption of

43 Ibid., pp. 209-17.
automatic dues checkoffs and centralized collective bargaining, conservative unionists have come close to acquiring perfect representational monopolies over the state industrial work force.44

Moreover, ninety per cent of the workers in state industry are now dues-paying union members, and about eighty percent of these belong to conservative unions. In the nonindustrial sectors more militants Labour force achieved narrower majorities within smaller and much less densely organized constituencies. Social democrats represent the majority of organized workers in transportation and construction.45

However, the socialist represent the majority of organized workers in both public and private services. The only major economic area in which all three factions have competed directly for the same membership is private manufacturing. In this sector, where nearly two thirds of the workers are organized, conservative Labour Leaders about forty per cent of all union members, socialists about thirty-five per cent, and social democrats about twenty five per cent.


45 Millen Bruce, "Factions of the Turkish Labour Movement Differ over Political Role", Labour Review, June 1969, pp.31-35.
Socialist unionists have been generally content with this informal three way partitioning of the Labour force because it has allowed them to secure a firm position among an important segment of the working class and to preserve their autonomy vis-a-vis the larger union factions and the state. But conservative and social democratic leaders have been far more eager to replace segmental organization with a unitary structure in order to increase Labour's bargaining power with employers and the major parties. In the factional struggle to restructure the Labour movement the key initiatives have come, first, from the conservative faction's attempt to assert monopolistic control through corporatism and, then from the social democratic faction's attempt to become the preeminent partner in the people's party coalition by capturing control of both. The nucleus of conservative unionism in Turkey is formed by three organizations the state monopolies worker's union, the miners' federation, and the textile worker's union. These are the largest and wealthiest unions in the nation. Under the Democratic Party regime unionism in these work branches became dominated by leaders who were the most willing to moderate demands and to cooperate in policy implementation in exchange for grants of representational exclusiveness and formal consultation. The strength and endurance of the coalition's alliance with the Justice Party is based on the mutual ambition of these union and Party Leaders to conclude
a similar exchange encompassing the entire Labour force. The conservative coalition never has been able to transfer to Turk-IS the privileged status and cartel control that they enjoy in their own constituencies. Nevertheless, they have consistently dominated the confederation's general congresses and leadership selection and have used their superior financial resources to encourage conservative leadership and centralized organization in several newer and smaller unions.

The original prototype of conservative unionism is the state monopolies Workers' Union, which represents workers in the alcoholic beverage, tobacco, and food processing industries. The union's leadership has had a thirty year history of relying on Democratic and Justice Party patronage in dealing with employers in some of the public sector's most profitable enterprises. Government and employer sponsorship of the union since its establishment has promoted a style of representation that emphasizes disciplining and managing workers more than expressing their grievances and demands.

Since the early 1960s they have supported the widespread introduction of Labour-saving technology and accepted

46 Ibid., pp. 31-35.
stable or even declining employment in return for union shops and steady wage increases. The organizational strategy of Tek-Gida-Is has been to focus far more closely on centralizing the union's administration than on expanding its membership. Instead of trying to build a broader base by aggressively organizing the mass of related workers in the private sector, union leaders have concentrated on constructing a more unitary and vertical apparatus around their original constituency of state workers. The highly centralized system of collective bargaining, which union leaders regard as their principal achievement, has distributed benefits very unequally among the rank and file. 48

However, in private industry each faction has emphasized a different type of enterprise in its strategy of organization. Conservative Unionists are more dominant in consumer goods industries such as textiles, clothing, food processing, and beverages. In these areas unionization has been aided by the prevalence of work sites that are fairly large and concentrated by private sector standards and by the preexistence of well-financed parent unions in the state sector. Large government subsidies and incentives have stimulated new investment and exporting by these private

48 Prine, Suzanne; Exporting Workers: The Turkish Case, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 70-100.
firms, and its expansion at least temporarily allowed many employers to accept growing union pressures to make wages more comparable to higher public sector level.

Social democrats have won control in such intermediate industries as leather, wood and furniture, construction materials, and printing. Most of these work branches were originally organized with the aid of larger and unions loyal to the Justice Party, but during the 1970s their leadership were taken over, one by one, by more militant unionists sympathetic to the people's party. Because these branches are almost entirely under private control, unionists find it difficult the general practice of passing on to their own members some of the higher wage levels of state workers in related industries. 49

Furthermore, the firms in these categories are some of the most economically precarious and marginal in the private sector. Generally they are smaller, more scattered, more labour intensive, and more dependent on native capital than are other private manufacturing establishments. As a result, their labour forces have been more difficult to organise and coordinate and their employers have been more determined to resist the loss of cheap labour.

The industrial membership of the socialist unions is concentrated primarily in the metals, machinery, rubber, pharmaceutical, and petroleum industries. These are the capital goods and intermediate sectors that have absorbed the bulk of new employment and investment in private industry since 1960.

In general these areas contain the largest work sites, the biggest concentrations of foreign capital and imported technology, and the highest rates of profit and productivity in Turkey's private manufacturing sector. They also contain the country's largest, best financed, and most militant employers' unions, which have often shown less interest in promoting industry wide bargaining right of representation was the rubber industry.50

However, one of the most notable characteristics of the monopolies workers' leadership is that it has served as the principal recruitment channels for the presidency of Turkey. Naci Kurt, Seyfi Demirsoy, Halil Tune and Ibrahim Denizeier all spent their early careers in the Tek-Gida-Is hierarchy. Since 1960 an unbroken succession of state monopoly unionists has occupied the confederation presidency. Thus, the example of Tek-Gida-Is is important not merely because

50 Ibid., pp. 23-53.
it typifies the passive and manipulable state unionism that was so prevalent before 1960 but also because its leaders have been able to translate their early privilege and status into an enduring competitive advantage that still allow them to exclude militant rivals from top positions in the nations' peak association.\(^51\)

The mine workers' federation has a long history of corruption and wildeat strikes. Mining is a classic example of a work branch where state managers and union officials actually have provoked the violent worker protest that they feared because of their poor communication with the rank and file and their continued reliance on coercion as a means of Labour control.\(^52\) The union's biggest locals, in Zonguldak coal fields, primarily represent the special interests of the engineers, foreman, and skilled workers who make up the permanent, above-ground work force rather than the majority of unskilled underground workers who are rotated seasonally between the mines and their villages. Underground workers have derived little benefit from the introduction of collective bargaining. They continue to be the poorest paid workers in Turkish industry while suffering one of the

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51 Ibid., pp. 23-53.
52 Derili, Toker, The Development of Turkish Trade Unionism, Istanbul: Istanbul University Faculty of Economics, 1968, pp. 40-88.
highest rate of work-related accidents and fatalities. They often have complained of being excluded from wage increases and from voting on contract ratifications. They also have indicated resentment over large increases in union dues and over frequent 'special assessment' for disaster relief, scholarship funds, Cypriot refugees and military equipment purchases.

Supporters of the People's Party have gained strength in the federation by encouraging better grievances procedures and trying to boost the low turnout of rotational workers in union election. Yet even these unionists remain isolated from workers because of the leadership's common practice of appointing union stewards instead of allowing their election. Social democrats in other unions and in the People's Party frequently have been disappointed by the reluctance of their supposed allies in the miners' federation to support any important change in Turk-Is policy or Leadership.53

The textile workers' Union is the only conservative union that has undertaken a major expansion beyond its original public sector base. In 1965 about 95 per cent of its members were state employees, but by the early 1970s it represented over thirty thousand workers in twentifive

53 Ibid., pp. 40-88.
Sumerbank plants and nearly seventy thousand workers in more than three hundred private firms. Textile worker's central committee has insisted on maintaining firm control over the Union's rapid expansion, preferring to train younger leaders within its own ranks rather than to absorb and accommodate strong independent affiliates. This policy has caused textile workers to lose some able leadership, but it has been a critical factor in preserving the hegemony of older conservative unionists despite the rapid enlargement and diversification of their constituency. 54

The Union's Leaders present their centralized organization and bargaining practices as a model of the Labour Movement's future development. They are some of the strongest supporters of Turk-Is demands to reduce the number of work branches, to replace flexible federations with vertical unions, and to allow confederation leaders to coordinate industry wide and even nation wide bargaining. 55

They have assembled a large professional and research staff that has worked closely with Turk-Is and American advisers in strengthening the confederation's special service bureaus of organization, training and public

54 Ibid., pp. 40-80.

information. They also have tried to influence the development of smaller unions by giving financial assistance for membership drives and emergency strike funds. Even so, these efforts have produced as much resentment as gratitude among recipients, who often perceive textile workers' generosity and concern for worker solidarity as pressures to adopt its centralized model of organization and to fall in line with the confederation's policies.56

The textile workers' limited impact on other industrial unionists and its success in drawing private employers into collective bargaining can be attributed to Union's endorsement of one of the lowest and most uneven wage structures in the manufacturing sector. Since the introduction of collective bargaining, the average daily earnings of textile workers actually haven relative to other industries despite the upsurge in textile production and exporting. When workers began to express serious concern about narrowing the income disparities between its original public sector base and the large contingent of cheap female Labour that has fueled the private textile boom, private employers quickly retaliated with one of Turkey's first industry wide Lockouts. The union's central committee gradually agreed to a series of compromises trading wage

56 Ibid., pp. 413-431.
stability for greater job security and fringe benefits, but this response reinforced the growing militancy of several private sector locals and pushed even more members toward DISK. 57

The organizational development and economic role of the largest conservative unions can be summarized in terms of three common denominators. Union leaders have relied so heavily on assistance from public sector management to acquire status and security that they still are perceived by much of the rank and file as semi-official representative of the state. Second, centralized collective bargaining for diverse categories of workers has yielded relatively high wages and steady increases only for select minorities of the Unions' mass constituencies. These Labour cartels have become vast hierarchies of privilege in which conservative union leaders receive preferment from employers and extend similar treatment to already advantaged groups such as semi professional and supervisory personal, skilled workers, and males. Finally, by helping to maintain low labour costs and uninterrupted production in the basic consumer goods and mining industries, these unions have contributed greatly to the recent expansion and restructuring of Turkish industry

They have cooperated with many state enterprises that have de-emphasized their traditional function of increasing employment in favour of accumulating more capital, which in turn, is reinvested in labour-saving technology. They also have promoted private industry by allowing exporters to enter foreign markets with competitive prices and by supplying the privately dominated capital goods industries with cheap inputs.

While the big three unions provide the financial base and top leadership of the conservative faction, several small unions supply the faction's secondary leadership and ideological cutting edge. Whereas the moderate statesmen of the conservative faction come from the older and larger organizations, the 'hard line polemicists' come from three newer public sector unions with memberships of about thirty-thousand each -- the sugar workers' union, the largest of the public utilities workers' unions, and the health workers union. Each of these organizations arose in an unusual work branch that was specially created by the Ministry of Labour for state employees. Each became an enclave in which workers were cut off from the rest of the labour force and unionists were courted by conservative politicians. Each has produced a set of politically

ambitious leaders who have tried to compensate for their organizations' limitations in size and resources by acting as aggressive spokesmen for right-wing positions. 59

The social democratic faction is a diverse and changing collection of dissident affiliates that has included unions from all major work branches in both public and private sectors. The numerous additions to and defections from the social democratic coalition have provided an interesting barometer of growing labour militancy during the 1970s. This faction's instability and ideological eclecticism indicate that it has served not only as a clearing house for diverse grievances accumulating within Turk-Is but also as a convenient way station for unionists in different stages of radicalization. 60

Many of the senior people's party unionists who founded the social democratic in 1970 shed their hostility toward socialism, shortly after their defection, the social democrats were joined by several other affiliates in which traditionally conservative leadership were overthrown by younger supporters of the people's party. Thus, social democracy has appealed both to the young and cautious


60 Ibid., pp.551-573.
leaders of newly militant unions, breaking longstanding ties with the conservative faction, and to more experienced radicals, preparing to abandon their frustrating role as leaders of Turk-Is's loyal opposition in favour of an outright merger. By the end of the decade, when social democracy was spreading to former conservative strongholds, the movement already had been rejected as too moderate by many of the older veterans who had launched it at the beginning of the decade.

Although social democratic unionists have emerged in a wide variety of economic contexts, they have encountered many similar obstacles to organization and effective bargaining. In attempting to cope with and overcome continuing legal, economic and cultural obstacles to organization, social democratic unionists have shared a series of radicalizing experiences through which they have come to perceive a common need for stronger political alliances and mass-based political action. 61

The coalition's popularity and endurance are attributable primarily to these shared experiences and practical interests and not to the superficial and transitory attachment that is member demonstrate for an inchoate social democratic ideology or to the mixture of

hope and suspicion that they express regarding their allies in the people's party. 62

While the members of the social democratic coalition are distinguished from Turk-Is's predominant conservative faction by their insistence on political unionism, there has been considerable disagreement within the coalition itself concerning the appropriate arms of political action and its importance relative to collective bargaining. Within the labour movement in general, a scale of militancy has emerged in which unionists who occupy different positions on the conservative-radical continuum also tend to represent different functional segments of the working class. Different degrees of militancy characterize five functional subgroups in the coalition. The most moderate unions are those in state sector manufacturing and the most militant unions are those in local public services. Transportation and public utilities unions have been close to the moderates, private service unions have been close to the militants, and the construction unions gradually have shifted from the more moderate side of the coalition to the more militant side. 63

63 Ibid., pp. 497-512.
In the public manufacturing sector, strong social democratic unions have emerged only in the petroleum and defense industries. State employers in these areas have been particularly reluctant to imitate the example of other public industrial managers in sponsoring unionization and collective bargaining. Their unwillingness to dispense with traditionally authoritarian personnel practices stems primarily from the military's direct involvement in organizing production and from the obvious importance of both sectors to national security. Furthermore, in each area the state is dependent upon powerful and unpopular foreign partners and concessionaires whose business practices often finds objectionable, but whose operations it nevertheless protects against labour disturbances and Leftist political protests. The leaders of the defense workers' Union and the petroleum workers' union have been forced to engage in long struggles to gain union recognition. In no other industrial work branches has there been such persistent conflict between employers and unionists about their respective legal rights or such frequent state intervention to prevent, delay, and suspend strike activity.64

64 Ibid., pp.497-512.
On the one hand, the continuing inflexibility of state employers in these areas has encouraged the emergence of unionists who are more militant than their counterparts in the rest of public industry. On the other hand, the repeated use of state and military power has discouraged radical tactics in favour of moderate protests aimed at improving grievances procedures and relaxing restraints on collective bargaining. Social democratic unionists in state industry regard a political alliance with the People's Party primarily as a means of expanding and institutionalizing collective bargaining. This is particularly true of Petrol-Is, whose highly skilled membership already receives greater average earnings than all other segments of the industrial work force.