Chapter - I

INTRODUCTION

After the coup d'état of 27 May 1960, socialism as a doctrine gained the fertile ground in Turkey which was centered around the rapid modernization based on rational organization of economic life. The urban intelligentsia, notably university professors, teachers, writers, journalists and old time Marxists became the exponent of Labour movement in Turkey.

The expansion of production and increased popular participation in economic and political life paved the way for social awakening in Turkey. The downfall of the intellectual bureaucratic order which ruled the country until the end of the 1940s, and the subsequent rise to power of agrarian entrepreneurial groups, appeared as the initial phases of a process of change leading to mass participation in political and economic decision making.¹

The Labour Party of Turkey might be viewed, therefore, as an attempt to capture the leadership of the socialist movement and to organize and use it for its own ideological purposes. The party was originally established by a small group of trade unionists on February 13, 1961, with the idea of sending workers' representatives to parliament. The

party met with some negative reaction from the main body of trade unions but was soon ignored, since it seemed as innocuous as many other similar organizations\(^2\) despite the fact that it had opened branches in several provinces by May of 1961.

The Labour Party of Turkey was revitalized under the astute leadership of Mehmet Ali Aybar. He was unanimously offered the Chairmanship of the LPT\(^3\) by its founders and accepted it on February 1, 1962, when he was fifty two and already an active and well known socialist. Because of his legal education, he started publishing a weekly in Istanbul 'Free' Magazine when this was closed down by the martial Law authorities. The party was established on the same day the Ministry of Interior Lifted the ban on political activities. The "offer of Party Leadership" to Aybar came only a few weeks after YON issued its 'socialist' declaration and seemed to have taken the lead in developing socialism. Some of the founders of Yon had held talks with trade union leaders at the end of 1961, hoping to establish a socialist party of their own. The proposal for a working man's party was defeated in a trade union convention largely through the efforts of Labour Party members from the provinces. Another

---

2 A 'socialist' party was established in January 1960, by Atif Akgui and Alaettin Tiridoglu reviving a similar party established by the latter in 1959. Later this party merged with a Labour Party on March 3, 1961.

3 Means Labour Party of Turkey.
attempt to establish a Social Security Party by 293 trade unions with approximately 300,000 members, was not carried out, lest it destroy the economic orientation of Labour. These attempts to establish Labour Parties were described by Behice Boran, a former sociology professor and leader of the Labour Party, as a 'Capitalist plot' engineered to oppose and defeat the Workers Parties. Yon itself was looked upon with suspicion by Labour Party Leaders and looked down as a pseudo socialist organ, though their differences were not publicly aired.4

However, the leadership set about organizing it on modern lines, setting up central bodies, founding branches and preparing for future elections. Characteristically, Aybar declared that the Party's task was to work to solve the neglected problems of the people. The most severe of these problems, as he saw them were: the productive capabilities of the people were not being used: covert unemployment had reached five and a half million in agriculture and one and a half million in industry unfit for the Turkish Labour Force was gainfully employed, Turkey would remain a backward society: Turkey's balance of payments had a deficit of 430 million dollars: its system of taxation had grave deficiencies and discriminated against the workers, whose standard of living had hardly risen. Although a fairly large number of workers were members of

trade union, they were only on the threshold of political awareness despite the new constitution and its guarantees, only a hero dared to utilize the promised freedoms, such as that of expression because of governments' policies.\textsuperscript{5}

During the 1960s, Seyfi Demirsoy and Halil Tunc directed Turkish transformation from an isolated and largely symbolic structure into a centralized peak association, which they vaunted as 'the largest and most effective pressure group in the nation aside from the army itself.'\textsuperscript{6} Although the new freedoms granted to the Labour Movement after the 1960 coup d'é tat enormously strengthened the confederation's economic and political bargaining power, its new leaders were determined to avoid what they regarded as the self-defeating tendency of their predecessors to press worker demands so vigorously as to alienate the ruling party and invite repression. In the reformist atmosphere of the early 1960s much of the union leadership was eager to establish a labour party. A widespread debate arose over whether the new party should represent only the working class or all labourers, whether it should be socialist or nonsocialist and whether a satisfactory division of labour could be created between unionist, intellectuals and


professional politicians. Demirsoy discouraged all such proposals, insisting that Turkish labour cautiously abstain from partisan activity and alliances until it had achieved central control over a reorganized set of national unions. 7

The 1947 Law on Workers' and Employees' Unions applied the fragmenting and isolating strategy of 'debilitating pluralism' to the Labour Movement more directly than the law of Associations did to voluntary organizations in general. Rival Unionism was encouraged by permitting an unlimited number of organizations in the same work branch and allowing multiple membership without providing any authoritative mechanism for settling disputes over representation. The principle of voluntary membership was strictly applied to prevent the formation of union, federation or affiliation with any type of multi union organization required a formal endorsement from two-thirds of the membership. Several provisions also attempted to isolate the leadership of the Labour Movement from undesired political contamination. 8

Nonworkers, white-collar employees, and civil servants were prohibited from joining Labour Unions. Unions could not 'become the instrument of a political organization'. Affiliation with international organizations was permitted with approval from the Council of Ministers, but this was

7 Ibid., pp. 35-51.
not granted for affiliation with the International Confederation of Free Trade Union until 1960. 9

Labour Organizations were clearly expected to subordinate their own economic and institutional interests to national goals. The statute declared that 'unions are national organizations and cannot engage in activities that are unpatriotic or contrary to national interests'. Strikes were of course, illegal and participating unions could be closed down by the courts for up to one year. The role of unions in settling industrial disputes was limited to providing advisory opinions to courts and arbitration panels and petitioning against employer attempts to reduce wages. Unions were given the right to negotiate collective agreements for their members, but the prohibition against strikes provided employers with no incentive to engage in face to face bargaining. Thus, the clear intent of the Law was to promote a multitude of competing, small local unions, deprived of any substantial economic functions, prohibited from forming open political alliances, and dependent upon the good will of the government in promoting the welfare of their members. 10

However, Mehmet Ali Aybar was so closely identified with the LPT from 1962 on, that it is not always easy to

---

9 Toker Dereli, The Development of Turkish Trade Unionism, (Istanbul: 1968), pp. 61-79.
10 Ibid., pp. 80-100.
distinguish between his own view and those of the party in these years. In addition to several radio lectures and party pamphlets which he signed, there is a useful selection of his articles and speeches, characteristically named 'Non-dependence, democracy socialism. The 672-page volume includes selections from the years 1945 to 1967, arranged chronologically, each article and speech annotated with source and date. Almost five hundred pages refer to his LPT activities and are of interest to us.11

Aybar was nominated party Chairman by the LPT's founders on February 1, 1962. One week later a press release was issued on the matter. On February 9, 1962, Aybar came out with a statement of his own to the press. In it he forcefully stated his interpretation of Turkey's current situation and listed his principles for dealing with it. Although he was to elaborate on them in later years, these briefly enunciated views may well have served as guidelines for future actions. Aybar maintained that Turkey was in the middle of a grave crisis, whose roots lay in the country's history and of which political uneasiness was only a superficial sign. Turkish society could not be truly civilized, so long as it was burdened with a medieval economy. Speedy industrialization was the solution as agriculture too ought to be based on strong industry and advanced technology, to reach the level suited to Turkey's

11 I. Giritly, "Fifty Years of Turkish Political development", MEJ, xxiii(3), Summer 1969, pp. 154-164.
needs. Absolute non-dependence on others is a condition for the advance of science and technology. In order that the working masses could have a decisive say in these and other matters, a political force should be established. The aims ought to be etatism and planned economy, on the one hand, and a decisive role in Turkey's life for the masses, on the other. The LPT programme, Aybar added, maintains that only a union of working intellectuals with other workers could advance Turkey along the road of contemporary civilization. It was impossible to separate the demand for a human standard of living for the working masses from the demand for letting them have a decisive say in the affairs of their homeland; these were but two sides of one demand. He summed up by saying that the small LPT, by working steadily and scientifically for Turkey's highest interests, could step in and fill a void in the recently-created democratic order and reach a position of great power. 12

Stripped of the rhetoric, this meant that the working class should take matters into its own hands and reach a position of power to save Turkey by industrialization and planning and thereby also improve the workers standard of living. Put together, this was the theme of LPT aims under Aybar's chairmanship. Obviously, an ideological framework was needed to rationalize and explain them, and Aybar's writings and speeches went a long way towards one. Nurtured

12 Ibid., pp. 154-156.
by his Marxist reading in France during his studies there, Aybar's dialectical approach was simplistic, and seems to have allowed only for right and wrong good guy and bad guy with nothing in-between. The LPT stood for social justice others were against it; even if they employed the term -- then very much in use -- this was only lip-service. The LPT was for overall economic planning and etatism, for the benefit of the masses, including reform in Landholding, equitable taxation and widespread education. Its opponents were for private enterprise, allied to foreign investments aiming at exploiting Turkey's natural resources and at developing areas convenient to this exploitation not necessarily consonant with Turkey's interest. The workers led by the LPT, were the defenders of democracy and the constitution, their opponents were capitalists using fascist laws.

As Aybar saw it, the only possible way to break the vicious circle of economic crisis was to enable the Turkish workers to control the means of production for their own interests and the interests of Turkey not for foreign markets. A planned economy directed by the working masses would do away with exploitation, bring about extensive reform in Land-holding and develop Turkey's poverty stricken areas. The LPT wanted private enterprise to continue but

not to predominate. This is an open regime, one of complete equality as the LPT understood it, without a preferred minority. In other words, the Turkish worker should get his share of the national income. Aybar considered this true democracy and the only safe way to defend Turkey from fascism.  

All this and much more hinges on what Aybar's concept of socialism, Turkish style, really was. In this respect, a pronouncement of his delivered in Ankara on February 15, 1968, appears to be a fairly detailed exposition of his views. Elsewhere, he had labeled socialism as the philosophy of life. He had also honestly sounded a note of warning that there is no ready-made recipe for socialism. In the long discourse under consideration, socialism is, for Aybar, the regime that puts an end to exploitation and grants man real liberty. In Turkey, such a regime could be established only after a struggle: when the LPT comes to power, it would liquidate the capitalist regime and establish socialism. This could be achieved only through sacrifices, special efforts were necessary for socialism to succeed for Turkey still was an Ottoman type state. The LPT was a completely new party with different party regulations and a new program. The difference lay in the party's

14 Ibid., pp. 37-40.
concept of socialism, which Aybar explained in detail.\textsuperscript{15}

The main characteristic of Turkish socialism was change, directed at the current capitalist regime with its three elements - the agas, the compradors and the American-type of bureaucrats -- all three working to the benefit of American imperialism and international capital. These elements doubled their wealth and influence annually, while the working classes suffered greater unemployment, landlessness and poverty. Turkish socialism led by the LPT aimed at fundamental changes in the present regime in Turkey, which it considered bad and unjust, and the establishment of another in its place. Politics is a struggle for existence, a fight between the exploiting and exploited classes. This struggle was carried out under the aegis of the constitution within an equilibrium of forces that typified the democratic way. The constitution sided with the people and guaranteed their social rights. However, the ruling coalition of compradors and American type bureaucrats did not apply these paragraphs of the constitution. The Justice Party strove for the amendment of the constitution - thus aiming to legalize what Aybar labeled the usurping regime.\textsuperscript{16}

The present regime contradicted the constitution,


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp. 156-170.
changing the regime was to uphold the constitution. Bringing the working popular masses to power by voting the LPT in was the only way to obey the constitution and save the situation. Professor Sadun Aren, another central figure in the Labour Party of Turkey and one of its best brains is as much an intellectual as Aybar. He is a well known economist, and the author of a book on employment, money and economic policies, which went through at least three editions, a second book dealt with inheritance taxes, and another was an introduction to economics. While his scholarly work steered clear of politics a long section of Aren's first book was devoted to development policies in underdeveloped countries. Much of what he had to say was aimed at Turkey, even if he did not say so specifically but pursued a theoretical approach though state planning was his often repeated and clearly elaborated solution. 17

The evolution and transformation of Labour Party of Turkey were made ideologically vibrant by the efforts of Left leaning intellectuals like Aren, Aybar and Behice. They had revived it if not Soviet type revolution but to some extent workers friendly system in Turkey as pressure group. 18

Aren who started the career as professor in faculty of


18 Ibid., pp. 156-170.
political science in Ankara and remained engaged in intellectual activity. During the tenure as professor he visited Switzerland, England, France and the United States for extensive research in economics. In 1965 he started active political life by getting elected to National Assembly from Istanbul on the Labour Party of Turkey's ticket. Subsequently, he resigned from University professor and sat in the National Assembly until 1969. With the defeat of LPT in 1969 election, weakening of Aybar's standing, Sadun Aren and Behice Boran were surfaced in decision-making position in the party.

Aren influenced by Marxist views applied the ideological yardstick in LPT's formation, and abstract economic terms were evidenced on the issue of employment, money and economic policies. The articles written by him in different journal supported the viewpoint of etatism. He favoured public sector over private sector and least control on economic matters by state. These views were shared by Turkish intellectuals both inside and outside of Labour Party of Turkey with certain variations.19

In late 1960's, Sadun Aren moved further to Marxist type socialism and demanded restriction on private sector. These views were expressed in his popular handbook of economics with emphasis on agricultural and industrial

19 K.H. Karpat; Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, London: 1968, pp. 358-376.
situation of Turkey. These ideas were interpreted in the light of Marxist theory. Aren's association with Mrs. Behice Boran, formerly a Lecturer in Sociology at Ankara University breathed a new life in LPT by her innovative political skill. She along with Aren ousted revolutionary Aybar from party leadership in 1969. This resulted into a factions of Boran-Aren group of LPT with the ouster of Aybar. In reality this faction enjoyed much of the support in and out of party.20

Aren proposed to use statism as an ideology for mobilizing the masses, and through it make factories and establishment centres of civilization and culture, in fact, true schools. "The emphasis on statism was legally concordant with the constitution, which had accepted the principle of a mixed economy granting equal place to private and state enterprises. The impact of these ideas was evident in the Labour Party's first national convention held in Izmir on February 9-10, 1964. The delegates were selectively chosen so as to allow those with political consciousness to exercise leadership instead of having a large group without consciousness who would give place to wavering.21 The delegates included all members of the central and Disciplinary Committees, the members of the provincial executive and disciplinary committees, and only


21 Ibid., pp. 49-87.
one provincial delegate for each 1000 members with paid dues. The latter's number would never exceed the number of deputy seats legally allotted to that province. The clause gave overwhelming power to the central bodies, that is, to those men deciding the party policy. This article, though criticized as undemocratic, was not amended. The convention amended the by-laws to strengthen the power of central bodies and define members duties. The member was to follow faithfully and program and by-laws, obey the decisions and directive of competent party organization, and fulfill thoroughly the responsibilities assigned to him. He was to vote for party candidates and use every opportunity to enlist new members and disseminate information about the Party's program and goals. He was to obey all decisions even if he personally disagreed with them.22

A new, voluminous party programme was presented to the convention by Yahya Kanbelat, Sadun Aren, Ismet Sungurbey and Behice Boran - none of whom was a worker and at least three were known as dedicated Marxists. The program begins by reproducing a declaration by the First Turkish National Assembly of October 21, 1920, condemning capitalism and imperialism. It defined the party as being the political organization, marching to power through Legal means and based on history and science, of the Turkish working class.

and of the groups which arrived consciously at the happy conclusion of seeing unity of fate with the working class, and followed its democratic leadership, such as socialist intellectuals, agricultural workers, Landlords, and insufficiently landed peasants, craftsmen, small businessmen and salary and wage earners, low income professional in a word all citizens leading a life based on their own effort.  

The program stressed the party's desire to follow democratic ways and to respect the constitution. It gave an extensive analysis of Turkey's social structure in order to dramatize the country's backwardness, and the existence of an overwhelming number of working-men, thus justifying the need for radical social reforms. The program also presented a doctrinaire interpretation of Turkish history and arrived at the conclusion that once workers became organized and acquired class consciousness nobody could oppose them for very long in carrying out their historical mission in achieving social progress and democracy.

The Labour Party was the living symbol of the fact that workers were becoming politically conscious and were bound to mobilize all toilers despite a regressive trade unionist leadership serving the ruling classes. The party was the political means for achieving a workers' democracy, while statism represented its social and economic dimensions. The

main solution to Turkey's problems, according to the program, lay in the political field, namely, in bringing workingmen to power through political education by the party, under the protection of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. The key production and exchange means were to be nationalized. The program rejected Western methods of development as being inapplicable to Turkey implemented and controlled through workers' participation. Private enterprises was to be an auxiliary of the state economy in this planned framework and gradually limited, as its functions were taken over by government enterprises. The LPT was joined by intellectuals, who knew more precisely what socialism was. The close collaboration of workers and intellectuals had made the party what it was. Together workers and intellectuals prepared regulations and a program adapted to conditions in Turkey. There had been different views as to the stand the party ought to adopt towards populism, that is whether or not to become a mass-party. Boran emphasized the role of the LPT as a vanguard; she saw this as the basic principle of the people's activity. The LPT could stay in the vanguard of the worker's movements by fighting for those causes which were shared by and agreed upon by the whole workers' movement that for Turkey's industrialization and against any exploitation of the workers by rolling

24 Ibid., pp. 7-32.
capitalist groups, both foreign and local. While in the industrialized countries of the West industrial workers were the core of the development and struggle of the working class in non-industrialized Turkey the workers had to unite in order to fight the bourgeois, both in Parliament and out of it. Before 1965 the working class voted in parliamentary election, but its members were never elected.²⁵

However, the socialist movement in Turkey during the 1960's had steadily grown stronger and broader despite external and internal struggles -- a matter in which it did not differ from other socialist movements. The events within the LPT, asserted Boran, might be characterized under two main headings: as the LPT was a socio-political movement, it was inevitable that, in the course of the years, inner differences of opinion would appear. The upper levels of the party succeeded in maintaining a balance between these differences and keeping them within bounds: but as soon as a rift occurred, it became public knowledge, side by side with its socialism, the party's growth and development called for many practical decisions. Such questions as democracy within the party assumed cardinal importance. In this respect, certain vulnerable spots became apparent. Moreover, the state was to establish basic industry and operate it as property, distribute land to peasants, and adopt a programme of land cultivation through

a system combining state, cooperative and private farms. Economic education was to be implemented according to the principle income effort culminating eventually in the abolition of a system based on the exploitation of man by man. The programme claimed that the party believed in the existence of social laws similar to physical laws above man's will power, but that this would not prevent outside intervention in order to achieve rapid harmony between historical conditions and social evolution. Science was the only road to follow; the party policy was to be defined according to scientific realities. 26

The programme in general was consistent with the party's outward idea of establishing a system based on the leadership of the working class. The doctrinaire, deterministic view of society and history was accompanied by various side interpretations and formal concessions to prevailing ideas in society, and formal respect for the constitution in order to enjoy its protection. Basically the programme sought several practical aims: first, to present a broad and cohesive interpretation of socialism, in order to attract all intellectual groups and prevent the rise of another form of socialism; second, to acquire a large popular following in order to assert its place among the other parties and forestall any effort to outlaw it; third to claim intellectual superiority by presenting a

26 Ibid., pp. 290-300.
total interpretation a standard idea for upcoming generations and, fourth, to emphasize its preoccupation with national problems and thus avoid discredited as a tool of a foreign power as has happened to other leftist parties in the past. 27

However, the LPT primarily made the mass support base among the lower middle class and working class of people. The subaltern approach of LPT attracted the lower class of masses into its firm grip as cadre force who strengthened the position of party in periodic election of Turkey.

Because of revolutionary socialist ideology LPT made swift dent into the lower middle class where there were no industrial workers to be found. Winning the votes of lower-middle class circles would make it very difficult to preserve the socialist nature of the LPT. While the party strove to reach power through the socialist nature of the LPT. 28

While the party strove to reach power through parliamentary elections within the provisions of the constitution, it did not solicit votes. It wanted only the votes of the truly aware voters, that is of those workers and labourers who were class-conscious and intended to gain positions of power because they considered it necessary to

27 Ibid., pp. 290-300.

change the regime and give it a socialist direction. Only if the LPT won power with the support of such convinced voters could it achieve its goals. She also doubted whether an electoral success by other means would last for the four-year term of the National Assembly. The convention displayed outward unity but internally was torn by a series of problems and divisionary activities. These consisted largely of different interpretations of social classes and of leadership. It was obvious that various groups of workers, some still in traditional forms of occupation and often related to their employees by non-economic ties, could not be lumped together with those supposed to lead the fight for a workers' democracy. Since the workers elite was in trade unions and apathetic to organized politics, the party had to devise a comprehensive sociological - rather than professional definition of working men. Finally, several party members following Algerian revolutionary Bin Bella's ideas, proposed to make the peasants the leaders of the social movement.

After the convention a few members resigned from the central committee. Esat Caga, appointed to senate by the President, denounced the dogmatic imitation of foreign models adopted without regard for their compatibility with Turkey's realities and continuous change of social conditions. The extreme Marxists, usually urbanite...

29 Ibid., pp. 460-480.
intellectuals, also denounced the Party's opportunism and compromise in favour of popular support some of the critics were soon expelled from the party as voicing the ruling circles views, Aybar's group took firm control. The efforts of others to gather a new convention failed. The new programme, the party's formal effort to uphold the constitution, and its outward moderation produced excellent results as the bulk of uncommitted, social-minded intellectuals began to side with it. Meanwhile, the Cyprus dispute enabled the party to inject a much needed nationalist ingredient into its propaganda and thus expand its own influence. This dispute, causing growing deterioration in Turkey's relations with the West led to rapprochment with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the controls over leftist activities lessened and the Soviets took full advantage of this in inviting neutral and socialist writers to Moscow; the latter dutifully publicized the Soviet achievements under socialism. The Moscow visits of Turkey's foreign Minister and afterwards premier Suat Hayri Urguplu, returning the visits to Ankara of Andrei Gromyko and a Soviet Parliamentary delegation, played their part in melting away suspicion towards the Soviets, especially after the later came fairly close to supporting

30 Ibid., pp. 460-480.
the Turkish view on Cyprus.31

While the party strove to reach power through parliamentary elections, within the provisions of the constitution, it did not solicit votes. It wanted only the votes of the truly aware, that is of those workers and labourers who were class-conscious and intended to gain positions of power because they considered it necessary to change the regime and give it a socialist direction. Only if the LPT won power with the support of such convinced voters could it achieve its goals. She also doubted whether an electoral success by other means would last for the four-year term of the National Assembly. However, the Republican Party, which headed three coalition governments until 1965, viewed sympathetically the laborites' efforts to attract the peasants and workers. It hoped that this would weaken the popular support of its main opponent, the Justice Party. Indeed, the accusations of communism, and after that physical attacks on the Labour Party by rightist groups, caused negative reactions among the public after these outbursts of violence were described as the Justice Party's desperate efforts to preserve its control over the lower classes. Consequently, the Labour Party intensified further its activities. It published a variety of newspapers, Toplum (society) in Gaziantep, Cagiri (Call) in Samsun,

Emekci (Labourer) in Istanbul and later Rencper (Farmer) in Ankara, Uyanan Isci (Awakened worker) in Ankara, along with the doctrinaire reviews Eylem (1964) Action, and Sosyal Adalet (Social Justice) in Istanbul. It also issued regularly a Haberler Bulteni (News Bulletin). 32

Following the above developments a large number of intellectuals, some senators, former officers, many of whom had only a normal yearning for social progress, joined the party. Yet, despite a drive to expand its organization, the party failed to establish enough provincial branches and thus qualify legally to enter the senatorial elections held on June 7, 1964. But it intensified its efforts and qualified for participation in the national elections held on October 10, 1965. In this last election the party tried to assure itself of representation in the Parliament. 33 It avidly sought publicity and complained that the press ignored it, though in reality it received far more coverage than its due. The party aimed at securing the highest possible number of ballots in order to divide the popular vote and bring about a coalition government since weak governments ruling in Turkey in 1961-1965 had helped its own rise. Moreover, viewed the election of 1965 as preparing, legally and politically, the ground for taking power in the

32 Ibid., pp. 36-55.

33 It must be stated, however, that the review Eylem represents a group of ideological minded intellectuals, either in the Party or sympathizing with it, who differ from the official line.
elections of 1969, and thus, as the Chairman put it, to bring, through vote, the working popular masses to power. This would have a world wide importance for such an experiment occurred nowhere. Indeed there is not yet any Marxist regime which has reached power by popular vote. 34

The party entered the elections in 51 provinces out of a total of 67. Its 382 candidates, according to the party's own classification, were grouped as follows: 101 workers, farmers and agricultural employees, 27 trade unionists, 27 craftsmen, 23 small businessmen five drivers, four women, 20 journalist, three artists, 14 officials, 21 technicians, four professors, 11 engineers, 36 lawyers, 22 liberal professions, ten businessmen and contractors. The top places on the provincial electoral lists, however, were usually given to intellectuals and spokesmen for the party's central bodies in order to assure their election to the Parliament.

The Chairman, Mehmet Ali Aybar, opened the campaign in Istanbul with a strong denunciation of the United States for its bases in Turkey its 'imperialistic policy and its opposition to the Turkish cause in Cyprus. Americans have seized all our national resources, be declared, oil companies dare to send insolent cables to our government and threaten the state. In these circumstances brother workers, citizens, your first duty is to deliver the country from

foreign occupation. Further on, in another chapter on "the Turkish socialist movement, from the point of view of social structure, Boran argued that Turkey's socio-economic backwardness was so great, that only a socialist overall solution could help it, as in the case of other underdeveloped countries. In Turkey, as Boran saw it the situation was compounded by the country's feudal regime, mainly in the east and southeast. Turkish reaction to the alliance between this feudal regime and foreign capital could be gauged by the increasing political awareness of Turkish workers, their increasing support for the LPT, and the relatively political neutral Turkish, as well as the anti-American and anti-NATO demonstrations.35

The general growth of the working class in Turkey prepared a favourable climate for all these trends. This was meaningful since the peasant masses in Turkey did not have an ideology of their own and tended to adopt a bourgeois ideology. In numbers, however, they were an important base for the socialist movement, their political involvement would increase with land reform and the mechanization of agriculture. The small artisans and tradesmen resembled the capitalist class in their places of work and the working-class in their physical labour. They were estimated at 1.5 million in Turkey and like other

workers were unjustly exploited by capital. Their basic pro-bourgeois feelings were exploited by capital. Their basic pro-bourgeois feelings were exploited by the leadership of the Turkish bourgeois, as when Demirel promised them that they would become factory owners.36

Finally, the socialist movement in Turkey, led by the LPT during the 1960's was in a position to win over the intellectual classes, too. Since the people, including the working masses, were still largely under the influence of bourgeois ideologies, Boran argued for an all-out effort to spread socialism and explain its egalitarian views. This would strengthen the features of welfare state vis-a-vis socialism as an state ideology.

Boran's socialist thought is only briefly analysed here. Other opinions of hers, equally interesting and ably expressed, as an Turkey's development and the direction it ought to follow, are more in line with the LPT's official policy. Boran does not always bridge her former attitude to socialism with her new one, as expressed in her book's second edition. For instance, there is some discrepancy between her earlier approach to socialism -- as having to suit local conditions -- and her later more rigid view of the world wide and immutable laws of socialism. There is, however, little doubt about her no-nonsense attitude towards elections and vote-getting, which she scorns. She clearly

36 Ibid., pp. 263-70.
prefers to stress educational-propagandist efforts for the preparation of cadres, to lead Turkey to socialism. This is much more than just a tactical difference of approach; it refers both to LPT ideology and its whole strategy of political action.\textsuperscript{37}

Cetin Altan was a younger thinker in the top ranks of the LPT, remarkably influential in certain youth circles. He was born in Istanbul in 1927 and graduated from the renowned Galatasaray Lycee, then from Ankara University's Law Faculty. Altan, who reads both English and French, has traveled extensively. He has published poetry and several plays, but is even better known for his journalistic activity. In the 1950's and 1960's he was one of the most widely-read Leftist journalists at least in intellectual youth circles. A study among Ankara University students, for example, found that he was their favourite columnist. After having joined the LPT in the early 1960's he was elected in 1965 to the National Assembly, but was not selected in 1969.\textsuperscript{38}

Cetin Altan's speeches in the National Assembly followed the party line, only more emphatically. Being irritating was their most striking characteristics. For instance, in a long speech on November 8, 1965, vehemently

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., pp. 105-115.

criticized the JP government's programme and accused it of keeping Turkey one of the world's ten most backward states and many of its workers at the poverty level of TL 5 to 10 daily wages. He denounced the capitalist exploitation of underdeveloped countries and called for the only way out industrialization as socialists understand it. In another speech a month later, Altan violently denounced the country's black market, describing it as characteristic of corruption, speculation and shady dealings. Similarly, on July 20-21, 1967, speaking on the move to withdraw his parliamentary immunity, he posed as the champion of free speech and free writing, and accused his detractors of fascism, barbarism and similar evils. However, forceful his speeches were, they were more in the nature of tactical moves to support or propagate LPT attitudes than part of a crystallized ideological approach and similar evils.39

Cetin Altan's scathing views on colonization and imperialism are a constant theme in his writing, his own brand of socialism is more difficult to grasp and define. Perhaps the best source for this is a book he wrote, which appeared in the summer of 1967 and went through at least three printings in the same year, "As they awaken the handbook of Turkish socialists. It is actually a combination of two different works: an instructive collection of eighty letters Altan received while at the

39 Ibid., pp. 371-398.
National Assembly by Turks from all strata of society are published verbatim, while the book's first 70 pages are a reply of sorts to the letters and amounts to Altan's own socialist credo. Characteristically, it is dedicated to the peasant, artisans, small tradesmen, clerks without backing and the exploited, hard pressed, ill-treated working-class.40

In what he termed 'an unpretentious simple explanation, Altan drew a picture of the class contrasts in Turkey. According to him, bourgeois circles were guilty of unlimited dictatorship, which Altan labeled 'fascism'. He saw in capitalism a pack of lies, first and foremost of which was the claim that it was a free system; if so, this was freedom for the bourgeois only. There existed no equality within the capitalist order. The child of the rich was born wealthy, while the child of the needy was born poor: one child would be literate, the other illiterate. The respective risks of boss and workers were unequal: the latter might become an invalid, the former could find refuge in bankruptcy. In a capitalist regime banks helped employers rather than their employees. In times of crisis, the workers suffered most. Turkey had about a million overtly or covertly unemployed. In the United States official figures showed there were more than five million jobless. The ruling bourgeois class was evidently

40 Ibid., pp. 371-398.
interested solely in its gains, while a planned economy would take into account the interests of the whole population. Only an economy geared to the interests of the workers would use Turkey's natural resources for the general good. Capitalism, which is essentially exploitation, would not lower prices and thereby its profits; it would prefer over production and subsequent unemployment. To solve their own problems, factory owners increasingly produced weapons and munitions. In the United States, according to Altan, nearly half of all workers were employed by the defense industries. A planned economy would be able to direct workers towards more peaceful work. Meanwhile, Altan maintained, the capitalist system should be forced to give the workers their due wages, weekly leave, social security, and let them have a say in the management of their places of work. Such measures were insufficient, however, and capitalism should and would be uprooted. The Labour Party of Turkey provided the socialist rationale behind the existing labour force in Turkey. This party was founded on 13th February 1961 by a number of trade unionists who sought to use it as a vehicle for working class representation in the assembly. The appointment of Semsettin in Gunaltay was the last straw for Republican extremists. He was a professor of history, with a reputation for Islamist

sympathies, and the extremists believed that he was capable of turning his back on Kemalism. As a protest against Gunaltay's appointment, the nationalist poet Behçet Kemal Caglar resigned his seat in the Assembly and left the RPP. There were rumours that there would be a split and that the extremists would form a new party to be called the Kemalist Party. The split in the RPP was avoided and Gunaltay began to implement a programme of reform which he hoped would appease the opposition, win over a sullen and dissatisfied population and lead the Republican Party to victory in the coming general election. One of Gunaltay's first announcements was the decision to adopt an overall economic plan to deal with Turkey's problems. A committee consisting of Necmettin Sadak, Nihat Erim, Nurullah Sumer, and Tahsin Banguoglo with Gunaltay as Chairman was set up.42

Gunaltay also began to implement his liberal policy towards organized religion, which later gave him the claim to boast of himself as the liberator of Islam in Turkey. At the same time government increased its repressive activities against the Left. The Turkish Left was neither big nor organized. Some socialists took advantage of the relative political freedom after 1945 to emerge into the open, but their activities were restricted to an appeal to the intelligentsia, of which they were themselves members. Some

42 Firoz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-75, pp.220-240.
even founded political parties. The most famous of these was the Socialist Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey, founded on 19 June 1946 by Dr. Sefik Husnu Degmer and closed down by the Martial Law authorities on 16 December. The Republican regime had always been hostile to the Left and Stalin's aggressive designs on Turkey in 1945 did not encourage the Turkish government to adopt a more tolerant attitude towards Left. During the Cold War, in which Turkey soon came to play an active part through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and later the North Atlantic Treaty Organization all those with socialist sympathies were seen as fellow-travelers and potential traitors. It was in this climate that the socialist writer Sabahittin Ali was murdered on 2 April 1948, allegedly by someone working for the police. It was also in 1948 that four professors were forced out of Ankara University as the result of a 'Witch hunt' to liquidate all possible leftist influence in the schools. Both the Republicans and the Democrats were agreed on the need to crush the Left and this task was duly accomplished in the early 1950s.43

The rest of the period up to the election was devoid of any new political issues and the Democrats found themselves reverting to their old tactics of trying to create issues in order to keep political tension as high as possible. They were always able to embarrass the RPP by harping on its

43 Ibid., pp. 220-240.
repressive past, so deeply engraved on the consciousness of the Turkish people, or on the prevailing economic destitution about which the RPP had been able to do little. The Democrats pursued a policy of cautious radicalism, which amounted to being cautious in action and radical in words. After Inonu government's defeat in 1965 the Party became more radical and the general election in October became its principal concern. There was, however, a strong reaction in the party against the 'turn to the Left'. According to a conservative Republican, Bulent Ecevit's speech before the party's youth congress in May, with its reference to nationalization, was a clear indication of the new orientation. The enrolment of three of 'the Fourteen' was also an indication of how the opposition parties would be able to exploit the RPP's reformism, especially once it adopted the slogan 'Left of centre' to describe its position in Turkey's political spectrum.44

The term 'Left of centre' was introduced to the public in Inonu's statement published in Milliyet on 29 July 1965. The controversy which resulted from this proved extremely costly at the polls on 10 October. The opposition parties, especially the JP, immediately began to use the slogan as a weapon against the RPP. In logic reminiscent of Alice in wonderland, being Left of centre, was explained "as being in

44 Tachau, Frank and A.H. Ulman, 1968, "Dilemmas of Turkish Politics". In Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1964, Ankara, Faculty of Political Science, pp. 1-34.
the centre of the left, Left of centre as the road to Moscow was intended to arouse the anti communist response conditioned by the word Moscow. It could not have been otherwise in a country where 'democrat' was symbolized by the white horse".

The Republicans were caught by their own ruse designed to undermine the position of their socialist rival, the LPT. They were forced to explain 'Left of Centre' and that proved particularly difficult in the countryside, where counter-propaganda using traditional factors like religion and private property was far more effective. Few people outside the urban areas were comforted by the thought that Sweden, Norway, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany were not communist but were ruled by 'left of centre' governments.45

Ali Ihsan, one of the younger men Inonu had brought in to rejuvenate the party, tried to explain that the word 'Left' is not an indication of communism as some people claim communism could be prevented by using rational means not by shouting 'may the communist perish!' Left of centre is not a matter of Ahmet and Mehmet, it is the issue of solving the problem of this country. Finally, three days before the election, Inonu decided to moderate his party's position by stating over the radio that 'the state, the

45 Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in changing Societies New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, pp. 131-60.
constitution and the RPP are all Left of centre.46

The election was a disaster for the party but there was now no turning back. Not only had the party made clear its intentions about pursuing a radical policy; it had also brought to the forefront younger radicals like Bulent Ecevit to represent such a policy. Initially the slogan had been accepted only as a talisman for the election, since the conservative elements, after successive electoral failures, could offer no alternative. The electoral defeat worse than any other Republicans had suffered, discredited the slogan and the policy if represented and left the party torn with dissension. The situation of the RPP after its adoption of the Left of Centre stance was similar to its position twenty years earlier after it had passed the Land reform bill. In both cases the forces of the status quo were mobilized in order to curb the rising tide of reformism. On the first occasion, dissension had led to the formation of the Democratic party; in 1965 events had yet to unfold. But the forces of the status quo took the initiative and tried to reverse the radical-reformist trend in the party.

The first spokesman for this group was Tahsin Banguoglu, the RPP senator for Edirne, who held Inonu responsible for adopting the slogan and leading the party to

defeat. Not to see such open realities one has to be senile or be influenced by a group of profiteers around oneself. Some officials of the party have lost themselves to such a degree that they seem willing to risk taking Turkey behind the Iron curtain. But it should not be forgotten that what the Turkish nation rejected was the wrong policy of Inonu at the end of his days and not the Republican people's party. The party will continue to fulfil its historic mission.47

Inonu did not intend to resign; he had declared in Trabzon before the election. "I will not give up politics until the reforms have been carried out". And after the election, he reaffirmed this in an interview with Mehmet Barlas. Had Inonu left the party at this point there would have been a bitter and uncontrolled struggle for power between radical and the conservative factions with victory in the balance. His presence assured a gradual evolution of a sudden shift in one direction or the other. Although the slogan 'left of centre' was used before and during the election campaign it is doubtful whether its effect on the electoral fortunes of the party was as serious as the critics claimed.

The RPP was unlikely to win the election in 1965. In spite of its political record, the supporters of the status quo considered it too progressive, and the radicals were disillusioned with it for being progressive in words,

47 Ibid., pp. 1-43.
conservative in action. The decision to introduce the slogan was regarded as an investment that would pay off, not in 1965 but in 1969 or even 1973. For the moment it was a question of defeating the conservatives in the party and establishing a consensus around the new orientation.48

Few people recognized or understood the fact that Inonu had been forced to adopt this slogan by the political changes of the sixties. After the founding of the WPT the Republicans had to define their position in the political spectrum. The 30 or 40 per cent of the total vote which the party had traditionally received was no longer guaranteed, since many votes were now going to the Justice Party or the LPT. Inonu recognised the danger that the country, especially its intelligentsia, might swing to the left if one of the major parties did not provide an alternative.

Inonu visualized a threat to Turkey from the Left represented by WPT, and the extreme Right, as yet not politically organised but manifesting itself in the Justice Party. He was willing to make his party the bulwark against the Left if only Demirel would agree to do the same thing on the right. The party in power outspokenly expresses its identity. This is an improvement. I see it as right wing. I tell them: "you protect our right wing from extremists and I will protect the Left Wing and then there will be no fear

48 Mardin, Serif, "Center and Periphery: A key to Turkish Politics?" in Political Participation in Turkey. Istanbul: Bogazici University Publication, 1975, pp. 7-22.
in the country". Will the Justice Party be able to protect itself from this? They have not done so far.⁴⁹ From the Nurist to the reactionary everyone joins the Right. Compared to them we are a Left-wing party. There is a threat on our Left also; but we will protect ourselves from that. The debate in the party continued to rage into 1966. The opponents of the Left of centre policy spoke in pragmatic terms, arguing that the country was too backward and conservative; and unprepared to accept such a radical departure. Others claimed that the people did not understand what the term stood for. And they were probably right: the Republicans were not clear about this either. On 2 December 1965 Cumhuriyet reported that twenty seven different definition of Left of Centre had been offered in the party. There were also the opportunists who proposed that the RPP ought to come to power first by using other, more popular slogans and then implement a 'Left-of-centre' policy.

Inonu, however, refused to abandon the slogan; he was wise enough to recognise that such a step would be disastrous for the credibility of a party whose sincerity was already in question. But he became more moderate in his statements and emphasized that his party was not becoming Marxist or socialist and that they were opposed to

communism. He reassured the capitalists that the RPP was not opposed to their interest either. The private sector was used against us in the last election . . . The ignorance of the private sector is that it considers our measures on taxation and other things are against it. But it is wrong. A country has to make sacrifices for development. The criticism had its effect and the slogan was virtually dropped in the campaign for the partial senate elections of 5 June 1969. However, the party fared no better than in the general election. But as Ecevit has demonstrated with election statistics, this had little to do with slogans, for the JP was also losing votes even though it had won the election. The voters were obviously disillusioned and angry with the traditional parties. 50

The RPP's Central Committee had accepted the Left of Centre slogan but there was still opposition in the party, especially in the Assembly Group and in some provincial organizations. The struggle continued until one of the factions was eliminated and both factions prepared for the General Congress in October 1966 when the question would be resolved. In Kadiril, there were two kinds of landowners: the first descended from the traditional notables or Lord of the valley of the area, the second from a group of rebellious nomads who were settled in Kadiril by the central government during the second half of the 19th century. It

is said that when their interests are at stake the landowners are able to cooperate without regard for party affiliation. Thus, a member of one of the older families became a vociferous spokesman in defense of property rights in the debates of the National constituent Assembly in 1961.51

In the case of Tarsus, the split between new and old wealth was even more striking. The traditional group of notables was represented here by an industrialist who belonged to an aristocratic family that had a long tradition of wealth and social position. By contrast, the owner and operator of the other large textile plant in Tarsus was a simple cotton farmer and cotton gin operator who happened to be the leader of the local Democratic Organization when that party came to power in 1950. Allegedly, he was able to acquire the wherewithal to build ties textile plant as a result of his position in the party. Unlike his more aristocratic counterpart, this entrepreneur had little formal education, and probably enjoyed little social prestige prior to his acquisition of political power. This case illustrates the use of political ties for the aggrandizement of an individual or group, a pattern that seems to have been fairly common among Democrats.52

51 Ibid., pp. 54-65.
52 Frank Tachau, Turkey, the Politics of Authority Democracy And Development, 1984, Praeger Publishers, New York, p. 140-60.
A similar pattern prevailed in another coastal province, Aydin, near the Aegean sea. Here, too, the primary economic base for the local elite was land; a secondary base was industry. Unlike Adana, however, there was no clear split between old and new wealth. In fact, much of the wealth of Aydin generally seemed to be quite new, deriving from cotton cultivation that came into prominence. This development favoured the old landed families. Thus, unlike Adana, where new wealth seems to have created a new elite rooted in industry, the new material wealth of Aydin remained confined to the established land owning families.\(^\text{53}\)

Both Adana and Aydin revealed a pattern of diffusion of local power and influence symptomatic of a general trend in the 1960s and since. Although the traditional local elite continued to exercise influence at both local and national levels, its position was no longer unchallenged. Challenges were especially evident in the form of intra party struggle and factional strife, where the elite often found itself opposed by an alignment of the national party center with local reform elements. General economic and social developments in the national system were also evident on the local scene from the 1960s on. A Survey of a number of provincial executive committees of the major political parties, for example, revealed that the dominant elements

were of middle-class origins rather than having risen directly from the peasantry. The occupations of these provincial politicians, however, were sharply different from those of their fathers, who tended to be involved with moderate-sized agricultural activities or with artisanship and small-scale trade.54

Furthermore, the rapidly developing economy spanned a growing number and variety of businesses and trades. Rising income levels as well as the growth and extension of the communications and transportation network brought in their wake such facilities as garages, automobile service stations, and sales agencies and repair facilities for such diverse machinery as household appliances and agricultural machines and supplies. Such new professionals and businessmen formed trade organizations that were able to represent their special interests. Links between these organizations and the parties existed and were exploited alternatively by both sides.

Such organizations also inspired the rise of counter forces; thus, large-scale landlords turned an existing organization, the farmers’ union into a lobby in order to maintain their influence in the light of development noted earlier. The basic divisions within the local society,

54 Leder Arnold, 1976. Catalysts of Change: Marxist versus Muslim in a Turkish Community. Austin Tex: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Universities of Texas at Austin, pp. 24-25.
involving a formerly dominant indigenous group itself divided between old wealth and new and several groups of immigrants, had structured local politics after 1960s. The involvement of the bureaucrats, however, added an ideological event that proved to be explosive. These bureaucrats viewed politics on an important and continuous activity in which ideological posture played a significant role. This view corresponded to the growing ideological emphasis in Turkey's national politics. Consequently, while they quickly grasped the nature of Saruhanli's solidarity group conflict, for the most part they insisted on interpreting it in ideological terms. In a crude fashion, the bureaucrats imposed a class or neo-Marxist interpretation on Saruhanli's solidarity group conflict.55

However, democratic process tends to enlarge these opportunities; it even allows them to flourish. So long as the national center enjoyed undisputed authority and was thoroughly committed to development and modernization, conflict of this sort could be subdued or at least sublimated. The development of industry and commerce and the flow of villagers to the cities have also had a profound impact on the social structure of the urban centres. Up to the end of World War II, the cities were dominated in terms of social prestige and economic influence by the government bureaucracy and local notables. With the rise of industry

55 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
and commerce after the war, these groups found themselves overtaken by the emerging entrepreneurs and merchants. These entrepreneurs operated primarily on a small scale and kept the control and management of their enterprise in their own hands or in the hands of members of their immediate families.56

However, there is evidence that during the same period, the prestige of the civil servant dropped while that of the businessman and merchant rose. Politically, these changes have been evidenced by the rise of a series of new professional organizations and pressure groups, such as chambers of commerce and industry, chambers of agriculture, farmers' unions, union of artisans, craftsmen and small businessmen. The development of the Turkish Labour Movement deserves separate mention. Mindful of the political importance of industrial labour, particularly in an environment of rapid social change, the Turkish Labour Movement has been treated with great delicacy since 1960s both by the government and by its American advisors.57

Drastic change occurred in 1962 when the Party Leadership was assumed by Mehmet Ali Aybar and a few associates well known as Marxist. His academic career was interrupted in

56 Research Project on Turkish Economic Development No. 4, February 1961 (Ankara: Faculty of Political Science, Institute of Public Finance).

1946 owing to his Marxist tendencies. He published Enchained Freedom, and associated himself with various leftist activities. His Marxist ideas, like those of many other Turkish Marxists, came largely from French sources.

At the end of 1962, the Labour Party engaged in a campaign to delete articles 141 and 142 from the criminal code, hoping thus to be free to propagate the concepts of class struggle forbidden by these articles. Later in 1967, the constitutional court rejected their claim that these articles were unconstitutional. The Labour Party vehemently attacked imperialists, capitalists and landowners.58

Their program, despite the fact that it paid lip service to democratic ways and respect for the constitution, in general was consistent with establishing a system based on the leadership of the working class. The Party turned its wrath on the West and especially on the US as the source of all evils which had fallen on Turkey. In December 1968 extreme left wingers even blamed the Americans for the failure of Turkish heart transplants because, they argued, the US had prevented the development of medicine in the country by drawing away Turkish doctors.

In 1965 Turkey rejected the view of the UN mediator Galo Plaza that a solution was to be sought directly between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and insisted on direct negotiation with Greece. In November 1967 new Greek Cypriot

attacks on Turkish Cypriots caused another threat of invasion from Turkey. It was averted by UN Mediation that led Athens to promise withdrawal of the many illegal Greek troops on the Island. Why in particular should it not support the country that had fought with it in Korea and was its faithful ally in the Atlantic Alliance? But it is also fair to add that there were anti-American demonstrations in Athens and Cyprus too, as each side accused the use of insufficient sympathy and aid.59

The RPP, which headed three coalition governments until 1965, viewed sympathetically the labourites' efforts to attract the peasants and workers by a 'nationalist ingredient' hoping that this would weaken the popular support of the Justice Party.

Despite vigorous efforts of the Marxists to arouse hostility against the current social and economic system and Turkish foreign policy, in the election held on October 10, 1965, the Labour Party won only three per cent votes out of the total electorate and elected only two deputies directly. Owing to the cumulative vote-national remainder' system in which every vote counted, it was awarded 13 more seats in the Parliament.

Despite the sympathy of some of the most influential dailies, the tacit support of the RPP, and general support

among the intellectuals who wish to see a socialist group in parliament, these result constituted a poor showing. When the Labour Party of Turkey came into being, it professed to be the only representative of Turkish socialism. But it came into immediate conflict with hardened socialists and communists who had been deprived of their political rights because of their earlier prison sentences. Prominent members of this group gathered around The Turkish Left, a weekly published by Mihri Belli.

This group accuses the Labour Party of Turkey leaders of dreaming about parliamentary evolution and condemns them as revisionists. After a convention held in November 1968, and a split within the party, another group was formed of chairman Aybar and his followers around the weekly And. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Aybar, apparently under the fear of losing Labour's Parliamentary foothold, condemned the invasion and started to claim that Turkish socialism will be liberal and smiling', that it will depend not only on Marx, and that parts of the bourgeois democratic institutions, such as the multi-party system, referendum and the constitutional court will be preserved. Professor Sadun Aren, Behice Boran and the popular columnist of the daily Aksam, Cetin Altan, all LPT deputies, established the third group which came out openly during the November 1968 convention against Aybar. Although the Aybar and Aren

groups differ in ideology, they say that they are united in the belief that socialism will be established in Turkey through Democracy. However, Aren and his group claimed that phrases like a 'Liberal, happy Turkish socialism' are devoid of scientific basis in socialism.61

The Labour Party had so far been the creature of intellectuals and had failed to attract the city worker. By this last crisis and split it became clear that this party failed to attract even some Marxists. But still LPT absorbs the energies of some militant young people.

Aybar's authority as Chairman was trimmed by a decision of the Congress. The delegates decided to take the choice of the party research bureau members from the Chairman and make it the responsibility of the 12 member central committee of the executive board. The delegates also passed a change in the party regulation which will require the chairman to clear any speech which commits the party with the central committee of the executive board. Previously the chairman could act with greater freedom in speaking for the party.62

This was one of the chief reasons for the rebellion in the party, as we have pointed out; after the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia Ayber sensed a need to

61 Ibid., pp. 168-70.
dissociate the LPT from the USSR action and a totalitarian system, in order to retain more chance of winning votes during the next elections in October 1969 from Turkey's traditionally conservative and anti-communist peasants who form 70 per cent of the population. He made several speeches referring to the smiling face of Turkish socialism as opposed to the 'grim' face of 'oppressive' socialism. But this enraged the doctrinaire socialists in the party.

They claimed there is only 'one socialism' and that to talk of a difference between smiling and grim socialism was heresy. They also said Aybar was overly autocratic in his chairmanship. The rebels' strategy was to forget about the 1969 elections and concentrate on building a strong, well motivated, well educated cadre which would spread socialism over the long term. The revolt widened after the regular convention and the rebels started working to call an extraordinary convention and put their case again.63

Many observers had predicted a split in the party. However, the rebel leaders, contracted after the results of the extraordinary convention, insisted they intended to stay in LPT despite Aybar's continuing control. The delegates of the extraordinary convention added a provision to the party regulation stating that the LPT is a socialist party. The explanation lies in the stronger political freedom existing

63 Panitch, Leo, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies", Comparative Political Studies, 10 April 1977, pp. 61-90.
now and then during the post-revolutionary period when the LPT was formed.

The extraordinary convention also passed a resolution which will allow some former LPT members, who had been expelled for disciplinary reasons, to return to the party. This action was again specifically directed at LPT members who were expelled by Aybar for opposing his chairmanship or decisions.64 The Labour Party's chief target -- the Justice Party and its leader Suleyman Demirel, accused of being a stooge of the West -- had won 240 seats out of a total of 450 in the 1965 election. The republican people's Party, pushed a bit Left -- 'Left of center', as Inonu said - did much less than expected with 29 percent and 134 seats. Coalition government then disappeared as the new Prime Minister, Demirel, formed a Justice Party government. He was the son of a peasant, trained engineer and new the West by personal experience. He was one of the new men. He was the first entrepreneur to lead a Turkish government. For Turkey it was a new experience.

Neither the Labour nor the non-partisan radicals and extremists have yet demonstrated the ability to communicate with the masses. Their political innovations to date have consisted of appropriating a Leftist political vocabulary and grafting it onto Kemalism-Ataturkism. Thus socialists

named nationalists as traditionalists' to distinguish them from so-called progressives. The rise to power of a new Lower Middle Class' thus was represented as a revival of Islamic reaction. The accusation that the Justice Party stood for religious reaction was several times rightly voiced. But reaction is a vague word. There is no doubt that the majority of the Turkish people desire economic progress. The peasants' demands for schools, Medical attention, roads, piped water and electricity, cheap fertilizers and consumer goods are not reactionary demands. The restoration of the caliphate and of the Sharia are no longer relevant to the hopes of the people.65

At the present time, what they seek in religion is the comfort of self justification in the search for material advancement, and not temporal leadership. Religion is not dead but obscurantism has decreased.

---