I. INTRODUCTION

Factionalism is the competition between factions for scarce resources or power. It manifests in many forms and is noticed in all parts of the world. In the context of villages, it is an important social process connected with the power structure (Dube, 1968). In the context of political parties factionalism refers to the conflict or competition between or among several groups to capture the party organization. The objective of such conflict is always power. Thus factionalism refers to antagonism between groups. Factionalism is an intrinsic part of political life. In many societies factions have become endemic with a range of cultural and symbolic trappings. Since factionalism is the conflict between factions, there is a need to understand what is a faction? A faction is a coalition of individuals personally recruited by a leader who has ties with followers which are usually personal, although followers sometimes recruit others on behalf of their leader.

The earliest interest of factions came from political scientists (Laswell, 1931). Firth (1957) was the first to set out systematically some of their structural characteristics. He treated them as informal counterparts of more formal political groupings. He noted that members are recruited according to structurally diverse principles. This approach was elaborated by Nicholas a decade later (1965) who viewed factions as essentially symmetrically organized conflict. Seigal and Beals (1966) considered factionalism as a product of rapid social change and a socio political adjustment of dynamic equilibrium. During the following decades, the studies on factionalism largely used structural - functional mode of analysis and viewed faction as a part of dynamic equilibrium of a balanced opposition.
The other set of studies viewed factionalism as a part of change. They maintain that "balanced" opposition for a greater access to the resources invariably create disequilibrium leading to significant changes.

**REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

Literature existing on factions and factionalism can be categorized into mainly three categories: 1) village studies 2) studies on factions within political parties 3) attempts at generalisations of politics of factionalism in Indian political system.

**I. Village Studies:**


Lewis, Dhillon, Y. Singh and Bailey have studied caste and factions. These are early studies (field-work in early 50s and published in mid-fifties to early 60s) of village-level factions. They count the number of factions in a given village and trace their origins. Functionalist-equilibrium model of society guided the modus operandi of these studies. Their primary concern was however the cohesion in the village. Oscar Lewis's, "Village life in Northern India", is a pioneering study of factions in a Jat dominated village namely Rampura, to the south of Delhi. The objectives of this study are to
find out what the factions are and how they take birth in the village, and who are the faction leaders? The main findings of his study are:

(1) Factions are vertical groups within castes; (2) Such groups are formed on the issues like wealth, women or land; (3) They are not political groupings or temporary alliances of individuals though some of them do involve in power politics. They are primarily kinship groupings which carry on important social economic and ceremonial functions besides their factional struggles against one another. These activities provide stability to them; (4) The main factions of the village are the factions of dominant castes who provide leaders to faction; (5) Faction leaders are wealthy and influential men within the village who act as patron by renting out land and lending money to the poorer members of the faction; (6) Factions also sometimes do good to the village.

Yogender Singh's, "Group-Status of factions in rural community", is a study of six villages in east of U.P. in which he analyses as many as 97 factions. He took most of the conclusions reported by Lewis in his study of Rampura as working hypotheses and observes by and large the same attributes that are observed by Lewis. Yogendra Singh noted the following characteristics of Factions.

One. Factions constitute a group of households within a caste or sub-caste rallying together for rites, rituals, ceremonies, community activities and who stand together in relation of social conflict. Such a phenomenon is characterised as party-bandhi or Goot-bandhi, which in fact refers to the process of clique formation.
Two. Although factions are not political groups or power groups per se they play an important role in the power structure of the village.

Three. Each faction is represented by one or more than one leader. Role of the faction leader emerges clearly only at the time of inter-faction tensions. The faction leadership otherwise is relatively less visible.

Four. The broad characteristics of the faction leader are (a) he enjoys a better economic status in comparison with other member households of his faction (b) the image of a faction-leader in each faction group is that of an honest person with character, age and has experience in social, economic and political spheres but not necessarily wealthy and rich (c) age is an important factor for becoming and sustaining as a factional leader.

Five. Though faction group and its formation are on the basis of quarrels, feuds and social tensions, factions are embedded in the rural social system. Factions operate not only in relation to conflict but also to work in union for benefit of the group.

J.S. Yadav\(^3\) studied factionalism in a Haryana village, near Delhi, namely Kultana. In this he discusses (a) the operation and emergence of factions over a period of about 25 years; (b) the cause of the mushrooming of faction and (c) the nature, scope and functions of these factions. He presents the following findings.
One. Factions are quasi groups who interact with each other, and only in conflict situations become active. The person who is centre to the conflict or leading quasi group is the leader of the faction.

Two. The faction leaders recruit the members cutting across the boundaries of kin and caste groups and thereby factions usually pose challenge to the established institutionalised structure.

Three. Faction leaders make coalitions and alliances with other faction having similar or identical interest in order to oppose another factions who have dissimilar interest on specific issues.

Four. Faction is essentially ephemeral in character lasting as long as the immediate goal of the members is achieved. The faction emerges and crystallizes only when an advantage is to be gained. Thus the membership of the faction does not always remain the same. However the individual decision with one faction or another based on the calculation of not only the past tradition of cooperation and conflict between the persons in question but also in the calculation of present and future gain or losses likely to be rejected as a result of their choice.

Five. Faction not only operates at the political level but at other levels. It emerges due to failure of institutionalized mechanisms to resolve conflicts arising out of cultural and social change in the village society.

A.K.Lai in his study of 'Dynamics of village factionalism: A study of conflict between traditional and emerging leader-
analyses the origin and internal structuring of factions, their social inclusiveness at different points of time, leadership pattern, principles of recruitment and expression of hostilities. The study analyses pattern of factional politics in the village Mohanpur in Bihar between 1954 and 1967. It approaches village power-structure in terms of operation of factional politics. The study comes to the following conclusions.

One. Introduction of democratic and socialistic measures like Zamindari abolition by the Government had upset the old established rural elite and led to mounting social tensions in the villages which in turn gave birth to clashes between the traditional leadership, characterised by exploitation and repression on the one hand and new groups asserting for status on the other. All this resulted into bitter factional fights in the villages.

Two. Given the changing structures and composition of factions over a period of time in the village, it is noticed that factions are distinct from basic social units such as kinship and family in the matter of stability and hence they are not corporate groups.

Three. Factions are likely to evolve into federation of small factions with an increase in the social inclusiveness in them. Once there is federation of small factions, they tend to assume a new form. In this process, leadership may slip into the hands of individuals who are out to exploit the power and resources giving rise to a new breed of leaders.
Four. Recruitment of membership to factions is made through different routes. The process of recruitment assumes both situational as well as structural specificities. Initially existing social boundaries (like lineages) in the village may work as the boundaries of warring factions. As the conflict escalates it takes the form of acute kinship, craze for power. And personal animosity may become the basis of recruitment of members to different factions.

Five. Changes in the village-leadership pattern shows that leadership of a faction, may not always lie in the hands of any single individual, it might be constellation of leaders each of whom has a following, but none of whom is capable of mobilising adequate support.

Six. The role played by upper caste persons in the operation of factional politics reveal that upper castes continue to have an advantageous position, because relatively they possess more land and influence than others, and command army of supporters and sub-ordinates in inferior castes. Numerically strong and resourcefully weak lower castes are to a large extent, a tool in the hands of upper castes.

Seven. Factionalism is though an evil resulting into constant litigations, still the collection of funds for school-building in the village shows the solidarity and cohesiveness among faction-members and hence factionalism contains within itself some adaptive and functional traits also.

Nityananda Patnaik and H.K. Lakshmi Narayana made a comparative study of factionalism in six villages - three in Mysore and three in Orissa. For them, factionalism is a kind of
political activity, which in turn means organised conflict over public power. Faction is generally a group of larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies. Factional groups become political parties when they start for putting candidates in the elections. Factional politics have their roots in villages as the ties between leaders and followers tend to be personal, when arenas grow larger, leader-follower ties dissolve into quasi-group networks. The recruitment of followers is diverse and based on kinship groups, friendships, patron-client, master-servant, borrower-lender relationships. They are localised cliques and are ascriptive in character. Faction leaders compete with the opposite faction leaders to bag resources and support from the people in the villages. In the peasant communities, factional conflict occur as a result of limited goods. Local politics link up with external politics through political patron-client relationship. The patron may be a political leader at the taluk, district, state or national levels and the client is village political leader. The village leader (client) distributes favors among his followers in the village and act as a brain-trust to the leaders above.

The impact of external politics on villages may be either positive or negative. Positive effect could be creation of awareness among the villagers about national problems and negative effect would be division of villagers into narrow groups. These divisions are created by Political elites for their political advantages. These divisions give rise to dissensions among villagers and perpetuate rivalry in the villages. The rivalries expressed through factions act as barrier to development. On the basis of his study of six villages (out of which there were three faction villages) the scholar observes that factionalism has occurred due to changes which have occurred in the villages.
like competition over economic resources and political power, whatever is the nature of cleavages like vertical or horizontal in the respective villages, they arise for political power, and get sharpened by franchise.

D.K. Samantha, in his study of political factions in a Deccan village, Navegaon in Maharashtra, discusses the determinants of political factions in the village. He writes "factional politics emerges mainly out of conflict and competition for acquiring access over power." Political factions are those groupings which come out of conflict over the control of local public institutions. The study also observes, "for factional politics, man to man relationships guided by various socio-economic reasons is of great relevance."

The study notes: One. The Panchayat elections has brought to the fore two factions within the Maratha caste itself. Over a period of time, old leaders of two factions have given place to new leaders. The election of panchayat influences elections of other public bodies. The spirit of rivalry between the factions is restricted to the village level. Factions compete even in spheres like ritual observations. Rivalry of factions at the village-level has an external influence also. Two different factions support two different political parties not on any ideological basis, but on the logic of mutual enmities. Further, the villages affiliation to either of the faction is dependent on various other factors like patron-client, lender-borrower and employer-employee relationships. The poor Mahar farm labourers get employment and credit from rich and medium Maratha farmers in the village and these in turn become leader-follower relationships in the village. Due to the ignorance of villagers about the government programmes, it is the
faction leaders who help the villagers in securing the benefits of the schemes. This also strengthens faction-linkages in the villages. Withdrawal of support to a particular faction results in withdrawal of economic help from that faction.

Two. Kin relationships are also an important determinant for faction linkages. Families tied by the matrimonial relations always support the same faction.

Three. Family feuds also play an important role in one's decision making towards affiliation with either of the faction. Feuds which arise due to ownership claims on ancestral property between two uterine brothers make them go to rival faction groups.

Four. Gossip groups also have influence on the individuals decision of favouring a particular faction. These groups are based on age and neighbourhood. The leaders of the respective faction spend their leisure at the house of one of the factions concerned. One gossip group supports one particular faction.

Five. Childhood friendship and friendships in the schools also contribute to factional polarisation.

Six. Occupational groups also sometimes become basis for factional alliances like school teachers supporting different factions in the village.

Thus the factional affiliations in village are determined by various factors on wide area of human relations such as "quarrels over ancestral land, loyalty to particular type of
kin, childhood friendship and also gossip groups". They have
direct bearing on factional politics. Family feuds and econom-
ic factors play an important role in determining one's politi-
cal support and aspiration. While factional alignment is
mainly guided by economic relationship between the leader
and supporter with varied caste affiliations, it is however
the kin obligation that reinforces the caste factor.

A.B.Hiramani, in his study, "Dynamics of factions in Maha-
ashtra Village", examined factions and their dynamics in
village Golatgaon in Aurangabad taluq of Maharashtra. The main
objectives of the study are to find out: a) the factors that are
attributed for growth of factions? b) leadership and membership
of factions c) the affiliations of factions with outside polit-
ical parties and d) the effect of factionalism on the village.

Following are findings of the study. One. In this village
the growth of factions are attributed to either sexual rela-
tions with a woman or disputes between two landlords in the
village. The economic interests also account for the growth of
factions. For instance, economic transactions around the co-
operative society has led to two clear-cut factions in the
village. The issue of loans and its distribution by the
elected person and also its misappropriation led to faction
formations. The study also observes that economic independence
of the leaders of the factions is an important factor in
perpetuating the factions. Even educational institutions namely
Sarvodaya Educational Society in the village was affected by
factional rivalries.

In fact it has led to a dispute between individual and
institutions. A land dispute over the boundary line involving
a faction leader widened the factional cleavage. This land dispute led to violent outburst and criminal charges against each other.

Two. Factions are led by landlords. The membership of and loyalty to faction is dependent on the economic power of the faction leaders. They provide jobs on their farms to the backward groups in the village and ensure their continued support.

Three. The factions arising due to local reasons struck affiliations with outside political parties. If one factional leader joined Congress, the other joined the then Jan Sangh party. This creates a situation where the village leadership is ready to be guided by external political forces.

Four. Factions influence village social-life by disrupting a traditional norm like celebration of a village festival (Hanuman Jayanti). There is no cohesion in the social, cultural, economic and political life of the village due to factionalism. Organizations like village panchayats, co-operative society are used and manipulated for factional ends. And factionalism is found to be undermining the traditional conflict-resolving agencies and mechanism of the village on the one hand and hampering the effective working of modern and developmental organizations on the other.

B.S. Bhargava and V.N. Torgal, in their study, "Factionalism : A study of a Panchayat in Karnataka", analysed the role of factions in a Panchayat in Karnataka. They have emphasised the analysis of political conflict: in the study of factionalism in the political organization like Panchayat. It is also discussed in the light of five propositions propounded by Nicho-
las (1965) and located the factional conflict in the typology of factions as enunciated by Jones (1974). They agree with Nicholas that factions in Mallampalli village panchayat are conflict groups, they are political groups, that they are corporate groups, and faction members are recruited by a leader on diverse principles. So also with Jones typology that Mallampalli village panchayat factions are primordial, machine type and have personal followings. And they are both functional and dysfunctional in the village. They are functional in the sense that they serve as source of checks and balances in the panchayat administration. They are dysfunctional in the sense that they stand as blocks in the smooth functioning of the panchayat. Deadlock is created by dividing the units and causing tensions among the Panchayat members. Factional politics have minimised the consensus decisions and thereby hindered the development of the village.

R.S. Khara in his study of "Groups and process of Political change in North-India Gopalpur", have analysed the formation of political groups and factions in the village over a period of time. In doing so, he investigates different organisational forms existing in a village such as factions, pressure groups, political parties, regional cliques and how are they related to each other as effective communicative structures of 'power management system'. The concept of faction, in this study, is also examined in relation to and as a part of wider political system.

The study points the changes in the villages at three points of time. In the pre-Independence period (1935-1947), all the factional fights in the village were led and decided by the Zamindars or by some of their influential kin. In Post-
Independence period (1958-60), power-pyramids of the village are reflected by Kurmi-Kayasta alliance as against erstwhile Zamindari group. It was in 1962, two different factions came under the influence of party politics. During 1960-63, there were three changes in the organization of factions. (1) high caste groups (Kayastha and Brahmins) changing affiliations with other castes in the village (2)by striking extra-village contacts by all the factions and (3)the untouchable caste groups reorganising themselves. All these changes were to capture the power in the village. The study observes that factions are organisational dimension of multi-factional, stable, broad based and better differentiated power-management system, created out of and developing over a period of time in the village due to complexity of democratic politics.

Mariam Sharma, in her study, "The Politics of inequality, Competition and Control in an Indian Village"\textsuperscript{10} maintains that the key to village political activity is in the hands of key leaders of the village who operate as leaders of factions and control the resources and their distribution. The disputes between the faction leaders become the political conflict of the village. The faction politics in the village revolve around the dominant caste politics. The faction leaders are also entrepreneur middle-men who exploit the resources and shift them from one area to another.

Power in the village gets fragmented due to many leaders in all castes and these big men play a zero-sum game in a struggle for power to acquire distributive prerogatives over scarce resources. Village factions are essentially composed of coalitions of village big men which are temporarily goal-oriented alliances. The more diffuse the power base in village is, the
greater will be scope for factions based on coalitions of leaders as opposed to single-leader centred factions. In the village conflicts, faction leaders (big men) participate as down to the earth entrepreneurs engaged in political competition to gain power.

In the wake of increasing competition for resources and an absence of any other effective decision-making bodies or widely accepted rules to determine their allocation, factions occupy the void. Factions ensure benefits to their members. The study points out that factionalism in no way inhibits agricultural advances or innovation. On the contrary it enhances competition for material gains.

The study observes that factionalism is the most efficient way to organise political activity and ensure effective decision making despite the fact that it leads to the escalation of conflicts which hinders co-operative venture. The study also observes that factional conflicts cut across classes. Factions do not reflect the cleavage between dominant landed Bhumiars and their landless labourers nor do they represent the interests of the dominant against the dominated. Factional politics are nothing but traditional politics. Factions fuse together if need be to oppose any changes in the class positions of subordinates as it affects the cleavages among dominant Bhumiars.

Alan R. Beals in his study "Pervasive Factionalism in a South India Village", has used the term factionalism in a general sense to describe conflict within an organisation. The village Namahalli is studied. The study deals with three varieties of factionalism viz., disruptive, schismatic and pervasive. Disruptive factionalism relates to internal conflicts
which tend to disrupt the normal or traditional activities of the group and interfere with policy process. Within disruptive factionalism, clear-cut distinction can be made between Schismatic factionalism and pervasive factionalism. In the former, conflict is between well-organised sub-groups and in the latter conflict tends to be within and between the sub-groups of the organisation. He holds that disruptive factionalism leads to abandonment of organisation goals and of the organisation itself. The factional conflict sustains even under circumstances requiring rapid change.

In this study, an exploratory attempt is made to find out an explanation to the phenomenon that some organisations respond to crises by engaging in apparently pointless bickering, while other organisations dissolve or make prudent or imprudent attacks upon the source of the crisis. In this case study, it is noted that factionalism arose due to failure of the village to meet the crisis resulting from the loss of war time prosperity and hence there was break-down of harmonious relations within the village. The main source of conflict involved traditionally defined authority relationships. Mainly there were two factions in the village. Between July 1952 to August 1953, there were series of disputes between the two factions which continued intermittently.

Two principal factions consisted of loose alliances of small groups of people, each assembled under the leadership of a particular influential individual. These sub-groups were either nuclear/extended families; or they were many conjures of families held together by ties of caste, neighbourhood, occupation or education. The stability of the sub-groups within factions appeared to depend largely upon the success within
which a particular leader could control and direct those who were tied to him by economic and kinship bonds.

One of the faction (Faction A) leaders was village Headman whose followers consisted most of his caste and family. The Lingayat caste was divided into four or five sub-groups which allied with Faction A and the Smith caste was affiliated to Faction B. The weavers and Madiga labourers-a sub-caste of the scheduled caste- were economically handicapped and did not show their interest to join in factions. It appeared that they divided equally between two factions. The Muslims aligned with Faction B. Though a fair number of neutrals were there among shepherds, weavers and Madigas and smaller castes, but they were not politically influential. The young educated were in Faction B. There were also some connection between faction-membership and neighbourhood groupings.

The shifting and indeterminate nature of faction-membership is consistent with the nature of factional disputes. In factional conflicts power seem to be an end in itself. Factional conflicts do not have clear victories nor total defeats. On the whole factions result in substantial losses to both factions. The factionalism in this village did not lead to endemic division as it got urbanised and became more pragmatic in solving the economic difficulties. As a result factionalism remained restrained.

F.G. Bailey in his article, "Para-Political Systems", deals with villages, universities or professional associations. He described these as para-political activities. He suggests a model for all kinds of politics in Village India and for politics in all para political situations. While doing so he
discusses three kinds of conflict situations in a village namely Bisipara in Orissa. They are (1) factions (2) caste-climbing (3) conflict between castes. He observes that the Oriya word for 'faction' is dolo, which means a flock or a hand or a political party. For faction, the English word 'party' is also in usage which has pejorative connotation. Conflict between factions is called 'doladoli'. In that village dolo formed around two prominent men in the warrior caste. Since warriors belonged to one agnatic lineage, factions are formed around descent divisions within that lineage. Each faction includes some lower caste members. The factional membership performed the ritual duties of agnatic kinship like weddings and funerals. The faction leader performed the 'brokerage' tasks alike for his dependents of other castes and also his caste followers and protect them when attacked by other faction members. Confrontations take place among the faction in the Panchayat in the form of passionate verbal attacks and defenses of honour. There would be accusations among them concerning embezzlement of village funds, failure to contribute to village development and so forth. Since the consensus can not be reached in such a situation, the confrontations end with gossip, back-biting. Except such trivialities there involves no great battles or decisive encounters. This game of doladoli is played very much within the rules. They do not waste resources in the course of conflict nor they materially damage the other man's resources. They get united when a common or urgent task is to be completed. And they do not take the quarrels outside the village by bringing suits against one another in government courts. Bailey in this study brings in some new concepts. He explains faction or dolo as a conflict group made up of two relationships or three roles., viz. Leader, follower and dependent. Follower and dependent differ
in the sense that follower cannot and the dependent can change the sides. He refers to the collectivity of followers as a core (the hard core) and collectivity of dependents as support. Thus the structure of a conflict group can be expressed as a variable derived from the core/support ratio. The process of conflict consists of confrontations and encounters. Since politics entails a notion of competition for the pursuit of certain valued ends, factionalism in Bisipara involve agnatic kinship allegiances in political competition. Thus in Doladoli (a) core/support variable which concerns the structure of teams (b) confrontations/encounter process (c) a political structure defines political activity through the idea of ordered competition. It (doladoli) is a single integrated political structure i.e., as a set of rules which regulate competition by agreement about prizes and about permissible tactics to be used in seeking those prizes.

Bailey discusses two other conflicts in the village, as stated earlier i.e., caste-climbing and caste-conflict. In caste-climbing the same competition operates under the given normative and pragmatic rules but in caste-conflict, while there is normative agreement about the goals, there is no agreement about permissible tactics either at the normative or at the pragmatic level.

Baljit Singh in his study entitled, "Next Step in Village India", 13 observes that village community is complex and basically faction-ridden. Singh holds that factions are created largely because of individual land rights and conflicting claims over land-ownership. He thinks that village life and its economy should ran along the co-operative lines ana replace individual family cultivation by joint family holdings in view of
the grave social dangers inherent in the tensions and conflict over land-ownership. Such conflicts lead to perpetuation of a stagnant agricultural economy with little or no respect for meeting the demands of a growing population. Singh feels that "in the economic field large capitalistic farmers of State farming may be an alternative, although a poor one, to a joint cultivation by peasant families. But these offer no solution to the problem of the faction-ridden society for which equality of land-rights and co-operative organisation are the only answer". Thus lack of cohesiveness and a 'we-feeling' in the village community is responsible for the creation of factional society. Singh has studied 64 factional splits of the village over the time. Twenty four splits, out of sixty four emanated from disputes over land, nine from marriage or marriage ceremonies, caste taboos and rites, seven on account of a sense of injury or denial of weight to caste or community three from rivalry among share-cropping households and resentment on issues, such as Jajmani rights. Since the main role of a faction is to support its members in litigation, disputes and fights, it gives rise to endemic litigations and acts of violence against persons and property.

II

The commonalities in these studies are that they dealt mainly with a) What are factions and how are they formed and sustained, b) What are their functions c) Who are the faction leaders and how do they recruit members to the factions

With regard to what are factions there are different viewpoints. For Lewis and Yoginder Singh they are vertical groups within caste. For Yadav, they are quasi groups which become
active in conflict situations. For A.K. Lal they are other than caste groups. For Nityanand Patnaik and H.K. Lakshmi Narayana factions are not only caste groups but are a group of larger units which work, for the advancement of particular persons or policies. For D.K. Samanta they are more than caste affiliations and for A.B. Hirmani, they are not caste groups but they are political conflict groups. For R.S. Khara they are affiliations of many castes. For Mariam Sharma they are coalitions of village big men. For Allan. R. Beals they are loose alliances of small groups of people. For F.G. Bailey they are descent divisions within the lineages. For M.S. Mashreque and M.R. Ameen they are groups among the peasants within the village. For Baljit Singh they are conflict groups whose membership depends on the conflicts.

With regard to functions of Factions while Lewis think that they perform social, economic and ceremonial functions. Yogendar Singh thinks that in addition to these functions they play very important role in the power structure of the village. J.S. Yadav, A.K. Lal, Nityanand Patnayak, D.K. Samanta, A.B. Hirmani, B.S. Bhargava, V.N. Targal, R.S. Khara, and F.G. Bailey view that factions perform political functions. For Marian Sharma, and Alan. R. Beals they are conflict groups for gaining power in the village. For Baljit Singh they basically perform economic functions.

For Lewis Factional leaders are wealthy and respected men in the village and poor are the members of the factions. Same is the case with Yogender Singh. For J.S. Yadav leader is one who leads the conflict and members cut across the boundaries of kinship and caste groups. Membership, of course, does not always remain the same. For A.K. Lal leadership does not lie in a
single leader but is a constellation of leaders capable of exploiting the power resources with a membership changing over the time and going beyond the caste and lineage. To him leaders come from upper caste and the members from subordinate castes. For R.S. Khara leaders and members constitute the caste groups. For Marian Sharma they are dominant caste leaders and members are landless labourers. For F. G. Bailey faction leaders are caste leaders who recruited lower caste members. For Patnaik, Lakshminarayana, and D.K. Samanta faction leader is a village leader who recruits followers from diverse sources such as kinship, friendship, master-servant, borrower lender and patron-client relationship.

On factionalism, most of the scholars view it as a kind of political activity and a conflict for economic resources and for political power. Some of these scholars think that it is a conflict for controlling organizations like panchayats. Some other scholars think that it is a conflict for getting village power. A few scholars think that factionalism is a socio-economic activity among kinship groups.

II

II. Studies on Factions within Political Parties:

Myron Weiner in his study, "Party-Building in a New Nation, the Indian National Congress", has examined the process of how factional relationship rather than simply caste or class-conflict shape the outcome of an election. He studied Ponnur Constituency in Krishna district in Anahra Pradesh in relation to the pattern of voting for 1962 Assembly and Parliamentary
elections. In these elections, Congress candidate contested for Assembly and Communist candidate for Parliament. Communists did not put up a candidate for Assembly elections. It appears as if both the parties supported each other. The common or usual explanations for the victory of the candidates are not satisfactory. An examination of occupation and voting satisfactorily explain the voting behaviour. The study observes that in those villages where agricultural labourers were highest, the communist candidate did not secure many votes. Nor in the villages where owner cultivators were more, the Swatantra candidate secured many votes. Thus class factor does not explain the voting behaviour in these elections. Hence dynamics of voting in this constituency calls for explanation from some other angle. He examines voting pattern through factions in six villages. The following are the findings:

One. Factional loyalties within Congress proved to be more intense than party loyalties in the elections.

Two. Party's associations with each faction is determined by kinship ties, personal interaction and caste affinities.

Three. Assembly candidates approached the villagers for votes through multi-caste village factions.

Four. Village factions saw the general elections as an opportunity to consolidate their followers and have affiliations with party bosses to obtain more wells, roads, fertilizers, seeds, loans and other amenities from the Government.

Five. For voting in the village, party-affiliations of the panchayat president or his association with the leader of the
congress faction in the district is an important factor, though he is not a village leader, but only a factional leader.

Six. Party politicians and village factions play the game of politics in the same way for power, because factions within the villages bargained with party candidates and even split their vote from Assembly to Parliamentary candidates as their goal was to improve their own power position within the village and at the same time maintaining access to sources of power outside the village.

B.S. Baviskar in "Factional conflict and the Congress Dilemma in Rural Maharashtra (1952-1975)" presents an analysis of factional politics in Kopergaon Taluk of rural Maharashtra, which has two factions known as gats locally for the past 35 years have become factions of the Congress party. The study raises the following questions: (a) How and why factions emerge? (b) whether they arise due to struggle to control local co-operatives and Panchayat Raj Institutions? (c) or due to the Maratha dominance in the region. He feels that factions are organised by rival local leaders who have supporters and followers in the villages and patrons at the state level and they function like political parties. Faction like political parties use very often party symbols and idioms. Factions perform the functions of political recruitment and conflict management.

Describing the history of factional conflict, the study observes that factions are comparable to local units of political parties. They are known as gats and each gat takes the name of its leader or leaders. Unlike the political parties, gats do not have a formal organisation, constitution or office-
bearers. They are loosely structured and function mainly as contenders for power. There are coalitions between various leaders and followers and hence ultimately only two gats are left out in the field to compete for power. For example during elections to co-operatives and union, there are to be only two rival panel of candidates. The affiliation of main leaders and core supporters remain stable and loyal, whereas minor leaders and their followers shift from one gat to another. The cleavages based on loyalty to different faction run through all levels of local politics-village, Taluk and district. Each faction has its patrons among the state-level leaders, ministers and party-bosses. Factional following cuts across caste especially during the elections time. Opposition parties tend to join hands with one or the other rival faction. They function like political parties in local context. Each of them select a 'panel' of candidates for elections to village Panchayats, Z.P., Village co-operative, co-operatives, co-operative sugar factories and other such institutions. They use the idiom of party politics to discuss policies and strategies in the sense that they appoint their 'Committees/Boards' to elect candidates for particular elections and speak of 'party discipline' in dealing with errant members. Gats are referred as parties and factional rivalries are known as gatbaji. Though gatbaji is persistent and appear as reality, it is regarded as something bad and each rival leader accuses the other of indulging in it.

In Kopergaoon, two factions functioned as rivals for at least past thirty five years. They are known as Rohmaregat and Kale-gat. These are dominant Marathas and well-educated and old aged. Out of the two, one (Rohare) is a congress member and the other PWP. These two worked together for two and half years
and as long as they worked together, elections to the important co-operatives and other institutions were unopposed. These differences between the two faction started in 1962 when Rohare got elected to Assembly and claimed for Cabinet Post and Kale to Z.P., by joining Cong-I. The open rift took place between them when elections to DCC bank were held in 1962 and Rohare got elected as chairman of the bank. Rohare tried to oust Kale from the chairmanship of a co-operative sugar factory and also for Taluk congress committee misled to open rift. The period 1963-66, saw an intense conflict between the two at all levels up to district in all elections. During this period Rohmare's influence declined and Kale gat managed to get support of new 'congress men' in important positions of party and government. The factions between these two become party-factions in Congress in Kopergoan Taluk and their rivalries continued till 1975.

Three elections are analysed to highlight the factionalism viz., 1967 Assembly elections, 1971 Mid-term Lok-Sabha elections and 1972 Assembly elections. By analysing these elections, the author maintains that district politics remained largely factional politics through out.

Baviskar concludes that factionalism is inherent given the dominant position of Congress in the district and the State as a whole. As opposition parties were weak, they were content with exploiting the divisions within the congress by supporting one of its factions. The party allows factional divisions within its ranks to organise and resolve internal conflict. It is clear from the fact that it re-admits to its ranks its suspended party members. Readmission to political party becomes easy because factionalism has no political ideolo-
gy, policies or programmes. Factions exist due to disputes over the control of local co-operatives which provide significant power, prestige and patronage to local leaders. Contests to co-operatives and legislatures was to consolidate the power in the local arena. The elections to co-operatives has become 'elite arena' at it was restricted to only handful of powerful leaders. Main rivals in the faction are from dominant caste and this checked them from becoming tyrannical in exercising power against other castes. Since each tries to enlist the support of other castes, caste does not become a major issue in factional conflicts and caste become important issue if Marathas are opposed by equally powerful castes and thus factions function like political parties by recruiting new members and by organising and resolving conflict at local level.

Mary C, Carras in her book, "The Dynamics of Indian Political Faction. A study of District Councils in the State of Maharashtra", studied party factionalism of Congress in Akola Z.P. of Maharashtra, and traced their linkages to the State Level. It focuses on the members of two groups, constituting the rival political factions within the Congress party. These two groups were formed due to the differences over the nomination of party candidates for the posts of Presidents and Vice-President of Z.P. in 1962 elections. The two groups were categorised as "Loyalists" and "Rebels". Loyalists are those who support the nominations of Congress Party officially and the others are those who oppose their. This calls for two explanations. One is that dynamics of political alignments and other manifestations of political life in India are to be understood primarily in terms of personal loyalties - sometimes called primordial loyalties, which are guided by feelings of caste solidarity or community solidarity or attachments to ascriptive groups.
This attunes a sort of an irrational bond between social unity and political action between leader and follower. This explanation is not sufficient to explain the deeper dynamics. The second explanation deals with the dynamics of hostility. It means all the ministers whether in the State Government or Central Government harbor feelings of hostility towards those who hold office in the Congress Party, particularly at higher levels and suggests that factional aspect of Indian political behaviour of political actors is 'rational'. This is to say that the behaviour is not determined by 'irrational' (that is emotional) and often unpredictable personal loyalties based on the charisma of a leader on feelings of loyalty evoked by caste or community ties or by family links but rational or calculable economic interests.

The study admits that ideological preferences do play a certain role in political behaviour, together with personal considerations. And it is difficult to say which is the 'prime mover' in a politician's behaviour. Both of them complement each other. Economic (material) interests combine in an interactive pattern to influence behaviour. It is not the drive for power which is the prime motivation for political action.

Factionalism is traced to economic origins whether ideological or material. The competition is due to economic interests in the sense that there were differences of opinion with regard to ownership of economic enterprises. One group within the political party prefers private individual control of economic enterprise and the other prefers collective form of economic enterprises such as co-operatives. At the district level this led to political division consisting of forces
associated with cooperative structures on one side and the other forces divorced from co-operatives, apparently linked with interests in the private economic community at another level. Rebel groups generally associate with co-operatives which usually go hand in hand with cultivation of commercial crops and of the loyalties with economic interests. With these assumptions, the study analyses the conditions of factional alignments in Akola Z.P., to focus on the competition for economic interests.

Three cornered conflict involving State-level leaders against certain regional interests and powerful rival groups at the district level provides the background for political factions in Akola in 1962. Marwari community replaced Brahmins in wielding political influence in the area by 1947. It controlled Akola District Congress Committee by 1962. It is this committee which distributed party-tickets to contest in Z.P. Elections. The rebel leaders are closely associated with Akola co-operative power-structure, who were against the officially elected Z.P. members because of their support to private individual entrepreneurship.

B.D. Graham in his study of "The succession of Factional systems in U.P. Congress Party 1937-66" analyses factional structures and factional competition within the congress party in U.P. from 1937-66. Factional structure in the party is studied to understand how leadership roles grow more specialised when the problem of maintaining the cohesion of the party becomes acute. The study holds that factions within the party are informal and impermanent, not legitimate as they do not adhere to the norms of corporate group. They have both primary followers and secondary followers. The factional systems are of various types such
as bi-factional, dominant factional and multi-factional system. There is a link between resources of the organisation and recruitment of members in the faction by their factional leaders. Leadership roles in faction conflict are of four categories: 1) command 2) arbitration, 3) mediation and 4) management. An authoritative leader exercises command when he issues decree without consulting the factions concerned that a certain role must be observed, does arbitration when he issues decree after hearing the faction leaders stating their uses, mediates by persuading faction leaders to find a common ground to reach a mutually satisfactory decisions after negotiations. He plays role of a manager when he insures that there is sufficient power to enforce a decision and enforce normative and pragmatic rules for the internal politics of the group so that factional competition is either prevented or strictly regulated. In political parties, some or all of these leadership roles may be allotted to separate persons depending on the seriousness of the disputes within the group.

The intense factionalism in U.P. congress party from 1937-66 was due to lack of threat by opposition parties. Before 1957, the dominant faction system was in force. During this period (1948 and 1957) organizational elections took place which were marked by intense factional fights and even an attempt by radical factions to form left-wing opposition. During 1958-60, bi-factional system emerged from dominant faction with Gupta's successful fight for political survival. During this period, factions became more stable and specialised. In 1963, under the Kamaraj plan, AICC continued to arbitrate between the two factions and all the mediation was done in Delhi, reflecting the authoritative institutions of the state party. There was emergence of third faction to balance the two old factions. Due to
factionalism, party had to concentrate on internal affairs and hence had to neglect the socio-economic problems of the State.

Paul Brass's study/ "Factional politics in an Indian state, the congress party in U.P."\(^{18}\) is a study on party factions. The major concerns of the study are: 1) How factions get formed within the party? 2) What conditions have contributed to the development of factional system in U.P. Congress? 3) The nature of factional conflicts in the districts; 4) How factions of the party reflect factions in Indian society? 5) What are the factors on which the strength and cohesiveness of factions depend? 6) What are the functions of factions? and 7) How factions contribute to political development? The main findings of this study are that factions in congress are a collection of local, district and State factions forming alliances and developing hostilities in constant struggles for positions of power and status in congress-controlled institutions of state and local government. Due to absence of powerful opposition parties, lack of internal consensus on ideological issues and absence of authoritative leadership led to the factional system in U.P congress. At the district level factional conflict declines as leaders are concerned with more pragmatic questions of how to get things done for followers. Factions and factional conflict whether within the party or village society is part of indigenous, social and political order as leader-follower relationship is a typical trait of social and political organisation in India. Factions in the party constitute vertical structure of power which cuts across caste and class divisions. The study points out that the strength and cohesiveness of factions depend on (a) the ability of a leader to distribute material benefits to his followers (b) lawyer-client relationship (c) controlling local institution of self-government or co-operation (d) access to
Factions have both disintegrative as well as integrative role. Factional conflicts which have extra political ramifications (Business and social life) and which are not amenable to ordinary political solutions have disintegrative role on the party itself in the sense that they affect the electoral strength of the congress in the state. Among the integrative functions, mostly factions perform the functions of political recruitment for the congress organization. The main functions that factions perform for the society are that they politicise social and religious groups. Hence especially in U.P., caste association have little importance to politics. Thus the analysis suggests that factions are alternative forms of political organisations. They are based on conflicting principles. They are vertical structures of power oriented towards influence, that is, towards the establishment of links facilitating distribution of favours and services. Interest groups are associations oriented towards the promotion of the long-term interests of a generalized category in population. Factions inhibit the organisation of interests, because they are based upon ties which unite opposed interests. The members of faction come from different social and economic groups in the society united by a desire for personal privileges. Finally, while strength of U.P. Congress lies in its willingness and its proven ability to manage diversity, yet it does not necessarily foster the goals of long-term political development. For, it gives no encouragement to auxiliary organisations.
B.K. Nagla in his study, "Factionalism, Politics and Social Structure" seeks to understand faction-formation at the district level in Rajasthan. The main objective of the study is to find out how do factions spring up at the district level from village factions? In what way do they get transformed from their nativistic structure to more diffused and diverse antagonistic party alliances and class relations? In what way do the district level factions get integrated with State-level politics, particularly in the case of Congress Party from 1947 to 1997. He has selected one panchyat samithi and two of its villages in Udayapur District of Rajasthan in order to relate factions found at village level with the panchyat samithi and then with the district so as to link the district level factions with the factions at state level. It also tries to understand the invisible factionalism, i.e., the suppression of factional rivalries by extending patronage and by opening new vistas of development satisfying the aspirations of the entire region.

Factionalism in Rajasthan is rooted in homogeneity of interests, which cut across the lines of caste and region. The guiding force of factionalism in this State is commonality of interests, but this interest remains confined mostly to the leaders belonging to the same caste and same region. This does not mean that all the leaders of a region or all the leaders belonging to a particular caste form a faction. All the members of a caste do not necessarily belong to the same faction. Intra-caste status distributions would not permit such a homogeneity of interests.

Factionalism in Udaipur district was determined by the social structure of the region and the ideological determinant as
seen in the state level politics. Within the congress party, it was non-antagonistic in nature. It means there was sharing of certain privileges and benefits by groups within the party depending on the position they have got, while maintaining at the same time an over all unity of the constituents as system. From 1954 to 1971, it was controlled by Sukhadia's conscious policy towards other leaders of either accommodation or isolation and dependence. Thus congress party's factionalism was determined by the forces of regionalism, self-interest and other interest-configuration.

At the panchayath samithi level, two factors which account for factionalism are common interest over-riding any consideration of party affiliation or ideology and continued dominance of feudal elements in power politics. Factionalism, at this level is not a class, but an elite conflict. Panchayath samithi is considered an important arena of politics and therefore factionalism as it commands financial and administrative resources and provides power position. In this panchayath samithi, the two factions have supporters in various village panchayath as well as zilla parishad. Leaders of these two factions come from congress and jansangh parties. State leaders kept themselves in touch with leaders of panchayat samithi.

In the two villages studied by Nagla, factions have different social bases. In one village, factions are caused by interest groupings rather than structural divisions. In other village, factions arose from structural divisions rather than interest-groupings. In the first village, factions emerged due to the impact of political parties, elections, developmental schemes and the sharing of power in the village panchayat and cooperative society etc. In the second village, factions
emerged due to differences over violations of conjugal and connubial rules and regulations and other such factors. In the first case, factions cut across caste lines, whereas in the second case, ethnocentrism dominates inter caste relations. In the first case, factions had political links with the factions at Panchayat Samithi and district levels while in the second, such linkages were weak. In the two villages, factionalism follows the trends of discord and conflict. The two sectors of conflict—politics and social issues are kept apart. For example, there was often unanimity in caste matters but they voted for different persons nevertheless. However, factions in the two villages are not class-based, they only represent an elite conflict rather than a social and economic conflict between rich and poor. The villagers talk of political parties but, in reality, the political parties do not function or operate as political parties. It is the so called followers of political parties, who form factional camps and influence the nature of political processes.

The above studies focus on mainly three aspects i.e., 1) Role of party factions within Congress in the elections like District Councils, cooperatives and Assembly elections? 2) What role party factions in general within Congress performs? 3) The linkages between village factions and party factions at various levels like Samithi, District and State.

Regarding first aspect while Myron Weiner views that factional loyalties proved to be more intense than party loyalties in the elections and in villages, in turn, the village factions consider the general elections as an opportunity to consolidate their strength. B.S. Baviskar thinks that local factional leaders become a base for party factions within congress and these play a
role in all the elections like cooperatives, village Panchayats and Zilla Parishads. Marry C. Carras considers economic interests play dominant role for party factions within the Congress and these party factions oppose each other in Zilla Parishad elections.

Regarding second aspect B.D. Graham thinks that leadership roles grow more specialised when the problem of maintaining the function of the party becomes acute due to intense factionalism within U.P. Congress party. Paul Brass views that factions within Congress are a collection of local, district and state factions forming alliances and developing hostilities in constant struggle for positions of power and status in Congress controlled institution of State and Local Government.

Regarding third aspect B.K. Nagla maintained that factionalism within Congress party was non-antagonistic in nature and was determined by regionalism and self-interest. Factionalism is more a result of an elite conflict and not a class conflict. They are largely guided by power considerations.

IV

III. Generic Studies on Factions:

Ralph Nicholas in his study, "Factions : A Comparative Analysis", by comparing reported instances of factions from five different kinds of society and social institutions, suggests two approaches to the study of factions. One approach focussed on the analysis of political conflict and the other on the analysis of political organisations. He describes the characteristics of factions in the form of five propositions.
One. factions are conflict groups. It is during social conflict that factions emerge out of a sociologically undefined background to give observer a view of their members.

Two. factions are political groups. If politics is 'organised conflict about the use of public power (Curtis, 1902, p. 23), Nicholas holds, then it is factions which organise this conflict in certain kinds of society and institutions.

Three. factions are not corporate groups, in the sense that though they are impermanent, but may persist for a long period of time.

Four. faction members are recruited by a leader. Members can be connected to a faction only through the activity of a leader, since the unit has no corporate existence or clear single principle of recruitment. The leader who is responsible for organising the members or a faction is ordinarily a man with more political power than any of his followers. Leadership may be provided not only by a politically powerful individual, but also a 'clique' based on an influential family.

Five. faction members are recruited on diverse principles. A faction leader ordinarily has different kinds of connections with his followers, and makes use of all possibilities to draw supporters into his faction.

David K. French in his study, "Ambiguity and irrelevancy in factional conflict", has focussed on factionalism as a form of conflict and on the problems which are involved in the area of such conflict. He has explained it through using the
data on American Indian population. He argues that (a) position of participants are not relevant to each other (b) there is relationship between factionalism and ambiguity in behavioral pattern among participants (c) factional contenders frequently charge each other with having illegitimate means or ends. He has maintained that there are differences in observing this phenomenon in terms of ideological and non-ideological behaviour.

Siegel and Beals differentiate factionalism from intergroups conflict, party conflict and the application of social sanctions. According to them, factionalism is only one type of solution to such group problems. French has taken the same position in analysing the factionalism, but differed in interpretation. He refers to factionalism as those forms of conflict which occurs within a system i.e., group and which can not be settled by traditional means. He thinks for employing traditional means to resolve the conflict, that conflict must persist long enough. It is added that though all factional disputes be regarded as forms of conflict, not all instances of conflict are to be classified as factional. The study considers those disputes which occur between systems and not within the system and those which are resolved by traditional mechanisms which do not persist for a longer duration as non-factional conflicts on the other hand, they are to be considered as 'war' or 'party conflicts'. Since he considers factionalism as a form of inner conflict, factional participants constitute sub-systems rather than autonomous systems. The study points out that there occurs many conflicts at traditional sub-systems, but they can be settled by traditional means, but those who create new sub-system within traditional sub-system have low-probability of resolutions. As against
Laswell's position (1965). French holds that principles as well as application would be involved in intra-systemic factional conflict. He also disagrees with Siegel and Seals that actors in factional disputes preserve the system in which they are participating. He cites an example of American Indians who believe like non-American Indians in the factional disputes. By citing this example, he brings out the relationship between reference groups and factions. They build up orientation towards a system called Klamath and thus participants in a system become active members of factions. This ambiguous behavioral pattern persists among the participants of factionalism and the forms of participation in non-ideological socio-cultural activities by parties in conflict is not congruent with each other. In other words participation of faction in the system is different according to their own understanding as well as ideology towards the system. Further when factions as opposed to political parties are in conflict there is not only high probability of ambiguity and irrelevance but also charges of illegitimacy of actions of opponents. The study holds that it is unlikely that it would be useful to regard factional conflict as peculiar to systems undergoing rapid change.

Thus French concludes that differences in forms of organisations among socio-cultural systems create problems of understanding in factional divisions. And it becomes necessary to differentiate between ideological and non-ideological behaviour. It is pointed out that below the ideological level, there is often 'structural or organisational irrelevancy' in factional conflicts.

David Hardiman in his study, "The Indian faction: A political theory examined" has critically examined the theory of faction-
alism and highlights usefulness of applying this theory to understand Indian politics. He holds that for many scholars, the concept of faction provided a key to the understanding of Indian politics. Because Factional Net-Works are supposed to encompass the nation, linking the peasant masses to rulers.

For Paul Brass, factional loyalties provide the link between parochial units of society such as family, village and caste and the political parties. Factional loyalty is transitional and intermediate form of politics. It is more than the parochial parties and something less than the party politics in European and American sense.

Hardiman reviewed the works of many scholars who include historians like B.R.Tomlinson, S.N.Mukherjee, David WashBrook, Social- Anthropologists like Osker Lewis, F.G.Bailey, Ralph Nicholas, Adrian Mayer, and political scientists like Paul Brass and Carter to examine the theory that factional networks encompass the nation linking peasant mass to the rulers. By reviewing these scholars' works, author says, there are two usage of factional conflicts in their literature on factions. 1) Factions as vertical political cliques. In this factions are seen as vertical political alliances, in contrast to class which be seen as horizontal type of political alliance. 2) Faction is not a small clique, but vast patron-client network. But he says these theoretical interpretations about factions have no empirical basis. He also says that much analysis of factionalism in rural India has been carried out in terms of election studies. In these elections the majority of villages are seen to be voting according to the wishes of the patron or their caste leaders. But still from such studies one cannot draw any profound conclusions about the nature of political alliances and solidarities in rural India.
Hardiman views that great Indian faction which means factional network encompass the nation linking peasant masses to the rulers is more of a myth than reality. Because much of political conflict described as factional at both district and village level is in fact conflict with in the oligarchy and in such conflict vertical mobilization is a necessary process. He also maintains that there is short disjuncture between district conflicts and village level conflicts. He does not agree with the distinction between factionalism as traditional and class conflicts as modern. He says it is issue or event which creates particular political alliances and networks rather than modernity and tradition. He says structural-functional and behavioral explanations about factions share a common assumption that Indian politics are factional because India is by tradition a factional society. It also means that Indian politics have autocratic ruling class in which masses only participate as clients of elite politicians and hence while dealing with mass politics we are to deal with patron-client network. He says the concept of faction is valuable to study Indian politics only when factions are understood as political cliques which struggle among themselves for power and whose members hold similar class interests. However there is no structural identity between such political cliques at the all Indian provincial levels and conflict groups at the village level.

Elliott Carolyn, in her study, "Caste and Factions in dominant Caste in Andhra Pradesh" held that vertical mobilisation is a key to power in A.P. politics, more so in the areas where dominant caste exist. Villagers look vertically to political and economic leaders for the authority and village leaders use both caste and class to maintain their dominance. Leadership of
village factions depends on skill and application of the faction leaders. When leadership roles are concentrated in one dominant caste, factional disputes occur between their brother or kinsmen over issues of land or prestige. And these divisions among dominant caste, give a way to factions, which is mobilised by opposing parties for their cause. The factional organisations are built on the relationships between master and servant, patron and client. The intensity and depth of factional organisation varies with the history in the village, but in most cases, the organisation is strikingly causal. During quiet periods, the factions exist only as social circles which may gather for gossip in the evenings. Carolyn says modern politics have intensified the vertical process of mobilisation in the village. Though still based on the traditional ties between patron and client, this intensity at election time gives factional alignments a modern face. She says there are certain dominant villages which assume the functions of arbitration and representation for the other villages in the same way that dominant caste do for lower castes in single village. The villages which are not clustered around such dominant villages get political support through regional elites. Given the legendary history of peasant castes the equality of peasant castes, caste status sustains the culture of dominance of Reddies and Kammas and they accept each other's right to rule. This becomes an important issue when persons of lower traditional status rise to positions of dominance. Such persons are accepted on the basis of their power, but grudgingly as nouveau riche.

Factions are unified at the top by caste and kinship interactions and sustained at the bottom by the vertical ties of village factions. It also explains how one dominant family becomes successful in district politics of Andhra.
There is little possibility for dominant caste leaders to organise coalitions for political support where political leaders emerged from the lower castes. In the places where backward castes have more support within a particular district, dominant caste do not include their representatives in district factions nor otherwise seek their support. Carolyn says, the culture of dominance is such that conflict between/among Reddies or between Reddies and Kammas is perceived as honorable and understandable within the system, but conflict between Reddies and other BCs, for example weavers, upsets the system and hence is feared.

In the modern factions, caste acquires a new secular meaning and factions are usually very careful to include members belonging to all the important caste groups. Caste is important as a symbol of cohesion, but more a network of groups which are activated by faction leaders through giving benefits to prominent members of caste groups in the villages. The power structure in the Andhra depends on how existing dominant caste factions make them as multi-caste factions by accommodating lower caste and whether lower-caste leaders raise to the position of leadership in multi-caste factions.

Hamza Alvi, in his study, "Village Factions" applies the concept of faction to analyse political activity at levels of local peasant community. For him, faction is the most pervasive form of peasant political interactions in peasant societies. Factional alignments cut across class alignments. Political cleavages are often vertical cleavages of class conflict. An important aspect of factional conflict is that rival factions are in general structurally similar in the sense that they represent similar configurations of
social group, though not necessarily always. Wherever rival factions belong to similar social groups, the factional model describes a segmental rather than class conflict. Such conflict does not have ideological expressions because rival factions or faction leaders fight for control over resources, power and status as available within the existing framework of society rather than for changes in the social structure. Through factional model one can identify actual political alignments in peasant societies. By this alignments one can identify the precise locus and operation of relationship of power. He says factional model of politics which manifest in vertical cleavages excludes class solidarity and class conflict. Factional model is specific to certain societies being inherent in the culture or social structure. The factional mode of politics is guided by the principle of diversity of factional recruitment which is based on certain structural factors. He mainly cites four factors which become basis for factional recruitment in the villages of erstwhile Punjab.

One. Economic structure and the pattern of alignments are determined by the distribution of ownership of land and the mode of its utilisation. The relationship between landlords and share croppers and labourers are guided by patron-client relationships and signify a relationship of reciprocity from which each party gains some benefit. The relationship of dependence in the case of landlords and share croppers and labourers and autonomy on the part of middle peasants.

Two. The second institutionalised structure which underlies the bases of alignments is kinship. The kinship structure in Punjab is known as biradaries based on endogamous patrilineages. Biradari solidarities bring in corporate groups and
political alignments. The degree of kinship solidarity is more in the case of independent peasant proprietors, which constitutes them into corporate groups and weak in the case of share-croppers and labourers. Biradari organisation is also weak in the case of landlords who are in competition with each other for power and status in local political arenas. In informal political gathering, they consult each other either to act in concert or to part in disagreement.

Three. The third structure which establishes ties between members of peasant communities is the 'political structure' primarily by the administrative structure of Government. Influential landlords set themselves up as political middlemen and mediate between members of the village individually as well as collectively and the Government. They establish a wide-network of links with government officials, rely on landlords and link up with local power structure. This structure includes links with political parties or urban political movements. Factional villages above the level of village are institutionalised as political parties and the latter induct faction-leaders, the local power-holders to establish local bosses.

Four. In Punjab villages there is also another element of powerful landlords known as Rassagira (patrons) who employ mafia, local bandits (goondas; to terrorise peasants, particularly by stealing their cattle and abducting women. The independent peasant proprietors (small peasants) get protection from them in return for their political support. The Independent Peasant Proprietors' alliances with factional leaders are based on variety of factors. It may be a relationship of protector and protege, the 'protector' being
Rassagir who terrorise them into faction or the faction leader may gain support by acting as an intermediary between them and bureaucracy. Biradaries of independent proprietors may unite against landlords by radical political parties or peasant unions.

In the village politics, the conflict of rival faction leaders is an elite-conflict and hence their class positions is not threatened. To mobilise political support they enter into alliances with their peers. The horizontal solidarity of kinship is a resource for landlord to exploit for political support. The biradari factional leader and their economic dependents constitute the core of the faction. Finally Hamza Alvi says the primary loyalties and structures of kinship do not themselves exist in 'functional' isolation. They are moulded by class relationships. The functional separation of structures and analyses of primordial loyalties themselves, outsides the matrix of class structures, vitiates the rules of political sociology and social Anthropology.

Keeping the above frame-work for analysis, Hamza Alvi, select a village namely Tekwala which has two or more big-landlords plus a mixed population of lineage of small-holders.

It has two biggest landowners, who contend for power in the villages. One was Pir Sher Shah who has 300 acres of land. He dominates in 43 households in the village. The other half was dominated by other landlord namely Mian Osman Farookhi, who has 500 acres in the village and 300 acres in other district. He dominates 68 households. Each tries to wean away the support of different lineages in the village for the purposes of power. Thus the mode of politics in Punjab vil-
lages of Pakistan is between factions, as in India where share-croppers and labourers have succeeded in organising on class lines, challenging the land-owners, the mode of politics ceases to be factional. There are two types of factional recruitment, between those who have a choice and those who do not, with economically dependent persons come on the latter category. That means, the relationship with leader is either contractual or moral. Those who have economic dependence and get patronage constitute the 'core' in the factions. Further, there is principle of diversity of recruitment in the factions. One must also distinguish between vertical and horizontal alignments. Vertical alignments include ties of economic dependence and the relationship between a protector and protege. Subversion of proteges increases resources of power of the rival faction leaders. Horizontal alignments in the form of lineage solidarity is strongest amongst those who are economically dependent and it is weak among economic dependents. Class solidarity is different. It constitutes a challenge to vertical alignments and such a challenge is not easily mounted.

E.H. Carter's study, "Elite politics in Rural India, Political stratification and alliances in Western Maharashtra", is more important for understanding political stratifications rather than faction-formation. He uses the term alliance instead of faction. He defines "alliances", as a kind of exchange of transaction involving decision to extend or withhold support or patronage and hence have transactional and decision making aspects. Carter refers to the concept of constraints, which includes kinship, caste, class and administrative and Governmental institutions. The political alliances are made in the arenas of administrative and Governmental
institutions. He says politics of Maharashtra is dominated by a political class, consisting of land-owning Vetendar Marathas, the Brahmins and the Jains. Carter also refers to vertical alliances based on economic dependence which are seen prominently during the time of elections. The vertical alliance refers to the relationship between political leaders and the non-political voters. He also refers to Horizontal alliances which are found within political class between the leaders and these alliances continue to change as they are generally based on expediency of strategies.

The main feature of the pattern of political alliances in rural western Maharashtra is the instability of coalitions and it is due to the result of the discontinuity in the distribution of power and the dominance of a small, privileged political class. The formation of vertical alliances have little influence on the formation of horizontal alliances within the political class. The dominant position of the political class also reduces the influence of its internal caste and kinship structure on the formation of horizontal alliances. It is the political strategy which is important for elite leaders, but not the ideology, nor personal loyalty, nor rights and obligations arising from caste or kinship. There are shifts in horizontal alliances because alliances are shaped primarily by strategic and personal advancement. As against the findings of existing literature on factions in local level politics, which consider caste and kinship as important determinants of political action. Carter says caste and kinship are often extrinsic pretexts for alliance than they are intrinsic transactional content of alliances. There are very few direct connections between caste and kinship on one hand and political interests on the other. That is why, according to Carter, the
elite politics of India is not completely caste-oriented and
tend to be static. Though political alliances are not permanent
and they keep on changing, but political class is not itself
internally stratified and there is with it no distinct sub-
class with privileged access to positions of power at the
district or state level. Political class of Maharashtra is
homogeneous. The composition of Maharashtra Cabinet was rough-
ly same as that of Phaltan Panchayat Samiti of Satra Z.P., which
he has taken for the study. Even in India, political class seems
to be becoming increasingly undifferentiated.

Thus the literature on factions shows that (a) there are
quite a number of studies on factions mainly to understand the
reasons for formation of factions in the village, their
characteristics, the leadership pattern of factions, princi-
bles of recruitment to factions, expression of hostilities by
factions, their role in village politics, etc. (b) There
are also studies on factions within political parties -
mainly factions within Congress -{I} Party and how this
factions within the party shape the outcome of elections (c)
There are few studies on linkages of factions i.e., how factions
spring up at district level from village factions and
district level factions get integrated with state level poli-
tics, (d) Some more studies on role of factions within politi-
cal institutions such as panchayats and zilla parishads (e) Very
limited studies are on examining the theory of factionalism in
Indian politics and also suggest approaches to study fac-
tions.

The data suggests that there is no comprehensive study in
the discipline of political science covering village factions
their political as well as non-political functions, their
linkage with political parties as well as their role in
district politics, mainly in elections, and the violent
means they resort to, their role in development / non-
development of rural areas, their historical background, the
socio economic dominance they maintain in the region. There
is a need for such a study in the region of states where
faction phenomena has been existing. Hence this study of
factions in Rayalaseema region of Andhra Pradesh which is
known for intense and violent factions. We have restricted our
study to one district i.e., Kurnool for analysing the faction
politics in detail.

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