CHAPTER III

MARATHA PENETRATION IN RAJASTHAN
(1761-1794 AD)

The defeat of the Marathas in the third battle of Panipat came as a severe setback to the Maratha power in north India and swept away the possibilities of Maratha predominance at least for the time being. The myth about their invisibility was broken. However, the Marathas under the leadership of Malharrao Holkar and Mahadji Shinde were able to restore their lost prestige within a decade. Holkar emerged as the most powerful Maratha sardar in central and north India. He led the process of the recovery of lost glory of the Marathas in the area beyond central India. By April 1761, 40,000 soldiers had assembled under the Marathas banner in and around Gwalier region. Holkar on his return from Panipat halted briefly at Gwalier to rally the surviving Maratha forces and then left for Indore. The return of Abdali opened the way for the Marathas to reassert their power in Rajasthan.

The debacle of Panipat gave an opportunity to the Rajput rulers to reassert authority in the areas that were under the Maratha control. The Rajput rulers became aggressive in order to regain what they had surrendered to the Marathas. The Chandrawat Rajputs of Mewar took over Rampura which was transferred to Holkar. In Kota territory the Maharao’s officers seized the fortress of Gagron and ousted the Maratha revenue collector. These were two important outposts on the border areas between Rajasthan and Malwa. Holkar quickly marched to recapture these outposts with artillery from Indore.

Seeing Marathas in weakened position Madho Singh not only stopped the payment of tribute to the Marathas but also made a serious attempt to dislodge the Marathas from Rajasthan. He began to make attempt to seek help from the Afghan chief Najib Khan and the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam. He sent Barhat Karidan to Johdpur to negotiate with Bijay Singh for the formation of anti-

1 Selection from the Peshwa Daftar, Vol. 29, L.81.
Maratha coalition. The rulers of Mewar, Kota, Bundi and Karauli were also approached to join the coalition\(^1\). However, Madho Singh did not receive any positive response either from the Rahilla chief Najib Khan or the emperor. Madho Singh’s attempt to rope in the other Rajput rulers also met with partial success. Mewar, by now had become a weak state and had a weak ruler. The ruler of Jodhpur was hostile to Marathas as they had supported the cause of Ram Singh in the succession dispute. However, the Jodhpur ruler Bijay Singh was not in favour of antagonizing Shinde with whom he had concluded a treaty in 1760 against Ram Singh. Bijay Singh was also unhappy with Madho Singh for the support that he had given to Ram Singh. The Hadas of Kota did not show any inclination to join the alliance against the Marathas as they were apprehensive about Madho Singh’s intentions. They suspected that Madho Singh wants to establish his supremacy over Kota and Bundi. Madho Singh’s activities in Kota territory also alarmed the Hadas. He besieged Newai held by the Marathas and challenged the Maratha officer Keshav Pandit in Keshorai Patan near Kota city in 1761\(^2\).

Enforcement upon the Kota territory by Madho Singh turned the Hadas against Jaipur. Moreover Kota could not afford to antagonize the Marathas because of its geographical proximity to Malwa that was under the Maratha control. Bundi and Karauli were not powerful states and any help from their side was not much in substance. Hence Madho Singh could not succeed in forming a united front against the Marathas.

Malharrao Holkar was aware of the moves initiated by Madho Singh to dislodge the Marathas from Rajasthan. The attack on his territory in Kota-Bundi region was provocative enough to invade Jaipur for which he sought the permission of the Peshwa. Holkar reached Madhukargarh from Indore via Mukundra pass along with the contingent of Shinde led by Khanji Jadav and

\(^{1}\) Selection from the Peshwa Daftar, Vol. 29, L.19. 27.10.1761; Sarkar, JN, Fall of the Maghal Empire, Vol 2, P 362.
\(^{2}\) Ibid.
Chinto Krishna. Nearly 15,000 Kota soldiers led by the Kota Diwan Akhay Ram and Zalim Singh Jhala joined Holkar. The Jaipur forces initially made the Marathas vacate some of their posts in Kota territory\(^1\). Both the forces met at a place between Mangrol and Bhatwara. The Jaipur forces were convincingly beaten by the combined forces of Holkar and Kota. The camp and property of Madho Singh were plundered by Holkar and Hadas.

The defeat of the Kachhawa forces created panic throughout Jaipur. Madho Singh, who had been watching the battle from Ranthambore, now quickly left for his capital. He sent his family to Amber as safety measure. Holkar chased Jaipur army upto Khapra. The Maratha army had begun plundering the Jaipur territory to enforce the demand of tribute.

Realizing that the Marathas were in total command of the situation, the Jaipur Diwan Kanhi Ram immediately opened negotiations with the Marathas to settle the dispute about the outstanding tribute. The Marathas were thus back in Rajasthan soon after their debacle in the battle of Panipat. The defeat of Madho Singh's forces once again established the supremacy of the Marathas in Rajasthan. Now they began pressurising Jaipur for payment of outstanding tribute. Malharrao Holkar instructed Maratha representative at Kota Lalaji Gulgule to press Diwan Kanhi Ram for immediate payment of the dues\(^2\). However, Jaipur ruler was rescued from imminent Maratha threat as the Marathas were compelled to leave Rajasthan to defend Bundalkhand from invasion of emperor Shah Alam and his wazir, Shuja-ud-daulah who had captured Kalpi and Jhansi\(^3\). Madho Singh's conflict with the Marathas at Mangrol in 1761 and the Maratha involvement in the Deccan where they were fighting with the Nizam delayed the resumption of normal communication channels between Holkar and Jaipur.

\(^1\) Sarkar, JN, *Fall of the Maghal Empire*, Vol 2, P 363.
However, diplomatic ties between the two sides were resumed in 1764 when Madho Singh sent his representatives Diwan Guru Sahay and Raj Singh Hamirdeka to Holkar’s court at Indore. This step was seen as an attempt at normalization of relations. Holkar responded by sending his representatives to the Jaipur court.

The exchange of messages between the two rulers also took place through their trusted and loyal officers. Diplomatic ties went beyond political concerns to cover certain areas of mutual interest. This is evident from Holkars request to Madho Singh to give protection to banker Kewal Ram whose father was persuaded by Sawai Jai Singh to shift his trade from Ujjain to Jaipur. Malharrao Holkar also enquired about the business of another trader cum hanker Murar Seth Krishnaji who was running his business in Jaipur. It may be pointed out here that Sawai Jai Singh was keen to develop Jaipur city as a leading commercial centre. He induced the migration of traders and bankers from other regions including Malwa. Sawai Jai Singh’s posting as the governor of Malwa facilitated the migration of some business families from Malwa to Jaipur. Holkar seemed to be concerned about the safety of those families who had left Malwa to settle in Jaipur. Through exchange of letters Holkar was trying to address this problem.

The issue of pending tribute was raised by Holkar in his lengthy letter to Madho Singh in October 1764. This letter contains details of Holkar’s demand for outstanding dues since 1761 which also included expenditure incurred on the upkeep of Ranthambhor fort. Between 1762 and 1764 the Marathas kept on reminding Madho Singh for payment of tribute. When Holkar realized that the payment was not forthcoming he proceeded towards Rajasthan to force Madho Singh to pay up. Holkar encamped at Chatsu and demanded clearance of dues.

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1 Indore Kharita No.83, Jeth Sudi 10, V.S. 1821/1764.
2 Indore Kharita No.84, Agahan Vadi 10, V.S. 1821/1764.
3 Indore Kharita No.85, Posh Vadi 10, V.S. 1821/1764.
4 Indore Kharita No.85, Posh Vadi 10, V.S. 1821/1764.
5 Indore Kharita No.87, Posh Vadi 10, V.S. 1821/1764.
6 Sarkar, JN, Fall of the Maghal Empire, Vol.2, P. 366.
Failing to get any response from Madho Singh he proceeded to Jobner and begun to plunder. Madho Singh was advised by his nobles to save the state from devastation by agreeing to pay. Madho Singh deputed his representatives to settle the issue of dues. Holkar demanded Rs 35 lakhs, the demand also included expenditure incurred on the upkeep of Ranthambhar Fort. Out of this, Rs 10 lakhs were to be paid within the year in four installments. First installment of Rs 4 lakhs was to be paid in cash immediately and the rest of the amount was to be paid within six months. Rs 25 lakhs was to be paid between 1765 and 1771 in annual installments of Rs 4.25 lakhs in the first 4 years and 4 lakhs each in 1770 and 1771. Madho Singh also agreed to surrender parganas Tonk and Rampura to Holkar. A jagir worth of Rs 1 lakh was bestowed upon Mala Rao, son of Malharrao Holkar by Madho Singh. After concluding this agreement Holkar left Jaipur.

The above agreement saved the Kachhawa state from being ravaged by the Marathas. Madho Singh satisfied Holkar by immediately paying up Rs 400,001. However he was not at all serious about paying the rest of the amount. But the surrender of Tonk and Rampura to the Marathas reduced the territory of Jaipur state which had financial implications for the state as well. It also gave the Marathas a strong base in the middle of Rajasthan to put pressure on the Rajputs and carry on military operations as and when required. By subduing the powerful Kachhawa state all alone not only established Holkar’s supremacy in Rajasthan, but also provided him financial resources to sort out his internal problems.

The persistent clan rivalries among the Rajput rulers were fully exploited by the Marathas to their advantage. The battle of Bhatwara led to increasing tension between the rulers of Kota and Bundi. Rao Chhatrsal of Kota was much annoyed with Rao Raja Umed Singh of Bundi for having sided with Madho Singh. The defeat of Madho Singh gave him the opportunity to settle score with his rival Umed Singh with the help of the Marathas. He solicited Mahadji Shinde’s help.

\footnote{Indore Kharita No.87, Magh Sudi 10, V.S. 1821/1764.}
and prompted him to take action against Bundi to put pressure for the payment of outstanding tribute. By now the Marathas had become too familiar with the game to play off one Rajput ruler against the other. Shinde promptly accepted the offer and combined forces of Kota and Shinde started ravaging the territory of Bundi. Attempts of Bundi ruler to conclude peace proved futile as the Marathas demanded a compensation of Rs 7 lakhs as military expenses and payment of tribute for the last three years. Umed Singh with the help of Jaipur prepared himself for the battle. However, he realized his weakness to face the strong Maratha army and sued for peace. He agreed to pay outstanding amount of tribute to Shinde who withdrew from the Bundi territory. The Kota- Bundi rivalry gave Mahadjji Shinde a foothold in the Harauti region of Rajasthan1.

In the meantime the Jat ruler of Bhartpur, Jawahar Singh, took advantage of the Maratha involvement in the affairs of Jaipur, Kota and Budi and prepared himself to settle score with Madho Singh of Jaipur who had espoused the cause of Najib-ud- dollah, the strong rival of Jawahar Singh. He hired a strong contingent of Sikhs and invaded Jaipur. Madho Singh knew that on his own he could not face his powerful opponent. Hence he approached both Holkar and Shinde for help2.

Keeping in mind the Maratha interest in North India both the Maratha leaders favorably responded to Madho Singh’s appeal and sent their forces to Jaipur. The Maratha intervention in favour of Jaipur spoiled Jawahar Singh’s plan as he could not afford to take on the Marathas. He was forced to make peace with Madho Singh. The timely help of Marathas saved Jaipur from the Jat incursion. This development was a turning point in Jaipur- Maratha relations at least for the time being.

The Maratha-Jat rivalry led to the emergence of a new anti-Maratha front in Rajasthan. Jawahar Singh was greatly annoyed with the Marathas who frustrated his plan against Madho Singh. He resolved to expel the Marathas from

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1 Saxena, R.K. Maratha Relations with Major States of Rajputana, PP 45-47
2 Kharita from Madho Singh to Malharrao Holkar, Asoj Vadi II, V.S. 1822/1765 (Draft Kharita Section); Selection from the Peshwa Daftar, Vol. 29, 1765.
Rajasthan and started looking for possible allies. He marched to Pushkar where he met Bijay Singh of Jodhpur. They vowed to end the Maratha domination in Rajasthan by waging a war jointly against them and push them across the river Narbada. Bijay Singh also requested Madho Singh to join the front but he declined. Madho Singh made a plan to attack the Jat territory with the help of Bikaner and the Marathas in the absent of Jawahar Singh. Madho Singh’s forces attacked the Jat territory\(^1\). Bijay Singh who came to know of these developments persuaded Madho Singh not to disturb the Jat Raja on his return journey.

However, the Jaipur Raja did not keep his promise. The Kachhawa and Maratha army attacked Jawahar Singh and defeated the combined Jat- Rathor forces. The Jaipur army also suffered heavily and lost a number of prominent Kachhawa commanders. The hostility of Jawahar Singh towards a section of the Rajputs on the one hand and the Marathas on the other, persisted till his death. The Marathas were relieved of a powerful opponent who was resisting the Maratha penetration into Rajasthan.

The haterated for the Marathas due to their unreasonable demands and military activities had prompted one or the other Rajput rulers to forge anti Maratha coalition. This time the initiative was taken by the Hadas of Kota who contemplated to form a united front for Jaipur, Jodhpur and Mewar against the Marathas. Guman Singh, the ruler of Kota arranged a meeting of Rana Ari Singh and Bijay Singh at Nathdwara\(^2\). The meeting between these three rulers took place in Nov 1766, but nothing came out of this meeting as the Jaipur raja abstained and the ruler of Mewar also showed reluctance to join the front Maharao Guman Singh was now left with no other choice except to profess his total allegiance to the Marathas.

Love and hate attitude of the Rajputs towards Marathas not only reveal the ambiguity of the Rajputs as to how to deal with the Marathas but also their

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\(^1\) Indore Kharita, Magh Sudi 1, V.S. 1824/ January 1768, Arzdaaht from Santaji Bhosle to Madh Singh, Magh Sudi 1, V.S 1824/January 1768; Kharita from Madho Singh to Tukoji Holkar, Magh Vadi 12, V.S.1824/January 1768 (Draft Kharita Section)

\(^2\) Saxena, R.K. *Maratha Relations with Major States of Rajputana*, P 51

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inherent weakness to unite for a common cause. The conflicting interests of the Rajputs and their own internal problems prevented them to pursue a uniform policy towards the Marathas. Moreover, they needed the support of the Marathas to sort out rifts among themselves. However, at the same time they resented their harsh demands. The disunity of the Rajputs made the Marathas sole arbiters in their internal disputes.

The rise of the Jat state Bharatpur also complicated the situation and forced both the Rajputs of Jaipur and Marathas to seek mutual help against the common foe. The Marathas were already facing difficulty in subduing the Jats of Gohod. The Bharatpur Jat too captured territory in northern Malwa where Marathas had their outposts. The Gohad Jats were in close proximity of the Bharatpur state and also enjoyed brotherly relations with the Bharatpur Jats. The Gohad Jats were being supported by Bharatpur. The Marathas found it difficult to dislodge Gohad Jats so long as Bharatpur Jats were so powerful. Holkar and Jaipur rulers came closer on account of the growing power of Bharatpur under Jawahar Singh, their common enemy. Malharrao Holkar kept Jaipur ruler updated about his military campaigns in the Jat territory in the year 1765.1

After the death of Malharrao Holkar in May 1766, his grandson Mal Rao Holkar too sought Madho Singh’s help against the Jats.2 The bitterness of the Marathas for the Rajputs following the battle of Panipat seemed to be getting over as evident from Mal Rao’s letter to Madho Singh in which he reminded the Jaipur ruler of Jaipur Maratha relationship going to several generations.3 He died the very next year on 27th March 1767. The agents of the English East India Company from Allahbad reported Madho Singh’s support to the Marathas against Jawahar Singh’s forces in 1768.

1 Indore Kharita No.89, Chaitra Vadi 10, V.S. 1821/1765; Indore Kharita No.93, Maghishri Vadi 12, V.S. 1822/1765.
2 Indore Kharita No.98, Asarh Vadi 3, V.S. 1823/1766.
3 Indore Kharita No.98, Asarh Vadi 3, V.S. 1823.
A severe war is now carrying on between the Jats assisted by the Sikhs on one side and Madho Singh with the Marathas on the other. When these powers are disengaged there is no knowing.

Malrao Holkar passed away only nine months after the death of Malharrao Holkar (1766). Madho Singh also died in 1768. Both sides were now headed by new rulers in 1767-68. After Madho Singh’s death his son, Prithvi Singh ascended the gaddi of Jaipur. Due to successive death in Holkar family Ahilya Bai took over the charge of Holkar affairs. Tukoji Holkar who was now commander of the Holkar army wrote six letters to Prithivi Singh within a span of eight months. All these letters were written in 1768 which contained messages of goodwill and also indicated that there was a temporary break in diplomatic ties on both sides and now the Holkars look forward to a new beginning of relationship.

The Peshwa Madhav Rao sent a turban to Prithivi Singh as a mark of recognition of his legitimate authority as the new ruler of Jaipur. The Peshwa expressed his desire to maintain cordial relations with Jaipur. Prithivi Singh promptly reciprocated the friendly gestures of the Peshwa. An examination of the letters sent by the Maratha leaders to Prithvi Singh reveal that now the posture was less hostile and there were hardly open or veiled threats as was the case in the earlier times. These letters were more in the nature of reminders and protests for nonpayment or delayed payment of dues. There were also protests against Jaipur Raja’s inaction in curbing disturbances caused by the Rajputs in the parganas held by Holkar in Jaipur territory. In 1767 Tukoji Holkar wrote to Prithvi Singh that the Holkars disapprove of Jaipur state’s control over parganas Tonk and Rampura which were handed over to them by Madho Singh. He asked Prithvi Singh to instruct his officials to co-operate and restore these parganas to

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1 Foreign Department Records, National Archives of India, secrete, February 19, 1768, (14, 127-128, 15, 212-14).
2 Indore Kharita No.101, Chaitra Sudi 10, V.S. 1824/1767.
3 Indore Kharita No.110, Posh Sudi 14, V.S. 1825/1768. Indore Kharita No.111, Falgun Vadi 12 V.S. 1825/1768, Indore Kharita No.112, Chaitra Sudi 1, V.S. 1826/1769; Indore Kharita No.113, Vaisakh Vadi 13, V.S. 1826/1769; Indore Kharita No.114, Jeth Sudi 7, V.S. 1826/1769; Indore Kharita No.115, Sawan Sudi 1, V.S. 1826/1769;
their local agent Pandit Sadashiv Gopal and be allowed to settle the revenue of above parganas. Tukoji Holkar maintained regular communication with Prithvi Singh to safeguard the territorial possessions of the Holkars in the Jaipur state as he put forward Indore’s claim over pargana Tonk and Rampura. Tukoji Holkar’s involvement in the external affairs of the house of Holkar continued till 1770. In his letter of 1769 to Prithvi Singh Tukoji wrote that since long time Najib, Jaipur state and the House of Holkar were united. In this letter he endorsed the solidarity shown by Jaipur state with Najib Khan.

The Holkars support to Jaipur in its ongoing fight against the Jats continued which quite is evident from Tukoji Holkar’s correspondence with Madho Singh. He wrote to the latter about the ongoing Maratha campaigns against the Jats in Malwa and Bundel Khand and asked for Jaipur’s support too. In the past few days fight between the Jat and your forces have been reported so quickly get ready with a big contingent and field guns to counter the same, this also is the wish of Peshwa.

Expressions of solidarity came again from Tukoji Holkar when he heard the news of the defeat of the Jat forces at the hands of Madho Singh’s army. He wrote, “Jats had misbehaved with Malharrao Holkar too and so now they are suffering.” The Peshwa also wrote to the Jaipur ruler that “we have dispatched our forces towards your territory and our forces along with those of Mahadji Shinde’s are marching quickly and on an auspicious day we are going to reach near Narmada.” From one of the Kharitas issued from Indore in January 1768, it is evident that the Peshwa also ordered many other Maratha Commanders to

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1 Indore Kharita No.105 A and B, Magishri Sudia, V.S. 1824/1767------
2 Indore Kharita No.121, Asoj Sudi 10, V.S. 1826/1769.
3 Indore Kharita No.105 A and B, Magishri Sudi 9, V.S. 1824/1767------या दीना में जाट को वा राज की फौज को कड़ीयों सुनवा में आयों जो सू नवीकरण या ही हो जो मायकी फौज वा टॉपवाना सू सिलाब राज सू सामील होय.... श्रीमत पंडित प्रधान जी की मददी याही छे.....
4 Indore Kharita No.106 A Magishri Sudi 1, V.S. 1824/1767---- जाट से व राज के फौज सू रती हुई जब जाट ने शिकल ख़याि माराय पदा का समावर मानाम हुआ जी सू घणी खुराशी हुई जाट ने ठेरासवारी वा राज सू घरी नेशवाल कोई भी जीके केल आफी पायो……
march to the north to fight the Jats. This fact is corroborated by Dastur Komvar which contained the names of Maratha commanders who fought with the Jats.

It appears from Indore Kharitas that from the beginning of 1770 Ahilyabai Holkar herself started taking interest in the external affairs of the house of Holkar. She herself entered into negotiation with Prithivi Singh protesting against the behavior of the Rajput bhomias in the villages of Jaipur parganas that were under the control of Holkar’s officers. The Kharita read “In Paragana Tonk and Rampura our Kamvisdar Pandit Rangoji has not been able to settle the affairs of these parganas because of the resistance of the bhomias. So I write that instruct all the bhomias to behave and allow our officers to carry on the work of settlement.

The Maratha advancement in Rajasthan in 1770s entered a new phase. The Marathas had come a long way in their politics in Rajasthan and north India from the days in 1730 and 1740s when their concentration was entirely on gaining control over the province of Malwa. Rajasthan was periphery in their scheme of northward expansion of the Maratha power. The Marathas were not familiar with the topography of Rajasthan. 1760s were difficult time for the Marathas as they were trying to overcome the debacle of the battle of Panipat. It was the tough time for both Holkar and Shinde as they had to face stiff resistance from the local power groups in the north India the Jats, Rajputs, Bundelas and Afghans who got the opportunity to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the Marathas after the battle of Panipat. The 1770s witnessed the revival of Maratha power in Rajasthan and north India under the leadership of Tukoji Holkar and Mahadji Shinde. Around this time the Peshwa had subdued his opponents in the south and considered himself strong enough to revive his northward ventures.

1 Indore Kharita No. 106 B, Magishri Sudi 1, V.S. 1824/1767.
2 Dastur Komvar, Dastur Dikhani
3 Indore Kharita No.130, Magishri Vudi 1, V.S. 1827/1770.
The objective was to re-establish the hold of the Marathas in north India. He ordered Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji Krishna to march towards north with 15000 cavalry\(^1\) to realize pending dues of war indemnity from the Jat Raja and to repossess the territory granted by the Mughal Emperor to the Marathas in 1754 in return of their help. The Marathas also demanded dues from Kota. The Kota Maharao was instructed to pay Rs 270,000 as the outstanding dues. The Malharao, who was not in a position to pay, immediately deputed Pancholi Shiv Nath to handle the situation tactfully so that the Marathas might not feel offended. The Maharao's inability to pay up forced the Marathas to enter into the territory of Kota\(^2\).

Kota situated on the Malwa- Rajasthan border was being used by the Marathas as a strategic base for overseeing the Maratha affairs in Rajasthan and north India. Very often the Marathas used Kota as a halting point on the way to their destination from Malwa to north and way back. Kota regularly figured in the letters exchanged between the Marathas and Jaipur Raja. Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji Krishna wrote to Prithvi Singh from their camp in Delhi in 1770 to escort Vaid Rajshri Ganga Bishanji from Jaipur to Kota, by providing troops as escorts. From Kota he was to go to Poona to attend the Peshwa's court\(^3\). For conducting campaigns in Rajasthan and in north India the Maratha army was no longer dependent on supplies from Ujjain and Indore in Malwa. Supplies of arms and ammunitions and food grains, were being arranged from within the Kota territory. The Marathas had also established arms depot and factory at Kota.

Tukoji Holkar entered the Kota territory and his army started plundering villages. He was also joined by another Maratha commander Ramachandra Ganesh. They continue to raid Kota territory. The Kota forces could not take on the superior Maratha forces; hence the Maharao of Kota tried to placat the Marathas through a Deccani Brahmin, Naroji. In the meantime Ramchandra

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\(^1\) Kharita from Peshwa Madhavrao to Sawai Prithvi Singh, Asoi Vadi 8, V.S. 1826/1769, Selections from Peshwa Daftar, Vol. 39, No 109, March 18, 1769.
\(^3\) Indore Kharita No.133, Posh Vadi 1, V.S. 1827/1770; Indore Kharita No.134, Chaitra Sudi 1, V.S. 1828/1771; and Indore Kharita No.135, Chaitra Vadi 1, V.S. 1828/1771.
Ganesh was instructed to go to the north and Tukoji Holkar himself took over the charge of Kota campaign. He took possession of two small forts; Bakani and Sukath. Holkar demanded a large amount for his withdrawal and prepared himself to attack Kota city. Maharao had to pay substantial amount to pacify Halker who then decided to leave Kota territory.

It was through the diplomacy of Zalim Singh that Kota enjoyed respite from Maratha attacks with the sole exception of the raid of Ambaji, Mahadji Shinde’s command in 1776. Zalim Singh was thoroughly prepared to face the Marathas and Shinde realizing that Zalim Singh was determined to face the Marathas decided to withdraw from Kota territory1.

Zalim Singh had earlier protested against Holkar’s attack on Kota on the ground that Kota had been a tributary state.

1770s witness growing gestures of friendship and mutual cooperation between Jaipur and the Marathas. Close personal bonds were developing between Holkar and Jaipur ruler Sawai Prithvi Singh. This is evident from the letters sent by Tukoji Holkar and Ahilyabai to Prithvi Singh. In his letter Tukoji Holkar informed the Prithvi Singh about the demise of Peshwa Narainrao2. Ahaliya Bai also expressed desire to communicate more and more with Prithvi Singh as she wrote to him asking as to why there was no news from Jaipur since long3. That the personal bonds between the two ruling houses were getting strengthened is evident from numerous kharitas issued from Indore inviting Jaipur ruler and his family to participate in the marriages organized by the Holkar family4. Tukoji invited Prithvi Singh along with family to attend the marriage ceremony of his son at Wafgaon5. In 1775 Prithvi Singh again received letter of invitation from Tukoji Holkar who solicited his presence on the occasion of the

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1 Saxena, R.K, Maratha Relations with Major States of Rajasthan, P 55-56.
2 Indore Kharita No. 164, Asoj Sudi 1, V.S. 1830/1773.
3 Indore Kharita No 140, Asarh Sudi 3, V.S. 1828/1771----- कागद समाचार आये दीन बहुत हुए सो या बांत सुलने सु नीपट दुरे है अब हमे से कागद समाचार हिंदड़े रहोगे।
4 Indore Kharita No. 165, Magishri Vadi 13, V.S. 1830/1773.
5 Indore Kharita No. 190, Posh Vadi 10, V.S. 1838/1781.
engagement ceremony of Chiranjeev Rao Phanse. Gifts were also being exchanged between the two on particular occasion. Tukoji dispatched horses, elephants, and other items of gift on the occasion of coronation ceremony of Prithvi Singh. Dastur Komvar records from Jaipur reveal that Holkar were sending gift items to Jaipur on the occasions of the marriage ceremonies in the royal families. The Maratha officials who visited the Jaipur court to deliver these gift items were given ceremonial reception according to their standing.

The Marathas also found Rajasthan to be a major source of the supply of camels and horses from local markets and cattle fairs organized at various places such as Pushkar, Rajgarh and Patan. Holkars were acquiring horses and camel for the army from Rajasthan even before the battle of Panipat.

**Shinde's operations in Rajasthan**

The other Marathas chiefs who demonstrated the strength of his army in Rajasthan and vied for domination and control over the strategically important and revenue yielding areas in Rajasthan were the Shindes. They also made entry into Rajasthan by participating in the succession disputes between the contenders for the gaddi. Bundi and Kota chiefs were brought under the Maratha control much before. Peshwa Bajirao visited Kota in 1738. The Kota chief agreed to pay Rs 10 lakhs as tribute to the Peshwa. The Hada states of Kota and Bundi were falling between Jaipur border and borders of Malwa which had come under the Maratha control. The Maratha interests in this part of Rajasthan were being looked after jointly by Ranoji Shinde and Malharrao Holkar. After the death of Bajirao Peshwa in 1740, the Maratha incursions into Rajasthan became a routine affair. Initially the Marathas were more pre-occupied with strengthening their hold over the Kota-Bundi territory. Shinde appointed his revenue collectors at various

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1. Indore Kharita No.175, Falgun Vadi 5, V.S. 1832/1775.
2. Indore Kharita No.118, Bhadon Sudi 14, V.S. 1826/1769.
3. Dastur Dikhni, Dastur Komwar.
4. Indore Kharita No.80, Posh, V.S. 1818/1761.
places in Kota and Bundi as he was keen to manage areas near Kota which he received from the Peshwa as his jagir.

His agent Gulgule’s records contain instructions of Shinde to Balaji Yashwant Gulgule, his revenue collector in Kota. Gulgule records hardly contain any information regarding the settlement of revenue of the area assigned to him in jagir and Ranoji Shinde’s dealings with the other Rajput rulers as he departed quite early in 1745.

It was during the time of Jayappa Shinde, the eldest son of Ranoji that the Marathas made their formal entry into Rajasthan beyond Kota-Bundi region as they were invited to participate in the succession dispute between Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh for the gaddi of Jaipur. Jayappa Shinde’s relations with the Jaipur state can best be studied through the collection of Shinde’s numerous dispatches to the Jaipur court.

The formal communication between Jaipur and Shinde opened up in 1751 after the massacre of the Maratha soldiers in Jaipur city in which Shinde’s forces suffered maximum loss. Jayappa took up the issue of tribute payment with Jaipur regularly. Apart from the payment of tribute the other issue that figured in the communications between the two sides concerns the Maratha control over territories within Jaipur State. Notwithstanding ongoing negotiations, Madho Singh always resisted the Maratha demand in some way or the other. Hostility to the Marathas is evident from the local resistance to the Maratha officials posted in various parts of Jaipur territory. Madho Singh was not comfortable with the Maratha presence on the borders of Jaipur adjacent to Kota and Bundi. He unsuccessfully tried to capture Bundi and Nenva by allying with a local dissident chief Kishan Singh Hada. Shinde reprimanded Madho Singh for encroaching upon Bundi and Nenva which he claimed as Shinde’s territory\(^1\).

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\(^1\) Gwalier Kharita No.155, Jeth Sudi 7, V.S. 1808/1751 ------ आपको भीम भार ने नेंवा के तरफ जाम्हार े और श्री कृष्ण सिंह जी को भी आपने बुलाए गए हैं जैपुर आस पास आपे चे सो मुळा तो प्रांत बुध्दी वा नेंवा तो हमारी आस जागीर चे उघेरी कुछ ही स्वीका र करणा आपके मुलासीभ नहीं चे प्रांत मजकूर भी कुछ बात सो आपके तरफ़ोँ खतरा होगा

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Despite occasional display of hostility between the two sides, the channels of communication were kept open by Madho Singh and Shinde. Diplomatic relations were maintained continuously by dispatching representatives to the court of each other. The practice of appointing agents or vakils in each others court started soon after Jayappa Shinde’s participation in the succession issue of Jaipur. Overt expression of cordiality and cooperation with Jaipur by Shinde continued so long as Madho Singh managed to satisfy him by promises to pay tribute in time. But Shinde gained nothing as the assurances of dispatching hundies for the payment of tribute and other outstanding dues proved to be false.

After Jayappa’s murder in July 1755 at Nagor by the Rathors of Jodhpur, his son Jankoji who became the camander of Shinde army concluded peace with Marwar in 1755. Thereafter he seriously followed the issue of tribute payment with Jaipur, asking Madho Singh for immediate payment. Jankoji regularly sent letters to Madho Singh and correspondences between the two continued till 1759. In his communication with Jaipur Shinde acknowledge the receipts of horses and other items of gifts sent by Madho Singh as gestures of good will. In 1756 Jankoji requested Madho Singh to offer protection to Ram Singh of Marwar who was fighting his brother Bijay Singh for the gaddi of Jodhpur. However, despite this show of goodwill and cooperation Shinde’s officials continued to demand from Madho Singh the surrender of Ajmer and twelve villages adjacent to it as per the agreement.

In 1758 when Jayappa was facing severe financial strain he pressed Madho Singh for immediate payment of RS 3 lakhs out of tribute amount due from Jaipur. This installment was to be paid in the last winter season and had

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1 Gwalior Kharita No.156, Kartik Sudi 2, V.S. 1812/1755, Gwalior Kharita No.155, Kartik Vadi 13, V.S. 1809/1752.
2 Gwalior Kharita No.160, Sawan Sudi 2, V.S. 1812/1755---- पत्र राज को आयो सो तीरथरूप जी को नाव सो आयो थे सो पायें के तक स्नेह सो लिखों थे तो आगे ही सो स्नेह हे सो की ही हिरदी प्रस्थय.... और पोड मेंट बाबेफा नैजो सो पायो छो.... हरेशा खत पत्र भेजा करोला....Gwalior Kharita No. 163, Vaisakh Vadi 14, V.S. 1813/1756---- पत्र भेजो सो पायें केदेंक स्नेह क्यों जीवों सो आगा उसा की व्यवहार सब एक ही जारीला जुदाई गयी
3 Gwalior Kharita No.163, Vaisakh Vadi 14, V.S. 1813/1756---- श्री महाराजा जी श्री राम सीवं जी .... मानने क्यों खतिने भेजे सो निसा सो पोहो चा छा फैछे सो राज जी के मात्रक आदमी राज भास आये पहचानी
become due. Armed contingent was sent to Jaipur to force Madho Singh to pay the demanded amount. He was asked to arrange the payment by borrowing money from the local sahukars. Shinde was also being pressurized by the Peshwa for immediate realization of tribute from Jaipur as his own coffers was empty in Poona. In order to receive payment at the earliest Shinde in his letter to Madho Singh instructed him to pay the amount of tribute to Naroshanker, the vakil of Shinde who was present in Jaipur darbar. The vakil in turn was directed to hand over the money to a sahukar who would arrange to remit this money by way of preparing hundis which were to be delivered at the Shinde’s court. Similar instructions were given to Sada Shiv Bhatt in 1759 who was to arrange hundis as Shinde was in dire need of money to maintain his troops.

Madho Singh's response to Shinde’s demands varied from avoidance to acts of open defiance, despite the strong Maratha presence on the Jaipur border. Shinde’s repeated attempt to realize tribute from Madho Singh met with partial success. Whatever payments the Marathas could arrange from Jaipur were made reluctantly. The Maratha officials appointed in Jaipur territory as tax collectors with the approval of Madho Singh also reported resistance to Maratha presence from their respective thanas. Shinde’s officials were ousted from many thanas by the local Rajputs. Jankoji Shinde asked Madho Singh to restore these thanas back to his officials or face consequences.

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1 Gwalier Kharita No.162, Falgun Sudi 10, V.S. 1815/1758.
2 Gwalier Kharita No.172, Posh Vadi 10, V.S. 1815/1758——— शालपुर सो तीन लाख रुपया हाल को तिलायूल को बांधकर बांधकर रहा है सो बांधकर अस्वाभाविक लुप्तरक्षक 1 बांधकर जी ताकक को है सो को भंडार दिन हुए है सो कु छ तीन लाख रुपया साक्षात शासन पास सो दिल्लीया कर सीताना जो सो भेज है दी देश करोला मति
3 Gwalier Kharita No.171, Magh Sudi 10, V.S. 1815/1758——— हाल को कार को रूपया मो बांधकर रहा है सो रूपया सब ही श्री नारी कारक उकील राज राजा हमारे है सो के मारकत साक्षात से पास दे सो हुई करोन सरकार गो भेज देवे करार गो तकावी त परेंगो सो ही करूँ राज राज को ताकक है सभी हमने हाल पत्र भेजते रहीयो
4 Gwalier Kharita No.174, Chaitra Sudi 11, V.S. 1816/1759——— हाल को माहेत बांधकर उकील को बांधकर रहा है लाख आर्थिक है सो हनेपुर हृदिया करावे भेजे नाही सो आंधी न करी है हाल बांधकर ही पत्र है साक्षात रूपया श्री नारी कारक पुनर्रंतत हमारे देश है सो के पास दे ... जो सो हृदिया का हमारा पास भेजे हेस फोज सवैं खर्च बांधकर जरूर चाहिये सो बांधकर तीन शासन ही लृदिया दिल्लीया को ही करोला मति...
5 Gwalier Kharita No.173, Falgun Sudi 7, V.S. 1815/1758——— त्या चारवें से बाग्भ्या भी सरकार से अनल है सो मरो लाख राजी जारीतार सवैं उतार राज को आमलदार जै है सो ये बाहर आती न करी है सरकार को आमल उतार देना सो बांधकर रुपया हाल बांधकर ही पत्र से शादी संग्रह शादी मतलब राज के एक हीर है उसमें उत्तम होकर राजी रहें उसमें बांधकर आयी हो बांधकर अनल संग्रह को बाहर जाय किसी बाहर सा खींचन न होने सो ही करोला या मो सतोख नी हर आयी सो करीयों प्रदेश सो राजी नामों राज
disapproved Madho Singh's unauthorized possession of Ranthambhor fort in 1758 and warned him to instruct his men not to create any further disturbances in that area.

It is evident from Shinde's letters that through regular diplomatic channels he was trying to strengthen his presence in Jaipur territory by reasserting claim for some pockets of Jaipur territory that had been allotted earlier but the Maratha claim was never fully accepted by the local Rajputs with the tacit approval of Madho Singh. As a result of which the Maratha officials appointed to manage these thanas were not achieving much success in collecting revenue from areas officially surrendered by Madho Singh to the Marathas. Resistance to the Maratha demands for tribute payment and their physical presence in pockets of Jaipur territory was always exhibited though in varied forms.

The Maratha debacle in the battle of Panipat put Mahadji Shinde in urgent need of money and he was compelled to turn to Jaipur ruler, demanding tribute which Madho Singh had stopped paying in the last few year taking advantage of Ahdali's presence in North India. Mahadji and Kedarji Shinde wrote to Madho Singh "they have no money even to take care of their daily requirements". They asked Madho Singh to pay Rs 12 lakhs of tribute without any delay and hand the amount over to their representative Seth Dhaneshar and Parsuram. Both the Shindes Kedarji and Madadji were dealing with Jaipur. Initially they sent kharitas written jointly by them and later on both started addressing Madho Singh individually. It created the impression that there is a rift between the two over the questions of leadership. Madho Singh taking advantage of the tension between Kedarji and Mahadji did not take demand of the either seriously.

The Maratha defeats at Panipat embolden the Rajputs to oppose the Maratha presence at various places in Jaipur territory. In one of his letters to

1 Gwalior Kharita No.166, Posh Vadi 10, V.S. 1815/1758.
2 Gwalior Kharita No.178, 185, 187, 191,194, addressed jointly by Kedarji and Mahadji shinde: Gwalior Kharita Nos.179,183,189,192 from Kedarji Shinde, Gwalior Kharita Nos. 184, 186, 190 from Mahadji Shinde.
Madho Singh Kedarji Shinde specifically instructed Madho Singh not to send any troop to Shahpura. The chief of Shahpura was troubling the Maratha revenue collectors with Madho Singh's backing. Maratha collector in Shahpura Jayaji Bohite himself informed Madho Singh about the mischief of Shahpura ruler. It was through the efforts of Shinde's vakil at Jaipur darbar who persuaded Madho Singh to withdraw his support to Shahpura that Jayaji Bohite was able to regain his position in Shahpura as the Maratha mamlatdar.

The family of Shinde faced tough time for two years after the battle of Panipat. The Rajputs were challenging their authority and stopped payment of tribute, the only possible source of income for the Marathas at this critical juncture. Frequent reminders to Madho Singh for payment of outstanding amount of tribute could not yield desired result. Payments were not only much shorter than the demand but were also irregular. Madho Singh resorted to paying some amount, promising to pay the rest later. Unable to mobilize liquid money Shindes even tried to press Madho Singh to meet the day to day requirement of Maratha officials posted in Jaipur territory. Unable to overcome the problem of acute shortage of cash in hand at Ujjain, Kadarji Shinde asked Madho Singh for immediate payment of the current instalment of tribute.

By now Mahadji Shinde was fed up with these delaying tactics of Madho Singh as he was badly hurt by nonpayment of dues. From 1763 onwards Mahadji Shinde started adopting tough posture towards Jaipur which is evident from the language of the Kharitas that he addressed to Madho Singh which had taken offensive tone. In July 1763 Mahadji reprimanded Madho Singh for his failure to pay the installment in time. The wording of the letter clearly indicates Shinde's desperation for getting money as soon as possible. He wrote "your dues for the

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1 Gwalier Kharita No.179, Chaitra Sudi 8, V.S. 1820/1763.
2 Gwalier Kharita No.180, Undated.
3 Gwalier Kharita No.180, Undated.
4 Gwalier Kharita No.183, Jeth Sudi 1, V.S. 1820/1763.
mamlat are pending since long, you have failed to pay installments on due date, this is unfair, upon receiving this letter, send all money\(^1\).

From 1765 onwards situation began to improve with the Shindes, as they recovered from the shock of Panipat. They now gained enough confidence to look beyond their holdings in Malwa. They were eager to follow their affairs in Rajasthan with a fresh vigor. However, in his Kharitas even now Shinde expressed keenness to develop healthy relations with Jaipur\(^2\). In the month of March 1765, Shinde displayed the show of strength at Ujjain by way of heavy concentration of the combined army of the Shindes. Mahadji Shinde proceeded to Kota and from there he dispatched a strong contingent consisting of about ten thousand Maratha soldiers to realize tribute from Marwar and Mewar\(^3\). In 1766 Mahadji Shinde was able to regain control of all pockets of area that were under the control of Shindes before the battle of Panipat. He was involved in settling these areas and making fresh appointments to replace the old officials\(^4\). In order to improve the Maratha position in Rajasthan in view of the death of Malharrao Holkar Shinde in his Kharita tried to impress upon Madho Singh that Malharrao’s grandson Malrao Holkar and Shindes are united\(^5\). By 1767 Mahadji Shinde was able to raise a fresh contingent which gave him confidence to put pressure on all those Rajput rulers who defaulted in paying tribute\(^6\).

In 1768 Mahadji’s position further strengthened as he was now in total command of the House of Shinde. From Poona he dispatched Jaswantrao Bable with a contingent of troops towards Jaipur to collect arrears of tribute. He wrote to Madho Singh “Ask your officer to deposit the arrears with Jaswantrao Bable. I will also be reaching Jaipur side soon”.

\(^1\) Gwalier Kharita No.184, Bhadon Sudi 9, V.S. 1820/1763.
\(^2\) Gwalier Kharita No.185, Kartik Vadi 4, V.S. 1822/1765.
\(^3\) Gupta, K.S. Mewar and the Maratha Relations P. 85.
\(^4\) Gwalier Kharita No.186, Jeth Sudi 5, V.S. 1823/1766.
\(^5\) Gwalier Kharita No.187, Swan Vadi 9, V.S. 1823/1766.
\(^6\) Gwalier Kharita No.190, Magh Vadi 9, V.S. 1824/1767.——— हय के तृक सू कोज सूधा राजश्री जसवंत राज वाले उपरी भेजे है तौ पीठली वाली का रूपा आवते है सो राज मुत सदिया सू ताकीद कर महाराने के पाव एड्विसेज जो हय की सवस भे उपरी सिवात आसी Also see, sardesai, G.S., New History of the Marathas, Vol. 2, PP. 511-512
The growing strength of Mahadji Shinde’s army is evident from his willingness to become a party to resolve the dispute for Udaipur gaddi on the invitation from Ratan Singh a Sisodia chief. Mahadji in his letter to Prithvi Singh confirmed Ratan Singh’s personal visits to Ujjain to solicit Shinde’s support against Maharana Ari Singh in 1768.

After the death of Madho Singh in 1768 Shinde renewed his demand for the transfer of control over territories promised to the Marathas. He wrote to Prithvi Singh, the new ruler of Jaipur to hand over the control of villages in Ajmer to his agent Pandit Govindrao. He also appointed a new vakil Pandit Malhar Raghunath at Jaipur darbar.

Mahadji Shinde now entered into regular exchange of Kharitas with the Jaipur ruler which among other things also reveals that now he was paying greater attention to the Maratha interests in Jaipur going beyond the Maratha concerns for the realization of tribute and territorial possessions. He became more demanding on Jaipur. We find Mahadji Shinde asking Prithvi Singh to ensure safe passage of Shinde’s men travelling from Jaipur to Ujjain by providing them with armed escort, protection for his own men living and holding property in Jaipur and traders from Ujjain who had shops in Jaipur. In one of the Kharitas sent to Prithvi Singh in 1770 Shinde was addressed as Subedar Madhavraoji Shinde which indicates his superior position in the Maratha political set up.

There was growing exchange of information between the two rulers as we find Prithvi Singh being kept informed about all important events involving Shinde. For example he wrote to Prithvi Singh about his role in bringing the emperor Shah Alam back to Delhi from his exile in eastern India to occupy the throne of Delhi. In 1774 Shinde appointed his vakil at the Delhi court. Again he shared this information with Prithvi Singh that a vakil from Ujjain had been sent at

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1 Gwalior Kharita No.198, Maghshri Sudi 4, V.S. 1825/1768.
2 Gwalior Kharita No. 3, Posh Sudi 2, V.S. 1826/1769, Gwalior Kharita No.10, Falgun Sudi 11, V.S. 1827/1770.
3 Gwalior Kharita No. 10, Falgun Sudi 11, V.S. 1827/1770.
4 Gwalior Kharita No.22, Posh Sudi 11, V.S. 1828/1771.
The return of Shah Alam to Delhi to reoccupy his lost position with the help of Mahaji Shinde clearly demonstrated that the Maratha leader had fully recovered from the battle of Panipat and he symbolizes the revival of Maratha power in North India. Mahadj Shinde requested Prithvi Singh to send a Jaipur contingent to be in attendance upon the emperor. Prithvi Singh readily agreed. However, the bon homie between the two through mutual acts of cooperation did not last long due to Prithvi Singh’s inability to satisfy the Marathas with regard to the payment of tribute. The Peshwa Madhavrao reminded Prithvi Singh about the accumulating arrears and demanded that the installment due must be paid forthwith to Bapuji Vaman.

Soon he sent another reminder to Prithvi Singh asking him to pay current dues of tribute to Apaji Narain. The Jaipur ruler tried to settle the issue of long standing arrears of tribute through the Peshwa’s vakil who was in Jaipur. The Peshwa again complained that no payment has been received so far and asked Prithvi Singh to send money through the Maraths vakil. Prithvi Singh promised to comply with. However, some amount was paid to the Maraths when they invaded Jaipur and laid waste the countryside. Five lakhs rupees were paid when the Maratha commander Ramachandra Ganesh attacked and devastated Jaipur territory. Only rupees one lakh could be realized from Jaipur when again Mahadj’s forces invaded Jaipur territory and demanded much more. Visaiji Krishna was also given a hundi of rupees 1.5 lakhs and presents worth Rs 50,000. Prithvi Singh complained to Peshwa Narainrao about the predatory activities of the Maratha commanders. Further he complained that he was unable

1 Gwalier Kharita No.25, Magh Sudi 14, V.S. 1829/1772.
2 Kharita from Prithvi Singh to Mahadj Shinde, Draft No. 149, Falgun Sudi 2, V.S. 1828/1771.
3 Kharita from Peshwa Madhaurao to Prithvi Singh, Jeth Sudi 4, V.S. 1827/1770.
4 Kharita from Prithvi Singh to Mahadj Shinde, Kartik Vadi 13, V.S. 1827/1770.
5 Kharita from Peshwa Madhavrao to Prithvi Singh, Maghishri Vadi 7, V.S. 1828/1771.
6 Kharita from Bohra Khushali Ram to Peshwa Narain Rao, Draft No. 189, Asarh Vadi 5, V.S. 1830/1773.
7 Kharita from Prithvi Singh to Peshwa Narainrao, Asarh Vadi 16, V.S. 1830/1773.
to pay the dues of tribute due to the ruination of standing crops by the Marathas\(^1\). He requested the Peshwa to check these activities of his commanders.\(^2\)

A perpetual source of tension between the Marathas and Jaipur right from the beginning of Madho Singh’s rule was the issue of timely payment of tribute and clearance of the black log dues. Even as the time progressed there was hardly any perceptible change in the situation as in all the Kharitas sent from Ujjain the issue of tribute payment had been invariably raised with all successive Jaipur rulers whether it was Madho Singh, Prithvi Singh or his successor Pratap Singh. Holkars were also constantly urging Jaipur rulers for payment of money but could not succeed much against Jaipur’s false promises and delay on one pretext or the other.

Continued resistance and disturbance caused by Rajputs in areas claimed by Holkars in Jaipur state further frustrated the Marathas. The Kharitas from Indore bear testimony to this fact as incidences of disturbance were frequently reported to the Jaipur rulers. In 1770 Ahilya Bai wrote to Prithvi Singh about the “unruly behavior of the Rajapth bhomias”, in Pargana Tonk and Rampura\(^3\). In 1771 Holkar’s official Sadashiv Bhutt reported to Tukoji about disturbances being created by the bhomias in Tonk and Rampura. Tukoji wrote to Prithvi Singh asking him to control their activities. In the same year Tukoji Holkar asked Prithvi Singh to look into repeated disputes between his official Sadashiv Bhutt and Rajput bhomias of the village Parana in Pargana Tonk\(^4\).

Tukoji also reported to Prithvi Singh about the harassment caused to his representative Pandit Gobindrao Munshi in village Thikariya of pargana Toda. The said village was given to the Pandit in inam. Tukoji wrote “recently we have come to know that the amil of Toda has taken over the ownership of the said village from Pandit Gobindrao. Prithvi Singh was requested to restore the village

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\(^1\)Kharita from Bohra Khushali Ram to Peshwa Narainrao, Vaisakh Vadi 4, V.S. 1830/1773.
\(^2\)Gwaller Kharita dated Swam Sudi 9, V.S. 1832/1775.
\(^3\)Indore Kharita No. 130, Maghishri Vadi 1, V.S. 1827/1770.
\(^4\)Indore Kharita No. 144, V.S. 1828/1771.
to the inam holder. Holkar’s kamvisdars in pargana Tonk and Rampura continued to report disturbances. Tukoji was compelled to write again and again to Jaipur ruler to take appropriate action.

It appears that Holkar’s officials were not able to effectively control their possessions in Jaipur territory on their own. Instances of growing confrontation and resistance to their presence became more frequent with the passage of time. Tukoji Holkar wrote repeatedly to stop disturbances caused by local Rajputs. In 1780 we find Tukoji Holkar reprimanding Pratap Singh the new ruler of Jaipur for his inaction to control disturbances in pargana Tonk.

The weakening position of Holkar in Jaipur led to Mahadji Shinde’s intervention on their behalf. He put pressure on Jaipur ruler to give up his aspiration to regain control over the areas claimed by Holkar. Mahadji even used veiled threats in his letter to Jaipur ruler if he did not respond positively. He warned Jaipur Raja that his occupation of Tonk and Rampura is unlawful and asked him to vacate the possession to pave the way for cordial relationship else he should be ready to face consequences. Pratap Singh was again warned by hinde to withdraw his troops from Tonk and Rampura or be ready to face Shinde’s forces.

However, Holkar’s officials in Pargana Tonk, Rampura Toda and Malpura continued to face the hostility of local Rajputs. Even Mahadji’s threats could not produce desired results. Tukoji kept on reminding Pratap Singh to take action against his Rajputs and restore control to his revenue official Gobindrao.

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1 Indore Kharita No. 179, Posh Sudi 1, V.S. 1834/1777.---- मोजे ठीकरीयां परगना तोड़ा का गांव बढ़े महाराज ने पहिले गोविंद राम मुनी के इनाम कर दिया है... हाल जाहर हुआ है जो तोड़ा के अमल दार ने वा गांव का मसानिले का अमल बंद करी जपती करी है ....

2 Indore Kharita No. 183, Kartik Sudi 10, V.S. 1836/1779.

3 Indore Kharita No. 185, Asarh Vadi 5, V.S. 1837/1780.---- सुनवा में आया जो राज के तरफ से परगने ठोक के अमल में खलस कर तरह तरह को फितूर हुआ है बात यू घणो ही आवरज हूँगो....

4 Gwalier Kharita No. 75, Sawan Sudi 4, V.S. 1836/1779.

5 Gwalier Kharita No. 76, Sawan Sudi 10, V.S. 1836/1779.

6 Indore Kharita No. 186, Asoi Sudi 3, V.S. 1837/1780.---- कमीना आदमी के सलाह सूं हवा के तालके परगने ठोक वा रामपुरा और ठोड़ा मलपुरा के गांव में खलसकर नुकसान किया... दोनो फरगना में ...
Repeated instances of resistance and defiance to Holkar's officials in 1780s indicate that his authority in Jaipur was becoming lax. Holkars in their kharitas to Pratab Singh continued reprimand him but could not go beyond that. They did not resort to military action against the Jaipur ruler. In 1790s Holkar's position in Rajasthan was further undermined due to widespread resistance against the Maratha presence in the territories of Rajput rulers.

Holkar's agents Laxman Rao Anand and Rao Jagnannath Ram Bahadur gave stern warning to the Jaipur ruler when it was reported that his forces were marching towards Lakshmangarh to support the local chief against the Marathas. Holkar's were dominating over Lakshmangarh. They threatened Pratap Singh with retaliation if he dared sending his forces in that area. Disturbances of the Rajput bhomias were reported in pargana Tonk in 1795. The bhomias were opposing the Marathas with the backing of Jaipur forces. In 1796 again trouble created by Rajputs bhomias in pargana Tonk was reported to Pratap Singh by Laxman Anand and Jagannath Ram Bahadur. They asked him to stop their disturbances.

Tukoji took several measures to retain his hold over pargana Tonk. He removed Pandurang Shivaji, the Maratha mamladar of the pargana and replaced him by Kripal Singh Sikh who was entrusted with the responsibilities of handling the affairs of Tonk. Elsewhere also the local bhomias were creating disturbances and damaging the crops to harass the Maratha officials as reported

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1 Indore Kharita No. 294, Jeth Sudi 5, V.S. 1852/1795.----सुनिबा में आयों के राज का तरफ सु फोज का पतल्ला लीजिए तालुके सर राजा के तरफ आई हैं तो राजा राजा मजुदर सरकार को छिन वा छ तालुके सी राज कोई तेरे खलान न करिला जो कदाऊख खलान करीगे तो सवारी वा तरफ़ुँ अवसी

2 Indore Kharita No. 293, Vaisakh Vadi 13, V.S. 1852/1795.---- राज के तरफ के कमदर ने दोहि वगीर दो मोज जप्तत कर लीये अर पर करो टोक इलाका हुकुक कर वा मै खलास करी छ अवार सुनिबे में आयों के कमुँ राज के तरफ का टोक ने गया है तो यह बातथोऱ नही... कहर माफ़ीक कमदर ने तागीद क्योंको कमदर के कोई बात का परन्य मजुदर मे। खलास करी नही सरकार का मुकदमा वा हुकुक तो येखी है

3 Indore Kharita No. 298, Sawan Vadi 2, V.S. 1843/1796.

4 Indore Kharita No. 299, Bhadon Sudi 12, V.S. 1853/1796. Indore Kharita No. 300, Kartik Sudi 1, V.S. 1853/1796.
by Holkar to Pratap Singh. The replacement of officials also did not improve Holkar's affairs in Jaipur. In 1797 he appointed Mehta Chhabilram as his new vakil at the Jaipur court. However, disputes concerning the payment of tribute and other dues could not be resolved to the satisfaction of Holkar. The Jaipur authorities kept on bothering the Maratha officials in one way or other. In one such instance when hundi of the banker Girdhari Lal was presented for encashment at Jaipur, the Maratha officials was asked to pay nazrana for its encashment. Tukoji's death in 1797 left Holkar affairs in Jaipur in complete disorder.

Mahadaji Shinde had to leave North Indian affairs to tackle Maratha problems in the Deccan arising out of the death of Peshwa Narainrao and the Anglo-Maratha war. The first Anglo-Maratha war further enhanced Mahadji Shindes's position in North India as Shinde during the course of war was able to win friendship of the powerful English East India Company. This war also offered opportunity to Shinde to examine the military power that he was able to build up after the Battle of Panipat. He reorganized his army following the European pattern and successfully raised infantry and artillery, similar to that of the Europeans. Under Mahadji Shinde's leadership the Marathas became a force to be reckoned with in view of the prevalent political situation of north India. The Rajput rulers of Rajasthan were now made to taste the power of Marathas who begun to pursue the issue of tribute payment more vigoursly. The Rajputs had evaded the payment of tribute again and again.

After Prithvi Singh's death his brother Pratap Singh ascended the gaddi of Jaipur in 1778. The gradual weakness of Jaipur Raj commenced with the death of Madho Singh in 1768. Situation did not change under the ineffective rule of his son and successor Prithivi Singh. Initial years of Sawai Pratap Singh's reign

1 Indore Kharita No. 293, Vaisakh Vadi 13, V.S. 1852/1795. Indore Kharita No. 300, Kartik Sudi 1, V.S. 1853/1796.
2 Indore Kharita No. 306, Bhadon Sudi 15, V.S. 1854/1797.---- निर्दयार्थी ताल साक्षर के घटी वातांत्रिक स्तर दिलाया वास्ते राज ने सिल्सी दी ही सो... ! तारोर राज्य गुणार्था साह गजबुद्ध से ही सो छुपना में आयें के राम के मुच्छा गुणार्था मजबुर सू. जननाश्चय भागे है,...
witnessed bitter factional fight between two groups led by Khushali Ram Bohra and Daulat Ram Haldia respectively for acquiring the top position in Jaipur administration. These internal strife led to the neglect of administration and further weakening of the Jaipur Raj.

Mahadji Shinde's absence from the North around this time was exploited by Mirza Najaf Khan, the powerful aide of the emperor Shah Alam II to bring back under the Mughal hold the territories that had become independent of the Mughal control. Najaf Khan appointed Himmat Bahadur to lead the Mughal army to force Jaipur to remit the dues of tribute. Jaipur Diwan Khushali Ram made an agreement with Himmat Bahadur in 1781 and surrendered parganas yielding annual revenue worth Rs 12 lakhs in lieu of tribute.

The first Anglo-Maratha war ended with the treaty of Salbye on May 17, 1782 which was signed by Anderson on behalf of East India Company. The alliance with the English not only gave Mahadji the freedom to manage the affairs of the emperor Shah Alam II but also put him in much advantageous position to establish his ascendancy in the North and Rajasthan. By November 1783, Mahadji was fully successful in sorting out the problems of the emperor. He was appointed as Vakil-i-Mutlaq at the Delhi court in Dec 1784. This new responsibility proved to be quite demanding for want of enough funds. Shinde found himself in acute financial strain. Within one year he accumulated debt of Rs 80 lakhs. As he found difficult to raise resources from elsewhere he turned his attention to Jaipur not only to realize arrears of his own dues but also that of the emperor. By now he came to the realization that his vakil alone would not be able to settle the issue of tribute payment with Jaipur and his direct involvement is necessary.

Mahadji made preparations for military action against Jaipur and invaded its territory. In Dec 1784 he captured Mahawa and Ramgarh on the Jaipur

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1 Raghubir Sinh, Malwa in Transition P. 196.
2 Parasanis, D.B; Delhi Yethil Marathyanche Rajkarna, letter No.106, July 1, 1785, letter No. 139, August 1, 1785.
Pratap Singh realizing that the Kacchawa forces could not match the superior Maratha army initiated negotiation through Khushali Ram Bohra. It was agreed upon that Jaipur would pay Rs 4 lakhs immediately, 2 lakhs in cash and 2 lakhs in the form of jewels.

Territory worth producing revenue of rupees 10 lakhs was to be transferred to Shinde and Rs 7 lakhs was to be collected from the leading jagirdars of Jaipur. The Maratha side kept sending reminders to Jaipur throughout the year for immediate payment but to no avail. Pratap Singh apprehending attack by the Marathas on Jaipur sent his representative to Shinde and promised to send hundis worth rupees 2 lakhs. The promised amount was paid but Pratap Singh made his hostility to Shinde obvious by demanding that the Maratha posts in Jaipur be vacated. He also delayed the payment of 2 lakhs that was to be made in kind. Since nothing could be achieved through negotiations Mahadji was now fully convinced that the only way to make Jaipur Raja behave is the show of arms.

In 1785 Mahadji along with the emperor marched to Jaipur. The aim to include the emperor in the action against Jaipur was to gain legitimacy for his attack on Jaipur. Realizing the danger of Shinde's attack Pratap Singh deputed Khushali Ram Bohra to make amicable settlement with Shinde. As the negotiations failed, Shinde's army made further advancement into Jaipur.

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1 Letter from Mehta Swaroop Singh to Roda Ram, Magh Vadi 3, V.S. 1841/1784; Mehta Sahib Singh to Roda Ram, Chaitra Sudi 12, V.S. 1842/1785.
2 Kharita from Pratap Singh to Raja Manik Pal, Jeth Vadi 5, V.S. 1842/1785 (Draft Kharita Section).
3 Gwalior Kharita, Bhadon Vadi 2, V.S. 1842/1785; Gwalior Kharita, Kartik Vadi 10, V.S. 1842/1785.
4 Kharita from Pratap Singh to Raja Balwant Singh, Maghishri Sudi 3, V.S. 1842/1785. (Draft Kharita Section), Gwalior Kharita, Bhadon Sudi 4, V.S. 1842/1785.
5 Khatut Ahal Karan, letter from Roda Ram to Mehta Sahib Singh, Maghishri Sudi 5, V.S. 1842/1785; Jaipur-Karauli Kharita No. 162, Maghishri Sudi 4, V.S. 1842/1785; Khatut Ahal Karan, letter from Muhnot Gyan Mal to Roda Ram, Posh Sudi 5, V.S. 1842/1785.
Maharaja Gaj Singh of Bikaner sent the offer to mediate and also assured Jaipur of his total support in case of war with the Marathas.

Shinde after reaching Jaipur again opened negotiation with Jaipur representatives. Pratap Singh needed to take Bijay Singh of Jodhpur into confidence before initiating any negotiation with Shinde. He requested Bijay Singh to instruct his representative Naval Rai to join Khushali Ram Bohra, the Jaipur representative. At the same time Pratap Singh also started preparing his forces to meet the Maratha challenge. After much deliberation, the Jaipur side agreed to pay Rs 63 lakhs. The payment was to be made in the following manner:

Rs 11 lakhs were to be paid within a month; 4 lakhs were to be given at the time of Mahadji Shinde leaving Jaipur territory; next installment of 4 lakhs after four month, Rs 2 lakhs were to be adjusted against the amount already collected by the Mughal forces during the period of their occupation of parts of Jaipur territory. Rs 21 lakhs were to be realized from the revenue proceeds of the parganas Paonta, Vazirpur, Salabad and Shekhawati which were to remain under the Maratha possession. Remaining 21 lakhs were adjusted against more territorial assignments to be made in Jaipur. The surrendered territory was to be brought under joint administration of Jaipur and Shinde and the Marathas were to vacate the possession once the payment was fully made. Khushali Ram Bohra paid rupees 3 lakhs immediately and left for Jaipur to arrange another 8 lakhs so that the total payment of the first installment could be made to Shinde.

As per the terms of agreement Bohra Khushali Ram paid the first installment after extracting money forcefully from the Jagirdar and traders. The Maratha army began to depart from Jaipur territory. However, Mahdaji left five

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1 Kharita from Pratap Singh to Raja Hari Singh, Falgun Vadi 13, V.S. 1842/1785 (Draft Kharita Section).
2 Khatut Ahalkaran, letter from Bukhshi Alam Chand to Roda Ram, Chaitra Sudi 12, V.S. 1842/1785.
3 Kharita from Pratap Singh to Bijay Singh, Vaisakh Vadi 12, V.S. 1843/1786 (Jodhpur Kharita).
4 Yaddashti Dikhniyan Ra Rupiya Diya Ri
thousand horsemen behind under the command of Raiji Patel to oversee the affairs of Jaipur and ensure timely payment of installments. However, as usual there was again delay in payment of the installments. In the meantime Khushal Ram Bohra who had negotiated terms of agreement with Shinde was replaced by Daulat Ram Haldia, a Maratha baiter, who strongly disapproved the Maratha incursion into Jaipur. Pratap Singh also tried to seek the help of English against the Maratha but in vain. The Kachhawa ruler was cautioned by his well wishers against the serious repercussion of the non compliance of terms of agreement and the possible attack of Shinde on Jaipur. They advised Pratap Singh to send rupees 4 lakhs to satify Shinde as he was preparing himself to take action against Jaipur. But the Jaipur ruler was unmoved by the warnings of Shinde as well as his own advisors. He did not change his attitude of hostility to Shinde.

Pratap Singh made obvious his intension to resist Shinde and started looking for allies. The rulers of Shivpur and Karauli agreed to send their forces. Bijay Singh of Jodhpur also promised his support and advised Pratap Singh to win over his dissatisfied kachhawa nobles. Pratap Singh was able to seek the support of Shekhawat nobles on the condition that the Jaipur Raja would bear the expenses of their forces.

He was assured of armed support by the ruler of Bundi and Rawat Bhim Singh, a noble from Udaipur. The kachhawa jagirdars were asked not to make any payment to the Marathas. Shinde now decided to take armed action to enforce the terms of agreement to realize tribute. Shinde proceeded to Deeg in 1786 and waited there in anticipation that the Rajputs might behave and accept the authority of his commander Raiji Patel who had gone to Mauzabad to

2 Kharita from Sanjay Singh to Roda Ram, Maghshri Sudi 9, V.S. 1843/1787.
3 Khatut Ahalkaran letter from Kishari Das to Vidya Guru Bhattji, Falgun Vadi 4, V.S. 1843/1787.
4 Kharita from Pratap Singh to Bijay Singh, Posh Sudi 2, V.S. 1843/1787 (Jodhpur Kharita).
5 Kharita from Rawat Bhim Singh to Roda Ram, Chaitra Sudi 14, V.S. 1843/1787 (Draft Kharita Section).
demand payment. However, he could not realize any money from Jaipur. Raiji Patel realizing his own weak position and hostile attitude of his extremely underpaid Mughal troops who were inclined to switch over to the enemy, appealed Shinde to take charge of Jaipur affairs.

It is not so that Mahadji had any antipathy towards Pratap Singh and did not treat him in the same manner as his predecessor Prithivi Singh. He kept Pratap Singh fully informed about all the details of the battle fought with the English and the Maratha victory in the battle of Borghat and even requested for military cooperation. It was Jaipur’s reluctance to be a party to join Maratha campaigns either in North or in the Deccan.

However, Shinde continued to ask for the cooperation of Jaipur to meet his political and other requirements. There was a regular traffic of officials and traders from Shinde’s territory to Jaipur for maintaining the supply of horses, camels and other items that were needed in the Maratha camp. Mahadji requested for Jaipur protection to Mehta Shiv Shankar’s family who were travelling from Ujjain to Jaipur.

They were to be safely escorted across Jaipur territory. Mahadji regularly sought cooperation from Jaipur ruler for the safe passage of merchants from Malwa within the Jaipur territory and sometimes as far as Delhi. When Seth Ganga Ram who was associated with the Shinde household was going to Delhi, Shinde requested Jaipur to provide him with escort. In one of his Kharitas to Jaipur Shinde reminded Jaipur ruler about the payment of tribute and asked him to handover the money to Seth Gangaram.

The growing interaction with Jaipur from Shinde’s side is evident. But the covert hostility of the Rajput ruler and the local zamindars towards the Marathas did not change and at times found overt manifestation. Mahadji many times drew the attention of Jaipur ruler towards the hostile attitude of Jaipur officials and

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1 Gwalier Kharita No.147, Maghishri Sudi 1, V.S. 1832/1775.
2 Gwalier Kharita No.127, Asarh Vadi 9, V.S. 1829/, V.S. 1832/1775.
3 Gwalier Kharita No.142, Maghishri Vadi 12, V.S. 1830/1773.
4 Gwalier Kharita No.142, Maghishri Vadi 12, V.S. 1830/1773.
zamindars to the Maratha agents. Shinde also complained to Jaipur ruler that his forces are supporting Kishan Singh Hada, a local chief in Kota-Bundi region who was troubling the Maratha officials in that area. He openly expressed his anguish over Jaipur’s behavior and wanted the Jaipur ruler to support Shinde’s local agent Pandit Vithalrao Gopal with armed contingent to enable him in ousting Kishan Singh Hada.

For Shinde however, the most crucial and complicated problem with Jaipur was the collection of tribute. This issue was nagging over the years without any change in Jaipur’s attitude. Promises were made and broken with impunity, prompting Shinde to issue letters of reminder. Representatives sent by Shinde to Jaipur for the collection of tribute often return back home empty handed. In one such instance Mahadji sent his representatives Jodhraj and Amarchand to Jaipur to collect Rs 4 lakhs the amount that was to be paid to Pandit Govindrao. However, the promised amount was not paid even to the representatives.

Territorial disputes between the two sides were also persisting and could not be resolved as per the terms of agreements between Jaipur and Shinde. The successive rulers overlooked the Maratha claims and rights over pockets of territory in Jaipur which were promised to Shinde in lieu of payment of tribute. Shinde found the attitude of Jaipur officials’ uncooperative and local Rajput bhomias recalcitrant. They resisted the Maratha attempt to realize revenue from the areas given to them.

Shinde intervened on behalf of Holkars who were given the right to collect revenue from certain parganas in Jaipur territory. When the local Rajputs contested the claim of Holkars to collect revenue from pargana Tonk and Rampura, Mahadji put pressure on Jaipur ruler to ensure that the control over these parganas is transferred to Holkars. In fact, Mahadji at times felt constraint to threaten the Jaipur Raja with dire consequences if he did not comply.

1 Gwalier Kharita No.143, Chaitra Sudi 1, V.S. 1831/1774.
2 Gwalier Kharita No.141, Jeth Vadi 1, V.S. 1830/1773.
Mahadji wrote to Pratap Singh “I declare the occupation of Tonk and Rampura unlawful and ask you to transfer the right over these parganas to Holkar in the interest of healthy relationship or there might be trouble in our relationship”. Shinde further warned Pratap Singh to remove his forces or he would also send his forces to settle the matter. Shinde also objected to the buildup of Jaipur forces at Samedhi thana. Next year Shinde ordered his forces to march towards Jaipur territory as all peaceful means adopted by him to settle the territorial disputes including Tonk and Rampura did not prove effective. It seems that the issue of Tonk and Rampura could not be resolved as we find Shinde again asking the Jaipur ruler to surrender these parganas to Holkar’s Kamvisadars. Two villages Chakwara and Dhimana in Jaipur territory had been in possession of the Marathas since long. These were given to the Maratha agent Pandit Balrao Govind in lieu of salary. The Jaipur officials recaptured these villages. A letter of warning was sent to Pratap Singh in which Shinde demanded immediate surrender of these villages to the Marathas.

In 1781 Shinde’s commander Jaswantrao Bable took an armed contingent to take over the control of Rampura and Tonk. Similarly dispute regarding control over taaluqa Borade also persisted. In one of his Kharitas we find Mahadji instructing Pratap Singh to give the revenue of Borade to Rahim Beg who was handling the affairs of mamlat of Ajmer on behalf of the Marathas. That the Jaipur Raja did not take these reminders and warnings seriously is evident from Shinde’s Kharita to Pratap Singh in 1782 in which Shinde reported about the loss.

1 Gwalior Kharita No.75, Sawan Sudi 4, V.S. 1836/1779. Also see Gwalior Kharita, Asarh Vadi 5, V.S. 1842/1785.
2 Gwalior Kharita No.76, Sawan Sudi 10, V.S. 1836/1779.
3 Gwalior Kharita No.150, Sawan Sudi 11, V.S. 1837/1780.
4 Gwalior Kharita No.148, Sawan Sudi 4, V.S. 1837/1780.
5 Gwalior Kharita No.149, Ashwin Sudi 7, V.S. 1837/1780.
6 Gwalior Kharita No.80, Kartik Sudi 14, V.S. 1837/1780.
7 ibid
8 Gwalior Kharita No.81, Asarh Vadi 14, V.S. 1838/1781.
9 Gwalior Kharita No.77, Magh Vadi 1, V.S. 1838/1781.
of goods and arms of his men travelling within Jaipur territory. Onkar Shinde passing through Jaipur territory was robbed of his possessions by thakur Takht Singh of Jamrauli village. Rajputs continued to defy the Maratha authority and resisted their presence at local level. The question arises why Shinde tolerated the hostile attitude of Jaipur ruler and continued defiance of the authority of his officials in Jaipur territory for so long. It seems that Shinde's ambition was not confined to establishing his dominance over the local chiefs of Rajasthan; he was more concerned with the larger objective of the supremacy of the Marathas in north India for which he needed allies and supporters. This explains why Shinde avoided harsh action against Jaipur despite prolonged tensions with Pratap Singh. He sought Pratap Singh's military help in 1783 against Maohammad Beg Hamdani. As already noted, after the end of Anglo-Maratha war, Mahadji emerged not only as the most powerful Maratha leader but also strengthened his position in the North as a result of friendship with English after the treat of Salbai. From 1783 onwards Shinde began to assert his domination vis-à-vis the Rajput rulers of Rajasthan. He intervened in the inter-state affairs of Kota and Jaipur. Shinde asked Jaipur Raja not to support the ruler of Shahpura Raja Kishore Das who had some territorial dispute with Kota. He sought Pratap Singh's arbitration in resolving the ongoing tussle between Kota and Shahpura. Mahadji's messages to Jaipur now contained a degree of assertion. He asked the Jaipur ruler to restrain the local officials and zamindars in Jaipur territory who were defying the Marathas. It is not so that he was demanding all the time. Friendly gestures were also shown towards Jaipur. He took Jaipur Raja into confidence and kept him update about all important events like his conquest of Gwalier fort. Details about the siege and capture of Gohad fort were reported to Pratap Singh.

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1 Gwalier Kharita No.79, Sawan Vadi 14, V.S. 1839/1782.
2 Gwalier Kharita No.83, Asoj Sudi 1, V.S. 1840/1783.
3 Gwalier Kharita No.84, Asarh Sudi 9, V.S. 1840/1783.
4 Gwalier Kharita No.89, Asoj Vadi 3, V.S. 1840/1783.
5 Gwalier Kharita No.85, Bhadon Vadi 10, V.S. 1840/1783.
6 Ibid
7 Gwalier Kharita No.88, Chaitra Vadi 13, V.S. 1840/1783.
Mahadji Shinde's dealings in Rajasthan at this juncture went beyond his political concerns. He started showing interest in the matters concerning the wellbeing of traders doing business in Jaipur. He asked Parthap Singh to look after the business interests of Jiwandas Govardhan and Uttamchand who had opened shops in Jaipur. Shivdas Nagar was sent by Shinde to Marwar for purchasing camels. He asked Pratap Singh to provide him with escort within Jaipur boundary. The tone of Kharitas seeking cooperation of Jaipur ruler on various matters concerning his officials, gives us a clear indication of the superior position of the Shinde vis-à-vis the Jaipur ruler. Mahadji was keen to seek military assistance of Jaipur to fulfill his desire to establish Maratha domination in the North. At the same time he did not undermine the Maratha interest in Rajasthan. The Maratha raids were not a sort of spontenious response to provocations from the side of Rajputs, the harsh action was resorted to when other avenues to make the Rajputs fulfill their commitments to the Marathas did not succeed. The Marathas invaded the Rajput states after having exhausted other alternatives ranging from several reminders- written as well as verbal, visits of the Maratha agents to the court of the Rajput ruler and threats of military action. Despite continued haggling over tribute payment the Marathas did not break diplomatic ties with the Rajput states which is evident from the dispatch of the Kharitas with remarkable regularity.

Shinde tried very hard to resolve the pending issue of tribute payment and Maratha control over the territories that had been promised to them. The most ticklish dispute around this time arose over the control of lucrative salt trade of pargana Sambhar. Shinde was interested in taking over the entire control of salt trade from the Rajputs. The right to Sambhar Lake salt was equally divided between Jaipur and Jodhpur states. The Jaipur Raja’s reluctance to surrender the control over Sambhar to Shinde is obvious from the charita which Shinde sent in 1784 to Pratap Singh. The Kharita reads “your state has given us

1 Gwalier Kharita No.90, Falgun Vadi 10, V.S. 1840/1783.
2 Gwalier Kharita No.91, Bhadon Sudi 6, V.S. 1840/1783. Shivadas Nagar was asked to purchase five camels and one cow from the fair ground in Marwar.
Sambhar, however, till now your amil of Sambhar has not vacated the local thanas. He is creating trouble to our people posted there. This matter was reported to you as well, but no action has been taken from your side so now ask the amil to handover the control to my officials who will coordinate with your court and manage the affairs of the place accordingly¹.

As the Jaipur officials continued to trouble the Maratha officials posted at sambhar, Mahadji wrote again in 1785 to Pratap Singh to check the excesses committed by his officials at Sambhar². The collectors of rahdari tax representing Jaipur side were not allowing the collection of rahdari from the area held in ijara by the salt traders of Sambhar. The Jaipur officials were realizing much more from the traders then the actual entitlement. According to the contract they were to collect Rs 20 per day but they were collecting four times higher than the sanctioned rate. Mahadji wrote to Pratap Singh to settle the rahdari of Sambhar to facilitate the smooth collection of his share of tax by the Maratha officials. Pratap Singh was asked to withdraw his armed men from Sambhar³. However, Mahadji's officials continued to suffer due to the activities of the amil Daulat Ram from Jaipur who was harassing the traders by demanding much more than the prevalent market price of salt. The traders retaliated by suspending their transactions at Sambhar, thereby causing loss of income to Shinde. Fed up with the amils unbecoming behavior, Mahadji asked Pratap Singh to remove him from the office and replace him by another as amil⁴.

Before his Lalsot campaign, Shinde again expressed his displeasure over harassment caused to his officials at Sambhar on one pretext or the other. This time he complained against the Khufianavis of Jaipur who were troubling the Maratha amaldars, traders of Sambhar and cultivators. He wrote to Pratap Singh “earlier also I had reported to you about their activities, but you have not cared to act, now call your Khufianavis from Sambhar”⁵. To improve the affairs of

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¹ Gwalier Kharita No.99, Falgun Vadi 11, V.S. 1841/1784.
² Gwalier Kharita No.103, Jeth Vadi 13, V.S. 1842/1785.
³ Gwalier Kharita No.116, Chaitra Sudi 3, V.S. 1841/1784.
⁴ Gwalier Kharita No.96, Maghishri Vadi 14, V.S. 1841/1784.
⁵ Gwalier Kharita No.97, Asarh Sudi 1, V.S. 1841/1784.
Sambhar, Mahadji decided to appoint his own officials at Sambhar in 1786 to take control of Sambhar salt trade as he lost confidence in the officials appointed by Jaipur. He wrote to Pratap Singh “we are sending Seth Gangaram and Rajaram from here to take charge of the office of amil and faujadar of Sambhar, so do conduct official work in consultation with them.”

Similarly reminders for the payment of outstanding dues of tribute were dispatched at regular intervals and enough warnings were given to Pratap Singh. Shinde wrote to Pratap Singh “inform Khawas Rodaram about the payment and send him soon with money. This is the only way left to grow our mutual relations.” In fact Shinde undertook Lalsot campain to punish Jaipur after sending several reminders and issuing sufficient warning.

Since Shinde decided to undertake personal charge of the Jaipur affairs he proceeded from the Deeg in March 1787 and reached Dausa near Jaipur. Pratap Singh was also prepared to fight as he was for quite some time preparing for war and collecting his army. Strong contingents of ten thousand Rathor cavalarly men were ready to join the Kachhawa at Sambhar. Even at this stage the avenues for an amicable settlement were not completely shut. Pratap Singh was advised to avoid armed confrontation with Shinde considering his preparation for the battle with the Rajputs. Negotiations were held through the Jaipur representative Shobha Chand who offered to pay rupees 12 lakhs to Shinde. But the offer was far below Shinde’s expectation; the amount proposed by Jaipur was too meager.

There was difference of opinion in Shinde’s camp regarding the peace offer made by Jaipur. One group of his advisers was in favor of accepting the offer of rupees 12 lakhs and leave Jaipur territory as the Rajputs were also well prepared to fight the Marathas. The other group was in favour of rejection of the

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2 Gwalier Kharita No.113, Bhadon 2, V.S. 1842/1785.
3 Parasnis D.B., Delhi Yethil Marathyanche Rajkarna, Vol.1, letter No.201, April, 1787.
4 Khata Ahalkaran letter from Meetha Lal to Pahar Singh, Vaisakh Vadi 9, V.S. 844/1787.
offer. Shinde considered both the opinions but could not make up his mind. In the meantime provocation came from the side of Jaipur as Pratap Singh’s representative left the camp of Shinde without caring to obtain the permission to leave.

Now Shinde was left with no alternative but to fight with the Rajputs. He instructed Mohammad Beg Hamdani to thwart the collusion of the Kachhawas with the Rathor contingent. Shinde himself reached near Jaipur to put pressure on Pratap Singh. Shinde’s expectation was that his presence in person would unnerve the Jaipur Raja who would accept the terms of agreement acceptable to the Marathas. But Pratap Singh did not move out of his fort. Shinde reopened the channel of communication to reach mutually acceptable settlement through Sivaji Vithalrao. However, he did not succeed in persuading Jaipur to accept Shinde’s terms for negotiation. Both the sides now decided to fight. Pratap Singh was already assured of the support of Bijay Singh, the ruler of Jodhpur. Ten thousand Rathor soldiers under the command of Bhim Raj joined the Kachhawa army. Friendly overtures were made to Mohammad Beg Hamdani, the Mughal commander who was with Shinde. He along with other Mughal commanders went over to the Rajputs. Shinde’s soldiers were getting restless day by day as they had been without pay since long. Shinde’s forces began to desert him. Some of the soldiers joined the opposite camp. Shinde requested help from Kota and some force from Kota joined Shinde’s camp.

Shinde marched toward Lalsot to take on the Rajputs there. Shinde was joined by his two Maratha commanders Ambaji Inglia and Apa Kanderai in July 1787. Both the sides were engaged in pitched battle at Tunga near Lalsot, the Maratha forces suffered considerable losses. Shinde seeing his losses decided to retreat towards Bharatpur side. Rajputs forces pursued Shinde a short

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2 Kharita from Pratap Singh to Bijay Singh, Asarh Vadi 5, v.s. 1844/1787 (Draft Kharita Section).
3 Kharita from Pratap Singh to Bijay Singh, Asarh Vadi 13, v.s. 1844 (Jodhpur Kharita).
4 Kharita from Pratap Singh to Manik Pal, Sawan Vadi 1, v.s. 1844/1787 (Draft Kharita Section).
distance and then gave up the chase\(^1\). The account of the battle of Tunga is recorded in \textit{Dastur Komvar}. According to this account both the sides suffered heavy loses in terms of casualty. Mohammad Beg Handani was blown up by Shinde’s artillery. Shinde realizing the heavy deployment of canons (162 in number) by the Rajputs decided to retreat from the battle field. Hamdani’s son and nephew along with Raja Amar Singh and Mahachand Khiduka were deputed to pursue Shinde to plunder his camp. Hamdani’s dead body was brought to Jaipur and buried in \textit{Ramjani Ki Bagichi}. Sawai Pratap Singh’s success against the Marathas was hailed by many Rajput rulers who expressed joy over Shinde’s defeat\(^2\). Holkar kept away from this contest as Pratap Singh continued to maintain friendly relation with him all this while\(^3\).

Pratap Singh conveyed his happiness to Bijay Singh over the success of his forces in Ajmer. With the loss of Ajmer Shinde’s hold in Rajasthan was badly shaken. Bijay Singh wrote to Holkar that the lands of Rajputs belonged to them only. The propriety of the Marathas lay only in earning their friendship. Both Pratap Singh and Bijay Singh were now making efforts to prevent Shinde from re-establishing his domination in Rajasthan. They approached the Peshwa through Holkar to convince him to remove Shinde from the charge of Maratha affairs in Rajasthan\(^4\). Bijay Singh also requested Holkar not to extend any support to Mahadji Shinde and even sought the help of English against Shinde though

\(^1\) Kharita from Pratap Singh to Bhim Singh, \textit{Sawan Sudi 4}, V.S. 1844/1787. An eye witness account of the battle of Tunga is given in \textit{Dastur Komvar} Dikhni which is as follows:

\(^2\) Kharita from Rawat Bhim Singh to Pratap Singh, Falgun Vadi 7, V.S. 1844/1787.

\(^3\) Kharita from Pratap Singh to Tukoji Holkar, \textit{Bhadon Sudi} 11, V.S. 1844/1787.

\(^4\) Arzi Bahi No.4, folio \textit{Posh Vadi} 14, V.S. 1844/1787, (Jodhpur Records).
unsuccessfully\textsuperscript{1}. Pratap Singh also tried to win over the support of emperor Sha Alam II. But nothing came out of his attempt\textsuperscript{2}.

The retreat of Shinde from Lalsot seriously undermined his position in Rajasthan and North India. His repeated request to the Peshwa for help at last yielded favorable response. Ali Bahadur and Tukoji Holkar were instructed to join Shinde. But the rift between Shinde and Holkar came in the way of Shinde’s attempt to regain his lost position in Rajasthan. Shinde’s energy was also diverted to sort out affairs of Delhi where he needed to crush the power of Ghulam Qadir. In October 1788, he repossessed Delhi. Thereafter he took time to organized his forces before his final assault on the Rajputs of Jaipur and Jodhpur. He asked De Boigne to prepare two more Brigades. Big and small guns were manufactured at Gwalier to equip De Boigne’s infantry and artillery. On 19\textsuperscript{th} June 1790 De Boigne’s newly formed army marched to Jaipur to take on the Rajputs. The Rajputs were also prepared for the battle. Pratap Singh sought help from Bijay Singh who readily agreed. The Rajputs also took advantage of ongoing rift between Shinde and Ismail Beg. He was lured by the Rajputs to join their camp. The Jaipur forces were defeated at Patan on 20th June 1790 and that of Jodhpur at Merta in September 1790\textsuperscript{3}.

The Marathas after their victory at Patan proceeded to Ajmer to recapture it. De Boigne proceeded to Jodhpur leaving behind some forces to capture the fort of Ajmer. The fort was surrendered to the Marathas after the defeat of the Rathors at the battle of Merta. As the rout of both Jaipur and Jodhpur forces was complete they were left with no alternative but to negotiate the terms of settlement with Shinde.

His commander Raiji Patel asked Paratap Singh to send his representatives for negotiation. The Jaipur representative met Shinde to discuss

\textsuperscript{1} Arzi Bahi No.4, folio Sawan Vadi 5, V.S, 1844/1787.
\textsuperscript{2} Kharita from Pratap Singh to Bijay Singh, Posh Vadi 6, 11, V.S, 1844/1787, (Draft Kharita Section).
\textsuperscript{3} Sanad Bahi No. 53, Jodhpur Records, Kharita from Pratap Singh to Bijay Singh, Asarh Sudi 10, V.S, 1847/1790.
the terms. The total outstanding amount of tribute of the Marathas and the Mughal emperor was calculated at Rs 63 lakhs. The amount already paid by Jaipur was to be adjusted\(^1\). Rs 15 lakhs were imposed upon Jaipur as war expenses. Out of this imposition the Jaipur ruler was to pay Rs 4 lakhs immediately and the rest of the amount was to be collected from the *jagirdars* of the Jaipur *Raj*. Shinde agreed that there would be no Maratha interference in the internal affairs of Jaipur and whenever the Jaipur ruler needed any military assistance of the Marathas it would be made available on condition of Jaipur bearing the expenses of the Maratha forces for the duration of stay\(^2\). Thus Shinde finally managed to subdue Jaipur completely. However, the reports of the disturbances caused by local *bhomias* in some areas continued to come in. The *bhomias* were troubling the traders who went to Sambhar and forcing them to pay *rahdari* at will. Mahadji Shinde informed Pratap Singh “traders visiting Sambhar to collect salt are being compelled by the Rajputs to pay *rahdari* hence they have suspended their visits to Sambhar. You control the *bhomias* of that area in the interest of both the sides”\(^3\). It was also reported to Pratap Singh that the local *amil* is preventing the Maratha officials from repairing the boundaries of the Sambhar Lake to enhance the output of salt manufacture which is in mutual interest\(^4\). The ongoing dispute regarding the transfer of Borade *thana* in Ajmer to Shinde was not yet resolved. In 1792, Shinde complained to Pratap Singh that Borade *thana* has not been vacated by your officials so far. The *thana* be handed over to my officials, otherwise I will instruct them to use force to capture it\(^5\). That the payments from Jaipur were still irregular is evident from his letter of 5th June 1793 in which he mentioned about his illness and asked Pratap Singh for the payments of tribute which had become due. He wrote “pay to Ganpat Rao the amounted that is accounted for the month of Jeth and pay in future as per the

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terms of agreement. This was probably his last correspondence with Pratap Singh before his death in February, 1794.

**Maratha Domination over Jodhpur**

The end of civil war provided Bijay Singh much needed space to consolidate his power and even aspired him to reoccupy Ajmer. However, he failed in his attempt and had to agree pay an amount of Rs 3 lakhs to the Marathas as compensation. Bijay Singh’s attack on Ajmer prompted Shinde to strengthen the defense of Ajmer against any attack in future. Henceforth Bijay Singh tried not to antagonize the Marathas and complied with their demand of sending Jodhpur contingent. When Holkar visited Jaipur in 1764, Madho Singh requested Bijay Singh for help but Bijay Singh did not agree. He also turned down Holkar’s request for help against the English as the Marathas were fighting them as an ally of Awadh nawab Shuja-ud-Daula. Tension between Bijay Singh and the Marathas persisted on the matter of tribute payment because of his failure in paying the tribute regularly. The Marathas prepared themselves for an attack on Marwar to collect the tribute. However, both the sides concluded an agreement whereby Bijay Singh agreed to pay Rs 10 lakhs and gave bonds for the payment. Thus he averted the Maratha attack. A part payment of tribute was made to Shinde by way of bonds. For the realization of the rest of the amount the Marathas had to send a force under Khanaiji Jadhav who entered Marwar and attacked Nawa. Bijay Singh deputed Diwan Surat Ram to take on the Maratha force. The Maratha forces went back to Ajmer. The negotiations for the outstanding amount of tribute were initiated following which Bijay Singh agreed to pay rest of the amount to Shinde.

Bijay Singh was hard pressed to meet the Maratha demand for tribute payment. He was unable to raise any money to bear the expenses of a Rathor

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1 Gwalier Kharita, No. 258, Asarh Vadi 13, V.S. 1850/ 1793.
2 Arzi Bahi No. 4, letter Sawan Vadi 4, V.S. 1821/1764.
3 ibid, letter Asarh Vadi 6, V.S. 1821/1765
4 Selections from the Peshwa Daftar, Vol 21, No 101
contingent which Shinde asked Bijay Singh to place at his disposal. Bijay Singh was forced to raise money by levying fresh taxes and also borrowed money from the sahukars at high rate of interest\(^1\). The growing pressure from Shinde for the payment of tribute turned Bijay Singh to Jawahar Singh Jat for a joint alliance against the Marathas. The Jat-Rathor forces were defeated by the Maratha-Jaipur forces on December 14, 1767 at Maonda. The Marathas now made Bijay Singh also a party in resolving a dispute between Ratan Singh and Maharana Ari Singh of Udaipur. Bijay Singh not only joined the Marathas who supported the cause of Ratan Singh but also paid the pending amount of tribute\(^2\). However, the Maharana placated the Marathas by agreeing to pay rupees 64 lakhs as tribute\(^3\). The Rathor-Maratha forces also occupied Godwad. Bijay Singh along with Gobindrao was deputed by Shinde to look after the affairs of Udaipur. However, realizing that the Mewar affair is too hot he left Udaipur in June 1772 and returned to Jodhpur\(^4\).

In the meantime Jodhpur defaulted in the payment of tribute. Shinde demanded the payment of installments due immediately and threatened Jodhpur with military intervention that would lead to devastation of the area. Shinde deputed Baji Krishna to collect the money from Jodhpur. But Bijay Singh could manage to pay only a small fraction of it\(^5\). Following Ram Singh's death in 1772, Bijay Singh occupied Sambhar and requested Shinde to recognize his occupation of Sambhar. Bijay Singh's request was accepted when he paid the arrears of tribute for the years 1769-1772 in two installments in 1774 and 1775\(^6\). However, Shinde's commander Ambaji Ingle despite the payment of tribute ravaged Marwar territory. Bijay Singh's protest was ignored by Shinde. Bijay Singh's resentment against Shinde was growing and the rift between the two came to surface when Shinde asked Bijay Singh not to interfere in the affairs of

\(^1\) Marwar Khyat, Vol 3, P 41; Arzi Bahi No. 4, letter Posh Vadi , V.S. 1823/1766.
\(^2\) Hath Bahi No. 2, PP 122-123.
\(^3\) Selections from the Peshwa Daftar, Vol 29, L. 243.
\(^4\) Arzi Bahi No. 4, letter Jeth Sudi 6, V.S. 1828/1772.
\(^5\) Arzi Bahi No. 4, letter Magh Sudi 6, V.S. 1828/1772.
\(^6\) Parihar, G.R; Marwar and the Marathas, P. 104
Bhinai pargana near Ajmer. Shinde also did not like Bijay Singh's attempt to win over the British in 1781. In the factional fight of the two groups of Mewar nobility Shinde and Bijay Singh supported the opposite group. The relations between the two worsened, when in 1786 Shinde threatened to invade Jodhpur for the realization of tribute. Bijay Singh now decided to resist the Maratha dominance and started hunting for possible allies. He had already improved his relations with Jaipur by making a common cause in the struggle against the Marathas.

Bijay Singh also tried to gain the support of Kota regent Zalim Singh. He assured Mohammad Sharif the vakil of Kota that he would persuade Tukoji Holkar to resolve his dispute with Kota over the issue of payment of tribute. In return he wanted Kota to break friendship with Mahadji Shinde. Bijay Singh tried to convince the Kota vakil that their friendship and support had made the Marathas more powerful. He also stressed upon the desirability of cordial relationship between Kota and Bundi as also between Kota and Jodhpur to demonstrate the unity of the Rajputs against the Marathas.

Bijay Singh along with Tukoji Holkar tried to create rift between Zalim Singh Jhala and the Maharana of Udaipur. Zalim Singh who was aware of the intentions of Bijay Singh and Holkar sought Mahadji intervention by sending his vakil to him. Shinde wrote to Holkar reminding him of the long standing friendship between Kota and the Marathas. He wrote "Our friendly ties with Kota are quite old please do not try to break them that would be better". Bijay Singh in February 1790 turned his attention to Macheri chief Pratap Singh Naruka, a Maratha supporter. He tried to win his favor by offering him Jagir worth Rs.1 lakh. Bijay Singh in his message conveyed his feelings to Pratap Singh that the latter by siding with the Marathas is blocking the unity among the Rajput chiefs and persuaded him to meet the Jaipur ruler. However, the Macheri chief put certain preconditions before Jaipur and Jodhpur which were not acceptable to the rulers of Jodhpur and Jaipur.

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In his reports of February 1790 and March 1790 Krishnaji Jagannath informed the Peshwa that Bijay Singh has sent his vakil Shobhachand Bhandari to seek the support of Ismail Beg. He asked him to leave the Marathas and join the Rajputs. He suggested that Ismail Beg should enter Rajasthan through Bikaner territory to join the Rajput force as the Marathas were present in Delhi. Bijay Singh also got an assurance form Najaf Kuli that he would support the Rajputs. He had sent his vakil Manrup Bhandari to Najaf Kuli.

Krishnaji Jagannath in his report also mentioned Bijay Singh’s apprehensions about the intention of his close ally the Jaipurruler Sawai Pratap Singh. The Rathors were also doubtful about the ability of the Kachhawas to engage them in fight for long. Going by the past experience Mahesh Das Kumpawat the Rathor noble pointed out that the Rathor force suffered maximum casualties while fighting jointly with the Kachhawas as latter had the tendency to leave the battle field.

Bijay Singh was clear about the reasons for his conflict with the Marathas. Jodhpur’s control over Ajmer against the wishes of the Marathas and nonpayment of tribute dues are cited as the burning issue by the Maratha vakil who also mentioned in his report that the Jodhpur ruler now regretted for having taken Ajmer from the Marathas. In his letter dated 9th March 1790 Krishnaji Jagannath reported about Bijay Singh’s apprehension of threat from Mahadji Shinde who by now had completely subdued Khichiwada and Gohad. Bijay Singh also wanted to send his representative to the Peshwa for his intervention in resolving the issue of tribute payment to the Marathas.

Bijay Singh tried hard to win the favors of Peshwa by explaining his side of story regarding tribute in February-March 1790 through a messenger and eagerly

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1 Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patravali, Parampara L-10, P.49.
2 Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patravali L.11, P.51
3 ibid, L.11, P.54
4 ibid L.10, P.47.
waited for the Peshwa's response and even asked Krishnaji Jagnnath again and again. Bijay Singh wanted to pay tribute only after hearing from the Peshwa.

Krishnaji Jagnnath also reported differences between Sawai Pratap Singh and Bijay Singh regarding Ismail Beg's support to the Rajputs. The Jaipur ruler was not in favour of promises made by Bijay Singh to Ismail Beg in return for his joining the Rajputs. Ismail Beg was offered territory in Rajasthan and payment for expenditure of his forces during the occupation of Ajmer by Bijay Singh. He also conveyed to the Jodhpur ruler that the Marathas regarded Jodhpur as their main enemy and Jaipur was capable of handling the Marathas. In order to clear all these doubts in the mind of Pratap Singh, Bijay Singh decided to send his representative Jivraj Purobit to Jaipur. Pratap Singh agreed to share equally with Jodhpur the monthly expenditure of Rs.1 lakh needed to maintain Ismail Beg's forces.

In May 1790 the Maratha forces led by Ambaji Ingle, Rana Khan, Raiji Patel and Jiva Bakhshi entered Jaipur territory through Macheri and camped 30 miles away from the place where Ismail Beg was encamping. Mahadji Shinde did not join the campaign and decided to wait at Mathura. Bijay Singh's five thousand troops joined Ismail Beg's forces. The strength of Ismail Be's contingent was 5 thousands cavalry, 14 thousands infantry and 100 pieces of guns.

A separate Rathor contingent of Jodhpur led by Gangaram Bhandari reached Moti Dungari near Jaipur. Later another five thousands soldiers of Jodhpur under the command of Shamlal Lodha joined Gangaram Bhandari. Four to five thousands Rathor force under Vijay Chand Singh also reached near Ismail Beg's camp.

Even at this stage when both the sides were prepared for the battle the Marathas made a last minute attempt to avert the war. The feeling in the Maratha

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1 Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patravali L.12, P.56.
3 ibid L.13, P.59.
camp was that the Rathors of Jodhpur are responsible for the entire build up on both the sides and the initiative to avoid the fight should come from their side by paying the dues. The Maratha commander Ambaji Ingle was firm on the issue that the Rathors should first pay the tribute dues. However, later on the Maratha commanders decided to send a letter to Bijay Singh asking him to give monetary compensation for Ajmer also asking both Jodhpur and Jaipur not to have any dealing with Ismail Beg and give up the claim for Delhi-Agra region.

Before the battle of Patan in June 1790 the Peshwa and Bijay Singh tried to resolve the issue of control over Ajmer and outstanding tribute through negotiations. According to the testimony of Krishnaji Jagannath the Peshwa was adamant on the surrender of Ajmer to the Marathas and clearance of tribute amount. On the other hand Bijay Singh was willing to pay the outstanding dues but was not ready to part with Ajmer. Bijay Singh was flexible on other issues but took a firm stand on Ajmer. He offered to send his vakil to the Peshwa for formal negotiations. However, no further progress could be made in the direction of settling this issue without an armed conflict.

The battle of Patan was fought in such circumstances and the defeat of Rathor forces at Merta forced Bijay Singh to change his stand on Ajmer. He conveyed his feeling to the Maratha vakil and also offered to pay the dues. However, the Marathas now made fresh demand of the surrender of half of the Marwar territory including the town of Jalore to the Maratha. Bijay Singh could not agree to this unreasonable demand and prepared himself to fight another battle with the Marathas. He assembled 20,000 Rathor forces.

In the Maratha Jodhpur negotiation following the defeat at Patan the Jodhpur ruler Bijay Singh was keen to make the Peshwa vakil a party as he did not have any trust in Mahadji Shinde words. He feared that negotiation only with Shinde would not be fair. So Bijay Singh took the position that he would accept all the terms that were settled in the presence of Krishnaji Jagannath. In the

1 Marwar-Maratha Aithhasik Patravali, L.14, PP.64.
2 Marwar-Maratha Aithhasik Patravali, L.15, PP.66.
course of negotiation several proposal were made by both the sides. Initially the Maratha demand consisted of Rs.2.35 crores as war expenses, the pending dues of peshkash, half of the Marwar territory that was given to Ram Singh and tribute for Ajmer for the past three years. Later the demand was revised. Rs.2.35 crores was demanded as war expenses and transfer of Sambhar and some other parganas to recover pending amount of tribute. However, the Jodhpur ruler agreed to pay Rs.1 crore in cash and offered some parganas for the recovery of the rest of amount. The Marathas in addition to the offer made by Jodhpur demanded war expenses and tribute for Ajmer. According to the Maratha vakil estimated pending dues amounted to Rs.15.66 lakhs and outstanding amount of tribute of Ajmer for three years was Rs.9 lakhs. The Marathas now demanded 24.66 lakhs in cash and two parganas of Marwar in lieu of war expenses. Sambhar was also to be given to the Marathas.\(^1\)

These negotiations were carried on in the presence of the Peshwa vakil. However, he was prevented from participation in the further negotiation by Shinde’s representatives. But even without his presence in the subsequent rounds of negotiation Krishnaji Jagannath managed to collect information about the talks that went on between Shinde’s representative and Jodhpur. Shinde’s representative asked for half of the Marwar territory and payment of Rs.56 lakhs with interest on it. This amount was due from the time of Jayappa Shinde.\(^2\)

Writing from the camp of Mahadji Shinde at Merta the Peshwa’s vakil mentioned Nana Fadnis’s opinion regarding the issue of Ajmer. He also strongly felt that the Rathors had no business to keep Ajmer occupied he wanted transfer of Ajmer to the Marathas along with the payment of war expenses. The Rathors had agreed to meet similar demands at the time of Jayappa Shinde.\(^3\) Krishnaji Jagannath also communicated the sensivity of the Rathors over the division of Marwar. They

\(^1\) Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patravali, L.16, P.68

\(^2\) Marwar Ri Khyat, P.38

\(^3\) ibid L. 4, P.17
were willing to die fighting rather than handing over half the Marwar territory to the Marathas\(^1\).

In the next round of negotiation again the Maratha vakil was not allowed participation. Shinde's men ignored Bijay Singh's plea for the presence of a mediator to avoid any misunderstanding later on\(^2\). The Marathas now wanted Jodhpur to pay Rs.40 lakhs as war expenses and transfer of parganas Sambhar, Nawa and Didwana for the settlement of this amount. To compensate the Marathas for the occupation of Ajmer, the Rathors were to pay Rs. 15 lakhs and to vacate Ajmer along with the fort.

Two very high ranking officers of Bijay Singh, Budh Singh Champawat and Bhawani Ram Bhandari were held in captivity by Shinde during the period of negotiation. At last Budh Singh Champawat was left with no option but to hand over a written document containing the terms and conditions of the agreement to Shinde. The Jodhpur committed to the following:

1. The parganas of Sambhar, Nawa and Didwana were to be assigned to the Maratha in lieu of Rs.40 lakhs settled as war expenses.
2. Rs.15 lakhs were settled as compensation to the Marathas for the occupation of Ajmer, out of which Rs.7 lakhs were to be paid immediately in cash and the rest in installments.
3. The Rathors were to vacate Ajmer as well as its fort.

In his letter of 28\(^{th}\) May 1791 to Nana Fadnis, Krishnaji Jagannath reported transfer of half of the territory of Sambhar belonging to Jodhpur along with other parganas and 27 villages. These territories were worth yielding revenue of Rs. 2 lakhs per annum\(^3\). However, a letter dispatched from Delhi court to the Peshwa offers a different account of the terms and conditions agreed upon by both side. According to it Jodhpur offered Rs.60 lakhs as out of which Rs.40 lakhs were to be adjusted as compensation to Jodhpur for the damages and plunder caused by

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\(^1\) Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patravali L. 17, P.70
\(^2\) ibid L. 18, P.73
\(^3\) Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patravali L.22, P.102; Marwar Ri Khyat, P.98

122
the Marathas in Marwar territory and the remaining 20 lakhs were to be paid only after Shinde force leaving Jodhpur territory\(^1\). Jodhpur also agreed to transfer Rupnagar, Parbatsar and half of Sambhar as security till the promised amount of tribute was paid.

Ajmer and its fort were to be handed over to the Maratha and the Jodhpur ruler would be allowed to occupy Merta only after the transfer of Ajmer to the Marathas. The Marathas were able to regain the control of Ajmer and this fact is confirmed by Krishnaji Jagannath in his letter dated 28\(^{th}\) May 1791 to the Peshwa\(^2\).

The suffering of Jodhpur during the war with the Marathas in terms of loss of men and material was considerable. The famine conditions persisting in Marwar for the last two years further aggravated the financial problem of the state. The reckless plunder of the countryside left the people resourceless. The Peshwa’s vakil mentions that not even a single village was untouched from the depredations of the Marathas and Ismail Beg’s force. He observed that it would take at least three years to bring back normalcy in the whole region of Marwar\(^3\).

The Jodhpur affairs needed some attention as the villages of pargans Sambhar that were mortgaged to Shinde by Bijay Singh had not been handed over to the Maratha officials. Shinde asked the Jodhpur ruler to instruct his officials to transfer the control over these villages to his Kamvisdars. Bijay Singh promised that the matter would be resolved soon\(^4\). The villages were transferred to Shinde on the personal instruction of the Jodhpur ruler. There was some delay in the payment of cash installments on the part of both Jaipur and Jodhpur. De Boigne was made the recipient of dues from Jaipur to meet his pressing need for money to maintain his troops awaiting the payment of salary\(^5\). Notwithstanding unintended delay sometimes, Jodhpur somehow managed to pay the tribute due to Shinde as per the promise till Bijay Singh’s death in July.

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\(^1\) Sarkar, JN, Sindhia as Regent of Delhi, P. 46  
\(^2\) Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patravali, L. 22, PP. 102  
\(^3\) Marwar-Maratha Aitihasik Patravali P. 73.  
\(^4\) Kharita from Mahadji Shinde to Bijay Singh, Asoj Sudi 14, V.S. 1849/1792.  
\(^5\) Gwalior Kharita, No. 47, Asarh Sudi 8, V.S. 1849/1792.
1793. After the debacle of Merta, Bijay Singh refused to be a party to any move initiated by the Jaipur Raja against Shinde.

Bijay Singh's defeat at Merta and the subsequent agreement with Shinde was a great setback for him as he lost his prestige and standing internally within Marwar as well as among the rulers of Rajasthan. He had to surrender a portion of productive area of Marwar to the Marathas which further strained the dwindling financial resources of the state. His authority in the state became lax which led to political instability and discontentment among the Rathor nobles. Bijay Singh had already lost his prominent officials at least for the time being as they were taken as hostages by Shinde to ensure fulfillment of the terms of agreement on the part of Jodhpur. His love for a low caste woman Gulab Rai Paswan further complicated the situation at Jodhpur court, giving rise to court intrigues and creating succession dispute.

Bhawani Ram Bhandari who was trusted by Shinde was appointed as the Diwan of Jodhpur and one faction of the nobles joined his group to counter Gulab Rai. Shinde after his departure to Poona had made Jiva ji Ballal incharge of Marwar affairs. After the death of Bijay Singh in June 1793 Marwar plunged into a state of crisis due to factional fights and succession disputes. Jiva ji Ballal gradually lost his grip over the affairs of Marwar as he could not contain fierce infighting among the Rathor nobles.

The Maratha vakil is his letter of 30th April 1794 commented on the Maratha affairs in the North during the period of earlier Peshwa and subsequent transfer of power to the Maratha commanders which severely undermined the authority of the Peshwa.

"Peshwa has lost his Charisma and all powerful position after delegating power in the North to his Sardars. Even tributes are not deposited in Peshwa treasury. Earlier in the time of Shrimant late Nana Sahib (Bala ji Bajirao) and Shrimant Peshwa late Madhav Rao contribution and presence from Jaipur, Kota,

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1 Parihar, G.R., *Marwar and the Marathas*, PP 134-140
Bundi, Udaipur and Jodhpur were sent to the Peshwa through vakil honoring his high status. All the rulers were in control of the Peshwa--around 350 vakil were placed in the courts of various rulers in the North--.

After spending a year in various parts of Rajasthan to consolidate his gains in that region Shinde made plans to move to Poona. He appointed Gopalrao Bhau as his deputy in Rajasthan and the other commanders of the Maratha forces were to follow his authority.

In 1792, Shinde started his march towards Poona via Ujjain. At this juncture he was at the peak of his dominance in Rajasthan and the North as he firmly reestablished his supreme position. He built up an army which was the strongest armed force in the North. However, the triumph of Shinde also brought to surface rifts among the Maratha sardars. He was hard pressed by Holkar and Ali Bahadur to share his gains in the North and Rajasthan with them. Shinde was not in a mood to meet these demands which he considered grossly unreasonable and unjustified. He wanted to settle this issue with the Peshwa by paying personal visits to his court.

Mahadji Shinde collected some high quality horses from Jaipur with the help of Pratap Singh before he set off to Poona. He asked Pratap Singh to arrange the purchase of four horses of Turkish breed which the Jaipur traders had brought from abroad. He wanted to present these horses as gift to Peshwa. He offered to pay for these horses. He sent two of his officials Pandit Ganpatrao and Parbatrao Shinde to select horses from Jaipur. Mahadji continued his communication with Pratap Singh while staying at Poona and acknowledged the receipts of messages received from Jaipur. In 1793 he himself wrote to Pratap Singh to extend favour to traders associated with Shinde household and doing business in Jaipur.

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1 Sarkar, J.N. Sindhia as Regent of Delhi, PP. 51-55.
2 Gwalier Kharita No. 28, Chaitra Sudii 6, V.S. 1848/1791.
3 Gwalier Kharita, No. 43, Asoj Sudi 5, V.S. 1848/1791, Gwalier Kharita, No. 44, Magh Sudi 1, V.S. 1848/1792.
4 Gwalier Kharita No. 57, Vaisakh Sudi 1, V.S. 1850/1793.
The Dynamics of the Maratha triumph in Rajasthan.

The Maratha presence in Rajasthan coincided with the expansion of the Maratha power in Malwa. The control over Malwa brought the Marathas on the border of Rajasthan as the principalities of Kota, Bundi, and Udaipur lying in south –east Rajasthan was adjacent to Malwa. The gradual advancement of the Marathas in Rajasthan reached its climax in 1790-91 when Mahadji Shinde decisively crushed the combined Rajput forces of Jaipur and Jodhpur first at Patan and thereafter at Merta. Shinde’s final assault over the combined strength of Jaipur and Jodhpur marked the end of Rajput resistance to the Marathas from 1750 onward which found manifestation in refusal to pay tribute and consistent opposition to the Maratha presence in the territory of Rajput states. The Marathas were the supreme power in entire Rajasthan to the exclusion of any local power. The Marathas owed their success partly due the long period of their presence and also owing to their superior military power as compared to any other regional power. Their stature as formidable military power further grew with the organization of the Maratha army on the European pattern. The Marathas also took advantage of the internal disputes in the Rajput states as well as interstate disputes over various issues. The chiefs of Macheri, Kishangarh, Salumbar who were having territorial disputes with bigger states looked up to the Maratha support against Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur during 1780s and 1790s. The rulers of Kota and Bundi also depended upon the Maratha support to sort out their internal as well as external problems. These states proved to be useful allies to the Marathas and offered their willing support to promote the Maratha cause in various forms. The Maratha received from these chiefs not only active military assistance but also valuable support in the form of military and local intelligence, supply of provision and safe base for the army. The local elites who had gone over to the Maratha side were motivated by different consideration. For example the chief of Kishangarh and Salumbar were having territorial disputes with their powerful neighboring rulers of Jodhpur and Udaipur. The other group of local elites who joined hands with the Marathas were enterprising and locally powerful men who aspired for enlarging their own territory at the expense of the
parent state. They looked up to the Marathas for support as on their own they could not afford to fulfill their ambitions. The case of Rao Raja Pratap Singh of Macheri, a kachhawa of Naruka subclan is the best example of the rise of local elites who befriended Shinde and helped him against Jaipur and Jodhpur. Pratap Singh rose from a humble background. In the beginning he was holding just two and a half villages as his jagir. But due to his enterprising nature and opportunistic moves obtained independent status from the Mughal emperor in 1780\(^1\). He did not adopt any adventurous policy so long as the parent state of Jaipur was strong. In fact he rendered active military support to Madho Singh in his fight with Jawahar Singh Jat of Bharatpur in 1767-68. By taking advantage of the internal weakness of the Jaipur state during the reign of Prithvi Singh who succeeded Madho Singh, he usurped territory belonging to Jaipur to lay foundation of the independent Naruka state of Alwar. This act of Pratap Singh Naruka spoiled his relation with Jaipur and brought him into direct conflict with Prithvi Singh and after his death Sawai Pratap Singh, the new ruler of Jaipur. The conflict with Jaipur drew Pratap Singh Naruka closer to Mahadji Shinde. He accompanied Mahadji Shinde throughout his Lalsot campaign and battle with Jaipur and Jodhpur in 1787. His close ties with Shinde is evident from the way he was consulted by Shinde before making any move during Lalsot campaign and even after the debacle of Lalsot when Shinde was preparing for another attack on Jaipur and Jodhpur\(^2\). Mahadji followed his advice to retreat from Lalsot in the face of desertion of his Hindustani troops which gave the Jaipur an upper hand vis a vis his opponent Shinde\(^3\). Again we find Shinde inviting him for consultation when he was planning to invade Jaipur in 1789. Shinde's commander Ambaji Ingle also visited Pratap Singh Naruka for consultation regarding the proposed attack on Jaipur\(^4\). The Peshwa's vakil at Jodhpur Krishnaji Jagannath in his letter of 9\(^{th}\) March 1790 to Peshwa mentions that Pratap Singh Naruka is creating

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\(^1\) Sarkar, JN, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. 3, PP. 224-234.

\(^2\) Sarkar, JN, Sindhia as Regent of Delhi, PP. 5,7,9,12.

\(^3\) ibid P. 12

\(^4\) ibid P. 26
disturbances in Jaipur territory bordering Alwar\(^1\). Pratap Singh Naruka offered valuable military support to Shinde in the battle of Patan in June 1790. He along with his 15 thousand strong cavalry fought against the forces of Ismail Beg who had joined Jaipur and Jodhpur\(^2\). In the battle of Merta again Pratap Singh Naruka participated from the side of Shinde.

Pratap Singh Naruka wanted to fulfill his ambition to acquire more territory with the help of the Marathas. His attempt to take possession of Patan after the battle there in June 1790 was thwarted by Shinde’s commander Ambaji Ingle. Macheri Rao kept on trying for Patan but Ambaji Ingle did not allowed him to capture it\(^3\). On earlier occasions also Pratap Singh tried to exploit his friendship with Shinde to play his politics with Jaipur. He had proposed to Shinde that the qiledars of Ramthanbore were under his control and if Shinde helped Prithvi Singh’s Son Man Singh to acquire the throne of Jaipur then the fort could be given to him\(^4\). However, Shinde did not take it seriously and instead asked Pratap Singh to prove his loyalty first by surrendering the fort of Alwar. Pratap Singh Naruka continued allegiance to Shinde as we find Shinde and his officials seeking his cooperation in 1791\(^5\).

The Marathas also sought cooperation from the ruler of Karauli state because of its favorable location between Jaipur and Gwalier. The Kharitas from the Karauli rulers to their counterparts in Jaipur reveal that both the states were maintaining harmonious relations and cooperating with each other. Minor issues cropped up in between but these were amicably resolved. The concern of Karauli about the Maratha advancement in Rajasthan particularly in the neighboring territories of Bharatpur and Jaipur is evident from the Kharitas of the Karauli rulers. In 1753 Madho Singh was informed about the movement of Maratha forces from the side of Kumher and the evacuation of people all

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1 Sarkar, JN, Sindhia as Regent of Delhi P. 36
2 Marwar-Maratha Aitiharik Patravali, L.11, P.55
3 Marwar-Maratha Aitiharik Patravali, L.14, P.65
4 ibid. L.14, P.65
5 Gwalier Kharita, No. 36/2 Baisakh Vadi 9, V.S. 1848/1791, No. 36/9, Sawan Vadi 8, V.S. 1848/1791, No. 36/4 Kartik Sudi 1, V.S. 1848/ 1791.
around\(^1\). Again in 1754 Gopal Singh Jadam, the Karauli ruler requested Madho Singh to acquaint him with the affairs of Delhi, Marathas and Marwar\(^2\). In 1759 Tulipal Jadam reminded Madho Singh of the traditional ties between the two houses and expressed regret over recent disruption in relations with Jaipur and assured him that all efforts would be made to clear misunderstanding\(^3\). It seems that around 1784 the ruler of Karauli was feeling the heat of Maratha presence in their neighborhood as Manikpal Jadam conveyed his concern over the departure of the Maratha forces and urged Sawai Pratap Singh to find way out to avert their visitation as it would be detrimental to the interests of Jaipur\(^4\). The karauli chief informed Pratap Singh of Jaipur that he had been paying tribute to the Marathas as per the agreement. He acknowledged the receipt of information sent by Jaipur through Shah Dulichand regarding the plunder of Jaipur villages by Shinde’s commander Ambaji Ingle to collect money. Jaipur Raja informed him about his intention of paying the pending dues to the Marathas at the earliest\(^5\). In 1786 the Karauli ruler wrote several letters to Pratap Singh regarding the Maratha affairs in Jaipur. He asked the Jaipur ruler to send information regarding the terms of settlement with Shinde and expressed joy over Shinde’s departure from Jaipur\(^6\). Amolakpal, the new Karauli ruler in his letter of 1787 expressed happiness over the victory of Ismail Beg against the forces of Shinde\(^7\). In 1790 Amolakpal conveyed to Pratap Singh that he is quite relieved to know about the progress of negotiation between Shinde and Jaipur. Again he informed the Jaipur Raja that Shinde is quite apprehensive with regard to the stand of Karauli in his conflict with Jaipur. Further he wrote to Jaipur that he has decided to comply with Shinde’s instruction for dispatching an authorized representative for talks\(^8\). In 1793, when negotiations between Shinde and Jaipur representative Daulat Ram

\(^1\) Karauli-Jaipur Kharita. No. 51, Falgun Sudi 12, V.S. 1810/ 1753
\(^2\) Karauli-Jaipur Kharita. No. 54, Magishri Sudi 5, V.S. 1811/ 1754
\(^3\) Karauli-Jaipur Kharita. No. 77, Asoj Vadi 9, V.S. 1816/ 1759
\(^4\) Karauli-Jaipur Kharita. No. 51, Posh Sudi 9, V.S. 1841/ 1784
\(^5\) Karauli-Jaipur Kharita. No. 51, Jeth Vadi 13, V.S. 1841/ 1784
\(^6\) Karauli-Jaipur Kharita. No. 51, Chaitra Sudi 12, V.S. 1843/ 1786; Vaisakh Sudi 15, V.S. 1843/1786, Asarh Vadi 1, V.S. 1843/1786, Falgun Sudi 9, V.S. 1843/1786.
\(^7\) Karauli-Jaipur Kharita, Magishri Sudi 15, V.S. 1844/ 1787
\(^8\) Karauli-Jaipur Kharita, Magh Vadi 11, V.S. 1847/ 1790
Haldia were being held at Bhusawal, the karauli chief requested Pratap Singh to ensure his uninterrupted possession over Karauli territory. In his Kharitas the Karauli Raja was stressing his friendship with Jaipur and showing sympathy over the Maratha affairs. However, at the same time he was loyal to Shinde and followed his instructions. Shinde promised to restore Bijaigarh to karauli in 1787.

During Shinde’s Lalsot campaign the Karauli chief was supplying provisions to the Maratha camp and the Jaipur Raja requested him to stop the supply. However, the Karauli chief could not afford to annoy the powerful Maratha. Karauli’s geographical location gave direct access to Shinde to enter Jaipur territory from Gwalier side by travelling through Karauli. The supply coming to the Maratha camp from Gwalier was routed through Karauli. On 11th July 1787 Sawai Pratap Singh ordered five to six thousand Jaipur troops to cut off supply of grain to Shinde. On 30th July, 1787 the Rajputs cut off a caravan of 6000 oxen and 700 camels loaded with grain and the other provision badly needed by the starving Maratha army. Willingly or unwillingly Karauli chiefs were made to subserve the Maratha interest.

Shinde won over friendship of the Rathor state of Kishangarh sharing border with Jodhpur. Kishangarh ruler’s territorial dispute with Jodhpur turned him to Shinde for support against his powerful neighbor. According to Krishnji Jagannath Virdi Singh, the ruler of Krishangarh was unhappy with Bijay Singh as he turned down his demand for the grant of pargana Parbatsar in lieu of serving in Mewar on behalf of Jodhpur. Krishangarh and Jodhpur were also involved in a longstanding dispute over the possession of some villages on the frontier of the two states. These villages were occupied by the bhomias of Kishangarh. Temper flared up on both sides when Rajputs from Jodhpur plundered and destroyed some villages belonging to Kishangarh. The Kishangarh ruler on receiving the news of this encroachment upon Kishangarh territory sent his representative to

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1 Karauli-Jaipur Kharita, No. 51, Chaitra Sudi 12, V.S. 1850/ 1793
2 Sarkar, JN (ed), Sindhia as Regent of Delhi, P.55
3 Ibid, PP 4-5
4 Ibid, PP 3-5
5 Marwar- Maratha Aithhasik Patravali, L.2, P.23

130
Shinde. Kishangarh was also involved in Jaipur succession dispute following the death of Prithvi Singh. The Kishangarh ruler did not approve of Pratap Singh's occupation of the throne of Jaipur instead he supported the claim of Man Singh, the son of Prithvi Singh who was born to the daughter of Kishangarh ruler married to Prithvi Singh. He appealed to Shinde against the succession of Pratap Singh. When Jodhpur forces attacked and surrounded Kishangarh from all sides thereby cutting off supplies, the Kishangarh Diwan Surat Singh paid Rs 5 lakhs to Tukoji Holkar and invited both Holkar and Shinde to come with their troops and rescue Kishangarh. Kishangarh also contested Jodhpur's claim over Rupanagar. After the defeat of the Jodhpur Rathors at the hands of Shinde's army in the battle of Merta, Rupanagar was restored to Kishangarh. However, it could not be retained by Kishangarh for much longer period. Kishangarh also served to the Marathas as a safe base when they were fighting with Jodhpur for regaining the possession of Ajmer. The Marathas in their attack on Ajmer were supported by Kishangarh forces.

In Mewar region Shinde found a willing ally in Rawat Bhim Singh, the Chandrawat chief of Salumbar who was opposed to the Rana of Udayapur. He became a handy tool in the hands of Shinde and acted as per his dictates vis-a-vis the Maharana. Zalim Singh, the regent of Kota was also an ally of Shinde. Through his effort the settlement between Shinde and the Maharana was concluded regarding Mewar's obligation to pay tribute.

How meticulously Shinde planned his offensive against the Rajaputs is evident from his attempt to lure the Banjaras to his side. The support of Banjaras was vital for maintaining the line of supply during the Maratha campaigns in Rajasthan. Just before his Lalsot campaign Mahadji honored the Banjara chief who was invited to his camp and offered the robe of honor and turban. Shinde needed the co-operation of Banjara's not only to ensure uninterrupted supply of food grains and other essential commodities as also to prevent the upward

1 Marwar- Maratha Aithihasik Patravali, L.2, P. 24
2 ibid, L.2, P. 41.
3 Sarkar, JN (ed) Sindhia as Regent of Delhi, P. 42
movement of food prices\(^1\). Shinde also offered incentives to the Banjaras by way of extending tax concessions. Because of the positive measures adopted by Shinde the Banjaras were able to maintain more or less regular supply of provisions to Shinde’s camp brought from Gwalier\(^2\).

Mahadji Shinde also succeeded in creating a powerful and influential group of supporters in the courts of Jaipur and Jodhpur. The Diwan of Jaipur Kushaliram Bohra who later on fell out with the Jaipur ruler was regarded as pro-Maratha. According to Krishnaji Jagannath’s report Shinde asked Kushaliram Bohra to visit Jodhpur and gather military information. He was also required by Shinde to meet Govardhan Khichi of Khichiwada\(^3\) in Malwa to collect similar information. Govardhan Khichi was against Shinde and advising Jodhpur ruler on matters concerning the Maraths. Kushaliram Bohra was entrusted with the task of assessing the strength of Jodhpur army, their terms for settlement with the Marathas and other relevant information\(^3\).

Bhawani Ram Bhandari who later became the Diwan of Jodhpur after Bijay Singh’s death was made a close confident of Shinde. He was sent to the court of Shinde as a clerk with the Jodhpur vakil Kriparam Joshi. He rendered useful assistance to Gopal Raghunath Chitnis who was handling Jodhpur affairs in behalf of Shinde\(^4\). Due to past services to Shinde he was made Diwan of Jodhpur. With his help the Marathas dominated the Jodhpur state affairs.

We have noted that the Marathas were able to gain support from sections of the elites and other functionaries in Rajasthan. However, they could not escape trouble and harassment at the hands of certain local communities particularly the Meenas who often looted convoys carrying supplies to the Marathas camp. During Lalsot campaign the Marathas tasted the plundering activities of the Meenas. It was reported from Mahadji’s camp on July 7, 1787 that the Meena horsemen carried off camels and ponies that were on the way to

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\(^1\)Sarkar, JN (ed) Sindhia as Regent of Delhi, PP 2-4
\(^2\)ibid, P.14
\(^3\)Marwar- Maratha Aitihasik Patravali, L.5, P. 32.
\(^4\)ibid, L. 19, P. 76.
the Maratha camp. The Meenas looted fruits being sent to the Maratha camp near Toda\(^1\). As mentioned in the news report on another location the Meenas plundered several carts of grain belonging to the Marathas. In one such raid the Meenas successfully carried off 150 oxen loaded with grain from the rear of the caravan heading for Shinde's camp\(^2\). There were also reports about the capture of Meenas by the Marathas who gave severe punishment to the Meenas involved in the offence.

Looking at the Maratha presence in Rajasthan particularly in the last 50 years of 18\(^{th}\) century, on the whole it would be reasonable to state that this period witnessed regular military campaigns and warfare. The continued local resistance to the Marathas presence was dealt with strong military campaigns. Once the Marathas under Shinde and Holkar acquired military superiority by adopting European style of warfare, there was a marked shift in balance of power in favour the Marathas. Mahadji Shinde in 1780s and 90s had a decisive victory over the combined forces of Rajput rulers. He overcame all resistance to the Marathas domination in Rajasthan by adopting combination of military superiority and diplomacy.

**How the Marathas are Depicted?**

How the Marathas are mentioned in Rajasthani sources? What are the terms used for them commonly? And, do appropriate references to the Marathas, viewed in chronological order, suggest any continuity or change? The use or non-use of particular words may also be indicative of attitudes. The terms used for the Marathas in different categories of Rajasthani sources are derived from the place of origin as they are mentioned as Dikhanis or natives of Deccan. No other common terms, not even the term Maratha, which is indicative of their ethnic origin has been used. In late medieval Rajasthani sources we find similar attitude towards the Muslims who irrespective of their varying ethnic origins are simply branded as Turks whereas in the case of Rajputs there is a degree of

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\(^1\) Sarkar, JN (ed), *Sindhia as Regent of Delhi*, P. 2-4.
\(^2\) ibid. P. 42.
consciousness that they be identified with their clan names as well. In the case of Marathas even a more detailed reference to their contextual occurrences does not make difference, the sole exception being the use of suffix Pandit in respect of the Maharashtra Brahmans and prefix Sindhia, Holkar, Pawar, Bable, Ingle, Jadhav and so on to differentiate them from Brahmans. The terms Dikhani or Pandit occur in each and every context be it the military campaign, visit to the court of Rajput chiefs or their interaction with the local society. The Maratha presence on the border of Rajasthan caused anxiety among the Rajput rulers as to the future plans of the Marathas for territorial expansion. We need to contextualize earlier reference to the Marathas against this background.

The apprehension about the Maratha designs in the bordering state of Mewar is evident from Maharana Jagat Singh’s letter to Bihari Das. This letter was written in the context of Peshwa Bajirao’s visit to Udaipur. The letter reads “Bajirao has come and he will derive reputation from having compelled a contribution from me, besides his demand for land. He has commenced with my country and will take twenty times more from me than from other Rajas. Malhar came last year, but this was nothing. Bajirao this year, and he is more powerful. But if God hears me, he will not get any land." Earlier too, in the perception of a section among the Rajputs the Marathas were perceived as being capable of creating great disturbance and representing the elements of anarchy and ruin of entire land. Even Sawai Jai Singh who had friendly relations with the Marathas called them thieves when he came to know about their repeated intrusions into the southern Mewar. Sawai Jai Singh’s agent at Ujjain Kesho Ram in his letter to Sawai Jai Singh used the term ghanims for the Maratha arm.

It is rather surprising that in Rajasthani sources the term ghanim for the Marathas is not found at least upto 1793. Even in periods of acute tension and extreme hostility between the two sides the Marathas are referred to as Dikhanis.

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2 Kharita from Sangram Singh to Sawai Jai Singh, Chaitra Vadi 7, V.S. 1782/1725.
3 Kharita from Sangram Singh to Sawai Jai Singh, Posh Vadi 5, V.S. 1785/1728.
This is evident from Dastur Komvar, chithi records and Marwar Ri Khyat which throughout the period of study refer to the Marathas as Dlkhanis. Even Mahadji Shinde’s arrival at Tunga IN 1787 to fight with Jaipur and Jodhpur is mentioned in a polite language as if his arrival was welcome\textsuperscript{1}. In Chithi documents of Jaipur the term ghanim is used for the Pindaris of Amir Khan who invaded Jaipur territory while serving under the Marathas.

It is also interesting to note that despite antagonistic relationship between the Rajputs and the Maratha the Rajasthani sources offer more or less an objective perception of the Maratha success in Rajasthan, their military superiority over the Rajputs and how they manifested their power vis-à-vis the Rajput rulers. In the context of the 1760s the Khyat admits undisputed ascendancy of the Marathas\textsuperscript{2}. And their growing strength\textsuperscript{3}. There is just one instance during the 1780s when the Rajputs boasted about their success against the Marathas and plight of Shinde in the battle of Tunga which is recorded as Shinde’s flight from the battle field and that he is running away\textsuperscript{4}. There is hardly any attempt to undermine the exploits of the Marathas, the despair and sadness among the Rajput rulers over the prospects of loss of face, territory and parting with huge sums of money to buy peace with the Marathas. The inability of the rulers to pay up the promised sum and acceptance on their part of the humiliating condition that made them place leading personalities of the state under custody of the Marathas as some kind of insurance for payment of the outstanding dues—all these facts are explicitly stated.

The undercurrents of resentment against the Marathas are also evident from measures adopted by the Rajput states prohibiting any social interaction with the Marathas. In one such recorded instance of the year 1761 Pema Ahir, a resident of qusba Tonk was punished by the state for marrying his sister to Pancham Dikhni.

\textsuperscript{1} Dastur Komvar Dikhani, Shindes arrival at Tunga is recorded as क्षयरा
\textsuperscript{2} Marwar Khyat, it reads “देखनीया र उत्तर करो”
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid it reads “दिखनीया र जोर हुआ”
\textsuperscript{4} Dastur Komvar, Dastur Dikhani
The anguish of a section among the Rajput elites, the high degree of their antipathy towards the Maratha power and dominance in Rajasthan is quite evident and its overt manifestation can be visualized from Bijay Singh’s reaction when he came to know about the Maratha control over Delhi in 1789. Bijay Singh made it known to the Jaipur ruler about his intention of inviting Afghan ruler Taimur Shah and destroying Maratha power as none of the Muslim powers in north India is capable of defeating the Marathas. According to Bijay Singh Taimur Shah was dead against the Marathas. He wrote to the Afghan ruler that the Marathas were not only the enemy of Muslims but also of the Rajputs, and both Jaipur and Jodhpur would support the Afghan rulers’ campaign against the Marathas. This highly surcharged outburst against the Marathas is a testimony to conflicting and inconsistent perceptions of the Marathas as they are seen as enemies of the Rajputs and at the same time their invincible position in contemporary politics is given due recognition.

Economic implications of the Maratha Presence.

The Maratha incursion into Rajasthan and the stay of the Maratha forces in various parts of Rajasthan was not a happy experience for the local people. The economic strain caused by the Marathas affected almost all sections of the society. The economic strain which each of these incursions brought to the economy of the Rajput states is well documented. Maratha sardars were not so vigilant about plunder and atrocities committed by the invading Maratha army. Damages were done not only to the standing crops but to property in the towns and villages and there were forceful collection of money from the local people when the Maratha army was in desperate need of money due to the non payment or delayed payment of salaries to the troopers. The Rajput rulers wrote letters of protest to Peshwa objecting to the loot and plunder by the Maratha army in their territories which is evident from the Peshwa’s reply to Madho Singh’s letter in 1758. Madho Singh took exception to loot and plunder.
by the Maratha army in Jaipur territory.

In order to assess fully the implications of the Maratha presence in Rajasthan it would be pertinent to point out the economic strain brought to the state exchequer by way of the Maratha demand for payment of the amount promised to them in return for their support to the contenders for the throne along with tribute. The mutual dissensions among the Rajput rulers and succession disputes brought the Maratha involvement in the internal affairs of the Rajput. It was sought for by the Rajputs themselves, for the first time in 1734 to settle the contest for the gaddi of Bundi and thereafter in the succession disputes in Jaipur and Jodhpur. The support of the Marathas was obtained by promising to pay huge sum of money. The Rajput rulers were also coaxed into paying annual tribute to the Marathas.

Inability of the Rajputs to make these payments gave the Marathas a pretext of further military intervention to enforce collection of tribute and other dues which often resulted in the devastation of the countryside and ruination of the raiyat. This further compounded the financial difficulties of the Rajput rulers who were now faced with diminishing revenue collection due to decline in agricultural production. The growing financial crisis compelled the rulers to turn to the bankers for loans and resort to the practice of ijara of the khalisa parganas as a mode of repayment of loan to the bankers.

It is difficult to calculate the total burden of Maratha demand in terms of actual payments made to the Marathas by the Rajputs as there was always a gap between what the Marathas had demanded and the actual payment that the Marathas were able to collect. An attempt has been made here in the light of the information available in the sources to make an estimate of the financial obligations that the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur owed to the Marathas.

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1 Gwalior Kharita No.165, Magh Sudi, V.S. 1815/1758---- सीधी श्री महाराजकुमार श्री सवाई माधुर्या सीधी जी जोय श्री पंजीत मुख्य प्रधान श्री बाजाजी बाजी राव को आसीनताद व्यक्ता जेट ो का समाचार मले छे उठा को भला वाहित अपने आपको कागंसु आया समाचार अध्ययण छो लिखो छो जो देश मे फोज आयकर देश मुकु तुराठे दे ई वाले लिखी छे ........ जा

2 Singh, Dilbagh, State, Landlords and Peasants; op.cit. Rajasthan During the Eighteenth Century, Delhi 1990, P.131
The Marathas decided to support the cause of Madho Singh after he promised to pay a nazar of Rs 10 lakhs to the Peshwa. In 1750 the Marathas demanded an additional sum of Rs 2 lakhs as compensation for the slaughter of the Marathas in Jaipur city. In October 1753 the amount of outstanding dues stood at Rs 15.25 lakhs and Rs 1.25 lakh was to be paid to Raghunathrao, raising the amount to 16.50 lakhs. Out of this amount Rs 7.35 lakh was paid in cash, Rs 3 lakhs in hundis issued by the sahukars, leaving Rs 5.15 lakhs still due.

In 1755 Madho Singh agreed to pay Rs 5 lakhs in addition to the outstanding dues, but again failed to pay. In 1757 the Marathas raised their demand up to 40 to 50 lakhs but settled for Rs 11 lakhs out of which Rs 6 lakhs were paid down.

In 1758 Madho Singh was coerced into promising Rs 36 lakhs payable in four years. The current year's installment was enhanced by the addition of a nazar of Rs 3 lakhs. In 1759 the arrears from Jaipur were to the tune of Rs 12 lakhs for 1758 and Rs 9 lakhs for 17594. In 1765 Madho Singh paid the current installment of Rs 5 lakhs to Holkar and promised to issue hundis of the sahukars for the payment of the balance. In 1779 the Jaipur ruler Pratap Singh paid Rs 2 lakhs and promised a further sum of Rs 20 lakhs in installments, out of which only 7.5 lakh was paid in 1781. In 1784 the Jaipur ruler promised to pay Rs 21 lakhs but paid only Rs 3 lakhs in 1785. In 1786 the outstanding amount of tribute and other dues was calculated at Rs 63 lakhs. Pratap Singh agreed to pay Rs 11 lakhs immediately, Rs 10 lakhs were to be paid in six months time and Rs 20 lakhs were to be adjusted by transfer of some territory of Jaipur to the Marathas. The remaining 22 lakhs were to be covered by assignments on the revenues of the thikanas of the Jaipur nobles and jagirs. The first installment of Rs 11 lakhs was paid and the Maratha officers were

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1 Sarkar, JN; A History of Jaipur, Delhi, 1984, PP 236-38
2 Chithi, Asoj Vadi 3, V.S. 1811/1754, Statements from Maratha Papers
3 Khantia from Madho Singh to Malharrao Holkar, Falgun Vadi 7, V.S. 1813/1756
depute to collect the second installment of Rs 10 lakhs and assigned revenue of Rs 22 lakhs on thikanas and jagirs. However, no further payment was made to the Marathas. In 1790 Mahadji defeated the combined forces of Jaipur and Jodhpur. The Jaipur ruler agreed to pay Rs 17 lakhs but was unable to pay the entire amount. After victory at Patan and Merta over Jaipur and Jodhpur, Mahadji Shinde halted at several places collecting money from local chieftains and villagers.

The Maratha expeditions in Jaipur continued in 1790s to realize the promised amount. In 1800 Pratap Singh purchased peace with the Marathas by agreeing to pay Rs 6 lakhs within one month and Rs 3 lakhs after six months. Thus throughout the second half of the 18th century the Jaipur rulers were made to face the Maratha menace and claims for huge monetary payment.

The Maratha incursions not only strained the state exchequers but also had a devastating impact on the raiyat, jagirdars and the bhomias of the Jaipur state. The chithis and Amber records furnish valuable information which enable us to list the Maratha incursions in a sequence and point out their significance in terms of the economic strain which each of these incursions caused to the rural economy of the region.

The visitation of the Maratha army in Jaipur territory proved disastrous to the raiyat of parganas Gaji ka Thana, Chatsu, Nainwa and many other unspecified parganas due to the rackless plunder by the Maratha army. The amils of the affected parganas reported ruination of standing crop and flight of the raiyat from the villages. In 1751 the raiyat of pargana Chatsu bore the brunt of the plunder. In 1753 the amils of pargana sawai Jaipur, Chatsu

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1 See, Sindhia as Regent of Delhi, PP 45-58 Several Instances of Mahadj collecting money from local Rajput chiefs are mentioned in the Persian Newsletters. One of the letter on P. 45 reads “In every march of Mahadji Sindhia, Ambaji and Deshmukh with the fauj and guns used to go ahead and collect 2 or 3 lakhs from villages and garhis of Shekhawati and bring away grain and cattle and hostages for contributions”.


3 Chithi to the Amil pargana Chatsu Vaisakh Sudi, V.S. 1808/1751, Jeth Vadi 4, V.S. 1808/1751.
reported plundering of the villages by the Marathas which severely damaged cultivation. The ruler was further informed that the raiyat are unable to resume cultivation for want of resources\(^1\).

In 1754 the amils of parganas Sambhar, Naraina, Fagi, Narnaul, Pargpura, Bairath, Khatu, Malarna and Lalsot reported plunder of the villages by the Marathas. The amils were instructed to enforce surrender of one month's salary by all the jagirdars and the other state officials. The chaudharis and qanungos were required to pay their customary perquisites for one year in order to raise money to be paid to the Marathas. The state realized malba from the raiyat of all the Khalisa villages. Pargana Lalsot was the worst affected as the raiyat of the pargana had to give up cultivation for want of material support\(^2\).

Sawai Madho Singh in his letter of 1756 to Malharrao Holkar protested against the loot and burning of the villages of parganas Rampura, Malarna, Niwai, Lalsot, Chatsu, Fagi etc. He informed Holkar that as a result of the damage done to the cultivation his state suffered the loss of Rs 11 lakhs which was the expected revenue yield from these parganas. The jagirdars of these pargans were also badly affected\(^3\). In 1757 it was reported that the raiyat of parganas Chatsu, Niwai, Fagi etc are indigent and villages are depopulated on account of the ruination of these parganas by the Marathas\(^4\).

By 1758 the situation became alarming due to persistent famine conditions. Widespread damage to cultivation caused by the Marathas ruined the villages which had become depopulated. The raiyat were forced to migrate to Malwa to escape plunder by the Marathas. Famine conditions had already diminished the resources of the raiyat and they were overburded by the

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\(^1\) Chithi to the Amil pargana Chatsu Falgun Vadi, V.S. 1810/1753, pargana Sawai Jaipur, Magh Sudi 6, Chaitra Vadi 8, V.S. 1810/1753.


\(^3\) Kharita from Madho Singh to Malharrao Holkar, Falgun vadi 7, V.S. 1813/1756.

\(^4\) Chithi, Asoj Sudi, V.S. 1814/1757, Chithi to the Amil pargana chatsu, Asoi Vadi 2, V.S. 1814/1757.
additional taxes levied by the state to enhance revenue. In order to escape from all these hardships the raiyat left their villages. All attempts by the revenue officials to console the raiyat and encourage them to resettle in the villages which had been abandoned proved in vain. The raiyat were reluctant to return to their villages for fear of the Marathas.

The parganas Chatsu, Tonk, Fagi, Toda Rai singh, Pragpura, Lalsot, Niwai, Mauzabad, Naraina and Sawai Jaipur were affected by the Maratha inroads in 1759. Villages were plundered; standing crops were burnt and badly damaged by the Marathas who even did not spare cattle and agricultural implements. The Jaipur administration strictly prohibited the purchase of looted property from the Marathas and declared it a punishable offence.

The situation remained the same in the following year as cultivation declined in almost all the parganas and depopulation of villages was reported from all over the Jaipur territory. The trading activities also suffered due to the Maratha menace. Even the moderate Maratha presence in Jaipur territory from 1762 to 1765 affected the raiyat of parganas Mauzabad, Dausa, Gijgarh, Bahatri and Chatsu. Plunder and ruination of villages and capturing of the cattle by the Marathas were reported to the authorities of the Jaipur state. Depopulation of villages and decline in agriculture continued to be the marked features in the 1760s and 70s. In 1777 the Marathas plundered the villages of pargana Niwai and ruined the crops. The extent of the damage done to the

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1 Chithi to the Amils of all the Jaipur parganas, Asoj Sudi 12, V.S 1815/1758; Asoj Sudi 13, V.S 1815/1758 Chithi to the Amil pargana Mauzabad, Bhadon Vadi 6, V.S.1815/1758, Chithi to the Amil pargana Lalsot, Asarh Vadi 14, V.S 1815/1758 and Magh Sudi 12, V.S 1815/1758, Chithi, to the Amil of pargana Narnaul Posh Sudi 11, V.S 1815/1758.

2 Chithi, Chaitra Sudi 12, V.S. 1816/1759, Chithi, to the Amil pargana Chatsu, Chaitra Sudi 7, V.S 1816/1759 and Jeth vadi 5, V.S 1816/1759.

3 Chithi to the Amils of all the Jaipur parganas, Asarh Vadi, V.S 1817/1760; Chithi to the Amil pargana Bahatri, Asarh Sudi 15, V.S.1817/1760, Chithi to the Amil pargana Mauzabad, Kati Vadi 6, V.S 1817/1760.

4 Chithi to the Amil pargana Mauzabad, Sawan Sudi 9, V.S. 1819/1762; Amber Records, letter Vaisakh Sudi 12, V.S. 1819/1762.

5 Chithi, Sawan Sudi 11, V.S 1820/1763; Chithi, to the Amil pargana Chatsu, Asarh Vadi, V.S 1820/1763 and Asarh Vadi 3, V.S 1821/1764, Chithi, to the Amil pargana Niwai, Chaitra Vadi 7, V.S. 1822/1765; Chithi, Asarh Vadi 3, V.S. 1826/1769.
The economic implications of the Maratha inroads and their cumulative effect on almost all sections of the rural society are vividly depicted in a chithi document. In a letter addressed to the amils of parganas Sawai Jaipur, Khohri, Gaji ka Thana, Naraina, Niwai, Narnaul, Qasba Sawai Jaipur, Gaori, Chatsu, Tonk, Toda Rai singh, Toda Bhim, Dausa, Paonta, Pinayan, Pahari, Pargpur, Fagi, Bairath, Bahatri, Malarna, Mauzabad, Malpura, Ram Garh, Lalsot, Serpur, Udehi and Wazirpur the state lamented the depopulation of villages belonging to Khalisa and Jagir and miserable condition of the raiyat, bohras and other inhabitants due to the Maratha depredations. Progressive decline in the jama as well as the increasing inability of the state to realize revenue were acknowledged officially. The letter further laments the miserable condition of the jagirdars on account of their inability to receive any hasil and hence their failure to render any kind of service to the state. The amils were instructed to make efforts to rehabilitate as many jagir villages as possible through the initiatives of the jagirdars. The raiyat and the bohras were to be induced to make endeavors for the rehabilitation of the remaining villages and resumption of cultivation with the financial support of the bohras wherever it could be made available. The state also proposed the advancement of tagai (agricultural loan) to the raiyat in cases where the bohars were not available to make such investments in agricultural production.

1 Amber Records, letter dated Asoj Sudi 15, V.S. 1834/1777.
2 Sarkar, JN. History of Jaipur. PP. 270-313
3 Amber Records, letters Asarh Sudi 6, V.S. 1848/1791.
4 Chithi Asarh Vadi, V.S. 1817/1760.
Like Jaipur, the Maratha intervention in Jodhpur was also sought to resolve internal disputes. In 1748, Abhay Singh solicited Holkar’s help against his brother, Bakhat Singh by paying rupees 11 thousand per day as fauj kharch. Ram Singh deputed his representative Pandit Jagannath to negotiate the price of securing Maratha help either from Holkar or Shinde in 1751. He offered to pay expenses for a contingent of 10 to 12 thousand and agreed to pay two months expense in advance.

Bakhat Singh made a counter offer of rupees two lakhs to Holkar to neutralize him. The Maratha involvement in Jodhpur affairs proved costly as they imposed upon Jodhpur the obligation to pay regular tribute and other dues. In 1756, Bijay Singh accepted the Maratha demand for the regular payment of tribute at the rate of Rs 1.50 lakh per annum. Later on when Bijay Singh took over Godwad, he agreed to pay Rs 30 thousand per annum as its tribute which was to be paid only to Shinde. Bijay Singh tried his best to be regular in the payment of tribute Gwalier Kharita of 1769 from Mahadji Shinde to Bijay Singh confirmed the receipt of mamlat from Jodhpur up to 1768 and henceforth the same amount i.e. rupees 1.50 lakhs was to be paid to Shinde as tribute. In 1770 again Shinde acknowledged the receipt of mamlat amount for Jodhpur and Godwad. It seems that there was some delay in the payment of mamlat which is evident from Pandit Balarao’s letter of 1774. Similarly only half the amount of mamlat for the period 1772 to 1776 for Jodhpur and 1773 to 1777 for Godwad could be paid. The balance amount was to be paid later on. The amount paid to Shinde for the period 1778-1782 in regular installments was as follows:

The amount fixed for these five years was rupees 9 lakhs at the rate of rupees 1.80 lakhs per year. The remission given out of this amount was rupees

2 Gwalier-Jodhpur Kharita, Asarh Vadi 14, V.S. 1813/1756.
3 Gwalier-Jodhpur Kharita, Chaitra Vadi 5, V.S. 1829/1772.
4 Gwalier-Jodhpur Kharita, Jeth Sudi 5, V.S. 1826/1769.
5 Gwalier-Jodhpur Kharita, Chaitra Vadi 5, V.S. 1827/1770.
7 Gwalier-Jodhpur Kharita, Magh Vadi 5, V.S. 1838/1781.
2 lakhs\(^1\). The rest of the amount was paid partly in cash and partly in kind. Rupees 6 lakhs was paid in cash and one lakh in kind. The first installment was broken into two and paid in July, 1784 and February, 1785. One hundred and ninety seven camels were sent in lieu of one lakh. The entire payment could be made by 1786. Out of the mamlat dues for the next three years amounting to rupees 5.40 lakhs only rupees 1.50 lakh could be paid\(^2\). In 1790, the total outstanding amount which included mamlat, fauj Kharch, nazrana, darbar kharch etc stood at rupees 6 lakh\(^3\).

However, the payment remained pending due to persistent famine conditions. Bijay Singh was allowed to make part payment in the form of bullocks and camels which were to be supplied in the Deccan. Out of the lot, the supply of three hundred best quality camels was demanded in Poona for the exclusive use of the Peshwa\(^4\). The payment of amount due upto 1790 was made in the form of the supply of elephants, oxen and camels, the supply of which was arranged by the Jodhpur official Bhandari Manroop\(^5\).

The monetary obligation imposed upon Bijay Singh by Mahadji Shinde after the battle of Patan was too burdensome. He was coerced into agreeing to pay rupees 60 lakhs as war expenses in addition to the usual payment of annual tribute out of which only rupees 11.63 lakhs were remitted to Shinde during 1790-91 in the forms of cash, hundis and kind. In 1792, Bijay Singh handed over parganas Merta, Didwana and Nawa to Shinde to adjust the payment of rupees 1.64 lakhs due to him. Thus the actual payments made in installments never matched the amount claimed by the Marathas. But whatever amount was paid, it was an unbearable burden on the financial resources of the state. The financial loss caused to the state by way of plunder, forced collection, devastation of land and destruction of crops and fodder cannot be

\(^1\) Gwalier-Jodhpur Kharita, Vaisakh Sudi 13, V.S. 1841/1784.  
\(^2\) Gwalier-Jodhpur Kharita, Aghan Sudi 1, V.S. 1843/1786.  
\(^3\) Gwalier-Jodhpur Kharita, Posh Sudi 1, V.S. 1847/1790.  
\(^4\) Gwalier-Jodhpur Kharita, Bhadon Sudi 12, V.S. 1848/1791.  
\(^5\) Gwalier-Jodhpur Kharita, Posh Sudi 13, V.S. 1848/1791.
estimated for want of detailed information. Bijay Singh, in order to meet the Maratha demands, levied extra taxes on the raiyat and the jagirdars which caused discontentment among the jagirdars and the raiyat. Financial crisis of the Jodhpur state in certain periods of time such as between 1755 to 1759 was so acute that it became difficult to arrange money even to take care of routine expenditure. The situation was so alarming that Bijay Singh could not afford oil for lightning lamps in the evening for holding his darbar. His personal attendants Narsingh Das Bhandari was instructed to make his appearance before the ruler and salute him to indicate that the supply of oil has been arranged and the court could be held.

The secret understanding between the two was that he would not show up in the event of non availability of oil for the lighting. The financial strain forced the ruler to leave his fort palace residence and shift to a smaller palace in the valley.

Damages done to the standing crops by the invading Maratha army, plunder of property in towns and villages and forceful collection of money from the local people whenever the Maratha army was in desperate need of money created widespread hardships to the people. Widespread desolation of the countryside, acute poverty of the raiyat due to the Maratha presence and growing inability of the Rajput rulers to provide relief or arrange resources for agrarian restoration, all these facts are testified to by contemporary sources. The unprecedented growth of revenue farming in Rajasthan during the second half of the eighteenth century is also attributed to the growing pressure of the Marathas for the tribute payment. The undercurrent of resentment against the Marathas are evident from measures adopted by the Rajput states prohibiting the raiyat all around not to buy any property movable or unmovable acquired by the Marathas by way of plunder. The economic hardship caused to the Rajput rulers by exorbitant Maratha demands for tribute and war indemnity made them

\[\text{1 Marwar Ri Khyat, P41 and 48}\]
desperate. The anguish of a section among the Rajput elites, their growing antipathy towards the Maratha power and dominance is quite evident.