The rise of twentieth century brought the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy. A concern with language has since then become the characteristic feature of contemporary philosophy. Analysis of language is thus taken as a method to solve (or to dissolve, as Wittgenstein said) philosophical problems which perplexed all the great philosophical minds of the past. But analysis of language as a philosophical method though important could not deliver the goods which it was expected to. Philosophy practiced as linguistic analysis becomes virtually confined to the mere analysis of concepts and words without having much bearing on wider philosophical issues. This is why philosophers these days are more and more critical of the practice of linguistic philosophy. There is a growing realization among the philosophers that language can be taken not only as a tool to solve philosophical problems but can also be a tool in terms of which we can understand the traditional philosophical problems in a new way. In the light of this new understanding we may be able to restructure these problems and restate them in the idiom of analytic philosophy. This, in other words, is to give a new meaning to the traditional philosophical issues in the light of philosophical analysis.

Among the modern analytical philosophers Hilary Putnam
is eminently known for his work in philosophy of language that explicitly addresses the wider issues of traditional philosophy. It is through his work on language that the entire realism has been conceived and restated in a new way. In this way, the traditional conception of realism is now approached in a new direction. This becomes evident when we see that it offers a perspective which enables us to understand the debate between realism and anti-realism in a much more comprehensive way so that we can be aware of both the strong and weak aspects of these two contrasting frameworks. This new approach to realism consists of representing realism in the light of the following two features. Firstly, realism is conceived in the form of an empirical hypothesis which, in actual terms, implies an explanatory framework. Secondly, this realist hypothesis intimately depends on the notion of reference. These are the two central features that indeed make Putnam's philosophy of language unique in contemporary analytic philosophy.

This uniqueness of Putnam's position becomes apparent if we take into the account the controversy that centers around realism in contemporary writings. With the emergence of linguistic analysis, the intimate relation between concepts like reference and truth on the one hand, and realism on the other hand, has been recognized to play a very important role in our understanding of the nature of realism. However, contemporary philosophers are not in agreement in this regard. On the one hand, there are philosophers like Devitt, who take realism to be
a metaphysical theory with no semantico-epistemological features. He thus maintains that reference and truth have no role to play in our discussion of realism. On the other hand, there are philosophers like Quine, Davidson and others who want to eliminate the concept of reference altogether. Philosophers of this persuasion maintain that our talk of realism does not depend on the concept of reference. On the contrary, they maintain that the concept of reference makes our talk of realism hazy. The reason is, the concept of reference forms an integral part of our 'representational' world-view. These philosophers further hold this 'representational' picture to be responsible for the problems associated with traditional (metaphysical) realism. Thus in their attempt to overcome the problems rising from a 'representational' picture they eliminate the concept of reference totally. Quine, while giving up the representational picture, maintains that reference is inscrutable in nature and should be given up. In a like manner, Davidson maintains that, "[I]t is good to be rid of representations, and with them the correspondence theory of truth . .."* (Davidson, 1989, 165-6). Thus both these philosophers attribute the problem of traditional realism to its insistence that there exists a unique reference relation between our words and the objects outside. This reference again ensures the correspondence relation which serves as the basis of the traditional realist notion of truth. So in their attempt to overcome the problem resulting from the correspondence theory of truth, they give up the notion of reference altogether. But the elimination of this notion of
reference invites a host of problems for both Quine and Davidson. As a result, Quine is forced to conclude that translation becomes indeterminate. This conclusion is counter intuitive since for all practical purposes we carry on with translation and interpretation inspite of this historic pronouncement of Quine, The same is equally true of Davidson. Since sameness in reference assignment forms the basis of all translation and interpretation, Davidson's rejection of the concept of reference makes it very difficult for him to account for these facts about our rational exercise.

Putnam's view differs from both these approaches to the relation between reference and realism. Contrary to Devitt, he maintains that realism enjoys a very intimate relation with reference. Our concept of reference in fact shapes the nature of our realism to a great extent. But to accept this is not to accept the metaphysical (traditional) realist concept of unique reference. Unlike Davidson and Quine, Putnam does not think that an elimination of the concept of reference is the only way out of the erroneous notion of unique reference of the metaphysical realist. It does not warrant such elimination either. Putnam's philosophy assumes uniqueness in presenting a novel way in which realism can be shown to depend on its notion of reference. Perhaps it will be more appropriate to say that an interplay between those two has been made possible because of Putnam's new approach to reference and realism. In so doing, he also provides us with deeper understanding into the age old problem of realism.
Introduction

The ideas expressed above spell out the main theme of this research. To put it in specific terms, its objective is to establish that Putnam's philosophy of language offers a framework that allows an interplay between reference and realism, the outcome of which offers a new conception of realism.

This proposed thesis, however, may not be acceptable to all. The idea that there is an interplay between reference and realism may be seriously questioned on the consideration that this idea is merely a part of a transitory phase in Putnam's philosophy. The various major shifts in Putnam's philosophical position strongly suggest that there cannot be any such thematic continuity as expressed in the idea of interplay between reference and realism. In fact, it is pointed out that Putnam's views on both reference and realism do not express any uniformity. In this respect it may be specially mentioned that there is a widespread belief among interpreters of Putnam that he has converted from hard core realism to anti-realism. Now in view of these drastic changes a serious doubt can be raised against the very consistency of the basic theme of the proposed research. Hence along with the objective stated earlier, the second objective of the thesis is to establish that there is a uniformity in Putnam's views on realism and reference. To establish the second objective is necessary in order to establish the first one.
To pursue the second objective, this thesis will question and refute the view which holds that there is a drastic change in Putnam's position. Certainly, Putnam has changed his position on the notion of realism as well as on reference, but amidst all these changes there is also an underlying unity in his philosophy. To establish this, Putnam's entire philosophy of language needs to be reconstructed. Accordingly, his philosophy of language may be divided into three phases. Thus, the first phase of Putnam refers to the period of his philosophizing till 1975. This phase is marked by an overt concern with the problem of reference in the context of the semantic framework. The underlying realist intuitions of this theory of reference though not explicitly stated, can easily be inferred from a detailed analysis of this theory. The second phase, which lasts for a comparatively shorter span, refers mainly to Putnam's John Locke Lectures, 1976 and also includes his illuminating article, "Reference and Understanding" (1978a). This phase consists of his attempt to explicate realism as an empirical hypothesis to explain the success of science. Reference, however, is not given up at this level. On the other hand, it is understood in the broader scheme of explanatory (empirical) realism. The concept of reference is conceived here as a causal-explanatory one constituting one of the pillars of the empirical hypothesis of realism. The third and the final phase points to the shaping of his internal realism which starts in the later phase of 1976 with his "Realism and Reason" (1978b). Internal realism provides a transcendental defense of realism formulated in the form of an
abductive argument which takes reference as a fact. This division in Putnam's writings may appear as purely chronological in nature. But it will be argued in this thesis that this division is based on conceptual consideration. All these above mentioned phases have a common theme; they all try to depict the interplay between reference and realism. This interplay is represented through different routes and in varying degrees in these three different phases. This fact therefore can be taken as the basis for our division of Putnam's entire philosophical writings into these three phases.

Having made this division of Putnam's philosophy into three phases, our task now is, as stated in the second objective, to show a continuity between these allegedly intermittent stages of Putnam. It will be carried out by demonstrating that the problem of reference, with which Putnam is overtly concerned in his early period remains his major concern in his later period of internal realism. This thesis thus tries to establish that reference remains central throughout the different phases of Putnam's philosophy. In addition, an attempt will also be made to work out the presuppositions of Putnam's entire philosophy of language in order to show that the different phases share some common basic ideas. Both these points refer to the existence of uniformity in Putnam's work.

The thesis that reference remains central to all the phases of Putnam's writings has significant bearing on the nature
of his realism. The centrality of reference is defined here in terms of the notion of invariance or constancy of reference. This means, to put in a nutshell, that it is in the light of this notion of invariant reference that all the other notions of Putnam's different frameworks assume relevance. The nature of realism, likewise, depends to a great extent on this invariance of reference. The centrality of reference thus shapes the course of the interplay between reference and realism at all these different phases of Putnam. With this brief introduction we now lay out the chapter plan of this thesis in order to show how the centrality of reference and the ensuing interplay between reference and realism in Putnam's work is worked out.

The Structure of the Thesis

The first phase of Putnam's philosophy forms the subject matter of the first chapter of this thesis, entitled, "The Theory of Reference". Here Putnam takes reference as a purely semantic notion. In this phase, Putnam develops his new or causal theory of reference which presents his polemic against the traditional theory of meaning. This phase does not contain any detailed discussion of realism. But the underlying realist intuitions can easily be brought out from a detailed discussion of his semantic theory of reference. The centrality of reference in this phase may be termed semantic centrality. This is because the invariance that explicates the nature of reference here and from which the above mentioned centrality is derived, is semantic
in nature. The theme of this chapter is dealt with in two sections. The first section devotes itself to the question of centrality in a semantic framework. In this respect the lacuna of the sense centrality, of the traditional theory of meaning will be examined. The second section makes explicit the underlying realist intuitions of Putnam's new theory of reference. This underlines our attempt to show that an interplay between reference and realism can be traced even in this early phase of Putnam's work.

The concept of invariance, when understood in a semantic framework, gets related to the criteria or conditions of applicability of a term/word. A component of a semantic scheme will be called invariant when it supplies the criteria of applicability. In other words, when it (that particular component, viz., sense or reference) serves as the ultimate arbiter in applicability. We will see that in the framework of traditional theory, an invariant position has been ascribed to sense rather than to reference. It is the sameness of sense that finally decides the question regarding semantic sameness. The sense of a term gives us the route to its referent. It thus provides the criteria for identity as well as the applicability of the term. Two terms may not share the same meaning inspite of having the same referents. For example, 'morning star' and 'evening star' are not considered synonymous or as having the same meaning inspite of the fact that both of them have the same referent. The reason is, they represent two different routes to
the same object, namely, Venus. This difference is reflected in belief contexts also as these two terms cannot be interchanged in such contexts without affecting the truth-value of the belief statement.

Putnam's reformulation of the traditional theory shows that this invariance of sense in the traditional theory results in a mentalistic and individualistic thesis. It is mentalistic as our mental states (psychological states) of grasping the meaning (or the sense) of a term determines the intension and thereby the extension of the term. The individualistic nature of the traditional theory is implied by its mentalism and also by its theory of language understanding. Understanding or semantic competence is a matter of pure knowledge in this framework. Both these jointly imply the individualism; a person can learn the meaning of a term/word in the privacy of his own mental state without depending on any external factor or any other speaker. These two features of the traditional theory invite a number of problems for it. It fails to incorporate the results of scientific change; it also fails to account for the abnormal members of a class. In short, it fails to be a proper semantic theory of language since it cannot explain our talk about counterfactual situations.

Putnam's theory, on the other hand, is an attempt to incorporate all these phenomena. Reference is considered invariant in this semantic framework as it supplies the criteria
for sameness. The causal theory of reference maintains that the reference (and the meaning) of a term is determined not by any conceptual content but by a causal chain that attaches a present use of a term with the initial introductory event when the term was dubbed onto the object for the first time. The concepts of paradigm or the sample used in the initial dubbing ceremony and causal chain running through the different generations assume utmost importance here. The causal chain points to the social nature of language which is captured in Putnam's concept of 'linguistic division of labor'. The concept of paradigm implies the contribution of the environment to our language. It also signifies, as will be made explicit in our fifth chapter, the humanistic perspective of our language. The causal theory of reference along with its concept of 'linguistic division of labor' points to the existence of trans-theoretic reference. It thus implies convergence which serves as the strongest realist intuition of Putnam in both his early and later phases. In addition to it/ the underlying realism of this phase implies Putnam's faith in the extra-theoretic notions of truth and reference. These two notions are given up in the later phases of Putnam.

The second chapter of this thesis, entitled, "From Reference to Realism", points to a transitory period of Putnam's writings where his focus is shifted from purely semantic issues to the wider issue of realism. Reference is viewed from a different perspective — from its contribution to the empirical
hypothesis of realism envisaged to explain the success of science. Reference is given a causal-explanatory explication here. This phase also shows how intimately reference is related to truth. This observation thus serves the basis for the main premise of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism, which says that the notion of a determinate reference supplies the support to the entire realist hypothesis. Another significant feature of this phase is Putnam's pronouncement that the causal-explanatory hypothesis of realism is interest-relative in nature. Reference, likewise is considered interest-relative here. This interest-relativity is derived from the interest-relativity of the very notion of explanation. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section delineates the nature of the causal-explanatory hypothesis of realism. The second section deals with causal-explanatory notions of truth and reference that form pillars of this empirical realist hypothesis. In the third section, the interest-relative nature of this hypothesis as well as of its two constituents will be discussed.

The significance of this phase lies in the fact that it is the forerunner of the internal realism of Putnam's later phase. It clarifies Putnam's underlying intentions for shifting from strong realism involving the extra theoretic notions of truth and reference to the moderate position of internal realism. Explanatory reference, Putnam observes, might be achieved through the physicalistic theory of reference also. That is how Field
and Devitt explain explanatory reference. Putnam, however, realizes the implicit incoherence of such an absolutist notion. This is because Putnam accepts the conclusion of Garfinkel that explanation by its very nature is a 'interest-relative' concept. It is essentially tied with its context as understood in the wider sense. Explanatory reference in a like manner is interest-relative. As Putnam clarifies in his next phase that reference is essentially related to our 'referential intentions'. The acceptance of this 'interest-relativity' of reference reflects Putnam's awareness of the problems of the extra-theoretic notions of truth and reference. It prompts him to consider the epistemological implications of the extra-theoretic notions of truth and reference needed for the world picture of metaphysical realism. The results of this deliberation of Putnam is reflected in his model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism. The model-theoretic argument, to put in a nutshell, maintains that since reference is indeterminate in nature, the unique correspondence that the metaphysical realist assumes is not achievable.

The third chapter entitled, "Reference and Internal Realism: Towards the Untenability of Metaphysical Realism", deals with the final phase of Putnam's writings. This phase will be further discussed in our fourth chapter. This phase of Putnam consists of his explication of his notion of internal realism. Internal realism can be explicated in two ways: (1) as an option offered against the problems arising from metaphysical realism.
These problems, as we have already seen, are made explicit by his model-theoretic arguments. (2) by contrasting it with anti-realism and cultural relativism, that is, with views that are often confused with internal realism. The third chapter is devoted to the first objective, while the fourth chapter takes care of the second objective. In third third chapter, Putnam's arguments develop in three steps. The first step shows how the metaphysical realist notion of truth as correspondence depends on its idea of reference. The notion of a unique, determinate referential relation serves as the basis of the total metaphysical realist picture. The second step consists of showing that no such unique, determinate relation is possible. The reason is, in order to accept such a unique relation, we have to accept an extra agent in addition to the set of operational and theoretical constraints which would identify the ‘intended’ (and thus unique) reference relation. Putnam's model-theoretic arguments, which are the result of the extension of the implications of Löwenheim-Skolem theorem to the field of philosophy of language, show that no such extra agent is available to a metaphysical realist. The third and final step consists in providing a demonstration of the implications of his model-theoretic arguments. Putnam's 'Brains in a Vat' argument is presented as a demonstration of his reductio against the metaphysical realist premises. This argument also shows the inefficiency of the proposal of the metaphysical realist that the causal chain fixes the reference and thus makes reference determinate.
The third chapter thus is divided into three sections. The first section enumerates the principal tenets of metaphysical realism in order to explicate how the unique referential relation serves as the basis of such a picture. The second section presents a critical exposition of Putnam's model-theoretic arguments and provides Putnam's 'Brains in a Vat' argument as a demonstration of this. The third section provides a brief outline of internal realism.

In continuation with the previous chapter, our fourth chapter, entitled, "Internal Realism, Anti-Realism and Cultural Relativism", further discusses the final phase of Putnam. Here internal realism is differentiated from anti-realism and cultural relativism. The difference between internal realism and anti-realism, the theme of the first section of this chapter, lies in the fact that internal realism, with its concept of objectivity, as implied by its notion of truth as the idealization of justification, surpasses the mere verifiability of anti-realism. Putnam's notion of truth again differentiates internal realism from cultural relativism. This will be discussed in the second section of this chapter. Cultural relativism holds that whatever is justified by a culture is true for that culture. Putnam does not accept this extreme conventionalism. His internal realism accepts that there are some facts to be discovered. This implies the objectivity of internal realism and it thereby underlines its difference from
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cultural relativism.

In both these chapters, viz., the third and the fourth, reference remains central to Putnam's discussion. In the third chapter, it is reflected in the fact that the metaphysical realist notion of reference is the main target of Putnam's attack as represented in the model-theoretic arguments. In the fourth chapter also, reference retains centrality though in an indirect way. In our discussion of the relation between internal realism and anti-realism, we have seen that the anti-realist theory of meaning gets exhausted in its verificationism. On the other hand, for Putnam, verificationism is accepted only as providing the theory of language understanding. But this does not exhaust his entire semantic theory. Theory of reference along with its causal mechanism is retained as a theory of language functioning. This mechanism makes available correspondence relations (though not of the unique nature) needed for the objectivity in Putnam's internal realist notion of truth. Objectivity, thus, is made available by Putnam's empirical theory of reference as incorporated in his internal realism.

The fifth chapter, entitled, "Unity in Putnam: Through Reference", is sharply different from the other four chapters in its focus. The first four chapters together try to give an exposition of Putnam's philosophy as developed in the course of his three phases. The focus of the final chapter, on the other hand, may be termed as reflective. This chapter tries to
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delineate, in explicit terms, how reference remains central in all the different phases of Putnam and how that centrality can be taken as evidence for the continuity between the different phases of Putnam. * It thus points to the uniformity in Putnam's views on reference and realism as explicated in the different phases of Putnam. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the justification of the centrality of reference in Putnam's work. This section is further divided into two subsections, one dealing with external justification and the other dealing with notional justification. In the second section of this chapter we will work out two presuppositions that regulate Putnam's entire writing in varying degrees. The question of how reference is considered central in the different phases of Putnam is dealt with in the external justification of the centrality of reference. Here the reasons that prompt Putnam to ascribe centrality to reference during his various philosophical persuasions will be enumerated. In this respect, a methodological distinction between presupposition and reason is made. All the different reasons for Putnam's ascription of centrality to reference are guided by a single presupposition, namely, the principle of benefit of doubt. This principle therefore can be taken as a presupposition of Putnam's entire philosophy of language. The second section of the fifth chapter will give a detailed analysis of this principle and of its functioning as the presupposition of all the different phases of Putnam.
The notional justification of the centrality of reference shows that apart from maintaining the centrality of reference, Putnam also retains the same notion of reference throughout all his different phases. This notion of reference can be explained with the help of the notion of invariance. Invariance, on the one hand, explicates the notion of reference and on the other it explains or provides internal defense to the centrality of reference. Thus it will be noted that all the three most crucial concepts of the three different phases of Putnam, viz., the conditions of the semantic applicability of a name/term of his first phase, the causal-explanation of the second phase and interpretation as rational exercise of his final phase assume significance in relation to this invariant nature of reference. The invariant nature of reference thus plays a crucial role in explicating the continuity and the ensuing unity in Putnam's philosophy. The invariance of reference that is involved in the first phase, due to its focus on semantics, can be called semantic invariance, that of the second phase may be called explanatory invariance and that of the final phase may be called empirical invariance. It is called empirical as here the semantic and explanatory invariances of first two phases are placed within a conceptual scheme. The seeming absolute invariance of the first phase thus makes way for non absolute invariance of the later phases. This observation is crucial from the point of view of the present thesis as this point gives rise to the charge of discontinuity in Putnam philosophy of language. Critics (namely Devitt, Hacking etc.) maintain that by shifting
from absolute invariance to non absolute invariance in his notion of reference, Putnam also shifts from full blown realism to anti-realism or nominalism. This objection can be answered in the light of the first objective of this thesis, namely, the interplay between reference and realism. That is to say, in order to reply to this charge, the interplay that exists between reference and realism in the different phases of Putnam needs to be studied closely. Such a study will help us identify the realist intuitions of his first phase in his later phase of internal realism. This also expresses the viability of the claim that internal realism is still a realism, though of a moderate nature. Our conclusion, thus, consists of a discussion of the interplay between reference and realism in Putnam. In this respect, it will be argued that the presence of the interplay between reference and realism at the final phase of Putnam ensures the presence of realism at this phase of internal realism.