PART II
The Sanskrit Text of Prabhācandra with English Translation and Exhaustive Notes

The Prameyakamalamārtanda written by Prabhācandra is the commentary on the Parikṣāmukha by Māṇikyanandin, who was the first writer who condensed the subject in the form of aphorisms taking materials from Akalaṅka’s works.

This part deals with the translation of the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda in the Prameyakamalamārtanda by Prabhācandra.⁽¹⁾
Pūrvapakṣa in the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda in the Prameyakamalamārtanda by Prabhācandra:

„nānau cānunām ayahśalākākalpatvenānyonyam sambandhābhāvatah
sthūlādipratītībhṛantatvāt katham tadvāṣṭāt tatsvabhāvo bhāvaḥ syāt? tathā hi—
sambandho ’ṛthānām pārayatraṅyalaksanō vā syāt, rūpaślesalaksanō vā syāt?
prathamaṇapakṣe kim asau nispānayoḥ sambandhinoḥ syāt, anispānayoḥ vā? na
tāvad anispānayoḥ; svārūpasyaivaḥ sattvāt saśasvavaiśāṇavat. nispānayoḥ ca
pārayatraṅyābhāvād asambandha eva. uktaḥ ca—

„pārayatraṅyam hi sambandhaḥ siddhē kā pārayatrataḥ,
tasmāt sarvasya bhāvasya sambandho nāsti tattvataḥ. //1//”

[Sambandhaparikṣā]

nāpi rūpaślesalaksanō ’sau; sambandhinor dvīte rūpaślesavirūdhaḥ. tayor
aikye vā sutarām sambandhābhāvah, sambandhinor abhāve sambandhāyogyat
dviṣṭhatvāt tasya. atha nairantarayam tayo rūpaśleṣaḥ; na; asyantaralarbhāva-
rūpatvena’atāttvikatvāt sambandharūpatvāyogaḥ. nirantaratāyāś ca sambandha-
rūpatve sāntaratāpi katham sambandho na syāt?

< Translation >

Well, the notion of a whole (consisting of parts) and so on is an illusion, because atoms have no relation among one another as they are like minute particles of iron; accordingly, how can something which is of the nature of that (the whole) be a positive entity (bhāva)? It can be put as follows: (If there is a relation, then) the relation of things may be either of the nature of dependence (pārayatraṅya) or of the nature of amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaśleṣa)? In the former case, (we have to ask) whether it (pārayatraṅya) exist between two already produced
relata (sambandhin) or between two unproduced relata (sambandhin)? It (pāratantrya) cannot be said to exist between two unproduced relata (sambandhin), because the very form (of the two unproduced relata) is non-existent like the horns of a hare and a horse. And, since there is no dependence (pāratantrya) in the case of two already produced relata (sambandhin) (independent of one another), obviously there is no relation.

(Therefore,) it is said (by Dharmakirti) as follows:

Indeed, a relation may be ‘dependency’ (pāratantrya), but if the relata are already produced, where is the question of dependency (paratantratā)? Therefore, in reality (tattvātās), there is nothing such as a positive entity (bhāva) called ‘relation (sambandha)’.

Nor can it (sambandha) be taken as of the nature of amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaśleṣa); because if the relata are two distinct things (independent of each other), the amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaśleṣa) is contradictory to its own idea. If, however, the two relata merge in one, (obviously) the relation does not exist. Because there can be no relation in the absence of two relata since a relation has to exist in two things.

[Objection]: Well, the amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaśleṣa) of the two relata is to be understood as the state of having no gap between two relata (nairantarya).

[Reply]: It is incorrect. Because, in this case, it (nairantarya) will become of the nature of the absence of the gap (between two things) and as such it (nairantarya) cannot be real. And consequently it (nairantarya) cannot be treated as a relation lying between two things. Moreover, if the state of having no gap between two things (nirantaratā) is treated as a relation, then why not the state of having the gap?
Moreover, we want to know whether this amalgamation (of the forms of the things) is total or partial. If the amalgamation is treated as total, then the whole consisting of the atoms will be only one atom. If the amalgamation is treated as partial, then we want to know whether the parts (of the relata) should be treated as identical with it (the relatum) or different from it (the relatum). If they (the parts) are identical with the relata, there is no amalgamation (rupasleśa) with the parts; since there is the absence of the parts (that is to say, the parts do not exist). Further, if they (the parts) are different from the relata, again we want to know whether the atoms have total amalgamation (rupasleśa) with these parts or partial amalgamation; and in this ways the same contingency will continue leading to endless regression.

(Therefore,) it is said (by Dharmakīrti) as follows:

If the relation is treated as the amalgamation of two forms of the things (rupasleśa), then how is it possible as long as the relata are
two? Therefore, ir-reality (tattvatas), there is no 'relation' among things which are distinct by nature. //2//

\[\text{kiñ ca, paro 'peksaiva sambandhah, tasya dvisthatvāt. tām cāpeksate bhāvaḥ svaṣyaḥ san, asan vā? na tāvad asan; apeksādhamśrasayatvavirodhāt kharāśirgavat. nāpi san; sarvanirāśamsatvāt(2), anyathā sattvavirodhāt. tan na parāpeksā nāma yad rūpaḥ sambandhah siddhyet. uktan ca —}\

"parāpeksā hi sambandhah so 'san katham apeksate.\

sams ca sarvanirāśamso bhāvaḥ katham apeksate. //3//"

[Sambandhaparikṣā]

< Translation >

Moreover, if a relation is, at all, accepted, it should be of alone the nature of 'dependency' on something else (parāpeksā), because it lies between two things. (We want to know) whether an entity (bhāva) depends on it (sambandha), itself being present (, or existent) or without being present. You cannot say that the entity depends upon the relation without being present, because it cannot be the locus (abode) of the property of being dependent (, or dependency); as the horn of a mule (cannot be the locus of any dependency). Nor can it (the entity) depend on something (relation) itself being existent, because the entity (independent of the relation) has already come into being without expectancy (of anything else); otherwise it cannot be said that it has come into being, leading to contradiction. Therefore, there is something like 'dependency', had it been there, it could have been a 'relation'.

Therefore, it is said (by Dharmakirti) as follows:

Indeed, a relation could have been 'dependency' (of one thing on
the other) (parāpeksā), but how can the non-existence (asat) require (or depend on) the other? How even an existent entity (bhāva) can require (or depend on) another without being expectant of other? //3//

\[kāṇ ca, asau sambandhaḥ sambandhibhyāṁ bhinnah, abhinno vā? yady abhinnaḥ; taddā sambandhināv eva na sambandhaḥ kaścit, sa eva vā na tāv iti. bhinnas cet; sambandhinau kevalau kathaṁ sambadhau(ddhau) syātām?\]

\[bhavatu vā sambandho 'ṛthāntaram; tathāpi tenaikena sambandhena saha dvayoh sambandhinoḥ kaḥ sambandhaḥ? yathā sambandhinor yathoktadoṣān na kaścit sambandhas tathātrāpi. tenānayoh sambandhāntarābhhyupagame cānavasthā syāt tatrāpi sambandhāntarānuṣaṅgāt. tan na sambandhinoḥ sambandhabuddhir vāstavi tadvyatirekenānyasya sambandhāsyaṃsambhavāt. tad uktam —\]

\["dvayor ekābhīsambandhāt sambandho yadi taddvayoh, kah sambandho 'navasthā ca na sambandhamatis tathā. //4//\]

< Translation >

Moreover, we would like to know whether the proposed relation is different from the two relata or identical with them. If you say that it is identical with them, then the proposed relation is not different from the relation and there is nothing extra called relation. Or, there is only that proposed relation and not the relata If it is different from them, then the two relata are to be treated as independent of each other and in-the case how can they be called related?

Or, let the relation be an entity different from the two relata, still with that single relation what can be the relation of the two relata? As there can be no relation between two relata on account of the defect pointed out above, on the same
ground there can be no relation between the proposed relation and the relata. Therefore, if you admit another relation between the relation and the two relata, it will lead to endless regression, because there too you will have to postulate another relation, again and again. Therefore, the comprehension (buddhi) that the relation lies between the two relata is not real, because there is nothing called relation more than the two relata.

Therefore, it is said (by Dharmakīrti) as follows:

If on account of the relationship with one entity called relation you say there is a relation between the two relata, we would like to know what the relation is between the relation and the two relata. Not only that, if this is accepted, it will lead to endless regression. Thus, the understanding of a relation is not real. //4//

\[\text{tataḥ} \]

\[\text{tau ca bhāvau tadanyāś ca sarve te svātmani sthitāḥ,} \]

\[\text{ity amiśrāḥ svayaṃ bhāvās tān miśrayati kalpanā.} \ //5//''\]

[Sambandhaparikṣā]

\[\text{tau ca bhāvau sambandhinau tābhyaṃ anyāś ca sambandhah sarve te svātmani svasvarūpe sthitāḥ. tenāmiśrā vyāvṛttasvarūpāḥ svayaṃ bhāvās tathāpi tān miśrayati yojayati kalpanā.} \]

< Translation >

Therefore,

The two relata (bhāva) and what you call additional relation are nothing but the own forms (of the two relata). Therefore, the entities (bhāva) are mutually exclusive of one another and it is the
imagination \( (kalpanā) \) that causes them to appear as related. //5//

The two relata \( (bhāva) \) and additional appearance called relation, all these exist in the own forms (of the relata). Therefore, the entities \( (bhāva) \) are distinct by themselves. Yet, the imagination \( (kalpanā) \) mixes them, that is to say, it causes us to know them to be related.

\[\text{ata eva tadvāstavasambandhābhāve 'pi tām eva kalpanām anurundhānair vyavahrthbir bhāvanām bheda 'nyāpohas tasya pratyāyanāya kriyākārakādi-vācinaḥ sabdāḥ prayaojyante} \]
\[ \text{— 'devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām daṇḍena' ity ādayaḥ. na khalu kārakānāṃ kriyāyā sambandho 'stī; kṣāṇikatvena kriyākāle kārakānāṃ asambhavat. uktai ca} \]

\[ \text{“tām eva ca anurundhānaiḥ kriyākārakavācinaḥ, bhāva-bheda-pratity-arthaṃ samyojyante abhidhayakāḥ. //6//”} \]

\[\text{[Sambandhāparikṣā]}\]

< Translation >

This is why in spite of the absence of any relation in reality, only on the basis of imagination \( (kalpanā) \), the speakers use sentences like “O Devadatta, please drive the white cow with your stick” and so on, which express the meanings of notions like the action \( (kriyā) \), its related factors \( (kāraka) \) (i. e. agent, object etc.) and so on in order to convey the difference from the different \( (anyāpoha) \) which is nothing but the difference of the positive entities alone. In reality there is no relation between an action \( (kriyā) \) and a related factors \( (kāraka) \), because of momentariness \( (kṣāṇikatva) \) at the time of an action \( (kriyā) \) there can be no its related factors \( (kāraka) \).

Therefore, it is said (by Dharmakirti) as follows:

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And, following that imagination (kalpanā), the words expressive of the action and its related factors are constructed in order to cause the knowledge of distinctions of the entities. //6//

\[
kāryakāraṇabhāvas tarhi sambandho bhāvisyatī; ity apy asamīcinām;
\]

\[
kāryakāraṇayor asahabhāvatā tasyāpi dvīṣṭhasyāsambhavāt. na khalu kāraṇakāle
\]

\[
kāryaṃ takāle vā kāraṇam asti, tulyakālam kāryakāraṇabhāvānupapateḥ
\]

\[
savyetaragoviśānavat. tan na sambnadhinau sahabhāvinau vidyate yenānayor
\]

\[
vartamāno 'sau sambandhāḥ syāt. adviṣṭhe ca bhāve sambandhatānupapannāvā.
\]

< Translation >

[Objection]: In that case, let the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva) be a relation.

[Reply]: This is not proper, either. Because both the cause and the effect do not exist together and so the cause and effect relationship can also not be treated as a relation since it does not satisfy the requirement of existing in two entities. There is no effect at the time of the cause, nor there is the cause at the time of the effect; if they are at one and the same time, there cannot exist the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva) between them, as there cannot exist both the cause and the effect (relationship) between the left and the right horn of the cow. Thus, the two relata do not exist together, or at the same time; had the two relata been together, there could have been the relation (proposed by you). And, when the entity called the cause and effect relationship does not exist in two things, it cannot be treated as a relation.

\[
kārye kārane vā kramenāsau sambandho varttate; ity apy asāmpratam;
\]

SATO 345
yatah kramenapi bhavah sambandhakhyay ekatra karye vah varttamano
'nyanisprah = karyakaranayor anyataranapekso naikavrittimana sambandho yuktah,
tadabhave 'pi = karyakaranayor abhave 'pi tadbhavati.

< Translation >

[Clarification]: The cause and effect relationship may exist, in succession, either in the effect or in the cause.

[Reply]: It is not proper, either. Because even if it is accepted that the entity called a relation will exist in succession being present either in the effect or in the cause, without requiring the other, that is to say, without being dependent either on the cause or on the effect, it cannot be accepted as a relation (sambandha), because it will exist in only one relatum and it can exist even without the existence of either the cause or the effect.

yadi punah karyakaranayor ekam karyam karanam vaepeksanyatra karye
karye vasau sambandha kramena vartata iti sasprhatvena dvishtha evesyate;
tadannapeksyanopakarinah bhavitavyam yasmad upakary apeksya syan
nanyah. katham copakaroty asan? yadah karanakale karyakhyo bhavo 'san tatkale
va karanakhyas tadah naivopakuryad asamarthya.

< Translation >

Moreover, if you say that the desired relationship, in succession, exists in one of the two, that is to say, either in the effect or in the cause depending on either effect or cause respectively, and hence it does exist in two because one requires the other, then that which is required must be regarded as a benefactor (upakarin), because it is the benefactor which is required and not anything else. But how can the non-existent (asat) have any effect (upakara) on the other? (It cannot be so.)

SATO 346
Because at the time of the cause the entity called the effect does not exist or at the
time of the effect the entity called the cause does not exist, where neither of the
two can have the effect on each other; the two entities (the cause and the effect) do
not exist at the same time, so that they do not have the effect on each other.

\[ kiñ ca, yady ekārthaḥbhisambandḥāt kāryakāraṇatā tayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvavatvenābhimata yok; tarhi dvitvaśaṃkhyāparatvāparatvāvibhāgadisambandḥāt prāptā sā savyeta rāgovisānayor api. \]

< Translation >

Moreover, if it is accepted that the cause and effect relationship
\( (kāryakāraṇatā) \) can exist between the two entities (the cause and the effect) since
they are connected with one thing (a relation), then, there will arise a contingency
that the left horn and the right one of a cow have the cause and effect relationship
because they are connected with the number ‘two’ \( (dvitva-saṃkhyā) \), far-ness
\( (paratva) \), near-ness \( (aparatva) \), separation \( (vibhāga) \) and so on.

\[ na yena kenaḥ ekena sambandḥāt sasyate; kiṃ tarhi? sambandhalakṣaṇenaiveti cet; tath na; dvīṣtho hi kaścit padārthah sambandhaḥ, nāto rīthadvayābhīsambandhād anyat tasya laksanam, yenāya saṃkhyāder viśeṣo vyavasthāpyeta. \]

< Translation >

[Objection]: We do not say that the cause and effect relationship should
be admitted because of the connection with one thing.

[Reply]: Then, what do you say?

[Objection]: We say that the relationship can arise when it is connected

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with something having the nature of a relation.

[Reply]: It is incorrect. Because we say that something existing in the things can be called a relation, so that there cannot be any other definition of a relation other than this. Had it been different, it could have been kept distinct from number (ṣaṃkhya) and so on.

\[
\text{kasyacid bhāve bhāvo 'bhāve cābhāvah tāv upādhī viśeṣanam yasya yogasya = sambandhasya sa kāryakāraṇatā yadi na sarvasambandhah; tadā tāv eva yogopādhī bhāvabhāvau kāryakāraṇatā'stu kām asatsambandhakalpanayā?
}
\[
bhedāc cet 'bhāve hi bhāvo 'bhāve cābhāvah' iti bahavo 'bhidheyāḥ kathāṃ kāryakāraṇatety ekārthābhidhiyāinā śabadhitamcyante? nanv ayaṃ śabdo niyoktāram samāśriyāḥ. niyoktā hi yaṃ śabdaṃ yathā prayunkte tathā prāha, ity anekatāpy ekā śrutir na virudhyate iti tāv eva kāryakāraṇatā.
\]

< Translation >

(If you say that) in a case when one entity comes into being when another entity exists, and it does not come into being when such an entity does not exist, then in such a situation the two things are to be considered as adjunct(s) (upādhi) of a third thing called relation (yoga = sambandha) and that is what we say the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇatā) and not any relation whatsoever, then let those two adjuncts (aspects) (that is to say, things) (upādhi), namely, the positive (bhāva) and the negative (abhāva) be treated as the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇatā); why do you postulate an unreal (asat) relation (sambandha)?

If you say that ‘because of difference (bheda)’, then how is it that a single word kāryakāraṇatā expresses a bundle of meanings such as “coming into being in the presence of something, and not coming into being in the absence of that

SATO 348
You may say that this word depends on the speaker. A word speaks as the user of that word wants it to speak, and so it is possible for a single word (sruti) to express many meanings and as such those two (bhāva and abhāva), can be the cause and effect relationship. Therefore, there is no doubt that those two imposed properties, that is to say, the existent and the non-existent can be the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇatā).

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yasmāt paśyann ekaṁ kāraṇābhimitam upalabdhilaksana-prāptasyā drṣṭasyā kāryākhyasya darśane sati tadadarśane ca satya'paśyat kāryam anveti 'idam ato bhavati' iti pratipadyate janah 'ata idaṁ jātam' ity ākhyātrbhīr vināpi.

< Translation >

When one sees the unseen effect which is confirmed by the (subsequent) cognition (upalabdhi), because of seeing one thing intended as the cause; and, after not seeing it (the cause), when he does not see the effect, he relates that ‘this comes from this’ and understands, accordingly, that ‘this results from this’ even without any interpreter.

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tasmād darśanādarśane — viṣayīni viṣayopacārāt — bhāvabhāvau muktāṁ kāryabuddher asambhavāt kāryādiśrutir apy atra ‘bhāvabhāvayor mā lokah pratipadam iyatiṁ sabdamālāṁ abhidadhyāt’ iti vyavahāralāghavārthāṁ nivesiṭeti.

< Translation >

Therefore, without the positive and negative entities such as ‘the seeing and not seeing’ since it is impossible to get the knowledge of the effect, the
expression ‘effect’ and so on is introduced on the basis of superimposition of object on the cognition in order to facilitate linguistic usage with an intension such that “let people not use so many words in each case for the positive and negative entities.”

anvayavyatirekāḥbhāyāṁ kāryakāraṇatā nānyā cēt katham bhāvabhāvābhāyāṁ sā prasaśdhyate? tadbhāvābhāvāṁ lingāt tatkāryatāgatīr yāpy anuvartaye ‘asyedam kāryam kāraṇam ca’ iti; sāṅketavīśayākhyā sā. yathā ‘gaur ayam sāśnādīmattvāt’ ity anena goyavahārasya viśayaḥ pradarśayate.

< Translation >

[Objection]: If the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇatā) is not different from the positive and negative concomitance, how can such relationship be established by the positive and negative entities?

[Reply]: On the ground, namely, there is the absence of the effect in the absence of the cause, we can get the knowledge of the effect; this expression such a ‘This is the effect of it (cause) and this is the cause of it (effect)’ merely refers to the convention: for example, the expression ‘This is a cow, because it has a dewlap (sāsnā) and so on,’ refers to the referent of the word ‘go’ (cow).

yataś ca ‘bhāve bhāvini = bhavanadharmīṇi tadbhāvah = kārānbhīmatasya bhāva eva kāraṇatvam, bhāva eva kārānbhīmatasya bhāvītā kāryānbhīmatasya kāryatvam’ iti prasiddhe pratyaksānupalambhati hetuphalate. tato bhāvabhāvāv eva kāryakāraṇatā nānyā.

< Translation >

In the presence of one thing, that is to say, an effect, which has come into

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being, there is the existence of that which is intended as the cause and this is what is called the state of being a cause. And in the existence of the thing intended as a cause, the thing which is intended as an effect comes into being, and this is what is called the state of being an effect. In this way, the state of being the cause and the effect are known on the basis of the seeing and not seeing. Therefore, the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāranatā) is nothing but the existent (of a cause in the presence of the thing as an effect) and the non-existent (of an effect in the absence of the thing as a cause).

\[
\text{tenaitāvanmātraṃ = bhāvabhāvau tāv eva tattvam yasyārthasyāsāv } \\
\text{etāvanmātratattvāh, so 'ṛtho yeśāṃ vikalpāṇāṃ te etāvanmātratattvārthāḥ = } \\
\text{etāvanmātribijāḥ kāryakāranagocarāḥ, darsayanti ghaṭitān iva = sambaddhān } \\
\text{ivā sambaddhān apy arthaḥ. evaṃ ghaṭanāc ca mithyārthāḥ.}
\]

< Translation >

Hence, only these two, that is to say, the existent (of a cause in the presence of the thing as an effect) and the non-existent (of an effect in the absence of the thing as a cause) alone are real; the object of which is of only these two facts. The term etāvanmātratattvārtha means that which form the content of those imaginations, that is to say, those which depend upon this much, that is to say, having the cause and the effect as the content. They show them as if these are connected although they are not connected in reality. Because of such construction, they are called false.

\[
\text{kiṃ ca, asau kāryakāraṇabhūto 'ṛtho bhinnah, abhinno vā syāt? yadi } \\
\text{bhinnah; tarhi bhinne kā ghaṭanā svasvabhāvavavyavasthitēḥ? athā'bhinnah; } \\
\text{tadā'bhinne kāryakāraṇatāpi kā? naiva syāt.}
\]

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Moreover, whether the objects, which are called cause and effect, are different or identical? If they are different, since they are existent in their own nature, how can there be any relation between one and the same thing? If you say that they are identical, then the cause and effect relationship can exist in that case? Certainly, there cannot be any relation in reality.

Your objection may be the following:

[Objection]: We do not say that the relation exists between two different things or between two identical things.

[Reply]: Then, what?

[Objection]: (We say so) because the two things are related with one thing called a relation.

[Reply]: In this case also, if another relation, different from the two things, were existent, the separated two things accepted as the cause and the effect could have been connected in reality.

But, how can the two things be treated as relata of connection (samyoga) and inherence (samavāya)? The word ‘ādi’ (mentioned in the verse 19 given below) includes the owner and owned relationship and so on. (In this way,) all the
matters regarding the relation are considered by this aforesaid refutation of relation in general (namely, no relation in reality exists).

\[ \text{samyo}gyādīnām \text{ anyonyam anupakārāc cā'janyajanakabhāvāc ca na sambandhi ca tādṛṣṭo 'nupakāryopakārakabhūtah.} \]

< Translation >

Since the things treated as the connected (samyo)gīn), or inherent (samavā)yin) and so on do not show any impact on each other and also because there cannot be any relationship (janyajanakabhava) like cause-and effect among them, there is no relatum which does not produce any impact mutually.

\[ \text{athāsti kaścit samavāyī yo 'vayavirūpaṃ kāryam janayati ato nānupakārād asambandhitetī; tan na; yato janane 'pi kāryasya kenacit samavāyinābhhyupagamyamāne samavāyī nāsau tadā jananakāle kāryasyānispatteh. na ca tato jananāt samavāyitvam siddhyati; kumbhakārāder api ghatē samavāyitvaprasaṅgāt.} \]

< Translation >

[Objection]: Well, we say that there is something called the relatum of inherency which produces the effect appearing as the whole, therefore, you cannot say that there is no relatedness because there is no impact.

[Reply]: It is incorrect. Even if we accept that something called the relatum of inherency produces an effect (appearing as the whole), it cannot be so, because at the time of the production of the effect the relatedness does not exist because at that time the effect has not arisen. You cannot say that since the effect has been produced from that, it becomes an inherent cause; because in that case the pot-maker and so on (that is treated as nimittakārana by thou) would also be a

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regarded as an inherent cause.

tayoh samavāyinoḥ parasparam anupakāre 'pi tābhyaṁ vā samavāyasya
nityatayā samavāyena vā tayoh paratra vā kvacid anupakāre 'pi sambandho
yadisyate; tādā viśvam parasparāsambaddham samavāyi parasparam syāt.

< Translation >

In spite of any mutual impact of the related one on the relation or of the
relation on the related, if you want to accept something as a relation, then everything
unrelated in the universe will become an inherent cause.

yadi ca samyogasya kāryatvāt tasya tābhyaṁ jananāt samyogītā tayoh
tadā samyogajananānāyān na tau samyoginau, karmano
'pi samyogītāpatteḥ. samyogo hy anyatarakarmajāḥ ubhayakarmajāḥ cesyate.
ādigrahanāt samyogasyāpi samyogītā syāt. na samyogajananāt samyogītā. kin
tarhi? sthāpanād iti cet; na sthitiḥ ca prativarṣitā = granthāntare pratikṣiptā,
sthāpyasthāpakayo janyajanakatvābhāvān nānyaḥ sthītir iti.

< Translation >

If you say that the two entities are called connected since the contact is an
effect and since it (the contact) is produced by the two things (samavāyin), then
these two things (samavāyin) should produce the contact and because these two
things produce the contact they cannot be called connected and in spite of that if
you say that they are connected then action (karman) should also be called connected.
A contact is produced from the action of either of the two things connected or from
the action of both the things connected. The word 'ādi' (mentioned in the verse 22
given below) implies that the contact (samyoga) should also be called contacted.
[Objection]: We do not say that two things are connected because they produce the contact.

[Reply]: Then, what?

[Objection]: They are called connected because such a state is brought into being.

[Reply]: It is incorrect. The idea of bringing into being (sthiti) has already been refuted, because what is brought into being (sthāpya) and what brings into being (sthāpaka) are not related by the cause and effect relationship (janyajanakatva) and there is other bringing into being (other than that which involves the cause and effect relationship).

(It is said (by Dharmakīrti) in his Sambandhaparikṣā as follows:)

"kāryakaraṇabhāvo api tayor asahabhāvatah,
prasiddhyati katham dvīṣho 'dvīṣthe sambandhatā katham. //7//

< Translation >
How can the cause and effect relationship (kāryakaraṇabhāva) be treated as a relation existent in two because both, the cause and the effect, do not exist together? And if it does not exist in two things, how can it be called a relation? //7//

kramena bhāva ekatra vartamāno 'nyanisprahah,
tadabhāve 'pi tadbhāvāt sambandho naikavṛttimān. //8//

< Translation >

SATO 355
The cause and effect relationship, in succession, exists in only one thing and does not require another thing (relatum). In this case, in spite of the absence of one thing, that is to say, either the effect or the cause it can exist in another thing, that is to say, either in the cause or in the effect, and so that the relation which exists in only one thing (at a time) cannot be regarded as a relation. //8//

_yady apeksya tayor ekam anyatrasau pravarttate,_

_upakari hy apeksyah syat katham ca upakarothy asan. //9//

< Translation >

If you say that requiring one out of the two (cause and effect), the relation extends in another, then the required one will have to be one which does some help. But how can an entity have the effect without being present? //9//

_yady ekarthabhisambandhat karyakaranata tayoh,_

_praptat dvitvadisambandhat savyetaravisanayoh. //10//

< Translation >

If you say that the cause and effect relationship (karyakaranata) can exist between the two entities (the cause and the effect) since they (cause and effect) are connected with the one thing (a relation), there will arise a contingency that the left horn and the right one have the cause and effect relationship because they are connected with the number ‘two’ (dvitva) and so on. //10//

SATO 356
Therefore, a relation is that which exists in two things. There is no other characteristic definition of a relation (other than this). If you say that the cause and effect relationship \( (kāryakāraṇatā) \) is the relation \( (yoga) \) which satisfies the condition of presence and absence of what is intended to be a cause and effect, 

Then, why cannot those two, namely, the conditions be regarded as the cause and effect relationship \( (kāryakāraṇatā) \)? So, it is not those two things which are intended to be a cause and an effect. So, where is the entity called cause and effect relationship in this case? If you say that one condition is different from another condition, that is to say, what is called as cause is different from what is called as effect, that is to say, there are different terms in the language to express what is called a cause and what is called an effect (and so one should accept the cause and effect relationship). No, it is not the cause because the linguistic term depends on the speaker.

So, where is the entity called cause and effect relationship in this case? If you say that one condition is different from another condition, that is to say, what is called as cause is different from what is called as effect, that is to say, there are different terms in the language to express what is called a cause and what is called an effect (and so one should accept the cause and effect relationship). No, it is not the cause because the linguistic term depends on the speaker.
< Translation >

When one sees one thing intended as the cause and sees subsequently what is called effect which was unseen, and when he does not see the cause and not see subsequently what is called the effect, he relates the previous one with the following as the cause and the effect without the help of any inference; therefore, even without the explanation by the interpreter he can know the effect of the cause (that is to say, he can understand the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇatā)). //13//

darśanādarśane muktā kāryabuddher asambhavāt,
kārtyādiśrutir apy atra lāghavārtham niveśitā. //14//

< Translation >

Without seeing and not seeing (the cause), it is impossible to comprehend the effect, and so, the word 'kārya' and so on is introduced for the sake of the economy of expression. //14//

tadbhāvabhāvāt tatkāryagatir yāpy anuvargyate,
sanketaviṣayākhyā sā sāsñāder gogatir yathā. //15//

< Translation >

So, what you have explained as understanding of the effect on the basis of the logic of presence and absence of what is intended as the cause and the effect is simply an object of linguistic convention as one understands a cow from the linguistic expression 'go' on the basis of a dewlap (sāsnā) and so on. //15//
bhāve bhāvini tadbhāvo bhāva eva ca bhāvita,

prasiddhe hetuphalate pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ. //16//

< Translation >
In coming into being of one thing, that is to say, the effect, there is the coming into being of what is intended as the cause; and in coming into being (of the effect) there will be property of being an effect in it and therefore, the cases are the cause and effect relationship (hetuphalatā), which is well-known on the basis of the seeing (pratyakṣa) and not seeing (anupalambha). //16//

etāvanmātratattvārthāḥ kāryakāraṇagocaraḥ,

vikalpā darśayanty arthān mithyārthā ghatiān iva. //17//

< Translation >
It is the imaginations which correspond to the only facts (, that is to say, anvaya and vyatireka) which come under the preview of the cause and effect relationship. Only imaginations (vikalpa), however, show the things to be connected (although in reality they are not connected). Hence the imaginations (vikalpa) have the false object. //17//

bhinne kā ghaṭanā 'bhinne kāryakāraṇatāpi kā,

bhāve hy anyasya viśiṣṭau śiśīṣau syātām kathāṃ ca tau. //18//

< Translation >
When the two things are different, where is the question of any
relation between them? And, when they are identical, then where is the question of the cause and effect relationship? When in reality there is a third thing (over and above the two relata) intended as a relation, how can the two things having the nature of being distinct (viśliṣṭa) be connected together? //18//

\[samyogisamavāyādī sarvam etena cintitam,\]

\[anyonyānupakārāc ca na sambandhi ca tādṛśāḥ. //19//\]

<Translation>
By this argument we have examined all relations such as the contact (samyoga) and inherence (samavāya) are considered. There cannot be any relatum (sambandhin) like that, since the things treated as the connected (samyogin) or inherent (samavāyin) and so on do not show any impact on each other. //19//

\[janane 'pi hi kāryasya kenacit samavāyinā,\]

\[samavāyī tadā nāsau na tato 'ūprasāṅgataḥ. //20//\]

<Translation>
Even if we accept that something called the relatum of inherence which produces an effect (appearing as the whole and so on), at that time (of the production of the effect) something called the cause cannot be called the inherent cause (, because the effect is not produced yet); and therefore, there is nothing called the cause and effect relationship and in spite of this if we accept what you say it will lead to the over-application (to anything which is not related).

SATO 360
tayor anupakāre 'pi samāvye paraatra vā,
sambandho yadi viśvam syāt samavāyī parasparam. //21//

< Translation >
In spite of the fact that the two things related with the inherence
have no mutual impact on each other if you accept the inherence
and other similar so called relationship, everything in the world
will become the inherent cause of any other thing. //21//

samyogajanane 'piṣṭau tataḥ samyogināu na tau,
karmādiyogitāpatteḥ sthitiṣ ca prativarṇitā. //22//"

[Sambandhaparikśā] iti.

< Translation >
That is why, even if the two things produce the connection (samyoga),
we say that they do not have the nature of being connected. Because
if you say that they are connected even without having the nature of
being connected then the action (karman) should also be called the
connected (, since the action also produces the connection). And,
the idea of the bringing into being (sthiti) has already been refuted.

//22//

astu vā kāryakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇāḥ sambandhāḥ, tathāpy asya
pratipannasya, apratipannasya vā sattvam siddhyet? na tāvad apratipannasya;
atiprasaṅgāt. pratipannasya cet; kuto 'syā pratipatīḥ — pratyakṣena,

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pratyakṣanupalambhābhyaṁ vā, anumānena vā prakārāntaraṁ sambhavāti?
pratyakṣena cet; agnisvarūpārāhina, dhūmasvarūpārāhina, ubhayasvarūpārāhina vā? na tävad agnisvarūpārāhina; taddhi tatasādhvavātram eva pratipadyate na dhūmasvarūpam, tadapratipattau ca na tadapekyāgneḥ kāraṇatvāvagamah. na hi pratiyogisvarūpāpratipattau täm prati kasyacit kāraṇatvam anyad vā dharmāntaram pratyetuṁ śakyam atiprasaṅgāti. nāpi dhūmasvarūpārāhina pratyakṣena kāryakāraṇabhāvāvagamah; ata eva, ubhayasvarūpagrahane khalu tannisṭhasambandhāvagamo yukto nānyathā. nāpy ubhayasvarūpārāhina; tatrāpi hi tayoh svarūpamātram eva pratibhāsate na tv agner dhūmaṁ prati kāraṇatvam tasyaiva täm prati kāryatvam. na hi svarūpāpaniṣṭhāpadārthadhyaṣṭyakajñāna-pratibhāsamātrenā
kāryakāraṇabhāvapratibhāsah, ghaṭapatiāder api tatprasaṅgāti. yat pratybhāṣānantaṁ ekatra jñāne yasya pratibhāsas tayos tadavagamah; ity api tādṛg; ghaṭapratibhāṣānantaṁ patasyāpi pratibhāsanāt. na ca ‘kramabhāvapadārthadhyaṣṭyakajñāna-pratibhāsamātrenā
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< Translation >

Or, let there be a relation (sambandha) called the cause and effect, still, we want to know whether such a relationship should be accepted to exist as ‘known one’ or ‘unknown one’? The first alternative, namely, ‘known one’ cannot be accepted because it will lead to the over-application (, that is to say, even a fictitious thing will become a relation). If you say that the other alternative, namely, ‘unknown one’ will be such a relation, we would like to know how such a relation is known? Is it known by perception (pratyakṣa), by the seeing and not seeing (pratyakṣa-anupalambha, that is to say, anvaya-vyatireka) or by inference (anumāna)? Since no other way of knowing is possible.
If you say that the relationship can be cognised on the basis of perception (pratyakṣa), then we would like to ask: can you cognise it by means of the comprehension of the nature of fire, the nature of smoke or the nature of fire and smoke? Of course, you cannot say that the (cause and effect) relationship can be cognised by means of the comprehension of the nature of fire, because in this case you can have the comprehension of only the existence of fire, but you cannot cognise the nature of smoke. When there is no comprehension of the nature of smoke, you cannot have knowledge that fire is the cause of it (smoke) on the basis of the comprehension of smoke. Indeed, because unless the nature of the counter-relatum (pratīyogin, that is to say, fire) is comprehended, nothing can be known to possess cause-ness or any other property (such as effect-ness) because it will lead to the over-application.

Nor can it be said that the relationship can be cognised by means of the perception of the nature of smoke. Therefore it will be proper to say that the relationship can be known only after knowing the natures of both, that is to say, the fire and the smoke, not otherwise.

But even the perception of both cannot help the knowledge of the intended relationship, because even in that case you can see only the nature of fire and smoke appearing in the perception but you cannot have the knowledge that fire is the cause of smoke and smoke is the effect of fire. Because there cannot arise the cognition of the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva) by mere cognition of the two things (padārtha, that is to say, fire and smoke) existing in their own forms. If it is accepted, it will lead to the over-application of the idea of the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva) between a pot and cloth.

If you say that immediately after the knowledge of one thing when another object is known one can know in the cause and effect relationship between them...
(fire and smoke). This argument is also of that type, that is to say, it also suffers from the difficulty of the over-application. Because immediately after a pot, the knowledge of a cloth can be known. It is also impossible to say that only one knowledge can relate the two things (padārtha) appearing in succession. Because everywhere, that is to say, in case of all knowledge, the difference in the knowledge depends upon the difference in the objects.

> athāgnidhūmasvarūpādāvanāgrāhiḥnānadāvanāantarabhāvismaraṇasahak-ārindriya-janitavikalpajñāne taddhvayasya pūrvāparakālabhāvinah pratiḥāsāt kāryakāraṇabhāvaniścayo bhaviṣyatīty ucyate; tad api uktaṁśrām; caksurādīnām tajjñānājananāsāmartye smaraṇa-saavyāpekaḍānām api janakatvavirodhāt. na hi parimalaśmaraṇa-saavyāpekaḍām lochanām ‘surabhi-candanam’ iti pratyayam utpādayati. tatsaavyāpekaḍālocaṇa-saavyāpekaḍāntaram eke kāryakāraṇabhūtā ity avabhāsanāt tadbhāvah sa-vikalpakapratyayakṣaprasiddhāh; ity api asamichīnaṁ; gandhasyāpi lochanajñānāvिषयतवप्रसāngat, gandhasmaraṇasaḥakāri-locaṇa-saavyāpekaḍāntaram ‘surabhi-candanam’ iti pratyayapratihec. tan na pratyakṣenāsau pratiyate.

< Translation >

If you (sambandhavādin) say that there will arise the determinate cognition of the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva) because the two things (a cause and an effect) one being pair and the other being subsequent, appear in the determinate cognition which produced by sense-organs (indriya) helped by the memory (smarana) arising immediately after two knowledges which reveal the nature of fire and smoke, this is also nothing but mere words. Because if the sense-organs like eyes and so on have no ability to produce the knowledge of the cause and effect relationship, it is contradictory to say that the things depending on

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the memory have ability to produce something. Because the eyes helped by the memory (smarana) of the sweet smell do not cause the perception of 'sweet-smelling sandalwood'.

If you say that the two things are known as the cause and the effect after the function (vyāpāra) of the eyes helped by remembrance and therefore, the cause and effect relationship is ascertained by the determinate perception (savikalpakapratyakṣa), in this explanation is also incorrect. Because it will lead to the over-application that the smell can be an object of the visual perception by the eyes. Because the perception, namely, 'the sandalwood is fragrant' arises only after the function of the eyes helped by the memory (smarana) of the smell. Therefore, you cannot say that the relationship can be cognised on the basis of perception (pratyakṣa).

𝑛āpi pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām; pratyakṣasyevānupalambhāsyaṁ
pratiṣedhyavivikta-vastumātravishayatvenātā’sāmarthyāt athāgniṣadjhāva eva
dhūmasya bhāvas tadabhāve cābhāvah kāryakāraṇabhāvah, sa caitābhāyaṁ pratiyate
ity ucyate; tarhi vaṁśtvasyāsarvajñavādinā vyāptih sāyāt. taddhi
rāgādimattva sarvajñatvasadbhāve svātmāny eva drṣṭam, tadabhāve
copalaśakalādau na drṣṭam. tathā ca sarvajñavātarāgāya datto jalaṁjaṁjaliḥ.

< Translation >

Also, you cannot say that the relationship can be cognised on the basis of the seeing and not seeing (pratyakṣa-anupalambha, that is to say, anvaya-vyatireka); because like the seeing (pratyakṣa), the not seeing (anupalambha) also has no ability to cause the knowledge of the cause and effect relationship because the object of negation is a discrete entity.

If you say that only in the case of the existence of fire there can arise the SATO 365
existence of smoke and in the case of the absence of fire there cannot arise smoke either, and this is what is called the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇābhāva) and it can be cognised on the basis of anvaya-vyatireka, then you should accept the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the speaker-ness (vakrtvā, or sādhana) and the non-omniscient-ness (asarvajñatvā, or sādhyā). And this can be confirmed in one’s own self in the existence of the non-omniscient-ness (asarvajñatvā) and the existence of the qualities like attachment and so on (with the speaker-ness (vakrtvā)) and in the absence of it (asarvajñatvā) in the fragments of stone we cannot see the speaker-ness. Thus, this amounts to relinquishing the Lord (Mahāvīra) who is said to be an omniscient (all-knowing) and free from all bad qualities like attachments and so on.

vakrtvasya vaktukāmatāhetukatvān nāyāṃ doṣāḥ; rāgādisadbhāve 'pi vaktukāmatābhāve tasyāsattvāt. nany evam vyabhicāre vivakṣāpy asya nimmattam na syāt, anyavivakṣāyaṁ apy anyaksabdopalambhāt, anyāthā gotraskhalanāder abhāvaprasangāt. athārthavivakṣāvyabhicāre 'pi śabdavivakṣāyaṁ apy avyabhicāre; na; svapnāvasthāyaṁ anyatra gatacittasya vā śabdavivakṣābhāve 'pi vakṛtvasamvedanāt. na ca vyavahātā sā tannimmattam iti vaktavyam; pratiniyatakāryakāranabhāvābhāvaprasangāt, sarvasya tatprāpteh. atha 'asarvajñatvādyabhāve sarvatra vakṛtvaṁ na sambhavati' ity atra pramānābhāvān na tasya tena kāryakāranabhāvalaksanāḥ pratibandhaḥ siddhayati; tad agnidhūmādāv api samānam. atha 'agnyabhāve dhūmasya bhave taddhetukātivirahāt sakrd apy ahetor agnes tasya bhāvo na syāt, drṣyate ca mahānāsādāv agnītaḥ, tato nānagner dhūmasadbhāvāḥ' iti pratibandhasiddhir ity abhidhīyate; tad apy abhidhānamāttram; yathaiva hindhanāder ekadā samudbhūto 'py agnih anyadāraṇinirmathanāt manyāder vā bhavannupalabhyate, dhūmo vāgñito

SATO 366
This invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the speaker-ness (vakrtvā, or sādhanā) and the non-omniscient-ness (asarvajñatva, or sādhyā) is not incorrect, since the speaker-ness (vakrtvā) is caused by the desire of speaking (vaktukāmatā).

Because even if the speaker has the passions and so on, he is not a speaker unless he wants to speak (vaktukāmatā).

well, if the probans (sādhanā) ‘the speaker-ness’ (vakrtvā) is in ‘inconsistent association’ (vyabhicāra) with the probandum as mentioned above, then ‘the intention of speaking’ (vivakṣā) will not cause the speaker-ness (vakrtvā), either. Because even if there is an ‘intention of speaking’ (vivakṣā) some words another word is spoken. This is our experience. Otherwise, there cannot be a mistaking of the name of gotva (while speaking).

(If you say that) even if there exists ‘the inconsistency’ (vyabhicāra) with regard to the desire to speak of a meaning, there cannot be any inconsistency with

SATO 367
regard to 'the intention of speaking' (vivakṣā) (because one speaks only when one wants to speak). This is also incorrect, because we can cognise 'the speaker-ness' (vaktṛtvā) in the person who is dreaming and in one who is absent-minded. And you cannot say that 'the intention of speaking' (vivakṣā) indirectly is the cause of 'the speaker-ness' (vaktṛtvā), because (if you accept the idea) it will lead to a situation that there will be no one-is-to-one cause-and-effect relationship, because any thing will become a cause of anything.

(Buddhist:) Well, when there is no absence of the state of not being all-knowing, everywhere speaker-ness (vaktṛtvā) is not seen — this statement has no proof and so there is no invariable concomitance (pratibandha, or avinābhāva) of the nature of cause-and-effect between the one thing intended as cause (sādhya) and the another thing intended as effect (sādhana). And this holds true even in the case of fire and smoke and so on.

(Buddhist:) Well, you say that there is invariable concomitance (pratibandha, or avinābhāva) between the thing intended as the cause and the thing intended as the effect because in the absence of the fire if there would have been smoke then since it (smoke) is not caused by that (fire) and even if in one case the fire is not the cause then there cannot be the smoke, but we do find the smoke caused by the fire in the kitchen and so on. But this is also only an empty expression. As we find one fire that arises from fuel and so on, another from the rubbing of two pieces of woods, or another from the crystal stone, still although a smoke arises from fire it can also arise from the smoke which arises from the fire as in the case of a pot (the portable body warmer and so on) used by the shepherds for warming their bodies. So even in the absence of fire there may arise smoke, and so, how can there be any invariable concomitance (pratibandha, or avinābhāva) between the thing intended as the cause and the thing intended as the effect?
Well, it is said that 'the fire arising from the fuel materials is different from the fire produced from the rubbing of two pieces of wood or another arising from the crystal stone and so on. Similarly, the smoke arising from the fire is different from the smoke produced from the smoke in the case of a pot used by the shepherd for warming his body. And if it is accepted that an effect may arise from another thing which is not related directly with it (the effect), it will lead to the over-application.', so, the smoke produced from the fire and similar other smoke do not come into being from non-fire. And if that is accepted then correspondingly that type of the nature of the fire has to be accepted and in that case there is. Therefore, it is said (by Dharmakirti) as follows:

"The top of Indra is of the nature of fire, then it is nothing but fire and if it is different from the nature of the fire, how can it cause the smoke?" (Pramāṇavārttika, 3, 36)

tadetad vakrtve 'pi samānam — 'taddhi sarvajñē vītarāge vā yadi syāt, asarvajñād rāgādimato vā kadācid api na syād ahetoh sakrd apy asambhavāt, bhavati ca tat tatah, ato na sarvajñē tasya tatasādṛśasya vā sambhavaḥ ' iti pratibandhasīddhiḥ.

< Translation >

And this holds true even in the case of the speaker-ness (vakrtva), namely, it is said that 'Indeed, if the speaker-ness exists in the omniscient or in the man who is free from all bad qualities like attachment, then it (vakrtva) can never arise from one who is a non-omniscient or who has bad qualities like attachment and so on because nothing can arise even once from something which is not its cause. But (here) that (vakrtva) does arise from the non-omniscient. Therefore, the speaker-ness (vakrtva) or anything similar to that does not exist in the omniscient, and so the SATO 369
invariable concomitance (pratibandha, or avinābhāva) cannot be established.

"kiñ ca, kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ sakaladeśakālāvasthitākhilāṅghidhūmavyakti-

krodhikaranenāvagato 'numānanimitam, nānyathā. na ca nirvikalpakasavikalpaka-

pratyakṣasyeyati vastuni vyāpārah, pratyakṣāṇupalambhayor vā.

< Translation >

Moreover, the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva) can be
the object of inference (anumāna) only when all the individual fires and smokes
existing in all the places and in all the times are known and not otherwise. With
reference to such a vast object neither the indeterminate and determinate perception
has capacity to operate. Nor the seeing and not seeing have such a capacity.

"kiñ ca, kāryotpādaśāktiśisṭatvam kāraṇatvam. na cāsau śaktih

pratyakṣāvaseyā kiṃ tu kāryadāraṇanagamā?

"śaktayah sarvabhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpattiṃgocarāḥ"

[Ślokavārttika, Śūnyavāda, 3254]

ity abhidhānāt.

< Translation >

Moreover, the causality is the state of possessing the capacity to produce
an effect. But that capacity cannot be determinated by the perception (pratyakṣa)
but it can be known by observing the effect. As it is said —

"the capabilities of all positive things are known by implication
from the effects." (Ślokavārttika, Śūnyavāda, s. 254)

tatra kāryāt kāraṇatvāvagame 'numānāc chaktyavagamāḥ syāt. tatāpi
SATO 370
In this case, if the cognition of the cause arises from the effect, you can cognise the ability on the basis of the inference. Here also, you cannot cognise the invariable concomitance (pratibandha, or avinābhāva) between the capability (sakti, or sādhyā) and the effect (kārya, or sādhanā) by the perception (pratyakṣa) and so on; because of the same defeats discussed above. And if you say that it can be cognised on the basis of the inference it will lead to an infinite regress or mutual dependency. But this argument the third proposition (pakṣa) is also considered.

_Uttarapakṣa_ in the _Sambandhasadbhāvāvāda_ in the _Prameyakamalamārtanda_ by Prabhācandra:

tadet tāvat sarvam asaminam; sambandhasadbhāvāvādā sambandhasadbhāvāvādā sambandhasadbhāvāvādā pratibhisāsanāt; tathā hi — paṭas tantusambaddha evāvabhāsate, rūpādayā sa paṭādisambaddhāh. sambandhābhāve tu teṣām viśiṣṭā pratibhāsāḥ syāt, tam antareṇyasya samśiṣṭapratibhāsahetor abhāvāt. kathaṁ ca sambandhe pratiyāmāne 'pratiyāmānasyāpy asambandhasya kalpanā pratitiyodhaṁ? arthakriyāvyodhaḥ ca, anuṇām anyonyam asambandhato jalādānāḥ haranādyarthakriyākāritvānupapattēḥ. rajjuvāmśadandādinām ekadesākarsanē tadanyākarsanāṁ cāsambandhavādino na syāt. asti caitat sarvam. atas tadanyathānupapattoṁ cāsau siddhāḥ.

< Translation >

_SATO_ 371
(PKM: 514\textsuperscript{5,13}) Well, all this is incorrect; because the entities appear in
the cognition only by means of perception of the relation. It is, namely, as follows
— the cloth appears as related to the threads and the colour and so on as connected
with the cloth and so on. If it were not the relation among them, they would appear
as unrelated with each other. Because there is no other cause excepting that, which
can cause the entities to appear as the united. And when the relation is known by
the perception, how can you say it is a postulation of an unknown thing which is
not a relation? Because it will lead to contradiction. And if you do not accept the
relation, then there can be the contradiction with the 'practical efficiency'
(arthakriyā), because the 'practical efficiency' (arthakriyākārita), namely, holding
water, fetching water (by pot) cannot be explained since (according to you) the
atoms are not related with one another. And, when one end of the rope, the
bamboo, the stick and so on is pulled toward one place, according to those who do
not accept the idea regarding the relation, the other end of them cannot be pulled
toward the same place since the entity (the atom) has no relation with each other.
But all this is a fact. Therefore, since all this cannot be explained without accepting
a relationship, the relation is established.

\textit{yac ca — 'pāraṇatryam hi' ity ādy uktam; tad apy ayuktam; ekatvapariniṭilakṣaṇapāraṇatryasyārthānāṁ pratiṭitaḥ suprasiddhatvāt,
anyathoktaḍosānusāṅgah. na cārthānāṁ smanbhaḥ sarvātmanaikadeśena vābhypagamyate yenoktaḍosah syāt prakārāntareṇaivāsyābhypagamāt.
sarvātmaikadesābhhyāṁ hi tasyāsambhavāt prakārāntaratasya vā bhāvāt, tatpratitiyanyathānupapatteś ca tābhhyāṁ jātyantaratayā śleṣāḥ
snigdharūksatānibandhano bandho 'bhypagantavyo 'sau saktutoyādivat.
viśliṣṭarūpatāparityāgena hi samśliṣṭarūpapateyā kathaṅcid

SATO 372}
anyathāvalakṣaṇaikatvaparinatīṁ sambandho 'ṛthaṁ citrasamvedane nilādyākāravat. na hi citrasamvido jātyantararūpa-patayo-pādaṁ anyo nilādyanekākāraiḥ sambandhaḥ, sarvātmanāikadesena vā tais tasyāḥ sambandhe proktāśeṣadāsānugāvīśeṣāt.

< Translation >

(PKM: 514\(^{14}\)-515\(^{5}\)) Well, it is said (by Dharmakirti) that ‘indeed, it (sambandha) is nothing but the dependency (pāratantra)’ and so on, but this is also incorrect; it is well known by our experience that there is the ‘dependency’ (pāratantra) among the objects which is of the nature of ‘transformation into one’ consisting of the mass. Otherwise, all the defects pointed out earlier will continue. And, we do not accept the position that one thing is related to another totally or partially. Had we accepted like that, your objection would have been valid. But we accept the position in a different way. Since it is not possible to accept that a relation occurs in total amalgamation or in partial amalgamation and since there is another explanation possible, and since it is not possible to explain our experience (of connectedness) without accepting a relation, we have to accept an entity called relation as belonging to another class of entity based on the states of wet-ness and dry-ness, as barley-powder and water. Indeed, as having the nature of the connected (samsūṣṭa) by giving up the nature of being distinct (viśīṣṭa), the transformation somehow into oneness, that is to say, the transformation of one state (viśīṣṭa) into another state (samsūṣṭa), it is possible to show the relationship of things as in the case of experiencing the variegated colour consisting of colours like blue and so on. The cognition of the variegated colour is nothing more than a relationship with many colours such as blue and so on arising as a different class of colour (i.e. it is nothing but the transformation of one state into another state). Had we, the Jainas, accepted that there can arise a total or partial relationship between the blue colour...
and so on and the cognition (i.e. the things), all the objections pointed out above (by Dharmakirti), would have continued.

\[ sa caivaṃvidhah sambandho \text{'}rthānām kvacin nikhilapradesānām anyonyapradesānupravesaṭaḥ \text{'} - yathā saktutoyādīnām, kvacit tu pradesāsamśiṣṭatāmātreṇa \text{'} - yathāṅgulyādīnām. na cāntar bahir vā sāmśavastuvādīnāḥ sāṃśatvānusāṅgo doṣāya; īṣṭavāt. na caivam anavasthā; tadbhede hi teṣām api tadvatā pradesāntaraiḥ sambandha ity anavasthā syāt nānyathā, anekāntātmakavastuno 'tyantabhedābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhाम paramānānām apy aṃśavatvaprasaṅgaḥ syāt; ity apy SATO 374
anuttaram; yato 'trāṃśāsabdah svabhāvārthaḥ, avayavārtho vā syāt? yadi svabhāvārthaḥ; na kaścid doṣas teṣām vibhinnadigvibhāgavyavasthitānekeśubhiḥ sambandhānyathānupapattyā āvad dhā svabhāvabhopedopapatteḥ. avayavārthas tu tatrāsau nopapadyate; teṣām abhedyatvenāvayavāsambhavāt. na caivam teṣām avibhāgītvām virudhyate, yato 'vibhāgītvām bhedaḥ itum āsakyaḥtvām na punar niḥsvabhāvatvam.

< Translation >

(PKM: 515) Well, in the case there will arise the contingency that even atoms (paramāṇu) should have parts. But this reply is also evasive. Because in this case, we have to ask whether the term 'aṃśa' refers to the own nature (svabhāva) or the part (avayava). If it means the own nature (svabhāva), there cannot arise any faults in that theory. Because the difference of the own nature can arise on the basis of the indivisible atoms (paramāṇu) and the various other atoms, which cannot be explained without the relationship, in all directions around the indivisible atom. However, if the term 'aṃśa' means the part (avayava), then the objection can be taken by us. Because the indivisible atoms (paramāṇu) cannot have their own parts on the basis of its being as the entity which cannot be devided any more. It cannot be said that there will arise contradiction since the indivisible atoms (paramāṇu) cannot be devided any more. Because the undivided-ness means 'that which cannot be divided any more', but not 'that which has no nature'.

yat tūktam — 'nispannayor anispannayor vā pāratantryalaksanaḥ sambandhah syāt' ity ādi; tad api asāram; kathaścin nispannyos tadabhyupagamāt. pato hi tantudravyārupatayā nispanna eva anvayino dravyasya paṭaparināmoṭpatteḥ prāg api sattvāt, svarūpam tv anispannah, tantudravyam api svarūpeṇa nispannaṃ paṭaparināmarūpatayā 'nispannam. tathāṅgulyādīdravyam svarūpam nispannam
samyogaparināmaṁātmakatvenānispannam iti.

< Translation >

(PKM: 515^17-22) (Dharmakirti had said) that ‘the relation having the nature of dependence (pāratantra) exists between either two already produced relata (sambandhin) or two unproduced relata (sambandhin).’; but it is not proper, either. Because, somehow, the relationship can be cognised between two already produced relata. The cloth is indeed the already accomplished in the form of the substance called thread, because a thread exists even before it transforms into the cloth, but in that mement the cloth is indeed unaccomplished in its own form. Similarly, the substance thread is already accomplished in its own form, but it is unaccomplished in the form of transformed cloth. In the same way, the substance like the finger and so on is the substance already accomplished, but it is unaccomplished in the transformed form of being connected.

kīn ca, pāratantryasya bhāvād bhāvānāṁ sambandhābhāve tena vyāptah
kvacit sambandhah prasiddhah, na vā? prasiddhaś cet; kathāṁ sarvatra sarvadā
sambandhābhāvah virodhaḥ? no cet; kathām avyāpakābhāvād
avyāpyasyābhāvasiddhir atiprasangā?

< Translation >

(PKM: 515^23-26) Moreover, if you say that the relationship cannot arise among the positive entities, since there is no dependency among them, then, whether any relationship pervaded by that criterion is known or not? If it is known, then, how can there be the absence of the relationship everywhere everytime exist? Because this is contradictory to our experiences. If it is not known, then, how can you establish the absence of the non-pervaded (avyāpya) on the basis of the absence of the non-pervader (avyāpaka)? And inspite of that if you accept it, then, it will SATO 376
lead to over-application.

'rūpaśleśo hi' ity ādy apy ekāntavādinām eva dūṣanam nāsmākam;
kathaṅcit sambandhinor ekatvāpattisvabhāvasya rūpaśleśalaksanāsambandhasvabhāhyupagamāt. aśakyaavivecanatvam hi sambandhino rūpaśleśah, asādhāraṇasvarūpata ca tada śleśah. sa cānayor dvīvām na virundhyāt tathā pratīteś citrākāraikasamvedanavat. na cāpeksikatvāt sambandhasvabhāvo mithyā'rthānāṃ sūkṣmatvādivad ity abhidhātyām; asambandhasvabhāvasvabhāvāni tathābhāvānuśaṅgāt. so 'pi hy āpeksika eva kañcid artham apekṣya kasyacit tadvayavasthitvanyathānupapatteh sthūlatādivat. 'pratyakṣabuddhau pratibhāsamānāh so 'nāpeksika eva tatprśṭhabhāvivikalpenādhyavasiyamāno yathāpeksikās tathā 'vāstavo 'pi' ity anyatṛāpi samānam. na khalu sambandho 'āhyakṣera na pratibhāsate yato 'nāpeksiko na syāt.

< Translation >

(PKM: 516¹⁷) Indeed, the objection raised before saying if 'a relation (sambandha) is taken as of the nature of amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaśleśa) and so on' is applicable to those who accept the absolutism (ekāntavādin), but not to us the Jainas who accept the non-absolutism (anekāntavādin); because, somehow, the Jainas accept the relation (sambandha) of two relata (sambandhin), which (sambandha) is characterised by the amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaśleśa) having the own nature of the transformation into oneness, that is to say, the transformation of one state into another state. Indeed, the amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaśleśa) of two relata is difficult to explain, and their discreteness is having an uncommon nature. This is not contradictory to the duality of the two relata because of our experience, as in the case of the cognition

SATO 377
of the variegated colour as one. You (Buddhist) should not say that since the nature of the relationship is relative, it is false as subtlety and so on of the entities. Because even though the entities do not have the own nature of relationship, the same objection can be raised in the case of the theory that there is no relationship, that is to say, it is nothing but the state of being relative. Indeed, this is also the state of being relative, some entities dependent on something else and this state cannot arise without being fixed on the state of being relative, as the whole-ness and so on. The another theory of yours that 'the appearance being in the perceptual cognition (pratyakṣabuddhi) is not the state of being relative but it is determined by the imagination (vīkālpa) following the perceptual cognition; as it is relative so it is unreal:' is also false. It is not the case that the relationship is never known by perception and hence it cannot be non-relative.

etena 'parāpeksā hi' ity ādy api pratyuktam; asambandhe 'pi samānatvāt.
‘dvayor ekābhisaṃbandhāt’ ity ādy apy avijñātaparābhiprayasya vijṛmbhitam; yato nāsmābhīḥ sambandhinās tathāparinativyatirekenānyah sambandho 'bhuyapagamyate, yenānavasthā syāt.

< Translation >

(PKM: 516¹³⁻¹⁷) By this argument (against the theory that a relation can be existent without being dependent on the other), it is also replied that 'indeed, a relation could have been dependency (of one thing on the other),' and so on discussed before; because, even if a relation is not accepted, the same objection will continue.

Moreover, the objection (by the Buddhists) that 'if on account of the relationship with one entity called relatum you say there is a relation between the two relata,' and so on is an expression of ignorance of our doctrine. Because we,

SATO 378
the Jainas, do not accept such a relation without modifications (transformations) in that way between the two relata; Had we accepted such a relation, your objection would have been valid and in that case it would have led to endless regression.

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tathā ca 'tām eva cānurundhānaih 'ity ādy apy ayuktam; kriyākārakādīnām sambandhinām tatsambandhasya ca prātiyartham tadbhidhāyakānām prayogaprasiddheḥ. anyāpohasya ca prāgevāpāstasvarūpatvāc chadbthathavam anupapannam eva. citrajñānavac cānekasambandhitādāmye 'py ekatvam sambandhasvāviruddham eva.
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< Translation >

(PKM: 516*) And in the same way, the objection (by the Buddhists) that ‘And, following that imagination (Kalpanā),’ and so on discussed before is not proper, either; because in order to cause the knowledge of the relata “the action and its related factors” and so on and of the relation (Sambandha), the addition of a word, that is to say, the words expressive of that meaning are used. And, we have already refuted the theory of ‘anyāpoha’, it cannot be accepted as the word-meaning. As in the case of the cognition of the variegated colour as the one, there is no contradiction in accepting that there is one relationship.

\[
yad apy uktam — ‘kāryakāraṇabhāvo ‘pi’ ity ādi; tad apy avicāritaramaṇiṣyam; yato nāsmābhīḥ sahabhāvītvaṁ kramaḥbhāvītvaṁ vā kāryakāraṇabhāvanibandhanam isyate. kin tu yad bhāve niyatā yasvotpattis tat tasya kāryam, itarac ca kārānam. tac ca kiṃcit sahabhāvi, yathā ghatasya mṛḍārvyaṁ daṇḍādi vā. kiṃcit tu kramabhāvi, yathā prāktanah paryāyaḥ. tatpratipattiḥ ca prayaksāmupalambhasahāyenātmanā niyate vyaktivīṣe, tarkasahāyena vā 'niyate prasiddhā. ekam eva ca prayaksam SATO 379
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Moreover, it is said (by the Buddhists) that 'how can the cause and effect relationship (be a relation existent in two?)' and so on; but this also sounds well until it is critically examined. Because we, the Jainas, do not accept that the entity existing at the same time or the one in sequence is due to the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhave). But, we say that regularly there arises something (A) because of something else (B), in this case, one (A) is the effect (kārya) and the other (B) is the cause (kāraṇa). In some cases the cause and effect may be together, as in the case of the substances such as earth (kāraṇa) or the stick (kāraṇa), and so on, with the pot (kārya), and in some other cases they may be sequential as in the case of such as the previous mode (kāraṇa, ex. milk) of the subsequent (kārya, ex. curd). And the comprehension of that (kāryakāraṇabhave) is known by the characteristic of the seeing and not seeing the individual entity determined (ex. the fire and the smoke: the specific cause and effect relationship) or by the logical reasoning (the theory that whenever there is the entity intended as the cause then the entity intended as the effect can arise: tarka: the knowledge of the sādyaśādhanaṇabhave) from the indefinite one (the general cause and effect relationship). And, the same perception is expressed by the words 'pratyaksā' and 'anupalambha' (the seeing and not seeing), that is to say, 'pratyaksā' is perception and 'pratyaksānupalambha' is also perception. Indeed, that perception (pratyaksā)
has the object intended as the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva): this is the cause and this is the effect. And other than that, at the same time there is also the not seeing-perception expressed by the word ‘anupalambha’ which has any other reality (entity) (vastu) as the object of itself. To explain, we can say that we cannot decide that the smoke can be ‘smoke’ which is not produced by ‘fire’ by so many ways if it would have been the case that the smoke is there in a particular place even before its association with fire; Or we could say this smoke has come from something else. But all this is refuted by perception (pratyakṣa) helped by ‘not seeing’ (anupalambha).

etena prāgānupalabdhasya rāsabhasya kumbhakārasannidhānāntaram upalabhyaṁanaśya tasya tatākāryatā syād iti pratīvyūdham; yadi hi tasya tatra prāgāsastvam anyadeśād anāgamanam anyāhetukatvam(3) ca niścetum śakyeta syād eva kumbhakārakāryatā. tat tu niścetum aśakyam.

< Translation >

(PKM: 517) In this way, that is to say, by means of the theory that the seeing and not seeing and so on have an ability which causes the knowledge of the cause and effect relationship, even if we see the donkey, which was not seen before, immediately after the potter arrives, the theory that it (donkey) can be the effect of the potter can be refuted. Because, had it been the case we could know for certain that the donkey did not exist before, it did not come from another place where the potter is, and it has no other reason than the potter, then we could have said that the donkey is the effect produced by of the potter. But that cannot be ascertained.

na ca bhinnārtagrahi pratyākṣadvayam dvītiyāgrahe tadapekṣaṃ SATO 381
And, you (the Buddhists) should not say that when perceptions having two different objects like the thing intended as the cause and the thing intended as the effect (smoke) is not capable of knowing cause-ness or effect-ness if out of the two one is not cognised since it depends on the knowledge of that (second). Because it is our experience that even if a person, who has a particular state of destruction and subsidence of knowledge obscuring-karma (jānānāviniyakarma) (ksayopāsamaviśeṣā), sees only the smoke he can understand that the smoke is produced from the fire by means of repeated experience. Otherwise, if we cannot distinguish the smoke from steam and so on, there will arise the inferential cognition of fire even from various other things and thus it will lead to a chaos with reference to our day-to-day behaviour. Therefore it is necessary to accept the cognition of the effect on the part of a person whom the impression arising from the cognition of that which is intended cause, as the form appears in the cognition of the form of blue and so on.

SATO 382
akāryakāraṇabhāvāvagamasya tvātadbhāvabhāvitābhyaśasah. tadabhāvān na
kvacīt teṣām kāryakāraṇabhāvasyā'kāryakāraṇabhāvasya vā niscaya iti.

< Translation >

(PKM: 5181-6) And, if you say that even if the inhabitants of the Island of the coconut-trees suddenly see the smoke or the fire, since the cause and effect relationship between the two is not ascertained it cannot be real, then, this is also not a good idea, because the determination of the cause and effect relationship is caused by the external cause and the internal cause. The internal cause is a particular act (state) of destruction and subsidence (kṣayopāsamaṃviśeṣa) (of knowledge-obscuring-karman (jñānāvāniyakarman), that is to say, labdhi), on the other hand, the external cause is the repeated observation (experience) that something intended as the effect can arise wherever something intended as the cause exists. But, they do not have the repeated observation (experience) that something intended as the effect can arise wherever something intended as the cause exists. That is the reason why they do not understand the cause and effect relationship between the smoke and the fire. Because of the absence of that (the external cause and the internal cause), they do not make the determination of either the cause and effect relationship or the non-cause-and-effect relationship.

dhūmādiṃjñānajanaṅnasāmagrīmatrāt tatkāryatvādiniścayāntapatte na
kāryatvāḥ dhūmādeh svarūpam iti cet; tarhi kṣanikatvādīr api tatsvarūpam mā
bhut tata eva. kṣanikatvābhāve 'vastutvam anyatṛ̣pi samānam, sarvathāpy
akāryakāraṇasya vastutvānupapatteḥ kharāśrīṅgavat.

< Translation >

(PKM: 5187-10) If you say that since it is not possible to explain the definiteness of the effectness arising only from the factors which will be the cause SATO 383
of the knowledge of the smoke and so on, we cannot know that the smoke is an
effect of the fire, that is to say, that the effectness and so on are the nature of the
smoke and so on, then, how can we call the momentary-ness (ksanikatva) the
nature of the smoke? In that case let the momentary-ness not be the nature of the
smoke, either, from the same ground. And if there is the absence of the momentary-
ness it will become unreal, and this logic is common elsewhere also. Because in
every way, any thing which is neither a cause nor an effect cannot be maintained as
a real entity and as such will become unreal like the horn of a donkey.

na ca kārasyānupannasyaiva kāryatvam dharmah; asattvā. nāpy
utpannasyātyantam bhinnam tat; taddharmatvāt. tata eva kāraṇasyāpi kāraṇatvam
dharmo naikāntato bhinnam. tac ca tato 'bhinnatvāt tadgrāhipratyakṣenaiva
pratīyeto tadvyaktisvarūpavat. drśyate hi pipāsyāyāṅrāṅacetāsām
itārārthhavacchenedābālam tadapanodasamarthe jalādau pratyakṣāt pravṛtīḥ.
tacchakti pradhānātāyāṃ tu kāryadarśanāt tan niściyate
tadvyātirekānyāsambhavāt. na ca svarūpēṇākāryakāraṇayos tadbhāvah
sambhavati. nāpy uttarakālam bhinnena tenānayoh kāryakāraṇataḥ bhinnā kartum
śakyaḥ; virodhāt. nāpi bhinnā; tayoḥ svarūpeṇa kāryakāraṇatāprasangāt. na ca
svarūpeṇa kāryakāraṇayor arthāntarabhūtatsambandhakalpane
kīcchāntprayojanasāt kāryakāraṇatāyāḥ svataḥ siddhatvāt?

< Translation >

(PKM: 518\[11-21\]) Moreover, it cannot be said that the effectness (kāryatva)
is the property (of that thing which has not yet been produced), because the effect
does not exist. Nor can it be said that it (kāryatva) is absolutely different from the
produced (kārya), because it (kāryatva) is the property of that (kārya). On the
same ground, the cause (kāraṇa) also will have the property called kāraṇatva

SATO 384
which is not totally different from the cause (kārana). So since the effectness (kāryatva) or the causeness (kāraṇatva) is identical with the effect (kārya) and the cause (kārana) respectively, namely, is not different from the effect (kārya) and the cause (kārana), when one perceives the effect (kārya), he will perceive the effectness (kāryatva), too, and when one perceives the cause (kārana), he will perceive the causeness (kāraṇatva), too, as one perceives the individual form. Indeed, we do observe that a person including a little child when pressed by the thirst moves towards water and so on by knowing water through perception as distinct from everything else and quenches his thirst with that (water) which has the capacity of removing the thirst, that is to say, in this case he sees both the kāryatva and the kāraṇatva. And, the effect is seen when water has got the capacity of removing the thirst, so the causeness can be determined, because the effect (the quenching the thirst) cannot arise without that.

The cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva) cannot arise between two things which are not intended as the cause and the effect by nature. Moreover, it is not possible to make kāryatā and kāraṇatā as identical after subsequently they will appear as different. Because it will lead to a contradiction.

And, nor is it possible to make them different from them, because if you make it identical with them, the effect (kārya) will become kāryatva and the cause (kārana) will become kāraṇatva by nature. And, on the basis of the nature, no purpose is served in postulation of the relationship appearing as the different thing between the cause and the effect, because they exist independent of each other.

nanu kārtyapratipattau kathāṃ kāraṇasya kāraṇatāpratipattis
tadapekṣatvāt tasyāḥ? kathāṃ evaṃ pūrvāparabhāgāpratipattau
madhyabhāgasyāto vyāvrttipratipattir apekṣākṛtatvāviśeṣāti? tataḥ “paṣyann ayam

SATO 385
ksanikam eva paśyate "iti [ ] vaco virudhyeta. madhyakṣanasvabhāvatvāt
tadvyavṛtthē tadgrāhijñānena pratipattiś cet; tarhi kāryotpādanaśaśakteh
kārānasvabhāvatvāt tadgrāhīnaiśa jñānena pratipattir iṣyatāṁ viśeṣābhāvāt. uktā
cā kāryapratipattih pratyakṣādisahāyenātmaney uparamyate.

< Translation >

(PKM: 518²²-519⁵) (Objection) Well, if the effect (kārya) is not known,
how can one know the causeness (kāraṇatā) in the cause (kārana)? Because it
depends upon the other. Similarly, unless you know the prior and subsequent part,
how can one know the middle part different from the pūrva and the aparā?
Because they are of the same character of being relative. Therefore, the statement “The
observer sees that this is momentary. (i.e. He sees only one moment: pūrva, kāṣaṇa,
madhyakṣaṇa and aparākṣaṇa)” will lead to a contradiction. The middle moment
has got the nature (svabhāva) which excludes the prior and subsequent and the
knowledge of the madhya will make you know that comprehension, if you say so;
(Reply) then, the power of producing the effect (kārya) is the nature (svabhāva) of
the cause (kārana), it should be known that the knowledge of the kārana will make
you know the effect (kārya), because there is no difference. The knowledge of the
effect (kārya) mentioned above arises by oneself (the soul) accompanied by perception
(pratyakṣa) and so on, so we stop here.

kiṇ ca, kāryāṇiścaye šaktier api niścaye niśādiścayo 'pi mā bhūt. yad
eva hi tasyāḥ kāryam tad eva nīlāder api, anayor abhedāt. vakṛtvasya
cāsarvajñatvādina vyāptyasambhavah sarvajñasiśādhipraghaṭṭake pratipāditāḥ.

< Translation >

(PKM: 519⁶⁹) Moreover, if you do not determine the effect, and, if you
do not determine the power of producing the effect also, the determination on the
SATO 386
basis of 'blue' (nila) and so on cannot be real, either. Because the thing intended as the effect produced from the power is the same produced from 'blue' (nila) and so on also, because both (śakti and nila) are same (, namely, both are what intended as the cause of the effect). And, there is no invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the speaker-ness (vaktrtvā, or sādhanā) and the non-omniscient-ness (asarvaśīnatvā, or sādhyā), as has been explained by us in the doctrine of the establishment of the omniscient (sarvaśīna).

na cendhanādirprabhavapāvakasya manyādirprabhavapāvakād abheda yena niyataḥ kāryakāranabhāvo na syāt. anyādirśākāro hīndhanaprabhavāḥ pāvako 'nyādirśākāraś ca manyādirprabhavāḥ. tadvicēre ca pratipattrā nipūnena bhavyam. yatnataḥ parikṣitem hi kāryam kāranaṁ nātiwartate. katham anyathā viṭārgetaravyavasthā tacceṣṭāyāḥ sānkaryopalambhāt?

< Translation >

(PKM: 51910-14) And, it is not the fact that the fire produced from fuel is identical with the fire produced from the gem, either. Had it been so, we could have identified both the kārya and the kārana. Because the form of the fire is different in the case of the fire produced from fuel and the fire produced from the gem. In making the distinction between the two, the knower must be an expert, that is to say, it should be carefully examined. When we carefully examine the effect with effort, the effect examined in such way cannot transgress its cause. Otherwise, how can you explain the respective difference between the the man free from all bad qualities like attachments and the opposite, though we can see the mixture of the two in their behaviour?

katham caivaṃvādino mṛtetaravyavasthā syāt?

SATO 387
Similarly, if you do not accept the theory of kāryakāraṇabhāva, how can you distinguish the respective difference between the dead and the not dead? Indeed, when we see a man who has the particular form of the motion and speaking, we can conclude that consciousness (caitanya) exists in the alive body. Because we can see a particular effect like the motion and so on. On the other hand, consciousness does not exist in the dead body, because we cannot see a particular effect like the motion and so on. Therefore, on the basis of seeing a particular effect and not seeing it, we can conclude the presence of a particular cause and the absence of it. This is how we can explain the difference between a person who is alive and who is dead.

akāryakāraṇabhāve 'pi caitat sarvaṁ samānāṁ — so 'pi hi dviśthāḥ katham asahabhāvinoh kāryakāraṇatvabhāyaṁ nisedhyayor varteta? na cādviśtho 'sau; sambandhābhāvavirodhāḥ. pūrvarat bhāve vartttāvā paratra kramenaṁsau varttamāno 'nyanisprhatvenaikavṛttimattvāt katham sambandhābhāvavarūpatā(āntāṁ) pratipadyeta? athākāryakāraṇayar ekam apeekṣānyatraśau kramena varttaita iti sasprhatvenāyaṁ dviśhatvāt tadbhāvavāresyate; tadā tenāpeekṣāmanoṇapakārīnā bhavitaṁ. 'katham copakaroṭy asan' ity ādi sarvaṁ atrāpi yojaniyaṁ.

Similarly, even in your case of not accepting SATO 388
kāryakāraṇabhāva, the same objections which were raised by you can be raised.

For example, it (akāryakāraṇabhāva) is also nothing but a relation which should exist in two entities, so how can you say that the two things not existing together, or at the same time are prohibited from the state of the relationship? It (asambandha) cannot be said that it does not exist in two entities; because the theory of denying the relation (sambandha) will lead to the contradiction that the akāryakāraṇabhāva is also nothing but a relation. If you say that it (akāryakāraṇabhāva) is what existing in succession being present either in the non-effect or in the non-cause, without requiring the other, that is to say, without being dependent either on the non-cause or on the non-effect, and you do not accept the relation, then how can you say the theory of the absence of the relation, in spite of denying the relation?

Well, if you say that the desired relation (akāryakāraṇabhāva), in succession, exists in one of the two, that is to say, either in the non-effect or in the non-cause depending on either non-effect or non-cause respectively, and hence it (asambnadha intended as the akāryakāraṇabhāva) does exist in two because one requires the other, and you do not accept the relation; then, that which is required (as the akāryakāraṇabhāva) must be regarded as a benefactor (upakārin) which has the effect on either non-effect or non-cause respectively, so the objection that ‘How can the non-existent (asat) have any effect (upakāra) on the other?’ must be used in every case, that is to say, it must be done in this case also.
buddhakabhavat. tan na pramanatah pratyamanaḥ sambandham
svabhiptatattvavananihvanitoyo yena sthuladipratiter bhrantatvāt
tatsvabhavatārthasya na syāt. citrajñanavad yugapada
ekasyānekākārasambhandhitvavāt kramenāpi tat tasyāvūrddham. iti siddham
parāparavivarttavyāpyekadravyalaksanamurddhvatāsāmānyam.

< Translation >

(PKM: 520^-^) Even if you do not accept the entities (artha) which are of
go no cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva), the cause and effect relationship
(kāryakāraṇabhāva) will become real. However, it is not proper that neither of the
entities being of kāryakāraṇabhāva and the entities being of akāryakāraṇabhāva
can be denied, because it is a contradiction, for example, as the nila and the not
nīla cannot be together in one thing, that is to say, you cannot say that this is nīla
and not nīla. Therefore, on some grounds (proofs), the akāryakāraṇabhāva can be
logically true because there is no knowledge of the kāryakāraṇabhāva mutually
among a cow (go), a horse (aśva), and so on, similarly, you should accept that the
kāryakāraṇabhāva can be also logically true because there is the knowledge that
something intended as the effect (e.g. smoke) can arise wherever something intended
as the cause (e.g. fire) exists among the fire and the smoke, and so on. So you
should, ultimately, accept the two (akāryakāraṇabhāva and kāryakāraṇabhāva),
because there is no obstruction to these theories. Therefore, when we have the
ground to explain the knowledge of the relationship, simply you cannot deny the
relation which is intended as asambandha by your own theory, if you deny the
relation, the entity having the characteristic of the whole will be also unreal because
the knowledge of the whole and so on is unreal. Simultaneously like the cognition
of the variegated colour, and, also like one form (, or ākāra) having a relation with
many, they are not contradictory.

SATO 390
[In this way, the theory of ārdhvaśāmānyā which has the characteristic of remaining the same through changes as a substance is established.]
The texts:

_Prameyakamalamārtanda_ of Shri Prabhācandra

Ed. with Introduction, Indexes etc. by Pt. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Sri Garib Dass

(B.O.R.I. 638): Manuscript of the _Prameyakamalamārtanda_ of Shri Prabhācandra,

(B.O.R.I. 836): Manuscript of the _Prameyakamalamārtanda_ of Shri Prabhācandra,

(3) _sārvesu nirākānksatvāt_

(4) It (anyāpoha) can be called ‘a negative abstraction from others’.

(5) _Anyāpoha_ can be called ‘a negative abstraction from others’.

(6) In the text, we can see “anāgamanānyāhetukatvam”, however, it cannot be correct
according to the context, so it should be read as “anāgamanānyāhetukatvam” or
“anāgamanānyāhetukatvam”.

According to the B. O. R. I. 638: 270a and the B. O. R. I. 836: 327a, we can see “anāgamanam
anyahetukatvam”, but we should read it as “anāgamanam anyāhetukatvam” on the basis of
the context and the _SVR_: 829.12.