PART I
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

An Attempt Is Made in This Chapter to Take an Account of the Researches Done on the Related Issues of the Topic of the Present Thesis and to Identify the Issues to Be Discussed in This Thesis

1. 0. 0:

It is well known that the *Sambandhaparikśā* (that is to say, the *Sambandhaparikśāprakaraṇa*) written by Dharmakīrti (circa AD 7th century) can be seen in the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda* in the *Prameyakalamārītaṇḍa* by Prabhācandra (Digambara sect, circa AD 10th-11th century), which is the commentary on the *Parikśāmukhasūtra* by Māṇikyanandin (Digambara sect, circa AD 9th-10th century) who was the first writer condensing the subject in the form of aphorisms with taking materials from Akalanka’s works (who is a very famous Jaina logician in the Digambara sect in the 8th century).

The beginning of the research on the *Sambandhaparikśā* by Dharmakīrti can be traced back to Professor Frauwallner’s research, who found the *Sambandhaparikśā* quoted in the *Śyādvādaratnākāra* by Vādidevasūri (Śvetāmbara sect, circa AD 11th-12th century) which was including 22 kārikās (from the 1st to the 22nd of the *Sambandhaparikśā*). According to the literature on the *Sambandhaparikśā* in Tibetan, it has 25 kārikās (from the 1st to the 25th) with some commentaries: the *Vṛtti* by Dharmakīrti, the *Anusāra* by Śaṅkarānanda (circa AD the 9th-10th century) and the *Tikā* by Vinitadeva (circa AD 8th century). We can get two Tibetan translations of the verses of the *Sambandhaparikśā*, because the translator of the *Sambandhaparikśā* and the *Vṛtti* into Tibetan differs from that of the *Sambandhaparikśā* and the *Anusāra* into Tibetan. Professor E. Frauwallner
translated the *Sambandhaparikṣā* with the *Vṛtti*, which is the Tibetan literature, into German, and revised it with referring to the *Syādvādaratṇākara* by Vādidevasūri in 1934.\(^{12}\)

With this as a turning point, in Japan Prof. E. Kanakura translated the *Sambandhaparikṣā* with the *Vṛtti* into Japanese\(^ {13}\) and Mr. Y. Shimizu also did it\(^ {14}\), and many scholars researched it, but all these studies on the *Sambandhaparikṣā* often fail to grasp the research as the Sanskrit literature, because, in my view, it seems that they were studied mainly according to the Tibetan literature; besides, we can see some scholars in their researches mistake the part of the *Sambandhaparikṣā* in the *Sambandhasadbhāvāvāda* for all the *Pūrvaṇa* in it, so that we cannot say that the *Sambandhasadbhāvāvāda* in the *Prameyakamalamārtanda* has been researched in detail. It is not too far from the truth to say that there is no research done so far on the *Sambandhasadbhāvāvāda* in the *Prameyakamalamārtanda* as the Sanskrit document. Moreover, we do not find any research on the *Uttarapakṣa* of Prabhācandra’s *Sambandhasadbhāvāvāda*.

Professor V. N. Jha, the director at the Centre of the Advanced Study in Sanskrit in the University of Pune (Poona) and my reverend Guru, translated the *Sambandhaparikṣā* in the *Prameyakamalamārtanda* by Prabhācandra into English, and published it in 1990. He treats it in his research\(^ {15}\) as a Sanskrit document by Dharmakirti, as is very important, because the original of the *Sambandhaparikṣā* by Dharmakirti was written in Sanskrit. Moreover Professor V. N. Jha explains in it the theory of the relation (*sambandha*), comparing the realism with the idealism in Indian philosophy. His explanation is very useful for us to understand the basic theory of the relation (*sambandha*) in the content of Indian logic and epistemology. In Japan also, Dr. H. Yaita in his recent survey\(^ {16}\) on the *Tarkarahasya* has taken

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some important steps in this direction, in this text (Tarkarahasya) he found out the missing kārikās (from the 23rd to the 25th)\(^{(17)}\) of the Sambandhaparikṣā in the Sanskrit literatures. His research is done on the basis of a careful observation according to the Buddhist's idea. These two scholars' achievements were roughly contemporary with each other.

The purpose of this thesis is to make the translation of the entire Sambandhasadbhāvavāda, both the Pūrvapakṣa\(^{(18)}\) and the Uttarapakṣa, in the Prameyakamalamārtanda by Prabhācandra into English, because a great deal of effort has been made on the research on the Sambandhaparikṣā, and what seems to be lacking, however, is the research on the Jaina theory of the relation (sambandha).\(^{(19)}\)

The primary texts I have used here are the following:

_Prameyakamalamārtanda_ of Shri Prabhācandra


1.0.1:

Most of the contents of the Pūrvapakṣa in the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda by Prabhācandra are approximately equal to the contents of the Sambandhaparikṣā.

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and the Vṛtti by Dharmakirti, moreover, they are equal to the contents of the Syādvādaratnākara, V, 8 by Vādidevasūri, as is well known. In the Pūrva-pāksa of the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda, altogether, Prabhācandra brings forward arguments to demonstrate the nonexistence of the relation (sambandha) in accordance with Dharmakirti’s theory in the Sambandhaparīkṣā, of course, this is not the Jaina theory of the relation (sambandha) and so he carries on the arguments from a Buddhist standpoint.

Dharmakirti’s theory that a relation is an imagination is very clear. To put it in simple words, his basic thought on the relation (sambandha) is that we imagine a thing (R) between an existence (A) and an existence (B) as a relation (sambandha). When the phenomenal world consists of these three things (A, B and R between the two) and they are real existent, if we do not accept the existence of the relation (R) between the two things (A and B, that is to say, relata), then we can deny the existence of the relata (intended as what are connected with each other directly) related to the relation (R) and automatically the relata (A and B) cannot be existent in reality, either. In the Pūrvapāksa in the Sambandhāsadbhāvavāda, Prabhācandra presents Dharmakirti’s theory of the relation as given in the Sambandhaparīkṣā and the Vṛtti. According to this theory the imaginations (kalpanā) show A and B as if these are connected by R although A and B are not connected in reality, since there are mere mental construction, and hence false. In this way, the Pūrvapāksa is presented in the Sambandhāsadbhāvavāda by Prabhācandra and the theory of the Jainas is elaborated in the Uttarapāksa by him.

The number of karikās in the Sambandhaparīkṣā by Dharmakīrti quoted in the Sambandhāsadbhāvavāda by Prabhācandra is twenty-two (that is to say, from the 1st to the 22nd), similarly, that in the Syādvādaratnākara V, 8 by Vādidevasūri.
is twenty-two. In this case, we should not judge that the Prameyakamalamārtanda
is a Sanskrit document with three kārikās from the 23rd to the 25th missing just
because these three kārikās of the Sammbndhaparikṣā in Tibetan literature cannot
be seen in the Pūrvapakṣa in the Sambnadhāsadbhāvavāda in the text by
Prabhācandra. Because in order to deduce the reason why the kārikās from the
23rd to the 25th of the Sambandhaparikṣā cannot be seen in the
Sambandhasadbhāvavāda and the Syādvādaratnākara, V 8, we have to suppose
many cases and make each of the cases clear. However, it is very difficult to
investigate the matter. Moreover, in the existing researches some scholars changes
the description in the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda in the
Prameyakamalamārtanda on the basis of the description in the Tibetan literature
on purpose, but we are misled if we do not understand that the Pūrvapakṣa of the
Sambandhasadbhāvavāda in the Prameyakamalamārtanda is written by
Prabhācandra. In other words, this means that it is a Jaina text and we should not
overlook the matter.

The following serves as an example:

\[ \text{tadbhāvabhāvāt tatkāryagatiṃ yāpy anuvartnyate,} \]
\[ \text{sanketavịṣayākhyā sā sāṣṇāder gogatir yathā. } \]
\[ //15// \text{ (Type A)} \]
\[ (\text{de yod yod phyir de 'bras rtogs } / /) \]
\[ \text{gang yang rjes su smra ba yi } / / \]
\[ \text{brda yi yul du de brjod de } / / \]
\[ \text{lkog shal la sosgs glang rtogs bzhin } / / \) \]

The sentence underlined in the 15th kārika above (Type A) can be seen in
the Sambandhaparikṣā in Tibetan literature and the Syādvādaratnākara, V, 8, of

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course, the meaning of these two descriptions is same. On the other hand, we can see the following description in the *Pūravapakṣa* of the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda* in the *Prameyakamalamārtanda* by Prabhācandra:

\[
tadbhāvabhāvāt tatkāryagatī yāpy anuvaryate,
\]

\[
sanketaviṣayākhyā sā sāsanāder gogatī yathā. //15// (Type B)
\]

<TRANSLATION>

So, what you have explained as understanding of the effect on the basis of the logic of presence and absence of what is intended as the cause and the effect is simply an object of linguistic convention as one understands a cow from the linguistic expression ‘go’ on the basis of a dewlap (sāsnā) and so on. //15//

Which is the better of the two above, Type A or Type B? According to the content of these sentences, it is possible to accept both of them. However, in this thesis we have to treat the concerned sentence as the description in the *Pūravapakṣa* of the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda* in the *Prameyakamalamārtanda* by Prabhācandra, so let us adopt the description “tadbhāvabhāvāt” in order to understand this kārikā. Moreover, when we investigate two manuscripts in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, we can see the description “tadbhāvabhāvāt” in *PKM* (B.O.R.I. 638): 266b\(^2\) and also “tadbhāvabhāvatakāryagatī” in *PKM* (B.O.R.I. 836): 324a\(^3\)\(^4\), namely, we can find out the context equal to Type B in these two manuscripts. The concerned kārikā represents just the theory of the invariable concomitance, if we understand the theory of *anvaya-vyāpti* and *vyatireka-vyāpti* exactly, we cannot misunderstand the context in this case. Both Type A and Type B are not incorrect. In this way, there are many interesting places in comparing the description in the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda* by Prabhācandra with the parallels among the
Sambandhaparikṣā by Dharmakirti and the Syādvādaratnākara, V, 8 by Vādidevasūri; besides, the contents of the Sambandhaparikṣā and the Vṛtti by Dharmakirti in the Tibetan literature is very similar to that of the Syādvādaratnākara, V, 8 by Vādidevasūri than that of the Pūrvapakṣa of the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda in the Prameyakamalamārtanda by Prabhācandra, but, roughly speaking, they are similar to one another.

In this thesis, however, we are going to put more emphasis on the philosophy of relations.
NOTES IN CHAPTER I

\(^{(1)}\)Potter[1995]

\(^{(2)}\)It can be seen in Prabhācandra’s commentary on the 6th sūtra in the chapter IV in the *Pariṣṭumukhasūtra*, which is as follows:

\[ \text{parāparavivartavyāprāvṛtyam ūrdhvatā mṛd iva sthāsādiṣu.} \]

\(^{(3)}\)Indra Candra Shastri says: “Prabhācandra is well known as the author of the *Prameyakalamārtanda* and the *Nyāyakumudacandra*. The former is a commentary on the *Pariṣṭumukhasūtra* by Māṇikyanandin and the latter on the *Laṅghyāstraya* by Akalaṅka. It appears that Prabhācandra wrote a commentary on the *Tattvārthādhisūtra* also. The authorship of the *Śāktaśīva-Vyāsa* also is ascribed to him; but it is not confirmed as yet.

The subject matter of the *Prameyakalamārtanda* is the same as that of the *Pariṣṭumukhasūtra*. It criticises all the non-Jaina systems at great length. Its style of refutation is rather destructive. Only a small portion of its treatment can be considered as a real contribution. The remaining portion is merely the wrangling of words. One cannot place it at par with Vidyānandin or Akalaṅka. Nevertheless, the composition represents the tendency of that age. Its influence on Vādidevasūri, in his *Syadvādaratnākara*, is clear.

The *Nyāyakumudacandra* is written in a fluent and clear language. The author has tried to follow Vidyānandin and Anantavirya in it, but how far he has succeeded is a matter to be judged; unlike Vidyānandin he does not try to clarify his own view but indulges in refutation of others by creating a labyrinth of alternatives; a big number of which is useless.

Unlike the *Prameyakalamārtanda*, the *Nyāyakumudacandra* is not written on any definite plan. The discussion of one and the same problem is scattered over many places.” (Shastri[1990]: 43)

Dr. Satkari Mookerjee says: “As regards Prabhācandra’s works, they are literally formidable for their abstruse array of the arguments and their forbidding language which has neither grace nor literary charm.” (PM(b): xi)

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The Parikṣāmukhasūtra is the only work attributed to Māṇikyanandin. But, it has immortalized the author. It is the first aphorism on the Jaina logic. Māṇikyanandin has put in it the logic of Akalanka in clear and precise terms. It has two commentaries of the Prameyaratnamalā and the Prameyakamalamārtanda which are widely studied in the Digambara institutions. They serve the purpose of elementary and detailed studies respectively. The Parikṣāmukhasūtra exercises a great influence amongst the logicians, both the Śvetāmbaras as well as the Digambaras. It is divided into six chapters of Pramāṇa, Parokṣa, Prameya, Phala and Pramānābhaśa. Māṇikyanandin introduced the condition of ‘apūrva’ (not already cognized) in his definition of pramāṇa and thus excluded the repeating cognition (dhārāvāhi jñāna) from the category of pramāṇa. He might have followed Akalaṅka in this respect, who adopted it under the influence of Kumārila. But, it was accepted by all the later Digambara scholars while the Śvetāmbaras did not concede to it. This is the only point in the definition of pramāṇa that differentiates the two traditions. Māṇikyanandin has also criticised Prajñākara for his theory of the effect existing before the cause. The Parikṣāmukhasūtra leaves into the Āgamic treatment entirely as far as the theory of knowledge is concerned. It does not refer to the five types of knowledge with their subdivisions of avagraha etc. anywhere. It divides pramāṇa into pratyakṣa and parokṣa with their subdivisions as suggested by the logic of Akalaṅka, including the Āgamic types in various categories. It follows Akalaṅka also in defining the terms of syllogism. Vidyānandin and Māṇikyanandin are staunch followers of Akalaṅka and therefore have striking resemblance in their definitions." (Shastri[1990]: 41-42)

(9) Nagasaki[1988]

(7) SVR: 812-820

(8) Potter[1995], Shastri, Indra Candra[1990], and so on.

(9) "Dharmakirtis Sambandhaparikṣā, Text und Übersetzung", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes No. 41. (Frauwallner[1934])

(10) Tsukamoto, Keisho & Matsunaga, Yukei & Isoda, Hirofumi [1990]
Professor Frauwallner in his research chose and investigated the different translation of the Sambandhaparikṣā in the Anusāra, and he published it. And, the translator of the Sambandhaparikṣā ant the Vṛttī in Tibetan is the same who translated the Sambandhaparikṣā ant the Tīkā into Tibetan; moreover, we can notice that Vādidevasūri, roughly speaking, gives his commentary on the Sambandhaparikṣā in his Syādvādārāmākara, V, 8 in accordance with the Vṛttī by Dharmakīrti. Professor Frauwallner in his research uses these materials above in his German translation of the Sambandhaparikṣā and the Vṛttī. (Frauwallner[1934] & Kanakura[1973])


(14) 「Dharmakīrti “Sambandhaparikṣā”の和訳解説」（「仏教學研究」37, pp. 21-53.）(Shimizu[1981])

(15) The Philosophy of Relations, Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series No. 66, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, A Division of Indian Books Centre. (Jha, V. N.[1990])


(17) saṃyoga-ādy-āśraye yogyaṃ ayogyam tac ca jāyate,

nityam yogya-svabhāvasya tad-vaikalya-virodhataḥ. //23//

(sbyor ba la sogs pa yi gnas //

rung ba'i dngos po de 'gyur na //

rung ba'i dngos po rtag na ni //

de dang bral bar 'gal phyir ro //23)

iti tad-yogyatā-vācyay svabhāvo asya nirucyatām,

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vibhāga-yoga-gatibhiḥ kim anyair gamana-ādibhiḥ. //24//

(de [255b7] bas bral dang ldan pa dang //

'gros sogs rung ba brjod pa na //

ngo bo 'di la nges par brjod //

'gro sogs gzhan rtogs ci zhid bya / 24)

teṣu satavy api tasya iti sambhandasya aprasiddhitah,
yuktah svabhāva-bheda ayam tat pratikṣaṇa-janmanām. //25//

(de dag rnams la yod na yang //

'di'i zhes 'brel pa mi 'grub phyir //

skad cig so sor skye ba yi //

drngos po tha dad 'di yin rigs / 25)

(18) In all existing researches we can see only the 70 percent of the translation of the
Pūrvapākṣa in the Sambhandhasādibhāvavāda, namely, the rest of the Pūrvapākṣa (the 30
percent of it, to put it concretely, PKM: 511'-514') has not been translated yet.

(19) However, we should not overlook Dr. Satkari Mookerjee's research, he published
the results of his research work on the relations (sambandha) in the Jainism: see the chapter
VII in his The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism (Mookerjee[1944]: 177-211). Dr.
Satkari Mookerjee gives an outline of the Jaina theory of the relations, referring to the
Pūrvapākṣa and Uttarapākṣa in the Sambhandhasādibhāvavāda in the
Premeyakalamārtanda and the Nyāyakamudacandra. This research is very good and
wonderful, but, unfortunately, it does not include the translation of the
Sambhandhasādibhāvavāda in the Premeyakalamārtanda.

In addition to this research, he gave another two researches regarding to the
universals in the same publication: The Nyāya Conception of Universals (Mookerjee[1944]:
212-265) and The Jaina Conception of Universals (Mookerjee[1944]: 266-286). We should
read these excellent achievements.
CHAPTER II
CHAPTER II

INDIAN REALISM AND IDEALISM:

THE INDIAN NOTION OF REALITY

2.0.0: The Existence and the Non-existence of the Form (Ākāra) of the Mind

What is knowledge accepted by us? About this question, there is a viewpoint whether the knowledge is possessed of the form (ākāra) of its content or not. If the answer is ‘yes’, it is the theory called sākārajñānavāda and if the answer is ‘no’, the theory is called nirākārajñānavāda.

Nirākārajñānavāda is that our consciousness is pure and not possessed of any form just like a clear crystal and a clear slate. When we cognise the external object, the consciousness never loses its own nature, and it itself never changes. This means that to know something is to get external objects reflected in our consciousness. Therefore, so long as the knowledge can arise, the objects are real things in this world. On the other hand, sākārajñānavāda is that our mind is not just like a clear crystal and a clear slate but it is possessed of some forms. This means that to know something is to know things of mind.

In this way, in the Indian philosophy nirākārajñānavāda takes the position of realism, and sākārajñānavāda takes the position of idealism.

2.0.1: Nirākārajñānavāda

We can find the theory of sākāra and nirākāra in some introductions to the Indian philosophy in the late period, especially, in the introduction to the Buddhist theory. For example, about the Vaibhāṣikas’ idea (the Sarvāstivādin’s
idea), Gunaratna (Śvetāmbara sect, circa AD 14th-15th century)\(^\text{(1)}\) in his *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* (the commentary on the *Śaṭḍarśanasamuccaya* by Haribhadra) says:\(^\text{(2)}\)

‘The apprehension (*bodha*) is formless (*nirūkāra*) and concomitant of the object and dependent on one totality (as one of the requirements for cognition), and it is an instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) for the object.’

The doctrine above is called *anākārajñānāvāda*, or *nirūkārajñānāvāda*, namely, the doctrine that the perception of the outer world does not arise from the image impressed on the mind. This doctrine can be traced back to the doctrine in the *大毘婆沙論* \(^\text{(3)}\): the knowledge cannot know the knowledge itself about the momentary knowledge, namely, regarding a moment of the knowledge, as is well known.\(^\text{(4)}\) The Vaibhāṣikas hold the theory that two knowledges cannot arise at the same time and there is no knowledge things independently of knowledge exist outside and when knowledge arises it is without any form and the outside objects reflect in the knowledge. This idea is called the realism, or the *nirūkārajñānāvāda* which is said by some philosophical schools in India, especially by the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jainas, and so on. However, it does not seem that from the beginning they emphasize that the knowledge has no form, because the idea about *nirūkāra* cannot be organized without the idea about *sākāra*, namely, the idea that the knowledge has the form. The *nirūkārajñānāvāda* accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas is criticized by the Sautrāntikas, the Vijñānavādins, and so on, who hold the *sākārajñānāvāda*, while the *sākārajñānāvāda* is also criticized from the realistic standpoint. Moreover, some bring forward arguments in the light of the relationship between the form (*ākāra*) and the knowledge (*jñāna*).
2.0.2: Sākārajñānavāda

About the Sautrāntikas’ idea, Guṇaratna in his Tarkarahasyadīpikā says:(5)

‘The external object cannot be perceived eternally, however, since the object of the knowledge cannot arise without the external object, it (the external object) is grasped as sat.’

And, he says about the Yaugācāras’ idea:(6)

‘There is no external object. Because it is the knowledge only that is truth.’

Moreover, about the Sautrāntikas’ idea and the Yaugācāras’ idea, he says:(7)

‘The apprehension (bodha) being of the form (sākāra) is an instrument of valid knowledge (pramāṇa).’

In this way, Guṇaratna gives an example of the difference of the two ideas.

Mokṣākaragupta (circa AD 11th-12th century)(8), who accepts the idea that the knowledge is possessed of the form, in his Tarkabhasā says:(9)

‘If the knowledge is not admitted as endowed with an image, it is not possible to establish (the existence of) the objects separated from one another because such a knowledge would remain the same without the image of each object.’(10)

In this case, one may raise an objection by saying that even in the case of nirākārajñānavāda, though the knowledge itself is possessed of no form, since it reflects the object, it is hardly possible that the distinction of the objects can be formed. But the Sautrāntikas supporting the theory of kṣanikatva say:(11)

‘In the apprehension of a blue object, there are two kinds of knowledge
involved — image of the blue object and the consciousness of the
blue. The image of blue is determined as different from the image of
non-blue. This is regarded as the source. The consciousness of blue
is determined as distinct from the consciousness of non-blue. This
latter knowledge is the resultant cognition (pramiti). As is stated (by
Dharmakirti): The resemblance of the mental image to its object is
the source of knowledge and the apprehension of the object is the
effect of knowledge. However, this distinction is maintained by
conceptual determination (only). In reality, there is no such distinction.
As is stated by (Dharmakirti): The same indeterminate knowledge is
a cause and effect both. Knowledge endowed with an image is
worth considering.\(^{(12)}\)

Moreover, they say: \(^{(13)}\)

‘The Sautrāntikas hold that everything is of the nature of consciousness.
All that is manifested in the form of blue and so on is consciousness
itself and not an external object since a material (external) object
lacks the capacity of manifestation. In this connection, it is also
added: Sensible is not perceptible itself although it gives rise to the
knowledge with a form of it.\(^{(14)}\)

This tells that the nirākārajñānavāda is rejected because the objects which
lack the capacity of manifestation cannot be perceived or grasped. In this case, the
lacking of the capacity of manifestation, that is to say, not being perceived or not
being grasped means that the object does not appear clearly in our mind. And, one
may further raise an objection by saying that if whatever is manifested is nothing
but consciousness, then how can it be ascertained that there is an external object.\(^{(15)}\)
The Sautrantikas answer:\(^{(16)}\)

'It is answered that the existence of the external world is proved by means of the method of difference. In fact, the blue forms and so on are not apprehended everywhere and at every time. It is also not consistent to hold that they come into existence by their material causes since it cannot be explained that this only occurs pertaining to a definite object? Therefore, it may be concluded that apart from the immediately preceding causes, there must be some other cause of these, due to which, these arise at some place and at some time only. That something is the external object.'\(^{(17)}\)

In this way, the Sautrantikas regard the existence of the external object which cannot be perceived directly, while the Vijñānavādins do not accept the existence. The Vijñānavādins say that the vāsanā, which accumulates in our mind from the previous, produces the form in our mind. Guṇaratna in his Tarkabhāṣā summarizes briefly the Yaugacāravādins' standpoint in the following:\(^{(18)}\)

'The blue, the yellow, and so on appear on the basis of the impression left in the mind (vāsanā), because ālayavijñānā supports all the impression left in the mind. The purification of ālayavijñānā is the very final beatitude.'

Therefore we can call the yaugacāravāda a vijñānavāda, that is to say, it is an idealism.

According to the idea accepted by the Vijñānavādins, we can say that both the grāhaka and the grāhya are in our mind. And, Vijñānavādins' final beatitude can be seen in the Trimśikā Vijñaptimātrasiddhi, which is as follows:\(^{(19)}\)
‘Consciousness when no longer cognises the object of cognition attains to the state of consciousness pure, there being no object for not cognising it. //28//

Non-cognition, non-perception, supramundane is such consciousness (and) the substratum tracks back in two ways when the dausṭhulyas wave away. //29//

Such unimaginable ‘dhātu’ is faultless, good and unchangable (it is) happiness, ‘nirvāṇakāya’, called the dharma of the great sage. //30//(20)

Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika says that avidyā causes the confusion: the grāhya and the grāhaka arise in our mind. (21) And, he says: (22)

‘In spite of non-distinction, as if the knowledge itself were seen to be possessed of the grāhya, the grāhaka and the samvitti by those who cherish the illusion. //354/’

And,

‘The establishment of the prameya, pramāna and pramiti is regarded (, though it is not true in reality), however, though it is avidyamāna, and it is regarded because of considering the grāhya, the grāhaka and the sanvid. //357//’ (23)

This idea originated in Dignāga’s idea (circa, AD the 6th century) in his Pramāṇasamuccaya, I, 11, which is as follows: (25)

‘Whatever appears (in our mind) is the prameya, moreover, the grāhaka and the samvitti are equal to the pramāna and the phala respectively. Therefore, these three cannot be regarded as the separateness respectively.’

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This means the following:

\[ \text{pramāṇa} = \text{prameya} = \text{pramiti} \]

Therefore, we can accept that Dharmakirti has inherited his idea from the above. By the way, Dignāga in his 「観所縁論」(Ālambanaparikṣā) explains the prameya in our mind, which is as follows: \(^{(26)}\)

‘The internal form to be known appears as if it were existent in the outside world, it is the object. Because it (antarjñeya) is the form of the consciousness and the causal factor of the consciousness.’

And, Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya defines the perception (pratyakṣa) as “pratyaksam kalpanāpodham”, as is well known. \(^{(27)}\) Dharmakirti in his Nyāyabindu adds “abhṛnta” to Dignāga’s definition, this is also well known: “pratyaksam kalpanāpodham abhṛntam”. \(^{(28)}\) Dharmakirti tries to exclude the illusion from the perception (pratyakṣa) as the instrument of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), and it is well known that he says that the object of the perception must be possessed of the causal efficiency (arthakriyā). However, we should not overlook that the exclusion of the illusion has to be considered on the assumption that the object as an existence outside subjectivity exists in the world. Though the external object cannot be cognised directly, the existence can be inferred, as is the standpoint accepted by the Sautrāntikas.

According to Dignāga’s idea, since the form of the object appearing in the knowledge and the knowledge are of inevitable relationship, the former is the cause of the latter, and the former proceeds the latter in the appearance. He does not say that the form of the object appears in our mind because of the external object, though it is produced through the sense-organs. And, Dharmakirti in his Pramāṇaviniścaya says: \(^{(29)}\)
Both the blue and the knowledge (dhi) are of no distinction, because we agree that both are known at the same time. In the case of the non-perception of the object, the seeing the object cannot be accomplished.'

He does not say that we cognise the object because of the existence of the object, that is to say, he proves the vijnaptimatra.

2.1.0: Vijnaptimatra

Let us briefly see the idea of the vijnaptimatra in the VimsatiKÄ Vijnaptimaturasiddhi by Vasubandhu:(30)

'It is all mere ideation because the non-existing things appear as seemingly the external objects as persons having bad eyes see non-real hair, texture and the like.'(31)

In this way, the Vijnaptivadins do not say that the vijnapti can be untrustworthy, in other hand, there arises an objection by those who accept that the external object is the real existence, which is as follows:(32)

'If the consciousness (is the only truth) without the external object, then, their spatial and temporal determination as well as the indetermination of the stream of the consciousness and their action (or usefulness) should all be unfounded.'(33)

And, the Vijnaptivadins reply:(34)

'The determinations of space and so on are established as in a dream. And so also on the analogy of the ghosts, the determination of 'santana' gets established. As if all of the ghosts perceive the rivers full with SATO 22
filth and the like. //3//

The usefulness (of the apprehended objects held unreal) is explained on the analogy of a sinful action in a dream. On seeing the hell-guards (narakaupa) and in view of the fact of their keeping others in submission. //4//"(35)

The Sautrāntikas accept that we cannot perceive the external object directly but infer the existence, and so they put a question 'Existence or non-existence is determined on the basis of the means of valid knowledge and of all the means of valid knowledge, perception is the strongest, and if any external object does not exist then how is it that there is perception of it?"(36) Against this question, the Vijñaptivādins reply:

'Perception happens as in a dream and the like. And when that (perception) occurs, the content thereof is not perceived, and how can you claim that perception has occurred.'(37)

Vasubandhu in his commentary explains the above.(38)

'And when such perception to the effect that "I perceive this" occurs, the content thereof is no longer perceived, perception is determined by the manoviṇāna and the eye-consciousness at that time, must have ceased. In that case, how could you call it a (cease of) perception at all? Colour, taste and the like of an everchanging object do cease (at that time, that is to say, when such perception occurs)."(39)

The Sautrāntikas say that we cannot perceive the external existence but infer it, while the Vijñaptivādins deny the object and say:(40)

'The negation of perceived objects in a dream is not known till one

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awakes from sleep. \(17\)

And, Vasubandhu in his commentary explains the above:\(^{42}\)

‘In the same manner, the biotic force (vāsanā) born of a (long persistent) habit of making wrong constructions, lulls people into a slumber, as it were, as in the case of a dream, they also perceive things not existing in reality and till they are awake (from such a sleep) do not realise the exact nature of things. But when they get awake after having attained the supersensuous indeterminate knowledge which is just the opposite of that (aforesaid stage of slumber, that is to say, which contradicts false knowledge born of wrong construction) and on the heel of it (or having attained such stage) they develop a pure (though) mundane knowledge and by virtue of that, they realise properly the negation of objects (and therefore), it is equal (to a dream).’\(^{43}\)

Here, they give suggestions that the aim of receiving the training is to enter the world of vijnaptimātra from the daily and worldly experience which can be likened to a dream. And they say ‘In a dream the “citta” becomes “blinded” with the “sloth” (of sleep) and so the result is different.’\(^{44}\)

2. 1. 1: The Structure of the Consciousness Accepted by the Vijnaptivādins

Well, let us see briefly the structure of the consciousness accepted by the Vijnaptivādins in the Trimśikā Viṃśaptimagrasiddhi by Vasubandhu.

The Trimśikā shows briefly the structure of the consciousness and explains our daily and worldly experience and the status of the salvation from the bondage
of this world, as is well known.

The *Trimsikā* says: *(45)*

'The various constructions (or impositions) as the soul or the elements (which are) prevalent, amongst the people and in the śāstra are but the development of vijñāna, or consciousness. And the development of the consciousness is of three kinds. //1//

This threefold (parināma) is called, vipāka, manana and visayavijñāpti. Among them, vipāka (parināma of moral causation) is the consciousness called ālaya which functions as the store-house of the seeds of all entities (imbued with the nature of restlessness to manifest). //2//

The vipāka is also called mūlavijñāna, ādānavijñāna, and so on, which lasts as long as the cycle of reincarnation continues. And, the ālayavijñāna is possessed of the object (ālambana) and the form (ākāra), which is as follows: *(47)*

'That is the consciousness (ālaya) in which ‘upādi’ (the substrate) and ‘sthāna’ (avasthāna = bhājana: the external world) are indistinctly apprehended. It is also associated with sensation (sparśa = contact between the object, the sense-organs and the consciousness), attention (manaskāra), faculty of feeling (vit = vedanā), concepts (saṃjñā = capable of coalescing with a word) and will (cetanā = conscious effort). //3//

The ālaya is the consciousness lying in the depths, and there is the manonāmavijñāna depending on it (ālaya), which is as follows: *(49)*

'It proceeds on, being based upon that. It has that (ālaya) as its

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ālambana and itself called the 'manas' and is of the nature of the cognition. //5b-d//

We can see the theory of ālaya, mano-nāma vijñāna and the concept in the Trimsākā, in which it can be seen that ālaya lasts as long as the cycle of reincarnation continues.

'The vāsanā, or the biotic force of deeds (moral antecedends) alongwith the two-fold grāha-vāsanā, or the biotic force inherent in the two-fold aspect of a self-conscious idea, give rise to the vipāka, or the accomplishment of maturation, the previous one having been worn away. //19//

On the other hand, we should not overlook the following:

'All constructions by reason of their being constructed are but the development of vijñāna and thus (tena) that (what is constructed) does not exist and therefore (tena) all this is but consciousness alone.

//17//

Here, they insist that all the things in this world is produced from the consciousness alone (vijñāntimātra).

Moreover, we should notice that the Trimsākā says three important svabhāvas: parikalpita-svabhāva, paratantra-svabhāva and parinīpanna-svabhāva, and says three important niḥsvabhāvatā: laksāna-niḥsvabhāvatā, utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā and paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā, which is as follows:

'All things that are constructed by various kinds of imagination are 'parikalpita' in essence (in-as-much-as) they do not (essentially exist).

//20//

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The *paratantra* nature means the constructions born of cause and conditions. The state of 'paratantra' ever being free from the previous (parikalpita-svabhāva) is called 'parinispanna'. //21//

And it says:(58)

'It (parinispanna) is, therefore, neither different nor identical with the 'paratantra'. It should not be held like 'anityatā'. This not being perceived, that (one) is not perceived. //22//

Well, what is the *nihsvabhāvatā*? The *Trimsikā* answers that three *nihsvabhāvatās* mean that three *svabhāvas* above (parikalpita-svabhāva, paratantra-svabhāva and parinispanna-svabhāva) are not possessed of their own nature, that is to say, this means *nihsvabhāvatā*, which is as follows:(60)

'Of three essences, having seen three-fold non-essence, non-essence of all elements has been ordained. //23//

The first is non-essence by its characteristics alone and that which exists not by itself is another kind of non-essence. //24//

Absolute of all elements is that since 'tathatā' is that. That being uniform all through, that alone is consciousness pure. //25//

In this way, being content with this vijñānimātratā is attaining higher perception. While it says about an ordinary person's status, it runs as follows:(62)

'The consciousness till it permeates in the consciousness pure, the close attachment of the two-fold grasping does not cease to exist. //26//

Well, what is the stage of the being spiritually awakened? The *Trimsikā* answers as we have seen above (2. 0. 2: *Sākārajñānavāda*), which is as follows:(64)
'Consciousness when no longer cognises the object of cognition attains to the state of consciousness pure, there being no object for not cognising it. //28//

Non-cognition, non-perception, supramundane is such consciousness (and) the substratum tracks back in two ways when the daus̄ṭhulyas wave away. //29//

Such unimaginable 'dhātu' is faultless, good and unchangeable (it is) happiness, 'nirvānākāya', called the dharma of the great sage. //30//

In this way, the theory of the vijñaptimātra is a practical doctrine which is of the aim that we should be content with this vijñaptimātrata as we have seen in the above. We should notice that they aim to try to free from the attachment and the worldly passions.

Dharmakirti also says in his Santānāntarasiddhi that the yogins even cannot be free from the imagination causing the conception of the subject and the object without being spiritually awakened,^{66} namely, the attaining higher perception free from the imagination can be achieved in the stage of the ultimate being spiritually awakened.^{67}

Well, according to the theory accepted by the Viṣṇaptivādins, we should explain the knowledge on the basis of the form (ākāra) in our mind, and, there arises an argument whether the form (ākāra) is in reality existent like the knowledge or the form in in reality non-existent, namely, only the knowledge is truth. The former is called the satyākāravāda and the latter is called the aihākāravāda, as is well known, and the argument about the form (ākāra) has been discussed in the late priod. We can see the satyākāravāda in the theory accepted by the Sāmkhas and the Vedāntins, however, they are not completely equal to the theory by the

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Sautrāntikas, moreover, the theory about the form accepted by the Jainas is different from them. In regard to this theory, we will have a glimpse of the Jaina theory of perception in Chapter III: The Jainism.

2.2.0: The Structure of the Cognition Accepted by the Realists (the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas)

We can call the theory that the object of the cognition exists outside the knowledge (jnāna) ‘realism’, for example, the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Jainas, all these schools adopt this standpoint, as is well known. Especially, with regard to the ontological and the epistemological theory, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas have something in common with each other. Let us briefly see the standpoints of these two schools.

2.2.1: The Definition of the Perception Accepted by the Naiyāyikas

\[\text{indriyārthasannikarṣotpampaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam.} \text{(Nyāyasūtra, I, 1, 4)}\]

‘Perception is the knowledge produced from the contact of the sense-organ with its object, which is determinate, unnamable and non-erratic.’

This is the definition of pratyakṣa accepted by the Naiyāyikas, and the interpretation of this definition has been discussed from the beginning. We can summarize the above as the following:

(1): On the assumption that the mind connects the sense-organs, perception cannot arise unless there is conjunction of the soul with
the mind. \((Nyāyasaūtra, II, 1, 22)\) The soul has not been excluded from our definition, inasmuch as the knowledge is a mark of the soul. \((Nyāyasaūtra, II, 1, 24)\) The mark of the mind is that there do not arise (in the soul) more acts of the knowledge than one at a time. \((Nyāyasaūtra, I, 1, 16)\)

(2): The knowledge of the perception cannot be expressed in words. \(Avyapadeśya\) signifies that the knowledge of a thing derived through perception has no connection with the name which the thing bears.\(^{68}\)

(3): \(avyabhicāri\): In summer the sun’s rays coming in contact with early heat quiver and appear to the eyes of men as water. The knowledge of water derived in this way is not perception. To eliminate such cases the epithet non-erratic has been used.\(^{69}\)

(4): \(vyavasāya\): This epithet distinguishes perception from the indeterminate knowledge; as, for instance, a man looking from a distance cannot ascertain whether there is smoke or dust.\(^{70}\)

Among the above, (1) is a common idea in the realists (the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṃsakas, and so on), but (2) shows a characteristic standpoint of this school. Vātsyāyana (circa AD 4th century)\(^{71}\) in his \(Nyāyabhāṣya\) says: \(^{72}\)

‘Perception is that each sense-organ operates on its object respectively. However, the function is the contact or the knowledge. In the case of the contact, the knowledge is the effect. And, in the case of the knowledge, the \(khāna\), the \(upādāna\), the \(upekṣā\) and the \(buddhi\) are the effects.’

In the above, we can consider that Vātsyāyana regards two kinds of perception.
And he says:\(^\text{(73)}\)

'To all the objects of the perception, the knower possesses the determination (vyavasāya) on the basis of the sense-organs. Subsequently, the consciousness of the perception (anuvyavasāya) on the basis of the mind arises, . . .'

In this way, Vātsyāyana divides perceptual knowledge into two kinds. If we regard this knowledge as the one mentioned above, we can see that he regards the perception as what is of three stages. Moreover, Vācaspatimiśra (circa AD 10th century)\(^\text{(74)}\) in his Ṛṣṭikāparyāṭikā treats the perception as what is of two kinds, as we can see later. I shall have more to say about this point later on.

2. 2. 2: The Definition of the Perception Accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas

Perception starts from the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, this idea can be seen in the Vaiśeṣika school, the Vedānta school, and so on.

The Vaiśeṣikasūtra does not say the definition of the perception apparently, however, we can see the following:

\[ \text{ātmendriyamano’rthasannikarśād yan nispadyate tad anyat. } \]

\(13/1\)\(^\text{(75)}\)

'The thing (knowledge) produced from the contact with the self, the sense-organ, the mind and the object is other (cause of the inference of the existence of the ātman).'

At the present time, this sentence in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra is regarded as the definition the perception (pratyakṣa) in this school. This sūtra is very similar to the definition accepted by the Naiyāyikas, however, we cannot overlook that each

\[ \text{SATO 31} \]
theory of the perception (pratyakṣa) accepted by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas respectively has a point of difference. Now let us see the common thought accepted by both the schools. The perception (pratyakṣa) is the knowledge produced from the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, as we have seen in the above.

The early Vaiśeṣikas accepted six categories of entities (padārtha): the substance (dravya), the quality (guna), the activity (kriya), the generality (sāmānyya), the particularity (viśeṣa) and the inherence (samavāya). This means that the quality (guna) and the activity (kriyā) inhere in the substance (dravya) and the generality (sāmānyya), the particularity (viśeṣa) inhere in the three: the substance (dravya), the quality (guna) and the activity (kriyā). In this way, they regard this inherence (samavāya) is also a padārtha. These padārthas are not the concepts belonging to the subject but the real existence outside the subject. Well how do we accept our cognition and perception?

The Vaiśeṣikasūtra says:(77)

‘(Among the padārthas), it was explained that the knowledge of the substance (was produced from the contact with the sense-organs). //8, 1//

(It was explained that) the mind and the self (were the causes of the knowledge). //8, 2//

The knowledge’s coming into being was explained in the specific mention of the knowledge. //8, 3//'
substance (dravya). However, Candrānanda (circa, AD 7th century)\(^{(78)}\) in his Vṛtti says that the quality and so on do not come into contact with the sense-organs.\(^{(79)}\)

Well, why can it be possible to cognise the quality and so on? The Vaiśeṣikasūtra says:\(^{(80)}\)

‘The cause of the knowledge’s coming into being concerning the quality and the activity not coming into contact with the sense-organs is the substance, and it is the cause of the cause (sannikāra). //8, 4//’

And Candrānanda says:\(^{(81)}\)

‘Because the substance is the inherent cause (samavāyikāraṇa), when they (the quality and the activity) do not come into contact with the sense-organs directly, To the consciousness’s coming into being, the cause of the contact which is the cause of the consciousness is not the quality and son on but the substance. Therefore, the knowledge of the quality and the activity is produced from the inherence in the conjoined (samyuktasamavāya). The term ‘ca’ means the reason.’

According to his commentary, the sense-organs’ coming into contact with the substance means the contact with the quality and with the activity inherent in the substance, however, the sense-organs do not come into contact with the quality and so on directly. Here, we can see that Candrānanda treats the sannikāraṇa as the samyoga, and the Vaiśeṣikasūtra says:\(^{(82)}\)

‘Since there are no generality and particularity in the generality and the particularity, the knowledge arises from that (contact with the substance). //8, 5//’
Candrānanda says:  

‘To the generality ‘sattā’ and so on and the ultimate particularity, the knowledge arises in those who perceive that on the basis of the contact with the substance. However, the knowledge does not arise from the generality and the particularity, because they have no generality and particularity.’

About the knowledge of the substance, the quality and the activity, the Vaiśeṣikasūtra says:  

‘About the substance, the quality and the activity, (the knowledge arises) on the basis of the generality and the particularity. //8, 6//’

And Candrānanda says:  

‘About the substance, the quality and the activity, the knowledge ‘being, or sar’, ‘the substance is’, and so on come into being on the basis of the contact of the substance with the sense-organ, on the basis of the generalities ‘sattā’ and so on, and on the basis of the particularities ‘dravyatva’ and so on. In this sūtra, the generality is ‘sattā’, or being-ness and the particularities are ‘dravyatva’ and so on; it is different from that in the previous sūtra.’

We can see that Candrānanda in his commentary above treats the particularity as the lower, more specific universals excluding the ultimate particularity. In this way, we should notice that there should arises the knowledge of the generality and of the particularity before the knowledge of the substance, of the quality and of the activity, as is the distinguishing characteristic epistemological rule in the Vaiśeṣika school. There cannot arise the knowledge of the substance and so on without the
knowledge of the generality or the particularity, namely, the knowledge ‘dravyam idam’ cannot arise without the knowledge of the ‘dravyatva’.

The knowledge of the generality or the particularity as the viśeṣaṇa (ex. dravyatva) must arise before the knowledge ‘this is a substance.’ as the viśeṣya arises.

The Vaiśeṣikasūtra says:(86)

‘About the substance, (the knowledge arises) on the basis of the substance, the quality and the activity. //8, 7//

This means that about the knowledge of the substance, the viśeṣaṇa is not only the generality and the particularity. However, the way of the knowledge’s arising of the quality and the activity is different from that of the substance. The Vaiśeṣikasūtra says:(87)

‘About the quality and the activity, the knowledge on the basis of the quality and the activity does not arise since the absence of the quality and the activity in them. //8, 8//

And it continues:(88)

‘(For example,) from the inherent white and from the knowledge of the white, the knowledge of the thing which is white arises. The both knowledge are the cause and the effect. //8, 9//’

In this way, the knowledge of the qualified (viśeṣya) depends on the knowledge of the quifier (viśeṣaṇa). The substance, the quality and the activity are the viśeṣyas, and before the knowledge of the substance and so on, the knowledge of the generality and the particularity as the viśeṣaṇa must be needed, as is well known.

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We can say that the Vaiśeṣikas regard the perception (pratyakṣa) as what is of three stages, which is as follows:

(1)<indriyārthaśaṅnikāraśa> — (2)<knowledge of sāmāṇya or sāmāṇya-viśeṣa as viśeṣa> — (3)<knowledge of dravya and so on as viśeṣya (cf. This is a cow.)>

In this process the first and second stage; ‘indriyārthaśaṅnikāraśa’ and ‘knowledge of viśeṣaṇa’ are known as “pre-predicative perception” (nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa), namely, “indeterminate perception”. And the stage (3) is known as “predicative perception” (savikalpa-pratyakṣa), namely, “determinate perception”, for example, it is the knowledge “this is a substance”. The cause of the knowledge seen in (3) is the knowledge of the generality ‘dravyatva’ seen in the stage (2). We can see the fact that both the generality and the particularity can be perceived in this world. For example, Śridhara (circa AD the 10th century) in his Nyāyakāndali says:

‘The perceptual awareness (ālocana) of svarūpa means only the grasping and the perception free from the conception. Because if the nature of the thing (vastusvarūpa) cannot be grasped on the basis of the indeterminate knowledge, then the determinate knowledge cannot arise, either, since the memory signifying it (the nature of the thing) is absent in that case. Therefore, when the determinate is desired, the indeterminate also should be desired.’

The nature of the thing (vastusvarūpa) in the above is regarded as the generality, for example, it is ‘gotva’ and so on. And the knowledge (gotvajñāna) from this generality (e.g. gotva) is not the knowledge of the words but the knowledge of the real. Praśastapāda (circa AD the 6th century) in his Praśastapādabhāṣya says:
‘. . . The panasatva also exists in (all) the panasas and is excluded from the mango and so on, as has already perceived.’

And Śridhara says: (93)

‘. . . The panasatva also exists in (all) the panasas and is excluded from the mango and so on, as has already perceived. It has already perceived by the indeterminate.’

According to these contexts, the panasatva which cannot be expressed in words can be perceived by the sense-organs. This is also the knowledge free from the conception. Here, the panasatva is the real. However, in this case above, the knowledge ‘asya panasatvam, or panaso ‘yam’ cannot arise because of the absence of the words. About these researches, see the researches by Miyamoto[1996a], Murakami[1997], and so on.

2. 3. 0: Avyapadeśya

Let us turn to the definition of the perception by the Naiyāyikas. They say:

\[ \text{indriyārthaṃ sannikārotpannam jñānam avyapadesyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ prayaksam. (Nyāyāsūtra, I, 1, 4)} \]

‘Perception is the knowledge produced from the contact of the sense-organ with its object, which is determinate, unnamable and non-erratic.’

We can summarize the above as the following, as has been seen in 2. 2. 1:

(1): On the assumption that the mind connects the sense-organs, perception cannot arise unless there is conjunction of the soul with the mind. (Nyāyāsūtra, II, 1, 22) The soul has not been excluded
from our definition, inasmuch as the knowledge is a mark of the soul. (Nyāyasūtra, II, 1, 24) The mark of the mind is that there do not arise (in the soul) more acts of the knowledge than one at a time. (Nyāyasūtra, I, 1, 16)

(2): The knowledge of the perception cannot be expressed in words. 

Avyapadesya signifies that the knowledge of a thing derived through perception has no connection with the name which the thing bears.

(3): avyabhicāri: In summer the sun’s rays coming in contact with early heat quiver and appear to the eyes of men as water. The knowledge of water derived in this way is not perception. To eliminate such cases the epithet non-erratic has been used.

(4): vyavasāya: This epithet distinguishes perception from the indeterminate knowledge; as, for instance, a man looking from a distance cannot ascertain whether there is smoke or dust.

Among the above, (1) is a common idea in the realists (the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṃsakas, and so on), but (2) shows a characteristic standpoint of this school.

The different point of the definition of the perception between the theory by the Naiyāyikas and that by the Vaiśeṣikas is that the term ‘vyapadesya’ is included in the Nyāyasūtra, while the Vaiśeṣikas hold the theory that the knowledge of the qualified (viśeṣya) is preceded by the knowledge of the qualifier (viśeṣana).

Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyabhāṣya literally understands the term ‘avyapadesya’ as the meaning ‘non-expressive’ in words. On this commentary by Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara (circa AD the 6th century) in his Nyāyavārttika gives no detail

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commentary, and Vācaspatimiśra in his Nyāyavārttikaṭāṭparyāśīka divides the perception (pratyakṣa) into two kinds: avikalpaka, or nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. He regards this knowledge of the object which cannot be expressed in words as the nirvikalpaka, which is as follows:

‘The representation in words (vyāpadeśa) is the qualifier (viṣesana) or the designation (upalakṣaṇa) and name (nāman), genus (jāti), and so on. It means that the object of the indication is expressed and qualified.

... The absence of the thing to be represented is the ‘non-expressive’ (knowledge) in words (avyāpadeśya), it is the grasping the nature of the genus and so on, but it is not the thing which can grasp the relation of the qualifier and the qualified.’

This is very similar to one of the stages of the perception by the Vaiśeṣikas, however, Vācaspatimiśra says that this nirvikalpakapratyakṣa is ‘sabdarahita’ and ‘vinaiva nāmadheyam’, we should notice this point, namely, he maintains the traditional theory of the Nyāya. Anyway, the indeterminate perception is free from the concepts and from the words, we may say here that he adopts the Vaiśeṣika’s theory that the knowledge of the qualified (viṣesya) is caused by the knowledge of the qualifier (viṣesana).

Well, we should not overlook that Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyabhāṣya says: ‘Perception is that each sense-organ operates on its object respectively. However, the function is the contact or the knowledge. In the case of the contact, the knowledge is the effect. And, in the case of the knowledge, the hāna, the upādāna, the upeksā and the buddhi are the effects.’ And he says: ‘To all the objects of the perception, the knower possesses the determination (vyavasāya) on the basis of the sense-organs. Subsequently, the consciousness of the perception (anuvyavasāya)
on the basis of the mind arises, . . .'. We can see that he regards the perception (pratyaksa) as what is of three stages, as has been seen in 2. 2. 1. However, the Naiyāyikas do not regard the theory that the knowledge of the qualified (viśeṣya) is preceded by the knowledge of the qualifier (viśeṣana), as is accepted by the Viśeṣikas. Moreover, according to the theory by the Vaiśeṣikas, the objects are the substance, the quality and the activity, while according to the thoery by the Naiyāyikas, smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are the objects of the sense-organs and qualities of the earth and so on. In this way, we can see that the theory of the perception (pratyakṣa) by the Naiyāyikas in the early time is different from that by the Vaiśeṣikas.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (circa AD the 9th-10th century) in his Nyāyamañjarī gives his idea about the term ‘avyapadeśya’ seen in the Nyāyasūtra, 1, 1, 4. His argument in the Nyāyamañjarī is numerous, so let us see some brief contents. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says,

‘The knowledge of the perception, which is determinate, with the consideration in words, and produced on the basis of the contact with the word, is the knowledge on the basis of the word, as the sūtrakāra doubts as mentioned above and shows that the knowledge of the perception is the knowledge free from the words.’

He shows that avyapadeśya in this case means that it is the knowledge free from the words. As we can see later, Keśavamiśra (circa AD the 13th century) and others in the late period regard the nirvikalpaka as the knowledge free from the words, too.

2. 3. 1: Nirvikalpakapratyakṣa in the Late Period

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When we take a general view of the *pratyakṣa*, held by the schools in the Indian philosophy, we can see two standpoints: one gives weight to the theory of the conception (*vikalpa*), the other does to that of the non-conception. The former is the theory by those who regard the world cognised as the real existence outside the subject, the latter is that by those who do not regard the experienced world as the real.

In the Sāmkhya, it is well known that Vāraṇagāya (circa AD the 3rd-4th century?)\(^{(105)}\) defines the *pratyakṣa* as the *śrotādvṛtta*, and Vindhyavāsin (circa AD the 4th-5th century)\(^{(106)}\) defines it as ‘*śrotādvṛttr avikalpiḥ*’.\(^{(107)}\) This is an old example about the *nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*. Guṇaratna in his *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* says:\(^{(108)}\)

‘The *avikalpiḥ* means to be free from any distinction of name, genus, and so on.’

We can trace the source of this concept back to the *Mahābhāṣya* by Patañjali (circa 2nd century BC)\(^{(109)}\) (especially on pravṛtti, see *MBh*, vol. 1: 19\(^{20-21}\)) and it is in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* by Dignāga saying ‘*pratyaksam kalpanāpoddham nāmajātyādiyojana*’. (on this subject, see Hattori[1968]: 25) In regard to this theory, we will have a glimpse of the Jaina theory of perception in Chapter III.

Well, let us see the development of the theory of *pratyakṣa*, especially, the *nirvikalpakapratyakṣa* posited by the eclectics (of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣiaks) in the late period.

**Keśavamīśra:**

Keśavamīśra in his *Tarkabhāṣā* says:\(^{(110)}\)

(A): ‘Sense-perception is the instrument of the direct cognition;
that right cognition being called ‘direct’ which is brought about by
the agency of the sense-organs. This sense-perception is of two
kinds — (a) Savikalpaka, Determinate of Concrete, and (b)
Nirvikalpaka, Non-determinate or Abstract.\textsuperscript{111)}

‘...; thus then, by the instrumentality of the Sense-organ as
being in contact with the object perceived, there comes about the
non-determinate perception; by which is meant that perception which
is free from all notions of name, genus and such other details, which
manifest (or objectify) the mere thing in itself as ‘something’ (in a
vague form). Of this perception, the Sense-organ is the instrument,
in the same manner as the axe is the instrument of the cutting; and
the contact of the Sense-organ with the object enters into this
perceptional process only as an intermediary secondary factor; just
as the contact of the axe with piece of wood does in the process of
cutting; and the non-determinate perception is the result; like the
cutting by the axe.\textsuperscript{112)}

And,\textsuperscript{113)}

‘The sense-organ-and-object contact is the instrument in those cases
where the above-mentioned vague perception [of the thing as
‘something’] is followed by the corresponding definite perception, in
which the ‘something’ is cognised as having a certain name, —
‘Dittha’ for instance, — as belonging to a particular genus or class
— ‘Brāhmaṇa’, for instance, — and as having in the form ‘this is a
dark-complexioned Brāhmaṇa named Dittha’, wherein are present
the notions of the qualification and the qualified; in this process the
corresponding vague perception constitutes the intermediary factor; and the definite perception is the ultimate result.\(^{(114)}\)

And,\(^{(115)}\)

'\The definite Cognition is followed by the notion of rejectability, acceptability of neutrality with regard to the object perceived [i.e., when we perceive a thing, we feel either that it is worthy only of being abandoned; or that it is worthy of being accepted; or that it is worthy of neither the one nor the other]; and in these notions (which also form a factor in the Perception), the instrument is the corresponding Vague Perception; and in this the Definite Perception enters as the intermediary factor; and the notion of rejectability, &c., form the ultimate result.\(^{(116)}\)

The process of the perception in the above is as follows:

(1): The contact of the sense-organs with the objects

(2): The knowledge of nirvikalpaka (, which is free from the words and the concepts.)

(3): The knowledge of savikalpaka (, which is of of the qualification and the qualified.)

(4): The notion of rejectability, acceptability of neutrality

Among the aboves, we can only infer that (2) is the knowledge which is not possessed of the the qualification and the qualified, since (3) is called savikalpaka being of the qualification and the qualified. In other words, it is not clear that (2) is the knowledge of the qualifier. We can only see here that the knowledge free from the words arises after the contact of the sense-organs with the objects.
Gângeśa: 

Gângeśa (circa AD the 14th century)\(^{(117)}\) in his *Tattvacintāmani* says:\(^{(118)}\)

\[
\text{tac ca pratyakṣam dvividham nirvikalpakaṁ savikalpakaṁ ceti. tatra nāmajātyādiyajanārahitam vaiśiṣṭyānaṅvāgāhi nisprakārakaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ.}
\]

'Perception is of two kinds: the indeterminate (*nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*) and the determinate (*savikalpakapratyakṣa*). The knowledge, which is free from the connection with name, genus, and so on, which does not determine the the qualification and the qualified, and which is not possessed of the epistemic qualifier, is the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka*).'

He defines the *nirvikalpaka* as the mentioned above. We can see 'nāmajātyādiyajanā' in the *Tarkabhāṣā* by Keśavamiśra, too. This expression can be seen in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* by Dignāga, as mentioned above. Well, here, what is 'jāti' called 'nāmajātyādi'? Is it a concept or the real? Gângeśa continues the following:\(^{(119)}\)

‘(If you say that) what is the instrument of the fact that the indeterminate perception is the knowledge and it (the indeterminate) is different from the determinate? Well, the perception is not the instrument, because of the indeterminate’s non-accomplishment and because it is known that it (the indeterminate) is beyond the sense-organs. The behaviour is not the instrument, because it is what is accomplished by the determinate; besides, it is neither the perceptual awareness'}
(ālocana) nor the distinction (determination) (vikalpa) which are from the instrument called the knowledge derived from personal experience (anubhava) that ‘this was not discriminated previously but I discriminate it now’. Because they (ālocana and vikalpa) can be produced from lots of knowledge and unconsciousness of the qualifier.’

And, he treats the knowledge of the qualifier, which is, for example, ‘gotva’, this knowledge of the qualifier is the indeterminate. In this case, the ‘gotva’ is not a concept but an objective thing, that is to say, a real thing in the world, as can be well regarded from the following: \(^{(120)}\)

‘[Objection] You may say that the contact of the cow-ness with the sense-organs is, for us, the cause of the indeterminate, and it is what reminds us of the impression (of the words). [Reply] Well, in this case, because the fixed cause exists. The direct perception (anubhava) of the gotva only will be on the basis of the contact of the gotva with the sense-organs. Because the totality of causes of the direct perception (anubhava) is more influential than that of the remembrance. And it is not the knowledge of the qualified, because the knowledge of the qualifier is previously absent. From these reasons, we call it the indeterminate (nirvikalpaka).’

The knowledge of the qualifier ‘gotva’ has no more knowledge of the qualifier, it is very clear that the gotva can be grasped by the sense-organs, that is to say, it can come in contact with the sense-organs.

And, about the determinate perception Gaṅgesā says:

\[
\text{savikalpaka} \text{ Ci viṣistajñānam yathā gaur ayam iti} \quad \left(1^{21}\right)
\]

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'The determinate is the knowledge of the qualified, for example, the knowledge 'this is a cow'.

The above is the definition of the determinate perception by Gaṅgeśa. In this way, we can see that he regards the perception on the basis of the relation of qualifier and qualificand.

Annambhaṭṭa:

Annambhaṭṭa (circa AD the 17th century) in his Tarkasamgraha says:

'Perception is the peculiar cause of perceptive knowledge. Perceptive knowledge is the knowledge born of the contact of the organ with (external) object. It is two-fold, undifferentiated and differentiated. Of these, undifferentiated is the knowledge of a thing without its qualities, e.g. 'this is something'. Differentiated is the knowledge of a thing with all its qualities, e.g. 'he is Dīthha', 'he is a Brāhmaṇa', 'he is black'.

And he says in his Dīpikā about the instrument of the indeterminate perception:

\[
gaur iti viśiṣṭajñānām viśeṣaṇajñānajanyam viśiṣṭajñānātvasād daṇḍīti jñānavad ity anumānasya pramāṇatvāt. viśeṣaṇajñānasyāpi savikalpakatve 'navasthyāprasaṅgān nirvikalpakasiddhiḥ. (TS: 30)
\]

'The knowledge of the qualified 'go' is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier. Because it is the knowledge of the qualified. For example, it is the knowledge like 'daṇḍin'. This inference is the instrument (of the indeterminate). If the knowledge of the qualifier

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is an indeterminate, it will lead to the endless regression. This is the reason why the indeterminate knowledge can be established.'

The knowledge ‘the man who has a stick’ can arise on the presupposition that there is the knowledge of the qualifier, that is to say, the knowledge of the stick. Similarly, the knowledge ‘this is a cow’ arises on the presupposition that there is the knowledge of the qualifier ‘gotva’.

Viśvanātha:

Viśvanātha (circa AD the 17th century)\(^{(125)}\) in his Bhāṣāpariccheda says:

\[ jñānam yan nirvikalpaākhyam tad atindriyam isyate, \ldots \ (BP, 58) \]

‘The knowledge that is called indeterminate is considered to beyond the senses.’\(^{(126)}\)

And he says in his Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali:\(^{(127)}\)

‘Immediately after the conjunction of the eye etc., it is impossible to have a knowledge like, ‘it is a jar’, about something qualified by jarhood etc. because the knowledge of the qualification ‘jarhood’ etc. is absent before it; and with regard to a qualified knowledge the knowledge of the qualification is a cause. So at first there arises a knowledge which does not comprehend the relation between a jar and jarhood. That is indeterminate knowledge. And it is not perceptible. To be explicit: the perception of knowledge is never without a comprehension of the relation (between the object and its qualification); for (regarding it) we have the experience, ‘I know the jar’. here knowledge is presented in the soul as a feature (prakāra),
as is the jar in respect of the knowledge, and jarhood in respect of the jar. The feature itself is designated as a qualification (*viśesana*).

That which specifies a qualification is called the determinant (*avacchedaka*) of the qualificationhood. The knowledge which is cognisant of this determinant of the qualificationhood as a feature is the cause of the knowledge that a qualified thing is related (to another).

In indeterminate knowledge jarhood etc. are not cognised as features; hence it is not possible for the relation of a jar or the like, which is qualified by jarhood etc. to be cognised in knowledge. Nor can there be qualified knowledge of a jar or the like, in which jarhood etc. are not (cognised as) features; for it is the rule that the knowledge of all categories other than the generic attribute and the unanalysable characteristic (*akhandopādhi*) must have some attribute as its features. *(128)*

And we can see the following in the *Kiranāvali* by Kṛṣṇavallabha:

*nirgato vikalpo viśesanaviśesyaabhavo yasmāt tat nirvikalpakam, . . .* *(NSMu: 194)*

‘Since the conception being possessed of the relation of qualifier and qualifican is absent, it is the indeterminate.’

From the above, we can see the process of knowledge’s coming into being on the basis of the perception, as follows:

(1): The contact of the sense-organs with the objects

(2): The knowledge of the qualifier which is, for example, the delimiter of the jar: *ghatatva* (here, the *vaistya* is not known)
(3): The knowledge of the *viṣṭa*, for example, ‘*ayam ghatah.*’ = *vyavasāya*

(4): The knowledge: ‘ghatam ahām jānāmi.’ = *anuvyavasāya*

(2) is called *nirvikalpaka*, and (3) is called *savikalpaka*, namely, *vyavasāya*.

In this way, the knowledge is not the knowledge of the words, but it is the knowledge of the qualifier (e.g. *ghatavata*) which is regarded as the indeterminate. And, the qualifier is not a concept but the real thing in the world. It is not too much to say that these theories show the typical realism in the Indian philosophy. Another point needs to be underlined here is that all our clear knowledges have contents which are of qualifier and qualificand structure, which involves a ‘Relation’.

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NOTES IN CHAPTER II

(1)SDS (b): General Editorial

(2)निरकारो बोधो 'र्थसाहाब्येकसामग्र्यादिनस तत्तृत्ति प्रमाणम इति।
(SDS, 11, §92; SDS (b): 73)

(3)自性不知_自性_（『大毘婆沙論』卷9；『大正新修大藏経』27. 43a)

(4)Murokumi [1991]: 188

(5)बाह्यो 'र्थो नित्यम् अप्रत्यक्षा एवा, ज्ञानकृत्यथानुपापत्याः तु सन्नवावत्यते। (SDS, 11, §93; SDS (b): 73)

(6)नास्ति बाह्यो 'र्थहः। ज्ञानद्वारास्या इवात्त्त्विकातः। (SDS, 11, §94; SDS (b): 74)

(7)सकारो बोधहः प्रमाणम। (SDS, 11, §93; SDS (b): 73)

(8)Potter [1995]

(9)यदि पुनः साकारम् ज्ञानम् नेशयते, तदा 'नाकारत्वेन सर्वत्र विशये तु लयत्वित
विभोगा विशयव्यावस्था ना सिद्धयते। (BTBh (a): 27)

(10) BTBh (a): 58

(11)निलादरं अर्थात ज्ञानं द्विरूपम् उपादयते, निलाकारम्, निलोदोभसः सवहावम्
चात्रानिलाकरवय्यृत्याः निलाकारम् ज्ञानम् प्रमाणम्। अनिलोदोभवय्यृत्याः
निलोदोभरूपम् प्रमितिः। सावित्र्यिः। यथोक्तम् 'अर्थसार्यपम् अस्य प्रमाणम्
अर्थाद्विद्विधेय प्रमाणपत्ताम्' इति। इत्यं का विकलपप्रत्ययेण भिन्नम् व्यवस्थाप्यते।
परार्थातास्तु न्यूत्य एव बहेदाः। यथोक्तम् — 'तद् एव प्रत्यक्षम् ज्ञानम्
प्रमाणपत्ताम्' इति। 'साकारम् चेदम् ज्ञानम् एस्थवयम्।' (BTBh (a): 26-27)

(12) BTBh (a): 58

(13)सावृंतिकानाम् मतम् — ज्ञानम् चेदम् सर्वम् निलाद्याकारेन प्रतिभास्ते,
ना बाह्यो 'र्थहः। ज्ञास्या प्रकाशयोगात्। यथोक्तम् —

SATO 50
"svakārajñānajanakā drṣyā nendriyagocarāh. ' iti (BTBh (a): 94)

(14) BTBh (a): 127

(15) "nānu yadi prakāśamāṇam jñānam evedāṃ, taddāsti bāhya 'ṛtha iti kutah? (BTBh (a): 94)

(16) "bāhyārthaśiddhas tu syād vyatirekataha. na hi sarvatra sarvadā nīlādaya ākārāḥ prakāśante. na ca tat svapādānamātra balabhūvitve sati yujyate. niyataviśaye pravṛttiyaogā. tasmād āsti kiṃcid esām samanantarapravṛtyayatīrthām kāraṇām, yad baleṇa kvacit kādācit bhavantīti śakyam avasānum, sa eva bāhya 'ṛtha iti, (BTBh (a): 94)

(17) BTBh (a): 127-128

(18) "vāsanāparipākato nilaṃśādpratibhāsāḥ, ālayavijñānāṃ hi sarvāvāsanādhārabhūtaṃ. ālayavijñānāvivisuddhir evāpavarga iti. (SDS, 11, §94; SDS (b): 74)

(19) "yadā tvālambanam jñānam naivopalabhate tada, sthito vijñānamātratve grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt. //28//

acitto 'nupalambho 'sa jñānam lokottaram ca tat, āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhā dauṣṭhulyahānītaḥ. //29//

sa evānāsravo dhātur acintya kuśalo dhrvaḥ,
sukho vimuktiśāyo 'sau dharmākhyo 'yaṃ mahāmuneḥ. //30//

(20) TVMS: 129-131


(22) avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmaviparyāśitadarśanaṃ,
grāhyāgrāhakasamvitibhedavān iva laksyate. //354// (PV, II, 354)

(23) yathāudarśanaṃ ceyam meyamanaphalasthitih,
kriyate 'vidyamānāpi grāhyāgrāhakasamvidām. //357// (PV, II, 357)

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Moreover, see Hattori [1968]: 29, 109, 184-185.

The first half of this verse can be seen in many texts: the Vyomavatf, the Brahmasutrabhasya, the Sarvadarṣanasamgraha, and so on. And the latter half can be seen in the Brahmasūrabhāṣya, as is well known. (Murakami [1991]: 198)
santānāniyamāḥ sarvaiḥ pāyanaṇadvīdādāraṇāḥ. //3// (VVMS: 2)

svapnopadyātavatkṛtyakṛtyā narākavat punah,
sarva narākapālādādāraṇā tais ca bādhane. //4// (VVMS: 4)

(VVMS: 2-4)

pramāṇavāśad astitvaḥ nāstītvaḥ vā nirdhāryate. sarveśāṁ ca pramāṇānāṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam gariṣṭham ity asaty arthe katham iyaṁ buddhir bhavati pratyakṣaṁ iti. (VVMS: 18)

(VVMS: 18-19)

(yadā ca sā pratyakṣabuddhir bhavatidam me pratyakṣaṁ iti tadā na so 'ṛthe 
dṛśyate manoviśijñānenaiva paricchedāc ca kṣurviśijñānasya ca tadā niruddhatvād iti kathā

tasya pratyakṣatvām iṣṭham? viśeṣena tu kṣaṇikasya visayasya taddānāṁ niruddham eva
tadāpāṁ riśādikaṁ vā. (VVMS: 19)

(VVMS: 19)

svapne drgvisayābhāvaṁ nāprabuddho 'vagacchati. //17cd// (VVMS: 21)

(VVMS: 20)

evam viśaṭhavikalpābhavāniśānāni śraddhāyā prasupta lokāḥ svapna ivābhūtām arthāṁ
pasyaṇa prabuddhaḥ tadābhāvaṁ yathāvaṇa nāvagacchati. yadā tu
tatpratipakṣalokatāraṇa-vikalpajñānalābhāt prabuddhāś bhavati tadā
tatpratipakṣalokottaranirvikalpajñānāś cābhāt prabuddhāś yathāvad

(VVMS: 21)

(VVMS: 21)

middhenaḥpahatam citaṁ svapne tenāsamaṁ phalam. //18cd// (VVMS: 23)

ātmaḥdharmanopacāra hi vividho yah pravartate,
vijñānaparināmo 'sau pariṇāmaṁ sa ca tridhā. //1// (TVMS: 26-29)

Vipāko mananākhyāyaṁ ca vijñapti visayasya ca,
tarālayākhyāṁ vijnānam vipākaḥ sarvabijakam. //20// (TVMS: 30)

(46) TVMS: 33-40

(47) asamviditakopādīstānāvijñaptikam ca tat,
sadā sparśamanaskāra-vītṛ-samjñācentanānvitam. (TVMS: 31-32)

(48) TVMS: 41-44

(49) . . . tadāśṛitya pravartate,
tadālambam mano nāma vijnānam mananātmakam. //5b-6// (TVMS: 50)

(50) TVMS: 51

(51) See TVMS

(52) karmano vāsanā grāhadvayavāsanayā saha,
ksīne pūrvavipāke 'nyadhvipākam janayanti tat. //19// (TVMS: 107)

(53) TVMS: 107

(54) vijnānaprīṇāmo 'yam vikalpo yad vikalpyate,
tena tena nasti tenedam sarvam vijnāpti-mātrakam. //17// (TVMS: 102)

(55) TVMS: 102

(56) yena yena vikalpena yad yad vikalpyate,
parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate. //20// (TVMS: 116)

paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpaḥ pratayodbhavah,
nispannas tasya pūrvaḥ sadā rahitatā tu yā. //21// (TVMS: 117-118)

(57) TVMS: 116-118

(58) ata eva sa naivānya naṁyaḥ paratantrataḥ,
anityatādīvad vācya no nādṛṣṭe 'smin sa drśyate. //22// (TVMS: 119-121)

SATO 54
(59) TVMS: 119-121

(60) trividhasya svabhāvasya trividhām niṣṭhānām niṣṭhāvāvatām,
sandhāya sarvadharmāṇām veśita niṣṭhāvāvatā. //23// (TVMS: 122)

prathamo laksanenaiva niṣṭhāvāvo 'parah punah,
na svayambhāva etasyety aparā niṣṭhāvāvatā. //24// (TVMS: 123)

dharmāṇāṁ paramārthaś ca sa yatas tathāpi sah,
sarvakālaṁ tathābhāvāt saiva viññaptimātratā. //25// (TVMS: 123-125)

(61) TVMS: 122-125

(62) yāvad viññaptimātratve viññānaṁ nāvatriṣṭati,
grāhadvayasyānuṣayas tāvan na vinivartate. //26// (TVMS: 126)

(63) TVMS: 127

(64) yadā tvālambanam jñānam naivopalabhaḥ tadā,

sthito viññānamārtrate grāhābhāve tadagrahaḥ. //28// (TVMS: 129)

acitto 'napalambo 'sau jñānam lokottarām ca tat,

āśrayasya parāvyrtir dvidhā dausthulyahānītaḥ. //29// (TVMS: 130)

sa evanāśravo dhāturo acintya kusalo dhruvaḥ,

sukho vimuktiśya 'sau dharmākhyo 'yaṁ mahāmuneh. //30// (TVMS: 131)

(65) TVMS: 129-131


See Murakami[1991]: 198.

(67) Murakami[1991]: 194

(68) Sinha, Nanda Lal & Vidyābhūṣanā, M. M. Satissā[1930]: 3
In addition to this category, in the late period we can see the seven padārthas, namely, the non-existence (abhāva) is added to this category.

\[\text{(77) dravyesu jñānām vyākhyātām. } //8, 1// (VS, 8, 1)\]

\[\text{mana ātāmā ca. } //8, 2// (VS, 8, 2)\]

\[\text{jñānanirdesē jñānanispatir uktā. } //8, 3// (VS, 8, 3)\]

\[\text{(79) \ldots gunādīnām cendriyena sannikarṣo nāstīty. } (VS: 62)\]

\[\text{gunakarmasv asannikṛṣṭesu jñānanispatir dravyaṁ kāraṇaṁ kāraṇakāraṇaṁ ca. } //8, 4//\]

\[\text{gunakarmanāṁ yato dravyaṁ samavāyikāraṇaṁ tatas teṣu sāksād indriyenaśannikṛṣṭesu vijñānanispatteḥ kāraṇasya sannikarṣasya tada eva dravyaṁ kāraṇaṁ na gunakarmāni tasmād gunakarmasu sannyuktasamavāyāj jñānām, 'ca śabdō hetu. } (VS: 62)\]

\[\text{(82) sāmānyavitisēṣeṣu sāmānyavīśeṣābhōvaṁ tata eva jñānam. } //8, 5//\]
Samanye sattadau višeṣeṣu cāntyeye taddarśinām dravyasannikarsād eva jñānam utpadyate, na sāmānyaviṣeṣeṣeṣbhayaḥ, āsa taddabhāvāt. (VS: 62)

Sāmānyaviṣesāpekṣaṁ dravyagunakarmasu. //8, 6// (VS: 63)

Dravyagunakarmasu dravyendriyasannikarsāt sāmānyāc ca sādeḥ(ṣattādeḥ?) sāmānyaviṣeṣāc ca dravyatvādeḥ ‘sā’ iti ‘dravyam’ ity ādi ca jñānam utpadyata iti. iha sūtre sāmānyam sattā, višeṣā dravyatvādayah, pūrvasūtre ’nyaathā. (VS: 63)

Dravye dravyagunakarmāpeksam. //8, 7//

Gunakarmasu gunakarmābhāvād gunakarmāpeksam na vidyate. //8, 8//

Samavāyināh śvātyāc bhaṅgyabuddhāiḥ svete buddhis te kāryakāraṇābhūte. //8, 9//

Potter [1995]

Svarūpasyālocaṇanām puravatikāhāṃ grahaṇamatram iti yāvat pratyākṣam pratyākṣa. yadi hi vastusvarūpasya nirvikalpakena grahaṇam nasyate, tadā tadvācakaśabdasya smṛtyabhāvāt savikalpakam api na syāt. atah savikalpakam icchatā nirvikalpakam api esītavyam, . . . (Nka: 438)

Potter [1995]

Panasatvam api panaseṣv anuvṛttam āmrādibhyo vyāvṛttam pratyākṣam eva,

. . . (Nka: 427)

Panasatvam api panaseṣv anuvṛttam āmrādibhyo vyāvṛttam nirvikalpakapratyākṣam eva. (Nka: 428)


See Murakami [1997]: 336-338.

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Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* explains the perception (*pratyakṣa*), he introduces two points about the contact; one is that the contact is of six kinds (*samyoga, samyuktasamavāya, samyuktasamavetasamavāya, samavāya, samavetasamavāya* and *viṣeṣanaviṣesyaḥabhaṇḍa*), the other is that all the sense-organs are possessed of the *prāpyakārita*. He maintains that the perception arises from the contact with objects, as is well known. Here, on the basis of the theory of *viṣeṣanaviṣesyaḥabhaṇḍa*, the theory of the perception by the Naiyāyikas tends to be close in the theory of *padārtha* by the Vaiśeṣikas, especially, the fact that the theory of *viṣeṣanaviṣesyaḥabhaṇḍa* can be accepted on the basis of the theory of samavāya is the beginning of adoption of the theory by the Vaiśeṣikas that the knowledge of the qualified (*viṣeṣa*) is preceded by the knowledge of the qualifier (*viṣesana*). (See Murakami [1997]: 338, 340)

The division of the perception like these (the indeterminate and the determinate) can be traced back to the theory by the Mīmāṃsakas, as is well known. Kumārila (circa AD the 7th century) in his *Ślokavārttika* says:

\[
\text{asti hy ālocana[jāhanam prathamam nirvikalpakam,}
\]
\[
\text{bālamukādivijjānam asadṛśam śuddhavastujam.} //112// (ŚV, 4, 112)
\]

‘First of all, there is a cognition in the shape of mere *observation* in the abstract, which is undefined, — similar to the cognition of the infant or the dumb, arising purely out of the object by itself (without any qualification).’

(Jha, Ganganatha [1900]: 87)

And he says:

\[
tatah param punar vastudharmair jātyādibhir yayā,
\]
\[
buddhyāvastiyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena sammatā. //120// (ŚV, 4, 120)
\]

‘And it is only after some time that the object comes to be characterised by such specifications as the “class” and the rest; and the cognition, by means of which such specifications are arrived at, is also included in Sense-
perception.’ (Jha, Ganganatha[1900]: 88-89)

...vyapadesō viṣeṣanam upalaksanaṁ vā nāmajātyādi, tatkarmma vyapadesyam viṣeṣyam iti yāvat... avidyamānam vyapadesyam yasmāṁ tadavyapadesyam jātyādisvarūpāvagāhī, na tu jātyādinām mito viṣeṣanaviṣeṣyabhyāvagāhīti yāvat.


...avyutpānṇānām asti sabdarahitam rūpādiśu nirvikalpakam pratyakṣam iti. na kevalam avyutpānṇānām, vyutpānṇānām apy astīy āha — gṛhitē 'pi ca sabdārthasambandha iti...vyutpānṇasyāpi nāmadheyaṃ saṃvartanaṃ pūrvam esitavyo vīnaiva nāmadheyaṃ arthapravayah. tad idam uktam gṛhitē 'pi ca sabdārthasambandhe asyārthasyāyaṃ sabdo nāmadheyaṃ iti. yadā tu so 'ṛhō grhyate nāmadheyarāhito nāmadheyaṃ saṃvartanaṃ pūrvam avikalpakaṇa, tadā pūrvasmād avyutpānṇāvasthāyāṁ arthajñāṇān na viśīṣyata iti. yato na viśīṣyate tasmān na tadarthajñānaṃ tadārg ēva bhavati.

See the Nyāyāsaṅkha: 110-111. (Nyāyasūtra of Ākṣapāda Gautama, In the Nyāyadarśanaṁ with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara’s Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra’s Tātparyāṅka and Viśvanātha’s Vṛtti, ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha, Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, 19, Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publishing, 1936-44.)

...gandharasārūpasparśasabdāḥ prthivyādīgunāḥ tadarthāḥ. (NS, 1, 1, 14)

Potter[1995]

For a discussion of this point, see, Murakami[1997]: 342-363.

...savikalpasya sabdasankalpakasya sabdasamsargaśāpekeśaṃjanmanah pratyakṣajñānasya sabdatāṁ pūrvavad āśāṅka tasyaiva sabdatāṁ darśayaty avyapadesyapadena sūtrakāraḥ. (Nyāyamaṇjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa; NM (b), Vol. I: 224)
This idea can be seen in many texts in the Indian philosophy, for a discussion of this point, see, Murakami[1997]: 385.

avikalpākā nāmājītyādikalpanāraḥatā. . . (SDS, 11, §92; SDS (b): 155)

Sāksātkārāpramanākaranām prayākṣam. sāksātkarini. ca pramā saivocyate yendriyajā. sā ca dvidhā savikalpakanirvikalpakahedat. (TBh (a): 32 33')

. . . tato 'rthasamnikśtenendriyena nirvikalpakam nāmājītyādikalojāhānaṃ vastumātrāvagāhi kimcid idam iti jñānam jāvate. tasya jñānasendriyam karaṇam chidyā iva parasuḥ. indriyārthasamnikārṣo 'vāntaratvāyāpārah chidyākaranasya parasāv iva dārūsamyoṣah. nirvikalpakam jñānam phalam parasāriva chidā. (TBh (a): 33 43)

Jha, Ganganatha[1924]: 9

Jha, Ganganatha[1924]: 9-10

yadda nirvikalpakajñānāntarāṃ savikalpakanjñānam nāmājītyādikalojāhānaṃ ditho 'yam brāhmaṇo 'yam śyāmo 'yam iti viśeṣaṇavāsasyāvagāhi jñānam upadīyate taddā indriyārthasamnikārsah karaṇam. nirvikalpakam evāvāntaratvāyāpārah. savikalpakam jñānam phalam. (TBh (a): 33 43)

Jha, Ganganatha[1924]: 10

yathoktasavikalpakajñānāntarāṃ hānopādānopoṣābuddhayo jāyante taddā nirvikalpakam jñānam karaṇam. savikalpakajñānam avāntaratvāyāpārah. hānādibuddhayah phalam. (TBh (a): 33 43-45)

Jha, Ganganatha[1924]: 10

Potter[1995]
**TU (a): 809**

**TU (a): 810**

**TU (a): 819**

**TU (a): 839**

**BP: 89**

**TS: 211**

**Potter[1995]**

**Potter[1995]**

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sambhavati. ghaṭatvādyaprakārakam ca ghaṭādiviṣiṣṭajñānam na sambhavati.

jātyakhandopādhyatiriktapadarthajñānasya kimcid dharmapraṇāratvacatvaniyamānāt. (NSMu, k. 58)

(BP: 89-90)
CHAPTER III
CHAPTER III
JAINISM:

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK OF JAINISM AND THE NOTION OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE

3. 0. 0: The Life of Mahāvira

The development of the Jaina theory of knowledge extends over a long period of 2600 years. The idea of knowledge and its various types can be traced as early as the history of the Jainism begins.\(^{(1)}\)

It is said that the founder of the Jainism is Nīgānṭha Nātaputta\(^{(2)}\), whose real name is Vardhamāna, and after his attaining higher perception, namely, spiritual enlightenment, people call him Mahāvira. In circa 444 BC, Vardhamāna was born as a son of a royal family in Kūṇḍa in northern Vaiśāli, whose father’s family name was Kāśyapa and Vardhamāna’s name was Siddhārtha, and his mother’s name was Trīśālā who was a younger sister of the King of Vaiśāli, ‘Ceṭaka’. After growing up, Vardhamāna married a woman and had a girl, and then, after his parents’ death, he renounced the world at the age of 30 and joined the Nīgānṭha sect and practiced asceticism. After about one year, he met Makkhali Gosāla and had practised asceticism with him for six years, and then when it had passed four years since he parted from Makkhali Gosāla, Vardhamāna attained higher perception, namely, spiritual enlightenment. After that, it is said that Mahāvira had enlightened the nation for thirty years and died in a village ‘Pāvāpuri’ in Bihār, which means Mahāvira’s entry into nirvāṇa.

According to the legend of the Jainism\(^{(3)}\), the Jainism is eternal and was preached by many tīrthāṅkaras, that is to say, saviors in each cycle of the world,
Ṛṣabha firstly appeared in this cycle of the world, avasarpini, at last Vardhamāna appeared as the 24th savior, who was called Mahāvira and the 23rd savior is Pārśva. Twenty-four saviors’ names, symbols and colour are as follows:

1. Ṛṣabha, ox, gold
2. Ajita, elephant, gold
3. Śambhava, horse, gold
4. Abhinandana, monkey, gold
5. Sumati, heron, gold
6. Padmaprabha, lotus, vermilion
7. Supārśva, swastika, gold
8. Candraprabha, moon, white
9. Suvidhi or Puṣpadanta, dolphin, white
10. Śītalā, mark of śrīvatsa, gold
11. Śreyāmsa or Śreyān, rhinoceros, gold
12. Vāsupūjya, buffalo, red
13. Vimala, pig, gold
14. Ananta or Anantajit, hawk, gold
15. Dharma, vajra, gold
16. Śānti, serow, gold
17. Kunthu, goat, gold
18. Ara, figure of nandyāvarta, blue
19. Malli, water jar, blue
20. Suvrata or Munisuvrata, tortoise, black

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21. Nami, blue lotus, gold
22. Nemi or Arištanemi, conch, black
23. Pārśva, snake, blue
24. Vardhamāna, rion, gold

It is said that each of these twenty-four saviors mentioned above is a member of royalty. Probably, in support of the historical fact that Vardhamāna is a member of royalty, it must be said that these twenty-four saviors are members of royalty. This list of these twenty-four saviors must have been formed after ages, but among them we can regard Pārśva (the 23rd savior) as a historical person and it is said that the parents of Mahāvīra were worshipers of Pārśva.\(^{(5)}\)

3. 0. 1: Affinity between the Jainism and the Buddhism

The Jainism developed as the Buddhism did, which had a great influence on the Indian culture as one of the two big philosophies except the Brahmanism. The Jainism was contemporary with the Buddhism and each of them (the Jainism and the Buddhism) originated with the person of the same rank (\(kṣatriya\)) in the almost same region (the northeastward of India), and they grew in being based on the almost same social structure and there was not much to choose between them in the process of the development; besides, the Buddhism was changing, similarly, the Jainism was doing at any time in its history. The doctrine of the two is very similar to each other, and the common technical terms can be seen in their works and we can see the similar mythology between the Jainism and the Buddhism. There are many similarities among the life and the biography of the founder of their own schools.\(^{(6)}\) In early time, the works of the two was written in Prakrit
different from Sanskrit, that is to say, the works of the early Buddhism was written in Pali and that of the early Jainism was done in Ardhamāgadhi. The organization of the two religious orders is also very similar to each other, as is based on the trainee monk renounced the world and supported by the laymen. Moreover, we can see some common terms in the works of the two schools to be called as the worthy saint: Buddha, Jina, Mahāvīra, Arhat, Bhagavat, and so on\(^{(7)}\). Furthermore, it can be seen that the Jainas have the similar theory of pratīyāsaṃutpāda as the Buddhist do, which is as follows:

\[
jahā \text{ ya an}dappabhavā \text{ balāgā an}dām \text{ balāgappabhavam \ jahā ya,}
\]

\[
\text{emeva mohāyataṇaṁ \ kha ta}ṇhām \text{ mohām ca ta}ṇhāyataṇaṁ \text{ vaya}ṁti.}
\]

\(/\!/6/!\)

\[
rāgo \text{ ya doso vi \ ya kammabīyam \ kammam ca mohappabhavam vada}ṁti,
\]

\[
kammam ca jāi-marānassa mūlam dukkhaṁ ca jāi-marānam vaya}ṁti.
\]

\(/\!/7/!\)

\[
dukkhaṁ \text{ iya}ṁ jassa \text{ na hoi mohō mohō hao jassa na hoi ta}ṇhā,
\]

\[
ta}ṇhā \text{ hayā jassa \text{ na hoi loho loho hao jassa na kima}ṇāṁ.} \ /\!/8/!
\]

\((\text{Uttarajjhayanaī, XXXII, 6-8})^{(8)}\)

'As the crane is produced from an egg, and the egg is produced from a crane, so they call desire the origin of delusion, and delusion the origin of desire. (6)

Love and hatred are caused by Karman, and they say that Karman has its origin in delusion; Karman is the root of birth and death, and birth and death they call misery. (7)
Misery ceases on the absence of delusion, delusion ceases on the absence of desire, desire ceases on the absence of greed, greed ceases on the absence of property. (8)

In the Uttarajjhayanāi, XXXII, 1-12, we can see the very similar idea of kleśa, karman and duḥkha in the Buddhism. And, in the Áyārangasutta we can find out the similar idea expressed with a fixed form. According to the theory of pratityasamutpāda in the early Jainism, the Jainas maintain the theory that all the things in this world are related to each other, namely, the idea of the world being of a mutual realtionship. For example, the Áyārangasutta says as follows:

. . . je egam jānati se savvām jānati, je savvām jānati se egam jānati.
. . . (Áyārangasutta, I, 3, 4, 1)

' . . . He who knows one thing, knows all things; and he who knows all things, knows one thing. . . .' (1)

. . . egam vigimcamāne pudho vigimcāi, pudho vigimcamāne egaṁ vigimcāi . . . (Áyārangasutta, I, 3, 4, 3)

' . . . he who avoids one (passion), avoids (them all) severally; and he who avoids them severally, avoids one . . . .' (2)

And, it is said that at a late time the Jainas succeeded to this idea, moreover, in the early Jainism we can find out the idea of madhyamapratipad, which is as follows:

kammam ca padilehāe kammamūlaṁ ca jam chaṇāṁ, padilehiya savvām samāyāya dohim amtehiṁ adissamāne tam pariṇāya medhāvī vidittā logaṁ vanītā logasaṇṇam se matimām parakkamejjāsi tti bemi.
(Ayārangasutta, I, 3, 1, 4)
'Examining *karman* and the root of *karman*, viz. killing, examining (it) and adopting its contrary, he is not seen by both ends. Knowing this, a wise man who knows the world and has cast off the idea of the world, should prudently conquer the obstructions to righteousness. thus I say. (4)\(^{(18)}\)

However, the sufficient comparative study of the Buddhism and the Jainism lies outside the scope of this paper, it is too involved a subject to be treated here in detail. It is desired that some researches on that topic by the pioneers of that field shall be read.

3. 0. 2: The Fundamentals in the Jainism

Mahāvira maintained that we could not direct ourselves to do anything without transcending the skepticism, because we cannot answer how to practice our religion with the skepticism only and attain salvation from the bondage of this world even if we adopt any thoughts the philosophers maintained in those days.\(^{(19)}\)

Therefore, as to the matter of the knowledge, he maintained that we should not judge the things from the viewpoint of the absolutism, or the one-sided viewpoint but investigate the things from the viewpoint of the non-absolutism because the things can be considered from the various aspects of itself. In the case of judging anything, we should observe our idea on it with a verbal (an indeclinable) 'syāt' which means 'it may be', 'perhaps', 'perchance', taht is to say, as refers to 'from a standpoint'.\(^{(20)}\) For example, the things can be regarded as the permanent (*nītya*) from the substantive standpoint (*dravyārthika-naya*) or as the impermanent (*anītya*) from the modal standpoint (*paryāyārthika-naya*), therefore, the things cannot be treated as the permanent (*nītya*) only, nor as the impermanent (*anītya*) only. Moreover,
we should not consider the concept of the permanent and the impermanent as the absolute but treat all the things as non-absolute. This investigation is called 'naya', that is to say, 'standpoint' or 'viewpoint', which is the method of expression and the rule of comprehension. Regarded from this point of view, it is said that the fundamental standpoint of the Jainism is the non-absolutism: syādvāda or anekāntavāda. We can plainly see this fundamentals in the Jainism in the Uttarādhyayānamūlasūtra, which is as follows:

"The man, who could cognise all the modes, or states (bhāva) of the substances (dāvā) by means of all the instruments of valid knowledge (pamāṇa) and all the rules of the standpoint (nayaviḥi), is called 'a man taking pleasure from the width of knowledge (vitthārarū)," (Uttarādhyayānamūlasūtra, 28, 1099)

This shows that we cannot answer how to practice our religion with the skepticism only, but, if we investigate the things from the viewpoint of the non-absolutism, that is to say, by means of all the instruments of valid knowledge (pamāṇa) and all the rules of the standpoint (nayavihi), because the things can be considered from the various aspects of itself, we can pass judgment on anything and build a philosophy, so that we can transcend the skepticism and attain salvation from the bondage of this world. In this way, it is not too much to say that the Jainism was a philosophy derived from reflecting on the tendency of thought the philosophers maintained in those days.

We can see the matter of the taking up a true trainee monk in the Sūyangadāmagasutta, which is as follows:

"A very clever (monk) who practises the vow of chastity, should not adopt the following (heretical) doctrines, nor behave badly in this
religion. (Sūyagadāmagasutta, II, 5, 1)

He should not believe that (this world) is without beginning or without end, eternal or not eternal, according to the argumentation (of heretics).

(Sūyagadāmagasutta, II, 5, 2)

From these alternatives you cannot arrive at the truth; from these alternatives you are, certainly, led to error. (Sūyagadāmagasutta, II, 5, 3)

One should not say: that there will be an end of beings who (know and) teach the truth: nor that all beings are not alike, nor that they shall be in (perpetual) bondage, or (that the prophets are) eternal.

(Sūyagadāmagasutta, II, 5, 4)

From these alternatives you cannot arrive at the truth, &c. (see verse 3) (Sūyagadāmagasutta, II, 5, 5)\(^{(24)}\)

And, we should notice the following:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{natthi loe aloe vā, nevam saṇṇam nivesae,} \\
\text{atthi loe aloe vā, evam saṇṇam nivesae. } &/12// \text{ (Sūyagadāmagasutta, II, 5, 12)}^{(25)}
\end{align*}\]

‘Do not maintain that the world does not exist, maintain that it exists’\(^{(26)}\)

This is a very important idea, because this is a matter the Buddhism keeps away from, so we can consider that the Jainism tries to answer what the Buddhism does not do. Mahāvira maintains that we can generally form a judgment of the things with a determiner ‘from a standpoint’ on the basis of the theory of naya and the judgments themselves can be different from each other according to the viewpoint.

When Mahāvira was asked by Jamāli whether the world should exist eternally
or not, he answered:

"Jamāli! The world is eternal. It is not what never existed in the past, it is not what never exists in the present and it is not what will never exist in the future. It existed in the past, it exists in the present and it will exist in the future. It is the persistence, the eternal, not destroyed, the continuance and the permanent."

"Jamāli! The world is also the impermanent. Because it becomes a state of *ussappini* and then does that of *osappini*, and, it becomes a state of *osappini* and then does that of *ussappini*.  

This shows that according to our experiences we can consider the things not only to continue to exist but also not to; if we rejected other aspects as error persisting in one aspect of our experience, then we would accept one or the other of the absolute doctrine of the permanent (*nitya*) and that of impermanent (*anitya*). Buddha rejected the two as the theory of the absolutism, but Mahāvira accepted the two and explained that they were two aspects of viewpoints derived from the mental attitude contradictory to each other produced from the two different concerns of ours about the things in the phenomenal world.

In case two different or opposing opinions as to the metaphysical problem arose, Buddha answered nothing, but Mahāvira was interested in it and thought that on the basis of the theory of *naya*, the thing could be defined as something from one standpoint and from another standpoint it could be done as another thing, namely, he maintained that the judgments themselves could be different from each other according to the viewpoint. His ultimate purpose is to remain calm, or have a peace of mind with accepting all the contradictory propositions on the basis of the theory of *naya*. Moreover, we can see the attitude of a trainee monk in the SATO 72
Dasaveyāliyasutta, which is as follows:

\[ \text{na ya vuggahiyaṃ kaham kahejjā na ya kuppe nihuimdie pasamte,} \]
\[ \text{samjamadhuva jogajutte uvasamte avihedaeje, sa bhikkhū.} \]

'A trainee monk (bhikkhu) is one who utters not quarrelsome words, who is not angry, allows not excitement of senses, who is calm, and steadfast in restraint, perfect in control and abuses not others.'

In this way, judging from these facts above, it seems that the Jainism maintains that every argument by each philosopher of the world is just like the andhagajanyāya, they, however, do not adopt a temporary expedient. Because we should notice the description that when arhat was questioned by the heathen, he should expound the true doctrine.\(^{(31)}\)

On the basis of these standpoints, Mahāvira, taking a critical attitude to any thoughts the philosophers maintained in those days, denied the authority of the Veda and maintained that a ritual ceremony brāhmanas hold was insignificant and worthless, and he opposed the class system of the Brahmanism. Especially, the offering an animal as a sacrifice in a ritual ceremony was blamed, as was seen in the Buddhism.\(^{(32)}\)

3. 0. 3: Facing up to Reality of Pain in the Jainism

Before we give an account of the theory of reality and knowledge in the Jainism, we have to inquire into the notion of pain in this school, because all the philosophers in those days in India, in a greater or less degree, teach that life is full of pain, and it is not too much to say that no other philosophers maintained the misery and the distress in this world as keenly as Mahāvira.\(^{(33)}\) Moreover, because
this notion in the Jainism influences the Jaina theory of reality and knowledge in the late period like the theory of naya. That is why we should not overlook these facts in this school. The early Jainism emphasized the pain that all animate beings experience in this world and maintained that there was pain in this world. The Jaina in the early period show that a major matter of concern in the Buddhism is how to deal with pain in this world, for example, we can see a context related to this matter in the Isibhāsiyām Suttām, which is as follows:

\[ \text{jam suhena suham laddham, accantasukham eva tam,} \]
\[ \text{jam sukhena duham laddham, mā me teṇa samāgamo.} \]
(Isibhāsiyām Suttām, 38, 1)

'The true happiness is that which yields unmixed bliss. May I never come across a happiness that results in anguish, said Satiputra Buddha, the seer.'

And, we should notice that the ideal of the Jainism is the liberation of the mind from all the pain and the root of that matter, we can see this idea clearly in the Uttarajjhayanā, which is as follows:

\[ \text{accaṇṭakālassa samūlagassa savvassa dukkhassa u jo pamokkho,} \]
\[ \text{tam bhāsao me padipūṇacittā! suheha egāṁtahiyaṁ hiyaitham.} \]
(Uttarajjhayanā, XXXII, 1, 2)

'With attentive mind hear me explain for your benefit the deliverance
from the beginningless time, together with its causes, and from all misery: a truly wholesome subject. (1)

By the teaching of true knowledge, by the avoidance of ignorance and delusion, and by the destruction of love and hatred, one arrives at final deliverance which is nothing but bliss. (2)^

Tha Jainism says that People feel pain because of not knowing the truth and they are ignorant. This means that the unwise are the ignorant. The man, who does not know the truth of human-beings and indulge in the attachments, is called the ignorant. (39)

And, we can consider that we feel pain because the things we desire and possess are the impermanent, we can see this idea in the Āyāramgasutta, which is as follows:

\[
pabhū ejassa dugumchāne ātāṃkadaṃdi ahiyam ti naccā. je ajjhattham jāṇati se bahiyā jāṇati, je bahiyā jāṇati se ajjhattham jāṇati. etam tulamannesim. iha samtigatā daviyā nāvakamkhamti jīvium. (Āyāramgasutta, I, 1, 7, 1)\]

'He who is averse from (all actions relating to) wind, knows affliction. Knowing what is bad, he who knows it with regard to himself, knows it with regard to (the world) outside; and he who knows it with regard to (the world) outside, knows it with regard to himself: this reciprocity (between himself and) others (one should mind). Those who are appeased, who are free from passion, do not desire to live. (1)\n
The theory of the impermanent was maintained not only by the Buddhism
but also by the Jainism, according to the Jainism, the soul and the world can be transformed and they are the real existence in this world, therefore, they are both the permanent and the impermanent. This means that the Jainas regard pariṇāminiyatā in the real existent which can be transformed. We have to notice this fact, this is important idea in the Jainism.

3. 0. 4: The Notion of the Self (Ātman) in the Jainism

In the Jainism also, the idea about the self (ātman) is very important conception, as is seen similarly in other scools. In the early Jainism, the term ‘ātman’ is used as the conception against others (para), and in the Jainism in the late period we can see the case that the conception of the self (ātman) does not differ from that of the soul (jīva), however, in the primary stage of this school we should notice that the self (ātman) differs from the soul (jīva): the self (ātman) is the conception that the living in anguish found out with searching their conscience, which is a real existence, on the other hand, the soul (jīva) is the conception that one realized with regarding the mental function as an objective phenomenon or a substance. The early Jainism regards the self (ātman), but we may say that opinions are divergent on this point.

The self-awareness in the early Jainism was to know that ‘I am lonely’, that is to say, ‘Nothing belongs to me. A man who, thinking, I am I. . . ’. The early Jainism maintains the pursuit of the self, that is to say, the real self. This fact can be seen in the early Buddhism, moreover, making a thorough investigation into the historical trace of this thought, we can trace it back to the Upanishadic idea, as is well known.

In the Jainism, a man attaining salvation from the bondage of this world is

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regarded as the man who knows the self (ātman), and the Jainas thought a great deal of the knowledge of the self (ātman), for example, we can see this idea in the Ayāramgasutta. The Jainas profess themselves to be the ātmavādins on the basis of the knowledge of the self (ātman). Now, what is the self (ātman) in the Jainism? We can find out two interesting contents in the early Jainism, one is what mentioned above, that is to say, the content of the Ayāramgasutta, I, 5, 5, 5, the other is as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
tumāṃ si nāma taṃ ceva jaṃ āhātaṃ ca \text{ti} \, māṇṇasi, \\
tumāṃ si nāma taṃ ceva jaṁ ajiāvetavāṃ ti manṇasi, \\
tumāṃ si nāma taṃ ceva jaṃ paritāvetavāṃ ti maṇṇasi, \\
tumāṃ si nāma taṃ ceva jaṃ parighetavāṃ ti maṇṇasi, \\
evāṃ taṃ ceva jaṃ uddavetavāṃ ti maṇṇasi. \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
amjū ceyam padibuddhajivi. tamhā na hamā, na vi ghātāe. \\
anusamveyamamapanennam, jaṃ āhātaṃ nābhipatthae. \\
(Āyāramgasutta, I, 5, 5, 4)\]
\]

‘As it would be unto thee, so it is with him whom thou intendest to kill. As it would be unto thee, so it is with him whom thou intendest to tyrannise over. As it would be unto thee, so it is with him whom thou intendest to torment. In the same way (it is with him) whom thou intendest to punish, and to drive away. The righteous man who lives up to these sentiments, does therefore neither kill nor cause others to kill (living beings). He should not intentionally cause the same punishment for himself. (4)’

This content above shows us two meanings: one is that each soul is individual
but it has something to do with each other, and, the other is that each soul is not apart from each other but as one, that is to say, the souls are united with each other; if we regard the latter, it can be said that the idea of the self (ātman) in the early Jainism is very similar to that in the Upanishad and the Vedānta, however, to inquire further into the matter would lead us into that specialized area of another topic, and such a digression would undoubtedly obscure the outline of our argument, so let us leave the matter open. It is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to enter into a detailed discussion of that topic. Anyway, the self (ātman) in the Jainism is omnipresent in all things, and it is the subject of the action, the cognition (knowledge) and transmigration of the soul (saṃsāra).

3. 0. 5: The Notion of Karman in the Jainism

The Jainas regard karman as a kind of material, that is to say, a fine substance, or particle of matter, which is, to no small extent, related to the action of human beings, as is well known. The Jainas say that the behaviour of human beings is subject to an illusion so that karman according to his behaviour can be formed and it (karman) adheres to the soul (jīva), as is called ‘the influx (āsrava)(54) of that (karman) into the body’, (55) and it (karman) composes a body called ‘karmic body (kammasarīra, or karmaśarīra)’, (56) it (karman) dazzles the soul (jīva) and makes it (jīva) in bondage. In the early Jainism, we can see this idea in the Āyāramgasutta. (57) In case of the never-ending cycle of reincarnation (saṃsāra) by means of producing karman, the existence of the subject must be assumed, then, the Jainas regarded the soul (jīva) as the subject, and in order to free ourselves from the restrictions of karman, we should aim at not producing karman, that is to say, not doing the acts. In other words, the Jainas teach us eliminating the current of
Karman. The Āyārāngasutta, I, 5, 6, 2\(^{(58)}\) says as follows:

‘The current (of sin) is said to come from above, from below, and from the sides; these have been declared to be the currents through which, look, there is sinfulness.

‘Examining the whirlpool, a man, versed in the sacred lore, should keep off from it’. Leaving the world to avert the current (of sin), such a great man, free from acts, knows and sees the truth; examining (pleasure) he does not desire them. (2)\(^{(59)}\)

The trainee monk pursuing the salvation from the bondage of this world has to try hard not to do the acts (conduct), therefore, the monk is the man who has ceased from the behaviour,\(^{(60)}\) namely, the Jainism proclaims the doctrine of the renunciation.\(^{(61)}\) According to the Āyārāngasutta,\(^{(62)}\) committing no sin, proceeding to the pilgrimage and thinking that the present moment is favourable, that is to say, as a contemplative attitude, the man, who should be steadfast and not carelessly conduct himself, is praiseworthy.\(^{(63)}\) And, the Āyārāngasutta, I, 2, 2, 1\(^{(64)}\) says as follows:

‘. . . Those who are freed (from the attachment to the world and its pleasures), reach the opposite shore. Subduing desire by desirelessness, he does not enjoy the pleasures that offer themselves. Desireless, giving up the world, and ceasing to the acts, he knows, sees and has no wishes because of his discernment; he is called the houseless. (1)\(^{(65)}\)

In this way, it is not too much to say that the Jainas respect ceasing the acts. In the early Jainism, the Jainas teach that when the ‘karmic body (kammasarīra, or karmasārīra)’ is destroyed by practicing asceticism, the pure nature of the soul

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(jīva) appears of its own accord and it is free from all pain, namely, which means the salvation from the bondage of this world (mokṣa, or nirvāṇa). The Āyāraṅgasutta, I, 6, 5, 6(66) says as follows:

‘On the decay of the body (he does not despond, but deserves) his appellation, ‘the leader of the battle’. The sage who has reached the other side, unafflicted and unmoved like a beam, being in the power of death, desires death as the dissolution of the body. Thus I say.

(6)\textsuperscript{(67)}

This means that the decay of ‘karmic body (kammasarīra, or karmaśarīra)’ makes the salvation from the bondage of this world (mokṣa, or nirvāṇa) perfect.

We can often see these ideas mentioned above in the early Jainism. When we research the Jaina theory of reality and knowledge in the logical period, we have a tendency to investigate the theory of the late logical contents only, however, we should not overlook them in the early Jainism. Because we cannot deny that the theory of the Jaina philosophy continues from the beginning of this school.

Well, in the Jaina Philosophy, at least, the term ‘karman’ appears to bear a double signification, namely, not only vibration or ‘action-current’ but also the materialized effects or vestiges in so far they affect the fate of the actor, continuing even beyond death and modifying his subsequent career.\textsuperscript{(68)} And, it is said that the karman as matter (pudgala) is of two kinds: (A) ghātikarman, or the karman obstructing the nature of the soul (jīva)\textsuperscript{(69)}, that is to say, ‘the obstructive karman’ and (B) aghātikarman, or the karman not obstructing the nature of the soul (jīva)\textsuperscript{(70)}, that is to say, ‘the non-obstructive karman’. The former is of four kinds, according as they retard the unfoldment of the tripartite ‘infinite psychical possibilities’, namely, ‘vision’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘freedom’\textsuperscript{(71)}: (A-1) jñānāvuraṇīya-karman, or

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‘the knowledge-obscuring karman’\textsuperscript{(72)}, (A-2) darśanāvaraniya-karman, or ‘the right vision-obscuring karman’\textsuperscript{(73)}, (A-3) mohaniya-karman, or ‘the deluding karman’\textsuperscript{(74)}, and (A-4) antarāya-karman, or ‘the obstructive karman’\textsuperscript{(75)}. The latter is also of four kinds, according as they determine the duration and other physical conditions of the soul (jīva)\textsuperscript{(76)}: (B-1) vedaniya-karman, or ‘the feeling-producing karman’\textsuperscript{(77)}, (B-2) āyuṣya-karman, or ‘the longevity-determining karman’\textsuperscript{(78)}, (B-3) nāma-karman, or ‘the physique-making karman’\textsuperscript{(79)}, and (B-4) gotra-karman, or ‘the status determining karman’\textsuperscript{(80)}. The idea about these eight kinds of karmans, that is to say, the nature of karman can be traced back to the Uttarajjhayanāi\textsuperscript{(81)} and the Isibhāṣiyāim Suttāim\textsuperscript{(82)}, as is well known, and it became a fixed form in the late period in the Jainism.

Moreover, the four kinds of karmans (from A-1 to A-4) of the ghātikarman (‘the obstructive karman’) are again subdivided according to the nature of the effects (prakṛti) they produce: the jñānāvaraniya-karman is of five kinds, the darśanāvaraniya-karman is of nine kinds, the mohaniya-karman is of twenty eight kinds, and the antarāya-karman is of five kinds. Also, the four kinds of karmans (from B-1 to B-4) of the aghātikarman (‘the non-obstructive karman’) are again subdivided: the vedaniya-karman is of two kinds, the āyuṣya-karman is of four kinds, the nāma-karman is of one hundred three kinds, and the gotra-karman is of two kinds. We can summarise the classification of the karmans in this way — the ghātikarman and the aghātikarman total one hundred fifty eight kinds of karmans.\textsuperscript{(83)}

3.1.0: The Metaphysical Notion of the Substance in the Jainism

In the Jainism, the consideration of the metaphysical matter is launched in order to attain the emancipation from worldly attachments. The Jainas regard the
universe as what is of two kinds: jīva, or the soul, and ajīva, or the inanimate (substance = the non-living), and the world consists of these two and this idea can be traced back to the Isibhāsiyāṁ Suttāṁ, that is to say, it is the theory by Pārśva, we may say that the Jainism adopts his idea and it has been handed down to the late period. In the Jaina philosophy, the existence, or the being (sat) is conceived as the differentia of the substance (dravya), which is characterized by origination (utpāda), decay (vyaya) and permanency (dhrauvya), and it has qualities (guna) and modes (paryāya) as is well known. In other words, the existence, or the being (sat) relates to the substance (dravya), quality (guna) and mode (paryāya), moreover, three aspects of the reality, that is to say, origination (utpāda), decay (vyaya) and permanency (dhrauvya). The theory of the substance (dravya) in the Śvetāmbara and that in the Digambara are almost same, that is to say, it is not too much to say that there is no difference between them. Therefore, in the Jaina philosophy, we can regard the substance (dravya) as what exists in real and that the real existence, or the being (sat) is the differentia of the substance (dravya).

Well, the Jainas define (A) jīva and (B) ajīva as the essential elements of the universe, moreover, the latter (ajīva) is again subdivided into four or five categories: (B-1) dharma, or the principle of motion, (B-2) adharma, or the principle of rest, (B-3) akāśa, or space and (B-4) pudgala, or matter. The Jainas call each of them 'astikāya', or the extended reals. Each extended real (astikāya) mentioned above is all the substance (dravya), that is to say, the substance (dravya) can be divided into the two: the sentient principle (jīva) and the non-sentient principle (ajīva), and it is said that each extended real (astikāya) possesses the space-points (pradeśa). Among these five extended reals (jīva, dharma, adharma,
ākāśa, pudgala), generally, space (ākāśa) subsumes (fills) loka, or the universe-space and aloka, or the unoccupied space, and the others (jīva, dharma, adharma, pudgala) extend over the universe (loka), that is to say, they are co-extensive with the universe. The principle of motion (dharma), the principle of rest (adharma), and space (ākāśa) are immobile (niṣkriyā) and each of them is a single substance, while the soul (jīva) and matter (pudgala) are infinite in number and active. The extended reals (astikāya) except matter (pudgala) are non-corporeal (arupin), in the Jainism, the world in real is constituted of these extended reals (astikāya). The Sarvadasanasamgraha says that the five extended reals (pañcāstikāya) is said to be ‘prapañca’ or ‘pañca-tattva’.

In the Jaina philosophy, the substance (dravya) has the quality (guna) and the mode (paryāya), and it is eternal (nitya), immutable (avasthita) and devoid of the form (arūpin), however, matter (pudgala) only is possessed of the form, that is to say, it is a rūpin. Moreover, the Dravyasamgraha by Nemicandra (the Digambara sect, circa AD 10th c.) says that matter (pudgala) is a mūrta and the rest are the amūrta. In this way, according to the concept of the reality in the Jaina philosophy, the substance (dravya) means the reality characterized by the existence, and it exists with the quality, capacity, or attribute (guna) and the mode, modification, or state (paryāya), moreover, it is possessed of the three factors: origination (upāda), decay (vyaya) and permanency (dhrauvya).

The quality (guna) depends on the substance (dravya) and does not have the quality of its own self. In the early Jainism, we can see that the term ‘guna’, or quality, which denotes the quality of the substance (dravya), is distinct from the substance (dravya) and the mode (paryāya), that is to say, it is a distinct category along with the substance (dravya) and the mode (paryāya). For example,
the definition of the quality (guna) can be seen in the Uttarajjhayanāi, which is as follows:

\[
gunāṇāṃsāsā davvan, egadavvasisyā gunā. \\
lakkhanāṃ p=javānāṃ tu ubhao assiā bhavē. //6\//^(107)\]

'Substance is the substrate of qualities; the qualities are inherent in one substance; but the characteristic of developments is that they inhere in either (viz. substances or qualities). (6)\(^{(108)}\)

And, Umāśvāti (circa AD 5th-6th century)\(^{(109)}\) says in his Tattvārthādhigamasūtra that the qualities (guna) are inherent in the substance (dravya) and they are themselves attributeless, which is as follows:

\[
dravyāśrayā nirgunā gunāh. //40\//^(110)\]

Pūjyapāda (the Digambara sect sect, circa AD 5th-7th century)\(^{(111)}\) in his Sarvārthasiddhi (a commentary on the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra), V, 41\(^{(112)}\) explains the sūtra above:

'... The qualification 'without attribute' is intended to exclude molecules of two ultimate atoms, etc. These molecules have got for their receptacle the atoms which go to constitute these molecules; these, however, possess the qualities. Therefore, these have been excluded by the qualification 'without attributes'. Some say that the the modes like the pitcher, etc., also have the substance as their substratum and are without the qualities. So the definition of the qualities would apply to these modes also. But it is not so, 'dravyāśrayā' implies that the qualities reside permanently in the substance because of the qualifying word 'permanently' understood.'
Hence the modes are excluded, for the modes are occasional.\(^{(113)}\)

Ākalaṅka (the Digambara sect, circa AD 8th century)\(^{(114)}\) in his *Tattvārthavārtika* (a commentary on the *Tattvārthādhiḥgamaśūtra*), V, 41\(^{(115)}\) says:

`. . . ‘Those which exist’ by inhering in an eternal permanent *dravya* are *gunas*, but *paryāyas* cannot continu to exist permanently in it, for example, existence and so on, form (or colour) and so on, of the matter are the inherent qualities in the soul-substance and the matter-substance respectively, while the knowledge of the pitcher and so on, are the modes of the soul and the *kapāla* and so on, are the modes of matter.\(^{(116)}\)`

And, we can see that Viḍyānanda (the Digambara sect, circa AD 8th-9th century)\(^{(117)}\) in his *Tattvārthaślokavārtika* (a commentary on the *Tattvārthādhiḥgamaśūtra*), V, 41 also adopts the same idea that Pūjyapāda and Ākalaṅka advance. These Jaina philosophers in the Digambara sect above maintain in their commentaries on the *Tattvārthādhiḥgamaśūtra* by Umasvāti that the quality (*guna*) inheres permanently in the substance (*dravya*) and it (*guna*) does not possess its own attribute, that is to say, the quality (*guna*) does not inhere in another quality (*guna*), and, on the other hand, the mode (*paryāya*) also inheres in the substance (*dravya*) but it (*paryāya*) does not inhere, or exist in the substance (*dravya*) permanently, because it is subject to the origination and the destruction. It is said that this is the fundamental difference between the quality (*guna*) and the mode (*paryāya*), that is to say, they are respectively essential and accidental characters or potentiality and actuality in the substance (*dravya*).\(^{(118)}\)

In another school, the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, III\(^{(119)}\) by Mādhava (circa AD 14th century)\(^{(120)}\) says that the substances (*dravya*) have their own qualities
...; "substance" (dravya) possesses "quality and action". Qualities reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the general qualities, knowledge, and so on, of the jīva, form and so on of the body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness and motion into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "the principle of motion", "the principle of rest", and ākāsa. . . .{(121)

The mode (paryāya) inheres in the substance (dravya) and the quality (guna), as is seen in the Uttarajjhayānāi, and it denotes ‘bhāva’, ‘viśesa’, ‘parināma’, and so on. Of course, it does not inhere in the substance and the quality permanently, as mentioned above. Umāsvāti says in his commentary on the Tattvārthadhigamasūtra that the mode refers to a state of an object and a name added to an object, namely, he explains that the mode refers to the different state and name attributed to one object. Kundakunda (circa AD 3rd? c.) says in his Pañcāstikāyasūtra that ‘paryāya’ is the mode of the existence of the substance (dravya) through its origination (utpāda), decay (vyaya) and permanency (dhrauvya). We can say that the substance has both the aspects: permanence and change, that is to say, the substance, which is existent in the world, is permanent from the viewpoint of ‘dravya’, and it is changing from the viewpoint of ‘paryāya’.

Pūjyapāda in his Sarvārthasiddhi says that what are not always associated with the substance (dravya) are the modes (paryāya), which is as follows:

...vyatirekiṇah paryāyāh. (SAS, V, 38, §600)

This means that the modification of the substance is the mode (paryāya), Akalaṅka in his Tattvārthavārtika explains that the substance has two natures: the general (sāmānya) referring to the quality (guna) and the particular (viśesa) referring...
to the mode \((\text{paryāya})\), that is to say, the transformation of a subsance \((\text{dravya})\) is the mode \((\text{paryāya})\). He says that the generality \((\text{sāmānyā})\), the general rule \((\text{utsarga})\), the association \((\text{anvaya})\) and the quality \((\text{guṇa})\) are all synonymous terms, and similarly, the particularity \((\text{vīśeṣa})\), the difference, or distinction \((\text{bheda})\) and the mode \((\text{paryāya})\) are synonymous. *(127)* And, Vidyānanda in his *Tattvārthaślokavārtika* says that many qualities \((\text{guṇa})\) can inhere in a substance \((\text{dravya})\) simultaneously, on the other hand, many modes \((\text{paryāya})\) inhere in a substance \((\text{dravya})\) in sequence. *(128)* In the *Sarvadarsanasamgraha*, III *(129)*, we can see that ‘\text{utpāda}', ‘\text{tadbhāva}', ‘\text{parināma}' and ‘\text{paryāya}' are all synonymous, moreover, it says that the existence of the substance \((\text{dravya})\) with some characteristics is the mode \((\text{paryāya})\), which is as follows:

’... “Action” \((\text{paryāya})\) has thus been defined; the actions \((\text{paryāyāḥ})\) of a substance are, as has been said, its existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its course to the end, as, e.g., in the \(\text{jīva}\), the knowledge of objects as of a jar, etc., happiness, pain etc.; in the \(\text{pudgala}\), the lump of clay, the jar, etc.; in the principle of motion and the principle of rest, the special functions of progress, etc. Thus there are six substances or *tattvas* (i.e., the five above mentioned and “time”). *(130)*

In connection with these matters of the transformation \((\text{parināma})\) and so on mentioned above, we should pay attention to Umasvāti’s idea. He says in his *Tattvārthaśāhīgamasūtra* that ‘one’s being — that is, one’s retaining one’s specific nature and yet undergoing origination and destruction — is transformation.’ *(131)* It is of two types — that without a beginning and that having a beginning. *(132)* In the case of substances possessed of colour — that is, *pudgala*-substances — it is
possessed of a beginning. Here, we can recognize that Umāsvāti’s idea that ‘tadbhāvah parināmah.’ has a strong resemblance to Pāṇini’s ‘tasya bhāvas tvatalau.’ in his Astādhyāyī. This is an important fact to stress. Because we can accept parināma in the Jainism as a state, or condition of the substance, or real existence, that is to say, it refers to a state, or condition in the sense of “the nature thereof”. This point deserves explicit emphasis and the problem of a resemblance between ‘tadbhāvah parināmah.’ by Umāsvāti and ‘tasya bhāvas tvatalau.’ by Pāṇini. It will be useful to keep these points in mind as we examine the Jaina theory of the relation by Prabhācandra (the Digambara sect, circa AD 10th-11th century).

Moreover, Dr. J. C. Sikdar mentions that it is apparently clear that each substance (dravya), undergoing changes into different forms in accordance with the cause as a result of its own changing nature, attains various transformations. And, according to the Pramānanayatattvālokālankāra’s account, he briefly mentions that the capacity of causing the transformation (parināma) or change in a substance (dravya) is called ‘guna’ and the transformation (parināma) due to ‘guna’ is known to be the mode (paryāya), or ‘bhāva’ (state or condition). This is a clear explanation, however, to follow up this matter further would involve us in other factors than Prabhācandra’s theory of relation (sambandha) and would take us beyond the scope of this paper. There is room for argument on the investigation of ‘dravya’, ‘guna’ and ‘paryāya’ in the Jainism, but I need not elaborate on this point; it is treated much more adequately in many scholar’s works.

3. 1. 1: The Notion of the Soul (Jīva) in the Jainism

Dr. J. C. Sikdar says “The view on the nature of the soul (jīva) as preserved
in the Jaina philosophy up to the present day, even keeping up its quality with the views of other schools of thought, is of one and the same kind, though newer and newer thoughts on the problem have emerged and progressed in the field of the Indian philosophy.\(^{(139)}\) In the Jainism, the term ‘jīva’, or the soul means life, existence, the principle of life, and so on, also, it does the living or personal soul distinguished from the universal soul. For example, we can see another few terms which refer to ‘jīva’, or the soul: ātman, cit, cidātman, prānīn, cetāna, vijñā, caitanya, bodha, and so on.\(^{(140)}\) The Āyārāṃgasutta\(^{(141)}\) says that the terms pāṇa (prāṇa in Sanskrit), bhūt(y)a (bhūta in Sanskrit), jīva (jīva in Sanskrit) and sattva (sattva in Sanskrit) are synonymous words. Moreover, in the Tattvasamgraha by Śāntarakṣita (circa AD 8th century), we can see that the term ‘pudgala’ represents the synonym for the soul, namely, the doctrine of the ‘soul’ according to the Vātsiputriyas, the soul (jīva) is called ‘pudgala’.\(^{(142)}\)

In the early Jainism, we can see the theory that the soul (jīva) is of six kinds (six kāyajīvas) in the Dasaveyāliyasutta: ‘the earth-bodied being’ (prthivikāyikā), ‘the water-bodied being’ (apkāyikā), ‘the fire-bodied being’ (tejaskāyikā), ‘the air-bodied being’ (vāyukāyikā), ‘the plant-bodied being’ (vanaspatikāyikā) and ‘the mobile beings’ (trasakāyikā),\(^{(143)}\) and, it is said that this is the reflection of the old theory of the animism, but, we should notice that according to the Āyārāṃgasutta, it does not seem that the Jainism is an animism, so it is debatable whether it be an animism or not.\(^{(144)}\) In addition to this, we can see the nature of the soul (jīva) in the Bhagavatāṅgasūtra\(^{(145)}\): the jīvāṅtikāya is a colourless, smellless, tasteless and touchless, non-corporeal, living, eternal and permanent, and fixed substance of the universe, having the attribute of consciousness.\(^{(146)}\)

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Umaśvāti in his *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* says that *jīva* and *ajīva* are the substances (*dravya*), and the substances are eternal (*nitya*), immutable (*avasthita*) and devoid of form (*arūpin*), with the exception of matter (*pudgala*) which is possessed of form (*rupa*), that is to say, it is tangible (*mūrtta*), and in the case of one particular soul (*jīva*) the space-points (*pradeśa*) are innumerable (*asāṅkhyeya*), and the souls (*jīva*) occupy one by innumerable (*asāṅkhyeya*) part or more of the universe (*lokākāśa*), for like a lamp their space-points (*pradeśa*) undergo contraction and expansion. In this way, the number of the space-points (*pradeśa*) of each soul (*jīva*) is equal to that of the universe, namely, it is innumerable, and it is clear that the soul (*jīva*) is eternal, fixed in number, and non-corporeal substance. Moreover, the soul (*jīva*) experiences pleasure, pain, life and death because of the agency of matter (*pudgala*). And, the *Dravyasamgraha* shows the nature of the soul: the soul (*jīva*) is characterised by 'upayoga', is formless and an agent, has the same extent as its own body, is the enjoyer (of the fruits of karman), exists in samsāra, is siddha and has a characteristic upward motion. It is not too much to say that this explanation in the *Dravyasamgraha* make us consider all angles of the soul (*jīva*). The *Dravyasamgraha*, 7 says that according to niścaya-naya, the *jīva* is without form, because the five kinds of colour and taste, two kinds of smell, and eight kinds of touch are not present in it, but according to vyavahāra-naya the *jīva* has form through the bondage of karman. About the agent, the *Dravyasamgraha*, 8 says that according to vyavahāra-naya, the *jīva* is the doer of the pudgalakarmams, according to niścaya-naya, the *jīva* is the doer of cetanakarmams, and according to sādhu-naya, the *jīva* is the doer of sādhabhāvas, and about the enjoyer (of the fruits of karman) the *Dravyasamgraha*, 9 says that according to vyavahāra-naya,
the jīva enjoys happiness and misery, the fruits of pudgalakarmans, and according to niścaya-naya, the jīva has cetanabhāvas only. Moreover, about the same extent as its own body, the Dravyasamgraha, 10 says that according to vyavahāra-naya, the conscious jīva, being without samudghāta, becomes equal in extent to a small or a large body, by contraction and expansion; but, according to niścaya-naya, it is extent in innumerable pradesas. Umāsvātī in his Tattvārthādhisthānasūtra says that the sansārin or worldly and the mukta or emancipated — these two are the classes of the souls (jīva), and the worldly souls are those possessed of manas or internal organ and those of it, and so on. And, the soul (jīva) has a characteristic upward motion, which is a characteristic theory in the Jainism. Umāsvātī says that as soon as all its karmas are annihilated the jīva goes upwards up to the end of the loka (tadanantaram ārdham gacchatyālokāntā). And, about the svaśātva of the soul (jīva), he says in his Tattvārthādhisthānasūtra: 'Aupaśāmika (i.e. that which results from a subsidence of the karmas concerned), kṣāyika (i.e. that which results from a destruction of the karmas concerned), kṣāyopāśāmika, or the mixed (i.e. that which results from a subsidence-cum-destruction of the karmas concerned) — these three plus two more — viz. audayika (i.e. that which results from a manifestation of the karmas concerned) and pārināmika (i.e. that which having nothing to do with karmas appears naturally) — thus five in all are the types of bhāva and they constitute the nature of a soul. (1) These five types have got 2, 9, 18, 21 and 3 sub-types respectively. (2) Samyaktva, or right inclination and cāritra, or right conduct — these two are aupaśāmika. (3) Jñāna, or determinate cognition, darśana, or indeterminate cognition, dāna, or donation,
lābha, or gain, bhoga, or immediate consumption, upabhoga, or recurrent consumption, virya, or endeavour, and samyaktva, or right inclination and cāritra, or right conduct — these nine are ksāyika.

(4) Four types of jñāna, or right determinate cognition, three types of ajñāna, or false determinate cognition, three types of darśana, or indeterminate cognition, the five above enumerated fortunes dāna etc., samyak, or right inclination, cārtitra, or complete discipline and samyamāsamyama, or partial discipline — these eighteen are ksāyopāsāmika.

(5) The four types of gati, or birth-species, the four types of kāśāya, or passions, the three types of liṅga (also called veda), or sexual feeling, one mithyādarśana, or wrong inclination, one ajñāna, or lack-of-cognition, one asamyama, or lack-of-discipline, one asiddhatva, or state-of-non-emancipation, and the six types of leśyā, or spiritual colouring — these twenty-one are audayika.

(6) Jīvatva, or being a soul, bhavyatva, or being worthy of mokṣa and abhavyatva, or being unworthy of mokṣa — these three, as also several others, are pārināmika.

The notion of these five kinds of the svaatattva of the soul (śīva) mentioned above is quoted in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, as is well known. However, to discuss the classification of the soul as a whole is beyond the scope of a brief paper.

In the Jainism, the nature of the soul (śīva) is ‘upayoga’, or consciousness, which is a very important conception in the Jaina epistemology. In the Jaina āgamas, for example, the Uttarājīhayaṇāi says the characteristic of the soul is the consciousness (upayoga), which is the knowledge (jñāna), faith or intuition
(darśana), happiness (sukha), and misery (duḥkha). Besides, it can be said that it is the (valid or right) knowledge (jñāna), faith or intuition (darśana), conduct (carita), austerities (tapas), energy (vīrya), and the consciousness (upayoga). Also, in the Bhagavatīṣṭhānaśūtra, the soul (jīva) is examined from eight aspects: the soul as substance (dravyātman), the soul actuated by passion (kaśyātman), the soul endowed with activity (yogātman), the soul endowed with consciousness (upayopgātman), the soul possessing knowledge (jñānātman), the soul possessing self-awareness (darśanātman), the soul existing in conduct (cāritātman) and the soul endowed with energy (vīryātman). Anyway, it is not too much to say that these mean that the nature of the soul (jīva) is the knowledge including the will and the living existence, the soul (jīva) in this case is equal to the self (ātman) in the Indian philosophy, and the life force in each substance is regarded as what is substantial. Therefore, the Jainism does not accept the self (ātman) which is only one and permanently omnipresent, but the innumerable selves which are substantial.

According to the ontological theory of the Jainism, the existence, or the being (sat) relates to the substance (dravya), quality (guna) and mode (paryāya), moreover, three aspects of the reality, that is to say, origination (uptāda), decay (vyaya) and permanency (dhravya), as is mentioned above: utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat. Moreover, we can see the same idea in the Saddarśanaasmuccaya by Haribhadra (the Śvetāmbara sect, circa AD 8th century): yenotpādavyayadhrauvyayutam yat sat sad isyate, and in the Sarvadarśanaśamgraha, III: utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat in. In this way, the existence, or the being (sat) is of the transformation, so it is not of only permanency. The existence, or the being in this world is what is of origination (uptāda), decay (vyaya) and permanency (dhravya), this means that even the self
(ātmā) does not possess absolutely unchanging universality. On the other hand, the real since it never gives up its being is eternal (nitya)\(^\text{174}\). And, neither ‘sat’ nor ‘nitya’ contradicts each other, because Umasvāti says in his Tattvārthādhiṣṭīka\(^\text{175}\) that each thing is possessed of a number of properties; for as viewed from the standpoint adopted and as viewed from another standpoint it proves to be something self-contradictory\(^\text{176}\), namely, from the viewpoint of sāmānyā, a substance (dravya) is nitya and from that of viśeṣa, it is anitya; in this way, all the existences are of both nitya and anitya. It is clear that the theory of the existence, or the being (sat) in the Jainism has relevance to the non-absolutism (anekāntavāda).

Let us now return to a matter of ‘upayoga’, or consciousness, it is said that the nature of the soul (jīva) is upayoga\(^\text{177}\) according to the Tattvārthādhiṣṭīka\(^\text{178}\) and the Dravyasamgraha\(^\text{179}\). Upayoga, or consciousness is of two kinds: darśana and jñāna. Darśana is known to be divided into caksur-darśana, acaksur-darśana, avadhi-darśana and kevala-darśana, which are nirākāra-upayoga. Jñāna is of eight kinds: mati-jñāna, śruti-jñāna, avadhi-jñāna, manahparyāya-jñāna, kevala-jñāna, mati-ajñāna, śruti-ajñāna and vibhāanga-jñāna, which are sākāra-upayoga. Moreover, the Dravyasamgraha says that according to vyavahāra-naya, the general characteristics of the soul (jīva) are said to be eight kinds of jñāna and four kinds of darśana, but according to śuddha-naya, they are pure jñāna and darśana\(^\text{180}\). And, it says that according to vyavahāra-naya, that is called jīva, which is possessed of four prānas, that is to say, the senses (indriya), force (bala), life (āyu) and respiration (ānaprāna) in the three periods of time (the present, the past and the future), and according to niścaya-naya, that which has consciousness (cetanā) is called jīva\(^\text{181}\). However, we should notice that upayoga,
or consciousness is not the jīva-in-itself, but the transformation (parināma) of the nature of the soul (jīva). Umāsvāti in his Tattvārthādhigamasūtra of the Śvetāmbara tradition says that one’s being — that is, one’s retaining one’s specific nature and yet undergoing origination and destruction — is the transformation (parināma), and, in the case of the soul (jīva) it is yoga and upayoga that are possessed of a beginning. And, it is cited in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha that the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to be pursued, which is defined as upayoga, as Padmanandin’s opinion. Moreover, it says:

‘Upayoga [or “the true employment of the soul’s activities”] takes place when the vision of true knowledge recognizes the manifestation of the soul’s innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of pradesa and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces [between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather be defined as “the cause of its recognising that is it other than these.”

In this way, it can be also said that upayoga, or consciousness is a kind of the cause which makes the salvation from the bondage of this world possible and complete.

In the Jaina epistemology, upayoga means the application or attention of consciousness, which is the essence (svatattva) of the soul (jīva). Umāsvāti says in his Tattvārthādhigamasūtra that upayoga, or consciousness (or cognitive operation) is the defining characteristic of a soul, that is to say, it is the definition of the soul (jīva). And, Vidyānanda in his Tattvārthaślokavārtika says, with pointing out the difference between the essence (svatattva) and the definition (lakṣaṇa), that upayoga, which is the essence (svatattva) of the soul (jīva), is not only a definition
(laksana) but also the definee (laksya). On the other hand, upayoga, which is only the definition (laksana) of the soul (jiva), is not necessarily given the position above. The consciousness itself is the soul (jiva), which is a kind of power known through the application, serves as a definition of the soul (jiva) better than consciousness. Therefore, it may say that the existence of the soul (jiva) can be approved on the basis of upayoga, or the function of consciousness. Upayoga, or consciousness is an essencial definition of the soul (jiva), and it cannot be separated from the soul (jiva), namely, in the Jaina epistemology, there is no soul (jiva) without upayoga, or consciousness and there is no upayoga without the soul. However, we should notice that upayoga, or consciousness is just a part of the psychical function, and that other functions like feeling, willing, and so on are not included into upayoga but the activity of the cognition. In other words, caitanya, which is a particular expression of consciousness, covers the whole of psychical matter. So upayoga is the definition of the soul (jiva).

It is said that 'upayoga' in the Jaina philosophy, especially in the late period, is a general term comprehending all activity related with consciousness, that is to say, it is the application of the faculty of knowing possessed by the soul (jiva), so, it is the attention of the soul (jiva) cognizing the object. Upayoga, or consciousness is divided into two kinds, as mentioned above: nirakara-upayoga, or darshana and sakara-upayoga, or jnah. Nirakara-upayoga, or darshana is an inarticulate cognition and sakara-upayoga, or jnah is an articulate cognition. We can say that the former refers to the perception possessed by the soul (jiva), which is the theory of perception in the Jaina agamas different from that in the logical period, and, the latter does the perception, which is affected by the theory of pramana held by other school, namely, by that of Nyaya, Vaisesika, Buddhism,
Vedānta, Mimāṃsā, Yoga school, and so on. In this case, nirākāra-upayoga, or darśana can be regarded as the direct perception of the soul (jīva) without the function of the sense-organs, so it is never the indistinct or ambiguous perception. We can see that the inarticulate cognition, or sensation preceding the articulate cognition is known as darśana in the Jaina epistemology, and it precedes the sense-perception as well as the supersensuous perception, or intuition and the articulate cognition is known as jñāna and ajñāna. Moreover, we can see that the term nirākāra-upayoga is explained in the Pramāṇanāyatattvāloka and the Syādvādaranākāra by Vādidevasūri (the Śvetāmbara sect, circa AD 11th-12th century) as the cognition of mere existence (sāmānyamātra-grahaṇa). Later I shall try to give a more precise account of the problem regarding to nirākāra-upayoga. Anyway, we cannot investigate the theory of jīva in the Jaina epistemology without the notion of upayoga, or consciousness or application.

3. 1. 2: The Notion of Dharma, or the Principle of Motion, and Adharma, or the Principle of Rest, in the Jainism

‘Dharma-astikāya’ refers to ‘the principle of motion’ and ‘adharma-astikāya’ does ‘the principle of rest’ in the Jainism. We can see many synonyms for dharmāstikāya and adharmāstikāya, as can be seen in the Bhagavatī-āṅgasūtra, XX, 2, which is also explained by Dr. Sikdar.

The nature of dharmāstikāya, or the principle of motion is said that it is a single, colourless, smell-less, taste-less, touch-less, non-corporeal, non-living, eternal and fixed substance of the universe. We can see the theory of dharma and adharma in the āgamas, for example, the Uttarāṭhāyāṇāi says:

‘Dharma, adharma, space, time, matter, and souls (are the six kinds
of substances); they make up this world, as has been taught by the Jinas who possess the best knowledge. (7)

Dharma, adharma, and space are each one substance only; but time, matter, and souls are an infinite number of substances. (8)

'Things without life are 1. possessing form, 2. formless; the formless things are of ten kinds, those possessing form are of four kinds. (4)

The ten kinds of formless things: 1. dharma, 2. its division, 3. its indivisible parts; 4. adharma, 5. its divisions, 6. its indivisible parts; 7. space, 8. its divisions, 9. its indivisible parts, and 10. time. (5, 6)

Dharma and adharma are co-extensive with the world (loka); space fills the world and the non-world (aloka); time exists in what is called the place of time. (7)

Dharma, adharma, and space are ever without beginning and end. (8)

Kundakunda in his Niyamasara says: (197)

'The auxiliary causes of motion and rest to soul and matter are called the medium of motion, and medium of rest respectively. That which is the auxiliary cause of giving space to all the substances, soul, and so on, is space.' (198)

Umasvāti in his Tattvārthādhigamasastra says: (199)

'The substances (jīva and ajīva) mentioned above are eternal (nitya), immutable (avasthita) and devoid of form (arūpa). . . . Of these five substances those upto ākāsa are one each. And they are devoid of activity (kriyā). In the case of dharma and adharma the pradeśas

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are infinite in number. . . . The substances dharma and adharma occupy the whole lokākāsa. . . . The act as an occasioning cause for motion and to do so for stoppage — these two respectively are the functions of the substances dharma and adharma.\(^\text{(200)}\)

Nemicandra in his Dravyasamgraha says:\(^\text{(201)}\)

'As water assists the movement of moving fish, so dharma (assists the movement of moving) pudgala and jīva. (But) it does not move (pudgala and jīva which are) not moving. (17) As shadow (assists the staying of) the travellers, (so) adharma assists the staying of the pudgalas and jīvas which are stationary. But it (adharma) does not hold back moving (pudgalas and jīvas). (18)\(^\text{(202)}\)

Pūjyapāda in his Sarvārthasiddhi says:\(^\text{(203)}\)

'The principle of motion (dharma) and the principle of rest (adharma) are not situated in the universe like a pot in a house. Then, how? They pervade in the whole like oil (which does inside the seeds). These two substances interpenetrate without interfering with each other, because it should be known that they possess the power of immersion.'

And, Akalanka in his Tattvārthavārtika says:\(^\text{(204)}\)

'The three (dharma, adharma and ākāśa) do not contradict one another because of non-corporeal. //2// Even though being corporeal, water, ash, sand, and so on are present at one place, to say nothing of dharma, adharma and ākāśa which are non-corporeal. Therefore, it should be known that they do not contradict one another because of
non-corporeal.’

In this way, dharma, or the principle of motion is the nimitta of the gamana of jīva and pudgala, and, adharma, or the principle of rest is the nimitta of the sthiti of jīva and pudgala. Therefore, we can infer the existence of dharma from a phenomenon of moving (gamana) in this world, and do that of adharma from a phenomenon of staying (sthiti) in this world, as is seen in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha. Anyway, we cannot explain the loka and the aloka without these two extended reals, dharmāstikāya and adharmāstikāya, moreover, we should notice that they are related to the condition of the soul (jīva) and matter (pudgala) in the Jainism.

3. 1. 3: The Notion of Ākāśa, or space in the Jainism

Ākāśa-astikāya, or space is a colour-less, odour-less, taste-less, touch-less, non-corporeal, non-living, permanent, eternal and fixed (constant) substance. It is a single substance from the point of view of substance (dravya), equal to the extent of the universe (loka) and the non-universe (aloka), that is to say, all-pervasion and infinite, from the point of view of field or locus (kṣetra); it is eternal from the point of view of time (kāla); it is colour-less, odour-less, taste-less and touch-less from the point of view of condition (bhāva), and it is endowed with the attribute of accommodation from the point of view of capacity or quality (guna), as can be seen in the Bhagavatiangasūtra, II, 10, which is also explained by Dr. Sikdar.

Kundakunda in his Niyamasāra says:

'The auxiliary causes of motion and rest to soul and matter are called the medium of motion, and medium of rest respectively. That which
is the auxiliary cause of giving space to all the substances, soul, and so on, is space.\(^{(209)}\)

Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* says:\(^{(210)}\)

'The substances (*jīva* and *ajīva*) mentioned above are eternal (*nitya*), immutable (*avasthita*) and devoid of form (*arūpa*). . . . Of these five substances those upto *ākāśa* are one each. And they are devoid of activity (*kriyā*). . . . In the case of *ākāśa* the space-points (*pradesa*) are ananta in number. . . . To act as an occasioning cause for the provision of room is the function of *ākāśa*.\(^{(211)}\)

Nemicandra in his *Dravyasamgraha* says:\(^{(212)}\)

'Know that which is capable of allowing space to *jīva* and so on, to be *ākāśa*, according to the Jainism. *Lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*, thus (*ākāśa* is) of two kinds. (19) *Lokākāśa* is that in which *dharma*, *adharma*, *kāla*, *pudgala* and *jīva* exist. That which is beyond (this *lokākāśa*) is called *alokākāśa*. (20)\(^{(213)}\)

Pujyapāda in his *Sarvārthasiddhi* says:\(^{(214)}\)

'It should be known that the function of *ākāśa* is to act as an occasioning cause for the provision of room for the substances, *jīva*, *pudgala*, and so on.'

In this way, *ākāśāstikāya* is divided into two kinds: *lokākāśa*, or the universe and *alokākāśa*, or the non-universe in the Jainism. *Lokākāśa*, or the universe is in which *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *pudgala* and time exist, that is to say, the middle portion of the infinite space in which five substances exist is called the universe (*loka*), and the portion in which there is only *ākāśa* is called the non-universe.
And, avagāha is done only in the universe (loka), and, in the non-universe the soul (jīva) free from the bondage of this world exist, where the universe does not exist. Ākāśa is eternal, one, devoid of activity, and the causes of a substance’s change of place. It is clear that Kundakunda, Umasvāti, and others in the late period have dealt with the notion of ākāśa, or space, on the basis of that in the āgamas, which regard it as what is divided into two kinds: lokākāśa, or the universe and alokākāśa, or the non-universe.\(^{(216)}\)

3. 1. 4: The Notion of Pudgala, or Matter in the Jainism

Pudgala, or matter possesses touch (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha) and colour (varna),\(^{(217)}\) which can be called the qualities (guna) of matter (pudgala),\(^{(218)}\) moreover, it is also characterized by sound (śabda), binding (bandha), subtneness (sauksmya), grossness (sthaulya), configuration (samsthāna), splitting (bheda), darkness (tamas), shadow (chāyā), hot radiation (ātapa) and non-hot radiation (light) (udhyota).\(^{(219)}\) And the Dravyasamgraha says:\(^{(220)}\)

> ‘Sound, union, fineness, grossness, shape, division, darkness and image, with lustre and heat are modifications (paryōya) of the substance known as pudgala. (16)’\(^{(221)}\)

And pudgala, or matter is of the form of an atom (anu) and of the form of an aggregate (grossness or compound) (skandha).\(^{(222)}\) The Sarvadarśanasamgraha says:\(^{(223)}\)

> ‘Pudgala possesses touch, taste, and colour. Pudgalas are of two kinds: atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed (perceived), the compounds are the binary (dvyanuka) and other combinations.'
Atoms are produced by separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from separation and conjunction [combined] hence they are called *pudgalas*, because they “fill” (*pūr*), and “dissolve” (*gal*).¹(224)

Therefore, *pudgala*, or matter occupy indefinitely — that is, as might be the case — one *pradeśa* or more of the *lokāśa*, as is seen in the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*.²(225) Moreover, Kundakunda in his *Niyamasāra* says:³(226)

“The substance matter (*pudgaladravya*) is of two kinds; in the form of an atom (*paramāṇu*) and in the form of molecules (grossness or compound) (*skandha*). And the molecules (grossness or compound) are six kinds and atom is of two kinds. (20)

From the real point of view an atom is said to be “matter substance” (*pudgaladravya*); but from the other (i.e. practical point of view) the term “matter substance” has been applied to the molecules (grossness or compound) (*skandha*). (29)”⁴(227)

The *Niyamasāra*, 26 explains the definition of the atom, which is as follows:⁵(228)

“That substance which is the beginning, the middle and the end by itself, inapprehensible by the senses, and is indivisible, should be known as an atom.”⁶(229)

Moreover, we can see that the atom is indivisible in the *Dravyasaṃgraha*.⁷(230)

Well, we can see the theory that the grossness are six kinds and the atom is of two kinds in the *Niyamasāra*, 20, as mentioned above. The *Niyamasāra* explains

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the grossness which are six kinds, which is as follows:\textsuperscript{(231)}

\begin{quote}
‘Gross-gross, gross, gross-fine, fine-gross, fine, and fine-fine are six kinds, earth, and so on. Solids like earth, stone, consist of gross-gross molecules (liquids) like ghee, water, oil are gross. Shade, sunshine, and so on, consist of gross-fine molecules. Objects of the four senses (of touch, taste, smell and hearing) are of fine-gross molecules. Karmic molecules, in the condition of being bound up with soul are fine. Those which are unlike these are of fine-fine molecules.\textsuperscript{(232)}
\end{quote}

And, the \textit{Niyamasāra} explains the atom which is of two kinds, which is as follows:\textsuperscript{(233)}

\begin{quote}
‘That which is the cause of the four root matters (earth, water, fire and air) should be known as cause-atom (\textit{kāranaparamānu}). The smallest possible part of a molecule should be known as effect-atom (\textit{kāryaparamānu}).\textsuperscript{(234)}
\end{quote}

Umāsvāti in his \textit{Tattvārthādhigamasūtra} clearly explains the formation of atom (\textit{āṇu} or \textit{paramāṇu}) and grossness (\textit{skandha}), which is as follows:\textsuperscript{(235)}

\begin{quote}
‘Pudgala is of the form of an atom and of the form of an aggregate. (25) The aggregate are caused through combination, split and combination-cum-split. (26) An atom is caused through split alone. (27) The visible aggregates are caused only through split and combination occurring together. (28) Combination takes place on the ground of smoothness and roughness. (32) Combination does not take place between smooth and components of a minimum degree (that is, between components whose smoothness or roughness — as the case might be — is of a minimum degree). (33) When the
\end{quote}
degrees concerned are equal combination does not take place between similar components — that is, between one smooth component and another, as also between one rough component and another. (34) Combination well takes place between components whose degrees differ by two units or more. (35) At the time of combination an equal or a larger degree transforms an equal or a smaller degree. (36)

Judging from these contents mentioned above, we can easily understand the meaning of a word ‘pudgala’ explained in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha: ata eva pūrayanti galantiti pudgalāḥ.

Also, Umasvāti says: ‘Body, speech, manas, or internal organ, in-breath and out-breath — these are benefits due to pudgala, that is, these are functions of pudgala. (19) Again, pleasure, pain, life and death — these too are benefits due to pudgala. (20)’

Pudgala, in this case above, means what composes an individual human being rather than what does the natural world. Dr. Kanakura and Dr. Nakamura point out the similarity between this theory of pudgala mentioned above and that in the Buddhism. Also, we can see the theory of pudgala in the Bhagavatīangasūtra, II, 10, however, it cannot be discussed here for lack of space, useful information on pudgala explained in the Bhagavatīangasūtra, II, 10 is given by Dr. J. C. Sikdar, for further details of pudgala, see Sikdar[1991a]: 268-289, and so on.

3. 1. 5: The Notion of Kāla, or Time in the Jainism
According to the Jainism, time (kāla) is a substance (dravya) but it is not an extended real (astikāya) as mentioned above (See 3.1.0: The Metaphysical Notion of the Substance in the Jainism and the notes). In short, time, or ‘kāya’ is that which has many space-points (pradesa). The five substances (jīva, dharma, adharma, pudgala and ākāśa) have many space-points (pradesa), therefore, these substances are called kāyas; but time (kāla), having a single space-point (pradesa) only, is not called so. This is the reason why time (kāla) is not called as ‘astikāya’ (the extended real).

Umāsvāti in his Tattvārthādhigamasūtra says:(240)

‘Certain authorities maintain that time (kāla) too is a substance. It possesses anantasamaya (as modes).’

And, he says:(242)

‘Perduration, transformation, activity and superiority-cum-inferiority — these are benefits due to time (kāla).’

Nemicandra in his Dravyasamgraha says:(244)

‘Vyavahārakāla (time from the ordinary point of view) is that which helps to produce changes in substances and which is known from modifications (produced in substances), while paramārthika (i.e., real) kāla is understood from continuity. (21) Those innumerable substances which exist one by one in each pradesa of lokākāśa, like heaps of jewels, are points of time. (22)’

It is said that the Digambara tradition has admitted kāla as an independent substance which first of all can be seen in the works of ācārya Kundakunda,(246) and that the Śvetāmbara tradition does not regard time-substance as atomic in nature.
except Hemacandra (the Śvetāmbara sect, circa AD 11th-12th century)\textsuperscript{(247)}. Anyway, the notion of time (kāla) as a category of reality is very unique in its originality in the Jaina philosophy, as it is found in both the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras.\textsuperscript{(248)}

3. 2. 0: The Theory of Naya, or the Standpoint in the Jainism

Naya is a ‘standpoint’, ‘viewpoint’ or the ‘way of expression’, that is to say, it is a kind of the rules of understanding or investigation, which plainly shows the non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) in the Jainism, as mentioned above: 3. 0. 2: The Fundamentals in the Jainism and the notes.

Umasvāti in his Tattvārthādīghamasūtra says:\textsuperscript{(249)}

‘Naigama, samgraha, vyavahāra, rjusūtra and śabda these five are the types of naya. Of these, the first — that is naigama — and śabda have got two and three sub-types respectively.’\textsuperscript{(250)}

However, it is difficult to determine the details of naya in the Jainism because of the complicated process in the history, so let us investigate it briefly according to Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi, as Prof. Nakamura did.\textsuperscript{(251)}

(1): naigama-naya (non-distinguished standpoint)

\textit{anabhiniṇīrvṛtārthasāṁkalpamātrāgrāhī naigamah.} (SAS, I, 33, §242)

‘Naigama is to seize only the purpose which is not achieved.’\textsuperscript{(252)}

(2): samgraha-naya (collective standpoint)

\textit{svajātyavirodhenaikādhyam} \\
\textit{pariyānākrāntabhedānaviśeṣena} samastagrahaṇāt samgrahah. \\
(SAS, I, 33, §243)

‘Samgraha adduces the singleness of occurrence without contradiction
to the genus of its own self and seizes the whole without the distinction of the unassailable modes.\(^{(253)}\)

(3): *vyavahāra-naya* (practical standpoint)

\[\text{samgrahana}yāksiptānām arthānāṃ vidhipūrvakam avaharānāṃ vyavahārah. \text{(SAS, I, 33, §244)}\]

'\textit{Vyavahāra} is to bring together the things seized by \textit{samgraha-naya} according to rule.'\(^{(254)}\)

(4): *rjusutra-naya* (straight expression)

\[\text{rjum pragunām sutrayati tantrayatī rjusūtraḥ.} \text{(SAS, I, 33, §245)}\]

'Rjusūtra is to string or to follow in a straight direction, or straightly. it seizes the object being present only, which is preeminent among the objects lying in the three times: past, present and future, because there is no efficacy among that which is past, as is perished already and that which is future, as is not produced yet.'\(^{(255)}\)

(5): *śabda-naya* (verbal standpoint)

\[\text{lingasamkhyaśādhanādvayabhicārānyātibhavyāt cropped śabdanayāḥ.} \text{(SAS, I, 33, §246)}\]

'Shabdanaya is the standpoint in order to stop the deviation by means of the gender, the number, the sense of the instrumental or agent (, or kāraka), and so on (of the noun).'\(^{(256)}\)

(6): *samabhirūdha-naya* (subtle standpoint)

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Samabhīrūdhah is said because of many meanings placed on, therefore, samabhīrūdhah surpasses many meanings and it is possessed of the conventional with being directed towards one meaning.(257)

(7): evambhūta-naya (such-like standpoint)

In the case of one thing which exists possessing one nature, evambhūta is to determine the thing possessing that nature.(258)

It is said that these nayas are divided into the followings.(259)

A: dravyārthika-naya: (1), (2), (3)

paryārthika-naya: (4), (5), (6), (7)

B. artha-naya: (1), (2), (3), (4)

śabda-naya: (5), (6), (7)

In addition to the theory of naya mentioned above, the Jainas use that of saptabhanginaya, we can see the explanation in the Sarvadarśanasamgrahaby Mādhava,(260) so let us quote the translation in Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997], which is as follows:

‘Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the saptabhanginaya, or the system of seven paralogisms, (1) “may be, it is” (syād asti), (2) “may be, it is not” (syān nāsti), (3) “may be, it is and it is not” (syād asti ca nāsti ca), (4) “may be, it is not predicable”
(syād avaktavya), (5) “may be, it is, and yet not predicatable” (syād asti cāvaktavyaś ca), (6) “may be, it is not, and not predicatable” (syān nāsti cāvaktavyaś ca), (7) “may be, it is and it is not, and not predicatable” (syād asti ca nāsti cāvaktavyaś ca). All this Anantavirya has thus laid down —

1. When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say “may be, it is”; when you wish to deny it, “may be, it is not”.

2. When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it be declared “indescribable” from the impossibility to describe it.

3. The fifth process is enjoyed when you wish to establish the first as well as its indescribleness; when the second as well as its indescribleness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.

4. The seventh is required when all three characters are to be employed simultaneously.\(^{(261)}\)

Moreover, the Sarvadaśanasamgraha says:\(^{(262)}\)

‘If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always, everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided. But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it. Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this “Is being or non-being'}
the real nature of the thing?" The real nature of the thing cannot be
being, for then you could not properly use the phrase, "It is a pot.
(ghato 'sti)", as the two words "is" and "pot" would be tautological;
nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot.", as the words thus used would
imply a direct contradiction; and the same argument is to be used in
other questions. As it has been declared —

"It must not be said 'It os a pot.', since the word 'pot' implies
'is';
nor may you say 'It is not a pot.', for existence and non-existence
are mutually exclusive." etc.

The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents
severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and
non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is
inexplicable (anirvacaniyatā); three other classes hold one or other
of the three first theories combined with the fourth. Now, when they
meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?" etc., we
have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way." etc., and
our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues to the
holder of the syādvāda, which ascertains the entire meaning of all
things. \(^{(263)}\)

The purpose of this saptabhanginaya shows to us that we cannot determine
the thing with saying 'asti', 'nāsti', and so on, in other words, it approves the
unsteadiness, that is to say, the non-absolutism. The Jainas divide each naya
among these seven nayas into the opposite respectively, which is as follows:\(^{(264)}\)

\textit{asti}: Sāmkhya

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nästi: Baudhavisēṣā Mādhyamikāḥ

asti ca nästi ca: Naiyāyika

avaktavya: Māyāvedāntin

asti ca avaktavyaś ca: Māyāvedāntin accepting the Sāṃkhya’s theory

nästi ca avaktavyaś ca: Māyāvedāntin accepting the Mādhyamika’s theory

asti ca nästi ca avaktavyaś ca: Māyāvedāntin accepting the Naiyāyika’s theory

In this way, the Jainas insist that we cannot express the thing from a particular aspect, for example, ‘asti’, ‘nästi’, ‘asti ca nästi’, and so on, because the thing is possessed of some aspects. This notion in the Jainism leads us to the non-contradiction to each theory in the Indian philosophy, namely, this is a peculiarity in the Jainism, as is called the non-absolutism.

3. 3. 0: The Placement of Pratyakṣa, or Perception in the Jainism in the Late Period

We can see the systematized theory of the epistemology and the logic in the Tattvārthādhisūtram by Umāsvāti, which is accepted by both the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara, the pramāṇa in the Jainism after Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthādhisūtram is divided into two kinds: pratyakṣa and parokṣa. In the Tattvārthādhisūtram, pratyakṣa is divided into three kinds: kevala, manahparyāya and avadhi, on the other hand, parokṣa is done into two kinds: māti and śrūta. These classifications can be seen in the early Jainism, as is well known. Pratyakṣa refers to the sacred conception, or the transcendent which is attributed to the pure soul (jīva), and parokṣa does to the common, or the empirical which is
attributed to the ordinary person who has a common conceptual thinking.

In the logical period when Jinabhadra (the Śvetāmbara sect, circa AD 6th century) and others flourished, it is natural that each school (the Vaiśeṣika, the Naiyāyika, the Bhauddha, and so on) in the Indian philosophy having something to do with one another should be influenced of one another, the Jainas are also no exception to the facts. In the the Jainism in the late period under these historical conditions, we can see the concept of ‘pāramārthika’ and ‘sāṃvyavahārīka’ adopted into the Jaina theory of perception (pratyakṣa). We can find out the placement of perception (pratyakṣa) on the basis of the the concept of ‘pāramārthika’ and ‘sāṃvyavahārīka’ in the Jainatarkabhāṣā by Yaśovijaya (the Śvetāmbara sect, circa AD 17th century), a Jaina logician who flourished at Dabhoi in the Bharoda State (Gujarat), in the Jainatarkabhāṣā he clearly treats pāramārthikapratyakṣa and sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa with using the concept of ‘pāramārthika’ and ‘sāṃvyavahārīka’.

3. 3. 1: The Placement of Pratyakṣa in the Jainatarkabhāṣā

In the Jainatarkabhāṣā, Yaśovijaya gives his opinion on the classification of pratyakṣa, basing an argument on the preceding Jaina philosophy, which is as follows:

‘The perception (pratyakṣa) is of two kinds: the empirical (sāṃvyavahārīka) and the transcendental (pāramārthika). The empirical (sāṃvyavahārīka) is based on unhindered transaction (sāṃvyavahāra), characterized by day-to-day talk of engagements and withdrawals, for example, perceptual cognition of ourselves. As it takes effect through the activity (vyāpāra) of the self (ātman),

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mediated by the sense-organs (indriya) and the mind (anindriya) in truth (reality) (paramārthatas), it is non-perceptual (parokṣa), because the fact of mediation is here the same as in the knowledge of the fire by the smoke. Moreover, it (śāṃvyavahārīkapratyakṣa) is in truth (reality) (paramārthatas) non-perceptual (parokṣa), because here also doubt, error and indecision are possible as in non-existent, inconclusive, and contradictory inference-fallacy and like a correct inference it also admits of the possibility of certainty preceded by the agreement (intimation) and the memory."(270)

Here, we should notice that the knowledge mediated by the sense-organs (indriya) and the mind (anindriya) is classified as a kind of the perception (pratyakṣa), namely, as the empirical perception (śāṃvyavahārīkapratyakṣa) in contrast with the transcendental perception (pāramārthikapratyakṣa).

According to the traditional Jaina thought, the Jainas do not classify the perception (pratyakṣa) into the two like this: the empirical perception (śāṃvyavahārīkapratyakṣa) and the transcendental perception (pāramārthikapratyakṣa). For example, in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra by Umasvāti, pramāṇa is of five kinds: mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyāya, keval; the former two come under parokṣa, and the latter three do under pratyakṣa. In this case, the knowledge mediated by the sense-organs (indriya) and the mind (anindriya) is regarded as parokṣa, it is never treated as pratyakṣa, this classification is the traditional thought seen in the early āgamas, as is well known.(271)
In addition to this classification of pramāṇa in the Tattvārthādīghamasūtra, it is Akalanka and others, influenced by Dharmakirti (circa AD 7th century), who classify the knowledge mediated by the sense-organs (indriya) and the mind (anindriya) as the perception (pratyakṣa) called sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa, as is seen in the Jainatarkabhāṣā. For example, in the Laghiyastraya by Akalanka, the empirical perception (sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa) as well as the transcendental perception (pāramārthikapratyakṣa) = mukhya is invariably included into the category of pratyakṣa, namely, he never say that the empirical perception (sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa) is parokṣa. Although there is a small difference for Akalanka’s idea like this, we can find out the same idea in the Parikṣamukhasūtra by Māṇikyanandin (the Digambara sect, circa AD 9th century), in the Nyāyakumudacandra and the Prameyakamalamārtanda by Prabhācandra, and in the Pramāṇamāṁśa by Hemacandra.

\[ \text{pratyakṣa} \rightarrow \text{mukhya (atīndriya-pratyakṣa)} \]

\[ \text{sruta} \]

\[ \text{parokṣa} \rightarrow \text{avagraha, ṭha, apāya, dhāranā} \]

\[ \text{mati (based on indriya and anindriya)} \]

\[ (\text{= smṛti, sāmjñā, cintā, abhinibodha}) \]

\[ \text{(Classification of pramāṇa in the Tattvārthādīghamasūtra)}^{(272)} \]
The logical system in the jainism is completed by Akalaṅka, as is well known, and in the Parikṣāmukhasūtra by Māṇikyanandin we can see about the same system of the classification of pramāṇa in the Pramāṇamīmāṃsā by Hemacandra. \(^{(281)}\) Akalaṅka, Māṇikyanandin, Prabhācandra, Hemacandra, and others in their main works say that the empirical perception (sāṃvyavahārīkapratyakṣa) as well as the transcendental perception (pāramārthikapratyakṣa) = mukhya is invariably included into the category of prayākṣa, namely, they never declare that the empirical perception (sāṃvyavahārīkapratyakṣa) is parokṣa.

\[\text{Classification of pramāṇa in the } \text{Laghiyastraya}^{(281)}\]
The knowledge (mati and sruta) mediated by the sense-organs (indriya) and the mind (anindriya) is classified as a kind of the perception (pratyakṣa), namely, as the empirical perception (sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa) in contrast with the transcendental perception (pāramārthikapratyakṣa) in the Jainatarkabhāṣā, however, we should not overlook an important fact that Yaśovijaya in his Jainatarkabhāṣā declares that the empirical perception (sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa) is in truth (paramārthatas) parokṣa, namely, he does not ultimately follow Akalaṅka and others’ ground influenced of Dharmakirti’s idea. In the late period, the 17th century, Yaśovijaya formally follows the theory of the placement of the perception (pratyakṣa) in the classification of pramāṇa which Akalaṅka, Māṇikyapandita and others declare, but ultimately he does regard the empirical perception...
(sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa) not as pratyakṣa but as parokṣa. This is an important opinion, because some scholars in their studies say that all the Jainas after Akalanka, Māṇikyanandin and others follow the theory of the classification of pramāṇa which they (Akalanka, Māṇikyanandin and others) regard.

Undoubtedly, the classification of pramāṇa in the Jainatarkabhāṣā is roughly about the same system in the Pariksāmukhasūtra by Māṇikyanandin and in the Pramāṇanāmāṇāsā by Hemacandra, however, we should notice that Yaśovijaya does regard the empirical perception (sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa) as parokṣa on the ground of the concept, ‘in truth’ (paramārthatas), as is seen above. According to the chapter of pramāṇa in the Jainatarkabhāṣā, the classification of pramāṇa is the following:
3.3.2: The Historical Process of the Placement of Pratyakṣa in Jainism in the Late Period

When we research the classification of pratyakṣa in the Jainatarkabhasa by Yaśovijaya, in the Viśeṣāvāśyakahāṣyayasvopajñāvṛtti by Jinabhadra we can find out the origination of the theory that the empirical perception (sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa) is regarded as parokṣa on the ground of the concept, 'in truth' (paramārthatas).

Moreover, this idea of sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa can be seen in the Nandisuttacūrṇī, 10\(^{285}\) by Jinadāśa Mahattara (the Śvetāmbara sect, circa AD 7th century\(^{286}\)), in the Nandisūrāvṛtti, 11\(^{287}\) by Haribhadra and in the Nyāyāvatārāvṛtti, 27\(^{288}\) by Siddharṣi (the Śvetāmbara sect, circa AD 10th century\(^{289}\)).

And, among the Jainas in the Digambara sect, Brahmadeva (the Digambara sect, circa AD 13th or 17th century?)\(^{290}\) in his Dravyasamgrahaśrūti,\(^{291}\) the commentary on the Dravyasamgraha, explains the reason why the Jainas in the late period regard matijñāna and śrutajñāna as the empirical perception (sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa) and do kevala, manahparyāya and avadhi as the
transcendental perception (pāramārthikapratyakṣa), that is to say, as mukhya,
although Umasvāti in his Tattvārthādhiṃsūtra regards kevala, manahparyāya
and avadhi as pratyakṣa and does matijñāna and śrutajñāna as parokṣa. Brahmadeva
says that the classification of pramāṇa in the Tattvārthādhiṃsūtra by Umasvāti
should be treated as utsarga and that in the Jaina works in the late period should be
done as apavāda. Dr. Sarat Candra Ghoshal made several important statement on
Brahmadeva’s commentary on the Dravyasamgraha.

To put it concretely, Yasovijaya in his Jainatarkabhāṣā explains the
classification of the perception (pratyakṣa) with using the discription in the
Śyādvādaratnakara, II, 4 by Vādidevasūri and in the Viśeṣāvāsyaśikabhāṣyaḥvādvyādvyātī,
90-95 by Maladhāri Hemacandra (the Svetāmbara sect, circa AD 12th century) (292),
which is as follows:

. . . samicino bādhārahito vyavahāraḥ pravṛttinivṛttilakṣaṇas tatra
bhavam samprayojanam asyeti vā sāṃvyavahārikaṃ. bāhyendriyādi-
sāmagrīṣāpekṣatvād apāramārthikam asmaddiṣṭapratyakṣam ity
arthaḥ. tad dhindriyānindriyavyavahitātmavyāpārasampādyatvāt
paramārthataḥ parokṣam eva. dhūmāgniṃjñānavat vyavahānaviśeṣād
iti . . . (SVR, II, 4)

. . . yad indriya-manonimittam jñānam tat parokṣam, samāśaya-
viparyayā-nadhyavasāyānāṃ tatra sambhavat, indriya-
manonimittāśiddhā-naikāntika-viruddhānāṃbhāsavat, iti
prathamah prayogah; yad indriya-manonimittam jñānam tat
parokṣam, tatra niścayasambhavat, dhūmāder agnyādyanumāṇavat,
iti dvitiyāḥ; yat punah pratyakṣam tatra samāśaya-
viparyayā-nadhyavasāya-niścayaḥ na bhavanty eva, yathā
And, the Viṣeṣaśaṭyaśakhaśyaśabhyadhavṛtti, 95 says:

. . . kīṁ tu yeṣam indriyajñānāsya pratyakṣatā proktaṁ saṁvyavahāramātrata eva, paramārthaṁ tu parokṣaṁ evedam. . .

(VĀbhBV, 95)

‘. . . however, the knowledge called pratyakṣa produced from the sense-oragans is just regarded as the empirical, in truth it is invariably parokṣa. . .’

In this way, we can see that the knowledge mediated by the sense-oragans (indriya) and the mind (anindriya), namely, the empirical perception (saṁvyavahārikapratyakṣa), is in truth regarded as parokṣa.

The idea in the Syādvādaratnākara, II, 4 and in the Viṣeṣaśaṭyaśakhaśyaśabhyadhavṛtti, 93, 95, and so on having influence on the Jainatarkabhāsa affirms the idea of pratyakṣa in the early āgamas and in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra by Umasvāti, it clearly follows the idea in the Viṣeṣaśaṭyaśakhaśyasvopajñāvṛtti that the empirical perception (saṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa) mediated by the sense-oragans (indriya) and the mind (anindriya) is in truth regarded as parokṣa.

3. 3. 3: A Small Conclusion of the Placement of Pratyakṣa in the Jainism in the Late Period

These sources mentioned above show that the perception (pratyakṣa: avadhi, manahparyāya, kevala) seen in the early and traditional Jainism and the perception (pratyakṣa: pāramārthikapratyakṣa, saṁvyavahārikapratyakṣa) in the Jainism after . . .

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Jinabhadra are justified by Yaśovijaya. In other words, they confirm that Jinabhadra and others regard pratyakṣa as the perception by the soul (jīva) only, with protecting the Jaina āgamas. The Jainas in the late period harmonizes the system of epistemology influenced of the Buddhism and so on with that of their own, on the ground of the concepts, ‘pāramārtha’ and ‘sāṃvyavahārika’. Moreover, it is not too much to say that the idea ‘pāramārtha’ seen in the works, the Jainatarkabhāṣā and so on, has a same meaning of the concepts, ‘tattvatas’, ‘ātmanas’, and so on in the Nandisūtravṛtti, 11.\(^{(24)}\)

We may say that the concepts like ‘pāramārtha’ and ‘sāṃvyavahārika’ have something to do with naya (nīscaya-naya, vyavahāra-naya) regarded by the traditional Jainism.\(^{(25)}\) Kundakunda in his Samayasāra says:

‘From the vyavahāra point of view, conduct, belief and knowledge are attributed (as different characteristics) of the knower, the self. But from the real point of view, there is no (differentiation of) knowledge, conduct and belief, in pure self. (SS, 7)

Just as a non-ārya cannot be made to understand anything except through the medium of his non-ārya’s language, so the knowledge of the absolute cannot be communicated to the ordinary people except through the vyavahāra point of view. (SS, 8)\(^{(26)}\)

According to the theory of naya (nīscaya-naya, vyavahāra-naya) mentioned above, we may say that it is very influenced of the Buddhism, for example, Nāgārjuna (circa AD 2nd-3rd century)\(^{(27)}\) in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says the theory of ‘paramārtha’ and ‘vyavahāra’, which is as follows:

\[
dve satye samuśrītya buddhānām dharmadeśanā,\]

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lokasmvrtisatyam ca satyam ca paramarthah. //8// (MMK, 24, 8)
ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgam satyayor dvayoḥ,
te tattvam na vijānanti gambhiram buddhaśāsane. //9// (MMK, 24, 9)
vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate,
paramārtham anāgamyam nirvāṇaṁ nādhigamyate. //10// (MMK, 24, 10)

In this way, the content of the Samayasara, 8 is very similar to that of the Mulamadhyamakakārikā, 24, 10, these two can be comparable, which is as follows:(298)

| Kundakunda | Nāgārjuna |
| niścayanaya | paramārtha |
| vyavahāranaya | vyavahāra |

Well, what is the perception (pratyakṣa) of the soul (jīva) in the traditional Jainism without being mediated by the sense-organs (indriya) and the mind (anindriya)? We can see a clear answer in the study of the Pramāṇamīmāṃsā by Dr. Nagasaki. Hemacandra in his Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, I, 15 explains kevala, which is as follows:(300)

'The (full) manifestation of the innate nature of a conscious self, emerging on the total cessation of all obstructive veils, is called 'that' (intuition) transcendent and pure. (PM, I, 15)’(301)

And, the commentary on the Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, I, 15 by Hemacandra says:(302)

'The pronoun ‘that’ is advisedly employed to indicate that is refers
to 'perceptual cognition'. Had it not been put in it, the word 'immediacy-cum-lucidity', which precedes it immediately, would have been syntactically construed with it. The self has consciousness as its essence and stuff, and is consequently luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the luminous nature of the self, which is nothing but the self as manifested, is styled mukhya, that is transcendent, intuition. It is supreme of all cognitions, just as the face is the supreme part of the body (and so is called mukhya). It is characterized as 'pure' (kevala) in scriptures, since it is independent of the services of (an external instrument such as) sense-organs, is cognisant of all objects, and thus stands apart (in a category of its own), having nothing in common (with other modes of cognition). [The manifestation of the luminous being of the self occurs] on the disappearance of the obstructive karmans that serve to obfuscate the innate knowledge, (belief and conduct). (This purgation, again,) is occasioned by the acquisition of the perfection of what is called 'triple jewel' by a course of prolonged, unremitting and reverent practice, and by the power of unflagging meditation on an aspect (of an entity conscious or unconscious), as laid down in the scripture, without change of object. *(Pramāṇamāṁśa, I, 1, §48)*

This explanation by Hemacandra shows that the nature of the soul (jīva) can be seen in only the sage free from the bondage of this world, namely, the sage on the disappearance of the obstructive karmans can perceive everything without the help of the sense-organs and so on. This knowledge is called kevala. Moreover, Dr. Nagasaki in his study proved that this kevala is different from the yogijñāna.
accepted by Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Yoga school, and he proved that kevala in the Jainism is very similar to suddha-pratyakṣa in the [瑜伽論] and to pratyakṣa (yoginah pratyakṣam) accepted by Dignāga (circa, AD 6th century) and Dharmakīrti.

In this way, we can see the traces that the Jainas in the late period have constructed the new system of epistemology and logic in their own school with influenced of other school's theories. According to the Śvetāmbara's works like Jinabhādra's work and so on, by means of the concept 'paramārthatas' the Jainas in the late period insist that the perception accepted by other schools is different from that in their own school, namely, the perception by other schools is just the empirical perception (sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa). This means that the Jainas in the late period draw a clear distinction between the pratyakṣa by other schools and the pratyakṣa by the soul (jīva) in the traditional Jainism. Therefore, we have to pay attention to this point in investigating the theory of pramāṇa in the Jainism, because we should not overlook that the matter of pramāṇa is done on the ground of the empirical aspect (sāṃvyavahārika) in the Jainism in the late period.

3. 4. 0: Some Aspects of Avagraha, or Sensation in the Process of Cognition

The Jainatarkabhāṣā written by Yaśovijaya is a primer of Jaina logic and epistemology. Although the Jainatarkabhāṣā deals with the important subject matter of Jaina logic and epistemology, only few attempts have so far been made to investigate this text. The first stage in the process of sensuous knowledge (mati) is avagraha, which is generally of two kinds: vyañjanavagraha and arthāvagraha. Dr. Dayanand Bhargava in his study understands that the former means contact-awareness and the latter does object-awareness; however, he gives no reason for
his interpretation regarding these terms.

The senses of sight and mind apprehend the object without physical contact, while the others (the sense of touch, taste, smell and sound) depend on contact. This means that the sight and the mind do not pass through the stage of *vyañjanāvagraha*, but reach that of *arthāvagraha* directly. We need not elaborate on this point, since it has been treated much more adequately in many studies. Yaśovijaya's *avagraha* has been discussed from time to time, but his understanding of the object of *avagraha* has not been clarified. Although a large number of studies have been made on *vyañjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha*, little is known about the reason why the former means contact-awareness and the latter does object-awareness. We miss the point if we regard them merely as contact-awareness or object-awareness without understanding the reason.

This 3. 4.: Some Aspects of *Avagraha*, or Sensation in the Process of Cognition is intended to investigate the object of *vyañjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha* in the *Jainatarkabhāṣā*. In particular we will attempt to extend the observation into the notions of the technical term 'vyāñjana' of *vyañjanāvagraha* and 'artha' of *arthāvagraha*, and the interpretation of the definition of *arthāvagraha* in the *Jainatarkabhāṣā*.

3. 4. 1: *Vyañjanāvagraha* in the *Jainatarkabhāṣā*

It is difficult to define the meaning of *vyañjana* as contact, because the term *vyañjana* has no meaning of contact at all. However, Yaśovijaya in his *Jainatarkabhāṣā* interprets *vyañjana* as follows:

'Sensuous knowledge is of four kinds: sensation, speculation, judgement and retention. The initial grasping is the sensation. It is
of two kinds: contact-awareness and object-awareness. *Vyañjana* is what manifests or displays the object; (1) it is *upakaranendriya* having the character of the particular power as the cause of cognizing the objects such as sound and so on, which is possessed by the internal sense-organ shaped like the *kadamba* (a kind of flower) and so on, (2) substances (transformed into sense-data) such as sound and so on, and (3) the relation between the two above. Therefore *vyañjanāvagraha* is a compound where the middle word has been omitted: the sensation of *vyañjana* (the substance such as sound and so on or the relation between the substance and the sense-organ) with *vyañjana* (the internal sense-organ called *upakaranendriya*).

As the sentence underlined shows, the term *vyañjana* has three meanings, (1) is *upakarana-indriya*, or the senses with particular power possessed by the internal senses (*antarnirvṛtti-indriya*),

(2) is *dravya*, or substances, and (3) is *sambandha*, or the relation between the two above. Though the term *vyañjana* basically has no meaning of contact, Yaśovijaya explains *vyañjanāvagraha* as the relation between the senses and the substances, that is to say, contact-awareness. We can find the same observation in the *Jñānārṇava* and the *Jñānabindu* by Yaśovijaya; moreover, this idea is in agreement with the concept of *vyañjanāvagraha* in the *Viśeṣāvaiśyakabhāṣyasyasvopajñavrtti* 193 by Jinabhadra (the Śvetāmbara sect, *circa* AD 6th century) and the *Viśeṣāvaiśyakabhāṣyayabhadravrtti* 194 by Maladhāri Hemacandra (the Śvetāmbara sect, *circa* AD 12th century). Furthermore, it is not too far from the truth to say that this idea is the general conception in the Śvetāmbara sect, because it is discussed, no doubt, in the texts of the Śvetāmbaras', as we shall see.
Although, as mentioned in the *Jainatarkabhāṣā* above, Yaśovijaya gives *vyañjana* three classifications, Umasvāti, who has a great influence on both the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras, states in his *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* I, 18 the meaning of *vyañjana* as follows:

\[
\text{vyañjanasyāvagrahah. (TAAS, I, 18)}
\]

‘The sensation of *vyañjana*.’

And in his *Tattvārthādhigamasūtraḥṣya* he says:

\[
vyañjanasyāvagrahāṃ eva bhavati neḥdayah. evaṃ dvividho ‘vagrahāṃ
\]

\[
vyañjanasyārthasya ca. ihādayas tv arthasyaiva. (TAAS-ḥṣya, I, 18)
\]

‘There is only the sensation of *vyañjana*, not the speculation and so on (of *vyañjana*). Thus the sensation is of two kinds: of *vyañjana* and *artha*. But only of *artha* there are the speculation and so on (not of *vyañjana*).’

Umasvāti uses the term *vyañjana* in the sense of ‘a kind of object’, but he does not explain the meaning of *vyañjana* in detail.

The Digambara commentators interpret *vyañjana* as *avyakta* and *sabdādiṣṭāṇa*; they say in other words that the term *vyañjana* means substance (*dravya*), or external existence and the object of the sense-organs (*indriya*).\(^{1315}\)

On the other hand, a Śvetāmbara commentator, Siddhasena Gaṇi (*circa* AD 7th century or 10th century)\(^{1316}\) states in his *Tattvārthādhigamasūtraḥṣyaṭikā* I, 18\(^{1317}\) that the term *vyañjana* has two meanings. The first is contact (*samaśleśa*) between *upakaraṇendriya* and *dravya*. The second is *dravya*, consisting of *pudgala*. Although this idea in the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtraḥṣyaṭikā* I, 18 is very similar to
that in the Viṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyasvapajñāvṛtti 193 and the Viṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya-brhadvṛtti 194, which will be treated later, Siddhasena Gaṇi does not clearly state that vyaňjana has the meaning of sense-organ, or indriya.

In this way, the commentary on the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 18, roughly speaking, has two lines. Now, how does Yasovijaya understand Umasvati's idea found in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 18? Yasovijaya in his Tattvārthavivaraṇa I, 18 states that vyaņjana has the meaning of contact between upakaraṇendriya and dravya. That is to say, he regards vyaņjana as the relation between the sense-organ and the substance. The context of the Tattvārthavivaraṇa I, 18 is very similar to that of the Tattvārthādhigamasūtraḥṣaṭikā I, 18. But here arises an interesting question: while Siddhasena Gaṇi in his Tattvārthādhigamasūtraḥṣaṭikā I, 18 clearly states that vyaņjana has two meanings (the contact between upakaraṇendriya and dravya, and dravya consisting of pudgala), Yasovijaya in his Tattvārthavivaraṇa I, 18 uses an ambiguous compound as follows:

vyaņjanam upakaranendriyasparśādyākāraparinatadravyasam-
bandhas tasyāvagrahā evaiko bhavati.

In the Jainatarkabhāṣā Yaśovijaya clearly states that vyaņjana has three meanings, but the sentence underlined above makes it possible to admit of two interpretations. First, that vyaņjana has only the meaning of contact between upakaraṇendriya and dravya; second, that vyaņjana has three meanings: upakaraṇendriya, dravya and sambandha. This is a question to which we shall return later.

Judging from the above, we can see some differences between the interpretation of vyaņjana in some commentaries on the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra

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and that in the Jainatarkabhāṣā. Accordingly, because we cannot trace the source of the Jainatarkabhāṣā back to the Tattvārthādhigaṃśūtra, it is necessary to seek some other source for the description discussed in the Jainatarkabhāṣā.

The Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, which occupies an important position in the Śvetāmbara tradition, can give authenticity to this question. The gāthā of the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya states as follows:

‘Vyanjana is what manifests the object. As if [for example], a pot [is manifested] by means of the light. It (vyanjana) is the relation (sambandha) between upakaraṇendriya and śabdādiparinatadravya (or it has three meanings: upakaraṇendriya, śabdādiparinatadravya and sambandha between the two). (VĀBh)’

We certainly cannot understand the meaning of vyañjana by this gāthā alone, however, because there are two ways of reading the compound in the gāthā. The term vyañjana admits of two interpretations: first, it has the three meanings; upakaraṇendriya, dravya and sambandha; secondly, it means sambandha alone (between upakaraṇendriya and dravya). Let us look at two commentaries on this gāthā.

Jinabhadra in his Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyasvopajñāvṛtti 193 states that:

‘... Vyañjana is what manifests the object. As if [for example], a pot [is manifested] by means of the light. It (vyañjana) means the relation (sambandha), or contact (sampṛkṣa), between upakaraṇendriya and śabdādiparinatadravya. In the case of vyañjanāvagraha, it (vyañjanāvagraha) should be considered as the determination of the connection (samāsa) between the two (upakaraṇendriya and śabdādiparinatadravya), that is to say, it is the sensation of vyañjana, or the
substance transformed into sense-data such as sound and so on with vyāñjana, or the internal sense-organ called upakaraṇendriya. (*VāBhSV*, 193)

Furthermore, Maladāri Hemacandra in his *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyaḥadvrtti* 194(321) says as follows:

Vyāñjana is what manifests or displays the object (e.g., for example), as if a pot (is manifested) by means of the light. What is it (vyāñjana)? It is said that 'tam ca' and so on, that is to say, it is vyāñjana which is the relation (sambandha) between upakaraṇendriya and sabdādiparinatadraṣṭa. The sense is of two kinds: the material structure (dravyendriya) and the psychic function (bhāvendriya). Each sense is (further), divided into two kinds: the former consists of nirvṛtti and upakaraṇa, the latter does of labdhi and upayoga. Nirvṛtti is (again), divided into two kinds: the internal and the external; the internal sense-organ is divided into five kinds, which are too small to be measured with the measure of an aṅgula, as follows: the form of the kadamba (a kind of flower), the grain of the masūra (a kind of pulse), the kāhalā (a kind of flower), the edge of the arrowhead and the cutaneous. But the external sense-organ has the forms such as the auditory passage of the ear and so on. Among them, upakaraṇendriya, which belongs to the internal sense-organ shaped like the kadamba and so on, has the character of the particular power as the cause of cognizing the objects such as sound and so on. And sound and so on are the objects of the organ of hearing and so on, and the word ‘ādi’ comprehends taste, smell and touch. The things

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which transformed into the state like that are the substances related to the division classed as language, that is to say, the substances transformed into sense-data such as sound and so on. And there are upakaranendriya and the substances transformed into sense-data such as sound and so on, the relation between the two is the relation between upakaranendriya and the substances transformed into sense-data such as sound and so on. First, this (1) the relation between upakaranendriya and the substances transformed into sense-data such as sound and so on) is called 'vyañjana'. Moreover, (2) the sense-organ is called 'vyañjana' because it can manifest the object, and (3) the substances transformed into sense-data such as sound and so on are, in a similar way, called 'vyañjana', because they can be manifested. Thus the three kinds mentioned above should be known as 'vyañjana', because of the using a term metaphorically. Accordingly vyañjanāvagraha is the sensation of vyañjana having the nature of the relation to the substances transformed into sound and so on, with vyañjana characterized by the sense-organ. Furthermore, vyañjanāvagraha is the sensation of vyañjana having the nature of the substances transformed into sound and so on with vyañjana (, or the sense-organ). Therefore even in the two cases mentioned above, it is a compound which omits one term 'vyañjana'. (VĀbhBV, 194)'

In this way, we can see that Jinabhadra and Maladhāri Hemacandra interpret the term vyañjana as something that has three meanings: upakaranendriya, dravya, and sambandha (the relation between upakaranendriya and dravya). The Viśeṣāvāśyakabhāsyasvopajñavṛtti and the Viśeṣāvāśyakabhāsyabrhadvṛtti clearly
state that \textit{vyañjanāvāgraha} means contact-awareness, because a compound from the term \textit{vyañjana} is used that has the three meanings: \textit{dravya}, \textit{indriya} and \textit{sambandha}. This interpretation of \textit{vyañjana} is in agreement with that in the \textit{Jainatarkabhāṣā}; and we can regard the \textit{Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya} as the source of the description discussed in Yaśovijaya’s \textit{Jainatarkabhāṣā}. Moreover, we can see many other works following this idea\textsuperscript{(322)}.

3. 4. 2: Definition of \textit{Arthāvāgraha} in the \textit{Jainatarkabhāṣā}

Object-awareness (\textit{arthāvāgraha}) is the next stage of contact-awareness (\textit{vyañjanāvāgraha}) in the process of sensuous knowledge (\textit{mati}). Here is the definition of \textit{arthāvāgraha} in the \textit{Jainatarkabhāṣā}\textsuperscript{(323)}

\begin{quote}
\textit{svarūpanāmajātikriyāguṇadravyakalpaṅaṃrahitaṃ}
\textit{sāmānyagrahāṇam arthāvāgrahaḥ}.
\end{quote}

‘Object-awareness is the cognition of generality without any distinction of own nature, name, genus, activity, quality, and substance.’\textsuperscript{(324)}

Judging from this, the term \textit{sāmānyya} as used by Yaśovijaya is applied to the object, which has no distinction of own nature and so on. He states that generality (\textit{sāmānyya}) can be cognized in object-awareness, when the cognizer does not know any particularity of the external existence. We may understand that generality is not a conceptual notion but a real existence which can be grasped in object-awareness. That is to say, since we can cognize it in the contact between the sense-organ and the object, he regards it as an existence outside subjectivity. What is \textit{sāmānyya} in this case?

Let us start with the analysis of \textit{artha} given in the \textit{Tattvārthādhigamasūtra},

\textbf{SATO 133}
which follows that of vyāñjana discussed above.

In his Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 16, Umasvāti states that each of the objects enumerated in the sūtra exists at all four stages of sensuous knowledge in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 15; and even in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 17 and the Tattvārthādhigamasūtrabhāṣya I, 17 we cannot find a detailed meaning of artha. Besides, judging from the Tattvārthādhigamasūtrabhāṣya I, 17 and so on, we should not understand that artha in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 17 is perfectly equal to the objects in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 16 and that it is copulative to them. Therefore we have to look at some other commentaries on the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 17 in order to clarify its meaning. The Digambara commentators regard artha as dravya, or substance, and states that it means encompassing not only dravya but also quality, or guṇa in their contexts. On the other hand, according to the Śvetāmbara tradition artha is regarded as what consists of the nature of touch, taste, smell, colour and sound, encompassing both substance (dravya) and mode (paryāya). Because both of them are interdependent, this idea includes the concept regarding 'the relation of qualifier and qualificand' (viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva). But it is not entirely fair to say that artha in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 17 can be grasped as the object of arthāvagraha defined in the Jainatarkabhāṣā, because the object (artha) in the definition of arthāvagraha in the Jainatarkabhāṣā is not particularity (viśeṣa) but generality (sāmānya); or perhaps it would be more correct to say that arthāvagraha is one stage in the process of the cognizing artha, as the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 17 shows.

It does not seem that the description of the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 17 has anything to do directly with the definition of arthāvagraha in the Jainatarkabhāṣā. The definition of arthāvagraha in the Jainatarkabhāṣā by Yāsovijaya is influenced
by some works\textsuperscript{(27)} of the Śvetāmbaras'. The \textit{Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyasyasvopajñāvṛtti} \textsuperscript{251} and the \textit{Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyayabrhadvṛtti} \textsuperscript{252} especially help account for the interpretation of the definition of \textit{arthāvagraha} in the \textit{Jainatarkabhāṣā}.

Jinabhadra in his \textit{Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyasyasvopajñāvṛtti} \textsuperscript{251}\textsuperscript{(28)} states that:

\begin{quote}
'Generality (sāmānyya) is inexplicable in words and it has no distinction of own nature (svarūpa), name (nāman) and so on.

[Objection]: If it be the case (can you explain) why (the sentence) "He has cognized the word," has no contradiction? (\textit{VĀbh}, 251)

. . . (Can you tell us) what kind of the object it \textit{(arthāvagraha)} grasps?

We mean that \textit{(arthāvagraha} grasps the object which is) generality, inexplicable in words, lacking distinction of own nature (svarūpa), name (nāman), genus (jāti), substance (dravya), quality (guna) and activity (kriya), and not to be related. . . . (\textit{VĀbhSV}, 251)'
\end{quote}

And Maladhāri Hemacandra in his \textit{Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyayabrhadvṛtti} \textsuperscript{252}\textsuperscript{(29)} interprets the \textit{gāthā} as follows:

\begin{quote}
'Even if the real thing (vastu), which can be grasped, consists of the nature of generality (sāmānyya) and particularity (viṣeṣa), one grasp not particularity but only generality by means of \textit{arthāvagraha}.

Because it lasts for a moment only, when one cannot reach the cognition of particularity. Some objects of the term sāmānyya also mean what are described in words: village, town, forest, army and so on. In order to exclude this idea (that sāmānyya means collective nouns such as village, town, forest, army and so on), it is said that the thing
\end{quote}
which is indescribable is what we cannot express in any words.

[Objection]: Why?

[Reply]: Because it has no distinction of own nature (svarūpa), name (nāman) and so on. The word ‘ādi’ includes genus (jāti), activity (kriyā), quality (guna) and substance (dravya). Among them, svarūpa is the nature (svabhāva), to the objects such as rūpa, rasa and so on, which can be cognized by one’s own sense-organ such as eyes and so on, and fixed for each single case. Nāman is the sound (dhvani) expressing rūpa, rasa and so on. Jāti is colour-ness (rupatva), taste-ess (rasatva) and so on. Kriyā is the words such as “This colour makes pleasure,” “This taste makes growth,” and so on, because activity is preeminent among them. Guna is ‘black’, ‘blue’ and so on. Dravya is the earth (prthivī) and so on. These distinctions of own nature, name, genus and so on are knowledge (jñāna) formed from inner speech. Jīva, by means of arthāvagraha, grasps only the object without any distinction, and it is, therefore, said that this is the object inexplicable in words. Because no one can explicate anything without any distinction of own nature, name, genus and so on.

(VĀbhBV, 252)

In this way we can exactly trace the source of the definition of arthāvagraha in the Jainatarkabhāṣā back to the Viśeṣāvāyaṇakabhāṣya. This is similar to the analysis of vyañjana.

3. 4. 3: Avagraha and Darśana

We must now return once again to a point we touched upon in 3. 4. 2. In
order to solve the question, "What is sāmānya in the definition of arthāvagraha in the Jainatarkabhāṣā?", let us analyze the relation of avagraha and darsana.

Umaśvāti in his Tattvārthādhiḥgamasūtrabhāṣya I, 15 states as follows:\(^{(330)}\)

‘Here (in the process of sensuous knowledge) the sensation is indistinct and (it is) the perceptual awareness (ālocana) of the objects by means of the sense-organs, that is to say, (it is) the determination of them. The sensation, the grasping, the perceptual awareness and the determination are synonymous.’

He defines avagraha as a kind of perceptual awareness and Pūjyapāda in his Sarvārthasiddhi I, 15, §190 (a commentary on the Tattvārthādhiḥgamasūtra I, 15) states:

\[
\text{visayaviṣayisamnipūtasamanantaramādyam grahaṇam avagrahah. visayaviṣayisamnipūte sati darsanam bhavati. tad anantaram artham grahaṇam avagrahah. . . . (SAS, I, 15, §190)}\(^{(331)}\)
\]

‘Sensation is the first cognition that arises immediately after the contact between the object and the sense-organ. On contact between the two, darsana comes about, and the sensation is the grasping of the object immediately after that. . . .’

We can find the same idea in the works\(^{(332)}\) of the Jaina logicians. From the contexts in which they appear, we can show the process of cognition:

\[
\text{A: <visayaviṣayisamnipūta> — <darsana> — <avagraha> — <iḥā> — <apāya> — <dhāraṇā>}
\]

<visayaviṣayisamnipūta>: the contact between the sense-organ and object
<darśana>: the grasping of the supreme universal ‘sattā’ as the object

<avagraha>: the grasping of lower, more specific universals

(cf. He is a man. This is white. etc.)

This diagram illustrates that Pujyapāda and others put darśana preceding avagraha, the first stage of sensuous knowledge\(^{(333)}\) in the process of cognition, but Yaśovijaya in his Jainatarkabhāṣā excludes darśana from the category of pramāṇa.\(^{(334)}\) This means that darśana is not knowledge (jñāna) at all and that sensuous knowledge is certainly determinative because jñāna is determinative. In short, Yaśovijaya does not consider that darśana is pramāṇa. Yaśovijaya’s darśana seems inconsistent with the theory of the process of cognition held by the Jaina logicians such as Pujyapāda and others mentioned above. We should notice that in the process of sensuous knowledge defined by Jinabhadra and Yaśovijaya, it is arthāvagraha that grasps generality as the object without any distinction, not darśana as defined by the Jaina logicians such as Pujyapāda.

The concept of the process of cognition caught hold among the Jaina logicians such as Pujyapāda aside, the process of sensuous knowledge posited by Jinabhadra and Yaśovijaya, as we have seen at 3. 4. 1 and 3. 4. 2, can be summarized as follows:

B: <vyanjandvagraha> — <arthāvagraha> — <ihā> — <apāya> — <dhāraṇā>

<vyanjandvagraha>: the contact between upakarana-indriya and dravya: the grasping the substance

<arthāvagraha>: the grasping of generality (sāmānya) that is
inexplicable in words

Based on the object in each stage of cognition, let us compare the process of sensuous knowledge defined by Jinabhadra and Yaśovijaya with that of cognition by the Jaina logicians such as Pūjyapāda. The result can be schematized as follows:

A: <vīṣayaviṣayayisansnipīta> = B: <vyañjanāvagraha>

A: <dārśana> = B: <arthāvagraha>

A: <avagraha> = B: <ihā> or B: <apāya>

In this correspondence there arises the question that we cannot put dārśana defined by the Jaina logicians such as Pūjyapāda in the same category as the process of sensuous knowledge defined by Jinabhadra and Yaśovijaya. We have seen that in the process of sensuous knowledge by Jinabhadra and Yaśovijaya, it is arthāvagraha which grasps generality (sāmānya) and not dārśana defined by Pūjyapāda and other Jaina logicians. But in order to resolve this contradiction Yaśovijaya in his Jainatarkabhāṣā states that sensation (avagraha) is of two kinds: naiścayikāvagraha and vyāvahārikāvagraha. The former grasps generality (sāmānya) and the latter grasps particularity (viśesa). Therefore the object of the sensation (avagraha) defined by Jinabhadra and Yaśovijaya is as follows:

The object of <naiścayikāvagraha>: generality (sāmānya) as the supreme universal

The object of <vyāvahārikāvagraha>: particularity (viśesa) as lower, more specific universals

We can find out the same idea in the Viśeṣāvaśayakabhistyasvopajñavalī by Jinabhadra, and the Viśeṣāvaśayakabhistyabhradvalī by Maladhāri Hemacandra; notable examples are such expressions as vastusāmānyamātra-
grahaṇa = anirdeśya = arthāvagraha = naiścayika, saṃvyavaḥārāvagraha, naiścayikārthāvagraha, vyavahārikārthāvagraha and vyavahārārthāvagraha.

It can be concluded from what has been said that arthāvagraha in the definition in the Jainatarkabhāṣā (see above, 3. 4. 2) is naiścayikāvagraha and equivalent to darśana, as Pūjayāpāda and others define it. It seems reasonable to suppose that generality (sāmānya) in the definition of arthāvagraha in the Jainatarkabhāṣā is sattā, that is to say, ‘being-ness’. Moreover, the underlined sentences in the Viśeṣāvyaśakabhāṣyabhyadhvṛtti 252 (see above, 3. 4. 2) make it possible to interpret arthāvagraha in the definition in the Jainatarkabhāṣā as darśanopayoga.

3.4.4: A Brief Conclusion of Some Aspects of Avagraha in the Process of Cognition

The Digambaras such as Pūjayāpāda, Akalanka and Bhāskaranandin (circa AD 11th century), in their own commentaries on the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 18, define the term vyaṇjana as substance (dravya) that is the external objects of the sense-organ (indriya). In addition to this idea, the Śvetāmbaras such as Siddhasena Gāṇi and Yaśovijaya, in their commentaries on the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 18, regard vyaṇjana as the relation (sambandha) between the substance (dravya) and the sense-organ having the character of the particular power (upakaraṇendriya). The Digambaras, in their commentaries on the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, do not seem to regard vyaṇjana as the relation between the sense-organ and the object, but just they do not clearly state that the term vyaṇjana means the relation between the sense-organ and the object. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that they do not consider vyaṇjana the relation between the sense-organ and the object. It is as the same time true that the contexts in which these terms appear in the Digambara...
tradition make them very obscure.

On the other hand, as we have seen in 3. 4. 1, the Śvetāmbaras such as Jinabhadra clearly state that vyaṇjana has three meanings: dravya, indriya and sambandha between the two. Here, the term vyaṇjana has three distinct meanings:

1. vyaṇgya = dravya

2. vyaṇjaka = indriya

3. vyaṇgyavyaṇjaka = indriyārthasannikarṣa

The point we should not overlook is that in the commentaries on the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 18, neither the Digambaras nor the Śvetāmbaras with all their minor differences define the term vyaṇjana as the sense-organ (indriya). Their reflections on the interpretation of vyaṇjana in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra do not make clear that Umāsvāti in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra I, 18 and in the Bhāṣya uses the term vyaṇjana to refer to the sense-organ (indriya). Without overstressing the case for it, we can say that the validity of this concept is backed up by solid evidence, Yaśovijaya uses the compound in his Tattvarthavivarana I, 18. Yaśovijaya in his Tattvarthavivarana I, 18 uses it ambiguously, as was pointed out at the beginning of this paper, although in his Jainatarkabhāṣā he clearly states that the term vyaṇjana has three meanings: indriya, dravya and sambandha between the two. We can assume from this that using an ambiguous compound in the Tattvarthavivarana, Yaśovijaya has tried not only to maintain the traditional authority of the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra but also to incorporate the Śvetāmbaras’ idea into Umāsvāti’s idea in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra.

The interpretation that in Jaina epistemology vyaṇjanāvagraha is generally defined as contact-awareness is concerned with these developments. One more point to be clarified concerning vyaṇjanāvagraha is the interpretation of the meaning
of the word *vyañjana*. Judging from the basic sense of the word *vyañjana* (meaning 'manifestation', 'implied indication', 'indication', 'allusion', 'suggestion', and so on) and the following process of sensuous knowledge: object-awareness (*arthāvāgraha*), speculation (*ihā*), judgement (*apāya*) and retention (*dhāraṇā*), *vyañjanāvāgraha* has a function that indicates or manifests *dravya* as the object of the sense-organ and produces knowledge to the cognizer. In this way the technical term *vyañjana* of *vyañjanāvāgraha* implies 'indication', 'allusion' or 'suggestion' of the next stage of sensuous knowledge to the cognizer. The technical term 'vyañjanāvāgraha' cannot easily be defined as contact-awareness without reference to these implications. When we regard *vyañjanāvāgraha* as contact-awareness, taking its original use into consideration, we must admit that it means sensation which can indicate or manifest the object and produce knowledge to the cognizer.

As we have seen in 3.4.2, the theory in the *Jainatarkabhāṣā* that generality (*sāmānya*) can be grasped in the stage of *arthāvāgraha*, which can be traced definitely not to the *Tattvārthādīhgaṃsūtra* but to the *Viśeṣāvāyakabhāṣāsvopajñavṛtti* 251, cannot be defined as original to Jainism. This is because Yasovijaya's idea that *sāmānya* is the real existence outside subjectivity is very similar to the theory of cognition posited by the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas. As is well known, in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 8, 5-9\(^{(342)}\) and elsewhere, both *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are the cause of concepts and inhere in all individual entities. The Vaiśeṣikas define the process of perception (*pratyakṣa*) as follows:

(1)<i>indriyārthasannikarṣa</i> — (2)<i>knowledge of *sāmānya* or *sāmānya-viśeṣa* as *viśeṣaṇa*</i> — (3)<i>knowledge of *dravya* and so on as *viśeṣya* (cf. This is a cow.)</i>

In this process the first and second stage; 'indriyārthasannikarṣa' and
‘knowledge of viśeṣa’ are known as “pre-predicative perception”
(nirvikalpakapratyakṣa).\(^{(343)}\) Similarly the process of sensuous knowledge in the
Jainatarkabhāṣā begins from contact-awareness, and the object of arthāvagraha is
sāmānya. After the first stage (avagraha) of sensuous knowledge, speculation
(ihā) arises, the inquisitive pursuit (for knowledge) of specific details of the real
thing (vastu) grasped by the sensation. The next stage of ihā is the perceptual
judgement (apāya) which is the determination of the specific characteristics of
what is speculated upon. What these facts make readily clear is that the process of
perception as defined by the Vaiśeṣikas, consisting of three stages, is divided into
the process of sensuous knowledge in Jaina epistemology\(^{(344)}\). This theory of
sensuous knowledge in Jainism is also similar to the process of perception posited
by the Naiyāyikas.

From what has been said in 3. 4. 2 and 3. 4. 3 it should follow that
object-awareness in the definition of arthāvagraha in the Jainatarkabhāṣā is “pre-
predicative perception” and refers precisely to the very first moment when the
cognizer becomes aware of the real thing (vastu). In accordance with the works\(^{(345)}\)
of the Śvetāmbaras, we can regard sāmānya, which the Jainatarkabhāṣā defines as
the object of arthāvagraha, as sattā\(^{(346)}\), that is to say, as ‘being-ness’ in the real
world, which can be directly perceived. Moreover, we can regard arthāvagraha in
this case as darśana.
NOTES IN CHAPTER III

(1) Shastri, Indra Candra [1990]: 1

The word ‘nigantha’ refers to ‘nirgrantha’ in Sanskrit and means the man who renounces worldly desires, and ‘nātaputta’ refers to ‘nāyaputta’ in Ardhamāgadhī and it means the man who comes from the Nāsa tribe.

(2) We can see the details in the Trisastisālākāpurusacarita by Hemacandra. (Nakamura [1991]: 160-164)

(3) We can see his biography in the Kalpasūtra, 149-169. (See Jacobi [1884]: 271-275.)

And, Dr. Kailash Chand Jain in his work writes a historical figure of Pārśvanātha. See Jain, Kailash Chand [1974]: 11-17.

(4) Āyārangasutta, II, 15-16 (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (I): 259-298), see Jacobi [1884]: 191-210

And, we can see a biography of Vardhamāna (Mahāvira) in the Kalpasūtra, 47-148. (Jacobi [1884]: 217-270). Moreover, Dr. Kailash Chand Jain in his work displays wide research on Mahāvira, his life, and so on. See Jain, Kailash Chand [1974].

(5) Nakamura [1991]: 170-171


Moreover we can see the idea of mamāyīta-mati in the early Jainism, as it can be seen in the early Buddhism. This shows that the beginning of the ascetic practices is to get at the truth that nothing attached to oneself exists in this world, for example, we can see this idea in the Āyārangasutta, which is as follows:

... esa parinā pavuccati kammovasamāti. je mamāiyamatim jahāti se jahāti mamātām. se hu diṭṭhapahē munī jassa ṇaththi mamātām. tam parinnāya mehāvī vidittā logām, vaṃtā logasannaṃ, se matimām
parakkamejāsi tti bemi.

nāratim sahati vire, vire no sahati ratim,

jamhā avimane vire tamhā vire na rajjati. //3//

sadde phāse adhiyasamāne nivināda namām iha jiviyassa. muni monam samādāya dhune kammasarīragam. paṃtaṃ lūham sevanti virā sammattadamāsino. esa oghāntare muni tinne mutte viratte viratte vīyāhite tti bemi. (Āyāraṅgasutta, 1, 2, 6, 2-3) (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (1): 29)

‘. . . This is called the true knowledge (and renunciation). He who ceasing from acts relinquishes the idea of property, relinquishes property itself. That sage has seen the path (to final liberation) for whom there exists no property. Knowing this, a wise man, who knows the world and has cast off the idea of the world, should prudently conquer the obstructions to righteousness. Thus I say. (2)

The hero does not tolerate discontent,

The hero does not tolerate lust.

Because the hero is not careless,

The hero is not attached (to the objects of the senses). //3//

Being indifferent against sounds (and the other) perceptions, detest the comfort of this life.

A sage adopting a life of wisdom, should treat his gross body roughly.

the heroes who have right intuition, use mean and rough food.

Such a man is said to have crossed the flood (of life), to be liberated, to have ceased (from all activity). Thus I say. (3)’ (Jacobi[1884]: 25-26)

From the point of this view, we can say that the Jainas also have the notion of nirmamatva. This content above means to abondon the notion of pariggaha, that is to say, it is nothing but the idea of aparigraha in the religious precepts in the Jainism. (Nakamura[1991]: 220-226)

(8)Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 15: 267-268

SATO 145
We can see the same idea in Gunaratna's commentary on the Saddarśanasamuccaya by Haribhadra and so on. See Nakamura[1991]: 239.

We can see the explanation of the term 'syāt' in many places in some works, which are as follows:

'syāccchabdaḥ khalv ayam nipātastiṁntappatirūpako 'nekāntadyotakah. yathoktam —
vākyesv anekāntadyoti gamyam prati viśeṣanam,
syānnipāto 'rihayogitvāt tāṁntapatirūpah. iti.' (SDS, III 376-382: 84)\(^{11}\)

'Syāt, "may be", is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it has been said —

"This particle syāt is in the form of a verb, but from its being connected with the sense, it denotes indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect on the implied meaning." (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]: 79-80)
The knowledge of the form of syādvāda and the knowledge of an omniscient personage are both the revealer of all things whatsoever (and in all their aspects); they only differ in that the former is an indirect type of knowledge while the latter a direct one. And if somebody posits a third type of knowledge he would be positing something fictitious.’ (ĀM: 91^[5])

Moreover, it can be seen that the term ‘syāt’ refers to ‘kathamcit’ or ‘kimvṛttacit’, which are as follows:

‘yadi punar ekāntadyotakah syādcchabdo ‘yaṃ syāt tadā syād astiī vākya syātpadam anarthakaṃ syāt. anekāntadyotakatve tu syād asti kathāmcd astiī syātpadāt kathāmcdity ayam artho labhyata iti nānarthakyam. tad āha —

syādvādh sarvathaikāntatyāgāt kimvṛttaccdvidheḥ,
saptabhāṅgināyāpekṣo heyādeyāvīśeṣakṛt. iti.’ (SDS, III^[303-308]: 84^[317])

‘If, again, the word syāt denoted determinateness, then it would be needless in the phrases, “may be, it is”; but since it really denotes indeterminateness, “may be, it is”, means “it is somehow”; syāt, “may be”, conveys the meaning of “somehow”, kathamcit, and so it is not really useless. As one has said —

“‘The doctrine of the syādvāda arises from our everywhere rejecting the idea of the absolute; it depends on the saptabhāṅginaya, and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to be accepted.’” (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]: 80)

‘syādvādah sarvathaikāntatyāgāt kimvṛttaccdvidheḥ,
saptabhāṅganāyāpekṣo heyādeyāvīśeṣakah. //104//” (ĀM, 104)

‘Syādvāda consists in making conditional (i.e. non-absolutist) assertions concerning these or those aspects of a situation and this by utterly giving up absolutism of all sorts; such syādvāda — based on the doctrine of ‘seven
forms of assertion' and on the doctrine of naya — helps the ascertainment of things sought to be accepted and those sought to be rejected (by the person uttering a sentence).' (AM: 90-91)

And, we can see some contents regarding to 'syār', 'syādvāda', 'anekāntavāda', and so on in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha by Mādhava.

(21) We can see the theory of naya in the Āvaiyakamulasūtranirṇyukti, 754 by Bhadrabāhusvāmin, which is as follows:

\[
\text{negamasamgahavahāvahāraujusue ceva hoi boddhavve,}
\]
\[
sadde ya samabhīrūdhe evambhūe ya mūlanayā.
\]
(Āvaiyakamulasūtranirṇyukti, 754)

And, Haribhadrasūri in the vṛtti gives his explanation of the above, which is as follows:

\[
\text{nyantiti nayāḥ — vastvavabodhogocaram prāpayanty anekadharmanakajheyādhavyasāyāntarataraitya ity arthaḥ, te ca naigamādayah, naigamaḥ sangrahah yavahārah rujṣūtraś caiva bhavatī boddhavvah, śabdaś ca samabhīrūdhah evambhūtaś ca mūlanayā iti gāthāsamudāyārtho nigadasiddhah. (Āvaiyakamulasūtranirṇyukti vṛtti, 754)}
\]

On the basis of these seven nayas (negama, samgha, vavahāra, ujjusya, sadda, samabhīrūdha, evambhūta), in the Āvaiyakamulasūtranirṇyukti, 759 we can see the explanation that each naya is of one hundred kinds, which is as follows:

\[
ekkekko ya sayaviho satta nayasayā havamti emeva,
\]
\[
anno 'vi ya ēeso pānceva sayā nayōṇam tu. (Āvaiyakamulasūtranirṇyukti, 759)
\]

Moreover, it is said that we can see the same idea in the Sthāṅgasūtra, too. (Nakamura[1991]: 193, 434-443)

In this way, naya means 'a standpoint conceiving of a thing from one point of view as primary and others secondary'.

(22) dāvāna savabhāvā savvapamāneheim jassa uvaladdhā, SATO 148
savvāim nayavihihi ya vithhārarūtti nāyavvo.' (Uttarādhayānamūlasūtra, 28, 1099)

(23) Jacob[1895]: 405-406

(24) ādāya bambahaceraṁ ca, āsapanne imam vayim,
assim ghamme anāyāram, nāyarejja kayāi vi. //1//
anādiyaṁ parinnāya, anavadagge ti vā puṇo,
sāsatanasāsate yāvi, iti diṭṭhim na ghārae. //2//
eteḥim dohim thānehim, vavahāro na vijjati,
eteḥim dohim thānehim, anāyāram tu jānae. //3//
samuccíchijhiṁti satthāro, savve pāṇā anelisa,
gamṭhigā va bhavissanti, sāsayam ti ca no vade. //4//
eteḥim dohim thānehim, vavahāro na vijjai,
eteḥim dohim thānehim, anāyāram tu jānaī. //5//

(Sūyagadāmgaṁutta, II, 5, 1-5); (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (2): 217-218)

(25) Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (2): 218

(26) Jacob[1895]: 407

(27) . . . sāsae loe jamālī janna kayāvi nāsi na kayāvi na bhavati na kadāvī na bhavissai bhuvim ca bhavai ya bhavissai ya dhavo natie sāsae akkhae avvæ avatthie nicce,
asāsae loe jamālī jao osappini bhavittā uṣsappini bhavai uṣsappini bhavittā osappini bhavai, . . . (Bhagavatāngastūtra, IX, 33)

(28) Nakamura[1991]: 188-189

(29) Dasaveyāliyaṁsuṭta, X, 10 (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 15: 73)

(30) DaSu (b): 204

je kei logamsi u akiriyāyā, anānena putthā dhutamādisamti,
ārambhassattā gādhita ya loe, dhhammam na yānānti vimokkhaheum. //16//
(Sūvagadagamasutta, 1, 10, 16); (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (2): 87)

‘Questioned by somebody who maintains the unchangeable character of the
soul, he (arhat) should expound the true (doctrine); those who engage in
works and are held in worldly bondage, do not know the Law which leads
to Liberation.’ (Jacobi [1895]: 308)

Moreover, we should notice that fact that the Jainism also holds the standpoint of
being free from the theory of an extremist.

samdhim logassa jōṇītta ātato bahiya paśa. tamhā na haṃṭā na vighātāe.
jamīnam annamannaavitigamchāe padilehāe na karoti pāvam kammām kim
tattha muni kāraṇām siyā?

samayam tatthuvehāe appānam vippasadāe,
anannaparam nāṇī no pāmāde kayā vi,
ātagute sadā vire jātāmātāe jāvāe. //10//

virāgam rūvehim gacchejjā mahatā khuddaehim vā,
āgatim gatim parinnāya dohim vi amtehim adissamānehim se na chiijati, na
bhijjati, na dajjhati, na hammati kampanāṃ savvaloe. (Āyāramgasutta, 1,
3, 3, 1-2) (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (1): 35)

‘Knowing the connection of the world, (carelessness is not for his benefit)’.

‘Look at the exterior (world from analogy with thy own) self, [then] thou
wilt neither kill nor destroy (living beings)’; viz. out of reciprocal regard
[well examining] he does not sinfull act. What is the characteristic of a
sage? ‘Recognising the equality (of all living beings), he appeares hisself’.

(1)

Knowing the highest good, one should never be careless;

Guarding one’s self, always prudent, one should pass life on the right road.

‘One should acquire disregard of sensual enjoyment, being with a great one
(i.e. a god) or the small ones (men)’. When one knows whence men come
and where they go, and when both ends are out of sight, one is not cut, nor slit, nor burnt, nor struck (2) by any one in the whole world. (Jacobi[1884]: 31-32)

(32) Also, we can see the Jainism blame other philosophers in those days, which is as follows:

ahinapamcemiyanattam pi se labhe uttamadhammasu hu dullahā,
kuṭīṭhiṇiseva jāne sāmayam goyama! mā pamāyae. //18//
laddhīṇa vi uttamaṁ suim saddahāṇā punarāvi dullahā,
mīcchāṭhīṇiseva jāne sāmayam goyama! mā pamāyae. //19//
(Uttarajjhayanāī, X, 18-19) (Jaina-Ágama-Series No. 15: 129)

‘kūppavyaṇāpāsami savve ummaggapāṭṭhiyā,
sammaggaṁ tu jinakkhāyaṁ esa magge hi uttame. //63//’ (Uttarajjhayanāī, XXIII, 63) (Jaina-Ágama-Series No. 15: 214)

‘Though he may possess all five organs of sense, still it is a rare chance to be instructed in the best Law; for people follow heretical teachers; Gautama, &c. (18)

Though he may have been instructed in the right Law, still it is a rare chance to believe in it; for many people are heretics; Gautama, &c. (19)’
(Jacobi[1895]: 43)

‘“The heterodox and the heretics have all chosen a wrong path; the right path is that taught by the Jinas; it is the most excellent path.”’ (63)
(Jacobi[1895]: 126)

According to the traditional view in the Jainism, the twelve angas are sammasuya, and they are very important doctrine and the right learning. (Nakamura[1991]: 196-198)

(33) Ayārāṃgasutta, 1, 6, 1 (Jaina-Ágama-Series No. 2 (1): 58-60)

Jacobi[1884]: 53-55

Nakamura[1991]: 206-207

SATO 151
Also, in the *Uttarajjhayanā*, it is said that the early Jainism has the idea about *samsāra* and the transitoriness, or the theory of the impermanent. (Nakamura[1991]:208-212)

'But a man always benighted, subject to old age and death, does not know that law.' (Jacobi[1884]:28)

'As the interior (of the body is loathsome), so is the exterior; as the exterior, so is the interior. In the interior of the body he perceives the foul interior humours, he observes their several courses (or eruptions). A well-informed man knowing (and renouncing the body and pleasures), should not eat (his saliva); he should not oppose himself to the (current of knowledge). Certainly, that man who engages in worldly affairs, who practises many tricks, who is bewildered by his own doings, acts again and again on that desire which increases his unrighteousness. Hence that above has been said for the increase of this (life). (A man addicted to pleasures) acts as if immortal, and puts great faith (in pleasure); but when he perceives that this body sustains pains, he cries in his ignorance. Therefore
Keep in your mind what I say. (5)† (Jacobi[1884]: 24)

(40)Jaina-Âgama-Series No. 2 (1): 14

(41)Jacobi[1884]: 13

(42)We can find out a fixed form of the idea about the theory of the impermanent in the early Jainism, which is as follows:

se bemi → imam pi jätidhammayam, eyam pi jätidhammayam;
imam pi vuddhidhammayam, eyam pi vuddhidhammayam;
imam pi cittamantiyam, eyam pi cittamantiyam;
imam pi chinnam milāti, eyam pi chinnam milāti;
imam pi āhāragam, eyam pi āhāragam;
imam pi anitiyam, eyam pi anitiyam;
imam pi asāsayam, eyam pi asāsayam;
imam pi cayovacaiyam, eyam pi cayovacaiyam;
imam pi vipparināmadhammayam, eyam pi vipparināmadhammayam.

(Ayāramgasutta, I, 1, 5, 6) (Jaina-Âgama-Series No. 2 (1): 11-12)

′... Thus I say. (5)

As the nature of this (i.e. men) is to be born and to grow old, so is the nature of that (i.e. plants) to be born and to grow old; as this has reason, so that has reason; as this falls sick when cut, so that falls sick when cut; as this needs food, so that needs food; as this will decay, so that will decay; as this is not eternal, so that is not eternal; as this takes increment, so that takes increment; as this is changing, so that is changing. (6)† (Jacobi[1884]: 10)

And, in the Ayāramgasutta, I, 2, 5, we can see that the Jainism also maintains that the pleasure is not eternal (Jacobi[1884]: 22-25); besides, in the Uttarajjhayanāi, we can see the same idea, which is as follows:

sallam kāmā visām kāmā kāmā āsīvisovamā,
kāme patthemānā akāmā jamti duggaim. //53/ (Uttarajjhayanāi, IX, 53)
'Pleasures are the thorn that rankles, pleasures are poison, pleasures are like a venomous snake; he who is desirous of pleasures will not get them, and will come to a bad end at last. (53)' (Jacobi[1895]: 40)

davagginā jahā ranne dajhamānesu jamtusu,
anne sattā pamoyānti rāga-dosavasam gayā.  //42//
evameva vayam mūdhā kāmabhogasu mucchiyā,
dajhamānam na bujjhāmo rāga-dosagginā jayam.  //43// (Uttarajhayanāi, XIV, 42-43) (Utr: 153)

'As when by a conflagration of a forest animals are burned, other beasts greatly rejoice, being under the influence of love and hate; even so we, fools that we are, being attached to pleasure, do not perceive that the world is consumed by the fire of love and hatred. (42, 43)' (Jacobi[1895]: 67)

abhao pathivā! tujjham abhayaddā bhavāhi ya,
anicce jīvalogammi kim himsāe pasajjasi?  //11//
jayā savvaṃ pariccajja gamtavamavasassa te,
anicce jīvalogammi kim rajjammi pasajjasi?  //12//
jīvyaṃ ceva rūvam ca vijusampāyacacalam,
jattha tam mujjhasi rāyaṃ! peccattham nāvabujjhasi.  //13//
dārānī ya suyā ceyā ceva mitta ya taha b Amanda,
jīvaṃtamanujjamīti mayam nānuvayanīti ya.  //14//
niñharaṃti mayam puttā piyaram paramadukkhiyā,
piyaro vi tahā putte bamaṃ rāyaṃ! tavaṃ care.  //15//
tao tena'jjie davve dāre ya parirakkhe,
kilamā'nee narā rāyaṃ! haṭṭhatuṭhamalamāṃkiyā.  //16//
tenāvī jam kayāṃ kammaṃ suhaṃ vā jaivā duhaṃ,
kammunā tena samjutto gacchati tu paraṃ bhavam.  //17// (Uttarajhayanāi, XVII, 11-17) (Utr: 170-171)
Be without fear, O king; but grant safety to others also; in this transient world of living beings, why are you addicted to cruelty? (11)

As you must, of necessity, one day part with everything, in this transient world of living beings, why do you cling to kingly power? (12)

transient like a stroke of lightning are life and beauty, which you love so much; you do not comprehend what will benefit you in the next life. (13)

Wives and children, friends and relations, all are dependent on a man during his life; but they will not follow him in death. (14)

The sons, in great sorrow, will remove the corpse of their father (to the cemetery); and so will parents do with their sons and relations; O king, do penance! (15)

O king, other men, glad, and pleased, and well attired, will enjoy the riches (the deceased) had amassed, and will dally with the wives he had so well guarded. (16)

And whatever actions he has done, good or wicked ones, with their Karman he will depart to his next existence. (17) ' (Jacobi[1895]: 81-82)

(4) See Bhagavatangasutra, IX

(4) Nakamura[1991]: 212-213

(4) In the Āyāramgasutta, I, which is the oldest work in the Jainism, we can see three terms: āya, attan and appan which refer to ātman. Although a large number of studies have been made on the early Jaina works, little is known about the difference of these terms. According to the recent researches, it has been said that four terms ‘appa(n)-’, ‘atta(n)-’, ‘āta-’, ‘āya-', which refer to ātman, can be seen in the early Jaina works. According to the phonology, we can say that the form of the words ‘appa(n)-’ and ‘atta(n)-’ is used in the same age and the form of the word ‘atta(n)-’ is older than that of ‘āta-’ and ‘āya-’. However, we cannot say that the sentences including the words ‘appa(n)-’ and ‘atta(n)-’ are older than those including ‘āta-’ and ‘āya-’. Because we can consider that these four terms were used by mixture throughout the compilation of the early Jaina works,

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that is to say, the rearrangement of the terms and the sentences was made. (Yamazaki[1984], Nakamura[1991]: 222)

(46) Āyāramgasutta, I, 6, 2, 2 (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (1): 62)

Jacobi[1884]: 55-56

(47) Nakamura[1991]: 213

(48) savve te vidiyā majiham micchādiṭṭhi anāriya,

viṃjamāne pare loe sammam jānāmi appayam. //27/ (Uttarajjhayanā, XVIII, 27)

(Utt: 172)

'I know all these heresies to be contemptible; I know that there will be a life hereafter, and I know my Self. (27)' (Jacobi[1895]: 84)

(49) obujjhamāne iha mānavesu āghāi se nare, jassa imāo jātīo savvato supaḍilehiyāo bhavaṁti āghāti se nānāmanelisam.

se kitṭatī tesim samuṭṭhiṭṭhānam nikkhittadāṁdānam samāhitānam paṇṇānaṁmaṇṭānam iha muttimaṅgam.

evam pege mahāvīrā vipparakkamamti.

pāsaha ege ‘vasiyamāne anattapanne. (Āyāramgasutta, I, 6, 1, 1) (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (1): 58)

'He who is awakened amongst men, preaches; the man to whom all these classes of lives are well known, preaches the unparalleled wisdom. He praises the road to liberation for those who well exert themselves, who have forsworn cruelty, are zealous and endowed with knowledge. Thus some great heroes are victorious; but, look, some others who are wanting in control do not understand (the welfare of) their souls. . . . (1)' (Jacobi[1884]: 53)

(50) For example, we can see the idea of the self (atman) in the Āyāramgasutta, which is as follows:

je ātā se vinnatā, je vinnatā se ātā. jena vijñāṇati se ātā. tam paṭucca

SATO 156
"The Self is the knower (or experiencer), and the knower is the Self. That through which one knows, is the Self. With regard to this (to know) it (the Self) is established.* Such is he who maintains the right doctrine of Self. This subject has truly been explained. Thus I say. (5)" (Jacobi[1884]: 50)

* This means that knowledge is a modification (parināma) of the Self, and therefore one with it, but not as a quality or action of the Self different from it. (Jacobi[1884]: 50)

And, the Āyāramgasutta, I, 1, 1* says as follows:

'O long-lived (Jambūsvāmin)! I (Sudhārman) have heard the following discourse from the venerable (Mahāvīra): (1)

Here many do not remember whether they have descended in an eastern direction (when they were born in this world), or in a southern, or a western, or in a northern direction, or in the direction from above, or in the direction from below, or in a direction intermediate (between the cardinal points), or in a direction intermediate between these (and the cardinal points). (2) Similarly, some do not know whether their soul is born again and again or not; nor what they were formerly, nor what they will become after having died and left this world. (3) Now this is what one should know, either by one's own knowledge or through the instruction of the highest (i.e. a Tirthakara), or having heard it from others: that he descended in an eastern direction, or in any other direction (particularised above). Similarly, some know that their soul is born again and again, that it arrives in this or that direction, whatever direction that may be. (4) He believes in soul, believes in the world, believes in reward, believes in action (acknowledged to be our own doing in such judgments as these): 'I did it'; 'I shall cause another to do it'; 'I shall allow another to do it'. In the world, these are all the causes of sin, which must be comprehended and renounced. (5) A man that does not comprehend and renounce the causes of sin, descends in a cardinal or
intermediate directions, is born again and again in manifold births, experiences all painful feelings. (6) About this the Revered One has taught the truth (comprehension and renunciation). For the sake of the splendour, honour, and glory of this life, for the sake of birth, death, and final liberation, for the removal of pain, all these causes of sin are at work, which are to be comprehended and renounced in this world. He who, in the world, comprehends and renounces these causes of sin, is called a reward-knowing sage (muni). Thus I say. (7) (Jacobi[1884]: 1-3)

* See Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (1): 1-3.

Moreover, it can be seen that there are many contents regarding to the self (ātman) in the Āyāramgasutta, see Nakamura[1991]: 214-215.

(51) Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (1): 55

According to the Āyāramgasutta, 1, 5, 5, 5, we can consider that the Jainas regard the self (ātman) as a metaphysical substance.

(52) Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 2 (1): 55

(53) Jacobi[1884]: 50

(54) According to the Jainism, matter (pudgala), which can become karman, fills the external world, and it adheres to the soul (jīva) because of the acts of kāya, vāc and manas. This is called ‘āsrava’, the karman the Jainas regard is this fine particle of matter which adheres to the soul (jīva) in that way. For that reason the pure nature of the soul (jīva) is covered and the bondage (bandha) arises, namely, an ordinary person continues in the never-ending cycle of reincarnation (samsāra). To the end that the pure nature of the soul (jīva) appears, we have to remove the karman adhering to the soul (jīva). The soul (jīva) in itself has darśana, jñāna, vīrya and sukha, but this real nature of the soul (karman) cannot appear without removing that karman.

(55) Jassa nathī pure pacchā majjhe tassa kuo siyā? se hu pannānamante buddhe ārambhovarae. sammametam ti pāsahā. jena bandhāṃ vahāṃ ghoram paritāvam ca dārunam. parichimdiya bāhīragam ca sotam nikkammadamsi iha macciehim. kammunā
Whence should he have it (success in faith), who does not get it early, late, or in the middle of life? But the discerning one is awakened, and ceases to act. See that it is good to be so! Cutting off that ‘whence bondage, cruel death, and dreadful pain’, ‘and the (desire for) external (objects) flow, he who among mortals knows freedom from acts’, ‘seeing that acts will beat fruit, the knower of the sacred lore, parts from (karman)’. (3)

A sage adopting a life of wisdom, should treat his gross body roughly. . . . (Jainagama-Series No. 2 (1): 29)

I shall not do (acts relating to plants) after having entered the order, having recognised (the truth about these acts), and having conceived that which is free from danger (i.e. control).’

He who does no acts (relating to plants), has ceased from works; he who has ceased from them is called ‘houseless’. (1)’
Look, Sir, at birth and old age here,
Examine and know the happiness of the living.
Thence the most learned, knowing (what is called) the highest good,
He who has right intuition, commits no sin. (1) (Jacobi[1884]: 29)

He is not fit for hilarity, playing, pleasure, show. Therefore, ah! proceeding to pilgrimage, and thinking that the present moment is favourable (for such intentions), he should be steadfast and not, even for an hour, carelessly conduct himself. His youth, his age, his life fade away.' (Jacobi[1884]: 16)

SATO 160
The action-currents of injury, or the obstructive karman

The action-currents of non-injury, or the non-obstructive karman

The action-current of injury of knowledge

The action-current of injury of right vision or the conation-obscuring karman

The karman that is injurious to the psychical equanimity resulting in the delusion or infatuation of the mind from the want of the right intuition and knowledge (Nahar, P. C. and Ghosh, K. C.[1988]: 395)

The karman that is injurious to the higher evolution and progress of the soul towards the perfect unfoldment of its infinite-possibilities (Nahar, P. C. and Ghosh, K. C.[1988]: 395)

The karman that sends in sensations of pain or pleasure

The karman that determines the longevity of the soul's physical existence and the duration of its surrounding conditions (Nahar, P. C. and Ghosh, K. C.[1988]: 395)

The karman that determines the colour and configuration of the soul's physical organism (Nahar, P. C. and Ghosh, K. C.[1988]: 395), or the individuality-making karman

The karman that determines the birth of the soul in a certain nationality, race, family, and so on (Nahar, P. C. and Ghosh, K. C.[1988]: 395)

See the Uttarajjhanā, XXXIII (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 15: 281-284) and Jacobi[1895]: 192-196.

See the Isibhāsiyāṁ Suttāṁ, 31 (Isibh: 132-139), especially see Isibh: 138-139.

For further details of the classification of karman, see Nahar, P. C. and Ghosh,

(4) The sentient principle, or the living substance

(5) The non-sentient principle, or the non-living substance

(6) Isibhäsīyāṃ Suttāṃ, 31 (Isibh: 132-139)

(7) sad dravyalaksānam. //29// (SAS, V, 29 ad TAAS, V, 29 (Digambara))

§582. yat sat tad dravyam ity arthah. (SAS: 229)

(8) utpādayadhravvyayuktam sat. //30// (SAS, V, 30 ad TAAS, V, 29 (Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 30))

Dr. J. C. Sikdar says that “the idea of the differentia of a substance (dravya) is embodied by the Digambara tradition in the sūtra “sad dravyalaksānam”. But it is also implied in the sūtra “utpādayadhravvyayuktam sat” of both the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara traditions. Thus, there is no difference between the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara views on the conception of the substance (dravya). Only the concept of it has been made more clear by the sūtra “sad dravyalaksānam” of the Digambara tradition.” (Sikdar[1991a]: 17)

Kundakunda explains in his Pañcāstikāyasāra that the substance (dravya) is the inherent essence of all things, manifesting itself in and through the infinite modifications, and it is endowed with the quality (guna) and it reveals permanence and change inherent in it to be real, which is as follows:

sattā savvapayathā savissarūvā aanaṃtapajjāyā,
bhamguppādadhuvattā sappaḍivakkhā havadi ekkā. //8// (Pañcāstikāyasāra, 8)

‘Substance is one (as a class). It is the inherent essence of all things. It manifests itself through diverse forms. It undergoes infinite modifications. It has the triple characteristics of creation, destruction and permanence. It also has the antithetical qualities, that is, it may be described by the opposites.’

(PAS: 6)

SATO 162
And he says in the *Pravacanasāra*:

\[
apariccattasahāvenuppādavayadhuvattasambuddham,\]

\[
gunavām ca sapajjāyā jat tam davvatti vuccanti. \]//3// (Pravacanasāra, II, 3)

\[
(aparityaktasvabhāvenotpādavayadhruvatvasambandham,\]

\[
gunavac ca saparyāyāyat tad dravyam iti bruvanti. \]//3// (See PraSā: 123-126.)

Pujyapāda says in his *Sarvarthasiddhi*:

\[
yathā svam paryāyair druvyante dravanti vā tāni iti dravyāni. \] (SAS, V, 2, §529)

What undergo the modification are the substances.

Dr. J. C. Sikdar explains that “as for example of such modification, take an ingot of gold as the substance. When an ornament is made out of it, the original lump of gold undergoes the modification having its original form destroyed (vyaya) and a new form born or produced (utpāda) but the substance-gold continues or persists (dhruvya) in this process of the change. For every substance possesses the quality of permanency (dhruvya) together with origination (utpāda) and decay (vyaya) as the modifications of itself and the existence (sat), as it is technically called, defines a substance (dravya)”. (Sikdar[1991a]: 18-19) This explanation is very clear. (See SAS, V, 29, 30 and so on.)

And, Akalanka says in his *Tattvārthāvārtika*, V, 30:

\[
svajātyaparityāgena bhavāntaravāuptir utpādah. \]//1//. . . tathā pūrvabhāvavigamo vyayanam vyayah. \]//2//. . . dhruveh sthairyakarmano dhruvatiti dhruvah. \]//3// (TAV: 494-495)

Origination (utpāda) is the modification of getting other condition (of a substance) without giving up its own genus. //1// Decay (vyaya) is the abstention from the previous condition (of a substance), or the disappearance of its form. //2// Permanency (dhruva) consists in the persistence of its constant karman (or bhāva) (throughout its various modifications). //3//
Moreover, Hemacandra in his Pramānānīmāṁśā, I, 1, 30 points out the permanent state of the substance (dravya):

\[ \text{pramāṇasya viṣayā dravyaparyāyātmakaṁ vastu.} \]

§118 . . . dravati tāṁs tāṁ paryāyān gacchati iti dravyaṁ dhrauvyalakṣaṇam. pūrvottaravivartavartyavayapratyayasaṁadhigamyam ūrdhvatāṁśāṁyam iti yāvat . . . (PM (a): 24-25)

The object of an organ of knowledge is the real which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode. //30//

§118 . . . The term dravya (rendered substance) is derived from द्रु (to go) and etymologically means that which runs through the different modes — which sets forth the characteristic of persistence. It thus ultimately transpires to be the vertical universal which is revealed by the cognition of its identity running (in succession) through the antecedent and subsequent states. (PM (b): 62)

Here, Hemacandra uses Akalanka’s words, which is as follows:

\[ \text{taddravyaparyāyātmārtho bahir antaś ca tattvataḥ.} \] (Laghīyastraya, I, 2, 7)

\[ ^\text{50} \text{gunaparyayavad dravyam.} \] (SAS, V, 38 ad TAAS, V, 37 (Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 38))

\[ ^\text{60} \text{Generally, the substance (dravya) is classified into five categories: (A) jīva, or the soul and (B) ajīva, or the inanimate subdivided into four categories: (B-1) dharma, or the principle of motion, (B-2) adharma, or the principle of rest, (B-3) ākāśa, or space and (B-4) pudgala, or matter. In addition to this classification above, however, in some texts (the Uttarajñānaṇī, the Dravyasamgraha, the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, and so on) we can see the theory that ajīva is subdivided into five categories, that is to say, (B-1) dharma, or the principle of motion, (B-2) adharma, or the principle of rest, (B-3) ākāśa, or space, (B-4) pudgala, or matter, and (B-5) addhāsamaya or kāla, or time. In this case, the Jainas regard kāla as a substance (dravya).} \]

For example, the Uttarajñānaṇī, XXVIII, 7 says that this world (loka) is of six

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kinds of substances (dravya), which is as follows:

\[
dhammo ahammo ākāsams kālo poggala-janītavo,
esa logo tī pannatto jīnehim varadamsihim. //7// \ (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 15: 238)
\]

'Dharma, adharma, space, time, matter, and souls (are the six kinds of substances); they make up this world, as has been taught by the Jīnas who possess the best knowledge. (7)' (Jacobi[1895]: 153)

And, the Dravyasamgraha, 23 says:

\[
evam chāvbhēyam idam jīvājīvappabhedado davam,
uttam kālavijuttam nāyavā pumca śrathiśkēyā du. //23//
\]

'In this manner, this dravya is said to be of six kinds, according to the subdivisions of jīva and ajīva. The five, without kāla, should be understood to be astikāyas' (DS: 63)

Moreover, the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, III says:

\[
... ata eva sad dravyānīti prasiddhih. (SDS: 73)
\]

'. . . Thus there are six substances or tattvas (i.e., the five above mentioned and “time”).' (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]: 71)

\(^{(9)}\) Astikāya' consists of two words, 'asti' and 'kāya'. 'asti' literally means 'exists'.

Now, the five kinds of substances, viz., jīva, pūdgala, dharma, adharma, and ākāśa always exist; hence, while mentioning any of these, one might say 'it exists'. Again, each of these substances has many pradeśa, like bodies. Hence, each of these might also be said to be 'kāya' (literally, body). These two characteristics being combined, each of the aforesaid five substances are named 'astikāya' or 'that which exists and has different pradeśas like body'. It should be remembered that to be an astikāya, a substance must have both these characteristics. The substance kāla, (time) though having the first characteristic (viz. existence), is not called astikāya, because it does not have many pradeśas. (Dr. S. C. Ghoshal's commentary, DS: 65)

\(^{(9)}\) Pradeśa has been defined in the verse 27 (in the Dravyasamgraha) to be that
part of space which is obstructed by one indivisible atom of matter. A pradeśa can contain not only the atoms of matter, but of the particles of other substances also. Thus each of the substances has pradeśas. Now, jīva, pudgala, dharma, adharma and ākāśa have many pradeśas, as these consist of many indivisible and inseparable parts, or, in other words, the particles of these are not separate, but are mixed up or capable of being mixed up. Hence, as we are unable to locate these particles, in definite pradeśas, these substances can be said to occupy many pradeśas. (Dr. S. C. Ghoshal’s commentary, DS: 65-66)

(93) The space within the universe

(94) The space beyond the universe

(95) In the early Jainism, we can see these ideas in the Uttarajñayanāi, XXXVI (Utt: 296-329), and for the translation, see Jacobi[1895]: 206-232. However, we should notice that this idea is, somewhat, different from that of the late theory in the Jainism, so in investigating the difference we have to research all the works in the Jainism more strictly.

(96) niskriyāni ca. //1// (SAS, V, 7 ad TAAS, V, 6)

(97) ā ākāśād ekadṛavyāni. //6// (SAS, V, 6 ad TAAS, V, 5)

(98) The notion that the soul (jīva), matter (pudgala) and time (kāla)* are an infinitive number of substances and the principle of motion (dharma), the principle of rest (adharma), and space (ākāśa) are a single substance, can be seen in the Uttarajñayanāi, XXVIII, 8, which is as follows:

dhammo ahammo ākāsam davvam ikkikamāhiyam,  
anamādini ya davvami kālo poggala-jamtvau. //8// (Utt: 238)

'Dharma, adharma, and space are each one substance only; but time, matter, and souls are an infinite number of substances.' (Jacobi[1895]: 153)

* The idea that time (kāla) is an infinitive number of substance is an opinion opposite to Umāsvāti’s theory, for example, see the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, V, 38. (Nakamura[1991]: 248-249)

Generally, the substance (dravya) is of five kinds except time (kāla) in the Jainism, however, we can see the idea that the substance (dravya) is of six kinds including it (kāla),

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for example, it can be seen in the Dravyasamgraha 23 by Nemicandra, which is as follows:

\[ evam chabhneyam idam jivajivaappabhedado davvan. \]
\[ uttam kālavijuttam nāyavvā paṃca śrathikāyā du. \]

‘In this manner, this dravya is said to be of six kinds, according to the subdivisions of jīva and ajīva. The five, without kāla, should be understood to be astikāyas.’ (DS: 63)

This means that time (kāla) is a substance (dravya), but it is not an extended real (astikāya). Why is time (kāla) not an extended real (astikāya)? We can see the reason in the followings:

\[ samtijado tenede attthiti bhanaṃti jinavarā jamhā. \]
\[ kāyā iva vahudesā kāyā ya atthikāyā ya. \]

‘As these exist, they are called “astri” by the great Jinas, and because (they have) many pradesas, like bodies, therefore [they are called] kāyas. [Hence these are called] astikāyas.’ (DS: 64-65)

\[ homti asamkhā jive dharmādhamme anamta āyāse. \]
\[ mutte tivhapadesā kālasāga na tena so kāo. \]

‘In jīva and in dharma and adharma, the pradesas are innumerable, in ākāśa (the pradesas are) infinite and in that which has form (viz., pudgala) (these are) of three kinds, (viz., numerable, innumerable and infinite). Kāla (time) has one (pradeśa). Therefore, it is not (called) kāya.’ (DS: 66)

And, we can see more information about it in the Sarvadarsanasamgraha, which is as follows:

\[ kālayuṣekapradesatvābhāvenāstikāyatvābhāve ‘pi dravyatvam asti. \]

(Sarvadaśanasamgraha, III) (SDS: 7224-255)

‘Although “time” is not properly and astikāya, because it does not occupy many separate parts of space (as mentioned in the definition), still it is a dravya (or tattva),...’ (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]: 70)

To sum up, time, or ‘kāya’ is that which has many space-points (pradeśa). The five substances (jīva, dharma, adharma, pudgala and ākāśa) have many space-points
(pradesa), therefore, these substances are called kāyas; but time (kāla), having a single space-point (pradesa) only, is not called so. This is the reason why time (kāla) is not called as ‘astikāya’ (the extended real). For further details of the pradesa, see Dr. S. C. Ghoshal’s commentary, DS: 64-70.

\[\text{(96) apare punar jīvājīvayor aparāṃ prapañcam ācakṣate} \]
\[\text{jīvākāśadharmaḥdharmaḥpudgalāstikāyabhedaḥ. eteṣu puñcaṣu tattvेशu} \]
\[\text{kālatrayasambandhitayāstītī sthitivāyapadesāḥ. anekapraṣṭatvena} \]
\[\text{śaṅkavatkalāyavāyapadesāḥ. (DS: 72\textsuperscript{254-255})} \]

‘Others lay down a different set of tattvas from the two mentioned above, jīva and ajīva; they hold that there are five astikāyas or categories, — jīva, ākāśa, adharma and pudgala. To all these five we can apply the idea of “existence” (asti); as connected with the three divisions of time, and we similarly apply the idea of “body” (kāya), from their occupying several parts of space.’ (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E. [1997]: 68)

\[\text{(992) gunaparyayavid dravyam. //38// (SAS, V, 38 ad TAAS, V, 37 (Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 38))} \]
\[\text{. . . tad uktam — gunaparyāyavid dravyam (ta. sū. 5, 38) iti dravyāśrayaṁ nirgūṇa} \]
\[\text{gūṇā (ta. sū. 5, 39). . . . (DS: 72\textsuperscript{255-256})} \]


\[\text{(101) nityāvasthiḥāny arūpāni ca. //3// (TAAS, V, 3 (Śvetāmbara))} \]
\[\text{nityāvasthiḥāny arūpāni. //4// (TAAS, V, 4 (Digambara))} \]
\[\text{(102) rūpinah pudgalāḥ. //4// (TAAS, V, 3 (Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 5))} \]
\[\text{(103) Potter[1995]} \]
\[\text{(104) ajjīvo puna neo puggala dhammo adhamma āyāsam.} \]
\[\text{kālo puggala mutto rāvādiguno amutti sesā du. //15// (Dravyasamgraha, 15)} \]

‘Again, ajīva should be known to be pudgala, dharma, adharma, ākāśa and kāla.

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Pudgala has form and the qualities, rūpa, etc. But the rest are without form. (DS: 44)

105 Umāsvāti says in his Tattvārthādhigamasūtra that the qualities (guna) are inherent in the substance (dravya) and they are themselves attributeless, which is as follows:

dravyāśrayā nirgunā gunāḥ. //40// (TAAS, V, 40 (Svetāmbara; Digambara: V, 41))

And, we can also see the following in the Sarvādarsānasamgraha, III:

... tad uktam — gunaparyāyavad dravyam (ta. sū. 5, 38) iti dravyāśrayā nirgunā gunāḥ (ta. sū. 5, 39)... (SDS: 72255-256)

. . .; “substance” (dravya) possesses “quality and action”. Qualities reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, . . .’ (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]: 70)

106 Sikdar[1991a]: 20

107 Utarajhavani, XXVIII, 6 (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 15: 238)

108 Jacobi[1895]: 153

109 Nagasaki[1988]

110 TAAS, V, 40 (Svetāmbara; Digambara: V, 41)

111 On his dates, see Winternitz[1983]: 459.

112 . . . ‘nirgunāḥ’ iti viśesanām dvyaṇukādinivrtyartham. tān api hi kāraṇābhutaparamāṇudravyāśrayāni gunavanti tu tasmāt ‘nirgunāḥ’ iti viśesānāt tānivarttitaṁ bhavanti. nanu paryāyaḥ api ghaṭasamsthānādayo dravyāśrayā nirgunāḥ ca, teśām api gunatvam prāṇotā. ‘dravyāśrayāḥ’ iti vacanāt ‘nityam dravyam āśritya varante ye’ te gunā iti viśesāt paryāyaḥ nivarttitaṁ bhavanti. te hi kāḍācīt kā iti. (Sarvārthasiddhi, V, 41, §606; SAS: 242)

113 Sikdar[1991a]: 22-23

114 On his dates, see Vidyabhusana[1921]: 185.

115 . . . nityam dravyam āśritya ye varante te gunā iti. paryāyaḥ punah kāḍācītā
iti na tesām grahanam. tenānvayino dharmā gunā ity uktam bhavati. tad yathā jīvasyāstitvādayah jñānadarśanādayaśa ca pudgalasyācetanātādayaḥ rūpādayaśa ceti. paryāyāḥ punah ghaṭajñānādayaḥ kapālādivēkāraśa ca. (Tattvārthavārtīka, V, 41; TAV, Vol. 2: 502)

\[(116)\text{Sikdar[1991a]: 23}\]

\[(117)\text{Uno[1988a]}\]

\[(118)\text{Sikdar[1991a]: 24}\]

\[(119)\ldots \text{tad uktam — gunaparyāyavad dravyam (ta. sū. 5, 38) iti dravyāśrayaḥ nirgunā gunā (ta. sū. 5, 39). yathā jīvasya jñānavādīdharmarūpāḥ pudgalasya rūpātāsāmānyavābhāvāḥ. dharmādharma-kāśakālānāṃ yathāsambhavam gatisthitāvagāhavartanāhahetutvādāsāmānyāṇi gunāḥ. \ldots (SDS: 72^{255-259})}\]

In short:

\[
\text{jīva: jñānavādīdharmarūpāḥ} \\
\text{pudgala: rūpātāsāmānyavābhāvāḥ} \\
\text{dharma: gatihetutva} \\
\text{adharma: sthīthhetutva} \\
\text{ākāśa: avagāhahetutva} \\
\text{kāla: vartanāhetutva}
\]

\[(120)\text{Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]}\]

\[(121)\text{Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]: 70}\]

\[(122)\text{gunānāmāsao davvam, egadavvassiyā gunā,} \\
\text{lakkhanam pajjavānam tu ubhao assiyā bhave. \#6/1}\]

\[(123)\text{bhāvāntaram saññāntaram ca paryāyāḥ. (TAAS-bhāṣya, V, 37)}\]

\[(124)\text{Potter[1995]}\]

SATO 170
Dravya in its reality can neither be created nor destroyed; it has only permanent substantiality. But through its modes, it secures the triple qualities of permanence, appearance and disappearance. (PAS: 11)

Dr. J. C. Sikdar cites one example:

The gold exists as the substance (dravya), but the ornaments and other things made of the gold are the modes (paryāya) of it. These may change; an ornament of the gold may be melted and a new one may be made of it. The disappearance of the previous ornament is decay (vyaya) and the appearance of the new one is origination (utpāda) and yet all the while the same gold persists through the change: this persistence is permanency (dhrauvya). Dr. J. C. Sikdar cites this mention form the commentary on the Pañcāstikāyasāra. (Sikdar 1991a: 48)

Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E. [1997]: 70-71

Dixit[1974]: 225-228

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The affixes *tva* and *tal* come after a word in the sixth case in construction, in the sense of "the nature thereof". (*ASṬ, Vol. 2: 889*)

"gunah sahabhāvī dharmo yathātmani vijñānavyaktiśaktīyādir iti. //7/ (SVR, V, 7)

'A mode is the evolute; as for instance, the feeling of pleasure, of pain etc., in that.' (Bhattacharya, Hari Satya[1967]: 390)

'Some people who regard themselves as 'Bauddhas' describe the soul by the name 'Buddha'..."
of ‘Pudgala’, and declare it to be neither the same as, nor different from — (the Skandhas, thought-phases). — (336)’ (Jha, Ganganatha[1937]: 239)

\[1\] tam jahā — pudhavikāiyā 1 āukāiyā 2 teukāiyā 3 vāukāiyā 4 vanassakāiyā 5 tasakāiyā. 6. //3// (Dasaveyāliyasutta, IV, 3) (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 15: 6)

‘The knowledge of six living bodies — of earth, water, air, and fire
And of vegetation and other bodies organic. //3//’ (DaSu (b): 23)

Note: Earth bodies or cells consist of elements like soil, sand, minerals, etc.; water bodies or cells consist of mist, dew, rain, etc.; fire bodies or cells consist of fire, lightning, etc.; air bodies or cells consist of various kinds of wind; vegetable bodies consist of all flora; and organic bodies consist of all bacteria to birds, beasts, and the most developed of them like men, gods etc. (DaSu (b): 23)

\[144\] It is expressed that ‘Do not drink water.’, because the living beings exist in water. And, it is expressed that ‘Do not use fire.’, because fire injures the living beings. (Nakamura[1991]: 249)

\[145\] jivatthikāe nam bhamte! kativanne katigamdhe katirase katīphāse?, goyamā!
avanne (avanne) jāva arūvi jīve sāsae avatthie logadavve, se samāsao pamcavihe pannatte,
tamjahā-davvao jāva guṇao, davvao nam jivatthikāe anantāim jivadavvāim, khettao
logappamānamette kālao na kayaī na āsi jāva nīcce, bhāvao pūna avanane agamdhe arase
aphāse, guṇao uvaogaunē. (Bhagavatāṅgasūtra, II, 10)

\[146\] Sikdar[1991a]: 233

\[147\] dravyāṇi jivāś ca. (TAAS, V, 2, Śvetāmbara)
dravyāṇi. (TAAS, V, 2, Digambara)

jīvaś ca. (TAAS, V, 3, Digambara)

\[148\] nityāvasthiṭāṇy arūpāṇi ca. (TAAS, V, 3, Śvetāmbara)
nityāvasthiṭāṇy arūpāṇi. (TAAS, V, 4, Digambara)

\[149\] rūpīṇāḥ pudgalāḥ. (TAAS, V, 4, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 5)
asankhyeyah pradesa dharmadharmayoḥ. (TAAS, V, 7, Śvetāmbara)

jīvasya. (TAAS, V, 8, Śvetāmbara)

asankhyeyah pradesa dharmadharmākajīvānām. (TAAS, V, 8, Digambara)

lokākāśe 'vagāhah. (TAAS, V, 12)

asamkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām. (TAAS, V, 15)

pradeśasamhārāvisargābhīyām pradīpavat. (TAAS, V, 16)

sukhaduhkhajīvānāmopagrahāḥ ca. (TAAS, V, 20)

'Again, pleasure, pain, life and death — these too are benefits due to pudgala.'

(Dixit[1974]: 194)

jīvo uvaogamao amutti kattā sadehaparimāṇo,

bhotā sansārattho siddho so vissasodhagai. (DS, 2)

DS: 4-5

vanṇa rasa pāmca gāmdha do phāsā aṭṭa niḍḍayā jīve,

no samti amutti tado vavāhārā mutti vamdhādo. //7// (DS::: 22)

puggalakammādinām kattā vavāhārado du niḍḍaya,

cedanakammānādā suddhanayā suddhabhāvānām. //8// (DS::: 24)

vavāhārā suhhadukkhām puggalakammaphalam pabhumjedi,

ādā niḍḍayanayado cedanabhāvam khu ādassa. //9// (DS::: 27)

anugurudehapamāṇo uvasamhārārappasappado cedā,

asamuhado vavāhārā niḍḍayanayado asamkhadeso vā. //10// (DS::: 28)

samsūrino muktāś ca. (TAAS, II, 10)

samanaskāmanaskāḥ. (TAAS, II, 11)

See Dixit[1974]: 85-86, and the Sarvadarsanasamgraha, III says:
The jivas (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the "released". The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (samanaska), and those destined of it (amanaska). The former possesses samjña, i.e. the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving instruction; the latter are those without this power.' (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E. [1997]: 68-69)

(162) See TAAS, X, 5 and Dixit [1974]: 367. Moreover, in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, X, 6 and in the Sarvadarsanasamgraha, we can see the reason why the soul (jīva) has a characteristic upward motion, which is as follows:

pūrvarayogādasangatvād bandhacchedāt tathāgatiparināmāc ca tadgatiḥ.
(TAAS, X, 6: Śvetāmbara)

(pūrvarayogādasangatvād bandhacchedāt tathāgatiparināmāc ca. (TAAS, X, 6: Digambara))

‘On account of the impulse imparted earlier, on account of the absence of an associated body, on account of the breaking down of a bondage, on account of that being its natural state of motion an emancipated jīva goes upwards.’ (Dixit [1974]: 368)

tadanantaram ārdhvaṁ gacchaty ālokāntāt (ta. sū. 10/5). yathā hastadanāndibhrampīrītām kulālacakram uparaṇe 'pi tasmās tadbalaḥ evāsamākṣākṣayam bhramati tathā bhavasthānaṁāpavargaprāptaye bahuso yat kṛtam pranidhānaṁ muktasya tadabha've 'pi pūrvasaṁskārdād ālokāntāṁ gamanam upapadyate. yathā vā mṛttikālepakṣaguravamalābhudravyam jaledhāḥ patati punar apetamritikābhandaṁ ārdhvaṁ gacchati tathā karmaraṁita ātmā asaṅgaṁtvād ārdhvaṁ gacchati. bandhacchedāder andabijavac codhvam gatisvabhāvāc

SATO 175
Then the soul arises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's wheel, whirled by the sick and hands, moves on even after these have stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated contemplations of the embodied souls for the attainment of mokṣa exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay, sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its isolation, from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of the caster-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame. “Bondage” is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual interpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; saṅga is merely mutual contact.

This has been declared as follows — “Liberation is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses, from the absence of saṅga, from the cutting of all bonds and from the nature development of the soul’s own powers of motion, like the potter’s wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the caster-oil plant, or the flame of fire”. —

Hence they recite a śloka —

“However often they go away, the plants return, the sun, moon, and the rest; but never to this day have returned any who have gone to ālokākāśa”.

(Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]: 77-78)

SATO 176
aupaśamikaksāyi kau bhāvau mīśraś ca jīvasya svatattvam auḍayikapārīnāmikau ca. (TAAS, II, 1)

dvinavāśādaśaikavināsitribhedā yathākramam. (TAAS, II, 2)

samyakvacārītre. (TAAS, II, 3)

jñānadarśanadānālābhahogopabhogavabhīyāni ca. (TAAS, II, 4)

(jñānājñānadarśanadānādālābdhāyāḥ ca) caturśtriṃpaṇcaḥbhedāḥ samyakvacārītrasamyāmāṃśaḥ ca. (TAAS, II, 5: Śvetāmbarā)

(gatikāśayalingamithyādarśanājñānāsamyatāśiddhāvāleśyāḥ ca) caturścatuṣṭryekāikaikaikasadhvābhādāḥ. (TAAS, II, 6: Śvetāmbarā)

(jñānājñānadarśanadhāyāḥ ca) caturśtriṃpaṇcaḥbhedāḥ samyakvacārītrasamyāmāṃśaḥ ca. (TAAS, II, 5: Digambara)

(jñānājñānādānādālābdhāyāḥ ca) caturścatuṣṭryekāikaikaikasadhvābhādāḥ. (TAAS, II, 6: Digambara)

(jivabhavyābhavyatvādini ca. (TAAS, II, 7: Śvetāmbarā)

(jivabhavyābhavyatvānā ca. (TAAS, II, 7: Digambara)

Dixit[1974]: 73-74

yad avocad vācakācāryaḥ — aupaśamikaksāyi kau bhāvau mīśraś ca jīvasya svatattvam auḍayikapārīnāmikau ca (ta. sū. 2/1) iti. anudayapraaptirūpe karmana upaśamā sati jīvasyotpadyamāno bhāvau aupaśamakāh. yathā paṅke kalanātaṁ kurvati kānaściddrayasambhandhādadadhahpatite jalasya svacchātā. ārhatatattvānusamdhānavaśād rāgādipanākāśālanena nirmalatāpādadakāh kṣāyīkāh bhāvāh. kāmanāh kṣaye sati jāyamāṇo bhāvau kṣāyikāh yathā paṅkāt prthagbhūtasya nirmalasya sphādikādībhūjanāntargatasya jalasya svacchātā. yathā moksāh. ubhayātmā bhāvau mīśraḥ. yathā uḷasyāṛdhasvavacchātā. karmadaye sati bhavanbhāva auḍayikāḥ. karmopaśāmādyanapēkṣāh sahaṅko bhāvaḥ cetanatvādhi pārīnāmikāh. tad etad yathāśambhavam bhavyaśābhavyasya vā jīvasya svarūpam iti sūtrārthāh. (SDS: 68²¹-69²³)

... As has been said by Vācakācārya [in a sūtra] — “The aupaśamika, the
ksāyika and the ‘mixed’ states are the nature of the soul, and also the audayika and the pārīṇāmika’.

1. The upaśāmika state of the soul arises when all the effects of past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing nut-plant, etc. 2. The ksāyika state arises when there is the absolute abolition of actions and their effect, as in final liberation. 3. The “mixed” (miśra) state combines both these, as when water is partly pure. 4. The audayika state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent influence on the future]. The pārīṇāmika is the soul’s innate condition, as pure intelligence, etc., and disregarding its apparent states, as (1), (2), (3), (4). This nature, in one of the above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sūtra quoted above.’ (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]: 67-68)

\textsuperscript{(166)} upayogo laksanam. //8// (TAAS, II, 8)

Upayoga, or consciousness (, or cognitive operation) is the defining characteristic of a soul.

sa dvividho 'stacaturbhedah. //9// (TAAS, II, 9)

This upayoga is of two kinds: eight types and four types.

*Eight types are mati-jñāna, śruti-jñāna, avadhi-jñāna, manahparyāya-jñāna, kevala-jñāna, mati-ajñāna, śruti-ajñāna and vibhanga-jñāna, which are sākara-upayoga. Four types are caksur-darśana, acaksur-darśana, avadhi-darśana and kevala-darśana, which are nīrākāra-upayoga. Also, see the Dravyasamgraha, 4, 5, and so on.

\textsuperscript{(167)} . . . jīvo uvaogalakkhano,

nānena damsanenam ca suhena ya duhena ya. //10// (Uttarajhayanāi, XXVIII, 10)

\textsuperscript{(168)} nānem ca damsanam ceva carittam ca tavo tahā,

viriyam uvaogo ya eyam jīvassa lakkhanam. //11// (Uttarajhayanāi, XXVIII, 11)

\textsuperscript{(169)} atthavihā āyā pannattā, tamjāhā — daviyāyā kasāyāyā yogāyā avaogāyā nānāyā

SAT0 178
damsanāyā carittāyā viriyāyā. (Bhāgavatīgītāsūtra, XII, 10)

(10)TAAS, V, 29 (Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 30)

(11)Winternitz[1976]

(12)DS, 57

(13)DS: 51

(14)tadābhāvāvyayam nityam. (TAAS, V, 30, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 31)

(15)arpitānarpitasiddheh. (TAAS, V, 31, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 32)

(16)Dixit[1974]: 211

(17)See DS, 2, TAAS, II, 8, and so on.

(18)TAAS, II, 9

(19)DS, 4, 5

(20)saṁsthāca daññadamsana sāmaṇṇam jīvalakkhaṇam bhāniyam,
vavahārā suddhanāyā suddham puna damsanam nānām. //6// (DS, 6)

(21)tiṭṭhāle ca duṣṭānaṁ imittvā balamā duṇḍanā ya,
vavahārā so jīvo nissayayaddo du cedāna jassa. //3// (DS, 3)

(22)tadābhāvāh parināmah. (TAAS, V, 41, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 42)

... — dharmādīnī dravyāṇi yenātmanā bhavati sa tadābhāvas tatvam pariṇāma iti ākhyāvate. (SAS, V, 42, §608)

(23)kāyaśvāmmana-karma yogah. (TAAS, VI, 1)

‘The activity of body, speech and manas is yoga.’ (Dixit[1974]: 229)

(24)yogopayogau jīveṣu. (TAAS, V, 44, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: none)

See Dixit[1974]: 225, 227.

(25)sahajadīrāuparāṇatāṃ svākuryāne jñānadarśane upayogah. sa

SATO 179
parasparapradesānām pradesābandhāt karmanaitikbhubhūtasyātmano

'nyatvapratipattikāranam bhavati. (SDS: 67\180-68\190)


(187) upayogo laksanam. //8// (TAAS, II, 8)

(188) jīvasya-yanuvartate. kah punah svatattvalaksanayor viśeṣah? svatattvam laksyam

syāl laksanam ca laksanam. laksanam tu na laksyam iti tayor viśeṣah.

yady evam kim atra jīvasya svatattvam laksanam ity āhā; —

tatra kṣayodbhavo bhāvah kṣayopasaṇamajāś ca yah. tadvyaktivyāpi sāmānyam

upayogo 'syā laksanam. //1//

kṣayodbhavo bhāvah kṣāyiko bhāvas tasya vyakti kevalajñānadarśane grhyete,

kṣayopasaṇamajāś ca vyākyo matyādi jñānānāi catvāri matyādi jñānānāi tṛīni

cakṣurdarśanādīnī ca grhyante tatraivopayogasāmānyasya vṛttān anyatraśṛṣṭanāt. . . .

(Tattvārthaslokavārtika, II, 8) (TAŚV: 318-322)

(189) Shastri, Indra Candra[1990]: 142

(190) Literally, upayoga means application, attention or coordination of the subject

and the object. (Shastri, Indra Candra[1990]: 55)

(191) sa dvividho 'stacaturbhṛdah. (TAAS, II, 9)

sa upayogo dvividhah — jñānopayogo darśanopayogaś ceti. jñānopayogo 'stabhṛdah —

matyādi jñānam śrutajñānam avadhijñānam manahparyayajñānam kevalajñānam matyādi jñānam

śrutajñānam vibhangajñānam ceti. darśanopayogaś caturvidhah — cakṣurdarśanam

acakṣurdarśanam avadhidarśanam kevaladarśanam ceti. tayoḥ kathāḥ bhṛdāḥ?

sākāraṇākārabṛdāḥ. sākāraṁ jñānam anākāraṁ darśanam iti. . . . (SAS, II, 9, §273)

(192) viṣayavisayaisannipatāntarasamudbhūtasattāmātragocaradarśanāy jātam

ādyam avāntarasāmānyākāraviśistavastugraḥanam avagrahāḥ. (PNT, II, 7)

viṣayavisayaisannipatāntarasamudbhūtasattāmātragocaradarśanāy jātam ādyam

avāntarasāmānyākāraviśistavastugraḥanam agagraḥa iti. (SVR, II, 7)

SATO 180
(193) Nakamura [1991]

(194) Sidar [1991a]: 184-185

(195) dhammo ahammo ākāsaṁ kālo poggala-jaṁtavo,

esa logo tì pannatto jinehim varadamshhim. //7// (Uttarajjhayanāi, XXVIII, 7)

(Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 15: 238) (See Jacobi [1895]: 153.)

dhammo ahammo ākāsaṁ davvam ikkikkamāhiyam,

anamthānī ya davvāni kālo poggala-jaṁtavo. //8// (Uttarajjhayanāi, XXVIII, 8)

(Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 15: 238) (See Jacobi [1895]: 153.)

(196) rūvino ceva 'rūvi ya ajīvā duvihā bhavhe,

arūvi dasahā vutta, rūvino vi cauvvihā. //4//

dhammatthikād taddese taddese ya āhie,

adhamme tassa dese ya taddese ya āhie. //5//

āgāse tassa dese ya taddese ya āhie,

addhāsamae ceva arūvi dasahā bhavhe. //6//

dhammādhamme ya do vee logettā viyāhiyā,

logāloge ya ākāse, samae samayakhettie. //7//

dhammādhammāgāsā tinī vi ee anādiyā,

apajjavasiyā ceva savvaddham tu viyāhiyā. //8//

(Uttarajjhayanāī, XXXVI, 4-8) (Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 15: 296-297) (See Jacobi [1895]: 207-208.)

(197) gamananimittam dhammam adhammam thidi jivapuggalānam ca,

avagahonam āyāsam jivādisavavadvānam. //30// (NiSā: 16)

(198) See NiSā: 16.

(199) nityāvasthitāny arūpāni ca. (TAAS, V, 3, Śvetāmbara)

SATO 181
(nityāvasthitāṁ arūpāṁ. (TAAS, V, 4, Digambara))

ākāśāṁ ēkadravyāṁi. (TAAS, V, 5, Svetāmbara)

(ā ākāśāṁ ēkadravyāṁi. (TAAS, V, 6, Digambara))

niskriyāṁ ca. (TAAS, V, 6, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 7)

asankhyeyāḥ pradeśāḥ dharmādharmanyoh. (TAAS, V, 7, Śvetāmbara)

(asankhyeyāḥ pradeśāḥ dharmādharmaikajīvānāṁ. (TAAS, V, 8, Digambara))

dharmādharmanyoh kṛtsne. (TAAS, V, 13)

gatishthitupagrahau dharmādharmayor upakārah. (TAAS, V, 17)

(200) See Dixit[1974]: 177-193. Moreover, we can see the following in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha:

dharmādharma-kāśāṣṭikāyāṁ ta ekatāsālimo niskriyāṁ ca dravyasya
desāntaraprāpṭiketavah. (SDS: 71:244-245)

‘Dharma and adharma, and ākāśa are singular categories [and not generic].
And, they have not the attribute of “action”, but they are the causes of a
substance’s change of place.’ (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E. [1997]: 69-70)

(201) gai-parinayāna dhammo puggalajīvāna gamaṇasahayāṁi,

toyam jaha macchéṇam acchāntā neva so net. //17// (DS, 17)

thānajūdāṇa adhammo puggalajīvāna thānasahayāṁi,

chāyā jaha pahiyāṇam gacchāntā neva so dharai. //18// (DS, 18)

(202) See DS: 52-56.

(203) agāre 'sthito ghaṭa iti yathā tathā dharmādharmayor lokākāśe 'vagāho na bhavati.

kīṁ tarhi? kṛtsne tileṣu tailavad iti. anyonyapradeśapraveśavyāghātābhāvah
avagāhanaśaktyogad veditavyah. (SAS, V, 13, §551)

(204) amūrtitvāt trayāṇāṁ parasparapradesāvirodah. //2// mūrtimanto 'pi kecit
jalahasmasīkaṭādayay ekatra avirodhena vatiṣṭhante kimutāmūrtini

SATO 182
The act as an occasioning cause for motion and to do so for stoppage — these two respectively are the functions of the substances dhārma and adhārma., hence the presence of the category “the principle of motion” is to be inferred from progress and “the principle of rest” is to be done from stationariness. (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]: 70)

Useful information on dhārmastikāya and adhārmastikāya is contained in Sikdar[1991a]: 184-204, and so on.

Sikdar[1991a]: 204-205

gamananimitam dhamnam adhamnam thidi jīwapuggalānam ca, avagahanam ēyasam jivādāsavitadavvānam. //30// (NiSa: 16)

See NiSa: 16.

nityāvasthitāryupāni ca. (TAAS, V, 3, Śvetāmbara)
(nityāvasthitāryupāni. (TAAS, V, 4, Digambara))
ākāśād ekadravyāni. (TAAS, V, 5, Śvetāmbara)
(a ākāśād ekadravyāni. (TAAS, V, 6, Digambara))
niśkriyāni ca. (TAAS, V, 6, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 7)
ākāśasyāntāh. (TAAS, V, 9)
ākāśasyāvagāhah. (TAAS, V, 18)

See Dixit[1974]: 179-193. Moreover, we can see the following in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha:

anyavasupradēṣamadhye ‘nyasya vastunah praveśo ‘vagāhah. tad

SATO 183
akāśaṃ. (SDS: 71)

'\n
The effect of akāśa is seen when one thing enters into the space previously occupied by another.' (Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E. [1997]: 70)

avadānajātaka jīvādīnā vāyū āyāsaḥ,

jenam logāgāsam allogāgāsamid duviham. //19// (DS, 19)

dhammādhhammā kālo puggalajīvā ya samii jāvadiye,

āyāse so logo tattu paradu aloguto. //20// (DS, 20)

See DS: 56-59.

jīvapudgalādānām avagāhinām avakāśadānām avagāha ākāśasyopakāro veditavyah. (SAS, V, 18, §561)

puggalajīvanibaddho dhammādhhammatthikāyakāladdho,

vattadi āyāse jo logo so savvakāle du. //36//

(pudgalajīvanibaddho dharmādharmāstikāyakālādhyāh,

vartate ākāse yo lokah sa savvakāle tu. //36//) (Pravacanasūra, II, 36)

asti hi dravyasya lokalokatvena viśeṣaviśiṣṭam svalaksanasadbhāvāt. svalaksanam hi lokasya saddravyasamavāyātmakatvam, a lokasya punah kevalākāśātmakatvam...

Useful information on ākāśa is contained in Sikdarf 1991a: 204-230, and so on.

sparsarasaghavarnavantaḥ pudgalāḥ. (TAAS, V, 23)

ajjivo puna neo puggala dhammo adhamma āyāsaḥ,

kālo puggala mutto rūpādipūno amuttī sasā du. //15// (Dravyasamgraha, 15)

'Again, ajīva should be known to be pudgala, dharma, adharma, ākāśa and kāla. Pudgala has form and the qualities, rūpa, etc. But the rest are without form.' (DS: 44)

Sabdamatthasasaktmyasthaulyasamsthānabhedatamaschāyātapodyotavantaḥ ca. (TAAS, V, 24)

SATO 184

(220) sadho bamdho suhama thëlo samthânabhedatamachayâ,
uijodâdasahiyyâ puggaladavvassa paajâyâ.  //16// (DS, 16)

(221) DS: 47-51

(222) anavah skandhâs ca. (TAAS, V, 25)

(223) spârsarasagandhavânavantah puggalâh (ta. sâ. 5 / 24). te ca dvividhâ anavah
skandhâs ca. bhoktum âsakya anavah. dvyanukâdayah skandhâh. tatra
dvyanukâdîskandhabhedâd anvâdir utpadyate. anvâdisamghâtâd dvyanukâdir utpadyate.
kvacid bhedasamghâtâbhâyam skandhotpattih (ta. sâ. 5 / 26). ata eva pârayanti galantiti
puggalâh. (SDS: 71-250-722)

(224) Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E. [1997]: 70

(225) ekapradesâdisu bhâjyäh puggalânâm. (TAAS, V, 14)

See Dixit [1974]: 185-191.

(226) anukhamdâhivyappena du puggaladavvam havei duvîyappam,
khamdâ hu chappayâra paramânû ceva duvîyappo. //20// (NiSâ, 20)
puggaladavvam uccai paramânû nicchaena idarena,
puggaladavvo tti puño vavadeso hodi khamdhassa. //29// (NiSâ, 29)

(227) NiSâ: 12, 15

(228) attâdi attamajbhkam attamta nêva imdîe gejhbkam,
avibhâgi jam davvam paramânû tam viânâhi. //26// (NiSâ, 26)

(229) NiSâ: 13-14

(230) jâvadiyam âyâsam avibhâgipuggalânuvatthaddham,
tam khu padesam jâne savvânuuuâthânadânariham. //27// (DS, 27)

‘Know that (to be) surely pradesa which is obstructed by one indivisible atom of
pudgala and which can give space to all particles.’ (DS: 69-70)

(231) aithulathula thulam thulamsuhumam ca suhumathulam ca,
suhumam aisuhumam idi dharadiyam hodi chabhheyam. //21// (NiSā, 21)
bhūpavadamādiyā bhanidā aithulathulāmidī khamdhā,
thūlā idi vinneyā sappijalatemādiyā. //22// (NiSā, 22)
chāyātavamādiyā thūledarakhandhamidi viyānāhi,
suhumathulam bhaniyā khamdhā caurakhavisayā ya. //23// (NiSā, 23)
suhumā havamti khamdhā pāvogga kambhavagojassau puño,
tavvivariyā khamdhā aisuhumā idi paruvedi. //24// caukkaṇ. (NiSā, 24)
(232) NiSā: 12-13

(233) dhāucaukkassa puño jaṁ heī kāraṇamti tam ṇeyo,
khamdhānāṁ avasāno nādavo kaijaparamānū. //25// (NiSā, 25)
(234) NiSā: 13

(235) anavah skandhās ca. (TAAS, V, 25)
samghātabhebhya utpadyante. (TAAS, V, 26, Svetāmbara)
(bhedasamghātebhya utpadyante. (TAAS, V, 26, Digambara))
bhedād anuḥ. (TAAS, V, 27)
bhedasanghātābhvyām cākṣusāh. (TAAS, V, 28)

(236) snigdharaṅkṣatvād bandhaḥ. (TAAS, V, 32, Svetāmbara; Digambara: V, 33)
na jaghanyagunānām. (TAAS, V, 33, Svetāmbara; Digambara: V, 34)
gunasāmye saddrānām. (TAAS, V, 34, Svetāmbara; Digambara: V, 35)
dvayadhiṅdigunānām tu. (TAAS, V, 35, Svetāmbara; Digambara: V, 36)
bandhe samādhikau pārināmikau. (TAAS, V, 36, Svetāmbara)
(bandhe ‘dhikau pārīnāmikau ca. (TAAS, V, 37, Digambara))

(236) Useful information on the formation of atom (anu or paramāṇu) and grossness (skandha) is contained in Dixit[1974]: 202-220, and especially see the chart following the Bhāṣya and the Vṛtti on page 217. And, see Nakamura[1991]: 526-530.

(237) sarīravānmanahprāṇāṇāḥ pudgalānām. (TAAS, V, 19)

sukhaduhkhajīvitamaranopagyahā ca. (TAAS, V, 20)

(238) Dixit[1974]: 193-195

(239) Kanakura[1944], Nakamura[1991]: 529

(240) kālaś cetv eke. (TAAS, V, 38, Śvetāmbara)

(kālaś ca. (TAAS, V, 39, Digambara))

so ‘nantasamayah. (TAAS, V, 39, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 40)

(241) Dixit[1974]: 224-225

(242) vartanā pariṇāmāḥ kriyā paratvāparatve ca kālasya. (TAAS, V, 22, Śvetāmbara)

vartanāparināmakriyāḥ paratvāparatve ca kālasya. (TAAS, V, 22, Digambara)

(243) Dixit[1974]: 195-198

(244) dawaparivattāruvo jo so kālo havei vavahāro,

parināmādilakkha vaṭṭanalakkha ya paramattho. //21// (DS, 21)

loyāyapadese ikkekke je thiyā hu ikkekka,

rayanānam rāsimiva te kālānā asamkhadavvāni. //22// (DS, 22)

(245) DS: 59-63

(246) sabbhāva sabbhāvānaṁ jīvānaṁ taha ya poggalānaṁ ca,

pariyatjanasambhūdā kālo niyamaṇa pannatto. //23// (Paññastikāyasāra, 23)

‘That on account of which these existences the jīvas, material bodies, the dharma

SATO 187
and adharma undergo changes is called real time or kāla-dravya.' (PAS: 20)

(247) Nagasaki[1988]


(248) Useful information on the notion of time (kāla) in the Jainism and a study comparing with that in other schools is contained in Sikdar[1991a]: 289-326.

(249) naigamasamgrahavyavahārarjusūtrasabdā nayāḥ. (TAAS, I, 34, Śvetāmbara)

ādyāsabdau dvitribhedau. (TAAS, I, 35, Śvetāmbara)

naigamasamgrahavyavahārarjusūtrasabdasaṁabhirūḍhaivamabhūtā nayāḥ. (TAAS, I, 33, Digambara)

(250) Useful information on nāya in the Jainism is contained in Dixit[1974]: 55-72, in Kanakura[1944]: 110-113 and in Nakamura[1991]: 434-443.

(251) Nakamura[1991]: 434-443

(252) Dixit[1974]: 62 says that depending on the variety of types of place, time and the nature of peoples the popular conventions as also the impressions left behind by them are of numerous types. Hence the naiga m nāya originating from them too is of numerous types — which is why its illustrations of various types are to be met with. And new illustrations of the same sort can well be constructed.

According to Siddhasena’s idea and the Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkāra’s idea, we can see various types of naiga m-nāya. (Kanakura[1944]: 110-111 and in Nakamura[1991]: 436-437)

(253) Useful information on samgraha-nāya in the Jainism is contained in Dixit[1974]: 63-64, in Kanakura[1944]: 111 and in Nakamura[1991]: 437.


Useful information on evamāhuta-naya in the Jainism is contained in Dixit[1974]: 69, in Kanakura[1944]: 112 and in Nakamura[1991]: 439.

Kanakura[1944]: 112-113
Nakamura[1991]: 440

atra sarvaratra saptabhanginayākhyam nyāyam avatārayanti jaināh. syād asti syān nāsti syād asti ca nāsti ca syād avaktavyah syād asti cāvaktavyah syān nāsti cāvaktavyah syād asti ca nāsti cāvaktavya iti.

tatsarvam anantavīryaḥ prayāpīpadat —
tadvidhānavivakṣyāṁ syād aśṛiti gatīr bhavet,
syān nāstī pravṛgyah syāt tannisṛedhe vivakṣe.
kramenobhāvavānchāyāṁ pravṛgyah samudāyabhāk,
yugapat tadāvyavakṣyāṁ syād avācyam aṣaktitaḥ.
ādāvācyavivakṣyāṁ pañcamo bhaṅga isyate,
antyāvācyavivakṣyāṁ sasthaḥ bhāṅgasamudbhavah.
samuccayena yuktasa ca saptamo bhāṅga ucyate. iti. (SDS: 8208-84[178])

yadi vastv aṣṭi ekāntataḥ sarvathā sarvadā sarvatra sarvāmanāstīti nopāditāśūnāśāhāṃ kvaicit kādācit kenaicīt pravṛtta nivṛtta vā. prāptāprāpīṇvavād aheyahānūnapapattes ca. anekāntapakṣe tu kathamct kvaicit kenaicīt sattvena hānopāḍāne prekṣāvātāṃ upapadyate. kim ca vastunah sattvam svabhāvah, asattvam vetyādi pravṛttaṃ. na tāvad aṣṭītvam vastunah svabhāva iti samasti. ghato 'stity anayah paryāyatāyā yugapat

SATO 189
prayogayogat. nāṣṭīti prayogavirodhāḥ ca. evam anyatraśi yayam. yathoktam —

gato 'stīti na vaktavyām san neva hi yato ghatāḥ,
nāṣṭī api na vaktavyām virodhāt sadasattvayoh. ity ādi.

tasmād ittham vaktavyām sadasatsadasadanirvacaniyavād abhedena prativedānaḥ
caturviddāḥ. punar apy anirvacaniyamatena mīṣrītāni sadasaadānimatiṁīni trividāḥ tānprati
kim vastv asīty ādi paryāṣyoge kathamcid asīty ādi prativaśanasambhaveṇa te vādinaḥ
sarve nirvīnāḥ santas fūṣmīnās ati sampūrnārhavinīścāyānāḥ syādvādaṃ angikurvatas
atra vijaya iti sarvam upapannam. (SDS: 85\textsuperscript{186-403})

\textsuperscript{183} Cowell, E. B. & Gough, A. E.[1997]: 80-81

\textsuperscript{184} Nakamura[1991]: 447

\textsuperscript{185} Kevala, manahparyāyā and avadhi are the jīva’s perceptions, which does not
depend on the sense-organs, on the other hand, \textit{mait} and \textit{sruta} are the knowledge, which
depend on the sense-organs: \textit{indriya} and \textit{anindriya \textit{manas}}. (Nāgasaki[1988])

\textsuperscript{186} Winternitz[1976]

\textsuperscript{187} Vidyābhūṣāna[1920], Shastri, Indra Candra[1990], Williams, R.[1963], and so
on.

\textsuperscript{188} On his dates, see Winternitz[1983]: 569, Vidyābhūṣāna[1921]: 217 and
Potter[1995].

\textsuperscript{189} pratyakṣam dvividham — sāmyavahārikam pāramārthikam ceti. samicino
bādhārahaṁ vyavahārah pravṛttinivṛttilokābhilāpalakṣanah sāmyavahārah,

tatprayaṇakam sāmyavahārikam apāramārthikam ity arthah, yathā asmadādi-pratyakṣam.

tad dhīndriyāṇindriyavyabhāvābhūtāṁagnyāpārasampādyatvāt paramārthataḥ paramokṣam eva,
dhūmāt agnijñānavad vyavadhānāvīṣeṣāṁ. kiṁ ca, asiddhānaikāntika-
viruddhaṁānumānābhāsate samśayaviparyayāṇadhyavāsāyaśasambhavāt, sadanumānāvat
sanketasmarṣādipūrvakaṇiścayanāśambhavāc ca paramārthataḥ parokṣam evavat. (\textit{JT Bh} (a): \textsuperscript{2\textsuperscript{13-18}})

\textsuperscript{187} \textit{JT Bh} (c): 35

SATO 190
In my personal opinion, only Hemacandra in the Śvetāmbara sect does not declare that the empirical perception (sāmyavahārikapratyakṣa) is in truth (reality) (paramārtha) non-perceptual (parokṣa).

According to Akalaṅka, arthāpati, anumāna, upamāna, āgama, and so on are included into śruta. Akalaṅka’s śruta is of two kinds: aksarātmaka and anaksarātmaka, for example, svārthānumāna is included into anaksarātmaka and parāthānumāna is done into aksarātmaka. (PMu: xix-xxii)

...ihāṣasya dravyendriyāni dravyamanaś ca pudgalamayatyāt parāni, prthagity arthaḥ. ‘tebhhyah’ parebhhyo ksasya yad jñānam upadyate tat parokṣam, indriya-manonimittam ity arthaḥ. parokṣam indriya-manonimittam, ātmanah paranimittatvāt, anumānavat. (VĀbhSV, 90)

... vaiśesikādīnāṁ aksaṁ āndriyāṁ, tad upalabdhiḥ pratyakṣaṁ. tad ihocye — nopalabdhimantāndriyāṁ, acetanatvāt, ghatavat, tathā mūrtimattvāt sparśavattvād ity ādi.
... tasmād nopalabdhimantīṇdriyāni. āha — kasyāyaṃ pakṣaḥ 'svatanrāṇīndriyāny upalambhante, nātāḥ iti? kīn tu yad indriya-manonimitāṃ ātmanas tat pratyakṣaṃ brūmāḥ. ucyate nanukṣaṃ 'parokṣaṃ, indriya-mano niṃimitāṃ, ātmanāḥ para niṃimitatvād, iti. (VĀbhSV, 92)

... itaś cendriya-manonimitāṃ ātmanāḥ parokṣaṃ. kutāḥ? sāṃśayādisadbhāvāt. iha yatra sāṃśaya-viparyayānadvhayavasāyānirṇayaḥ sambhavanti tat parokṣaṃ tu drśṭaṃ, yathā 'numānaṃ anumānābhāsās cāsiddhaviruddhānīkāntikāḥ, yāc ca pratyakṣaṃ na tatra sāṃśayādayaḥ, yathā 'vadhyaśisu'. (VĀbhSV, 93)

... idānim viśeṣyapakṣaḥ kriyate — māti-śrute parokṣaṃ, ātmanāḥ paranimit tatvāt, anumānāvartat. yathā pārupalabdhasambandhānusmarānāti, iha yat pārupalabdhasambandhānusmarānād vijñānam utpadyate tat parokṣaṃ drśṭaṃ, yathā dhāmadārānād agnidhānusmarānusmarānāṃ anumānaṃ anugāti iti. (VĀbhSV, 94)

... yadh ca vadhyaśi dāe kāntenaiva pratyakṣaṃ ātmanāḥ, alingavatā, indriyāniṃ alingajñānāvartat. yat punah sākṣād indriya-manonimitāṃ tat teśāṃ eva pratyakṣaṃ, alingavatā, ātmano 'vadhyaśi divat, na tv ātmanāḥ, ātmanas tu tat parokṣaṃ eva, 'paranimit atvāt, anumānavartat' ity uktam. teśāṃ api ca tat samvyavahāhata eva tat pratyakṣaṃ, na paramārthataḥ. kasmāt? 'acetanatvāt, ghaṭavat' ity uktam. āha — na sūtre viśeṣīm ātmanāḥ samvyavahāhataḥ pratyakṣaṃ, na paramārthataḥ' iti... (VĀbhSV, 95)

(VĀbhSV, 91)

... tasmād nopalabdhimantīṇdriyāni. āha — kasyāyaṃ pakṣaḥ 'svatanrāṇīndriyāny upalambhante, nātāḥ iti? kīn tu yad indriya-manonimitāṃ ātmanas tat pratyakṣaṃ brūmāḥ. ucyate nanukṣaṃ 'parokṣaṃ, indriya-mano niṃimitāṃ, ātmanāḥ para niṃimitatvād, iti. (VĀbhSV, 92)

... itaś cendriya-manonimitāṃ ātmanāḥ parokṣaṃ. kutāḥ? sāṃśayādisadbhāvāt. iha yatra sāṃśaya-viparyayānadvhayavasāyānirṇayaḥ sambhavanti tat parokṣaṃ tu drśṭaṃ, yathā 'numānaṃ anumānābhāsās cāsiddhaviruddhānīkāntikāḥ, yāc ca pratyakṣaṃ na tatra sāṃśayādayaḥ, yathā 'vadhyaśisu'. (VĀbhSV, 93)

... idānim viśeṣyapakṣaḥ kriyate — māti-śrute parokṣaṃ, ātmanāḥ paranimitatvāt, anumānāvartat. yathā pārupalabdhasambandhānusmarānāti, iha yat pārupalabdhasambandhānusmarānād vijñānam utpadyate tat parokṣaṃ drśṭaṃ, yathā dhāmadārānād agnidhānusmarānusmarānāṃ anumānaṃ anugāti iti. (VĀbhSV, 94)

... yadh ca vadhyaśi dāe kāntenaiva pratyakṣaṃ ātmanāḥ, alingavatā, indriyāniṃ alingajñānāvartat. yat punah sākṣād indriya-manonimitāṃ tat teśāṃ eva pratyakṣaṃ, alingavatā, ātmano 'vadhyaśi divat, na tv ātmanāḥ, ātmanas tu tat parokṣaṃ eva, 'paranimit atvāt, anumānavartat' ity uktam. teśāṃ api ca tat samvyavahāhata eva tat pratyakṣaṃ, na paramārthataḥ. kasmāt? 'acetanatvāt, ghaṭavat' ity uktam. āha — na sūtre viśeṣīm ātmanāḥ samvyavahāhataḥ pratyakṣaṃ, na paramārthataḥ' iti... (VĀbhSV, 95)

(VĀbhSV, 91)
davvimidv, bhavvimidvassya tadāyahattapanato. (NSC, 10)

(286) Shastri, Indra Candra[1990], Thakur[1964], Winternitz[1976]

(287) se kim tam ity ādi. atha kim tadindriyapratyakṣam?, indriyapratyakṣam pañcavidham prajñaptam. tad yathā — śrotrindriyapratyakṣam ity ādi. śrotrindriyasa śrotrindriyaprathānam vā pratyakṣam śrotrindriyapratyakṣam, śrotrindriyanimitam ity arthaḥ. evam seṣeṣv api vaktavyam. etac copacārataḥ pratyakṣam, na paramārthataḥ. katham jñāyate? iti cet, sūtraprāmāṇyaḥ. vaksyati ca — "parokkham duviham pannattam, tam jahā — abhirupanānaparokkham ca suyaṇānaparokkham ca"[suttam 43]. na ca mati-śrutāḥ bhūvā indriya-manoṇimitam anyad asti yat pratyakṣam anjasā bhavet, bhāve ca ṣaṃsthājānānaprasāṅgād virodha iti, tasmāt parokṣam evedaṃ tatvata iti.

āha — iha loke ‘lingaṇam parokṣam’ iti pratiśam iti, ucyate, tāḥ yaḥ indriya-manoṇbhir bāhyalṅgaptvārayam upapadīta tad ekāntenaiśvāriyāṇām āṭmanāḥ ca parokṣam, paranimittvāḥ, dhūmādagniṇānavad iti, atah parokṣam iti pratiśīḥ. yat punah sākṣādindriya-manoṇimitam tathā eva pratyakṣam, alīṅgavit, āṭmano ‘vadhyaḍivat, na tv āṭmanah āṭmanas tu tat parokṣam eva, paranimittvāḥ, laṅkāvāḥ. indriyāṇām api tadupacārataḥ pratyakṣam, na paramārthataḥ, katham?, acetaṇatvād iti, atra bahu vaktavyam tac cāṇyaṭra vaksyāmāḥ, mā bhūt prathamagrantha eva pratipattigauravam ity ālaṃ vistāreṇa. . . . (NSV, 11)

(288) sakalāvaranamuktātmā kevalam yat prakāṣate, pratyakṣam sakalārthātmatasatapratibhāsanam. //27//

. . . tathā hi — aksāśabdo jīvaparyāyas tataḥ cākṣam prati vartate iti pratyakṣam, yatāṭmanah sākṣād vyāpāraḥ, vyāvahārīkam punar indriyavyayaḥitiātmyāpāsāṃpādyatvāḥ paramārthataḥ parokṣam eva, dhūmādagniṇānavat, tirodhānāvītesāt. . . . (NAV, 27)

(289) Potter[1995]

(290) Potter[1995] says the 17th century, but Winternitz[1976] says the 13th century. It is a problem to be solved.

(291) DSV: 6-9

SATO 193
'egaṃtena parokkham lingiyam ohāyam ca paccakkham, indiya-
manobhavam jam tam samvavahārapaccakkham. 1/95/

'egaṃtena parokkham lingiyam' iti bāhye dhūmādau linge bhavam laingikam yaj jñānam tadēkāntena "tmana indriya-manasām cā(pra. vā) 'sāksākāreṇopajāyamānāvatvād ekānaparokkham — indriya-manobhir gṛhite bāhye dhūmādau linge gnyādivisayam yaj jñānam upapadyate tadēkāntena parokkham, indriya-manasām ātmanaḥ ca tadgrāhyāṛthasyaikāntena parokkhatvāt, iti bhāvah. 'ohāyam ca paccakkham' iti 'ekāntena' ity atrā 'pi vartate, tataḥ cā 'vadhīmanahparyāyakevalalakṣaṇam jñānatrayam ekāntena "tmanah pratyakṣam, bāhyelingam antareṇendriya-manonirapekṣatvāna ca jīvāya vastusākārīrtvād iti. 'indīyamanobhavam' ity ādī yat punar indriya-manobhavam jñānam tat samvavahārapratyakṣam, lingam antareṇaiva yadi indriya-manasām vastusākārīrtvāna jñānam upajāyate tat teṣām pratyaksatvāl lokavavahāramārāpeksayā pratyakṣam ucayate, na paramārthata ity arthaḥ, indriya-maṇahsu acetanatvāna jñānavṛtter abhāvād iti prāg evoktam. etām eva ca samvavahārapratyakṣatvām apekṣyā "game 'piṇḍriyapratyakṣam ity uktam?, paramārthatas tv avadhāyādikam eva pratyakṣam, ātmanah pratyakṣatvāt, idam tu tasya parokkham, paramimitatvāt anumānādīvat, ity anekadāḥ praktam eva.

āha — nānu bhāsayaķārenā 'pi kuta etallabdham yad uta — indriyamanobhavam jñānam samvavahārata eva pratyakṣam, na paramārthah?; na hy atra sūtre kim apy evam viṣeṣātāḥ praktaṁ asti 'indriyapratyakṣam' iti sāmānyenaiva nirdeśāt. satyam, kim tu pradeśāntare (nandistūre) praktaṁ — "parokkham duviham pannatam, tam jahā — ābhīnibohinānam parokkham, suyānānam parokkham ca" iti. na cā "bhīnibodhika-
śrutābhyām anyadindriyaniṁittam jñānam asti yat paramārthataḥ pratyakṣam syād iti.
åha — yady evam, tarhi yale lingam antarenaiva säkṣādindriyaniṃtattam jñānam utpadyate tat paramārthaḥ pratyaḥkṣam astu, yat tu dhūmādīlīṅgād agnyādīviśayam laṅgikām jñānam tat parokṣaḥsvarūpe ābhinibodhika-śrute iṣyatām, ity āgamasya pradeśādavyoktam api samarthitaṃ bhavati. tad ayuktam, dhūmādīlīṅgād agnyādīviśayasya laṅgikājñānasyaṃdriyaniṃtattvatābhāvāt, indriyaṃ hi pratyaṅgatāṅgākālaṃdārabhāvyeva vastu grhnāti, lingā tu vahnyādir arthas trikālaṃvīṣyayō 'py anumīyate. tasmāl laṅgikāṃ jñānam manonimīttaṃ eva bhavati, noindriyaniṃtattam, indriya-manonimitte ca mati-śrute atraiva vāskyete, iti katham kevalamanovīṣayasya laṅgikājñānasyaiḥ mati-śrutarūpaṭaḥ syāt? kiṃ ca, indriyajñānasya mati-śrutābhāyam pārthākṣye śaṣṭhajñānānarāśiṃgāh syāt. tasmād indriyajñānasya mati-śrutavor evā 'nātā bhāvah, tathā ca sati mati-śrutayoh parokṣate tasyā 'pi pāramārthikham parokṣatvam eva, manonimīttaṃśi pī jñānasya paraniṃtattvād anumānevad parokṣatvam prāg evoktam. na ca vaktavyam — āgamyāntasya na va ścīd viśeṣato bhūhitam yato mati-śrutavor āgamy parokṣatvasya viśeṣato 'bhūhānāt, manonimīttaṃśi 'pi ca jñānasya taddantāḥ pātīvād indriyajñānasyevasa parokṣatvam śiddham eva.

åha — naṃu "imdiyapaccakkham ca noimdiyapaccakkham ca" ity atra manonimīttaṃ jñānasya śiddhānte pratiyakṣatvam uktaṃ, yato noindriyam tatra mana ucyate, tasyendriyakadeśavṛttitvā, nośabdaya caikadeśavacanatvā; tataś ca noindriyaniṃtattam pratyaḥkṣam noindriyapratiyakṣam iti vyutpattīyā manonimīttaṃ jñānasya pratiyakṣaṭvaiḥ syāt, katham parokṣatā? iti. tad ayuktam, āgamārthā 'parijñānāt, tatra hi nośabdaya sarvanāḍovacanah, tataś cendriyābhāva eva noindriyam ucyate, tathā ca sati noindriyenaṃdriyābhāvenā "imanah pratyaḥkṣam noindriyapratiyakṣam iti sāmāṣaḥ sarvathendriyapravṛttiḥ iti rāhitaṃ cā "imanah pratyaḥkṣanāvadhi-manahparyāya-kevalānyeva bhavanti, na punar manonimīttaṃ jñānām. yadi punar noindriyam tatra mano vyākhyāyeta, tādā noindriyaniṃtattam pratyaḥkṣam iti manonimīttaṃ evā 'vadhīyādi jñānāṃ pratyaḥkṣam syāt, tathā ca sati manahparyāṭyāḥ paryāpātaṇa manuṣya-devādvaravādhi jñānām na syāt, manaso 'bhāvāt, tacyāṃ cā yaktam "cuemīṃn tti jñānā" iti vacanena śiddhānte tasyā 'vadhījñānābhāyapagamāt, kiṃ ca, śiddhānām api pratyaḥkṣajñānābhāvah syāt, aṃnaskatvāt teṣām. aparāṃ ca, manonimīttaṃ jñānām manodravyadvāreṇāvāya jāyate; tataś ca paranimītattvād anumānevad parokṣatvam eva tat katham pratyaḥkṣam syāt? kiṃ ca, yady etat
paramārthaḥ pratyaksam syāt tadā parokṣatvenktaṃvar mati-śrutatvar nāṇaṃ bhave, tataś ca māter aṣṭāṃśatatiḥbhedābhinnatvar na syāt, manojñānasambandhitāṃ avagrahādhībhedaḥ pārthāḥ pratyaksam gacchati tatpārthakye śaṣṭhajñānaḥ vāptiś ca syād iti. tasmād indriya-monobhayam jñānaṃ parāmītattvāt parokṣam, mati-śrutāntar bhāvāc ca paramārthaḥ pratyaksam; samśyavahārātasa tu pratyaksam iti sthitam iti gāthāḥ.  
(VĀbhBV, 95)

(254)se kim tam ity ādi. atha kim tadindriyapratyaksam?, indriyapratyaksam pañcavidham prajñāpatam, tad yathā — śrotrendriyapratyaksam ity ādi. śrotrendriyasya śrotrendriyapradhānāṃ vā pratyaksam śrotrendriyapratyaksam, śrotrendriyānimittam ity arthaḥ. evam āṃśaṃ api vaktavyam. etac copacārataḥ pratyaksam, na paramārthaḥ. katham jñāya? iti cet, sūtraprāmāṇyāt. vaksyati ca — "parokkham duviham pannattatam, tam jahā — ābhīnibhīyanānaparokkham ca suyānānaparokkham ca" [suttam 43]. na ca mati-śrutābhāvyāṃ indriya-manonimittam anyad asti yat pratyaksam aṅjasā bhavet, bhāve ca śaṣṭhajñānaprasangādī virodhaḥ iti, tasmāt parokṣam evedaṃ tattvata iti.

āha — iha loke 'lingajaṃ parokṣam' iti pratītītaḥ iti, ucyate, iha yaḥ indriya-manobhir bāhyalingapratyaksam utpadyate tad ekāntenaśvendriyānāṃ ātmanāḥ ca parokṣam, parānimittattvāt, dhūmād agnijñānavad iti, ahaḥ parokṣam iti pratiḥītaḥ. yat punah sākṣāntendriya-manonimittam tat teśīma eva pratyaksam, alīṅgarvāt, ātmano 'vadhyādivat, na tv ātmānaḥ, ātmanas tu tat parokṣam eva, parānimīttattvāt, laṅgikavat. indriyānām api tadupacārataḥ pratyaksam, na paramārthaḥ, katham?, acetanavat iti, atra bahu vaktavyam tac cāṅyastra vaksyaṃ, mā bhuḥ prathamagrantha eva pratipattigauravam ity alan vistareṇa. . . .  (NSV, 11)

(255)Bhagavatiṅgasūtra, XVII, 6, 1-2

(256)vavahārenaḥpaddissadi dhānissā caraśadamsanam nāṇaṃ, 
navi nāṇaṃ na caraṃ sam na dāmsanam jānago sūdhaḥ. //7// (SS, 7)

(skt.:) vyavahārenopādiśyate jñānaṃ ca cārītaṃ dāmsanam jānanam, 
nāpi jñānaṃ na cārītaṃ na dāmsanam jānayaḥ sūdhaḥ. //7//

jaha navi sakkam anajjo anajjābhāsaṃ vinā du gāhedum,
taha vavahārena vinā paramatthuvadesanam asakkaṁ. \(//8//\) (\(SS, 8\))

(skt.: yathā na śakyo 'nāryyo 'nārīyyabhāṣāṁ vinā tu grāhāyitum,
tathā vyavahārena vinā paramārthopadeśanam aśakyaṁ. \(//8//\))

\(^{(297)}\) Potter [1995]

\(^{(290)}\) There is room for further investigation regarding to this problem, but I leave the matter open in this paper.

\(^{(290)}\) Nagasaki [1988]

\(^{(300)}\) tat sarvathāvaranaviyā ye cetanasya svarūpāvīrūhâvo mukhyam kevalam. (\(PM, 1, 15\))

\(^{(301)}\) \(PM (b): 26\)

\(^{(302)}\) 'tat' iti pratyakṣaparāmarśārtham, anyathānantaram eva vaiśadyam abhisambandhyeta. dirghakālaṁantaratasātvāsātvānatrayāprakārṣaparyante ekatvavārthāvāśyāntaṁ gharākārmanāṁ prakṣaye sati cetanāsvabhāvasyātmakaṁ prakāśasvabhāvasyāt yāvat, svarūpasya prakāśasvabhāvasyāt sata evāvaranāpagramaṁ 'āvīrūhāvahāvīrūhātuṁ svarūpāṁ mukham iva śarīrasya sarva-jñānaṁ pradhānāṁ 'mukhyam' pratyakṣam. tac cendṛiyo-ādiśāhāyakavirahāt sakalaviśaya-tvād asādhabhāną niet ca 'kevalam' ity āgama prasiddham. (\(PM, 1, 1, \$48\))

\(^{(303)}\) \(PM (b): 26\)

\(^{(304)}\) Potter [1995]

\(^{(305)}\) Nagasaki [1988]: 16-72

\(^{(306)}\) This (3. 4. 0 - 4.) will be soon published in the Prof. P. S. Jaini's festschrift as an international publication from the University of Lund, the Kingdom of Sweden.

\(^{(307)}\) See \(JT Bh (c)\).

\(^{(308)}\) See, for example, \(JT Bh (c)\), Bothra [1976], Shastri, Indra Candra [1990], Tatia [1951] and so on.
It is difficult to explain the theory of the sense-organ (indriya) in the Jainism, because it is very complicated not only in its own theory but also in the historical process in the Jainism. So let us quote Dr. Indra Candra Shastri’s explanation, since it is very clear, which is as follows:

‘In Jainism the senses are described as mark of the jīva as well as the instruments of cognition. In the first sense they are related with entomology and in the second case with epistemology. The five senses in the former sense are known as five types of life (prāna) possessed by animals according to the stage of their biological evolution. The Jaina divides the living beings into five classes (jātis) on the basis of the number of senses possessed by them. These classes consist of the one-sensed animals, two-sensed animals and so on up to the five-sensed ones. In the field of epistemology the senses are instruments of perception. They have two types: the material structure (dravyendriya) and the psychical function (bhāvendriya).

The senses as material structure are effected by the corresponding nāmakarman. They are physical and made of the same stuff as that of the body. The Jaina does not regard a particular physical element as the cause of a particular sense-organ as the Nyāya holds. As a matter of fact the Jaina does not hold the earth, water etc. as the elements. They are themselves compounds or bodies made from the combination of atoms. In the atomic state they are simply pudgala and can-not be differentiated as earth or water and so on.
The atoms are grouped together into eight *varganās* according to their capability of being transformed into certain bodies. We have already stated the five types of bodies, which have corresponding five *varganās* for their constitution. The speech, mind and breathing also are material. They have one *varganā* each as their material cause. Our physical structure is constituted of *audārika-varganā* and the same is the material cause of sense-organs.

*Dravyendriya* is further divided into *nirvṛtti* and *upakarana*. *Nirvṛtti* means the arrangement or form. It is again divided into *bāhya-nirvṛtti* (external) and *ābhyantara-nirvṛtti* (internal). *Bāhya-nirvṛtti* is the external form and *ābhyantara-nirvṛtti* is internal form. The *Prajñāpanā* states that *bāhya-nirvṛtti* has innumerable forms according to the innumerable types of animals. We see a clear difference in the outer form of the ears between a horse and a man. But the *ābhyantara-nirvṛtti* has the same form in all the animals.

The *Prajñāpanā* states that the form of the auditory sense is like the flower of the *kadamba*. The visual sense is like the grain of *masura* (a kind of pulse). The olfactory sense is like the flower of *atimukta*. The gustatory sense is like the edge of a sword. The cutaneous sense possesses various forms.

According to the Digambara tradition *bāhya-nirvṛtti* is the particular material form and *ābhyantara* is the part of the soul surrounded by the physical structure. According to the Śvetāmbaras *bāhya* and *ābhyantara*, both are material; but Śilāṅka in his commentary on the *Ācārāṅga* supports the Digambara tradition.

*Upakarana* is the power of grasping an object, possessed by the *nirvṛtti*. The Digambara tradition holds that *upakarana* means what assists. It is also a material structure without which the *nirvṛtti* is incompetent to function. It is divided into two parts of external *upakarana* and internal *upakarana*. In the case of eye the pupil — the white and black substance — is internal *upakarana* and the eye-lids and eye-brows are external *upakarana*. Śilāṅka also endorses the same view. It should be observed here that the Digambara
tradition divides material structure of senses into three parts: (1) bhāya-
nirvṛtti, (2) abhyantara-upakarana and (3) bhāya-upakarana. The
Śvetāmbara tradition holds upakarana not as the material structure, but, the
power possessed by the material structure which is known as nirvṛtti.
According to the Digambara tradition abhyantara-nirvṛtti is psychical, the
Śvetāmbara holds it as material. The dravyendriyas are caused by the
 corresponding nāma-karman.

<Śhāvendriya>

The physical senses (bhāvendriyas) are not material but power or function
of the self. They are again divided into labdhi (power) and upayoga
(application). Labdhi means the partial destruction and the partial subsidence
(kṣayopaśama) of the obscuring and the obstructing karmans. The application
of labdhi on a particular object, is known as upayogendriya. It results into
the cognition of an object.

It has been stated above that the living beings are divided into five classes
according to the number of senses possessed by them. The animals possessing
one sense only are recognized as ekendriyas. Those possessing two are
known as dvindriyas and so on. The order of their possession is cutaneous,
gustatory, olfactory, visual and auditory. The animal possessing the latter
must possess the former also.’ (Shastri, Indra Candraf 19901: 233-235)

(O1) . . . indriyārthasambandha iti tatsamayabhāvāti tātparyārthah, yogārtham āha
— svayaṃ vyajjate prakatikriyate ‘rtho ‘neneti vyāñjanam.

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... tatravagraho dvividho vyānjanāvagraghārthāvagragrahahedāt. tatra vyānjanena šabdādipinaratādravyāvanikurambena vyānjanasya śrotrendriyāder avagrahah sambandho vyānjanāvagragrahah, ... (JB: 93a-93b)

On his dates, see Potter[1995]: 228.

On his dates, see Wintemitz[1983]: 462.

For example, in the Sarvārtha-siddhi I, 18, §200 (see SAS: 83^14) by Pūjyapāda and the Tattvārthavārttiika I, 18 (see TAV, vol. 1: 66^27-67^a) by Akalanka, vyānjana is defined as avyakta and sabdādijāta. Bhāskaranandin in his Tattvārthādhigama-sūtrasukhabodha I, 18 (see TAAS-SB: 15^17-28) also approves of the definition given by Pūjyapāda and Akalanka. Anyway they regard vyānjana as what is manifested or grasped by the organ of hearing and so on, and say that it is 'avyakta' and 'sabdādijāta'.

On Siddhasena Gaṇi's dates, Potter[1995]: 353 says that he flourished about the 10th century. According to Vidyabhusana[1921]: 182, he flourished about the 7th century.

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Here, **Vyanjana** is what manifests or displays the object, (for example,) as if a pot, which is in the dark, (is manifested) by means of the light. Also, **vyanjana** is of contact (**samslesa**), that is to say, it is **vyanjana** that is contact (**samslesa**) between the sense-organs such as touch named **upakarana** and the substances transformed into sense data such as touch and so on. There is only the sensation of **vyanjana**, which is **grähaka**. . .

Note: We can discover the description ‘**sparśānyākārāparinatāḥ**’ in the *Tattvārthāḥ* (*Tattvārthāḥ* *Sūtraḥ* *Bhāṣya* *Āśrama*), (see *TAAS-T*, vol. 1: 87), but because of the context it seems to regard it as ‘**sparśānyākārāparinatāḥ**’. Perhaps it is a misprint.

**Note:** We can also interpret the sentence above as: **vyanjana** is **upakaranendriya**, **sparśādyākārāparinatatravyasambandhas**. . .

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According to the Viṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyasvopajñavṛtti, vyañjana means upakaranendriya, śabdādiparinatadṛavya and sambandha between the two. But we can also understand in the gāthā that vyañjana means the relation only.

\[(32)\text{See VĀbhSV, vol. 1: 45}^{15-20}\]

\[(32)\text{vamjjñai } jena \text{ ttho ghaḍo } vva \text{ divena } vamjanam \text{ tam ca,} \]

vyajyate yena 'ṛtho ghaṭa iva dipena vyañjanam tac ca, upakaranendriyaśabdādiparinatadṛavyasambandhah.)

vyajyate prakātriṣyante 'ṛtho yena, dipeneva ghaṭah, tad vyañjanam. kim punas tat?, ity āha — 'tam cetyādī' tac ca vyañjanam upakaranendriyasabdādiparinatadṛavyasambandhah: — indriyam avyā diśīdhah — dravyendriyam, bhāvendriyam ca. tatra nirvṛtyasy upakaranāne dravyendriyam, labdhvayupayogau bhāvendriyam. nirvṛttīś ca dvidhā — angulāśamkhīyabhāgādīmānā

kadbakhāsakṣamaṇokṣanaśārāmāṃśakṣamalokarūpā, sarirākāra ca śrotrāṇāṃ pañcānām api yathāsāmkhyam antarnirvṛttih; karnāśaṅkūlādirūpā
tu bairinirvṛttih. tatra kadbakhāsaṇokṣamaṇokṣamalokāpāḥ antarnirvṛttih

śabdādvipaśyaparicchedahetur yah śaktivishayah sa upakaranendriyaṃ, śabdaśiś ca śrotrāṇāṃ vyāśitām api yathāsāmkhyam antarnirvṛttih,

ādīśabdād rasa-gandha-sparśāparigrahah; baddhāvena pariṇatāti ca tāni bhasāvargaṇādisambandhini dravyāṇi ca śabdādiparinatadṛavyāṇi ca, teṣām

parasparam sambandhaṃ upakaranendriyaśabdādiparinatadṛavyasambandhaṃ; esa tāvad vyañjanaṃ ucyate. aparam cendriyena 'py arthaśaḥ vyañjamāṇatvāt tad api vyañjanam ucyate. tathā śabdādiparinatadṛavyanikārambam api vyañjamāṇatvāt vyañjanam

abhādhiyata iti. evam upalakṣaṇavākyāṇām ațīyotho’ṃ vyañjanam avagantarvāṇam. tataś cendriyalakṣaṇena vyañjanena śabdādiparinatadṛavya-

sambandhasvarūpāṃ vyājanasyavāgrahē vyājanāvagrahāḥ, atha vā tena vyañjanena śabdādiparinatadṛavyātmakāṇāṃ vyañjanānāṃ avagraho vyañjanāvagrahāḥ; ity ubhayatāpi ekāya vyañjanāśabdasya lopam kṛtvā samāsah. iti gāthārthāḥ. (VĀbhBV,
We can see the same idea in the *Nandisuttacūrṇi* 49 (see NSC: 35\(^{42}\)) by Jinadāsa Mahattara (the Svetāmbara sect, *circa* AD 7th century or 12th century?) and the *Nandisūtravṛtti* 49 (see NSV: 49\(^{16-20}\)) by Haribhadra. Moreover, in the *Nandisuttacūrṇi* 56-[1] (see NSC: 40\(^{14}\)) and the *Nandisūtravṛtti* 58-[1] (see NSV: 54\(^{18}\)), the term *vyāṇjana* is defined as having three meanings: *dravya*, *indriya* and *sambandha*. What is true in the contexts of the *Nandisuttacūrṇi* 56-[1] and the *Nandisūtravṛtti* 58-[1] is to a considerable extent true for those of the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyasvopajñāvṛtti* 249, the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyabhadvṛtti* 250 and the *Jñānārṇava* (see JA: 51a\(^{13}\)) as well.

Note: On Jinadāsa’s dates, Thakur[1964]: 100 says that he flourished about the 7th century, and Potter[1995]: 408, who calls him Jinadāsagani, says he flourished about the 12th century. Nonetheless I do not believe we can determine his dates at this stage.

\(^{42}\)See *JTBh* (a): 49.

\(^{43}\)This is Ratnaprabhā’s interpretation (see *JTBh* (b): 78\(^{8-18}\)); but we can read the compound as follows:

‘Object-awareness is the cognition of generality without any distinction of own nature, that is to say, name, genus, activity, quality and substance.’

This provisional translation means that own nature (*svarūpa*) is equal to name (*nāman*) and so on. In other words, it follows that own nature (*svarūpa*) is qualifier (*viśeṣana*), and name (*nāman*), genus (*jāti*), activity (*kriyā*), quality (*guna*) and substance (*dravya*) are also qualifier (*viśeṣana*).

Of course, name (*nāman*) and so on are five kinds of qualifier (*viśeṣana*), that is to say, ‘the reason for the use of any term in the particular significations which it bears’ (*pravṛttinimitta*). We can trace the source of this concept back to the *Mahābhāṣya* by Patañjali (*circa* 2nd century BC) (especially on *pravṛtti*, see *MBh*, vol. 1: 19\(^{20-21}\)) and it is in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* by Dignāga (on this subject, see Hattori[1968]: 25) that the expression such as ‘name (*nāman*) and so on’ means qualifier (*viśeṣana*). Some texts in the late period treat of it, for example, in the *Tarkasamgraha* (see *TS*: 29\(^{18-21}\)) and the *Tarkasamgrahadipikā*.
(see TS: 30-10) by Annambhatta (circa AD 17th century), ‘name (nāman) and so on’ are clearly defined as qualifier (visēśana). Furthermore, on the evidence of the arguments in the Vīseśāvaśayakabhāṣyaabrhadvyrtti 252, the Praśastapādabhāṣya (see PBh: 463-17) by Praśastapāda (circa AD 530) (on his dates, see Potter[1995]: 216) and the Nyāyakandaḷī (see NKa: 298-44) by Śrīdhara (circa AD 991) (on his dates, see Potter[1995]: 379), we can be fairly certain that they regard own nature (svarūpa) as qualifier (visēśana). (We can find the description ‘sārūpaṁ’ in NKa: 298-4, but because of the context it seems to regard it as ‘svarūpa’. Perhaps it is a misprint.)

In addition to these, the explanation of avagraha by Siddhasena Gaṇi in his Tattvārthādhigamasūtrasūtraḥṣyaṭikā I, 15 (see TAAS-Ṭ, vol. 1: 80^-21) helps account for the interpretation of the compound in the provisional translation. We notice that here he deals synonymously with the following terms: ‘sāmāṇya’, ‘ānirdēśya’, ‘svarūpakalpanāraḥita’ and ‘nāmādikalpanāraḥita’.

For reasons mentioned above, it is possible to analyze the compound of the definition of arthāvagraha described in the Jainatarkabhāṣā as follows:

\[(svarūpa) + (nāmajātiśrayāgunadravya)]kalpanāraḥitam = <sāmāṇya>\]
\[<sāmāṇya>graḥanam = arthāvagrahah\]

(325) According to the Sarvārthasiddhi I, 17, §198 (see SAS: 82^-10) by Pūjyapāda, the Tattvārthavārttika I, 17 (see TAV, vol. 1: 65^-66) by Akalanāka and the Tattvārthādīhigamasūtrasukhabodha I, 17 (see TAAS-SB: 15^-15) by Bhāskaranandin, it is clear that they regard artha as dravya, or substance.

(326) In the Tattvārthādīhigamasūtrasūtraḥṣyaṭikā I, 17 (see TAAS-Ṭ, vol. 1: 86^-18) by Siddhasena Gaṇi and the Tattvārthavivaraṇa I, 17 (see TAAS-Vi: 235^-237) by Yaśovijaya, artha is regarded as what consists of the nature of touch, taste, smell, colour and sound. Moreover, in these texts it is stated that it (arthā) means both substance (dravya) and mode (paryāya), because both of them (dravya and paryāya) are interdependent.

(327) The same observation regarding arthāvagraha seen in the Jainatarkabhāṣā that only generality can be grasped in the stage of object-awareness applies to the idea in the Jñānārṇava (see JA: 51a^-14-51b'), the Jñānabindu (see JB: 93b^-9), the

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Visesāvaśya-kahāsya-vasopajñāvṛtti 251 and the Visesāvaśya-kahāsya-vahṛhādvyṛtti 252. We can, moreover, find the same idea in the Nandisuttacūrṇi 47 (see NSC: 34\textsuperscript{17} seq(q.)), the Nandisuttacūrṇi 56-[2] (see NSC: 40\textsuperscript{21} seq(q.)), the Nandisutrāvṛtti 49 (see NSV: 49\textsuperscript{16} seq(q.)), and the Nandisutrāvṛtti 58-[2] (see NSV: 54\textsuperscript{17}-55\textsuperscript{10}). Furthermore, in the Āvaśya-kāsāutrāvivaraṇa (see ĀSV: 22b\textsuperscript{11-12}) by Malayagiri (the Śvetāmbara sect, circa AD 13th century): (on his dates, see Potter[1995]: 456), the theory that generality can be grasped at the stage of the sensation is described with some quotations. Besides, in the Āvaśya-kāsāutrāvivaraṇa (see ĀSV: 23b and so on) we can see descriptions of vyavatāvagraha and concepts associated with the Śvetāmbara tradition.

\textsuperscript{139} śāmaṇṇam anīddesam sarūvanāṁātikappanārahitam, jadi evaṁ jam tenaṁ gaḥite sadde tti tam kidha nu? [251]

śāmaṇṇa\textsuperscript{9} gāhā. tam ca kiṁ prakāraṁ artham grhṇāt? śāmaṇyaṁ anirdeśyam svarūpa-nāma-jāti-dravya-guṇa-kriyāvikalpavimukham anākhyeyam ity arthaḥ. . . (See YĀBhSV, vol. 1: 57\textsuperscript{9-12})

\textsuperscript{139} śāmaṇnum anīddesam sarūva-nāṁāikappanārahiyam, jai evaṁ jam tenaṁ gaḥie sadde tti tam kiha nu? (YĀBh, 252)

(skt: śāmaṇyaṁ anirdeśyam svarūpa-nāṁādikalpanārahitam, yady evaṁ yat 'tena grhītah śabdah' iti tat katham nu?)

grāhyavastunah śāmaṇya-visesāya-vasopajñākārake saty api arthāvagrahena śāmaṇyarūpam evā 'rtham grhṇāti, na viśesārūpam, arthāvagrahasyaikāsārṣamayikatvāt, samayena ca visesāvagrahāntīyogād iti. śāmaṇāyārthā sa kaścid grāma-nagara-vana-śenādīśabdena nirdeśyo 'pi bhavaṁ, tadvayvachchēdārtham āhā — anirdeśyam kenāpi śabdēna 'nabhilapyaṁ. kutāḥ punar etat?, ity āhā — yataḥ svarūpa-nāṁādikalpanārahitam, ādiśabdāj jāti-kriyā-guna-dravyaparigrahaḥ. tatra rūpa-rasādyarthānāṁ ya ātmīyacaksurāndriyāsādhyāya práttinivātah svabhāvas tat svarūpam. rūpa-rasādikas tu tadabhidhāyako dhvanir nāma, rūpatva-rasatvādikā tu jātiḥ. pritikaram idaṁ rūpam, puśṭikāro 'yaṁ rasa ity ādikas tu śabdah kriyāpradhānavatvāt kriyā. kṛṣṇanilādikas tu guṇah. prthivyādikam punar dravyam. eṣāṁ svarūpa-nāma-jātyādīnāṁ kalpanā antarjālpārusītajāhāntuṁ pāyā raḥitaṁ evā 'rtham arthāvagrahena grhṇātī yato jīvah, tasmād anirdeśyo 'yaṁ arthah proktah,
In the Tattvārthahavārttika I, 15 (see TAV, vol. 1: 60) by Akalanka, and the Tattvārthādhigamasūtrasukhabodha I, 15 (see TAAS-SB: 13) by Bhaskaranandin, it is said that the pre-predicative perception named darsana arises in the contact between the object and the sense-organ, manifesting ‘being-ness’ of the real thing (vastu) with no particularity such as white-ness and so on. Moreover, in the Pramāṇanamīmadīlākāra II, 7 and the Śyādvādaraṅgākara II, 7 (see SVR, vol. 2: 347) by Vādidevasūri, it is stated that sensation (avagraha) is the first grasping the real thing (vastu) characterized by lower, more specific universals, and it (avagraha) is engendered by darsana, which (darsana) can grasp ‘being-ness’ alone, arising immediately after the contact between the object and the sense-organ. Even in the Pramāṇanamajjñānah, it is stated that sensation is a matter of the grasping the object immediately after darsana, in contact between the object and the sense-organ.

(VĀbhBV, 252) (See VĀbhBV, vol. 1: 127-138.)

(33) Sensuous knowledge (matijñāna) is a pramāṇa.

(34) See JTBh (a): 1-6.

(35) atha vā avagraho dvividhah — naiscayikah, vyāvahārikaś ca. ādyah sāmānyamātra-grāhi, dvitiyaś ca viśeṣavisayaḥ taduttaram uttarottaradharmaṅkāṅkaśārūpehāpravṛtthe, anyathā avagraham vinehānūthānaprasāṅgāt atraiva kṣipretarādibhedasāṅgati, ata eva coparyupari jñānapravṛttīrūpasantānayavahāra iti drastavyam. (JTBh (a): 5-13)

(36) See VĀbhSV, 281-4, 287 and 288.

(37) See VĀbhBV, 282-5, 288 and 289.

(38) Vyāvahārikāvagraha defined by Jinabhadra and Yaśovijaya is equivalent
to *avagraha* posited by Pūjyapāda and others. This would mean that *avagraha* posited by Pūjyapāda and others relates to common life, practice, or action. In short, Yaśovijaya considers it empirical.

(339) From the concept that generality (*sāmānya*) is ‘being-ness’ (*sattā*), it follows that own nature (*svarūpa*) as qualifier (*viśeṣa*) in the definition of object-awareness (*arthāvagraha*) in the *Jainatarkabhāṣā* excludes ‘the supreme universal’ (*sattā*).

From this (see also note (324)), it is possible to construct a hypothesis by comparing *svarūpa* in the definition of object-awareness (*arthāvagraha*) in the *Jainatarkabhāṣā* with the *svarūpa* of *svarūpālocana* posited by Praśastapāda and others. In order to prove the hypothesis, first let us examine four sentences Schmithausen[1970], Miyamoto[1996a] and Murakami[1997] quote and investigate.

1. **[T-1]**_dravye tavad dvividhe mahaty anekadrayavyavattvodhūtarūpaprapakāsacatuṣṭayāsumikārṣad dharmādhisāmagrye ca svarūpālocanātmāram._ *(PBh: 552:0–553:2)*
   
   Note: In this case *svarūpālocanātmāra* is a pre-predicative perception. Besides, we can see an interesting description of this — ‘svarūpāgraḥanam iti astituṣṭataḥ’ — in the *Nyāyakandaliṇājikā* by Rajaśekhara Sūri *(circa AD 15th century).* *(See NKa: 439:13.)*

2. **[T-2]**_sāmānyaviśeṣadravyaṇuṣakarnaviśeṣaṇāpeksād ātmamanāḥsannikārṣāt pratyakṣam utpadyate sad dravyāṁ prthivi viśāṇī śuklo gaur gacchatiti._ *(PBh: 553:15)*
   
   Note: In this case *pratyakṣa* is a predicative perception.

3. **[T-3]**_tatra sāmānyaviśeṣaḥ svarūpālocanātmāraḥ pratyakṣaḥ pramāṇaḥ prameyo dravyādaḥ pādārthaḥ pramāṇātmā pramitir dravyādiviṣayām jñānām._ *(PBh: 553:21–23)*
   
   Note: In this case *svarūpālocanātmāra* is a pre-predicative perception.

4. **[T-4]**_sāmānyaviśeṣajñānottpatāv avibhaktam ālocanātmāraḥ pratyakṣaḥ pramāṇam asmin nānyat pramāṇāntaram asti aphalarūpāt._ *(PBh: 553:21–23)*

   Among them, there are different opinions regarding the interpretation of
sāmānyavārīṣeṣa in [T-3] and [T-4], which turns us to the question whether sāmānyavārīṣeṣa in [T-3] should be regarded as 'generality (including the supreme universal) and particularity (lower, more specific universals)' or as 'specific universals (excluding the supreme universal)'. Actually we can see various interpretations about it even in such texts of the Vaiśeṣika as the Vyomavati, the Nyāyakandali, and the Kiranāvāli by Udayana (circa, AD 11th century) (on his dates, see Potter[1995]). Murakami[1997] and Miyamoto[1996a] agree on the point that sāmānyavārīṣeṣa in this case can be regarded as 'generality (including the supreme universal) and particularity (lower, more specific universals)'. Anyway, according to the texts of the Vaiśeṣika, wherever perception (pratyakṣa), which is in the category of valid cognition (vidyā) and consisting of 'pre-predicative perception' and 'predicative perception', is explained, both svarūpa and sāmānyavārīṣeṣa clearly refer to viśeṣa. Therefore in the case of the Vaiśeṣika we can consider them synonymous and both interpretations regarding sāmānyavārīṣeṣa in this case true.

To return to the hypothesis, we now can answer the question: what hypothesis can be formulated from these facts? It is that sāmānyavārīṣeṣa in [T-3] means 'specific universals (excluding the supreme universal)'.

If we consider svarūpa in the definition of object-awareness (arthāvagraha) in the Jainatarkabhāṣā equal to svarūpa of svarūpālocana as stated by Praśastapāda and others, there is sufficient reason for concluding that sāmānyavārīṣeṣa in [T-3] has the precise meaning of 'specific universals' which excludes the supreme universal (sattā). Moreover, we are entirely justified in saying that this result justifies Schmithausen[1970] and Halbfass[1992] in their argument that sāmānyavārīṣeṣa in [T-3] means 'specific universals'. This is also justified, according to the contexts in the Jainatarkabhāṣā and so on. However, we have only limited information on this matter and the compound sāmānyavārīṣeṣa in [T-3] leaves room for a variety of interpretations. Besides, it is debatable whether the correspondence of svarūpa in the definition of object-awareness (arthāvagraha) in the Jainatarkabhāṣā with svarūpa of svarūpālocana posited by Praśastapāda and others is valid or not. This is because the theory of perception in Jainism may be influenced not only by that in the Vaiśeṣika but also by that in Buddhism. This is too involved a subject to be treated here in detail and must await further consideration.
In the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* we can see that in some contexts Praśastapāda interprets *indriya* as *vyañjaka* or *upalambhaka*:

\[ \ldots \text{indriyam } \text{gandhavyañjakam } \text{svaprañinām jālādyanabhīhūtaih} \]

\[ \text{pārthivāvayavair ārabdham } \text{grāhām.} \ldots \text{ (PBh: 196) (Some critical editions — for example, } \text{Praśastapāda } \text{Bhāṣya} \]

\[ \text{with the Commentary Nyāyakandali of Śrīdhara, edited by} \]

\[ \text{Vidhyesvari Prasad Dvivedin, Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series 13,} \]

\[ \text{Delhi: Sri Satguru Publication, 1984 and so on — use the term} \]

\[ \ldots \text{‘rasavyañjaka’ instead of ‘rasopalambhaka’.)} \]

\[ \ldots \text{indriyam } \text{svaprañinām } \text{rasopalambhakam} \]

\[ \text{anyāvayavānabhīhūtair jalāvayavair ārabdham rasānam.} \ldots \text{ (PBh: 236) (Some critical editions — for example, } \text{Praśastapāda } \text{Bhāṣya} \]

\[ \text{with the Commentary Nyāyakandali of Śrīdhara, edited by} \]

\[ \text{Vidhyesvari Prasad Dvivedin, Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series 13,} \]

\[ \text{Delhi: Sri Satguru Publication, 1984 and so on — use the term} \]

\[ \ldots \text{‘rasavyañjaka’ instead of ‘rasopalambhaka’.)} \]

\[ \ldots \text{indriyam } \text{svaprañinām } \text{rūpavyañjakam} \]

\[ \text{anyāvayavānabhīhūtais tejovayavair ārabdham caksuḥ.} \ldots \text{ (PBh: 247) (Some critical editions — for example, } \text{Praśastapāda } \text{Bhāṣya} \]

\[ \text{with the Commentary Nyāyakandali of Śrīdhara, edited by} \]

\[ \text{Vidhyesvari Prasad Dvivedin, Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series 13,} \]

\[ \text{Delhi: Sri Satguru Publication, 1984 and so on — use the term} \]

\[ \ldots \text{‘rasavyañjaka’ instead of ‘rasopalambhaka’.)} \]

\[ \ldots \text{indriyam } \text{svaprañinām } \text{sparśopalambhakam} \]

\[ \text{prthivy-} \]

\[ \text{ādyanabhīhūtair vāyavayavair ārabdham śārīrvyāpi} \]

\[ \text{tvagindriyam.} \ldots \text{ (PBh: 259) (Some critical editions — for example, } \text{Praśastapāda } \text{Bhāṣya} \]

\[ \text{with the Commentary Nyāyakandali of Śrīdhara, edited by} \]

\[ \text{Vidhyesvari Prasad Dvivedin, Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series 13,} \]

\[ \text{Delhi: Sri Satguru Publication, 1984 and so on — use the term} \]

\[ \ldots \text{‘rasavyañjaka’ instead of ‘rasopalambhaka’.)} \]

Since in Jaina epistemology Jinabhadra is the first man who defined the term *vyañjana* as the sense-organ, it is very interesting to compare his idea with that of Praśastapāda. Moreover Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandali* interprets *vyañjaka* as *upalambhaka*. When we apply this idea in the *Nyāyakandali* by Śrīdhara to the concept of *vyañjana* in Jaina epistemology, as follows:

1. \( \text{vyañjaka} = \text{upalambhaka} \)
2. \( \text{vyañgya} = \text{upalambhya} \)
3. \( \text{vyañjana} = \text{upalambhana} \)

In this way, we can understand *vyañjana* as the relation between the sense-organ and the object. We cannot, however, say for certain whether Yaśovijaya and others take the...
theory posited by the Vaiśeṣikas into consideration or not. It is too involved a subject to be
treated here in detail, and needs further consideration. I hope to investigate this question at
the earliest opportunity.

\[^{042}\text{See VS: 62}^{18}-63^{16}.\]

\[^{043}\text{See Halbfass[1992]: 100-102.}\]

\[^{044}\text{It is interesting to note that } avibhaktālocana \text{ as defined by the Vaiśeṣika is}
similar to } vyājanāvagraha \text{ in Jaina epistemology. For example, according to the}
Prāsastapādabhāṣya \text{(see PBh: 553^{23-25}) and the Nyāyakandali \text{(see NKa: 462}^{3}-463^{3})},
we can be fairly certain that } avibhaktālocana \text{ means contact between the sense-organ and the}
object. However, when we compare the process of cognition posited by the Vaiśeṣikas
with that of sensuous knowledge in Jaina epistemology, rather than considering the single
correspondence of } avibhaktālocana \text{ with } vyājanāvagraha, \text{ we should admit that the process
of cognition ('contact between the sense-organ and the object' — 'knowledge of qualifier}
(viśeṣa)') posited by the Vaiśeṣikas corresponds to that of cognition ('contact between
the sense-organ and the object' — 'dārśana' \text{(which is regarded as 'nāścayikāvagraha' by}
Yaśovijaya) — 'avagraha' \text{(which is regarded as 'vyāvahārikāvagraha' by Yaśovijaya)}
defined by Pujyapāda and others. In this case we should notice that the process of cognition
defined by Pujyapāda and others is sāmyavahārikāpratyakṣa, and 'in truth' \text{(paramārtha)}
it is regarded as parokṣa by Yaśovijaya.

Now we compare the process of cognition ('vyājanāvagraha' — 'arthāvagraha')
Jinabhadrā, Yaśovijaya and others define \text{(see 3. 4. 2 and 3. 4. 3)} with that of cognition in
the Vaiśeṣika. In order to examine this correspondence we need an alternative supposition:
the compound 'sāmānyavīśeṣa' in the second stage in the process of cognition the Vaiśeṣika
define, that is to say, the knowledge of qualifier (viśeṣa), means either 'generality (including
the supreme universal 'sattā') and particularity (lower, more specific universals)' or 'specific
universals (excluding the supreme universal 'sattā')'.

First, if we interpret 'sāmānyavīśeṣa' as 'generality (including the supreme universal
'sattā') and particularity (lower, more specific universals)', the process of cognition ('contact
between the sense-organ and the object' — 'knowledge of qualifier (viśeṣa)') in the
Vaiśeṣika corresponds to that of cognition ('vyañjanavagṛha' — 'arthavagṛha' — 'iḥa' or 'apāya') defined by Jinabhadra and Yaśovijaya. This is very similar to the correspondence of the process of cognition in the Vaiśeṣika with that of cognition Pujyapāda and others define.

Secondly, if we interpret 'sāmānyaviśeṣa' as 'specific universals (excluding the supreme universal 'sattā')', the process before the second stage of cognition (knowledge of qualifier (viśeṣana)) in the Vaiśeṣika corresponds to that of cognition ('vyañjanavagṛha' — 'arthavagṛha') defined by Jinabhadra and Yaśovijaya; and the process from the second stage of cognition (knowledge of qualifier (viśeṣana)) in the Vaiśeṣika to the third (knowledge of qualificand (viśesya)) corresponds to that of cognition ('iḥa' or 'apāya') defined by Jinabhadra and Yaśovijaya.

Judging from these interpretations, the note (338) and (339), naiścaiyikavagṛha Yaśovijaya states means that jīva itself grasps the object directly without any intermediate. This concept is intended as the traditional theory of perception in Jainism, namely, naiścaiyikavagṛha is darśana, or darśanopayoga. It has nothing to do with the concept of knowledge (jñāna) influenced by the theory of pramāṇa in the period of logic. This is confirmed by the contexts of the Viśeṣāśvaśyaśabṛdhravṛtti 252 (see VĀbhBV, vol. 1: 127¹) and the Jainatarkabhāṣā (see JTbh (a): 1⁵⁷). In other words, matters regarding knowledge (jñāna) can be cognized by means of vyāvahārikavagṛha, which has something to do with words. It relates to common life or practice or action, that is to say, it is empirical.

Apart from this, Yaśovijaya regards the theory of perception (that 'in truth' (paramārthatas) jīva can grasp the object without the process of cognition which is empirical) as naiścaiyikavagṛha; this implies that Yaśovijaya tries to incorporate the theory of perception in the period of logic into the traditional doctrine of Jaina epistemology.

⁴⁴⁵TAAS-T, I, 17, TAAS-Vi, I, 17, JTbh, VĀbhSV, 251, VĀbhBV, 252 and so on.

⁴⁴⁶It is well known that the description of 'being-ness' (sattā) in the Praśastapādabhāṣya (see PBh: 51²⁴-²⁶ and PBh: 677¹-¹⁷) is an accurate reflection of Indian realism. In Jaina epistemology, based on Indian realism, we can see some ideas regarding darśana and
jnāna relating to generality (sāmānāya) and particularity (viśeṣa). For example, in the Sammatitarkaprákarana (see STP, vol. 4: 457 seq.) by Siddhasena Divākara (the Śvetāmbara, circa AD 7th-8th century) (on his dates, see Nagasaki[1988]: 345 and Potter[1995]: 261) and so on, we can find descriptions relating to generality (sāmānāya) and particularity (viśeṣa); some texts say that grasping generality by means of darsana means ‘sattālocana’. This is sufficient evidence to prove that generality (sāmānāya) in the definition of arthāvagraha in the Jainatarkabhāṣā is ‘being-ness’ (sattā).
CHAPTER IV
CHAPTER IV

NOTION OF A RELATION

4.0.0: What is a Relation?

Once Prof. V. N. Jha asked me, ‘Sato, why do you call Buddha?’, and he continued, ‘Because he has Buddhatva.’ And, he asked again, ‘Why do we call it a desk?’ he said, ‘Because it has the desk-twa.’, and he continued, ‘This is the expression of a viśiṣṭajñāna.’ This means vyavasāya which is produced from the relation (sambandha) between the qualifier (viśesana) and the qualified (viśesya). In other words, it is savikalpakajñāna, as we have seen in Chapter II.

It has been observed more than once that a relation is possible, if the terms are both identical with and different from each other. Relation cannot hold between absolutely different, or between absolutely identical facts. Identity and difference both are presupposition of a relation.\(^1\) Here, the problem is whether the relation is a real entity or not. Prof. V. N. Jha says:

‘Is there anything called Relation which is real? ‘No’ is the answer of the idealists and ‘yes’ is the reply of the realists.’\(^2\)

By the way, what is the nature of a relation? The basic characteristics of a relation is that it rests on two entities,\(^3\) because a relation connects one with the other.

Prof. V. N. Jha explains:

‘When one hand is connected with the other, the relation (contact) rests on both the hands; when a blue colour is seen in a cloth, the relation (inherence) rests on both the blue colour and the cloth; when
we see a wheel moving, the relation (inherence) exists on both, the
movement and the wheel; when a cloth is produced out of a bundle
of threads, the relation (inherence) subsists in both the cloth and the
threads; when it is observed that many individuals form one class,
the relation (inherence) exists in both the class and the individuals.

This is a very clear explanation of relations; as he pointed out, all these
cases suggest that a relation subsists in two things. We can consider the nature of
the relation (R) subsisting in two things (A and B) as the following:

\[ A \rightarrow R \rightarrow B \]

We can regard this idea above as the basic theory of the relation in Indian
Philosophy. It means, 'dvistah sambandah.' And, it is not too much to say that
we can apply this idea to all cases.

4. 1. 0: Relations (Sambandha)

Sambandha is a sannikarṣa, which brings about the state of the qualified
(viṣeṣya) and the qualifier (viṣeṣana) in two different things. For example, when
the cognition arises in the form: 'The man who has a stick.', it is the contact
(samyoga) which brings about the state of the qualified (viṣeṣya) and the qualifier
(viṣeṣana) in the man and the stick. If it were not for the relation between the man
and the stick, the cognition 'the man who has a stick' could not arise, namely, the
cognition as the state of the qualified (viṣeṣya) and the qualifier (viṣeṣana) could
not arise.\(^{(5)}\)

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The Navya-Naiyāyikas classified relations by using various parameters. At first the relation can be classified either as the direct relation (sāksātsambandha) or the indirect relation (paramparāsambandha), as is well known.\(^5\) And we can see the relation classified either as the locus-pervading (vyāpyavṛtti) or as the non-locus-pervading (avyāpyavṛtti),\(^7\) moreover, the relation can be classified as either the occurrence-exacting (vṛttiniyāmakasambandha) or as the non-occurrence-exacting (vṛttyaniyāmakasambandha).\(^8\) Any relation can be classified either as the occurrence-exacting (vṛttiniyāma) or as the non-occurrence-exacting (vṛttyaniyāma).

The direct relations (sāksātsambandha) are as follows:

1. Contact (samyoga)
2. Inherence (samavāya)
3. Self-linking (svarūpa), and so on.

And, the coexistence, or the co-locus-ness (sāmānādhikaranya) is applied to the indirect relation (paramparāsambandha).

According to the second parameter, the above are as follows:

1. Contact (samyoga) = non-locus-pervading (avyāpyavṛtti)
2. Inherence (samavāya) = locus-pervading (vyāpyavṛtti)
3. Self-linking (svarūpa) = locus-pervading (vyāpyavṛtti)

Relation of the co-locus-ness (sāmānādhikaranya) = locus-pervading (vyāpyavṛtti)

And, according to the third parameter, the above are as follows:

1. Contact (samyoga) = occurrence-exacting (vṛttiniyāmakasambandha)

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(2) Inherence \((sama\text{v}a\text{ya})\) = occurrence-exacting \((vrt\text{ti}niy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha})^9\)

(3) Self-linking \((sva\text{ra}p\text{a})\) = occurrence-exacting \((vrt\text{ti}niy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha})^10\)

On the other hand,

Relation of the co-locus-ness \((s\text{a}m\text{ān\text{ā}dhi}kar\text{a}n\text{ya})\) = non-occurrence-exacting \((vrt\text{tyaniy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha})^11\)

According to the explanation of Prof. V. N. Jha, the relation of describer-ness \((nir\text{nirpaka}kat\text{v}a)\) and described-ness \((nir\text{niryatva})\) can be added to the list of the non-occurrence-exacting relation \((vrt\text{tyaniy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha})^12\). And, it should be further noted that some occurrence-exacting relations \((vrt\text{ti}niy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha})\) can act as the non-occurrence-exacting \((vrt\text{tyaniy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha})\) under certain situation. Such relation is the relation of the contact, that is to say, conjunction can be both \(vrt\text{ti}niy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha}\) and \(vrt\text{tyaniy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha})\). An occurrence-exacting relation \((vrt\text{ti}niy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha})\) is the relation which presents the content of a cognition or rather the qualifier and the qualificand, in the \(\text{ādhārādheya}\) — form. For example, while a pot is on the floor, or berries are in a basket, the conjunction between the pot and the floor on the one hand, and the berries and the basket on the other, is the \(vrt\text{ti}niy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha}\). For here, the relation causes the notion of \(\text{ādhārādheya}abh\text{āva}\) of the two related things; the floor and the basket are \(\text{ādhāras}\), the pot and the berries are \(\text{ādheya}\).\(^{13}\) Similarly, when the cognition that ‘the left hand is on the right hand’ by contact arises, the contact is considered to be the occurrence-exacting relation \((vrt\text{ti}niy\text{yamakasa}m\text{bandha})\).\(^{14}\) But if the cognition that ‘the left hand is connected with the right hand’ arises, when both the hands are horizontally placed side by side, the same contact will be considered as a

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non-occurrence-exacting relation \((vṛtyaniyāmakaśambandha)\).\(^{(15)}\) Inherence is a permanent relation and so there is no chance of re-arranging its relata and hence it is always an occurrence-exacting relation \((vṛt tinīyāmakaśambandha)\). So far as the self-linking relation \((svarūpasambandha)\) is concerned, it can be either an occurrence-exacting relation \((vṛt tinīyāmakaśambandha)\) or a non-occurrence-exacting relation \((vṛtyaniyāmakaśambandha)\).\(^{(16)}\) These explanations by Prof. V. N. Jha are very clear and useful for us to understand the idea of the relation, so we should keep them in mind.

4.1.1: Contact of the Sense-organs with the Objects \((Indrīyaṛθhasannikarṣa)\)

We have already analyzed the theory of the contact-awareness in the Jaina epistemology in chapter III: the Jainism. Well, let us see the theory of \(sannikarṣa\) in the Nyāya school.

According to the explanation about the \(Nyāyasūtra\), 1, 1, 4, Uddyotakara in his \(Nyāyavārtti\) explains the perception \((pratyakṣa)\), he introduces two points about the contact; one is that the contact is of six kinds \((saṃyoga, saṃyuktasamavāya, saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya, saṃavāya, samavetasamavāya\) and \(viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāva)\),\(^{(17)}\) the other is that all the sense-organs are possessed of the \(prāpyakāriṭva\). He maintains that the perception arises from the contact with objects, as is well known. Here, on the basis of the theory of \(viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāva\), the theory of the perception by the Naiyāyikas tends to be close in the theory of \(padārtha\) by the Vaiśeṣikas, especially, the fact that the theory of \(viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāva\) can be accepted on the basis of the theory of \(saṃavāya\) is the beginning of adoption of the theory by the Vaiśeṣikas that the knowledge of the qualified \((viśeṣya)\) is preceded by the knowledge of the qualifier \((viśeṣana)\), as we
have seen in chapter II.\(^{18}\) Among the above, briefly, let us see the six kinds of contact (ṣāmyoga, ṣāmyuktasamavāya, ṣāmyuktasamavētasamavāya, samavāya, samavētasamavāya and viśeṣanviśeṣyabhāva).

Uddyotakara in his Nyāyavārttika says:\(^{19}\)

‘To examplify these — When a certain thing — a jar, for instance, — is seen, the jar which is endowed with colour is the ‘object’, and the eye the ‘sense-organ’; and in this case, the ‘contact’ of these two is of the form of conjunction; because both are substance (and as such capable of mutual conjunction) (1) — in the perception of the colour (of the jar) the ‘contact’ of the eye with the colour, which latter is not a substance, is of the nature of inherence in that which is in conjunction; because the colour (which is in contact) subsists in the jar which is in conjunction with the eye, — this ‘subsistence’ being of the nature of inherence (2). — In the perception of the genus subsisting in the colour, the ‘contact’ is of the form of inherence in that which inheres in that which is in conjunction [the genus inhering in the colour, which inheres in the jar, which is in conjunction with the eye]; similarly in the case of Perception by means of the Olfactory organ, there is conjunction with the odorous substance, — in the odour, there is inherence of that (substance) which is in conjunction (with the organ), — in the genus subsisting in the odour, there is inherence of that (odour) which inheres in that (substance) which is in conjunction (with the organ) (3). In the case of the perception of Sound, the ‘contact’ is in the form of inherence (4) [Sound inhering in the Akāśa of the auditory organ, by which it is
apprehended]. In the case of Sound, the first sound that is produced has its source in conjunction and disjunction.

On this point, there arises the question — “(a) Which Sound has its organ in conjunction? (b) and which in disjunction?”

(a) [The Sound having its origin in conjunction we find in the case of the beating of the drum; in this case] Sound being the distinctive quality of ākāśa, its cause must be a conjunction subsisting in ākāśa; — and it is a well-known law that in the producing of qualities and actions, Conjunction cannot operate independently; it must depend on something else. — Now what is that upon which it depends? Well, as a matter of fact, Sound is produced (in the case of the sound of the drum, for instance) by the conjunction of the ākāśa with the drum; and this conjunction is aided by (and hence is dependent upon) the conjunction of the drum with the stick (with which it is beaten); and this later conjunction is also dependent upon the force with which the stick is struck. [From this it does not follow that Sound is produced by the conjunction of the drum with the stick; because] if the cause of Sound consisted in the conjunction of the drum and the stick (and not in that of the drum and ākāśa), then the cause of Sound would not be co-substrate with it, [the Sound inhering in ākāśa, and the conjunction causing it subsisting in the drum and stick] and if such causal operation were admitted, then it would be possible for sound to be produced anywhere and everywhere; [because the only condition that restricts the effectiveness of causal agencies to particular effects lies in the necessity of their subsisting in the
same substrate with the effect to be produced; and hence if this sole
restriction were removed, any effect could be produced by any cause
anywhere].

(b) *Sound produced by disjunction* we find in the case of the splitting
of the bamboo; in which case the Sound is produced by the disjunction
or separation of the bamboo-fibres from ākāsa, — this disjunction
being aided by the disjunction among the bamboo-fibres themselves.

Sound thus produced produces other sounds all round — one sound
on each side of itself; each of these again sets up another sound; —
and so on, till there is produced a sound in that part of ākāsa which
is enclosed within the ear-drum; and that sound, which inheres, is
produced, in the part of ākāsa therein enclosed, is perceived through
the relation of *inheritence* (because the sound inheres in the ear or
auditory organ, and this organ is only a form of ākāsa).

In the case of the perception of the genus or class-character belonging
to these sounds, the 'contact' is in the form of 'inheritence' of the
inherent (the genus inhering in Sound which inheres in the ākāsa of
the Auditory Organ). (5)

In the perception of Inherence and Non-existence, the contact bringing
about that perception is in the form of the relation of the qualification
(Inherence being the qualification of that which is inherent, and Non-
existence the qualification of the spot on Earth which is perceived).

(6)

Thus we find that the *Sūtra* has made use of the word 'sannikarṣa',
'contact', because it includes all those conditions that give rise to
Perception — viz., conjunction, inherence and qualification-qualified relationship. And this contact is regarded as the distinguishing feature of Perception, because it is what brings about the Perception.\(^{(20)}\)

According to the above, these six kinds of *sannikarṣas* are as follows:

1. *samyoga*: contact

   The contact of the sense-organs with the objects, for example, the eyes with the pot and so on which is possessed of colour, form, and so on. The contact is a temporary conjunction.

2. *samyuktasamavāya*: inherence in the conjoined

   The inherence in the conjoined is the relation of the eyes and colour and so on being inherent in the substance. In this case, Colour and so on are inherent in the substance which is connected with the eyes.

3. *samyuktasamavetasaṃavāya*: inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined

   The inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined is the relation of the eyes and the generality (e.g. *rūpatva*) being inherent in the colour and so on. In this case, the generality is inherent in the colour and so on which are inherent in the substance connected with the eyes.

4. *samavāya*: inherence

   The inherence is the relation being possessed of the characteristic of non-separated. Here, Uddyotakara explains the relation by means of the example of the sound.

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5. *samavetasa*ma\v{y}a*: inheritance in the inherent

The inheritance in the inherent is the relation which causes the knowledge of the *śabda*atva being inherent in *śabda* which is inherent in ākāśa.

6. *vi\=sesanavi\=sesyabhāva*: relation of qualifier and qualificand

The relation of qualifier and qualificand is the relation which can be accepted in the case of the inherence (*samavāya*) and the non-existence (*abhāva*).

However, we may say that these ideas about the *sannikarśa* are influenced of the idea in the *Praśastapādabhāsya*, which is as follows:\(^{(21)}\)

‘As regards substance, it appears with reference to three forms of it, in the gross form; and proceeds from such causes as the existence of many parts, the appearance of manifested colour, and the presence of the contact of four things, aided by such auxiliaries as *dharma* and the like; in this the knowledge is in the character of 'mere perception of form'.\(^{(22)}\)

This means that the first stage of the contact is the contact with the substance (*dravya*) being possessed of the colour, form, and so on. This contact of the sense-organs (*indriya*) with the substance (*dravya*) is a basic theory of the contact, and the quality (*guna*) and the action (*kriyā*, or *karman*) are inherent in the substance. And, in the *Praśastapādabhāsya*, the contact with the quality and so on can be divided into four kinds, which is as follows:\(^{(23)}\)

‘With regard to colour, taste, odour, and touch the sensuous knowledge is brought about by means of particular sense-organs, and proceeds

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from such causes as — their inherence in composite substances, peculiarities in the qualities themselves and the contact with the substances of these qualities. The knowledge of sound proceeds from threefold contact; and inhering in the ear, it is known by the ear alone. Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Distance, Proximity, Viscidity, Fluidity, Velocity and Action are perceived by the eye and the skin, through their inherence in perceptible substances. Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort are perceived by the contact of both mind and self.\(^{(24)}\)

Praśastapāda in the above says that the contact with the quality (guna) and the action (kriyā, or karman), and so on are perceived on the basis of the contact with the substance. And he says:\(^{(25)}\)

\begin{quote}
'Bhāvatva (the character of ‘being’), dravyatva (the character of ‘substance’) gunatva (the character of ‘quality’) karmatva (the character of ‘action’) and others — when inhering in cognisable substrates — are perceived by means of those sense-organs that perceive their substrates. This is the case with our ordinary ‘sensuous’ knowledge.\(^{(26)}\)
\end{quote}

Although Praśastapāda does not say that there are six kinds of contacts but explains our perception, it is clear that these theories are explained on the basis of the contact. This is a very important point in order to understand the theory of perception.

4. 1. 2:Indriyārthasannikarṣa in the Late Period

Well, let us see the theory of indriyārthasannikarṣa in the late period.

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Keśavamisra in his Tarkabhāṣā says: \(^{(27)}\)

'The contact of the Sense-organ and the object, which is the cause of direct right cognition, is of six kinds: — (1) Direct Conjunction, (2) Inherence in that which is in direct conjunction, (3) Inherence in that which inheres in that which is in direct conjunction, (4) Direct Inherence, (5) Inherence in that which is inherent, and (6) the relation of qualification and qualified.

(1) When the perception of the jar is brought about by the eye, — in which case the eye is the 'Sense-organ' and the jar the 'object', — the 'contact' that there is between these two is in the form of Direct Conjunction; because the connection between them is not inseparable. Similarly, when the perception of the soul — in the form 'I' — is brought about by the inner organ of the mind, — in which case the mind is the 'organ' and the Soul the 'object', — the 'contact' between these is of the nature of Direct Conjunction. (2) When the colour of the jar is perceived by the eye, in the form 'the colour of this jar is dark', — in which case the eye is the 'organ' and the colour of the jar the 'object', — the 'contact' between these is of nature of Inherence in that which is in direct conjunction; because the colour inheres in the jar, which latter is in direct conjunction with the eye. The same kind of 'contact' is present in the case of the perception, by means of the mind, of the pleasure, pain, etc., inhering in the soul.

In the perception of the Dimention of the jar, we have to admit of a further four-fold contact, over and above that in the shape of 'inherence in the conjoined'; as without such four-fold contact there could be no
perception of Distance from a distance. This four-fold contact is as follows: — (a) Contact of the constituent particles of the Sense-organ with the whole of the object; (b) of the constituent particles of the object with the whole of the Sense-organ; (c) of the constituent particles of the Sense-organ with the constituent particles of the object; and (d) of the whole of the object with the whole of the Sense-organ.

(3) In cases where the generality of 'colour', as inhering in the colour that inheres in the jar, is perceived, — in which case the eye is the Sense-organ, the generality of 'colour' is the object, — the 'contact' between these is of the nature of 'inherence in that which inheres in that which is in direct Conjunction.'

(4) The 'contact' is of the nature of 'inherence' in the case where sound is perceived by the ear; in which case the ear is the organ, and sound the object; 'contact' of these two is the nature of 'inherence' because the ear-organ is only a form of Ākāśa (as enclosed in the tympanum), — and sound is the quality of Ākāśa; — and the relation subsisting between a substance (e.g., Ākāśa) and its quality (i.e., sound) is of the nature of 'Inherence'.

(5) In cases where the generality of 'sound' as inhering in sound, is perceived by the ear, — where the ear is the organ, and the generality of 'sound' the object, — the 'contact' between these is of the nature of 'inherence in that which is inherent'; in as much as the generality of 'sound' inheres in the 'sound' which, in its turn, inheres in Ākāśa.

(6) In a case where the absence of the jar in a place which is in conjunction with the eye, is perceived by the eye in the form 'the jar
does not exist in this place', — the 'contact' is of the nature of 'the qualification and the qualified'; in as much as the place is the 'qualified', being qualified by 'the absence of the jar' which is the 'qualification'. Similarly when the absence of pleasure, in the Soul which is in conjunction with organ of mind, is perceived (by the mind), — in the form 'I am devoid of pleasure', — the 'absence of pleasure' is the qualification of the 'Soul in conjunction with the mind'. And so also, when the absence of the generality of the letter-sound 'gha' in the letter-sound 'ga', which inheres in ear-organ, is perceived, — the absence of the generality 'gha' is the qualification of the 'ga' letter-sound inhering in the ear. Thus then, in brief, negation, or absence, is found to be perceived by the Sense-organ, through that organ-object contact which consists of the relation of 'the qualification and the qualified', — this relation being based upon any one of the five kinds of relation described above (Direct Conjunction and the rest).

Inherence is also perceived in the same manner; for example, the Inherence of the cloth in its constituent yarns is perceived by the eye, only through the relation that it is the 'qualification' of the yarns which are in conjunction with the eye. Thus have been explained the six kinds of 'Contact'. On this point we have the following comprehensive verses: —

Right cognition born of the Senses is of two kinds — Determinate and Non-determinate; the cause of such cognition is of three kinds — [Constituent, Non-constituent and Efficient]; and
‘contact’ is of six kinds; through each of which respectively the following objects are perceived — (1) the jar; (2) the blue colour of the jar; (3) the generality of ‘blue’; (4) sound; (5) the generality of ‘sound’; and (6) Negation and Inherence. "(28)

In this way, according to the contents in the Tarkabhaṣa by Keśavamīśra, we can see the indriyārhtasannikāraṇa, regarded as the cause of the determinate cognition, being of six kinds, which is as follows:

(1): samyoga

(2): samyuktasamavāya

(2)-1: indriyāvayavair arthāvayavānām saṃnikāraṇa

(2)-2: indriyāvayavair arthāvayavināḥ saṃnikāraṇa

(2)-3: indriyāvayavinārthāvayavināḥ saṃnikāraṇa

(2)-4: arthāvayavair indriyāvayavināḥ saṃnikāraṇa

(3): samyuktasamavetasamavāya

(4): samavāya

(5): samavetasamavāya

(6): viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāva

And, Annāmbhaṭṭa in his Tarkasamgraha says: "(29)

‘The contact of organ and object, which is the cause of Perception, is of six kinds: — 1 Conjunction, 2 Intimate union with the conjoint, 3 Intimate union with the intimately united with the conjoint, 4 Intimate union, 5 Intimate union with the intimately united, and 6 Connection of the attribute with the subject.

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1 Conjunction is the contact producing perception of the jar by the eye. 2 Intimate union with the conjoint is the contact producing the perception of the colour of a jar, as the colour is intimately united with the jar which is conjoint with the eye. 3 Intimate union with the intimately united with the conjoint is the contact in perceiving the genus of colour, as colour is intimately united with the jar conjoint with the eye, and the genus of colour is intimately united with therewith. 4 Intimate union is the contact in the perception of word by the organ of hearing, as the organ of hearing is the ether in the cavity of the ear, (since) word is the quality of ether and the quality and qualified are intimately united. 5 Intimate union with the intimately united is the contact in cognizing the genus word, as the genus is intimately united with word which is intimately united with (organ of) hearing. 6 The connection of the attribute with the subject is the contact in the perception of negation, as the negation of a jar is an attribute of a place in contact with the eye wherever a place is devoid of a jar.

The knowledge thus produced from the sixfold contact is Percept. its peculiar cause is the organ. Hence organ is perception. 4(30) These are the explanation of the vyāpāra of pratyakṣa, that is to say, indriyārthasannikarṣa being of six kinds.

4. 2. 0: Types of Relations
We have already mentioned the basic theory of viśiṣṭajñāna, or the relation of qualifier and qualificand (viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva) in chapter II. Let us now see some theories of relations as found in the Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and Its Technical Terms, which is a manuscript in the Government Sanskrit Library in Varanasi written by Mm. Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna. This is included in the following:


I would not obtain this book and so I used the Sanskrit text printed in Uno[1996a].

4. 2. 1: Sākṣātsambandha

We can see the explanation of the direct relation (sākṣātsambandha) in the Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and Its Technical Terms by M. M. Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna, which is as follows:

‘Sākṣātsambandha is the relation which is not made of another relation. It is of many kinds based on the division of inherence (samavāya), conjunction (contact: saṅyoga) and self-linking (svarūpa). In the case of ‘a man who is possessed of the colour’, ‘there is water in the vessel’, ‘there is no cloth in the house’, and so on, of the colour of the man, of the water in the vessel and of the absence of the cloth in
the house we can, in sequence, recognize the relations called ‘inherence (samavāya)’, ‘conjunction (contact: samyoga)’ and ‘self-linking (svāraṇa)’.

The inherence (samavāya) is explained by Kanāda as the sixth category (padāṛtha), which is the constant relation. For example, it is the relation that is inherent in brāhmaṇa in the case of ‘that brāhmaṇa possessed of a colour goes’ and so on, namely, it is the relation between the genus ‘brāhmanatva’ and ‘brāhmaṇa’, between the quality ‘rūpa’ and ‘brāhmaṇa’, and between the action ‘calana’ and ‘brāhmaṇa’. Since the inherence exists in all the substrata (ādhāra) or in all the superstrata (ādheya), it is said that the inherence (samavāya) is the constant relation. And, the inherence (samavāya) has another name ‘ayutāsambandha’ (non-separable relation).

Against the above, the conjunction (samyoga) and so on are not so. Because even though the conjunction and so on of the substratum with the superstratum are existent, it can be seen to be separable. And the conjunction is a kind of the quality which Kanāda has explained.

Svarūpasambandha is the relation in the non-existence and so on. For example, in the case of ‘there is no cloth on the ground’ and so on, of the absence of the cloth on the ground, can the self-linking relation (svarūpasambandha) be recognized. The self-linking relation (svarūpasambandha) has another name ‘viśesanāta’ (qualifier-ness).’

This explanation is very clear. Among the relations above, it is not difficult for us to understand the idea of the samavāya and samyoga, but about the idea of
svarūpasambandha we cannot understand the concept so easily. However, Prof. V. N. Jha in his study explains the svarūpasambandha concisely. He explains the svarūpasambandha giving examples.\(^{(13)}\)

\[\ldots\] it is true that pitṛtā does not exist in putra, but it is not true that it does not exist there at all. The fact is this that any entity exists somewhere by some specific relation, and it is not correct to say that the entity should exist by one and the same relation everywhere. Thus, when pitṛtā exists in pitr directly by the relation of āśrayatā, it can exist in putra by the relation of nirūpakatā. Because, it is because of putratā in putra, the pitṛtā has come to reside in pitr. Thus, the pitṛtā in pitr is described in terms of putra and the putratā in putra is described in terms of pitr. Thus, although the direct locus of pitṛtā is pitr, putra can also be its locus since putra describes the pitṛtā in pitr. Similarly, although putratā is directly located in putra; it can also claim pitr as its locus since it is because of pitr, he is called putra. Thus R (relation) at one end exists through āśrayatā-sambandha and the another end it exists through nirūpakatā-sambandha.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{R (pitrā)} & \rightarrow & (\text{āśrayatā}) \\
\text{A (pitr)} & \text{R (putratā)} & \text{B (putra)} \\
& \text{R (nirūpakatā)} &
\end{array}
\]
What Prof. V. N. Jha wants to point out is this that the Navya-Naiyāyikas want that this symmetry need not be enforced in all cases. What is required is a relation, and not one and the same relation to relate R with A and B.(34)

The object-ness (viṣayatā), the correlated-ness (described-ness: nirūpitatva), the temporal and spatial relation (attributiveness) (kālikasambandha and daiśikasambandha), and so on are called the self-linking relation (svarūpasambnadha), as these relations are in the form of either of the related

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4. 2. 2: Paramparāsambandha

Let us see the explanation of the indirect relation (*paramparāsambandha*) in the *Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and Its Technical Terms* by M. M. Mahesa Candra Nyāyaratna.¹⁶

‘*Paramparāsambandha* is the relation which is made of another relation. (It is the relation: it is in one relation that another relation lies.) For example, it is the relation of the coexistence (*sāmānādikaranya*) which has the nature of ‘*sva* (the colour of the thread)-*samavāyin* (the thread: *samavāyikāraṇa*)-*samavāyata* (the cloth)-*sva*’¹⁷. In this *paramparāsambandha*, the colour of the thread is also existent in the cloth. And, this relation is produced from the inherence (*samavāya*).

Similarly, if there is the man in the house who has the stick and the pitcher, the stick and the pitcher are also existent in the house on the basis of the indirect relation (*paramparāsambandha*) which has the nature of ‘*sva* (the stick and the pitcher)-*samyogī* (locus: the man)-*samyogī* (the house)-*sva*’ in the form of the locus-ness of the locus of itself (*svāśrayāśrayatva*). And, this relation is produced from the conjunction (*sāmyoga*).

The number of the indirect relation (*paramparāsambandha*) is not definite as that of the direct relation (*sākṣātsambandha*) such as the inherence (*samavāya*) and so on. And, in this case there is no definite
measure. An indirect relation (*paramparāsambandha*) can be extended infinite by like 'long (*dirgha*), longer (*dirghatara*) and the longest (*dirghatama*)'. Even though the two entities are quite unconnected, they are related on the basis of the indirect relation (*paramparāsambandha*). And in this case, 'a great distance and so on' are not the obstructing elements, because, for example, on the basis of 'the relation 'being governed by the ruler of the government of the very one', all Indians, who are the Aryan and the non-Aryan, belong to England. And, in this case, on the basis of the relation 'being governed by the queen of the very one', English are existent in England, even though they are in another place. The untold secrets of the indirect relation (*paramparāsambandha*) are the following — in the case of expressing the starting point (e.g. *x, y, . . .*) of a *paramparāsambandha* with the word 'sva', the 'tva', which is the last stop of the relation, is existent in the very thing (locus) on the basis of the *paramparāsambandha*. [Therefore, *x, y, . . .* are also existent in the locus.] In the previous example, in the case of expressing the starting point of a *paramparāsambandha* 'Indian (*x, y, . . .*)' with the word 'sva', since it, namely, 'rājya-tva' is existent in England, on the basis of the relation the Indians are existent in England.'

Here, the word 'sva' indicates all the Indians (*x, y, . . .*), and we can regard that they are all existent in England through the 'rājya-tva'. In this way, this shows that we have to notice that two entities (*x, y*), which are seemingly unrelated to each other, have something to do with each other indirectly.
4.2.3: *Vṛttiṇiyāmakasambandha* and *Vṛtyaniyāmakasambandha*

The relation (*sambandha*) can be classified as either the occurrence-exacting (*vṛttiṇiyāmakasambandha*) or as the non-occurrence-exacting (*vṛtyaniyāmakasambandha*). We can say that any relations can be classified either as the occurrence-exacting (*vṛttiṇiyāmaka*) or as the non-occurrence-exacting (*vṛtyaniyāmaka*). Let us see the explanation of the occurrence-exacting (*vṛttiṇiyāmakasambandha*) and the non-occurrence-exacting (*vṛtyaniyāmakasambandha*) in the *Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and Its Technical Terms* by M. M. Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna. (38)

‘Moreover, the relation is of two kinds: the occurrence-exacting (*vṛttiṇiyāmaka*) and the non-occurrence-exacting (*vṛtyaniyāmaka*).

In the case of a *sambandha*, the one is existent in the other (occupancy: *vṛttitā*), that is to say, the substratum and superstratum relationship (*ādhārādheyabhāva*) or the locus and attribute (property) relationship (*āśrayāśrayibhāva*) is comprehended, the relation like this is the occurrence-exacting (*vṛttiṇiyāmaka*). In the case of the occurrence-exacting (*vṛttiṇiyāmaka*), the seventh declension (the locative case) is used about the declension of the substratum (locus: *ādhāra*). For example, it is the case ‘there is a pot on the ground’ (*bhūtale ghatah*). And, about the suffix of the superstratum (*ādheya*), the suffix ‘*-mat (-vat)*’ and so on are used, for example, it is the case ‘the ground is possessed of the pot’ (*bhūtalam ghatavat*). The occurrence-exacting relation (*vṛttiṇiyāmakasambandha*) are the inherence (*samavāya*), the conjunction (*samyoga*), the self-linking (*svarūpa*), and so on. Because, in the case of these relations above, ‘there is colour in the earth’
(prthivyāṁ rūpāṁ), 'the berries are in the basket' (kūnde badarāṁ),
'there is no pot on the ground' (bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti), and so on are
represented. The conjunction of both hands standing upright on the
same level is not the occurrence-exacting (vṛttiṇiyāmaka), either.
Therefore, the conjunction of both hands standing upright on the
same level, that is to say, in the form of the open hands placed side
by side and slightly hollowed, is not the occurrence-exacting
(vṛttiṇiyāmaka). So, in this case, we cannot say 'hand on hand (hand
in hand)' (haste hastah). And, the conjunction of both hands in the
form of the upper and lower is the occurrence-exacting (vṛttiṇiyāmaka),
therefore, in this case, we can also say 'hand on hand (hand in hand)'
(haste hastah).

Against the above, in the case of a sambandha, the one is existent in
the other (occupancy: vṛttītā), as we have mentioned, that is to say,
the substratum and superstratum relationship (ādharādheyabhāva) or
the locus and attribute (property) relationship (āśrayāśrayībhāva) is
not comprehended, and, merely, the relatum(-ness) only is
comprehended, the relation like this is the non-occurrence-exacting
(vṛttyaniyāmaka). Therefore, in this case, the seventh declension
(the locative case) indicating the substratum and superstratum
relationship (ādharādheyabhāva) and the suffix ‘-mat (-vat)’ and so
on are not used, but the suffix ‘-in’, ‘-īya’, and so on, which causes
the knowledge of the relatum(-ness), are used. For example, since
the [svāmi-]svatvasambandha is not the occurrence-exacting
(vṛttiṇiyāmaka), even though the minister is existent, 'the minister is
possessed of the king' (mantri rājavān) or 'the king is existent in the minister' (mantrini rājā) on the basis of the svaṭvasambnadha is not represented, but 'the king’s minister' (rājakīyo mantri) is represented. Since the representation 'the man has fortune and his son' and so on can be seen, the svāminivasambandha is also the occurrence-exacting (vṛttiniyāmaka). All the indirect relations (paramparāsambandha) is generally the occurrence-exacting (vṛttiniyāmaka). Therefore, in the case of the man, who has a peacock, is in the house, on the basis of the svāṣrayapurusāṣrayatasambandha, ‘the house is possessed of the peacock’ (sikhāvad grham) is not represented.

Here, the vṛtti is that state in which one of the related things is the substrate and the other is the occupant (ādhārādheyabhāva). And, we have to notice that the vṛtti has two meanings: the superstratum (ādheya; ādheyatāvat) and the superstratum-ness (ādheyatā).\(^{(39)}\)

The conjunction can be both the occurrence-exacting (vṛttiniyāmaka) and the non-occurrence-exacting (vṛttyaniyāmaka). While a pot is on the ground or the berries are in the basket, the conjunction between the pot and the ground on the one hand, and the berries and the basket on the other, is the occurrence-exacting (vṛttiniyāmaka). Because the relation delimits the substratum and superstratum relationship (ādhārādheyabhāva) of the two things; the ground and the basket are the substrata (ādhāra), the pot and the berries are the superstrata (ādheya). In this case, the substratum and superstratum relationship (ādhārādheyabhāva) is expressed by the seventh declension (the locative case),\(^{(40)}\) as we have seen in the above.

And, we should not overlook that we can see the relation (sambandha) classified either as the locus-pervading (vyāpyavṛtti) or as the non-locus-pervading

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(avyāpyavṛtī),\(^{(41)}\) which is as follows:

\[
\text{samyogavibhāgaśabdātmaviśeṣaṅunām pradeśavṛtitvam.}\(^{(42)}\)
\]

‘Conjunction, disjunction, sound and the specific qualities of the self have a partial existence.’\(^{(43)}\)

\[
\text{pradesavṛttayo 'vyāpyavṛttayāḥ svāṣraye varttante na varttante cety arthaḥ. . .}\(^{(44)}\)
\]

‘. . . These qualities do not extend over the whole of their substrates; that is to say, they exist (in parts) and also do not exist (in other parts) of their substrates.’\(^{(45)}\)

4. 2. 4: Kālikasambandha (Kālikaviśeṣanatā) (Temporal Relation)

According to the Naiyāyikas, although time is infinite and single, in order to explain the notions, ‘this moment’, ‘this week’, ‘this month’, and so on, they accept infinite time, which are infinite time conditioned by the movements of the sun. Everything does exist in time through the temporal relation (kālikasambandha). That is why time is said to be the substrate of everything (sarvādhāra). For example, in the notions, ‘now there is a pot on the ground’, ‘this month it rains’, and so on, a relation between the pot and ‘now’ and so on is presented to the cognition. In this case, the pot and so on exist in ‘now’ and so on, on the basis of the temporal relation (kālikasambandha), and the substrate is finite time (kandakāla). The temporal relation (kālikasambandha) in these examples is direct. And, the temporal relation (kālikasambandha) can also be an indirect relation, as for example when two persons are related to each other on the basis of the svāṣrayaṅakālāśritatva,'
that is to say, time which is the substrate of one is the substrate of the other also.\(^\text{(40)}\)

Now, let us see the explanation of the temporal relation (kālikasambandha) in the *Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and Its Technical Terms* by M. M. Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna.\(^\text{(47)}\)

Some temporal relations (kālikasambandha) are the occurrence-exacting (vṛttyaniyāmaka) and others are the non-occurrence-exacting (vṛttyaniyāmaka). Everything is existent in time on the basis of the temporal relation (kālikasambandha) in the form of the occurrence-exacting (vṛttyaniyāmaka). And time has two kinds: the universal time (mahākāla) and the particular time (khandakāla). ‘Everything is existent in time’ is the cognition possessed of mahākāla as the object. ‘The cold is strong in this month’, ‘it rains today’, and so on are the cognition possessed of khandakāla as the object. On the other hand, the temporal relation (kālikasambandha) in the form of the non-occurrence-exacting (vṛttyaniyāmaka) is the indirect relation (paramparāsambandha) ‘svāśrayakālaśrīvatva’. On the basis of this relation, everything is existent everywhere. Indeed, the locus (āśraya) of the house (= sva) is time, moreover, the man is also existent in it, therefore, on the basis of the relation ‘svāśrayakālaśrīvatva’ (sva = house, āśraya = time, āśrīta in it = man), the house is also related to the man.’

And, Prof. V. N. Jha in his study explains time clearly.\(^\text{(48)}\)

‘The Navya Naiyāyikas paraphrase svarūpa as viśesātā. This viśesātā is further divided into two types: (1) daisika-viśesātā and (2) kālika-viśesātā, while daisika-viśesātā can be further
paraphrased as desanirūpita-viśesānta, kālika-viśesānta can be paraphrased as kālanirūpita-viśesānta. When the cognition arises that 'There is an absence of the pot on the ground' (ghatābhāva-vat bhūtalam) the absence of the pot appears as the qualifier, the qualifier-ness of which is described by the qualificand-ness of the ground which is a place. Similarly, when we cognise 'There is a pot in the universal time (ghatavān mahākālaḥ)', the pot appears as the qualifier, the qualifier-ness of which is described by the qualificand-ness of time.

Thus, the temporal relation, or kālikasambandha is a svarūpasambandha which is nothing but kālika-viśesānta.

Svarūpasambandha is not a distinct entity as such. The Navyas inform us that svarūpa is to be understood either as ādhāra-svarūpa or as ādheya-svarūpa. Thus, in the cognition 'There is an absence of the pot on the ground', there is nothing more than the absence of pot which is ādheya and the ground which is ādhāra simply because it is a qualified cognition (viśistajñāna) which presents the content-structure of the qualifier-qualificand type, we have to accept some relation between the qualifier and the qualificand, without which it is improper to call them as qualifier and qualificand and the knowledge as a qualified knowledge. Thus, in order to explain such cases, the Naiyāyikas have accepted something called svarūpa-sambandha.

Needless to say, that neither contact can be a possible relation between the absence of pot and the ground, because contact is possible between two substances only, nor inherence is possible there because that is
possible only in the five positive cases like part and whole, quality and substance, and so on. Time is conceived in the Navya Nyāya Physics as a nimitta-kāraṇa to any effect since it is all pervading. Whatever is produced is produced at a particular time. Time cannot be the material cause (samavāyi-kāraṇa) to all effects. Neither can it be a non-material cause of any effect because it is a substance and a substance can be only a material cause and never a non-material cause. At the same time, all effects are produced in time. Therefore, time is a nimitta-kāraṇa of all effects. In other words, all effects are produced in time. Naturally, the question arises, what would be the relation by which the effect-ness present in all effects could be delimited? Obviously, we cannot maintain either of the established relations namely, contact and inherence as the delimitor of the effect-ness. But without such a delimitor we cannot explain the reality of effects. Therefore, the Navyas advocate kālika-viśeṣanatā as the delimiting relation of the effect-ness.'

As Prof. V. N. Jha explains, from the above we can say that time can be defined in the Navya Nyāya as the following:

\[
kālikasambandhāvacchinnakāryatvāvacchinnakāryatānirūpita-
tādātmyasambandhāvacchinnādhikaraṇatvāvacchinnakāraṇatvāni
kālalaksanam.\]

Prof. V. N. Jha shows in full detail that this can be demonstrated diagrammatically as follows.
And, we should notice that the qualifier-ness (viśeṣanatā) relation is of two kinds: abhāviya-viśeṣanatā[-viśeṣa] and kālika-viśeṣanatā[-viśeṣa]. However, opinions are divided among the Navyas on the temporal relation, it is too involved a subject to be treated here in detail. For further details of the kālikasambandha, see Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxx-xxxv, Matilal, Bimal Krishna[1968]: 44, and so on.

4. 2. 5: Dīgviśeṣanatā (Daiśikaviśeṣanatā) (Spatial Relation)

The relation between the nonexistence of a thing of which the nonexistence is apprehended, and the substrate is the daiśikaviśeṣanatā. For example, the nonexistence of a pot exists on the ground on the basis of this relation.(51) Now, let us see the explanation of the spatial relation (dīgviśeṣanatā, or daiśikaviśeṣanatā) in the Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and Its Technical Terms by M. M. Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna.(52)

‘What is called spatial relation (dīgviśeṣanatā) is also the occurrence-exacting (vṛttiniyāmaka) and a kind of relations like the kālika-viśeṣanatā. For example, in the case ‘in the north there is the Himalayas having a divine soul’ and so on, in the north, namely, on the basis of the spatial relation (dīgviśeṣanatā) the vṛttitā of the Himalayas can be apprehended. This relation is also called ‘daiśikaviśeṣanatā’.'
4. 2. 6: *Tādātmyasambandha* (Selfsameness, or the Relation of Identity)

According to the Naiyāyikas, a thing exists in itself on the basis of the relation of identity (*tādātmyasambandha*). With regard to a quality inherent in a substance, the substance is a cause. In this case, the relation delimiting the causality in the substance is the *tādātmyasambandha*, that is to say, it is the *kāranatāvacchedakasambandha*. This is an explanation in the *Manikāna*, which is as follows:

. . . *nāvyās tu janyasattvāvacchinnam prati dravyam tādātmyena kāraṇam. tatkāryatāvacchedakasamsargatayā samavāyasiddhīḥ; . . .* (MK: 20-22)

'The modern [logicians], however, say that with regard to every effect possessed of existence, substance is the cause through [the relation of] self-sameness; and, therefore, inherence is established as the relation determining that effectness. . . .”

Since in the case of the existence of the substance (*dravya*) the quality (*guna*) and so on exist, and since in the case of the absence of the substance (*dravya*) the quality (*guna*) and so on do not exist, we can say that the relation between the substance and the quality and so on is the causality (cause and effect relationship). In this case, since the cause is the material cause (*upādāna*), the relation related to the effect which the cause is possessed of is the selfsamness (*tādātmyasambandha*). Therefore, the *tādātmyasambandha* is the *kāranatāvacchedakasambandha*.

Generally, it is in the case of the explanation of the mutual absence
(anyonyābhāva) that this relation ‘tādātmyasambandha’ can be seen. For example, in the expression ‘the pot is not the cloth’, we can regard the cloth as the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of the difference, which exists in the pot. Unless pot is identical with pot and cloth is identical with cloth, we cannot say that ‘pot is not cloth’. This is why the Navyanyāya defines the mutual absence (anyonyābhāva) as tādātmyasambandhāvacchinnapratīyogitābhāva, that is to say, an absence, the counterpositive-ness of which is delimited by the relation of identity. For further details of the kālikasambandha, see Jha, V. N.[1990]: xix-xxv.

4. 2. 7: Paryāpti (Relation of Completion)

The paryāptisambandha is accepted over and above the inherence-relation in the Navyanyāya, as is well known. Prof. V. N. Jha in his study says that it is a relation for explaining a cognition in which a vyāsajya-vṛtti-padrtha appears existing simultaneously in more than one locus. For example, the number two is grasped as located simultaneously in two loci. Now the fact that the number two is present in each and it is a quality is explained by accepting inherence and the fact that it is present simultaneously in both is explained by accepting an additional relation called paryāpti. This relation is also one type of the self-linking relation (svaṛūpasambandha) only. And Prof. V. N. Jha presents a diagram, which is as follows:

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A  - R (paryāpti)  - B
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According to the theory accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the number
is a quality (guna) and it exists in the substance on the basis of the relation of inherence (samavāya). In the case of considering two pots (x, y), since the number two inheres in two pots (x, y) respectively, one pot is possessed of the number two (eko dvitvavān), however, it is absurd to say ‘this pot is two’ (eko dvau). To avoid this absurdity, the Naiyāyikas think out the relation called ‘paryāptisambandha’. On the basis of this relation, the number two does not exist in two pots (x, y) respectively, but collectively in two pots (x + y). In this way, this relation is regarded as what inheres in the collective. Moreover, about the avacchedakatā also we can recognise this relation, for example, in the case ‘there is no fire in the kitchen’, the pratiyogitāvacchedakatā in opposition to the absence of the fire exists in two things ‘mahānasīyatva’ (an avacchedakadharma) and ‘vahnitva’ (an avacchedakadharma) through the relation ‘paryāptisambandha’. It is too involved a subject to be treated here in detail, for further details of the paryāptisambandha, see the Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and Its Technical Terms by M. M.. Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna.

4.3.0: Conclusion

There is a detailed theory of the relation (sambandha) accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (see the Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and Its Technical Terms by M. M.. Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna). To discuss all the details of the relations as found in the Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and Its Technical Terms is beyond the scope of this thesis.

As we have seen above, it is not too much to say that the Modern Logicians treat the theory of sambandha as very important. Especially, the theory of relation (sambandha) is indispensable for the inquiry into the idea accepted by the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika school. And, the basic idea that a relation (R) subsists in two things (A and B), namely, the idea that (A—R—B) is very important conception in the Indian realism. It is ‘dvistah sambandah’. As a matter of fact, acceptance and non-acceptance of a Relation will provide a valid parameter to clarify Indian philosophical systems into a realist system and an idealist system.
NOTES IN CHAPTER IV

[1] Mookerjee[1944]: 177

[2] He says: ‘By ‘idealists’ I mean the Buddhists and the Advaitins and by ‘realists’ I identify the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṁsakas and other pluralists.’ (Jha, V. N.[1990]: xi)


And, we can see this characteristic of the relation in the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda in the Prameyakalamalamārtanda by Prabhacandra, as we shall see later in the next chapter.


[7] samyogavivekābabdātma-vivekārūṇām pradeśavrtaṃ. (Prāṣastapādabhāṣya, see NK: 255)

samyogavivekābabdātma-vivekārūṇām pradeśavrtaṃ iti pradeśavrtra vyāpyavrtraḥ svārūṇyaḥ varṛtanto na varṛtante cety arthāḥ. . . . (See NK: 255-256)

See Jha, V. N.[1990]: xiv, xxv.

[8] punaḥ ca sambandho dvividhah, — vṛttinīyāmāmakāḥ vṛttinīyāmāmakāḥ cety. (BN: 10)

[9] In expressing it, the locative case-ending can be used with one of the related. (MK: xxxvi)

[10] vṛttinīyāmāmakasambandhāś ca samavāya-sanyoga-svarūpaprahaḥvṛttaṃeva
kecana; . . . (BN: 10)

\(^{11}\) paramparāsambandhāh prāyaśah sarvva eva vṛttiyāmakaḥ. (BN: 11)

\(^{12}\) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xiv, xxv

\(^{13}\) In such instances the ādhārādheyabhava is expressed by the locative case-ending:
bhūtale ghatāḥ, kunde badaram. (MK: xxxvi)

See BN: 10.

\(^{14}\) In this case, we can say that ‘haste hastah’. (BN: 10)

\(^{15}\) samasūtrapātena sthitayor ubhayoh samyogo ’pi na vṛttiniyāmakah. (BN: 10)

See Jha, V. N.[1990]: xiv, xxv.

In this case, we cannot say that ‘haste hastah’. (BN: 10)

\(^{16}\) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xiv

\(^{17}\) NS: 94-95 (Nyāyasūtra of Akṣapāda Gautama, In the Nyāyarśanam with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara’s Vārttika, Vācaspāti Miśra’s Tātparyatīkā and Viśvanātha’s Vṛtti, ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha, Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, 19, Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publishing, 1936-44.)


\(^{19}\) tatra caksur indriyam, rāpavān ghatādir arthah. tena sannikarsah samyogah. tayor dravyavahāvatvat. adravyena ca tadratarūpādina samyuktasamavāyāh, yasmāc caksusā samyakte dravye rūpādi varṛtata iti. vṛttis tu samavāyāh. rūpādivṛttinā sāmānyena samyuktasamavetasaṃvāvāyāh. sannikarsah. evaṃ ghrānādiṣu gandhavādāddravyena samyogah. tattamavesesu gandhadūsu samyuktasamavāvāyāh. tadvartisu ca sāmānyādiṣu samyuktasamavetasaṃvāvāyāh. sabde samavāyāh. ayam khalu śabdah samyogavibhāgayanirādyah. tatra katamah śabdah samyogayonīḥ katamaś ca vibhāgayonir iti? ākāṣagunavat śabdasyākāśāvṛttih samyogah kāraṇaṁ guṇakarmasvarahdhayesañc sāpeka iti sāpeko na nirapeka iti: kim apeksate? bheryākāsasyāmogah tāvat śabdasya kāraṇam, tasyānugrahako bheridandasamyogo dandagataveśe peka iti: yadi punar

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bheridandasamyoga eva śabdasya kāraṇam syāt, vyadhikaranah samyogah śabdākāraṇam iti sarvatrotpatiprasaṅgah. vibhāgāc chabdaḥ — vamśadalavibhāgāmugrutīd vamśadalākāśavibhāgāc chabda iti. sa utpannah śabdaḥ sarvadikākāni śabdāantarāni karoti, tāny api pratyekam śabdāantarāni tāvat, yāvat karnaśākālīm atyākāsadesāh iti. yah karnaśākālīm atyākāsadesāṃ samavaiti, sa samavāyād upalabhyaite. tadgatesu ca sāmānyeṣu samavetasadmayāt. samavāy cābhāve ca viśeṣānviśeṣyabhbavād iti. so 'yam sannikarṣaśabdāḥ samyogasamāvāyaviśeṣāni viśeṣyabhbāvāvāvāpākāvād upātta iti. so 'yam sannikarṣaḥ pratyaṅghaṣya kāraṇam bhavatīti lakṣaṇāvenocayate. (See NS: 95-97; Nyāyasūtra of Aksāpāda Gautama, In the Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara’s Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra’s Tātparyatikā and Viśvanātha’s Vyrtti, ed. Amarendra Mohan Tarkatirtha and Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha, Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, 19, Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publishing, 1936-44.)

(20) Jha, Ganganath[1983]: 118-121

(21) ṛṣaṛye tāvad dvividhe (trividhe)*
mahatyanekadravyavaitvodbhātāparāppakāsacatuyasyasannikarṣād dharmādisāmagrye ca svarūpālokanamātram. (NK: 436-437)

*: See Murakami[1997]: 120, 201.

(22) See Jha, Ganganatha[1982]: 391, and Prasastapāda in his Praśastapādabhāṣya continues:

śāmānyavīśeṣadṛavyagunakarmavīśeṣanāpekṣād ātmamanahsannikarṣāt pratyaṅgaṃ upadhyate sad dravyam prthivi viśāṇi śuklo gaur gacchatāt. (NK: 437)

‘From the contact of the mind as qualified by (1) generalities, (2) specialities, (3) substances, (4) qualities and (5) action, — these proceeds a ‘directly sensuous’ knowledge, — f.i., in the form, ‘the (1) existing, (2) substance, (3) earthy cow, (4) white and with horns, (5) is moving’. (Jha, Ganganath[1982]: 391)

(23) rūparasagandhasparsēsv anekadravyasamāvāyāt svagatalviśeṣāt svāśṛyasannikarṣān niyatendriyanimittam upadhyate. śabdāṣya trayasannikarṣāc chrotrasamavetasya tenaivopalabādhiḥ. samkhya-prārthā prathakvasamyoga-
vibhāgāparatvāparatvasnehadravatvavegakaranām pratyakṣadṛavyasamāvayāc
caksusparṣaṇābhīyāṃ grahanam. buddhisukhadaḥkhecchādveṣapesprayatnānāṃ ddayor
ātmamanasoḥ sannikāraśād upalabdhiḥ (NK: 451-454)

(24) Jha, Ganganatha [1982]: 391-392

(25) hāvadṛavyavatv agunavatvakarmavādīnāṃ upalabhāyādharasamavatānāṃ
āśrayagrāhakair indriyair grahanam ity etad asmadādināṃ pratyaksam. (NK: 454)

(26) Jha, Ganganatha [1982]: 392

(27) indriyārthayos tu yah sāksātkāripramāhetuḥ sa sannikāraśad advidhā eva. tad
yathā — samyogah, samyuktasamamāvyaḥ, samyuktasamametasaṃmāvyaḥ, samavāyaḥ,
samavetasaṃmāvyaḥ viṣeṣanaviṣeṣyabhāvaḥ ceti. tatra yadā caksusā ghatavīsayam jñānam
janyate tadā caksuḥ indriyam ghaṭo 'ṛthah. anayoh samnikarṣaḥ samyoga
evāyutasiddhyābhāvaḥ. evam manasāntarenendriyena yadātmavīsayam jñānam janyate 'ham
iti tadā mana indriyam āmārthah. anayoh samnikarsaḥ samyoga eva. kada punah
samyuktasamamāvyaḥ samnikarṣaḥ. yadā caksusā ghatagatarūpaḍikam grhyate ghaṭe śyānam
rūpaṃ astīti tadā caksuḥ indriyam ghatārūpaṃ arthah. anayoh samnikarṣaḥ
samyuktasamamāvyaḥ eva. caksuḥsamyukte ghaṭe rūpaṃsaṃmāvyaḥ. evam
manasātmamasamāvete sukhādau grhyamāne ayam eva sannyuktasah,
ghatagataripāmānādīgrahe catuṣṭayasamnikarṣo 'py adhikam kāraṇam iṣyate, saty api
samyuktasamamāvyaḥ tad abhāve dāre parimānādīgraheḥ. catuṣṭayarṣamnikarṣaḥ yathā,
indriyāvyavai vair arthāvyayavaiṃ. indriyāvyavaiṣvair arthāvyayainah,
indriyāvyavaiṅārthāvyayainah, arthāvyavai indriyāvyavaiṃ samnikarṣaḥ iti. yadā punaḥ
caksusā ghaṭasamametve rūpādau rūpāṭvāśāṁyam tadā caksur indriyam, rūpāṭvāśī
dāṁyam arthah. anayoh samnikarṣaḥ samyuktasamametasaṃmāvyaḥ eva. yataś caksuḥ
samukte ghaṭe rūpaṃ samametvam tatra rūpāṭvasya samamāvyaḥ. kada punaḥ samamāvyaḥ
samnikarṣaḥ. yadā śrotreṇḍriyena śabdo-grhyate tadā śrotreṇ triyam śabdo 'ṛthah.
anayoh samnikarṣaḥ samamāvyaḥ eva. śrotreṇṣya cākāśātmakatvāc chābdasya cākāśāgneśaḥ
gununinoṣ ca samamāvyaḥ. kada punaḥ samametasaṃmāvyaḥ sannyuktasah. yadā punaḥ
śabadasmametvem śabdatvāśāṁyam śrotreṇḍriyena grhyate tadā śrotreṇ indriyam
śabdatvāśāṁyam arthah. anayoh samnikarṣaḥ samametasaṃmāvyaḥ eva. śrotreṃsamave

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śabde śabadatvasya samavāyāt. kadā punar viśeṣana viśeṣyabhāvaś cendriyārthaṃ śaṃnikarṣo bhavati. yadā caṅkuṣā śaṃyuṭke bhūtale ghatābhāvo gṛhyate iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāstiti (tadā viśeṣana viśeṣyabhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ.) tadā caṅkuṣa śaṃyuṭasya bhūtalasya ghatābhāvo viśeṣanam bhūtalāṃ viśeṣyam. yadā maṇah śaṃyuṭke ātmanī sukhādyabhāvo gṛhyate ’ham sukhādirāhita iti tadā maṇah śaṃyuṭasyātmanāḥ sukhādyabhāvo viśeṣanam. yadā śrotroṣaṃavete gākāre ghaṭābhāvo gṛhyate tadā śrotroṣaṃavetasya gākārasya ghaṭābhāvo viśeṣanam. tad evaṃ saṃkṣepataḥ paṅcavidhasambandhānāyataṃ sambandhaḥ sambaddhaḥ viśeṣanasamavīṣyabhāvaḥ valaṅkāṣanenaṃdriyārthaṃ śaṃnikarṣenabhāva indriyena gṛhyate. evaṃ śaṃavāyo ’pi. caṅkuṣa sambaddhaḥ sāndor viśeṣyabhātaḥ paṭasamavāvo gṛhyate. iha tantuṣu paṭasamavāya iti. tad evaṃ śoḍhā śaṃnikarṣo vartināḥ. saṃgrahaḥ ca.

aṅkṣajā pramīṭīr vṛddhā saṅkicalpāvivikalpājā.

kaṇārṇam trividham tasyāḥ śaṃnikarṣas tu saṅvidhāḥ.

ghaṭatannīlantavāsābdaśaṅbdatva jātayāḥ.

ahāvasaṃavāyāv ca grāhyāḥ sambandhaḥ satakataḥ. (TBh (a): 34–36)

(Jha, Ganganathāf 1924: 11–13)

pratyakṣajñānaḥ hetur indriyārthaṃ śaṃnikarṣaḥ saṅvidhāḥ. saṃyogāḥ saṃyuṭasamavāyāḥ saṃyuṭasavetasamavāyāḥ samavāyāḥ samavetasamavāyō viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvaś cetti. caṅkuṣā ghaṭapratyakṣaṃ ātmanā śaṃyogāḥ śaṃnikarṣaḥ. ghaṭarūpa pratyakṣaṃ ātmane saṃyuṭasamavāyāḥ śaṃnikarṣaḥ caṅkuṣasamayukte ghaṭe rūpaśya samavāyāt. rūpavasāmānyapratyakṣe saṃyuṭasamavetasamavāyāḥ śaṃnikarṣaḥ caṅkuṣasamayukte ghaṭe rūpaṃ samavetam tatra rūpavasā samavāyāt. śrotroṣa śabdaśākṣātākāre samavāyāḥ śaṃnikarṣaḥ karnāavavariyākāśasya śroṭavat śabdasyākāśagunatvat guṇaguninoś ca samavāyāt. śabdatvasākṣātākāre samavetasamavāyāḥ śaṃnikarṣaḥ śrotroṣaṃavete śabde śabdatvasya samavāyāt. abhaṅapratyakṣe viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvah śaṃnikarṣa ghaṭābhāvo bhūtalāṃ iti atra caṅkuṣasamayukte bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaya viśeṣanatvat. evaṃ śaṃnikarṣaśaḍkajanyām jñānām pratyakṣaṃ. taṭkaṇāṃ indriyaṃ. tasmād indriyaṃ pratyakṣapramāṇaṃ iti siddham. (TS, §43)

(20) TS: 221
This is Benares Sanskrit University in the present.

sambandhāntarāghatītah sambandhah sākṣātsambandhah; sa ca samavāya-
samyoga-svarūpādibhidhāt bhavuvidhāh. ‘rūpavān purusah’ ‘pātre jalām asti’ ‘grhe pāto
nāsti’ ity ādau puruṣe rūpasya, pātre jalasya, grhe ca paṭābhāvasya yathākarāmam samavāya-
samyoga-svarūpanāmānah sambandhah pratiyante. samavāyaḥ ca saṣṭhapadārthatayā
kaṇādenokto nityah sambandhah; yathā ‘rūpavān brāhmaṇo ‘yaṃ calati’ ity ādau
brāhmaṇavājāteḥ, rūpagunasya, calanakriyāyāḥ ca brāhmaṇe samavāyaḥ sambandhah.
yāvadādha rāmaḥ yāvadādhe yām va samavāyas tiṣṭhatīti ‘samavāyaḥ nityasambandhah’ ity
ucyate; samavāyaśyaiva ‘ayutasambandhah’ iti nāṃnāṃtaram. samvyogādikas tu naivam;
sator api ādhaṛādheyyoḥ (dandapuruṣoḥ) samvyogādē parāyadarśanaḥ. samvyogaḥ ca
kaṇādoktagunaviśeṣāḥ. abhāvādeḥ sambandhah svarūpasambandhah; yathā ‘bhūtale pāto
nāsti’ ity ādau bhūtale paṭābhāvasya svarūpasambandhah pratiyate.
svarūpasambandhasyaiva ‘viśeṣanatā’ iti nāṃnāṃtaram. (BN: 9)

Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxv-xxix
Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxix
MK: xxxv

sambandhāntarāghatītah (yasya sambandhasya madhye sambandhāntarasya
praveśo vidyate tādṛśāḥ) sambandhah paramparāsambandhah. yathā
svasamavāyaśalametatvarūpam sāmānādhihkarāyam; tena paramparāsambandhena tantar
api rūpam pate ‘sti. ayaḥ ca sambandhah samavāyaghatītah.

evaṃ dandakamandadaladhārīni puruṣe grhe tiṣṭhati sati svasamvyog-
samyogītvarūpena. svāśārayāśrayatvena paramparāsambandhena dandakamandalā api grhe
sta iti. ayaḥ ca sambandhah samvyogaghatītah.

samavāyaśaṅkṣātsambandhahavat paramparāsambadho na niyatasaṃkhyāḥ, nāpi
cia niyataporimāṇaḥ, yathācchām sambandhisambandhādikam ādāya dirgha-dirghatara-
dirghatamā asamkhyā eva te kalpayitum śakyate. sarvito ‘samsrṣṭāv api padārthau
paramparāsambandhena sambaddhaḥ bhavataḥ; tatra ca dārātvādi na pratiśīkapakam,
tathā hi svasamṛdadhikśātyatvasambandhena bhāratavārśivāḥ sarvva eva ārivyā

SATO 254
This means that it is the inherent (samaveta: the cloth) which is inherent in the inherent cause (samavāya: the thread) of the itself (sva: the colour of the thread).

(punaś ca sambandho dvividhah, — vr̥ttiniyāmakaḥ vr̥tyaniyāmakaḥ ceti. yasmiṁś ca sambande sati ekasmin aparasya vṛttitā, ādhaṛādheyaabhāvāḥ, āśrayāśrayibhāvāvā va pratiyate sa sambandhaḥ vr̥ttiniyāmakaḥ. vr̥ttiniyāmakaṁ sambandhasthale ādhaṛā saptamīvibhaktiḥ prarujyate, yathā ‘bhūtale ghataḥ’; ādheye ca matabādayah pratyayāḥ bhavanti, yathā ‘bhūtalam ghavatāv’ḥ. vr̥ttiniyāmakaṁ sambandhāḥ ca samavāya-samyojag-svarūpaprabhṛtya eva kecana; teṣu sambandeṣu satsu ‘prthivyām rūpam’, ‘kunde badaram’, ‘bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti’ ity ādi praroyā. samsūtrapātena sthitayor ubhayoh samyogo ‘pi na vr̥ttiniyāmakaḥ. ata eva aṁjaliṁrapāyā samsūtrapātena sthitayor hastayoh samyogo na vr̥ttiniyāmaka iti tatra na ‘haste hastah’ iti praroyoh. tayor eva hastayoh uparyadhbhāvena sthitayoh punah samyogo vr̥ttiniyāmaka iti tatra ‘haste hastah’ iti praroyoh ‘pi bhavati.

yasmiṁś tu sambandhe pūrvvoktarūpā vṛttitā ādhaṛādheyaabhāvaś ca na pratiyate, kevalāṁ sambandhitāmātram, sa vr̥tyaniyāmakaḥ sambandhaḥ. ata eva tatra ādhaṛādheyaabhāvabodhiḥkāyāḥ saptamīvibhakteḥ matsabdipratayasya ca prarogyo na bhavati, kiṁ tu sambandhitvabodhiḥkāḥ ‘in’–‘iya’-prabhrtya eva pratyayāḥ prarujyante. yathā svatvasambandho na vr̥ttiniyāmakaḥ iti mantrini satī api svatvasambandhe ‘mantrī rājaṁ’ iti kiṁ vā ‘mantrini rāja’ iti na prarogyoḥ; kiṁ tu ‘rājakāyo mantrī’ iti prarogyoḥ. ‘dhanāvān putravāṁś ca ayam puruṣaḥ’ ity ādi prarogyadarśanāt svāmītvavasambhandhaḥ tu vr̥ttiniyāmako ‘pi bhavati. paramparāsaṁbandhāḥ prāyaśca sarvva eva vr̥ttiniyāmakaḥ. ata eva śikhini puruse gṛhe tīṣṭhati svāsrayapuruṣāśrayatvasambandhena ‘śikhāvad graham’ iti na prarogyoḥ. (BN: 10-11)
(39) See NK: 798

(40) MK: xxxvi

(41) See Jha, V. N.[1990]: xiv, xxv.

(42) See NK: 255

(43) Jha, Ganganatha[1982]: 224

(44) See NK: 255-256.

(45) Jha, Ganganatha[1982]: 224-225

(46) MK: xxxiii-xxxiv

(47) Kālikānāmakaḥ sambandhaḥ kāścit vṛttiniyāmakaḥ kāścic ca vṛttiyāmakaḥ 'sti vṛttiniyāmakena kālikasambhandhena kāle sarvam vartate. sa ca kālah mahākālarūpaḥ khandakālarūpaḥ ca. 'kāle sarvam' iti mahākālaviśayinī pratītah; 'asmin nāse śītādhiyam'; 'ādyā vṛṣṭīr jātā' ity ādayaś ca khandakālaviśayinīyāḥ pratītayaḥ. vṛttiyāmakaḥ kālikas tu svāśrayakālāśritavarūpah paramparāsambandhah; tena sambandhena sarvam sarvatra vartate. tathā hi grhaśya āśrayo yah kālah, tasmin puruṣo 'pi vartate iti svāśrayakālāśritavasambhandhena (svasya grhaśya āśrayah kālah tadāsriyoh puruṣa iti) grham api puruṣe vartate. (BN: 11-12)

(48) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxx-xxx

(49) NSMu: 155 (Kiranāvali on the Nyāyasiśādhāntamuktāvalī)

(50) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxxi

(51) MK: xxxiv

(52) Kālikaviśeṣanatāvat digviśeṣanatānāmako 'pi vṛttitānīyāmakaṃ kāścit sambandho 'sti. yathā 'asti uttarasyām diśi devatāmā himālayah' ity ādau himālayasya uttarasyām diśi digviśeṣanatāsambhandhena vṛttitā pratiyate. eṣa ca sambandho daiśikaviśeṣanatānāmāpi vyavahriyate. (BN: 12)

(53) MK: xxxiv

SATO 256
(54) MK: 21-22

(55) Jha, V. N. [1990]: xxix-xxx

(56) MK: xxxv

(57) BN: 12
CHAPTER V
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY OF DHARMAKIRTI'S ARGUMENTS

5.0.0:

As we have mentioned in Chapter I, the *Sambandhaparikṣā* (the *Sambandhaparikṣāprakaraṇa*) by Dharmakirti is found in the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda* in the *Prameyakamalamārtanda* by Prabhācandra, which is the commentary on the *Parikṣāmukhasūtra* by Māṇikyanandin who condensed the subject in the form of aphorisms by taking materials from Śaṅkara’s works.(1) We can see in the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda* that it is concluded by the Bauddhas that the relation (*sambandha*) is only our way of looking at things and is not an objective entity, as is equally seen in Dharmakirti’s *Sambandhaparikṣā*.

Most of the contents of the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda* by Prabhācandra are approximately equal to the contents of the *Sambandhaparikṣā* and the *Vṛtti* by Dharmakirti, moreover, they are equal to the contents of the * Svādvādaśaratanākara*, V, 8 by Vādividevasūri, as is well known.(2) In the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda*, altogether, Prabhācandra brings forward arguments to demonstrate the nonexistence of the relation (*sambandha*) in accordance with Dharmakirti’s theory in his *Sambandhaparikṣā*, of course, this is not the Jaina theory of the relation (*sambandha*) and so he carries on the arguments from a Buddhist standpoint.

Well, let us see Dharmakirti’s theory of the relation (*sambandha*) in Prabhācandra’s *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda*, with reference to Prof. V. N. Jha’s research(3).

SATO 259
5.1.0: The Contents of Dharmakirti’s Arguments about the Relation (*Sambandha*) of the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda*

Dharmakirti’s theory that he regards the relation (*sambandha*) as an imagination is very clear, to put it simply, his basic thought on the relation (*sambandha*) is that we imagine a thing (R) between an existence (A) and an existence (B) as a relation (*sambandha*). When the phenomenal world consists of these three things (A, B and R between the two) and they are real existent, if we do not accept the existence of the relation (R) between the two things (A and B, that is to say, *relata*), then we can deny the existence of the *relata* (intended as what are connected with each other directly) related to the relation (R) and automatically the *relata* (A and B) cannot be existent in reality, either. In the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda*, Prabhācandra presents Dharmakirti’s theory of the relation given in the *Sambandhaparikṣā* and the *Vṛtti* that the imaginations (*kalpanā*) show them as if these are connected although they are not connected in reality, because of such construction, they are called false. In short, anyway, Dharmakirti regards the relation (R) (*sambandha*) as what (R) subsists in two things (A and B), namely, this means that we can consider the nature of the relation (R) subsisting in two things (A and B) as the following:

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A ———— R ———— B
```

The above (A—R—B) is taken into consideration with ‘*dvīṣṭah sambandhah*’ in mind.
5. 1. 1: *Pāratantrya*?

Prabhācandra in the *Pūrwapakṣa* of the *Sambandhasadbhāvavāda* presents the theory by Dharmakīrti: if there is a relation (*sambandha*), then the relation of things may be either of the nature of dependence (*pāratantrya*) or of the nature of amalgamation of the forms of the things (*rūpaśleṣa*). In the former case, (we have to ask) whether it (*pāratantrya*) exist between two already produced relata (*sambandhin*) or between two unproduced relata (*sambandhin*)? It (*pāratantrya*) cannot be said to exist between two unproduced relata (*sambandhin*), because the very form (of the two unproduced relata) is non-existent like the horns of a hare and a horse. And, since there is no dependence (*pāratantrya*) in the case of two already produced relata (*sambandhin*) (independent of one another), obviously there is no relation.

This can be demonstrated diagrammatically as follows: *(4)*

(1)

```
sambandha (R)
  /     \
/        \
\        \ dependency (pāratantrya) amalgamation (rūpaśleṣa)
```

SATO 261
between two already produced relata \[\text{nisp\text{\textit{pannayoh}}}\] \[\text{anisp\text{\textit{pannayoh}}}\] between two unproduced relata

If already \text{nisp\text{\textit{panna}}, no question of any dependency}

So dependency $\neq R(A)$

In this way, the fluxist considers the dependency (\text{\textit{p\text{\textit{ratantrya}}}) not to be a relation. There can be no relation between two things, which are independent. Because the fluxists think that the relation (\text{\textit{sambandha}) presupposes that the things are brought together. Here, Dharmakirti considers the relation (\text{\textit{sambandha}) to be of two kinds: (1) of the nature of dependence (\text{\textit{p\text{\textit{ratantrya}) or (2) of the nature of amalgamation of the forms of the things (\text{\textit{rup\text{\textit{a\text{\textit{lesa). And he says that in the case of (1), even though we can regard two cases (whether \text{\textit{p\text{\textit{ratantrya exist between two \text{nisp\text{\textit{pannas or between two \text{anisp\text{\textit{pannas), \text{\textit{p\text{\textit{ratantrya cannot be regarded as a relation.}

5. 1. 2: \text{\textit{Rupa\text{\textit{lesa?}}

And, in the case of (2) above, Dharmakirti says: nor can it (\text{\textit{sambandha}) be taken as of the nature of amalgamation of the forms of the things (\text{\textit{rup\text{\textit{a\text{\textit{lesa}; because if the relata are two distinct things (independent of each other), the amalgamation of the forms of the things (\text{\textit{rup\text{\textit{a\text{\textit{lesa) is contradictory to its own idea. If, however, the two relata merge in one, (obviously) the relation does not exist. Because there can be no relation in the absence of two relata since a relation has to exist in two things.

This can be demonstrated diagrammatically as follows:$(5)$

SATO 262
(2)

amalgamation (rūpaślesa)

- of two distinct things (a)
- of two identical things (b)

If (a), then how amalgamation possible?

If (b), then impossible, because the relation must be between two distinct things.

So amalgamation ≠ R (B)

rūpaślesa = nairantaryā = antarāla-abhāva
abhāva = tuccha

... R ≠ reality (C)

Against the objection: the amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaślesa) of the two relata is to be understood as the state of having no gap between two relata (nairantaryā), Dharmakirti continues: it is incorrect. Because, in this case, it (nairantaryā) will become of the nature of the absence of the gap (between two things) and as such it (nairantaryā) cannot be real. And consequently it (nairantaryā) cannot be treated as a relation lying between two things. Moreover, if the state of having no gap between two things (nirantarattā) is treated as a relation, then why not the state of having the gap (sāntaratā) also be treated as a relation?

His argument is very clear, namely, nor can it be supposed that the relation is nothing but the nairantaryā between two things, that is to say, the things in relation are just close to one another and not separated by a gap in between them.

SATO 263
But if the nairantarya may be a relation, why should not separation by a gap be also a relation? In this case also, however close the things may be brought together, they cannot be supposed to abandon their separateness, unless there be a unification of the things. Therefore, the fluxist cannot regard the nairantarya as a relation.

Moreover, whether is this amalgamation (of the forms of the things) (1) total or (2) partial? Dharmakirti says that if the amalgamation is treated as total (1), then the whole consisting of the atoms will be only one atom. If the amalgamation is treated as partial (2), whether should the parts (of the relata) be treated as (a) identical with it (the relatum) or (b) different from it (the relatum)? If (a), there is no amalgamation (rupāślesa) with the parts; since there is the absence of the parts (, that is to say, the parts do not exist). Further, if (b), again we have to know whether the atoms have total amalgamation (rupāślesa) with these parts or partial amalgamation.

This can be demonstrated diagrammatically as follows:

(3)

amalgamation (rupāślesa)

(1) total

(2) partial

If (1), then the amalgamation of atoms = one atom

If (2), then

(a) part + paramāṇu = paramāṇu itself?

or

(b) part + paramāṇu = part + paramāṇu

SATO 264
If (a), then we cannot maintain that R is with a part because part is not left out separately.

If (b), then again,

(x) \( R_1 \text{ part } - t_1 R_2 + \text{paramāṇu} = R_1 \text{ paramāṇu?} \)

(y) \( R_1 \text{ part1 } R_2 \text{ part2 } \text{paramāṇu?} \)

If (x), then again the same contingency like (a) above.

If (y), then anavasthā i.e. repeating the same process again and again.

So \( rūpaśleṣa = R \ (D) \)

5. 1. 3: Parāpeksā?

An objection ‘if a relation is, at all, accepted, it should be of alone the nature of ‘dependency’ on something else (parāpeksā), because it lies between two things.’ arises.

Against this objection, Dharmakirti in the Purvapakṣa of the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda says: we want to know whether an entity (bhāva) depends on it (sambandha), itself being present (, or existent) or without being present. In other words, he says that we cannot say that the entity depends upon the relation without being present, because it cannot be the locus (abode) of the property of being dependent (, or dependency). And, nor can it (the entity) depend on something (relation) itself being existent, because the entity (independent of the relation) has already come into being without expectancy (of anything else); otherwise it cannot be said that it has come into being, leading to contradiction. Therefore, there is something like ‘dependency’, had it been there, it could have been a ‘relation’.

SATO 265
It is said by Dharmakirti as follows:

parāpeksā hi sambandhah so 'san katham apekṣate,
saṃś ca sarvanirāsaṃso bhāvah katham apekṣate. //3//

Indeed, a relation could have been ‘dependency’ (of one thing on the other) (parāpeksā), but how can the non-existence (asat) require (or depend on) the other? How even an existent entity (bhāva) can require (or depend on) another without being expectant of other? //3//

5. 1. 4: The Proposed Relation is Different from the Two Relata or Identical with Them?

In addition to the above, Dharmakirti says: whether the proposed relation (R) is different from the two relata (x, y) or identical with them (x, y)? If it is identical with them, then the proposed relation is not different from the relation and there is nothing extra called relation. Or, there is only that proposed relation and not the relata If it is different from them, then the two relata are to be treated as independent of each other and in the case how can they be called related?

This can be demonstrated diagrammatically as follows:

(4)

If x R y,

then

R

SATO 266
If (a), then how can we say: x and y are related?
If (b), then either x or y or R exists and so there is nothing like x R y.
So R $\neq$ a reality (E)

5. 1. 5: The Relation Can Be an Entity Different from the Two Relata?

Moreover, Dharmakirti continues: let the relation (R) be an entity different from the two relata (x, y), still with that single relation what can be the relation of the two relata? As there can be no relation between two relata on account of the defect pointed out above, on the same ground there can be no relation between the proposed relation and the relata, namely, it will lead to endless regression, therefore, the comprehension (buddhi) that the relation lies between the two relata is not real, because there is nothing called relation more than the two relata.

This can be demonstrated diagrammatically as follows:\(^{10}\)

(5)
Let R be a thing, still

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
x & r_1 & R & r_2 & y \\
\end{array}
\]

What will be $r_1$ and $r_2$?

The difficulties will be the same as the above between x and y of R.

If $r_1$ and $r_2$ are also treated as the realities, then again the same question will arise: what is the relation between $r_1$ and x and $r_2$ and y? In this way, it will lead to the anavasthā.
So R ≠ reality (F)

5.1.6: The Imagination (Kalpanā) Mixes All Entities (Bhāva)

According to the Bauddhas, the two relata (bhāva) (x, y) and additional appearance called relation (R), all these exist in the own forms (of the relata). Therefore, the entities (bhāva) are distinct by themselves.

Here, Dharmakirti says an important idea that the imagination (kalpanā) mixes them, that is to say, it causes us to know them to be related. He emphasizes that it is only the imagination (kalpanā) that connects x and y, namely, he says that this is why in spite of the absence of any relation in reality, only on the basis of the imagination (kalpanā), the speakers conventionally use the linguistic expression which express the meanings of notions like the action (kriyā), its related factors (kāraka) and so on in order to convey the anyāpoṣa which is nothing but the difference of the positive entities alone. In reality there is no relation between an action (kriyā) and a related factors (kāraka), because of momentariness (ksanikatva) at the time of an action (kriyā) there can be no its related factors (kāraka).

This can be demonstrated diagrammatically as follows: (11)

(6)

kalpanā — kalpanāvisaya — anyavyāpyṛtta — śabdavisaya

So R ≠ kriyākārakasambandha (G)

It is concluded by the Bauddha that the relation is only our way of looking at the things and is not an objective entity.

SATO 268
5. 1. 7: The Cause and Effect Relationship (कार्यकारणाभवा) Can Be a Relation?

(1)

(5. 1. 7-1)

Against the objection: the cause and effect relationship (कार्यकारणाभवा) can be a relation, Dharmakirti says that it is not proper, because both the cause (x) and the effect (y) do not exist together and so the cause and effect relationship cannot be treated as a relation (R), either, since it does not satisfy the requirement of existing in two entities.

This means that there is no effect at the time of the cause, nor there is the cause at the time of the effect. If both the cause (x) and the effect (y) are at one and the same time, there cannot exist the cause and effect relationship (कार्यकारणाभवा) between them, it is just like the left and the right horn of the cow.

This can be demonstrated diagrammatically as follows:\(^{(12)}\)

(7)

\[
\begin{align*}
x \ (\text{cause}) & \quad \longrightarrow \quad R \quad \longrightarrow \quad y \ (\text{effect}) \\
\text{How can R exist in x and y at a time?} \\
\text{So R \neq a reality (H)}
\end{align*}
\]

The relation of the cause and the effect is unreal, since the two do not co-exist at one time. The antecedent is called the cause and the consequent may be called the effect, however, the Baudhha insist that this is only a conceptual
characterization, that is to say, it does not imply an objective relation, which is possible between co-existent things. The cause ceases to be when the effect comes into being, therefore, the two things posited as the cause and the effect are never synchronous and on the basis of this idea no relation can be posited between them. In the absence of one of the things, the cause and effect relationship also cannot be a real relation but only an idea. Hence, Dharmakirti says: kāryakāraṇayor asahabhāvatas tasyāpi dvīṣṭhasyāsambhavāt.

(5. 1. 7-2)

Moreover, the objection that the cause and effect relationship may exist, in sequence, either in the effect or in the cause continues, namely, it is asserted that the causal relation is sequential and not synchronous, and so the objection urged on the basis of the lack of synchronism is irrelevant. However, Dharmakirti replies: it is not proper, either. Because even if it is accepted that the entity called a relation will exist in sequence being present either in the effect or in the cause, without requiring the other, that is to say, without being dependent either on the cause or on the effect, it cannot be accepted as a relation (sambandha), because it will exist in only one relatum and it can exist even without the existence of either the cause or the effect. He, who does not regard the reality of the relation, which is according to him only a subjective way of evaluation, refuses to take this defence as a logically sound proof of the objectivity of the causal relation. Here, it must be recognized that the character of the cause and effect relationship does not depend on the effect when it occurs in the causal antecedent, because the effect has not yet come into being, similarly, the relation posited as the causality is not dependent on the cause. The connection between the cause and the effect cannot be anything more than a subjective construction.
So, kāryakāraṇabhāva ≠ R

(5. 1. 7-3)

And, the objection arises: the desired relationship, in sequence, exists in one of the two, that is to say, either in the effec or in the cause depending on either effect or cause respectively, and hence it does exist in two because one requires the other.

Against this objection, Dharmakīrtī replies: that which is required must be regarded as a benefactor \(\text{upakārin}\), because it is the benefactor which is required and not anything else. But how can the non-existent \(\text{asat}\) have any effect \(\text{upakāra}\) on the other? It cannot be so. Because at the time of the cause the entity called the effect does not exist or at the time of the effect the entity called the cause does not exist, where neither of the two can have the effect on each other; the two entities (the cause and the effect) do not exist at the same time, so that they do not have the effect on each other.\(^{17}\)

This means that if the relation were factual and the dependence of the effect were real, it must be shown that the cause is of real service to the effect or vice versa. However, there is no possibility of service, mutual or solitary, between a non-existent and an existent fact. The dependence is ontologically possible only between things being related as the benefactor and beneficiary \(\text{upakārakopakāryabhāva}\), but about the cause and the effect, one of the two is always absent when the other is in existence. In this way, the relation of dependence is only a subjective interpretation so far as the cause and effect relationship is concerned.\(^{18}\)

So, kāryakāraṇabhāva ≠ R
Moreover, the objection that the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraniṇati) can exist between the two entities (the cause and the effect) since they are connected with one thing (a relation) arises.

Against this, Dharmakīrti replies: there will arise a contingency that the left horn and the right one of a cow have the cause and effect relationship because they are connected with the number ‘two’ (dvitva-samkhya), far-ness (paratva), near-ness (aparatva), separation (vibhaga), and so on.

So, kāryakāraniṇahāva ≡ R

The objection that the relationship can arise when it is connected with something having the nature of a relation arises.

Against this, Dharmakīrti replies: it is incorrect. Because we say that something existing in the things can be called a relation, so that there cannot be any other definition of a relation other than this. Had it been different, it could have been kept distinct from number (samkhya) and so on.

So, kāryakāraniṇahāva ≡ R

The objection that in a case when one entity comes into being when another entity exists, and it does not come into being when such an entity does not exist arises.

Against this, Dharmakīrti replies: in such a situation the two things are to be considered as adjunct(s) (upādhi) of a third thing called relation (yoga = sambandha) and that is what we say the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraniṇati)
and not any relation whatsoever.

And he continues: let those two adjuncts (aspects) (that is to say, things) (upādhi), namely, the positive (bhāva) and the negative (abhāva) be treated as the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāranatā); why do you postulate an unreal (asat) relation (sambandha)?

So, kāryakāranabhāva ≠ R

(5. 1. 7-7)

The objection arises: ‘because of difference (bhedā), that is to say, how is it that a single word kāryakāranatā expresses a bundle of meanings such as “coming into being in the presence of something, and not coming into being in the absence of that something”? 

Against this objection, Dharmakirti replies: this word depends on the speaker. A word speaks as the user of that word wants it to speak, and so it is possible for a single word (śruti) to express many meanings and as such those two (bhāva and abhāva), can be the cause and effect relationship. Therefore, there is no doubt that those two imposed properties, that is to say, the existent and the non-existent can be the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāranatā).

So, kāryakāranabhāva ≠ R

(5. 1. 7-8)

In addition to the above, Dharmakirti continues:(19) when one sees the unseen effect which is confirmed by the (subsequent) cognition (upalabdhi), because of seeing one thing intended as the cause; and, after not seeing it (the cause), when he does not see the effect, he relates that ‘this comes from this’ and understands, accordingly, that ‘this results from this’ even without any interpreter. Therefore,
without the positive and negative entities such as ‘the seeing and not seeing’ since it is impossible to get the knowledge of the effect, the expression ‘effect’ and so on is introduced on the basis of superimposition of object on the cognition in order to facilitate linguistic usage with an intension such that “let people not use so many words in each case for the positive and negative entities.”

(5. 1. 7-9)

The objection arises: if the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāرانată) is not different from the positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatireka) concomitance, how can such relationship be established by the positive and negative entities?

Against this, Dharmakirti replies: on the ground, namely, there is the absence of the effect in the absence of the cause, we can get the knowledge of the effect; this expression such a ‘This is the effect of it (cause) and this is the cause of it (effect)’ merely refers to the convention. In the presence of one thing, that is to say, an effect, which has come into being, there is the existentce of that which is intended as the cause and this is what is called the state of being a cause. And in the case of the cause, it is like so. In this way, the state of being the cause and the effect are known on the basis of the seeing and not seeing. Therefore, the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāرانată) is nothing but the existent (of a cause in the presence of the thing as an effect) and the non-existent (of an effect in the absence of the thing as a cause). A person observes the antecedent unassociated with the consequent, and the consequent unattached to the antecedent. But the observation of the consequent as following upon the antecedent, and the absence of observation of the consequent in the absence of the antecedent are interpreted as the cause and effect relationship.

We can see that Dharmakirti insists that only the existent (of a cause in the

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presence of the thing as an effect) and the non-existent (of an effect in the absence of the thing as a cause) are real; the object of which is of only these two facts. The imaginations (kalpanā) show them as if these are connected although they are not connected in reality. Because of such construction, they are called false. This means that the imposition of a relation between the antecedent event and the consequent one is only a subjective necessity of thought, so the two events are not related in reality.

So, kāryakāraṇabhāva ≠ R

5. 1. 8: Whether the Objects (Cause and Effect) Are Different or Identical?

We have to ask whether the objects, which are called cause and effect, are (a) different or (b) identical?

If (a), then, how can there be any relation between one and the same thing?

If (b), then, the cause and effect relationship can exist in that case?

So, we cannot regard the cause and effect relationship as a real thing.

And, the objection that the relation does not exist between two different things or between two identical things, because the two things are related with one thing called a relation may arise.

Against the above, Dharmakirti replies that in this case also, if another relation, different from the two things, were existent, the separated two things accepted as the cause and the effect could have been connected in reality. And he continues: since the things treated as the connected (samyogin), or the inherent (samavāyin), and so on do not show any impact on each other and also because there cannot be any relationship (janyajanakabhāva) like cause-and effect among

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them, there is no relatum which does not produce any impact mutually.

Here, we can see that Dharmakirti uses the same theory of relation mentioned above; $kāryakāranabhāva \neq R$, namely, \textit{‘kāryakāranabhāva \neq R’} also sets aside the possibility of the contact and the inherence as the relations\textsuperscript{(21)}, as we shall see later in the following.

5. 1. 9: The Inherence (\textit{Samavāya}) Can Be a Real Relation?

The objection arises: there is something called the relatum of inherency which produces the effect appearing as the whole, therefore, you cannot say that there is no relatedness because there is no impact.

Against this, Dharmakirti replies: it is incorrect. Even if we accept that something called the relatum of inherency produces an effect (appearing as the whole), it cannot be so, because at the time of the production of the effect the relatedness does not exist because at that time the effect has not arisen. You cannot say that since the effect has been produced from that, that becomes an inherent cause; because in that case the pot-maker and so on (that is treated as \textit{nimittakāraṇa} by thou) would also be regarded as an inherent cause. He continues: in spite of any mutual impact of the related one on the relation or of the relation on the related, if you want to accept something as a relation, then everything unrelated in the universe will become an inherent cause.

We can see that the impossibility of exchange of beneficiary services between the things makes the relation a chimera and the recognition of this fact knocks out the pretensions of all other relations posited by philosophers. If the entities could be supposed to be related in spite of the lack of reciprocal services, there would be

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no logical bar to the postulation of a relation between anything and everything in this world.\(^{22}\) Here, we can find out the same theory by Dharmakirti in reply to the objection that the cause and effect relationship can be a real thing.

And, the objection continues (a): the two entities are called connected since the contact is an effect and since it (the contact) is produced by the two things \(\text{samavāyin}\).

Dharmakirti replies: if (a), then, these two things \(\text{samavāyin}\) should produce the contact and because these two things produce the contact they cannot be called connected, and in spite of that, if you say that they are connected, then, the action \(\text{karman}\) should also be called connected. Because, a contact is produced from the action of either of the two things connected or from the action of both the things connected, that is to say, the action \(\text{karman}\) is posited as the cause of the contact by the Vaiśešikas, however, according to them, the action \(\text{karman}\) cannot have the quality of being conjoined, because the quality can belong only to the substance. On the same ground, the contact would be possessed of the \(\text{samyogitā}\). This is not correct.

Moreover, the objection continues (b): the two things are not connected since they produce the contact, but they are called connected because such a state is brought into being.

Agains (b), Dharmakirti replies: it is incorrect. Because what is brought into being \(\text{sthāpya}\) and what brings into being \(\text{sthāpaka}\) are not related by the cause and effect relationship \(\text{janyajanakatva}\) and there is other bringing into being other than that which involves the cause and effect relationship. He says that nor can the contact or the quality of being conjoined be supposed to be a characteristic of the things placed in a particular situation.\(^{23}\)

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5. 1. 10: The Cause and Effect Relationship (*Kāryakāraṇabhāva*) Can Be a Relation? (2)

(5. 1. 10-1)

Let there be a relation (*sambandha*) called the cause and effect, still, we have to know whether such a relationship should be accepted to exist as ‘known one’ (a) or ‘unknown one’ (b)?

If (a), then, it will lead to the over-application, namely, even a fictitious thing will become a relation.

So, *kāryakāraṇabhāva* = R

If (b), then, is it known by perception (*pratyakṣa*) (b-1), by the seeing and not seeing (*pratyakṣa-anupalambha*, that is to say, *anvaya-vyatireka*) (b-2) or by inference (*anumāna*) (b-3)?

In the case of (b-1), we have to ask that you can cognise it by means of the comprehension of the nature of fire (b-1-1), the nature of smoke (b-1-2) or the nature of fire and smoke (b-1-3)?

If (b-1-1), you cannot regard the *kāryakāraṇabhāva* as a relation in reality.

Because in this case you can have the comprehension of only the existence of fire, but you cannot cognise the nature of smoke. When there is no comprehension of the nature of smoke, you cannot have knowledge that fire is the cause of it (smoke) on the basis of the comprehension of smoke. Indeed, because unless the nature of the counterrelatum (*pratīyogin*, that is to say, fire) is comprehended, nothing can be known to possess causeness or any other property (such as effectness) because it will lead to the over-application.
And in the case of (b-1-2), nor can it be said that the relationship can be
cognised by means of the perception of the nature of smoke. Therefore it will be
proper to say that the relationship can be known only after knowing the natures of
both, that is to say, the fire and the smoke, not otherwise.

However, we should notice that the fluxist does not regard the
$kāryakāranabhāva$ as a relation in reality.

He continues that even the perception of both cannot help the knowledge of
the intended relationship, that is to say, in the case of (b-1-3), even in that case you
can see only the nature of fire and smoke appearing in the perception but you
cannot have the knowledge that fire is the cause of smoke and smoke is the effect
of fire. Because there cannot arise the cognition of the cause and effect relationship
($kāryakāranabhāva$) by mere cognition of the two things ($padārtha$, that is to say,
fire and smoke) existing in their own forms.\(^{(24)}\)

So, $kāryakāranabhāva \neq R$

The objection arises: immediately after the knowledge of one thing when
another object is known one can know in the cause and effect relationship between
them (fire and smoke).

Against this, the fluxist replies: it also suffers from the difficulty of the
over-application. Because immediately after a pot, the knowledge of a cloth can be
known.

So, $kāryakāranabhāva \neq R$

And, he continues: it is also impossible to say that only one knowledge can
relate the two things ($padārtha$) appearing in sequence. Because everywhere, that
is to say, in case of all knowleges, the difference in the knowledge depends upon
the difference in the objects.

So, kāryakāraṇabhāva ≠ R

(5. 1. 10-2)

The objection arises: there will arise the determinate cognition of the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva) because the two things (a cause and an effect) one being pair and the other being subsequent, appear in the determinate cognition which produced by sense-organs (indriya) helped by the memory (smarana) arising immediately after two knowledges which reveal the nature of fire and smoke.

Against this objection, the fluxist replies: this is also nothing but mere words. Because if the sense-organs like eyes and so on have no ability to produce the knowledge of the cause and effect relationship, it is contradictory to say that the things depending on the memory have ability to produce something.25

So, kāryakāraṇabhāva ≠ R

Another objection arises: the two things are known as the cause and the effect after the function (vyāpāra) of the eyes helped by remembrance and therefore, the cause and effect relationship is ascertained by the determinate perception (savikalpapratyakṣa).

Against this, the fluxist replies: it is also incorrect. Because it will lead to the over-application that the smell can be an object of the visual perception by the eyes. Because the perception, namely, 'the sandalwood is fragrant.' arises only after the function of the eyes helped by the memory (smarana) of the smell. Therefore, you cannot say that the relationship can be cognised on the basis of perception (pratyakṣa).
Our sense-organs were incapable of envisaging the cause and effect relationship by themselves and they could not be supposed to transcend this incapacity even if they were supposed to be reinforced by memory.

So, *kāryakāranabhāva* ≠ R

(5. 1. 10-3)

The fluxist continues: the relationship cannot be cognised on the basis of the seeing and not seeing (*pratyakṣa-anupalambha = anvaya-vyatireka*); because like the seeing (*pratyakṣa*), the not seeing (*anupalambha*) also has no ability to cause the knowledge of the cause and effect relationship because the object of negation is a discrete entity.

Here the objection arises: only in the case of the existence of fire there can arise the existence of smoke and in the case of the absence of fire there cannot arise smoke either, and this is what is called the cause and effect relationship (*kāryakāranabhāva*) and it can be cognised on the basis of *anvaya-vyatireka*.

Against this, the fluxist replies: in the case of the above, you should accept the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the speaker-ness (*vakṛtva*, or *sādhanā*) and the non-omniscient-ness (*asarvajñatva*, or *sādhyā*). And this can be confirmed in one's own self in the existence of the non-omniscient-ness (*asarvajñatva*) and the existence of the qualities like attachment and so on (with the speaker-ness (*vakṛtva*)) and in the absence of it (*asarvajñatva*) in the fragments of stone we cannot see the speaker-ness.

In this way, the fluxist says that we cannot cognise the cause and effect relationship by means of the *pratyakṣa-anupalambha*.

So, *kāryakāranabhāva* ≠ R

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In addition to the above, the fluxist continues: this invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the speaker-ness (vākrtva, or sādhana) and the non-omniscient-ness (asarvajñatva, or sādhyā) is not incorrect, since the speaker-ness (vākrtva) is caused by the desire of speaking (vāktukāmatā).(26)

The objection arises: the probans (sādhana) ‘the speaker-ness’ (vakrtva) is in ‘inconsistent association’ (vyabhicāra) with the probandum as mentioned above.

Against this, the fluxist replies: if so, ‘the intention of speaking’ (vivaksā) will not cause the speaker-ness (vakrtva), either. Because even if there is an ‘intention of speaking’ (vivaksā) some words another word is spoken, that is to say, this is our experience.(27) Even if there exists ‘the inconsistency’ (vyabhicāra) with regard to the desire to speak of a meaning, there cannot be any inconsistency with regard to ‘the intention of speaking’ (vivaksā).(28) This is also incorrect, because we can cognise ‘the speaker-ness’ (vakrtva) in the person who is dreaming and in one who is absent-minded. He continues that ‘the intention of speaking’ (vivaksā) indirectly is not the cause of ‘the speaker-ness’ (vakrtva), because if you accept the idea, it will lead to a situation that there will be no one-is-to-one cause-and-effect relationship, because any thing will become a cause of anything.

(5. 1. 10-5)

The Bauddhas say: when there is no absence of the state of not being all-knowing, everywhere speaker-ness (vakrtva) is not seen — this statement has no proof and so there is no invariable concomitance (pratibandha, or avinābhāva) of the nature of cause-and-effect between the one thing intended as cause (sādhyā) and the another thing intended as effect (sādhana). There is no difference between the case of fire-and-smoke and the above.

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So, *pratibandha*, or *avinābhāva* ≠ R

The objection arises: there is invariable concomitance (*pratibandha*, or *avinābhāva*) between the thing intended as the cause and the thing intended as the effect because in the absence of the fire if there would have been smoke then since it (smoke) is not caused by that (fire) and even if in one case the fire is not the cause then there cannot be the smoke, but we do find the smoke caused by the fire in the kitchen and so on.

Against this, the Bauddhas say: this is also only an empty expression.

For example, because we can find the fire from fuel and so on, another from the rubbing of two pieces of woods, or another from crystal stone, still although a smoke arises from fire it can also arise from the smoke which arises from the fire as in the case of a pot used by the shepherds for warming their bodies. Here, the Bauddhas say that even in the absence of fire there may arise smoke, and so, how can there be any invariable concomitance (*pratibandha*, or *avinābhāva*) between the thing intended as the cause and the thing intended as the effect?

So, *pratibandha*, or *avinābhāva* ≠ R in reality

And, the Bauddhas continue: the fire arising from the fuel materials is different from the fire produced from the rubbing of two pieces of wood or another arising from the crystal stone and so on. Similarly, the smoke arising from the fire is different from the smoke produced from the smoke in the case of a pot used by shepherd for warming his body. And if it is accepted that an effect may arise from another thing which is not related directly with it (the effect), it will lead to the over-application.
So, the smoke produced from the fire and similar other smoke do not come into being from non-fire. And if that is accepted then correspondingly that type of the nature of the fire has to be accepted and in that case there is.

So, pratibandha, or avinābhāva ≠ R in reality

(5. 1. 10-6)

The bauddhas continues: the theory above holds true even in the case of the speaker-ness (vakṛtva). It is said that: if the speaker-ness exists in the omniscient or in the man who is free from all bad qualities like attachment, then it (vakṛtva) can never arise from one who is a non-omniscient or who has bad qualities like attachment and so on because nothing can arise even once from something which is not its cause. But here the vakṛtva does arise from the non-omniscient.

So, pratibandha, or avinābhāva ≠ R in reality

5. 1. 11: Kāryakāranabhāva Can Be Comprehended by Means of the Inference (Anumāna)?

The Baudhās say that the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāranabhāva) can be the object of inference (anumāna) only when all the individual fires and smokes existing in all the places and in all the times are known and not otherwise. With reference to such a vast object neither the indeterminate (nirvikalpakapratyakṣa) and the determinate perception (savikalpakapratyakṣa) has capacity to operate. Nor the seeing and not seeing (pratyaksānapalambha) have such a capacity.(29)

And, they continue: the causality is the state of possessing the capacity to produce an effect. But that capacity cannot be determinated by the perception (pratyakṣa) but it can be known by observing the effect.(30)
In this case, if the cognition of the cause arises from the effect, you can cognise the ability on the basis of the inference. Here also, you cannot cognise the invariable concomitance (pratibandha, or avinābhāva) between the capability (śakti, or sādhyā) and the effect (kārya, or sādhanā) by the perception (pratyakṣa) and so on; because of the same defeats discussed above. And if you say that it can be cognised on the basis of the inference it will lead to an infinite regress or mutual dependency. But this argument the third proposition (pakṣa) is also considered.\(^{(31)}\)

Here, we can see that the bauddhas do not regard any relationships (sambandha) as what existing in reality in the world, namely, they insist that the relation cannot be grasped directly, which has nothing to do with objective reality. And, the cause is nothing but what possesses the power to produce an effect, so causality is nothing but power (śakti). However, power cannot be perceived but can be inferred from the observation of its effect. But the inference of the causal power can be possible only if the necessary universal relation between the power and the entity is known before. The perceptual knowledge is incompetent for grasp the universal relation, namely, the invariable concomitance, and the inference presupposes such knowledge as its condition. Causality is not capable of being known either by perception or by inference. The knowledge of causality must be set down as a subjective construction or a way of thought.\(^{(32)}\)

So, according to the Baudhas, no relation can exist as an objective reality in the world.

5. 2. 0: The Lost Fragments of the Sambandhaparikṣā

Dr. H. Yaita in his recent survey\(^{(33)}\) on the Tarkarahasya has taken some important steps, in this text (Tarkarahasya) he found out the missing kārikās (from

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the 23rd to the 25th) of the *Sambandhaparikṣā* in the Sanskrit document. His research is done on the basis of a careful observation according to the Buddhist’s idea. We can see the missing *kārikās* on the basis of the Tibetan documents, which is as follows:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{saṃyoga-ādy-āśraye yogyam ayogyam tac ca jāyate}, \\
\text{nityam yogya-svabhāvasya tad-vaikalya-virodhatāḥ. //23//}
\end{align*}\]

\[(sbyor ba la sogs pa yi gnas //)

\[\text{rung ba'i dngos po de 'gyur na //}

\[\text{rung ba'i dngos po rtag na ni //}

\[\text{de dang bral bar 'gal phyir ro //23}

\[\text{iti tad-yogyatā-vācyāḥ svabhāvo asya nirucyatām,}

\[\text{vibhāga-yoga-gatibhih kim anyair gamana-ādibhiḥ. //24//}

\[(de [255b7] bas bral dang ldan pa dang //)

\[\text{'gros sogs rung ba brjod pa na //}

\[\text{ngo bo 'di la nges par brjod //}

\[\text{'gro sogs gzhan rtags ci zhig bya //24)

\[\text{teṣu satsv api tasya iti sambandhasya aprasiddhiḥ,}

\[\text{yuktah svabhāva-bheda ayam tat pratikṣaṇa-janmanām. //25//}

\[(de dag rnam s la yod na yang //)

\[\text{'di'i zhes 'brel pa mi 'grub phyir //}

\[\text{skad cig so sor skye ba yi //}

\[\text{dngos po tha dad 'di yin rigs //25)}
\]

We can collect the fragments of the *Sambandhaparikṣā* from the

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Tarkarahasya (A: TR: 111⁵¹⁹, B: TR: 69¹³⁻⁷¹¹², C: TR: 64⁷⁻¹⁹), as is well known.(34) In TR: 111⁵¹⁹, three kārikās of the Sambandhaparikṣā can be seen: from the 1st to the 3rd. In TR: 69¹³⁻⁷¹¹², three kārikās above, namely, from the 23rd to the 25th, is quoted. In TR: 64⁷⁻¹⁹, we can see the continuation of the arguments in B: TR: 69¹³⁻⁷¹¹², moreover, the fragment of the kārikā 25th can be seen.

5.2.1-1: TR: 111⁵¹⁹

Let us see TR: 111⁵¹⁹, which is as follows:

nanu —

vyāprīr nāma sambandhah. sa kim svabhāvo 'stu yuṣmākam? yasmād bauddhair avadhṛto dravyā”dipādarthaganaḥ. katham?
tadantargataḥ sambandho 'vaṣisyatām.

śrotrocyate —

“'pāratantryam hi sambandhah siddhe kā paratantrata?”
tasmāt sarvasya bhāvasya sambandho nā'sti bhāvatah.”
sāṇvṛtam tu na vāryate.

“rūpasāleṣo hi sambandho dvitve sati katham bhavet?
tasmāt prakṛtiḥbhināṃ sambandho nā'sti bhāvatah.”

yadi svabhāvasāṃsāleṣo na hi sambandhino dvitvam.
arthasambandhino bhinnasvabhāvau bhāvau stāḥ, tarhi rūpasāṃsāleṣāyā’'stā jala'ñjalir iti virodhād asambhavi sambandho 'vāstavah.

parā'peksā'pi sambandhah so 'san katham apeksate?

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Here, we can see three kārikās of the Sambandharpārīkṣā: from the 1st to the 3rd. For a translation of this passage, see Yātī [1990].

5. 2. 1-2: TR: 69^{13}-71^{12}

Let us see TR: 69^{13}-71^{12}, which is as follows:

\[
yathā — meṣayāh, anyatara-karmajah. yathā — sthānuśyena
samyogah. samyogajaś ca samyogah. yathā — sarvaih
samavāyikāraṇair ākāśah saṃyuktah. tātsamyogaś cā’kāśena
kārasya saṃyogah.
\]

athā'pi syāt? na saṃyogajananāt saṃyogināu. kim tarhi? sthāpanāt.

sthitir api prati-kṣipta 'bhinnā' 'bhinnavikalpena dūsanāt.

“saṃyoga”’dyāśraye yogyam ayogyam tac ca jāyate,

nityam yogyasvabhaṅavasya tadvaikalyavirodhatah.

iti tadyogyatāvācyah svabhāvo ’syā nirūcyatām,

vibhāgaya-yogga-tibhih kim anyair gamanā ’dibhih.

teṣu satasv api tasyeti sambandhasya prasiddhitāh,

yuktah svabhāvabheda ’yam tat prati-kṣanajanmanām.’

yadi samyuktā’samyuktayoh nā saṃyogabhāvā’bhāvabhyaṃ viṣeṣah.

yadi ca vibhaktā’vibhaktayor gartrehadagacchator vā
vibhāgakarmabhāvā’bhāvabhyaṃ, katham amī vyapadeśā na
“kundali devadattah”, “chatro vā devadattah”?
evam vibhaktā‘dāv api vácyam. tasmāt — saṃyogavibhāgakarmāni
saṃyuktā‘ dibuddhitām karaṇāni.
na.
tulyaparyanuyogatah. tavā’pi tulyarūpasya vibhaktā‘deh kim na
saṃyogā‘disamavāyah? karmā‘bhāvā‘dyanutaraṇi karmā‘pi
janakaṃ saṃyogasya dravyāt kim na jāyate?
tasmād — ‘daṇḍakūndalā‘didravyam vibhaktam ayogye prāk paścād
upasarpāparatrayasyasamarpitā‘imabhāvaṇi saṃyogasamavāye
yogyamājāyate’ iti tvayā vaktavyam. yataḥ satatāṃ
saṃyogā‘diyogayogyasya svabhāvasya bhāvasya tadvaikalyaṃ
vируddhyate.
asmākam api —
tarhi saṃyogā‘dikam anicchatāṃ tulyam etat.
gāṇḍamāndalasannikṛṣṭam aparā‘parapratyayavaśāt
kūṇḍalā‘dikam saṃyuktabuddhinibandhanam anyaktāraṇa‘bhāvāt
tathābhūtaṃ notpannam iti na kūṇḍaliti nisidhyate. sannikṛṣṭam
uppannam cchātṛiti vā vidhiyate.
tasmād —
yogyatā‘khyah svabhāvah saṃyogā‘dikam prati tvayā
abhyaupagamyamānah kevalo ‘saṃyuktā‘ dibuddhinibandhanam. kim
anyah saṃyogā‘ dibhih?
yasmāt stām api gamanā‘dīnām svā‘śraye vāstavaḥ sambandho
nistiddhaḥ ‘pāratantryam’ ityādinā. kutāḥ sambandhā‘bhāve
tannibandhano vyapadeśah?
yathā'nyagataih karmā' dibhir asambandhād anyo na tantrā''dikāh,
tathā tadjatasthammatair api.

"tesu satṣv api tasyeti sambandhasyā'prasiddhitah.
yuktāḥ svabhāvabheda 'yam tatpratiksanaṭjanmanām."

pratiksanaṭjanma kaiṣcid upasarpānā''dipratvayair nirantarotpādaḥ
samyoṣaśabdavācyah.
dandaśūkaphūṭkāraśrūtisādhvasā''disāmagrīyā
pratipā'parā'parapradesaṭsthatayotpādo vibhāgavyapadeśavisayāḥ.
ekadiṃmukhatayā prarāparadesaṃmyogavibhāgabhāgitayotpādo
gamanā''khyāḥ. pūrvā'paratvenotpanne ca bhāve
pūrvām'parā''disanketa. . . .

In this way, here, we can see three kārikās of the Sambandhaparikṣā: from
the 23rd to the 25th, and the commentary on them. For a translation of this
passage, see Yaita [1990].

5. 2. 1-3: TR: 647-19

Let us see TR: 647-19, which is as follows:

tadābhoganibandhānas ca paratvā'paratvagunām antareṇā'pi
pratiksanaṭvalipalitāśmaśrujālā''divisīṣṭavabhāvotpādaśvisayō
yuvāsthavirā''divyapadeśāḥ. na sthir aiksvabhāvanaṃ bhāvānāṃ
kādācitkasvabhāvā'bhīnicosino vyapadeśāḥ sambhavanti.
tad evam —
pārataṇtryaṃ, rūpaśleṣo, nairantaryaṃ, prāptih, saṅgatir avicchedah.
apekṣā''disamyoṣagasamavāyo, niyamo, virodhā''dayo na vastubhūtāḥ

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sambandhah. kim tarhi?

bhavānāṁ athātmanām avibhāgavantam adhikṛtya
tadāmyasambandhah sāṃvṛtaḥ. bhāvā bhāvau niyatāv avadhārya
kāryakāraṇabhāvah sāṃvṛtaḥ. yato — bhinnān eva bhāvān mīśrayati
kalpanā. sa ca 'vidyā' 'nubhavavāsanāsambandhāj jāyamānā, viparitā
cā vastusvabhāvā 'vagāhinī vēti vyavahārā 'ṅgiktā. tatra vyāptau
sambandhe vipratipattavyam.

For a translation, see Yaita[1990]. Here, we can see the theory of relation
by the Buddhists, namely, which is the same idea by Dharmakīrti in his
Sambandhaparikṣā. Moreover, we have to notice that in the TR: 64.19 the conclusion
of the Sambandhaparikṣā can be seen. Furthermore, it is not too much to say that
TR: 64.19 is the continuation of TR: 69.11 mentioned above,(35) which is as
follows:

. . . pratiksānajanma kaiścid upasarpānā' dipratyayair
nirantarotpādaḥ sāmyogasadāvācyah.
dandaśūkāphūkāraśrutisādhvasā 'disāmagṛyā
dhipā' parā' parapradesāsthathatayotpādo vibhāgavyapadesāviṣayah.
ekadinmukhatayā praprā' parapradesāsamyoğavibhāgabhāgitayotpādo
gamanā 'khyaḥ. pūrvā' paratvenotpanne ca bhāve
pūrvām' parā' 'disanketa(h). tadābhoganibandhanaś ca paratvā' paratvagnāṁ antareṇā' pi
pratiksānavaipalitaśmaśrujāla 'disivaśasvabhāvotpādaviṣayo
yuvāśhavirā 'dhyapadesāh. na sthir aiksvabhāvānāṁ bhāvānāṁ
kādācīkavabhāvā 'bhinivośino vyapadesāḥ sambhavanti.

tad evam — . . .

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5. 2. 2: Conclusion on the Lost Fragments of the Sambandhaparikṣā

We can see some fragments of the Sambandhaparikṣā in the Tarkarahasya, as we have seen in the above. Here, in the anumāna chapter of the Tarkarahasya, the objection that the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) on the basis of the tādāmya and the tadutpatti in Buddhism cannot be established is supposed. And, against this objection, we may say that the Tarkarahasya says that the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) on the basis of the tādāmya and the tadutpatti cannot exist in reality, or truth, but can be existent as the samvrita. Therefore, the Bauddhas can hold the thoery of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti), which is the basic conception of the Buddhist logic.
NOTES IN CHAPTER V

(1) Akalanka is a very famous Jaina logician in the Digambara sect in the 8th century. (Potter[1995])


(3) Jha, V. N.[1990]

(4) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxxvii

(5) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxxvii

(6) Mookerjee[1944]: 178

(7) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxxviii

(8) PKM: 505

(9) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxxviii

(10) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxxix

(11) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxxix

(12) Jha, V. N.[1990]: xxxix

(13) Mookerjee[1944]: 179-180

(14) PKM: 506

(15) ... yatah kramenāpi bhāvah sambandhābhya ekatra kārane kārye vā varttamāno 'nyanisprahah = kāryakāranayor anyatarānapekṣo naikavṛttimān sambandho yuktah, tadabhāve 'pi = kāryakāranayor abhāve 'pi tadbhāvāt. (PKM: 506-507)

(16) Mookerjee[1944]: 180

(17) PKM: 507

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For example, the expression ‘This is a cow, because it has a dewlap (sāsnā) and so on,’ refers to the referent of the word ‘go’ (cow).

Because the eyes helped by the memory (smarana) of the sweet smell do not cause the perception of ‘sweet-smelling sandalwood’.

Because even if the speaker has the passions and so on, he is not a speaker unless he wants to speak (vaktukāmatā).

Otherwise, there cannot be a mistaking of the name of gotva (while speaking).

Because one speaks only when one wants to speak.

"Kiṇ ca, kāryakāranabhāvaḥ sakaladesakālāvasthitākhilāñnidhūma-vyaktikrodikaraṇenāvagato 'numānanimittam, nānyathā. na ca nirvikalpakasavikalpakapratyaksasyeyati vastuni vyāpāraḥ, pratyaksānapalambhayor vā. (PKM: 513)

"Kiṇ ca, kāryotpādaśaktiśiṣṭatvam kāraṇatvam. na căsau śaktiḥ pratyakṣāvaseyā kin tu kāryadarsanagamyā, . . . (PKM: 513)

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(31) lātā kāryāt kāraṇatvāvagame 'numānāc chaktyavagamah syāt. tatrāpi šaktikāryayoḥ pratibandhapratitir na prayaktādeḥ; uktadoṣānusāgat. anumānāt tādavagame 'navasthetaretarāśrayānusāngo vā syāt. etena tṛtiyo 'pi pakṣaḥ cintīta iti. (PKM: 514)

(32) Mookerjee[1944]: 184

(33) 「Tarkarahasya研究(I)」（『成田山仏教研究紀要』12, pp. 75-98.） (Yaita[1988]), 「TarkarahasyaにおけるSambandhaparikṣā」（『印度学仏教学研究』38-1, pp. (82)-(84.) (Yaita[1989]) and 「Tarkarahasya研究(II)」（『成田山仏教研究紀要』13, pp. 83-104.）(Yaita[1990])

(34) Yaita[1990]

(35) For further details of this idea, see Yaita[1990].

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CHAPTER VI
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY OF PRABHĀCANDRA’S ARGUMENTS

6. 0. 0:

Prabhācandra’s arguments for refuting Dharmakirti’s theory of relation (sambandha) in the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda in the Prameyakalamārtanda are summarized here. We can see that he refutes Dharmakirti’s theory of relation on the basis of the Jaina theory of reality and that of pramāṇa: pratyakṣa and parokṣa in the Jainism in the late period, that is to say, we do not overlook the Jaina theory of reality and knowledge especially mentioned in the Chapter III, before reading the Uttarapakṣa of the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda in the Prameyakalamārtanda by Prabhācandra. We can see the Uttarapakṣa of the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda: from PKM: 514 to PKM: 520.

6. 1. 0: Sambandha Is Real.

Against the objections from PKM: 504 to PKM: 514, Prabhācandra replies: ‘tadetat sarvam asāmicinam.’ (All this is incorrect.), because the entities appear in the cognition only by means of perception of the relation. We can, here, see that he regards the sambandha, as an objective reality.

For example, the cloth appears as related to the threads and the colour and so on as connected with the cloth and so on. If it were not the relation among them, they would appear as unrelated with each other. That these are distinct and different is not open to denial. The whole is different from the parts and the quality is different from the substance, still they are perceived together. The given

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togetherness cannot be explained by any hypothesis other than that of a relation.'

When the relation is known by the perception, how can you say it is a postulation of an unknown thing which is not a relation? Because it will lead to contradiction.

And, Prabhācandra continues: if you do not accept the relation, then there can be the contradiction with the 'practical (causal) efficiency' (arthakriyā), because the 'practical (causal) efficiency' (arthakriyākāritva), namely, holding water, fetching water by pot cannot be explained since according to you the atoms are not related with one another. The pot is supposed by the Buddhist to be nothing more than a collection of atoms existing side by side. The Buddhist admits that an atom does not possess the capacity for drawing water. However, the pot has this capacity and as such cannot be supposed to be identical with the isolated atoms.'

Moreover, when one end of the rope, the bamboo, the stick and so on is pulled toward one place, according to those who do not accept the idea regarding the relation, the other end of them cannot be pulled toward the same place since the entity (the atom) has no relation with each other. But all this is a fact. Therefore, since all this cannot be explained without accepting a relationship, the relation is established.'

So, for Prabhācandra, the relationship can be real.

6.1.1: Transformation (Parināma) and Sambandha

Dharmakirti says that the relation of things should be of the nature of dependence (pāratantra), and he denies the relation (sambandha), as we have seen in 5.1.1 in Chapter V.

Against this, Prabhācandra replies: this is incorrect, because it is well known
by our experience that there is the 'dependency' (pāratantra) among the objects which is of the nature of 'transformation into one' consisting of the mass. And, he says that we do not accept the position that one thing is related to another totally or partially, but the Jainas accept the position in a different way. Since it is not possible to accept that a relation occurs in total amalgamation or in partial amalgamation and since there is another explanation possible, and since it is not possible to explain our experience (of connectedness) without accepting a relation, we have to accept an entity called relation as belonging to another class of entity based on the states of wet-ness and dry-ness, as barley-powder and water. Indeed, as having the nature of the connected (samslista) by giving up the nature of being distinct (viślista), the transformation somehow into oneness, that is to say, the transformation of one state (viślista) into another state (samslista), it is possible to show the relationship of things as in the case of experiencing the variegated colour consisting of colours like blue and so on.

Prabhācandra says that the cognition of the variegated colour is nothing more than a relationship with many colours such as blue and so on arising as a different class of colour, namely, it is nothing but the transformation of one state into another state. The factuality of the relation is attested by our experience, the things in spite of their differences can transform themselves into a unity. It is a fact that the things are dynamic and they maintain their identity in spite of their changes, in so far, at least, as their nature is thought to unfold itself to our consciousness. (5)

In this way, the theory of sambandha can be real on the basis of the theory of the transformation accepted by the Jainas. (A)
6.1.2: The Regions of Sambandha

Prabhācandra regards the relation (R) among the things:

1. R with all regions because of entering into mutual regions as the relationship (for example, the relationship between barley-powder and water).{6}

2. R only on the basis of the association with the regions (for example, in the case of one finger with another finger).{7}

According to the Jainas accepting the real entity possessing the parts, both inside and outside, it is not a defect to hold the association with parts. It is not true that it will lead to the endless-regression; because there is no absolute difference between the whole possessing the parts and the parts.{8} The Jainas do not believe in the existence of simples, which have no aspects, qualitative or quantitative, namely, a real is the identity of an infinite plurality of aspects and modes.

Here, the objection can arise: there is a difference between them. However, Prabhācandra replies that in that case, there can arise the endless regression.

And, Prabhācandra continues: the entity having the nature of unsteady (variable) property will form a separate class of entities on the basis of absolute difference and non-difference, as in the case of the cognition of the variegated colour.{9} A real is a unity and diversity in one, and the relation involved is neither one of absolute identity nor one of absolute otherness, but something different from them both. It is sui generis, which does not permit of being determined by absolute criteira. The parts or modes or aspects are neither different nor identical with the unity to which they belong. The relation inside the unity is also sui generis. The validity of such a relation cannot be called in question on the ground.
that it refuses to be determinated in terms of identity or of otherness, because it is ultimate and simple as identity and otherness are. This theory is all on the basis of the conception by the Jainas, as we have seen in Chapter III.

In this way, we can see the Jaina theory in the above, which, especially, appears at: 'there is no absolute difference between the whole possessing the parts and the parts.' and 'the entity having the nature of unsteady (variable) property will form a separate class of entities on the basis of absolute difference and non-difference'. This is a typical theory of the non-absolutism (anekāntavāda).

6. 1. 3: Amśa

In the case of the above, the objection can arise: there will arise the contingency that even atoms (paramāṇu) should have parts (amśa).

Against this, Prabhācandra says: this reply is also evasive. Because in this case, we have to ask whether the term 'amśa' refers to (1) the own nature (svabhāva) or (2) the part (avayava).

If (1), there cannot arise any fault in that theory.

Because the difference of the own nature can arise on the basis of the indivisible atoms (paramāṇu) and the various other atoms, which cannot be explained without the relationship, in all directions around the indivisible atom.

If (2), then the objection can be taken by the Jainas.

Because the indivisible atoms (paramāṇu) cannot have their own parts on the basis of its being as the entity which cannot be divided any more. And, the undivided-ness means 'that which cannot be
divided any more’, but not ‘that which has no nature’.

The assertion of infinite diversity does not make the conception of atoms impossible. An atom is *ex hypothesi* an indivisible unit. But though spatially indivisible it may be divisible in other dimensions. An atom has a plurality of aspects and thus it can be divided into these aspects. According to the Jainas, both are agreed upon the point that the manifold of qualities, original and derivative, which are possessed by the reals, is infinite. The things in relation are neither wholly finished entities nor non-entities. The relation is identity of different things. Such being the case, the things are neither what they were out of relation nor do they change their identity entirely when they come to be things of a relation.*

6. 1. 4: The Relation of Things Can Be of the Nature of Dependence (*Pāratantrya*)

As we have seen in 5. 1. 1 in Chapter V, Dharmakirti says that if there is a relation (*sambandha*), then the relation of things may be of the nature of dependence (*pāratantrya*). In that case, whether does it (*pāratantrya*) exist between two already produced relata (*nispānasambandhin*) or between two unproduced relata (*anispānasambandhin*)? Consequently, he denies the existence of the *sambandha* in any cases above.

Against this, Prabhācandra replies: it is not proper. Because:

Somehow, the relationship can be cognised between two already produced relata.

For example:

(A) The cloth is the already accomplished in the form of the substance called thread, because a thread exists even before it transforms into

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the cloth, but in that mement the cloth is unaccomplished in its own form.

(B) The substance thread is already accomplished in its own form, but it is unaccomplished in the form of transformed cloth.

(C) The substance like the finger and so on is the substance already accomplished, but it is unaccomplished in the transformed form of being connected.

The cloth is the product and the thread is the material cause of it. The cloth was not in existence as the cloth before it came into being. But it was not an absolute non-entity as it existed as the thread. It is the thread which becomes the cloth and so the two are not different in an absolute sense. The cloth again abstracted from the thread is only an idea and a fiction. So the cloth as the other thing of the causal relation was in existence before as the thread, though not as the cloth. The thread and the cloth are not as the substance two absolutely different entities, but they are the same substance with difference of qualities. The relation of cloth and thread is an instance of internal relation — internal in the sense that the change occurs in the causal stuff and the changed cause becomes the effect. The effect is the product of a process, which goes within the cause and so the production of the other thing and that of its relation are rather simultaneous events. But so far as relation is considered as a separate fact, it must be recognized that it is not external to the things in the sense that it can exist independently of the latter. Relation, whether internal or external, is integral to the things and is the result of an internal change in the nature of things. So also such external relations as conjunction of two fingers are nothing external in the sense of being independent. The fingers conjoined are no longer absolutely the same entities as they were while
out of relation. The fact of being conjoined is a new attribute which they did not possess when they remained side by side in isolation. The emergence of the new quality is the result of a process of change in both the things, which eventuated in the conjunction of both. The conjunction is thus the product of an internal change in the constitution of the things and thus is as much entitled to be regarded as internal as relation as the so-called relation of inherence (samavāya).\(^{13}\)

Moreover, the objection can still arise: the relationship cannot arise among the positive entities, since there is no dependency among them.

Against this, Prabhācandra says: whether any relationship pervaded by that criterion is (1) known or (2) not?

If (1), how can there be the absence of the relationship everywhere evetytime exist? Because this is contradictory to our experiences.

If (2), how can you establish the absence of the non-pervaded (avyāpya) on the basis of the absence of the non-pervader (avyāpaka)? And inspite of that if you accept it, then, it will lead to over-application.

So, Prabhācandra regards that the relation of things can be of the nature of dependence (Pāratantrya).

6. 1. 5: The Relation of Things Can Be of Rūpaśleṣa.

As we have seen in 5. 1. 2 in Chapter V, Dharmakirti says that if there is a relation (sambandha), then the relation of things may be of the nature of amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaśleṣa). And, he denies the sambandha even on the basis of the theory of rūpaśleṣa.

Against this, Prabhācandra replies: this is applicable to those who accept
the absolutism (ekāntavādin), but not to us the Jainas who accept the non-absolutism (anekāntavādin); Because:

Somehow, the Jainas accept the relation (sambandha) of two relata (sambandhīn), which (sambandha) is characterised by the amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaślesa) having the own nature of the transformation into oneness, namely, the transformation of one state into another state. Indeed, the amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaślesa) of two relata is difficult to explain, and their discreteness is having an uncommon nature. This is not contradictory to the duality of the two relata because of our experience.

For example:

It is just like in the case of the cognition of the variegated colour as one.

So, Prabhācandra regards that the relation of things can be of the amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaślesa).

6. 1. 6: The Nature of the Relationship Is Relative (Āpeksika).

And, the objection can arise: since the nature of the relationship is relative, it is false as subtlety and so on of the entities.

However, Prabhācandra says that it should not be said. Because:

Even though the entities do not have the own nature of relationship, the same objection can be raised in the case of the theory that there is no relationship, namely, it is nothing but the state of being relative.

Indeed, Some entities dependent on something else and this state
cannot arise without being fixed on the state of being relative.

For example:

It is just like the whole-ness and so on.

Moreover, the objection can arise: the appearance being in the perceptual cognition (pratyakṣabuddhi) is not the state of being relative but it is determined by the imagination (vikalpa) following the perceptual cognition; as it is relative so it is unreal.

Against this, Prabhācandra says: it is also false. It is not the case that the relationship is never known by perception and hence it cannot be non-relative.

So, Prabhācandra regards that the nature of the relationship is relative (āpekṣika), and he says that by this argument, against the theory that a relation can be existent without being dependent on the other, it is also replied that ‘indeed, a relation could have been dependency (of one thing on the other),’ and so on discussed before; because, even if a relation is not accepted, the same objection will continue.

We can see that the Jainas do not accept such a relation without transformations (modifications) in that way between the two relata. Therefore, we can see that the theory that on account of the relationship with one entity called relatum there is a relation between the two relata is not accepted by the Jainas.

6. 1. 7: The Imagination (Kalpanā) Mixes All Entities (Bhāva)?

As we have seen in 5. 1. 6 in Chapter V, according to the Baudhhas, the two relata (bhāva) (x, y) and additional appearance called relation (R), all these exist in the own forms (of the relata). Therefore, the entities (bhāva) are distinct
by themselves. And, Dharmakirti says that the imagination (kalpanā) mixes them, namely, it causes us to know them to be related in spite of the absence of any relation in reality.

Against this, Prabhācandra says that it is not proper. Because:

(1) In order to cause the knowledge of the relata “the action and its related factors” and so on and of the relation (sambandha), the addition of a word, namely, the words expressive of that meaning are used.

(2) The theory of ‘anyāpoha’ have been already refuted by the Jainas, it cannot be accepted as the word-meaning. As in the case of the cognition of the variegated colour as the one, there is no contradiction in accepting that there is one relationship.

This is Prabhācandra’s theory in reply to Dharmakirti’s theory: ‘the speakers conventionally use the linguistic expression which express the meanings of notions like the action (kriyā), its related factors (kāraka) and so on in order to convey the anyāpoha which is nothing but the difference of the positive entities alone. In reality there is no relation between an action (kriyā) and a related factors (kāraka), because of momentariness (ksanikatva) at the time of an action (kriyā) there can be no its related factors (kāraka).’

6. 2. 0: The Cause and Effect Relationship (Kāryakāranabhāva)

In addition to the above, the arguments about the cause and effect relationship by Prabhācandra is open. Dharmakirti does not regard the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāranabhāva) as the real, as we have seen in Chapter V. Let us now see.
Prabhācandra’s idea about the kāryakāranabhāva.

6. 2. 1: There Arises Something (A) Because of Something Else (B)

As we have seen in 5. 1. 7-2 and so on in Chapter V, it is said by the Buddhists that ‘how can the cause and effect relationship be a relation existent in two?’ and so on; and, consequently, they do not regard the cause and effect relationship as the real.

However, Prabhācandra says that this also sounds well until it is critically examined. Because the Jainas do not accept that the entity existing at the same time or the one in sequence is due to the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāranabhāva). But, they say that regularly there arises something (A) because of something else (B), in this case, we can regard that one (A) is the effect (kārya) and the other (B) is the cause (kāraṇa).

He continues:

(1) In some cases the cause and effect may be together.

For example:

In the case of the substances such as earth (kāraṇa) or the stick (kāraṇa), and so on, with the pot (kārya).

(2) In some other cases they may be sequential.

For example:

In the case of such as the previous mode (kāraṇa, ex. milk) of the subsequent (kārya, ex. curd).

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6. 2. 2: The Comprehension of *Kāryakāraṇabhāva* by the Characteristic of the Seeing and Not Seeing or by the Logical Reasoning

In addition to the above, Prabhācandra continues: the comprehension of *kāryakāraṇabhāva* is known (1) by the characteristic of the seeing and not seeing the individual entity determined* or (2) by the logical reasoning (*tarka*: the instrument of the knowledge of the *sādhyasādhanabhāva*) from the indefinite one (the general cause and effect relationship).

Regarding (1), Prabhācandra says:

The same perception is expressed by the words ‘*pratyakṣa*’ and ‘*anupalambha*’ (the seeing and not seeing), namely, ‘*pratyakṣa*’ is perception and ‘*pratyakṣānupalambha*’ is also perception. Indeed, *Pratyakṣa* has the object intended as the cause and effect relationship (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*): this is the cause and this is the effect.

And he continues:

And other than that, at the same time there is also the not seeing-perception expressed by the word ‘*anupalambha*’ which has any other reality (entity) (*vastu*) as the object of itself.

For example:

We can say that we cannot decide that the smoke can be ‘smoke’ which is not produced by ‘fire’ by so many ways if it would have been the case that the smoke is there in a particular place even before its association with fire; Or we could say this smoke has come from something else. But all this is refuted by perception (*pratyakṣa*) helped by ‘not seeing’ (*anupalambha*).
About (2), this is the theory that whenever there is the entity intended as the cause then the entity intended as the effect can arise.

By means of the theory that the seeing and not seeing and the logical reasoning have an ability which causes the knowledge of the cause and effect relationship.

For example:

Even if we see the donkey, which was not seen before, immediately after the potter arrives, the theory that it (donkey) can be the effect of the potter can be refuted. Because, had it been the case we could know for certain that the donkey did not exist before, it did not come from another place where the potter is, and it has no other reason than the potter, then we could have said that the donkey is the effect produced by the potter. But that cannot be ascertained.

So, the Jainas say that the comprehension of kāryakāranabhāva is known by the characteristic of the seeing and not seeing the individual entity determined or by the logical reasoning from the indefinite one (the general cause and effect relationship).

6. 2. 3: The Comprehension of the Cause and the Effect by Means of One's Repeated Experience

As we have seen in 5. 1. 7 in Chapter V, the Buddhists insist that when two perceptions having two different objects like the thing intended as the cause (fire) and the thing intended as the effect (smoke) is not capable of knowing either cause-ness or effect-ness if out of the two one is not cognised since it depends on
the knowledge of that (second).

Against this, Prabhācandra says: even if the person having a particular state of destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring-karman (jñānāvaniyakarman) 
(ksayopaśamaviśeṣa) sees only the smoke, he can understand that the smoke is produced from the fire by means of his repeated experience. If we cannot distinguish the smoke from the steam and so on, there will arise the inferential cognition of fire even from vapour and thus it will lead to a chaos with reference to our day-to-day behaviour.

So, the Jainas say that we can comprehend the cause and the effect by means of our repeated experience.\(^{17}\)

6. 2. 4: The Determination of Kāryakāraṇabhāva by the External Cause and the Internal Cause

In addition to the above, Prabhācandra insists on the importance of the ksayopaśamaviśeṣa and one's repeated experience.

An objection arises: even if the inhabitants of the Island of the coconut-trees (i.e. the savages) suddenly see the smoke or the fire, since the cause and effect relationship between the two is not ascertained, so the cause and effect relationship cannot be real.

Against this, Prabhācandra says that the determination of the cause and effect relationship is caused by (1) the external cause and (2) the internal cause, which is as follows:

(1) The external cause: The repeated observation (experience) that something intended as the effect can arise wherever something intended
as the cause exists\(^{(18)}\)

(2) The internal cause: A particular act (state) of destruction and subsidence (ksayopaśanaviśesā) (of knowledge-obscuring-karman (jnānāvāniyakarman), namely, this means labdhi\(^{(19)}\)

He continues that the inhabitants of the Island of the coconut-trees do not understand the cause and effect relationship between the smoke and the fire, because of the absence of the external cause and the internal cause\(^{(20)}\) so, they do not make the determination of either the cause and effect relationship or the non-cause-and-effect relationship.

So, Prabhācandra says that we can do the determination of kāryakāraṇabhāva by the external cause and the internal cause, as mentioned above. Moreover, we can see that the Jainas admit that for the knowledge of the causality the mind co-operates with our sense-organs, and the contribution of each of them is necessary.

6. 2. 5: The Buddhist Logician Contradicts Himself

The objection can arises: since it is not possible to explain the definiteness of the effectness arising only from the factors which will be the cause of the knowledge of the smoke and so on, we cannot know that the effectness and so on are the nature of the smoke and so on.

Against this, Prabhācandra says:

If it is so, how can we call the momentary-ness (kṣaṇīkatva) the nature of the smoke?

In that case let the momentary-ness not be the nature of the smoke, either, from the same ground.
This means that if the Buddhists cannot regard the effect-ness, in that case they should not regard the momentary-ness (ksanikatva), which is accepted by the Buddhists themselves. The Buddhists thus contradict themselves and they are compelled to confess the bankruptcy of the Jainas’ theory. The criterion of falsity must be found in contradiction. If there can be the absence of the momentary-ness, then the momentary-ness (ksanikatva) and so on cannot be the nature of the smoke and so on. Here we can see that the Jainas regard the nature of the things as the real.

6. 2. 6: Kāraṇatva and Karyatva

In addition to the above, Prabhācandra says:

(1) We cannot say that the effectness (kāryatva) is the property of that thing which has not yet been produced, because the effect does not exist. Nor can it be said that it (kāryatva) is absolutely different from the produced (kārya), because it (kāryatva) is the property of that (kārya).

(2) The cause (kāraṇa) also have the property called kāraṇatva which is not totally different from the cause (kāraṇa).

This means that since the effect-ness (kāryatva) or the cause-ness (kāraṇatva) is identical with the effect (kārya) and the cause (kāraṇa) respectively, namely, is not different from the effect (kārya) and the cause (kāraṇa). In other words, when one perceives the effect (kārya), he will perceive the effect-ness (kāryatva), too, and when one perceives the cause (kāraṇa), he will perceive the cause-ness (kāraṇatva), too, as one perceives the individual form. Here also, we can see the
non-absolutism in the Jainism.

For example:

A person including a little child when pressed by the thirst moves towards water and so on by knowing water through perception as distinct from everything else and quenches his thirst with that (water) which has the capacity of removing the thirst.

This means that in this case he sees both the kāryatva and the kāranatva, and the effect is seen when water has got the capacity of removing the thirst, so the causeness can be determined, because the effect (the quenching the thirst) cannot arise without that. A thirsty man sees water and at once drinks it. He knows that water possesses the power of quenching thirst and he perceives it along with his perception of water. After all, it is not the physical organs that are the instruments of perception. The organs are but the channels or media through which the soul works upon the data.

Prabhācandra continues: the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāranabhāva) cannot arise between two things which are not intended as the cause and the effect by nature. Moreover, it is not possible to make kāryatā and kāranatā as identical after subsequently they will appear as different. Because it will lead to a contradiction. And, nor is it possible to make them different from them, because if you make it identical with them, the effect (kārya) will become kāryatva and the cause (kāraṇa) will become kāranatva by nature. And, on the basis of the nature, no purpose is served in postulation of the relationship appearing as the different thing between the cause and the effect, because they exist independent of each other.

In causation the two things are related by sequence; and if a further intrinsic
determination of the relation is determined the Jainas supply it by pointing out that the things stand to each other in the relation of identity-in différence. The effect is a modification of the cause and thus is not absolutely different from the cause or identical with it. As substance the two are the same identity, but as qualities or modes they are numerically different.({25})

Here also, we can see the non-absolutism in the Jainism.

6. 2. 7: The Power of Producing Kārya Is the Svabhāva of the Kārana

The objection can arise:({26})

1) If the effect (kārya) is not known, how can one know the causeness (kāraṇatā) in the cause (kāraṇa)? Because it depends upon the other.

2) Unless you know the prior and subsequent part, how can one know the middle part different from the pūrva and the aparā? Because they are of the same character of being relative.

Therefore, the statement “The observer sees that this is momentary. (i.e. He sees only one moment: pūrvaksana, madhyaksana and aparaksana)” will lead to a contradiction. The middle moment has got the nature (svabhāva) which excludes the prior and subsequent and the knowledge of the madhyā will make you know that comprehension.

Against this, Prabhācandra says: the power of producing the effect (kārya) is the nature (svabhāva) of the cause (kārana), it should be known that the knowledge of the kārana will make you know the effect (kārya), because there is no difference.

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The knowledge of the effect (kārya) mentioned above arises by oneself (the soul) accompanied by perception (pratyakṣa) and so on.

The percipient is ultimately the self, whose store of knowledge is constantly growing and with the growth of knowledge his powers of perception are being constantly improved and enriched. There is no logical necessity for supposing that the knowledge of attributes, which is reached by a laborious course of speculation, must be mental and subjective.\(^{(27)}\)

And, Prabhācandra continues: if you do not determine the effect, and, if you do not determine the power of producing the effect also, the determination on the basis of ‘blue’ (nila) and so on accepted by the Buddhists cannot be real, either. Because the thing intended as the effect produced from the power is the same produced from ‘blue’ (nila) and so on also, because both ṣakti and nila are same, namely, both are what intended as the cause of the effect.

6. 2. 8: Specific Cause for Specific Effect

Prabhācandra continues: it is not the fact that the fire produced from fuel is identical with the fire produced from the gem, either. Had it been so, we could have identified both the kārya and the kāraṇa.\(^{(28)}\) In making the distinction between the two, the knower must be an expert. When we carefully examine the effect with effort, the effect examined in such way cannot transgress its cause. Otherwise, how can you explain the respective difference between the the man free from all bad qualities like attachments and the opposite, though we can see the mixture of the two in their behaviour?

And, in the case that you do not accept the theory of kāryakāraṇabhāva,
How can you distinguish the respective difference between the dead and the not dead?

(1) Consciousness (caitanya) exists in the alive body, because we see a man who has the particular form of the motion and speaking.

(2) Consciousness does not exist in the dead body, because we cannot see a particular effect like the motion and so on.

In this way, on the basis of seeing a particular effect and not seeing it, we can conclude the presence of a particular cause and the absence of it. This is how we can explain the difference between a person who is alive and who is dead.

6. 2. 9: Akāryakāraṇabhāva Can Be a Relation

Prabhācandra says that even in the case of not accepting kāryakāraṇabhāva, the akāryakāraṇabhāva is also nothing but a relation which should exist in two entities.\(^{(29)}\)

The objection can arise, as we have seen in 5. 1. 7 in Chapter V: the akāryakāraṇabhāva is what existing in succession being present either in the non-effect or in the non-cause, without requiring the other, namely, without being dependent either on the non-cause or on the non-effect, and consequently the relation cannot be accepted.

Against this, Prabhācandra says: then how can you say the theory of the absence of the relation, in spite of denying the relation? He says that we can regard it as a relation.

As we have seen in Sambandhapariksā 9, the objection can arise: the

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desired relation, \textit{akāryakāraṇabhāva}, in succession, exists in one of the two, namely, either in the non-effect or in the non-cause depending on either non-effect or non-cause respectively, and hence the \textit{asambnadha} intended as the \textit{akāryakāraṇabhāva} does exist in two because one requires the other, and consequently the relation cannot be accepted.

Against this, Prabhācandra says: what is required as the \textit{akāryakāraṇabhāva} must be regarded as a benefactor (\textit{upakārin}) which has the effect on either non-effect or non-cause respectively.

So the objection that ‘How can the non-existent (\textit{asat}) have any effect (\textit{upakāra}) on the other?’ must be used in every case, namely, it must be done in this case also. This means that the \textit{akāryakāraṇabhāva} supposed by the Buddhists can be the desired relation which has the effect on somethings, namely, it is a contradiction itself.

6. 2. 10: \textit{Akāryakāraṇabhāva} and \textit{Kāryakāraṇabhāva} Can Be Regarded

Even in the case of not accepting the entities (\textit{arthā}) which are of no cause and effect relationship (\textit{kāryakāraṇabhāva}), the cause and effect relationship (\textit{kāryakāraṇabhāva}) will become real.

However, Prabhācandra says that it is not proper that neither of the entities being of \textit{kāryakāraṇabhāva} and the entities being of \textit{akāryakāraṇabhāva} can be denied, because it is a contradiction, for example, as the \textit{nila} and the not \textit{nila} cannot be together in one thing.\(^{39}\)

Therefore, the Jainas say that on some grounds, the \textit{akāryakāraṇabhāva} can be logically true because there is no knowledge of the \textit{kāryakāraṇabhāva}

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mutually among a cow (*go*), a horse (*aśva*), and so on, similarly, we should accept that the *kāryakāranabhāva* can be also logically true because there is the knowledge that something intended as the effect\(^{(31)}\) can arise wherever something intended as the cause\(^{(32)}\) exists among the fire and the smoke, and so on.

Prabhācandra says that we should, ultimately, accept the two *akāryakāranabhāva* and *kāryakāranabhāva*, because there is no obstruction to these theories. Therefore, when we have the ground to explain the knowledge of the relationship, simply you cannot deny the relation which is intended as *asambandha* by your own theory.\(^{(33)}\)

6. 3. 0: Brief Conclusion

We can now sum up the Jaina conception of relation, as follows: the relations are objective verities which are as much given to intuition and to thought as the things are. A relation has no objective status outside the things. It is the result of an internal change in the nature of the things. It is *sui generis* in that it cannot be placed under the head of identity or of difference, both of which are contained as traits in its being.\(^{(34)}\)

Neither synchronism nor succession is believed by the Jainas to be the essential characteristic of causal relation. Causality is a relation of determination. The effect is that whose coming into being is necessarily determined by the being of another. The determinant is called the cause and the determinatum is called the effect.\(^{(35)}\)

And we should not overlook that the thoery of *sambandha* can be real on the basis of the thoery of the transformation accepted by the Jainas. Moreover, we
can say that these conceptions are on the basis of the Jaina theory of reality and knowledge, as we have seen in Chapter III.

NOTES IN CHAPTER VI

1) Mookerjee[1944]: 185

2) Mookerjee[1944]: 185

3) \textit{atas tadanyathānupattees cāsau siddhah.} (PKM: 514)

4) Otherwise, all the defects pointed out earlier will continue. And, the Jainas do not accept the position that one thing is related to another totally or partially. If they accepted like that, the objection by the Buddhists would have been valid. (See PKM: 514)

5) Mookerjee[1944]: 186

6) It is just like the case of solution of a powder in water. In this case, the parts of powder and the parts of water interpenetrate and we get practically and indistinguishable whole.

7) In the case of conjunction of two fingers it is partial.

8) Here, we can see that this is the Jaina view, on the other hand, the Nyāya view is that they (the whole and the parts) are total different.

9) \textit{anekāntātmakavastuno} \textit{tyantabhēdābhēdhābhīyāṁ} \textit{jātyantaravāc citrasamvedanavad eva.} (PKM: 515)

10) Mookerjee[1944]: 188

11) Mookerjee[1944] says: The Jaina explains relation by reference to an internal change in the terms, which makes it inevitable for them to come to a focal unity. The terms are numerically different no doubt, but when they come into relation they become changed into an identity of differents. The transformation into identity, which we have called

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unification, is believed to be neither complete nor partial and so the consequences alleged
would not apply to them. The unification is different from both. It is neither a total merger
nor partial identification. The unity of the terms in relation is *sui generis* (*jātyāntara*). It is
on a par with the unity of the cognition of a variegated carpet. The unity of the cognition in
spite of the numerical difference of contents is an attested fact. The reality of total or
partial identification is to be admitted on the basis of experience, and if experience records
a case of unification of different in which their difference is not annulled, but transformed
into a different kind of identity, we have no reason to call in question its authenticity.
(Mookerjee[1944]: 187)

(12) Mookerjee[1944]: 189

(13) Mookerjee[1944]: 189-190

(14) . . nāśmābhīḥ sambandhinos tathāparinātivyatirekenānyāḥ sambandho
    'bhyanpomayate, . . . (PKM: 516)

(15) Anyāpoha can be called ‘a negative abstraction from others’.

(16) For example, the fire and the smoke: the specific cause and effect relationship

(17) Of course, we should not overlook the necessity of a particular state of destruction
    and subsidence of knowledge-obscurring-karman (*jñānāvanīyokarman*) (*ksayopāsamaviśeṣa*).

(18) tadbhāvabhāvīnābhāhvāsas tu bāhyam. (PKM: 518)

(19) *ksayopāsamaviśeṣo hi tasyāntahkāraṇam.* (PKM: 518)

(20) Mookerjee[1944]: 196 says:

The Jaina posits a twofold cause for the perception of universal relation — an internal and an external condition. The internal condition is found in the developed state of our mind and the external condition is the repeated observation of the sequence of the two events. That the savage fails to
intuit the causal relation between fire and smoke is due to his lack of this internal condition.

However, here, we can regard both the internal and the external condition as the

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reason why the savages cannot comprehend the cause and effect relationship, namely, universal relation.

(21) na ca kāryasyānupannasya kāryatvaṁ dharman; asattvāt. nāpy utpannasyāryantam bhinnam tat; tadadharmatvāt. tata eva kāraṇasyāpi kāraṇatvaṁ dharman aikāntato bhinnam. tac ca tato 'bhinnatvāt tadgrāhipratyakṣenaiva pratiyate tadvyaktisvarūpavat. (PKM: 518)

(22) tacchaktipradhānatāyāṁ tu kāryadarśanāt tān niścīyate tadvyātrekenāṣyāsambhavāt. (PKM: 518)

(23) Mookerjee[1944]: 197

Because the form of the fire is different in the case of the fire produced from fuel and the fire produced from the gem.

(24) na ca svāraṇena kāryakāraṇayos tadbhavaḥ sambhavati. nāpy uttarakālam bhinnena tenānayok kāryakāraṇatā bhinnā kartum śakyā; virodhāt. nāpy bhinnā; tayoh svāraṇena kāryakāraṇatāprasangat. na ca svāraṇena kāryakāraṇayor arthāntarābhāvatātisambandhakalpane kīcitprayojanam kāryakāraṇatāyaḥ svataḥ siddhatvāt? (PKM: 518)

(25) Mookerjee[1944]: 193

(26) nanu kāryāpratipattau katham kāraṇasya kāraṇātāpratipattis tadapekṣatvāt tasyāḥ? katham evam pūrvāparbhāgaḥpratipattau madhyābhāgasaya eva vyāyātipratipattir apeksākṛtatavāvīšeṣāt? tataḥ "paśyann ayaṁ kṣañikam eva paśyate" iti [ ] vaco virudhyeta. madhyākṣaṇasvabhāvatvāt tadvyāvyrtteh tadgrāhiḥjñānena pratipattiś cet, . . . (PKM: 518-519)

(27) Mookerjee[1944]: 197

(28) Because the form of the fire is different in the case of the fire produced from fuel and the fire produced from the gem.

(29) How can you say that the two things not existing together, or at the same time are prohibited from the state of the relationship? It (asambandha) cannot be said that it does not exist in two entities; because the theory of denying the relation (sambandha) will lead to the contradiction that the akāryakāraṇabhāva is also nothing but a relation.

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(30) This means that we cannot say that this is *nila* and not *nila*.

(31) For example, the smoke

(32) For example, the fire

(33) If you deny the relation, the entity having the characteristic of the whole will be also unreal because the knowledge of the whole and so on is unreal. Simultaneously like the cognition of the variegated colour, and, also like one form (, or *ākūra*) having a relation with many, they are not contradictory.

(34) Mookerjee[1944]: 191-192

(35) Mookerjee[1944]: 192
CHAPTER VII
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

7.0.0: We can see here that though the Jaina logicians are very much influenced by the logicians of other schools such as the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Baudhāyas, and so on, they have maintained their long-cherished idea of the non-absolutism (anekāntavāda).

7.1.0: The Placement of the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda

Before analysing the theory of relation by Prabhācandra, let us see the placement of the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda.

The Prameyakamalāmārtanda by Prabhācandra is the commentary on the Pariksāmukhasūtra by Māṇikyanandin, as is well known. And the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda is a part of the commentary on the Pariksāmukhasūtra IV, 5:

'parāparavivarttavyāpīdravyam īrdhvata mrdiva sthāsādiṣu'. This means that īrdhvatāsāmānya is a thing which remains the same through changes such as earth in its (modifications) sthāsa and so on. The Pariksāmukhasūtra IV explains two kinds of the generalities: tiryaksāmānya and īrdhvatāsāmānya.

Well, let us see the Pariksāmukhasūtra IV, which is as follows:

sāmāṇya viśeṣātmā tadartho viṣayah. //1//

anuvṛttavāyāvṛttraprayagyagocaratvāt

pūrvottarākāraparihārāvipātirhitilakṣaṇaparināmenārthakriyopapat-
teś ca. //2//

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sāmānyaṃ dvedhā tiryagūrdhvatābhedāt. //3//
sadṛśaparināmaḥ tiryak khamādiṣu gotavavat. //4//
parapararavicaturvyāpidravyam ūrdhvatā mṛdīva sthāsādiṣu. //5//
viṣeṣaḥ ca. //6//
parāyavyatirekabhedat. //7//

ekasmin dravye kramabhāvinah pariṇāmāḥ paryāyā ātmani
harṣavisādādīvat. //8//

arthāntaragato visadṛśaparināmo vyatireko gomahīśādīvat. //9//

‘The subject matter of it (pramāṇa) is viśaya of two kinds characterised
by sāmānya and viṣeṣa. //1//

As there is attainment of the object (as a result of knowledge) from
signs of changes from its original state to a later state preserving its
essential characteristics and from our idea of general and special
characteristics. //2//

Sāmānya is of two kinds being divided into tiryak (sāmānya) and
ūrdhvatā (sāmānya). //3//

Tiryak (sāmānya) is the same modification such as khand, munda,
and so on in the condition of a cow. //4//

Ūrdhvatāsāmānya is a thing which remains the same through changes
such as earth in its (modifications) sthāsa and so on. //5//

Viṣeṣa (is) also (of two kinds). //6//

Being divided into paryāya and vyatireka. //7//

Paryāyas are modifications in sequence in a single substance e.g. joy
and grief in oneself. //8//

Vyatirekas are different modifications in different objects such as a cow, a buffalo, and so on. //9//'

In the above, tiryaksāmānya is the go-tva and so on in khanda-cow or in munḍa-cow, and so on. On the other hand, ārdhvatāsāmānya is earth and so on in its modifications sthāsa and so on.

7. 1. 1: Tiryaksāmānya and Ārdhvatāsāmānya

Moreover, we can see this concept of these two sāmānyas: tiryaksāmānya and ārdhvatāsāmānya in the Tarkabhāṣā by Mokṣākara-gupta, which runs as follows:¹⁴

'The object of the sources of knowledge is twofold — the directly perceived and the indirectly conceived. Of these, the directly perceived is the object of indeterminate perception, it is the unique particular characterised by what is perceived. The indirectly conceived object is the universal which is apprehended when the mental determination occurs following indeterminate apprehension. This universal is twofold — the universal belonging to an individual (ārdhvatālaksana) and the universal belonging to a class (tiryaglaksana). Of these, the universal belonging to an individual (ārdhvatālaksana) is constructed through the accumulation of moments of an individual object, e.g. a jar which is distinguished from other (objects) of the same class (other jars) and this universal is the object of perception. The universal belonging to a class (tiryaglaksana) is the class-character belonging
to all members (all jars) of one class which are distinguished from other classes. This universal is the object of perception grasping universal relation \( (\text{vyápti}) \)."\(^{5}\)

Furthermore, in the \textit{Syádvádaratnákara}, III, 5, 6, also we can see this idea, which is as follows:

\begin{align*}
\text{anubhavasámtihetuka}m & \quad \text{tiryagárdhvataśámányádígocaram} \\
\text{saḿkalanátmakàm jñánam pratyahhjñánm iti.} & \quad //5//^{(6)}
\end{align*}

\textquoteleft Conception is due to apprehension and recollection and consists in a synthetic knowledge (of a thing under observation) with regard to characteristics common to the whole species or to essences underlying a number of modes or with regard to other characteristics.\textquoteright\(^{7}\)

\begin{align*}
\text{yathá tajjátiyà eváyàm gopíndo gosadráo gavayàh sa eváyàm jinadatta ityádìtì.} & \quad //6//^{(8)}
\end{align*}

\textquoteleft For example: That cow is of that species: a \textit{gavaya} is like a cow; he is that Jinadatta; etc.\textquoteright\(^{9}\)

In the \textit{Syádvádaratnákara}, III, 5, it is said that: \textquoteleft Pratyabhijñá is assimilative knowledge. Its causes are apprehension and recollection. The subject-matter of \textit{pratyabhijñá} is the characteristic or the group of characteristics inherent in the object under observation. The characteristics may be either \textit{sámánya} or 'generalities' which make a thing similar to others or features which distinguish it from others. The \textit{sámánya} again may be either \textit{tiryaksámánya} or \textit{úrdhvatásámánya}. The former is the group of characteristics which make a thing similar to the other members of its species. \textquoteleft Go-tva', or cow-ness is an instance of the \textit{tiryaksámánya}, representing the general characteristics common to the whole species of cows. The
Undhvatásamānya is the immutable substratum which persists in and through the varied modifications of a thing. A lump of earth may now appear as a cup, then as a pitcher, next a doll and so on, but earth continues as the constant substratum of these earthen things. Earth is thus the undhvatásamānya underlying these these clay modifications. . . .

We have to notice these backgrounds in reading the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda.

7. 2. 0: Transformation (Parināma)

As we have seen in Chapter III, in connection with the transformation (parināma), we should pay attention to Umāsvāti’s idea. He says in his Tattvārthādhigamasūtra that ‘one’s being — that is, one’s retaining one’s specific nature and yet undergoing origination and destruction — is transformation.’ It is of two types — that without a beginning and that having a beginning. In the case of substances possessed of colour — that is, pudgala-substances — it is possessed of a beginning. Here, we can recognize that Umāsvāti’s idea that ‘tadbhāvaḥ parināmaḥ’ has a strong resemblance to Pāṇini’s ‘tasya bhāvas tvatalau.’ This is an important fact to stress. Because we can accept parināma in the Jainism as a state, or condition of the substance, or real existence, that is to say, it refers to a state, or condition in the sense of “the nature thereof”. This point deserves explicit emphasis and the problem of a resemblance between ‘tadbhāvaḥ parināmaḥ’ by Umāsvāti and ‘tasya bhāvas tvatalau.’ by Pāṇini. Moreover, it is apparently clear that each substance (dravya), undergoing changes into different forms in accordance with the cause as a result of its own changing nature, attains various transformations. And, according to the
Pramāṇanayatattvālokālankāra’s account, the capacity of causing the transformation (parināma) or change in a substance (dravya) is called ‘guna’ and the transformation (parināma) due to ‘guna’ is known to be the mode (paryāya), or ‘bhāva’ (state or condition).

In the Sambandhasadbhāvavāda also, we can see the theory of the transformation, as we have seen in Chapter VI. Prabhācandra says that the theory of sambandha can be real on the basis of the theory of the transformation accepted by the Jainas. There is no absolute difference between the whole possessing the parts and the parts. Here, we can see that this is the Jaina view, on the other hand, the Nyāya view is that they (the whole and the parts) are totally different. And, Prabhācandra says that the entity having the nature of unsteady (variable) property will form a separate class of entities on the basis of absolute difference and non-difference, as in the case of the cognition of the variegated colour. Somehow, the Jainas accept the relation (sambandha) of two relata (sambandhin), which (sambandha) is characterised by the amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaśleṣa) having the own nature of the transformation into oneness, namely, the transformation of one state into another state. Indeed, the amalgamation of the forms of the things (rūpaśleṣa) of two relata is difficult to explain, and their discreteness shows an uncommon nature. This is not contradictory to the duality of the two relata because of our experience. And, Prabhācandra regards that the nature of the relationship is relative (āpeksika). The Jainas do not accept such a relation without transformations (modifications) in that way between the two relata. In addition to these, the Jainas treat many other conceptions about the relation, for example, about the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāranabhāva), about the invariable concomitance (vyāpti), and so on, any theories about sambandha are
based on the theory of the transformation, as we have seen in Chapter VI.

7. 3. 0: Conclusion

Where can we trace the source of this idea, transformation (parināma), back? We can say that at least it can be traced back to the Tattvārthādhigamasmṛtra by Umasvāti: utpādavyadvṛtyayuktam sat.(20) Moreover, we may say that this idea can be traced back to Kundakunda’s, and more anciant Jainas’ āgamas, as we have seen in Chapter III. According to the ontological theory of Jainism, the existence, or the being (sat) relates to the substance (dravya), quality (guna) and mode (parīyāya), moreover, three aspects of the reality, namely, origination (utpāda), decay (vyāya) and permanency (dhrauvya), as has been mentioned in Chapter III. Utpāda is an appearance i.e., assuming new modification, and this does not mean the creation out of nothing. Creation by the fiat of a will is not recognised by the Jainas. Therefore, utpāda means that phase of the process of the development when a new form is assumed. Vyāya is losing the previous form. Here also it is different from an absolute disappearance. It only means that phase of development where the earlier form is replaced by the succeeding one. Dhrauvya refers to the persistence of the essential nature of dravya which undergoes development and which makes both utpāda and vyāya simultaneously possible. In fact the process of development includes all the three phases.(21) In Jainism, we may say that the being can exist both as the anītya and as the nītya. According to the Jainas, change is integral to the real. The nature of a real is constituted by an infinite number of attributes, which cannot be known by us in a collection. In this way, we can easily consider the expression ‘tadbhāvah parināmah.’ by Umasvāti to take on importance in order to comprehend the Jaina epistemology and logic.
We can say that the theory of sambandha can be real on the basis of the theory of the transformation (parināma) accepted by the Jainas. Moreover, we have to notice that the Jainas regard the theory of ksayopāśama as an important idea, and this means that the Jainas admit that for the knowledge of the relation the mind co-operates with our sense-organs, and the contribution of each of them is necessary. We cannot say anything about sambandha without accepting both the inner world and the outer world, in other words, jīva and aṇīva, which are regarded as the changeable in the Jainism. On the basis of our experience related to the being (sat), which relates to the substance (dravya), quality (guna) and mode (paryāya), moreover, three aspects of the reality, namely, origination (uppāda), decay (vyaya) and permanency (dhārvya), namely, which is of transformation (parināma), the Jainas can consider sambandha to be real. A thing (A) transforms a thing (B), and so on, in this case, A is not equal to B, but not absolutely different from B. This is the reason why the theory of sambandha in the Jainism is described in the commentary on the Pariksāmukhasūtra IV, 5: ārdhvātāsāmānya is a thing which remains the same through changes such as earth in its (modifications) sthāsa and so on. Therefore, the Jainas say that sambandha is a sadbhāva. According to the Jainas, the perticipient is ultimately the self, whose store of knowledge is constantly growing and with the growth of knowledge his powers of perception are being constantly improved and enriched. There is no logical necessity for supposing that the knowledge of attributes, which is reached by a laborious course of speculation, must be mental and subjective. Of course, we should not overlook that the Jainas use the theory that all our clear knowledges have contents which are of qualifier and qualificand structure, which involves a ‘Relation’. To the question whether the attribute of causality is different from or identical with the entity, the Jainas would
give the characteristic answer: it is different and at the same time identical. Identity-in-difference is the way of all relations and there is no reason for departure from this universal principle in the case of causality being the attribute of an entity.\(^{(22)}\)

Moreover, we can say that the Jainas are neither absolutely equal to the \textit{ksanabhaṅgavādin} like the Buddhists and so on nor \textit{nityavādin} like the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, and so on. The Jainas are neither absolutely the idealists nor the realists, but they are the \textit{anekāntavādin} who can include both of the two ideas above. Furthermore, it is a very important point that the realistic phase of relations in the Jainism is ontologically based on the theory of \textit{karman} accepted by them, as we have seen in Chapter III. It is not too much to say that this standpoint exists in the \textit{Sambandhasadbhāvavāda} of Prabhācandra’s \textit{Prameyakalamalamārtanda}.

Thus without disturbing their theory of \textit{anekāntavāda} they have argued in favour of realism by accepting \textit{sambandha} as a real entity and not as a fictitious entity.
NOTES IN CHAPTER VII

(1) *PMu*: 150

However, in the Prameyakamalamārtanda it is the commentary on *PMu*, IV, 6.

(2) *PMu*: 150

(3) *PMu*: 146-151

(4) *dvividho hi pramānasya viśayah grāhīyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. tatra pratyakṣasya pratiḥsāmanām svalaṅgaṃ eko grāhyah. adhyavaseyas tu pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvino vikalpaṃ pratiḥsāmanām sāmānyam eva. tac ca sāmānyam dvividham, urdhvataṅgaṃ tiryaglaṅgaṃ ceti. tatraikasyām eva ghaṭādīvyaktau saijāyavyāvṛttaśām anekalaṅgaṃsamudāyah sāmānyam urdhvataṅgaṃ sadhanaprtyakṣasya viśayah. viśāyavyāvṛttaś tv anekavyāktayah tiryaksāmānyam vyāptigrāhakaprtyakṣasya viśayah. . . . (BTBh (a): 26)

(5) *BTBh (a):* 56-57

(6) *SVR:* 488

(7) Bhattacharya, Hari Satya[1967]: 172

(8) *SVR:* 489

(9) Bhattacharya, Hari Satya[1967]: 173

(10) Bhattacharya, Hari Satya[1967]: 172-173

(11) *tādabhāvah parināmāh.* (TAAS, V, 41, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: V, 41)

(12) *anādir ādīmīṁ ca.* (TAAS, V, 42, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: none)

(13) *rūpīśv ādīmān.* (TAAS, V, 43, Śvetāmbara; Digambara: none)

(14) Dixit[1974]: 225-228

(15) *AST,* V, 1, §119:

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The affixes *tva* and *taL* come after a word in the sixth case in construction, in the sense of "the nature thereof." *(AST, Vol. 2: 889)*

(16) *gunah sahabhavi dharmo yathatmani vijnanavyaktsaktyadir iti.* //7// *(SVR, V, 7)*

'An attribute is co-existent with the nature (of a thing) as for instance, the actual and the potential knowledge etc., in a soul.' *(Bhattacharya, Hari Satya[1967]: 390)*

*paryayas tu kramabhavi yathataatraiva sukhaduhkhedarititi.* //8// *(SVR, V, 8)*

'A mode is the evolute; as for instance, the feeling of pleasure, of pain etc., in that.' *(Bhattacharya, Hari Satya[1967]: 390)*

(17) Sikdar[1991a]: 49-50

(18) *anekantasamakavastuno tyantabhedabhedabhym jayantaravac citrasamvedanavad eva.* *(PKM: 515)*

(19) *nasmabhinh sambandhinos tathaparinatvyatirekenanyah sambandho bhvyapagamyate, .* . . *(PKM: 516)*

(20) *TAAS, V, 29* *(Svetambara; Digambara: V, 30)*

(21) *PMr: 149*

(22) *Mookerjee[1944]: 197-198*