PART B

THE TEXT

WITH

ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Saluting the Gods Gaṇeśa, Kṛṣṇa etc. and also the revered teacher Śri Anantadeva, the learned Śri Kondadeva expounds Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā for the delight of the virtuous.

Dharma is that which is established by pramāṇa (authority), bheda (varieties), anga (subsidiary), prayukti (procedure), krama (order), adhikāra (qualification), different kinds of atidesa (extensions), ubha (modification), bādha (contradiction), tantra (one performance meant for many) and prasānga (one performance helping many).

Dharma is the object of discussion in PM

As the cause of the entire aim of humans is Dharma, it has been expounded in the book of twelve chapter (i.e. mīmāṃsādārśana) by Jaimini. [Notes: It is restatement of the view of Jaimini in the sūtra ‘athato dharmajijnasa’¹, which is also supported in the commentary of Kumārila as ‘dharmābhikhyam viṣayam vaktum mīmāṃsāyāh prayojanam’²]

Adharma is not its object

It is not the case that adharma also is the object of it just as dharma is, because that which does not make obtain i.e. lead to even a bit of the aim of human life is not

¹ Jaimini Sūtra (JS.) 1.1.1.
² Ślokavārttika 1 (on JS. 1.1.1).
(regarded) fit to be an object (subject matter) of a śāstra. Also because being the counter positive of the absence of the cause of human aim, it is proper only for the state of being a cause of human aim to be the delimiter of objectiveness.

And also because it is mentioned in the book on dharma by Yājñavalkya etc. which discusses entire aim of humans like artha etc. and also adharma, that Vijiñānesvara etc. have declared the subject matter to be only dharma, on the basis of the same reason.

And also because of the time of propounding the six types of dharma, the duty of the different strands of the society has been stated there by accepting the action of prohibition as dharma enjoyed by the śāstra as in Brāhmaṇa must always abstain from (drinking) alcohol.

[Notes: Vijiñānesvara while commenting on Yājñavalkya Smṛti (1.1) in his Māṭākṣarā has stated six-foldness of the dharma which is the object of the śāstra such as varnadharma, āśramadharma, varnāśramadharma, guṇadharma, nimitadharma and sādhāramadharma. Under varnadharma he has stated the example as nityam madyaih brahmanto varjayet.]

And also because, had adharma been the subject matter, then it would have been proper to state the (act of) abstaining from alcohol while stating the sub types of that (adharma).
And also because, it is not proper to state the objecthood of *adharma* with reference to any of the chapter (*laksāṇa*) of which has no scope of discussion about *ūha, bādha, tantra* and *prasāṅga* dependent on the discussion of extension; because it does not accept to be understood by negative injunction as it is taken up by any inclined person, because it is not even an object of discussion about procedure and order which are object of subsidiaries and which has no other subsidiaries, which does not accept the knowledge obtained by/through the proper study of the Veda, which does not have acceptance of any subsidiaries (as in case of *dharma*) in the attainment of hell, and therefore which is not an object of originative injunction as it is not known from the names of Vedic rituals and which does not except any *mantra* by being unfit to be performed.

Also because it is not proper to imagine many sentence meaning by accepting the form of secondary meaning of the first two aphorisms and the *bhāṣya* thereon such as 'ko dharmaḥ' (what is dharma?) etc. when there is no hindrance (in construing the primary meaning).

Also because, it is not proper to imagine many sentence meaning by accepting the form of secondary meaning of the first two aphorisms and the *bhāṣya* thereon such as 'ko dharmaḥ' (what is dharma?) etc. when there is no hindrance (in construing the primary meaning).
It should also not be argued that as prohibition is discussed in some *adhikaranas* of the sixth chapter\(^3\), it has been expounded in the twelve chapter, and hence although it is not a subject matter of each and every chapter (of the *mīmāṃsādārśana*) it is relevant to be the object of it (*dvādaśalakāsaṇa*); for in the sixth\(^4\) (chapter), as there is discussion about the being and non-being of making of house and chariot, during the discussion about the mandatory completion of the same, there would be the contingency of making of it (i.e. house and chariot) being the object of it (*dvādaśalakāsaṇa*).

Similarly by the beginning of a separate enquiry as to 'what are its instruments ?', the topics of prohibition related to ritual/sacrifice would be placed outside (the purviews) of dharma and adharma just as the *prayājas* etc.

*Dharma is not unseen as propounded in Vaiśeṣika*

\[\text{च काण्डाधर्ममधक्षणेणु गणनात् धर्मपदर्थयाद्वृद्धस्य नामपेयापरिवर्च्छेदक्तवादिना न सकलविचारयोपयोगिति शंक्यम्। यद्येक योगितित्वृत्त्य तत्त्वि धर्मानीति वैदिकप्रयोगेयण्याचारदार्थदीनि प्रकृत्यथा तु परमो धर्मै वृत्त्य स्मार्तप्रयोगै च शाख्यमुः वा तत्निमित्तवादिति न्यायसहकृतन्तत्त्वः तत्त्वः यागादित्वाद धर्मत्वात्। साधनविधियत् प्रत्येकगम्यस्य साधनवाचिश्चत्तद्वेक्षयाभिकारहेत्वात्।} \]

It should not be doubted that *dharma* which is *adrṣṭa* and not known by Vedic names (of rituals), is not fit to be discussed in totality since (both) dharma and adharma have been counted under (the list of) qualities by Kāṇḍaṇa; for *dharma* is *yāga* etc. which is the producer of that (*adrṣṭa*) (and this is) determined by the Vedic usage *yajñena yajñam* upto *tāni dharmāni*\(^5\), and also by the *smṛti* usage *śvācāra domādini* upto

\(^3\) SD. VI.1.5- discussion on na kalaṅjam bhaksayet .  
\(^4\) SD. VI.1.4.  
\(^5\) साधनविधियत् प्रत्येकगम्यस्य - S  
\(^6\) RV. I.64.50, X.90.1
Doubt about dharmatva of yāga etc. and its refutation

It should not be doubted that according to dharmah ksarati kīrtanāt i.e. dharma perishes (lit flows) by narrating, perishability due to praising does not apply to yāga etc. for it is momentary, (this is) because the root (ksar) denoting a particular action residing in a liquid substance does not have power to express destruction. (And if you say that) by secondary relationship the root may denote destruction then by (accepting) the secondary relation, even the contingency of the fruitlessness of yāga etc could be stated.

[Notes: If secondary implication is accepted in the meaning ‘destruction’ by the Vaiśeṣika, then it can also be accepted in the meaning ‘naisphalya’ (not producing result). Thereby the statement dharmah ksarati kīrtanāt can also be supported with respect to the views of the mīmāṁsaka (i.e. the yāga would become fruitless by narration).]

Definition of dharmatva and adharmatva

Since it is not possible to state dharma which leads to adṛṣṭa and which is known independent of being produced by enjoined action, hence by logical simplicity it is proper to state dharma as the state of action which is enjoined or simply the state of

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7 Yajñavalkya Smṛti 1.8
8 JS. 1.3.9.
being enjoined, and by the same rule *adharma* as the state of being a prohibited action or simply the state of being prohibited.

न चैव प्रश्नपक्षे कांम्योगोदहनादेहर्मत्वाभावेऽन तत्तति धर्मिकत्वव्यवहारानुपूर्वति।

निदेशान्तद्विधाणेऽन तद्व्यवहारपरसभावात्।

And it is not the case that in case of the first option, there being absence of *dharma* in case of milking of the cow (which takes place in a ritual leading to some) desired (result) etc, the usage of the term *dhārmika* (doer/follower of *dharma*) with reference to its (i.e. milking of cow) agent will not be justified; that (kind of) usage would be justified only in case of the agent of *darśa* etc., which is undoubtedly the substratum of *dharmatva*, because in that case there would be absence of agent of milking of cow etc. independent of it (*darśa* etc.)

कान्यस्याङ्गानीति वक्तव्ये कान्यस्य साधनानीति निदेशान्ताङ्गानं गांगासागाधारणानांकान्यस्याङ्गाधारणानां

धर्मिकत्वाभावसूचनाच्च।

And also because, instead of stating 'what are its subsidiaries' the statement what are its instruments indicates an absence of *dharmatva* in all the instruments common to all subsidiaries and non-subsidaries.

[Notes: By the statement *kāṇi asya sādhanāni* (ŚB. on JS. I.1.1.) (what are its(*dharma*’s) instruments) of the *bhāṣya*, there is denial of *dharmatva* in all the instruments whether they form the part/subsidiary of a sacrifice or not.]

एवेन बहिष्पहरेजतत्ने न देवानां निषिद्धरजनात्तात्तेः अधर्मतस्लक्षणायामिस्तिर्तस्ताः।

कृत्यविनियमिविद्याभावावान

कृत्यवृत्तसाधनानां तथा निषिद्धविनियमिविद्यावावासः समस्मान योगसिद्धान्ताभ्यां वर्तमानविनियमिविद्यायां

धर्मतस्लक्षणावर्तमानविनियमिविद्यायां वर्तमानविनियमिविद्यायां

By this, the defect of narrow-application of the definition of *adharma* to the prohibited silver etc. in case of (the sentence like) "*barhiṣi rajatai na deyam*" (silver should not be given in *yāga*) is also ruled out. Because it is not possible to state the case of *dharma* here as in the case of holding of *śodāsi*, because it is impossible to

9 *Taittirīya Samhitā* (TaitSam.) I.5.1
know the absence of *istasādhanta* from the negative injunction, as from the negative injunctions meant for the sacrifice (*kratu*) the instrument of the result (*apurva*) of the sacrifice is understood.

[Notes: The prohibition that forms a part of the enjoined rite only indicates that the fruit of the sacrifice is produced by the absence of the prohibited, and in no way does it make/know the *anistasaśadaḥantatā* (the state of being the instrument towards the evil) of the prohibited.]

Even if there is such (kind of) usage, then it would have to be necessarily stated as metaphorical/figurative.

It is not the case that in this way there would be contingency of non-relevance (*asāṅgati*) of *indriyakāmādhiḥkarma* etc., relevance in the *śastra* is quite clear as it propounds the instrument of *dharma*.

[Notes: In the injunction ‘*dadhyendriyakāmasya juhuyāt*’¹⁰, the substance curd is enjoined for the result of (strong) sense. Since there is absence of actionhood in curd, the discussion on the injunction will not form a part of PM. But it does forms a part because it discusses the instrument of *dharma*. Śābara has clearly stated in the *bhāṣya* such as ‘*kāṁ asya sādhanāni ?*’ (what are its(*dharma’s*) instruments?), that the instruments of *dharma* is also the object of discussion in *PM*.]

It is not the case that there is non-contingency of the milking of the cow etc. becoming an object of the *śastra* ‘*dharmaḥ kṣaraṇi*’ etc. because it is acceptable [i.e. milking of cow etc. which forms the part of instrument of *dharma* are indeed out of the purview of the said *smṛti*].

¹⁰ *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* (TaitBr.) II.i.5.6.
Also it is not the case that there is over-application of the definition of dharma in speaking of lies for marriage, and (over-application) of the definition of adharma in case of holding of the sōdaśi etc.

अत एव क्रियात्मकहिते उकलक्षणे न सम्भवत इति शास्त्रः।

Therefore, it should not be doubted, that the two definitions devoid of the state of action, stated earlier also are not possible.

Explanation of vihitatva and nisiddhatva

विहितत्वं विभिषोधितक्रतुपकाराभिभिषेकाधनताक्त्वम्, स्वविध्यनुभावत्वं वा।

न च तद्व्यतर्द्वाहानृतवचनात्। निमित्तसानिधिहेतुतः तात्पर्यायः।

State of enjoined(vihitavam) is the describer of desired instrumentality (iṣṭasādhanatā = the state of being instrument towards the desired object) different from the help (upakāra) of kratu(rite) understood from the injunction, or (it is) the state of being a performance prescribed by the self injunction; and neither of the two is present in speaking of lies for marriage etc., (this is) because the said injunction (i.e. speaking of lies for marriage) is only for the purpose of an exception (apavāda) of the state of absence of iṣṭahetuta (aṇīṣṭahetuta - instrumentality towards the evil) known by the prohibition.

[Notes: The injunction of speaking of lies etc. is called abhyamujñāvidhi (lit. permitted injunction). They do not enjoin anything to be performed but they only denote the absence of evil that is generally associated with their performance on account of their prohibition, in the particular context. For example, speaking of lies has been prohibited by the sentence nānrtam vadet (one must not speak a lie). But in the context of marriage it is prescribed. Thus in the context of marriage, it only denotes
that there would be no production of evil which is generally associated with prohibition.

Similarly, the state of being prohibited is describer of the state of absence of *istaśādhamatā* (*anistahetutatā* - instrumentality towards the evil) understood from the prohibition or (it is) the objecthood of aversion produced by retraining (*nivartananā*) understood by that (prohibition).

And neither of the two (is present) in holding of the śodāsi etc. As the prohibition meant for the sacrifice denotes the instrumentality of the various absences which are the object of prohibition as the help to the *kratu*, (and) the main injunction, forming the sentence-unity with those (prohibitions) is the inducer of a human being into an action qualified by such an absence.

**Over-application in worldly injunctions and prohibitions and its refutation**

If it is said that the state of causality of good (*ista*) and evil (*anista*) is understood from injunction and prohibition (respectively), then taking the worldly injunction and prohibition there would be over-application in case of worldly acquisition of wealth and intake of poison.

If the word *vidhi* etc. stands for the *Veda*, then it is (not) possible, because in case of the sentences such as *vedānadhītya* etc. there is an absence of the state of being enjoined by the text which is known (*klptam*) as the meaning of the word *Veda*.

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If the word *Veda* stands for the sentences occurring in it, then, there would be narrow-application in case of the keeping of matted hair (*śikhā*) etc. enjoined by the injunction informed (i.e. derived) from the *mantra* such as *kumārā viśikhā iva* etc., because it is not possible to have Vedahood in those (sentences) which are not so stated, as there is an absence of either *mantra*-hood or *brāhmaṇa*-hood in them.

[Notes: Veda is said to *mantrabrahmandtmaka* i.e. of the form of *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa*. The derived injunction does not form the part of either.]

Further if it stands for *apauruṣeśavākya* then too, there would be over-application in case of fire (*agni*) etc. in the (Vedic) sentence such as *'agnir himasya bheṣajam'* (fire is cure of cold) etc.

[Notes: Since the injunction is derived from the *apauruṣeśavākya* hence it also has the characteristic of being *apauruṣeya* (absence of any human agency). Sentences such as this, which states something which can also be known by other means are considered as *arthavāda*(eulogium). ]

If it is argued that the state of being made known is (regarded as) the state of making known that which is unknown, then too there would be over-application in the case of *śyena* etc., then (it is) not so because it is refuted by the word *arthā* occurring in the second aphorism\(^{11}\).

\(^{11}\) चौदहात्त्वः: अःथः: धर्मः: - J.5. 1.1.2.
Doubt regarding dharmatva of Śyena and its refutation

It is not proper to say that it (Śyena) is dharma only, and the killing of enemy namely, the result of it, is obtained through desire (rāga) and is adharma on the basis of the maxim of lipsādhikarana. Because in the context of stating the purpose of that adhikarana (codanālaksano 'rtho dharmah), the adharmatva of Śyena has been clearly stated by the revered Miśra \(^{12}\) by stating that the purpose (of the adhikarana) is to establish anartha of Śyena etc., (which is) set aside by the word artha (occurring) in the definition of dharma in the second aphorism. Otherwise it would be redundant to include (the word) artha in the second aphorism.

[Notes: In the lipsādhikarana [Śastradīpikā (ŚD. IV.1.2)] it has been discussed that only the action is enjoined by the injunction. The fruit is obtained by rāga (desire) and not by the injunction.]

It is not meant for avoiding the over-application in violence etc. which is the result (of it), because it is already refuted by not being indicated/stated by codanā (Vedic injunctive sentence), and also because of the contradiction with the source book like bhāṣya etc.

\(^{12}\) Śastradīpikā (ŚD.) I.1.2.
By this, there should also be understanding of absence of *dharmatva* in other enjoined actions (performed) with the purpose of killing an enemy. Because even there, there is evil character (*anarthatva*) in the main ritual, as the resolution, ‘I must carry out killing of (my) enemy’, is (no doubt) an object of *bhāvanā*, still as it is obtained from one's will (*rūga*) and is not an object of an injunction, therefore, as it indicates the *anistahetuta* understood from a prohibitive injunction and indicates the volition which pervades the volition regarding the main ritual, hence, there is refutation of it by the word *arthā* in the second aphorism.

**Refutation of acceptance of *adharma* on the basis of the *smṛti***

And if the view is mentioned that although it appears to be a *dharma* there is *adharma* in the rites of black magic (*abhicāra* *karman*) on the basis of the prohibition inferred from the censure from the *purāṇas* such as *parasyōtsādanārtham yat tattāmasam samudāhrtam* (that which is meant for the destruction of the other is *tāmas*) then it is not acceptable.

13 *Śrimadbhagvadgītā* (Gītā) 17.19
Because there would be redundancy of inference of such a prohibition, when the censure is justified from only the inducement (pravṛtti) of prohibition that is already established with reference to the result.

[Notes: The censure of violence etc. is already established by the prohibitive sentence na himsyat sarvabhūtāni\textsuperscript{14}.]

And also because it would be impossible to accept dharmatva in it, going against the whole world when there is an absence of usage of dhārmikātva with reference to the agent of rites of black magic (abhicāra). [i.e. in the world there is no usage of the word dhārmika for a person who performs abhicāra.]

अभिचारकतृती धार्मिकत्वथवराभावेन तत्र सकललोकविरुद्ध धर्मतत्त्वादीनामवस्थासम्भवाच।

This is the reason why as it is decided that it (syena etc.) is not the definition following the usage of the world and the śāstra, one should not be satisfied even by accepting the redundancy of the word artha occurring in the second aphorism for refuting it (alakṣyatva).

सात्त्विकानुष्ठानविधि प्रति जरितत्ववायववविविधताविद्विधच्छेष्टवेन ज्ञातत्वानावक्तव्यवाभावाच।

Because there is an absence of an independent ground so far as the sāttvikānuṣṭhāna vidhi is concerned, in the form of a narrative sentence as in the case of the injunctive suffix the object of which is yavāgu (gruel) made of jartila (wild sesamum).

And also because of clear presence of the injunction sāttvikāni eva seveta (one must perform only the sāttvika actions) in the other sāstra.

\textsuperscript{14} Chāndogyopaniṣad (ChāndoUp.) VII.15.1. (Originally the text reads अहिम्सन सर्वभूतार्नि.}

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And also because the meaning of dātavyamiti yaddānam diyate ‘nupākarine dese kale ca pātre ca taddānam sātvikaṁ smṛtam⁵ (that gift(dāna) which is given as a duty to give in a (suitable) place and a(suitable) time to someone who does nothing in return is called sātvika (dāna)) is intended in coherence with the words of Yajñavalkya etc. such as ‘dese kale upāyena dravyam shraddhāsamanvitam pātre pradīyate yat tat sakalam dharmalakṣanam⁶.

The topics that are stated are not even objects of injunction

In fact, it is proper to accept the penance which is not asserted/enjoined by the injunction in the second half, as in the first half such as ‘myḍha grāhena ātmano yatpīdaya kriyate tapah⁷.

And it is observed that in the same context that the objecthood of the mention of tāmasa yajña(sacrifice), dāna(donation) and tapas(austerity) is not touched upon (mentioned) by the injunction. Not being an object of assertion by the injunction is seen in ‘Vidhiṁnaṁsrṣṭāṁ nam mantraṁmandadaksīnāṁ shraddhāvīrāhitam yajñam tāmasam parichaksate⁸’ (The sacrifice which is devoid, i.e. contrary to injunction, in

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⁵ Gitā. 17.20
⁶ Yajñavalkya Smṛti 1.6
⁷ Gitā. 17.20
⁸ Ibid. 17.13
which food is not distributed, which is devoid of the mantras, in which dakṣinā is not given and which lacks in faith is said to be tāmas.)

and also in ‘adeśakāle yaddānamapātrebhyaśeṣa diyate asatkrtaṁvaṇijñātam tatīmasamudāhṛtam’ (the gift which is made in an improper place, improper time and to an improper person, without proper treatment and with insult is said to be tāmas)

And also in the tāmasa action in ‘abhisamidhāya yaddhimsām’ etc.

Therefore it is not possible to infer prohibition that establishes adharmatva through this censure (mentioned in Purāṇas) even when there same is asserted by the injunction, how then is there a possibility of refutation in your opinion of the violence that is enjoined, which produces evil/sin and (which) is so accepted by the sanikhya etc. What is the use of an argument with those who do not have any tradition of understanding?

Refutation of the justification of inclination towards syena by defining anarthatva

The quoted verse could not be found, however a similar verse is found in Adhyatmaramāyaṇa as:

19 Ibid. 17.22
20 The quoted verse could not be found, however a similar verse is found in Adhyātmaramāyaṇa as:
As to the opinion that evil (anarthatva) is that which does not produce evil in more quantity than necessary and evil being more than necessary means having powerful aversion (dvesa) and the absence of more than necessary evil sometimes is possible in the context of syena because of some unseen(previously performed) karman, otherwise (there would be) a contingency of absence of inclination (pravṛtti) towards it. This also is not acceptable, because the intended meaning of the word balavattva is the greater pain in future as compared to the happiness (at present) which is the (immediate) result of it (syena). Because, such a balavattva has to be asserted in the future happiness in order to support the true-inclination in action which is accomplished by lot of pain and a great expenditure of wealth etc.

बलवदनिश्चातनुनिश्चित्वात्मास्य प्रवृत्तिकारणत्वमुन बलवदनिश्चातनुनिश्चित्वात्मास्य तदप्रवृत्तिव्यक्तित्वमुन वा कारणतावच्छेदके प्रतिबन्धकारणतावच्छेदके वामाधिक्यात्मनो बलवदनिश्चात्मस्य प्रवेशः।

In the opinion that the cause of inclination is the cognition of absence of (the relation with) the evil more than necessary or in the opinion that obstructor of it (inclination) is the cognition of the production of greater evil, there is inclusion of balavattva in the form of lesser (evil) in the delimiter of causality or in the delimiter of the state of being an obstructor.

किं तु ‘हिंसाकिंसे मदुकृते धर्माधिकृतात्तुप्ते तद्दिवसा: प्रच्छन्ते तत्मात्त्तत्तव्य सौचता’ इति शास्त्रानुसारे पूर्ववासनात्वौशसहकृत्वात्मात्मनोद्वारित्तस्य अभिचारजन्यदुर्लघस्य शत्रुश्च क्षणात्विविषोपविद्यर्षी हि पूर्ववासनानुपन्धितसहकृत्वात्मात्मनात्त्ववासनातः शत्रुनिर्युत्तावेव रूचिरे दूरितनिवृत्तो चन्माहिम्मा श्रेयनादी प्रवृत्ति:।
अहिंसाकारावतस्य दूरितनिवृत्तावेव संचित्यमाहिम्मा श्रेयनादिप्रवृत्तिविशेषान्यतः सत्तत्ता दीप्रवृत्ति:।

But according to the śāstra- hiṁśrāhimsre mrudukrūre dharmādharmāvārttānte, tadbhāvitāḥ prapadyate tasmātattaya rocate21, because of the accompaniment of particular impression (of previous birth) the excessive aversion in the ātman (self), even when there is no difference in the aversion towards the sin produced by abhicāra and towards the enemy, (still) for the one who has impression of the violent action

21 Mārkandeya Pūrṇa 48.40
performed in the elimination of the enemy and not in the elimination of sin because of which there is inclination towards good company etc. which is opposed to the inclination towards śyena etc.

There should not be inclusion of such a universal (belonging to) the self in the form of excessive-ness, depending on special action, into both the delimiters, because there is no proof for the existence of such a universal.

And also there is no rule (stating) that balavattva can be included in the definition only when it is included in the two delimiters because of which there would be the contingency of non-contingency of inclination towards śyeva.

Refutation of acceptance of greater fruit in acceptance of sodasīn

And also the argument that in order to avoid adharmatva of accepting sodasī (the cup named so) although prohibited, the prohibition presumes the establishment of great help of the sacrifice by other subsidiaries even in the absence of holding of sodasīn, and this is the reason why there is the presumption of greater fruit by the injunction of (accepting) sodasīn is not viable.
In the expression *abāve 'pi* (even in the absence), by the locative case whether it is intended that the great help of the performance (of rite) qualified by the absence (of *sodaśi-grahana*) is not produced by *sodaśin* (i.e. *sodaśi-grahana*) or it is produced by the absence of it (i.e. *sodaśigrāhna*). In the first case, there would be a contingency of non-extension of the absence of *sodaśi-grahana* as it is not a subsidiary (of the rite).

In the second case too, (there is a doubt) whether the *sodaśin* produces more result (than its absence) through the sacrifice or independently. In the second case then would be a contingency of non-extension of *sodaśin*. In the first case, there being subsidianness in both the *bhāva* (presence) and the *abhāva* (absence) (of the *sodaśi-grahana*), how come there would be no contingency of the lacuna (*vaigunya*) by the absence of the other in the rite qualified by one.

If it is argued that there is no subsidianness in one so far as the rite qualified by the other is concerned just like in the case of *vṛihi* and *yava* as per the maxim of the sixth chapter, then in the same manner it is not possible for both the injunctions, prescribing the subsidiaries, namely, *sodaśi-grahana* and its absence, to denote the great help of the rite and excessive/more result because both the injunctions do not remind (express) of the great help of the sacrifice or the result.

[Notes In case of options such as *vṛihi* and *yava*, when the rite has been started by the acceptance of one, then the other option is not considered as the subsidiary of the rite]
Therefore in case of absence of that substance by some reason, its substitution is accepted. The other option is not accepted. ŚD. VI.3.12.]

It would be necessary to speak of the dependent nature of injunction of procedure (prayogavidhi) which includes the two different options just as in the case of the injunction of jyotistoma that includes different options relating to dikṣā in ekā dikṣā tisro dikṣā and just as in case of the injunction of ādhāna which includes different options relating to dakṣinā such as ekā deyā tisro deyā etc.

It (the vidhi) has served its purpose just by presuming different results of the different bhāvanās which is qualified by different option, hence it does not touch upon (convey) the establishment of help of the sacrifice with the other subsidiaries along with the other option, in the absence of the first option, according to the other maxim of the option - this must be thought upon by the learned.

Refutation of dharmatva of the knowledge of brahman

It is not the case that, in this way there is scope of doubting dharmatva of brahmāṇa. (i.e. knowledge of brahman) which is (descriptor of) instrumental in (attaining) sreyas as expressed (as made known) by the veda according to (the śastra) tarati śokamātravid (the knower of atman swims across(trespasses) the sorrows)

22 Chāṇḍogup. VII.1.3.
Because in the opinion of the apanisadas (vedāntins) there is absence of both the state of being enjoined and the state of being an action. Because there is no difference of the present sentence which restates an established fact, with (the sentence) 'agnir himasya bhesajam' (fire is the case of cold), with the help of an example of the knowledge of oyster shell.

In the same manner even in the opinion of Nyāya just like the previous opinion, there is no scope of such a doubt (i.e. brahmajñāna becoming dharma) as it is impossible to have the state of being understood in the form of the state of being understood which was not understood before for the knowledge that results in liberation (mokṣa) through the seen channel (in the form of) by remoral of false (mithyā) knowledge there is remoral of vices such as attachment etc. and by that the removal of pravrutti (inclination) etc.

If the mīmāṃsaka states that as in the case of combined āgneya and agnisominya through only one paramāpūrva let there be the result namely mokṣa through knowledge and action, then there would be no problem in accepting the dharmatva of it (brāhamajñāna) as it would be possible to be enjoined by the injunction, just as in
the case of knowledge got by the injunction of studying enjoined by the injunction in
yadeva śraddhayā karoti vidyāya23 as explained in Nyāyasūdhā.

तथा चाक्षपादेयृं मूर्तुः खजनमप्रृतितेषु विद्याज्ञानानुज्ञातयार्थपाध्यायेः तदनन्तरार्थादयत्वाः इति।

And also there is aphorism of Aksapāda (i.e. Gautam) as
idukkhājanamaparāvyādo samānāntyāyānāṃ mittarottarātyāve tadanantarātyāvādy24. (There is cessation of each member of the following series- pain, birth, activity, defect, and wrong notion- the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it ; and this ultimately leads to final release. 25 )

व्रह्मणि तु धर्मलक्षणातिलवलक्षणातिको तत्वनिहारार्थौ ज्योग्यायत्वविषयोंविवेकवाद्यानं भुक्तवान्तसम्मतौ।

निविष्यविषयस्य वाहुमनांगोचरस्य न तस्य कार्य करणं च विधात इति ज्योग्यायत्वविषयविवेकवादी-बोधितसाधनताः कत्वाभावात।

There is a doubt of over-application of the definition of dharma in brahman. In order to avoid it, the inclusion of the qualifies krtisādhyatva (the state of being achieved by Kṛti) is of no use (like vomiting the eaten). Because there is absence of the state of being a describer of instrumentality made known by the vidhi (injunction) of that which is not a cause / instrument according to the śrutī 'na tasya kāryam karanam ca vidyate'27 (there is no effect (karya) or cause (kāraṇa) of it), which is not known by the mind and the speech and which is not an object of the injunction.

सुगुणाभिप्रायमेतत् तस्य सर्वकारणत्वादिति चेतुः। न। औपिनियस्वेतस्य शास्त्रविश्वयत्वानुवेदीकोण्य तस्य धर्मत्वोपि पीनस्लवत्या भास्करानुस्थानेन कश्चत्वाभावात्। सर्वकारणस्य बलवदन्तिष्ठ प्रत्येकारणतेन सौत्त्रायंत्रदेव बायसप्मथ्वाच।

If one argues that it is regarding the saguna (that which has attributes) because of its being the cause towards all, (then) it is not so. Because there is no harm even if it is accepted to be dharma, as the Vedāntins do not accept the same to be the object of

23 ChāndoUp. 1.1.10.
24 Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.2.
26 अभूतवान् -S
27 Śvetāsvatārpanisād 6.8.
there is no doubt raised about repetition. And also because, it is possible, to avoid by the word *artha* accuring in the *sūtra*, for it being the cause of everything, (it is also) the cause of evil that is greater.

Just as in case of *dharmatva* of quality such as desirable time (*kāmya kāla*) etc. which exists in (the rite) *upanayana*, whole *krūtisādhyatva* can be expanded through the action, of which it is the sub-stratum although (it) being non-achievable by volition, similarly it would be necessary to propound the *krūtisādhyatva* of *sagunabrahman* through the *upāsanākarmaṇ* (worship) of *sagunabrahman*, hence even after the inclusion of *krūtisādhyatva*, the problem stays in the same situation.

Thus ends (the section of) definition of *dharma* in *Bhūṭamatapradīpikā* of Śrī Śrī Kṛṇḍadeva.

\[28 \text{ Colophon is missing in S} \]
**Nature of vidhi**

क: पुनर्विधि: यदाौधितश्रेष्ठ: साधनताक्षणं धर्मांत्वमिति चेत(न) तिःवदिज्ञायेन यद्र्शानेन पुल्लग्रेवति: स

विधि:।

What is an injunction? By which the state of being dharma (a rite) is understood as the means of human good, then the injunction is that by the knowledge of which, produced by *śruti* (optative mood) etc. inducement of a person takes place i.e. a person is induced.

**View of the old logicians and its refutation**

तत्र यद्यपि प्राण्वस्तातिर्क्तका इत्यादिनतां बलवनिश्चितामुनुलिन्तां कृतिसाध्यायां चेति तद्वर्धनातिवित्यत्र

सूर्यंक्षेण वास्त्यमहिंकुविन्ति। एवैन्युन्नतस्तथा जाते चैत्यकाने कलज्ञभक्षणे मेघच्छायादै

प्रवृत्तिदारणतेः। तत्त्वस्य वर्तमानक्षेत्रीयोधी धात्विकविशेषयों को दर्शायाविद्विधः।

There the old school of logicians accepts as the trio, namely, *iṣṭaśādhanatāḥ* (the state of being instrument towards the desired), *balaśādhanatāḥ* (the state of being non-producer of evil which is greater) and *kṛṣṇādhyātāḥ* (the state of being achievable through effort/volition) as the meaning of it just as the sun and the moon (are accepted) to be the primary meaning of (the term) *puspavantau*, because no inducement is seen regarding *chaityavandana* (paying homage to the Buddhist monastery), *kalanābhaśaṇa* (eating of poisoned meat) and *meghachāyā* (shadow of the cloud) etc. if and when there is lack of knowledge of one by one (of the three respectively). (The fact is) in the injunction of *darsā* (new-moon) sacrifice etc. the knowledge of the *yāga* which is the meaning of the root as qualificand, qualified by all the three (takes place).
(But) In the case of syenaabhicaran yajeta (one performing black magic should perform syena sacrifice) etc. as the anista\textsuperscript{7}anubandhitva factor is discarded by the injunction of expiation on account of exorcism/black magic, the knowledge of the other two as qualifiers (only occurs).

Similarly, in the case of na kalanjarh bhaksayet (one must not eat poisoned meat) it is that part (i.e., anista\textsuperscript{7}anubandhitva) is (again) discarded as it is construed with the meaning of the negative particle.

View of the neo-logicians

(In view of ) Neo-logicians, the knowledge of balavadanista\textsuperscript{7}anubandhitva (the state of being non-producer of greater evil) is not the cause of inclination because even in the absence of it inclination is seen by the knowledge of kritis\textsuperscript{8}dhyatva (the state of being achievable by effort) and istas\textsuperscript{9}dhanatva (the state of being instrument of the desired object), but the knowledge of it being the producer (of the greater evil) is obstructor of inclination. And the absence of it (anubandhitvaṃ kāna= knowledge of being the producer) though remaining unknown is the cause of inclination just as the desire to do(being the cause of inclination though unknown), (hence) it is also not expressed by lin just as that(desire is not expressed by lin).
Krtisadhyatva (the state of being achievable through effort) is also not expressed by it (\textit{lin}) because of the cognition of effort qualified by the root-meaning by the relationship of producerness (\textit{anukūlatā}) which is established by the similar cognition of \textit{lat} (present) etc. by the maxim of being known by being an object of similar knowledge, there is no scope of postulating the expressibility of \textit{krtisadhyatva} which is known by the other (means) just as the agent (is not expressed as it is known by some other means).

\textit{Hence istasādhanatva} (the state of being the instrument of the desired object) alone is the meaning of \textit{lin} etc.

It is construed with the meaning of the root. In case of prohibition however the construction of \textit{anistasādhanatva} (the state of being the cause of the evil/undesired) in that (root-meaning) is made known by the \textit{lin} etc. which is juxtaposed with \textit{nānī} (the negative particle). Hence in the case of prohibition (prohibitive injunction) there is no contingency of accepting different understandings (\textit{vyutrapatti}) in the expressed (meaning) of the single suffix, by construing the two out of the three (meanings) expressed by the single suffix with the root-meaning, and of the one which is \textit{balavadaniṣṭānanubandhītva} with the meaning of the negative particle \textit{nānī}. 

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Also, it is not the case that the same part (balavadanistānamanubandhitva) which is construed with the root-meaning in the case of injunction is construed with the meaning of the negative particle in the prohibition nor in the case of *na pacati* etc. where the meaning of negative particle which is construed with the meaning of the word ending in nominative case,(may be) construed with the root meaning in the case at hand and the injunctive suffix will help in understanding the intention of negative particle as negation.

One need not argue that this will lead to the contingency of (assigning) different meanings to *līn* etc. because even the same cannot be avoided by you.

Also in the opinion that the meaning of the *vidhi* is the state of the instrumentality of the desired, there is no inclusion in its form of the common object of desire,because desire is not expressible by the said maxim and also because, ' the instrumentality of the desired object in general’ cannot be the inducer.

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29 अनिवार्यचातुः च | - S

30 The whole sentence is missing in manuscript S.
The knowledge of instrumentality towards heaven is an inducer of the person desirous of heaven, hence, the instrumentality towards heaven, fame etc. is made known by the *lin* construed with *jyotiṣoma* and *rārisatra* the intention of which is known through the word *svargakāma* (desirous of heaven) and (through) the narrative passage. Therefore *lin* should be accepted as similar to sense-organ (i.e. giving the direct knowledge). Or similar to *sarvanāman* (common noun) there is making known of the instrumentality which is made present by the word *svargakāma*, the narrative passages etc. And this is similar in the making known of the causality towards hell etc. made known by the negative particle *nañ*, narrative passages etc.

**View of the mīmāṃsakas**

नन्व्याङ्गेदां दिजां दिवाच्चेन्द्रि मतं ज्ययः।

Objection- The opinion that the expressed meaning of *lin* etc. is inducement (*pravartanā*) is better than this (the above mentioned) view.

**Problem of accepting many understandings in the view of logicians**

तथाहि अस्मिन्तेकष्टि पचति न पचतीत्वां कृते: प्रधमानातपदार्थानि जयोत्त्वेऽवाबुगेकार्णिमिति

व्युत्पत्तिद्वयः। न पचति न पचेदिष्टा च नवश्वर्णानल्पेशै। नवद्वाराधार्थानि जयोत्त्वेऽवाबुगेकार्णिमिति

व्युत्पत्तिद्वयः। नातित्राि इति वाक्ये च नवशे विद्यांगमात्रात्वाबुगेकार्णिमिति

स्वतंत्रेन व्युत्पत्तिप्रवत्तिनि गौतेम।

To explain it – Even in this (previous meaning of *lin* is *iṣṭasādhanata*) opinion, in the case of *pacati* (cooks) and *na pacati* (does not cook) there are two understandings (*vyutpatti*) on account of accepting the construction of *kṛtī* (volition) with the meaning of the nominative case-ending and with the meaning of *nañ* (negative particle). And also in the case of *na pacati* (doesn’t cook) and *na pacet* (shouldn’t cook) there are two understandings by accepting the meaning of the nominative case-ending and meaning of the root as the prime qualificand though there is the same (presence) of *nañ* (in both the cases i.e. *na pacati* and *na pacet*). And from the sentence *nātirātre* etc. there is again different understanding by accepting the
construction of *istāsādhanatā* which is the meaning of injunction with the meaning of *nañ*, and thus, this leads to cumbersoness caused by five types of understanding.

**Establishment of the view on the basis of the usage**

In the opinion that the expressed (meaning) of *ān*, in the Veda is inducement, which is a special function (residing in) of *ān* etc. accepted on the basis of the usage. ‘being induced by the injunction, it was done by me’, similar to the acceptance of the expressed (meaning) of *ān* as a function or as an inducement in the worldly behaviour, of the desire of the King known by the usage, ‘being induced by the King, it was done by me’. there is no acceptance of different understandings. because as in the case of *pacet* there is construction of the meaning of *ān* with the relation of the state of being caused into the *bhāvanā* (volition) of *pāka* (cooking), so also in the case of *na pacet* there is construction of (the meaning of *ān*) into that (the volition of *pāka*) by the relation of the state of being counter-positive of the absence of being caused, and thus, there is no postulation of different understanding.

Also in the case of *pacati* as there is construction of Caitra etc. with the volition, by the relation of locatedness (*ādheyatva*), so also, in case of *na pacati* there is construction (of Caitra) with the volition by the relation of counter-positiveness of the absence residing in himself.
Prime-qualificandness of bhāvana

The construction of volition in/with the meaning of liṅ should not be doubted, because of the understanding of bhāvana as the cause of the knowledge, of which the meaning of the personal suffix is the qualifier along with time etc. by (the statement) bhāvapradhānamākhvātam. Because it is logically simple to accept bhāvana as prime-qualificand which is known by the personal suffix.

A doubt need not be raised, that the meaning of liṅ may be construed with bhāvana as its object (i.e., being an object of bhāvana) because, in that case, as there will be the contingency of usage of pacet when cooking is caused by injunction and the meaning of injunction is the means of desired goal, so also, in the opinion where the meaning of injunction is inducement the same contingency will be inevitable.

Elaboration of prarabdhyatva

The state of being caused (prarabdhyatvam) is the state of being produced by the inference of īstasādhana (which is) produced by its own-knowledge.

Its own knowledge is the knowledge of the inducement. As it enters into a relation in the form produced by the knowledge of the particular an individual liṅ etc. existing
prior to the time of (that) particular inclination \textit{(pravrtti)}, so the relation of the meaning of the relation of \textit{lin} with the \textit{bhāvanā} is \textit{svarūpayogyatvam} (capability of producing the result) which is the state of being produced by the inference of \textit{istāsūdhanatā} which is produced by that particular individual (knowledge of inclination), and so at the time of presence of \textit{bhāvanā} because of obstruction into it (\textit{bhāvanā}) of the one having inclination which is the meaning of \textit{lin} by such a relation, there is no contingency of the usage of (the word) \textit{pacet}.

And also because inclination \textit{(pravrtti)} is denoted by the \textit{ākhyāta} part of the personal suffix, it is not obtained by any other element.

\textbf{Discussion on delimiter of the state of being expressed (sakvatāvacchedaka)}

The state of being an inducer is not the delimiter of the state of being expressed but it is the state of being a function \textit{(vyāpāratva)}. And that too is not the property common to all functions, but it is a distinct-class common to (both) Vedic and worldly inducement having the form of function of \textit{lin} and the desire of man (respectively) pervaded by the state of function, established on the basis of its being the delimiter of the causality, upon the establishment on the basis of being the delimiter of the effectness of the varieties residing in the inclination occurring just after the inducement on the basis of the usage of the form. ‘this inclination is produced by inducement and not this’.

\footnote{\textit{व्यासं -}B}
Or it is the distinct objecthood common to both (Veda and the world) of the form, ‘let him be induced here’.

Hence because of the function being construed with volition in the said form of the function understood from *lin*, the first understanding is that it is volition that has function.

Discussion on relation

To the enquiry as to by which relation is it (volition) said to have it (function), it is said, in the case of the usage such as *pacet* etc in the worldly parlance, there is a usage such as, ‘I cook being induced by the other’, as the function is in the form of desire into cooking and has the relation with volition (*krti*) which has cooking as the object having the form, ‘let him be induced into cooking’. Once this is established and once the reliability of the elderly person who has/possesses desire is decided by some other means, it is known by the same cognition that the *paka* (cooking) is the object of the volition which is the object of the desire in the reliable person, the form of which is stated above, and thence, as the *vyapti* (invariable concomitance) such as: ‘wherever there is such objecthood in a volition which is the object of such a desire in the same reside *krtisādhyatva* and *iṣṭasādhanatva*’ is remembered, both (*krtisādhyatva* and

32 विषये - S
Istasādhanatva) are inferred (inference of both arises) and it is clear that such an inference is the cause of inducement. The particular relation and the particular form of desire are not the meanings of words as they are obtained from elsewhere.

In case of the Veda too, when there is a cognition such as, ‘the volition of sacrifice is the one that has function’, as there is the usage such as, ‘being induced by lin I perform the sacrifice’ and as the function resides in the lin and is related with the volition of sacrifice, the form of volition being ‘he should be induced towards (the performance of) sacrifice’ by the establishment of reliability (āptatva) of lin etc. on account of being free from defect/fault, there is inclination by the inference of istasādhanatva etc in the same manner, (hence) there too the special form of the desire and relation is got by the other (means of knowing).

Definition of āptatva

The state of being valid reliable speaker (āptatva) is common for/to both the world and the Veda and it is: the state of being agent of conducive and non-conducive sermons which are not produced for deceiving etc. and absence of agendhness with respect to other (kinds of) sermons. Thus, because of the possibility of having inference of the istasādhanatva on account of being sermoned by the āpta having same form in the world and the Veda, being known-obtained by the other, it (istasādhanatva) too is not denoted by lin. if it is said so, then no.
Refutation of the view that the meaning of \textit{liṅ} is inducement and supporting the view that the meaning of \textit{liṅ} is \textit{istasādhanaṭva}

Refutation of the establishment of the said view on account of the usage


It is not possible to accept inducement as the meaning of \textit{liṅ} as there is the usage such as, ‘being induced by the King, it was done by me’. Similar to the usage of the form, ‘being induced by the King, it was done by me’, by the (person) induced by the sentence of the King devoid of \textit{liṅ}, such as, ‘It is your \textit{istasādhana}, it is your \textit{kṛtisādhya} also’, on account of being produced/possible even otherwise than the usage put forth (\textit{upanyasta}) by you of the employment of the sentence having \textit{liṅ} etc., it is not possible to accept inducement to be the meaning of \textit{liṅ}.

[Notes: By the maxim of \textit{ananyalabhyaḥ sabdārthaḥ} only that which cannot be obtained by any other means is considered as the meaning of the word. Since inducement can be obtained even by the sentence devoid of \textit{liṅ}, it cannot be considered as the meaning of \textit{liṅ}.]

It is also seen that in case of a person along with all the materials required for (making of) the pot being present near the potter, there is inference of the potter of the desire meant for inducement for creation of the pot and being induced by that, there is usage of the form, ‘being induced by this, I did such a thing’. Moreover, the
knowledge of īstasādhana-tva is part of the group (of materials) required for inducement because of acceptance of it by implication (ākṣepa) on account of inducement (produced) even by others.

It is not so that there would be a contingency of the usage of the (person) induced by the sentence uttered by the messenger of the King, such as, ‘being induced by the messenger’ because there would be non-inference of such a kind, by the obstruction of the objecthood of inclination by the determination of the objecthood of salary etc. of the desire of that person.

Where there is no obstruction of that (objecthood of inclination) by the object-hood of (something) other than that which is contradictory to the objecthood of inclination, there the said usage prevails by the inference of the desire having (its)object the inclination even in the speaker of the sentence(uttered) on account of the inducement by the other. For example in case of the uttering King (who speaks) on account of the inducement by the wicked.

Hence it is through the power of utterance of word denoting īstasādhana-tva itself that the inducement of the form of ‘desire having its object as the inclination’, on account of being known by the other (means of knowing) is not (accepted as being) denoted by lin.
Establishment of the importance of īstasādhana-tā over inducement

It is not the case that there is the case of equal importance (vinigamanāvihara) because of the opposite also being possible by the previously said manner. In the inclination of the child towards one’s own (desired object), independent of (i.e. not produced by) words, there being knowledge (upalambha) as being produced by the knowledge of īstasādhana-tā and not being produced by the knowledge of inducement, there is importance (vinigamakatvam) of the possibility of inference of the knowledge of īstasādhana-tā as the cause of inclination occurring after (production of) words.

And also because of the brevity in implication of inducement made known by the īstasādhana-tā disregarding the consideration of āptatva which is cumbersome.

Refutation of similar understanding of injunction and prohibition

With regard to the explanation of the similar form of injunction and prohibition by resorting only to the difference in relation, is also against experience. In case of ‘ Caitraḥ pacati na pacati’ (Caitra cooks and does not cook) the clearance of the doubt of existence of the volition of pāka (cooking) and its absence (related to) the present time in Caitra, (occurring) immediately after the verbal understanding is established by the experience.
How can the cognition of the same form having as relation/qualifier the objecthood of special relation (which is itself) dependent on some other means of knowledge, eliminate the said doubt by the arrangement.

As in (the case of) *pacati* (he cooks), the construe of number one with *bhāvanā* is possible with the help of its relation with agenthood, and then the doubt ‘whether the agent is one or not’ is removed, so also when a question is: ‘how is the cooking?’, the answer like, ‘Caitra cooks’ or ‘Caitra does not cook’ would have been proper answers, this is the contingency. How could this be experienced by the *sahrdaya*?

It is not possible to refute different understandings even by accepting the experience of the same form having (different) arranged relation on the basis of difference of co-utterance.

In case such as ‘*ghakavad dravyam*’ (the substance possessing pot), the state of being the producer of the verbal understanding of single meaning having a general relation as contact of the co-utterance of single form by the understanding of single kind is indeed possible.

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35 संसार्गक -S
[Notes: In case such as ghatavad dravyam, there is only one possible relation of contact(samyoga), thus it is possible for the co-utterance of one kind, to generate verbal understanding leading to one meaning considering this common relation because of only one kind of understanding(vyutpatti).]

यो हि प्रकारादिविषयः समभव्याहारभेदेन व्यवस्थितो भासते स शाब्दबोधात्कार्यात्मच्छेदकप्रविष्टः सन्

व्यवस्थितहेतापादक हि , कथं संस्मृतिवद्य न तथात्म्यः।

The object such as qualifier etc. which seems to be arranged as per the difference in co-utterance, entering as the delimiter of the effectness in verbal understanding is the cause (āpādaka) of the different understanding, thus how come it is not the same (even) in the case of different relation (which is also reflected as qualifier in verbal understanding).

[Notes: Different relations would also cause different understandings because they are also taken into consideration for the production of verbal understanding.]

स्वाच्छेवं चत्रः पश्चिमं चत्रं पश्चिमं चत्रेण पश्चिमतीवादी तत्तत्त्वायकविभक्तिनां

तत्तत्त्वसंस्कृतकोषजने तत्तत्त्वप्रायाहतात्मह्रुगुकृत्य चत्रप्रकारका कल्प विभिन्नकृत्य

प्रतिसमभव्याहार नामार्थसबधियोः सुव्यवस्थितवेदान्तविन्यासाय व्यवस्थितहेतापादक-गौरवंच्छेदित्यः।

It would have been so : In case of ‘Caitrah paśyati’ (Caitra sees), ‘Caitram paśyati’ (someone sees Caitra), ‘Caitrena paśyati’ (someone sees with the help of Caitra) etc., it is proper to avoid cumbersomeness in the difference in verbal understanding for the sake of explaining/maintaining the relation between nominal meaning and action and between the nominal stem-meaning and the meaning of case-ending for each co-utterance by accepting the uniform understanding where Caitra is the qualifier and action is the qualificand, by accepting the different karaka-vibhaktis other than the genitive case to be the factors which make (the hearer) know the intention (of the speaker) to generate understanding of the relation with that particular meaning.
By this there is refutation of the statement of absence of different understandings also in the case of *pacet* (should cook) and *na pacet* (shouldn’t cook).

[And] Indeed, there would not be elimination of doubt such as ‘whether it induces or repels?’, from the (verbal) understanding produced by (the word) *pacet* (should cook), but there would be elimination of doubt regarding/of the form ‘the volition has function or not?’. [Because the only understanding that would be produced by the word *pacet* would be *vyāpāravati pākakṛtiḥ*, i.e. volition of *pāka* is one that has function.]

Moreover, on the question, ‘this volition is of what kind?’ the answers *pacet* (should cook) or *na pacet* (shouldn’t cook) are not proper.

There would be clear non-agreement(*virodha*) with (the statement occurring) in *ṭupṭikā, tantravārttika* and their commentarial works of the explanation of completely different/distinct verbal understanding of injunction and prohibition(which is arrived at) by accepting the repeller-ness of the meaning of injunction, of *nāṇ* (negative particle) (decided) by prior analysis (of the option) of it should either enjoin the meaning of negation or should repel the meaning of injunction.
If it is argued that similar to you a neo-logician this contradiction with the primary text is also desirable (slāghya) to me the neo-mimāṁsaka, then no.

Because it is absolutely undesirable (asālghya) to accept that which is contradicted with one’s own and other’s experience. Because there is no understanding of the form, ‘the volition belongs to/resides in Caitra’ from (the sentence) Caitro na pacati (Caitra doesn’t cook), and ‘the volition of Caitra is one that has function’ from (the sentence) na pacet (shouldn’t cook), nor is its similarity to the form of injunction, a matter of experience of anybody.

It is not so that (usage of) the form ‘he induces or repels me’ is something that is enough to carry out interaction.

Indeed this kind of knowledge having the state of inducement etc. as qualifier, which is the inducer of usage/interaction of such kind, is not obtained before the usage (from any means) other than the word.

Therefore, how is the usage meant for obtainment of the object of knowledge of such a kind is possible to occur of the sahrdaya on account of the power of the usage describing the inclination which is dependent on the knowledge of such kind.

[Notes: vyavahāra is jñānapūrvakāsabdaprayoga i.e. usage of words preceded by knowledge. Thus first knowledge is expected and only then any kind of usage is possible and not vice-versa.]
Refutation of prime-qualificandness of bhāvanā towards all the meanings of the verbal suffix

As to the knowledge/understanding having injunction as qualificand and volition as qualifier in our father’s work Bhattalankara, accepting the validity of the statement of nirukta and knowing volition which is known by verbal suffix as the prime qualificand on the basis of the volition being the qualificand having all the meanings of the verbal suffix as qualifier, the refutation of the statement of qualifiemness towards volition of the injunction, is also not true.

Because of the aptness of explanation of the (said) statement of nirukta, in the sense of merely (stating the) primary-ness of volition as being known/indicated by verbal root, on the basis of the establishment by experience of the state of qualifier of the present time etc. known by the verbal suffix in the meaning of verbal root in cases such as jānāti (he knows), naśyati (perishes).

[Notes : In case such as jānāti and naśyati there is absence of volition. Therefore the construction of the present time is accepted qualifying the root-meaning]
Support for construction of present time in \textit{bhāvanā} even in \textit{jānati, naśyati} etc.

Let it be so, (but) even in the said case, there is no construction of the present time etc. into the meaning of the verbal root, but in the volition (\textit{bhāvanā}). We do not call (denote by the word) \textit{bhāvanā} the volition, but only that which is the meaning of that which is qualified by the verbal suffix. Hence there is construction of the present tense with locusness (\textit{āśrayatā}) in case of \textit{jānāti} and with counterpositiveness (\textit{pratiyogitā}) in case of \textit{naśyati}, known by the verbal suffix.

[Notes: For the logicians, the verbal understanding arising from the sentence \textit{Caitro jānāti} (Caitra knows) is of the form jānāśrayah Caitraḥ i.e. Caitra is the locus of knowledge, and in \textit{ghato naśyati} (Pot perishes) of the form nāśapratiyogī ghaṭaḥ i.e. Pot is counter-positive of destruction.]

Statement of the relation in construction of the present time and the form of verbal understanding

There too, in case of \textit{naśyati} (perishes), (there is construction of the present tense) by the relation of being the object of destruction which is produced occurring in itself. Otherwise, even in case of construction of the present time in the meaning of verbal root which is destruction, there would be contingency of the use of (the expression) \textit{naśyati} even in cases when destruction has taken place long ago.

And there would be contingency of more cumbersomeness in construction of the present time into the root meaning by accepting \textit{ajahat} secondary signification of

\textsuperscript{38} Secondary meaning where the primary meaning is not lost.
production by the root. (i.e. the root would indicate the meaning of production in addition to the primary meaning of destruction).

Hence (in ghato naśyati) there is understanding of the form- the counter-positive of destruction residing in the pot is one that has presenthood by the relation of being an object of destruction that is produced in the present time. In Caitro jānāti (Caitra knows), (there is understanding of the form) locusness residing in Caitra is one that has presenthood by the relation of being an object of knowledge of the present time. If it is argued, similarly it is so in case of niḍrāti (sleeps) etc. too, then no.

Refutation of the construction of present time into bhāvanā

Locusness is either self-natured (svārupātmikā), or of the form of some different power, and in both these cases, there being possibility of its presenthood even without (the expectation of) an indicator, there would be contingency of usage of the expression jānāti (he knows) even before (acquiring) knowledge. There is no other form of locusness except the two which has been stated.

Even in the case of (acceptance of) the state of production of various (lit. infinite) locusness, occurring in the same time as the knowledge of locatedness, there would be defeat on account of much cumbersomeness which is invalid, of the conception of the form, ‘of those which do not expect material cause’ (which would become necessary) with respect to (the usage) nāśo bhavati asti (there is destruction).
[Notes: In case of conception of production(*utpatti*) which indicates the state of produced and producer, there is expectancy of the material(*samavāyī*) cause. But material cause is not possible in case of destruction. Thus usage such as *nāsō bhavati* would require the above said special consideration which would be cumbersome.]

Refutation of construction of present time into qualified locusness

It is not so that there is no contingency of the usage (of the term) *jānāti* (he knows) even before the knowledge on account of the construction of time into locusness that is qualified by the root meaning, because there would be contingency of different understanding(*utpatti*) in case of construction of time into *jānāti*(knows) etc. than (into) *pacati* etc.

[To explain] In case of *pacati*(he cooks), (accepting that) cumulative volition/effort beginning with the first effort and lasting till the production of the fruit, is the one which is construed with time, by the form of effort-ness which is conducive to cooking; the material-time which is fit to be construed into that(cumulative effort) is accepted as the meaning of *lat* through the form of presentness by the old(logicians).

But (there is acceptance) by the Neo of any (one) effort out of the cumulative effort(as the one which is construed with time) because of it having the same time as that of the utterance of *lat*, (and) presentness having the time not different(i.e. same) from the time of utterance of *lat* is accepted as the meaning of *lat*. 

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There (in the view of the Neos) by the word lat, lat itself or by (the principle of) sṛngagrahikā (directly pointing) that specific (lat) (is to be accepted?). In the first (option), there would be over application and in case of the second (option), why is there no acceptance of the time itself by (the principle of) sṛngagrahikā.

Also by the word uccāraṇa (utterance), the utterance of alphabet or the construed knowledge which is separated by the knowledge of the word and knowledge of the referent (is to be accepted?). In the first case, there is contingency of the cognition of the defined presentness, because of the absence of the (same) time of utterance at the time of knowledge, thereby, not leading to the evident elimination of doubt regarding presentness.

In both the cases, upon the question Caitra is cooking or not? There would be contingency of (having) a different content of the answer pacati (he is cooking) (then what is being asked). On account of the difference in the two utterances of the question and the answer and in the two construed knowledges which are caused by those (two utterances), there being difference in the two presentness having the form of time which is locus of them (utterance and construed knowledge), the fact that something else was asked and something else is answered is quite clear.
Let it be so, anyhow in both the views there is no construction with present-ness of either the cumulative volition or the specific volition which is qualified by *pāka* (cooking i.e. meaning of the verbal root *pac*), because there is obstruction of that (construction) in all the volitions except for the one which is not separated (i.e. co-exists) with the result.

Hence, how is it that there is no difference in understanding in case of construction into qualified volition in *jānāti* (knows) etc. of the time which is construed with a specific volition (in other cases such as *pacati* etc.).

And the difference in the understanding resulting from cognition having different relations occurring on account of arrangement (made) due to different co-utterances, has already been explained before.

And, on account of cognition having the present-ness as qualifier, of the locus-ness and of counter-positiveness, how can there be removal of doubt about present-ness being qualifier in knowledge and in the production of destruction without resorting to some other means of knowledge. (Since in the said case present-ness is not construed with the root-meaning.)

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39 कल्पना-B
Also, how the answer jñātī,naśyati would not be possible with respect to the questions, ‘what kind of locus-ness of knowledge?’ and ‘what kind of counter-positiveness of destruction?’ (i.e. such (undesirable)answers would become possible).

अतो न कालस्य भावनायः प्रकार्त्तनियमः। नायतुप्यन्यायांश्यालामापिवधुदेभचनार्ध्यवेक्तवादे। फले
कर्त्तवी च पदान्तरलध्य: आक्षेपलध्य: चान्त्यमानार्यस्थ्योराण्याख्याताय: प्रकार्त्तवाभावेन।४०
भावनाप्रकार्त्तस्य
दूराधास्तत्त्वातु(दूराधास्तत्त्वात्)॥४१।

Hence, there is no rule regarding the qualifieriness of the time in volition.

Nor of the state of getting (the fruit)oneself (denoted by the voice of the self) etc. which is the meaning of adjoining word(upapada)(indicating the fruit), or of the one-ness etc. which is the meaning of the number, because of farfetched-ness of qualifieriness into volition (which is one of the meanings of suffix), on account of the absence of qualifieriness into the meaning of the suffix of them (voice-ness and one-ness), which are construed with the result and the agent got from a different/separate word and by implication (respectively).

[Notes: (a) Atmanepada is used to indicate the obtainment of the fruit by the agent. (svaritaṁñitah kartrabhīprāye kriyāphale Pāṇini 1.3.72)
(b)Since voice-ness and the one-ness is not even construed with the suffix-meaning, but into the meanings obtained from some other source, their construction into the bhāvanā which is one of the meanings of the suffix is farfetched.]
Therefore, because of the construction of them with volition through the result/fruit and the agent (respectively), there is no contingency of falsification of prime-qualificandness of it(bhāvanā).

Thus, because of the absence of destruction of it(prime qualificandness of bhāvanā), on account of the construction of the time into bhāvanā, which is construed with root meaning, through it(root meaning), the acceptance of construction into locus-ness etc. of the time by the rejection its construction into root meaning, which is against the experience, would be fruitless.

In case of absence of the desire of stating/enjoining(avivaksā) of the voice of self, which is construed with the volition through the fruit, on account of (it) being qualifier of the object/purpose (uddēsya), the explanation/statement of the source text about the(prescription of) voice of self, on account of the instrumentality towards that(fruit/desired object) won’t be possible.

In upanayita, upatisṭhata etc. the construction into root meaning of the meaning of - atmanepada is out of contention(i.e. clear), how can there be a rule of qualificandness of volition, of the cognition that has all the meaning of the verbal suffix as qualifier.
Hence, it is appropriate to accept in the statement 'bhāvapravṛddhānāmākhyātām' only that meaningfulness which is in agreement with (the statement) of the smṛti 'tayostu pratyayah prādhānyena'\(^{42}\) (out of the two (the suffix and the root), suffix is the prime).

Or let the word bhāva occurring here (bhāvapravṛddhānāmākhyātām) also denote injunction (vidhi) with respect to (the usage) pacet etc. just as (it denotes) the common/general locusness with respect to (the usage) jānāti etc., because its synonym the word bhāvanā though not being popularly used in that sense (of vidhi) according to definition of logician, is seen (to be used) in that sense as per the usage of mimāṃsaka which is based upon the power of the word sādbhāvanā.

Propriety of construction of arthibhāvanā into sādbhāvanā

Thus, it is proper (to accept) the qualification into that (sādbhāvanā) of the ārthibhāvanā which is the desired object of sādbhāvanā, just as (the acceptance of qualification) into that (ārthibhāvanā) of the heaven etc. which is the desired object of ārthibhāvanā, because of obtainment of understanding of a single form which is qualification into bhāvanā of the desired object, and also because of experience, 'it induces here (i.e. towards the desired object)'.

\(^{42}\) Pravṛtti-pravṛtti-pravārthya sādbhāvanā - Famous maxim accepted by all. It is said to be statement of Nirukta, but the sentence is not found there.
Also, because of the rule stating the construction into action (kriyā) of only the case (kāraka) as per the maxim of vājapeyādhikarana\(^{43}\) just as there is the rule of construction of kāraka only in the kriyā as per the maxim of arunādhikarana\(^{44}\).

Construction of only the cases into action

न मीमांसकेन विषे नारकहर्षस्मानिन्यो वाच्यः।

The mīmāṃsaka should not state the construction into bhāvanā of injunction(vidhi), which is not a kāraka.

वाजपेयकारणिका स्वाराज्यकर्मिका यागीया भांवनेति वाजक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधसमानाकरे हि

वाजपेयवाक्यजन्यजोधे तदेव न वैहृष्णयं न कस्याक्षवृत्तिसुप्रतिक्षणियवलेवोदाहलबोधसम्भवनेन यागेन

यागमित्यप्रस्तुतितिमा पर्वतीयदायार्थन तत्त्वं सर्वगच्छते।

In case of the understanding/cognition produced by the sentence of vājapeya which is of similar form to the verbal understanding produced by the sentence of the form, ‘vājapeya karanikā svārāiya karmikā yāgīyā bhāvanā’ (bhāvanā is one which is related to sacrifice, having vājapeya as instrument and kingdom as the object/purpose), there is no vairūpya(difference of form) nor is there repetition of anything just like that the elaborate sentence-) (upon such kind of view) the contingency of vairūpya etc. occurring there(in the adhikarana) by obtaining of the presence of (the two forms) yāgena and yāgam on account of impossibility of the exemplified understanding is justified only on the strength of the said rule(i.e. there is only construction of the cases into action).

[Notes: In the vājapeya-adhikarana, at the time of explaining the construction of the sentence vājapeyena svārāyakāmo yajeta, it is stated by the prima facie view that there is construction of the yāga into the bhāvanā without any particular relation.

\(^{43}\) ŚD. I.4.6

\(^{44}\) ŚD. III.1.12
Thus it assumes the form *yāgam* when it is construed with the substance, and it assumes the form *yāgena* when it is construed with the fruit. Thus in acceptance of *tantra* (one element serving many purposes) in *yāga* there would be no difference in form or the necessity of any kind of repetition. Upon this the *siddhāntin* points out that this construction with other elements of substance and fruit of the single element *yāga* is not possible because *yāga* is not a *kriyā*. It can be construed with the other element only through the *bhāvanā*. And its construction into the *bhāvanā* is only possible through the accusative or instrumental case, because of the rule that only cases can be construed into the action. And in such case there would be the contingency of difference of form and of the repetition. Because of such contingencies it is decided at the end that *vājapeya* is the name of the sacrifice and it is in agreement with the *yāga* which is construed as an instrument/means (ŚD. I.4.6.)

It is not so that injunction(*vidhi*) is *kriyā* because of which there would be impossibility of construction of *bhāvanā* into it.

It is not so that there is no(such kind of) said rule because of the construction into action *paśya*(see) of the action of *yāna*(going) which is a non-*kāraka* in examples such as 'paśyodagraplutivādīviyati bahutaram stokamuryām *prayāti*'(Abijñānasākuntalam 1.7) (see *paśya*) (this antelope which) on account of its forward jump, moves(*prayāti*) more in the sky and less on the earth, because there is construction of that (*kriyā*) only through the *karaka*(case) on account of the reason of (presence of) *subanta* (word ending in nominal suffix, like *tam/etam*(that/this) in the present case) which is brought in(*advāhṛta*) after (the word) *prayāti*. 
Indeed in reality, there is construction of the *bhāvanā* of *yāna* in the root-meaning *paśya* by the relation of being an object, because of the nature of being known as delimeter of the state of root-meaning.

In cases such as *eteneṣṭvā yajeta* (one should sacrifice after performing this(*iṣṭi*)) the construction into the root meaning of the later time etc. which is the meaning of the suffix *ktvā* etc. has already been explained.

Hence there is no qualification of the injunction into the *bhāvanā*- with this intention the statement of the revered teacher must be known. Thus enough(of the discussion on this topic).

The said relation(of *svaprayojyayatva*) is also not possible, because there is usage/norm of the *mīmāṁsakās* of such kind that one’s own object must not be instigated of the subsidiary and the primary originative injunctions (individually/separately), because of instigation-ness(happening) only by the main injunction. *Prayāja* etc. though available by extension at both the places, must be caused only by the injunction of animal (sacrifice)(which is the main) and not by the injunction of *purodāṣya* (sacrificial cake)(which is a subsidiary sacrifice).

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45 Reference not found. Probably referring to *dārśapūrṇamūnīsūbhīyāṃ isticvā somena yajeta* JS. II.4.4.
Though the state of qualified injunction being same, in case such as *somena yajeta*, *soma* is prescribed by the implication of the prescription of qualifier, and in case such as *hutvābhīṣuṭya bhakṣayanti* (they eat after performance of sacrifice and extraction (of *soma*)), there is no instigation of sacrifice and extraction by the implication of that (injunction of qualifier).

There (in the above cases a question is) the state of being caused (*prayojayatva*) which is upholder of such a norm (of *mīmāṃsaka*) is non-different from the said relation or it is different from it?

**Case where the causality is non-different**

In the first case, because of the validity of the knowledge of construction having the said relation (*svaprayojayatva*) of the subsidiary injunction into its *bhāvanā*, on account of being instigated by it (subsidiary injunctions), the instigation by the prime injunction again of the subsidiaries is not possible.

At the time of being made available by extension even by the injunction related to *purodāsa* just as the injunction of animal, on account of there being contingency of instigation of *prayāja* etc. along with the other subsidiaries, there would not be instigation by the two prime injunctions.

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46 प्रयोजकमिति - S
Even in the two exemplified qualified-injunctions, being similar (in nature), there would be contingency of conception of that the causality of the two qualifiers too in order to uphold that (kind) of instigation even in the qualified, (the instigation) which is (already) known as being construed with those specific injunction in the qualified action having the said relation which is experienced and is established by authority.

If it is argued, that the statement against their prime text of the neo-mīmāṇsaka is viable and thus has already been answered, (then) it is not so. Because the worthiness of neo-logicians though stating against their prime text is possible on account of there being no problem of trespassing the practice of the learned and also on account of absence of disagreement with any other śāstra. But it is not possible of the neo-mīmāṇsaka on account of the contingency of trespassing of the practice which is accepted by all the learned mīmāṇsakas and yajñikas and also on account of contingency of opposition with the aphorism(i.e. text) of the kalpa etc. which are their sources.

To explain, because of there being non-expectancy of the order of subsidiaries which are caused by different injunctions just as (there is non-expectancy of order) of the rites (performed) for different desires and because of non-potency of the injunction of order on account of non-consideration (aparāmarśa) of other subsidiaries of each one of subsidiary-injunction, there won’t be any rule of order by the order of
text (pāthakrama), (hence) there would be (possibility of) performance of samidh(first prayāja) even after the performance of tanūnapāt(second prayāja).

[Notes: Prayāja are the five subsidiary sacrifices performed before the main sacrifice namely samit, tanūnapāt, īṣṭ, barhiḥ, and svāhākāra. Their order is decided by the order of their occurrence in the text. There is expectancy of order amongst the subsidiaries only when they are caused by the main injunction. If they are caused by their own injunctions then there would be absence of any consideration of the other subsidiary thereby causing the absence of any order.]

And also, there won’t be moving back (apakarsa) or moving forward (utkarsa) of āghāra and sūktavāk by the bringing back and carrying forward of prayāja and anūyāja, with respect to daikṣa and savanīya animal (sacrifice).

[Notes: Prayajas are performed after placing of the havis (sacrificial material). But in the Soma sacrifice wherein animals are also havis, there is an injunction in the context of agniṣomīya animal sacrifice stating ‘तिष्ठन्ते पशु प्रयजति’ (ĀpaŚŚ. 7.14.6) (he performs the prayājas while the animal is standing i.e. while it is still alive). Thus on account of this injunction the prayājas are shifted back and performed before the animal is killed. Similarly, anūyājas which are subsidiary sacrifices performed after the prime sacrifice, are performed after the idāprāśana (eating of the sacrificial cake). But on account of the injunction stated in the context of the savanīya animal stating ‘अनिमारुतदूर्दृष्टमूूयैष्क्रियति’ they are performed after agnimārūta śāstra (group of mantras recited before the sacrifice of Soma). Thus the anūyājas have to be carried forward and performed later. The adhikarana twelve of the first section of the fifth chapter deals with these two injunctions and arrives at the conclusion that the prayājas are not to be moved back singularly, but along with all the related rites such as the āghāra sacrifice etc. that precede them. And in the same way the anūyājas too

47 स्वस्त्यानात्तूर्द्धमायकस्तपत्ति: परत्व चोलकर्मः: - Mayukhamālikā on Śāstradīpikā 5.1.12.
are not to be moved forward in isolation but along with the subsidiaries such as the sūktavāk etc. which follow them. ŚD. V.1.12]

In fact, on account of being caused by the same extension, there would be contingency of carrying forward of the two rites of daksināgni by the carrying forward of amuyāja out of those having fixed order.

[Notes : Two rites namely the pīṭṭalepahōma(sacrifice of the residue sticking to the vessel ) and the phalikaraṇāhōma(oblation of the husk which are separated from the grains) are performed in the daksināgni (fire placed in the semi-circular altar in south). Both of them are related with the purosaśa(sacrificial cake).]

It should not be doubted that there is contingency of carrying forward on account of the carrying forward of the amuyāja related with it, of both of them related with the sacrificial cake which is performed in the mādhyandinasavāna(mid-day performance), by the maxim establishing the moving back of only the nirvāpa(to pour out/to set aside the amount of material required for the sacrifice) related with only the first īsti in purāvākah prawātoḥ occurring in the īsti named) advarākalpā. Because of obtainment of carrying forward of both of them related with the material of the savāniya occurring in the trīyasavāna(third performance).

(And) On account of the possibility of causality even of the unobtained homa and abhiṣava, there is contingency of impossibility of the causality by the implication of both which are already known/obtained.

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[48]nuyājōtkārābhāṣyām. S
Case where the causality is different

Then, if it is said that the causality existing in relation is different from the causality which is responsible for the usage, then that itself should be (accepted as) relation in the cognition having bhāvanā as qualificand and injunction(vidhi) as qualifier.

And also (if you ask) how is there non-contingency(i.e. absence) of causality by the injunctions of subsidiary of the subsidiaries, then it has been answered in the main texts and in other texts such as Nyāyakanikā etc. On account of restatement(anuvāda) by the subsidiary-injunction having the nature of being causal on account of having the form of inducement, the instigation(prayukti) denoting/expressing that which is (already)performed and which should be performed, does not express(apadayati) the causality of the injunctions of subsidiary. Moreover, here the causality which is described by distinct knowledge(praśnti) produced by a distinct lin is not included in the relation because of which it would not restate. It serves the state of being the relation even though being restated.

By the locusness of performability which is made known, common to both that which is enjoined and which is restated, it is possible to say that bhāvanā (is one that is) qualified by injunction(vidhi).

49 यो नानूक्षेत - B
Also in the situation of presence of bhāvanā how come the instigation of the said form being the differentiator of that bhāvanā established by the knowledge (pratīti) and established by the nature, just as time etc. established by nature and just as yāga etc. established by knowledge in (sentences such as) vrihibhiryajeta etc., on account of difference of parts enter into the state of relation? Thus there won’t be contingency of the usage of (the word) pacet (he should cook) (in the situation of presence of bhāvanā).

In case of Soma sentence (i.e. somenā yajeta), there is postulation of the prescription of Soma with respect to sacrifice (yāga) to uphold subsidiariness (of soma) known by the first cognition.

And in case of abhiṣutyā etc (abhiṣutyā hutvā bhakṣayanti), there is no such postulation because there is no understanding of subsidiariness of homa and abhiṣava even in the first cognition, and thereby such arrangement is justified, then how come (it is said that) the postulation is made by leaving aside the views of the main/source texts.

Refutation of inclusion of inference of istasādhanaṭā in relation
And the acceptance of the inclusion of the inference of *istasaiddhanatā* in the relation, that too, how is there the acceptance of objecthood towards the inducing-knowledge of that (inference) which is experienced (*yogakṣema*) as similar to desire, (such kind of acceptance) being a surprise it is purposeless and causes undesired (result).

In case of acceptance of purpose as cessation of contingency of the usage of (the term) *pacet*, in the situation of presentness of the *bhāvanā* which is produced by the inducement on account of absence of it, there would be non-contingency (non-possibility) of the usage of *inference* of that in the time which is distantly prior as per the manner stated by you (*mīmāṃsaka*).

(And) Of the *svarūpayogyatā* (the capacity to produce result), what indeed is distinct amongst (the two) prior-absence and the destruction of the inference. (i.e. there would be no distinction in the *yogyatā*). *Yogyatā* is of the form of the property which is delimiter of that kind of state of being produced or (it is) of the form of being non-locus of absolute absence.

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50 *तद्भवेन परिवेदित प्रयोगपतितिवारणे हि प्रयोजने स्वीकीयमाणे* भवदुरकृत्या तद्नुमिती: प्राण्व्यवहितकाले प्रयोगानायति:।

51 *मन्त्रातिविनयोजकविवधी विपरीताभावकल्पे राजिस्वरकल्लम्बनविवधी विकृतिकथाभावकल्पे तिरिस्वेदिनि च प्राणेव*
And in *sarvebhyaḥ kāmebhyaḥ darṣapūrṇamāsau* (perform new and full moon sacrifice for the purpose of all desires) where the verb form is not heard (i.e. not present); in injunction of application of incantation/formula etc. arrived at by the conception based on *linga*(indicative power of the word); in injunction stating the relation of fruit with (the sacrifice named)*rātrisatra* through the postulation of alteration; and in the injunction of extension involving the conception of the manner of performance of modification(*vikṛti*), there being conception along with suitable word based on *istasaḍhanatā* which has been decided beforehand, how is it possible to state the construction of injunction into the *bhavana* through the relation imbibed in it, in those (cases) where the inference of *istasaḍhanatā* is not possible, just as *yajeta svargakāmāḥ* (where such is possible).

Also, it is not so that there is inference of that (*istasaḍhanatā*) by the conceptualized injunction for establishment of relation between *mantra* and cutting, which is known by the indicative power along with/assisted by the context.

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52 भावि -S
Nor is it that there is inference of that (istäsädhanatä) by the conceptualized injunction for the purpose of establishing the aptness got by the brevity of the purposeness of fruit made known by the explanatory passage (rather than conception of a totally new/unknown fruit).

Nor is there a possibility of inference of istäsädhanatä in the substances or in the helpers, by the conceptualized/assumed extension which makes available the help and substances which are instruments towards it belonging to the archetype, for the purpose of fulfilling the desire of the helpers belonging to the modification (rites).

Hence inducement is not the meaning of lin. Nor is there qualification of it (? meaning of lin) in the bhāvanā. It is not proper that istäsädhanatä is injunction because of not being obtained by any other, (based on the fact that) there is no inference of that (istäsädhanatä) based on the experience/knowledge having that as relation.

**Refutation of lin (vidhi)= istäsädhanatä and justification of lin=inducement (pravartana)**

Refutation of meaning of lin is istäsädhanatä

Even then, this is not proper. This is so because, although being induced by the statement, ‘this is your istäsadhana’, said by the teacher, (it is seen that) there is such kind of statement of the modest (savīnaya) student such as, ‘I shall not do it when it is
said thus, (but) I shall do it when (the word) kuru (you do) is said'. And upon being said thus, he is inclined.

It is not so that both such kind of inclinations would arise in the case of istasādhana being the meaning of the injunctive suffix lin etc.

[Notes : In the first case though there is usage of the word istasādhana inclination is not seen But there is expectancy of the use of the suffix lin. And in the second case though there is usage of the suffix lin, still there is expectancy of the usage of the word istasādhana Thus istasādhana cannot be said to be the meaning of lin ]

Indeed, upon the utterance (of the question), ‘having which desire does he cook? Having which desire does he sacrifice?’, when there is giving of the answer such as, ‘desirous of salary, desirous of heaven’ (respectively), there is understanding of that particular volition(kriyā) having that particular purpose on account of co-utterance with the word kāma even without (the utterance of) the suffix lin etc.
It is not so that the injunctive-ness of the verbal suffix which is attached/associated is possible here (in the answer, svargakāma) even by alteration (of the mood (lakāra)), as this would lead to the contingency of disagreement of the question and the answer.

[Notes: The answer ‘svargakāma’ accepts the verbal form ‘pacati’ from the question ‘kiṁ kāmō sau pacati?’. Here the verbal form in the answer may be changed into the imperative mood as pacet to make the form of the answer injunctive in nature. But this is denied as this would result in disagreement of the forms in the question and the answer, which must be in agreement.]

And the state of making known the īstāsadhanatā of the word kāma independent of injunction has been stated by the revered Bhāṭṭa in the Vārttika while stating in the second chapter as, ‘The word kāma is the only provider of the (desirous)object/purpose of the volition, and not the accusative case ending’.

And, ‘the agenthood qualified by the desire, does not arise without the instrumentality towards the desired’ this has also been said by Miśra (Parthasārathi Miśra) in the sixth chapter.

53 Somarākṣo-B
54 The whole expression is missing in S.
55 अत: स्थवर्गामार्थप्रवृत्तिपूलिष्यतचतुर्यायत्रें विष्णुस्य यागः स्थवर्गसाधनत्वेन विष्णुस्य भवति पद्म. SD VI.1.1.
Moreover) The expectancy of co-utterance with the word *kāma* of *lin* etc. for the production of inducing-knowledge having as object (that which has) instrumentality towards heaven, has also been explained by you.

Hence, by the positive and negative co-relation, *istasādhanatva* is not the meaning of *lin* because of being known by the other (i.e. by the co-utterance with the word *kāma*).

Those which are known (in general) as being the *istasadhana* by the (separate) injunctions of *āgneya* etc., (and which are) expectant of the particular goal, the injunction of *darsāpūrnamāsa*, inclined for the purpose of providing that towards them, making known the instrumentality towards heaven of each one which is non-dependent (i.e., independent of the other), would not be the establisher of co-performance (of them).

Or, in case of (establishment of) instrumentality (towards heaven) of those that are (already) together, there would be contingency of invalidity of the origniative injunctions.

[Notes The *darsāpūrnamāsa* sacrifice consists of six main sacrifices, three of which namely the *purodāsa* for *Agni*, the *upōṃśu* for *Vishnu/Prajāpati/Agnisoma*, and the *purodāsa* for *Agnisoma* are performed on the full-moon day (*pūrṇimā*), and the other three namely *purodāsa* for *Agni*, curd for *Indra* and milk for *Indra* are performed on the new-moon day (*darsa*) Each of these sacrifices are enjoined by separate injunctions The six sacrifices together are called *darsāpūrnamāsa* which is performed for the fruit of heaven, made known by the sentence *darsāpūrnamāsābhhyām svargakāmo vajeta*.]

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56 काश्यप -B
57 TaitSam II 2 5
Establishment of co-performance in the view of the siddhāntin

If you think that there is establishment of togetherness (i.e. co-performance) of the different means only by the manner prescribed by you, then it is not so.

In our view, there are four functions of the injunction which has the form of inducement, which are origination (upatti), application (viniyoga), qualification (adhisthana) and performance (prayoga).

In case of obtainment of either of the four from some other means, the injunction performing (enjoining) the other (i.e. unobtained) function(s) serves the purpose of restatement on the part of the other (i.e. obtained). Like the injunction of āgneya etc., obtaining the three functions from the injunction of darsapūrṇamāsa, enjoining only the origination, restates those three.

Or, like the injunction pūrṇamāsyaṁ pūrṇamāsyā yajeta (he should perform pūrṇamāsī sacrifice (the three sacrifices which are performed on pūrṇīmā) on the full moon day), enjoining only the performance (prayoga), (restates) the origination (obtained) from the injunction of āgneya and application and qualification (viniyoga and adhisthana) (obtained) from the injunction of adhisthana (i.e. the injunction of darsapūrṇamāsa).

58 tadanāt eva vyāpārasya
59 yathāmāyuyādīkāloghaṁavyāpārasya pūrṇamāsyaḥ ca turṇaḥ bhūtāḥ TaitSaṁ. II.6.3.
60 Satapatha Brāhmaṇa (SatBr.) 11.1.3.6.
In case where not even one out of the four is obtained, there, one injunction enjoints all the four functions as in the example of \( \text{vāyavyam svetamālabheta} \) etc. This has been said in \( \text{paunaruktaparihāramālā} \) of the father and in \( \text{nyāyakaṇṭika} \) etc.

There the establishment of co-performance of the means which have already originated and have obtained/gained objecthood towards any one of the (other) three functions is possible because of its nature of having qualifierness which is meant to be said (i.e. enjoined) on account of (its) having the state of being enjoined (i.e. because it is enjoined).

[Notes : With respect to an object which is enjoined, all its qualifiers are also enjoined. JS. X.4.1. (grahaikatvadhikarana)]

Absence of co-performance in the prima facie view

In your opinion/view, who desire cognition having/which has root-meaning as qualificand and \( \text{īstastādhanavatva} \) as qualifier, the contingency of unintendedness of co-performance becomes non-avoidable/inevitable, because of (there being) causality of

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61 TaitSam. II.1.1
62 विशिष्टे वैशिष्ट्याववाहिबोध -S
knowledge of qualified (dharmī) having as qualifier the delimiter of qualifiedness (dharmitā), as qualifier towards the qualified-cognition (visitavaiśīṣṭyāvagāhi), and on account of it (dharmijñāna) being obtained from the sentence of origination itself and because of the obviousness of the restated-uddeśyatā of the sacrifice in the sentence/statement ye yāgaste svargasādhanam (those which are sacrifices are means of (attaining) heaven)

[Notes: In the view of the neo-logicians the meaning of liṅ (= Īstāsādhanatva) is construed in the root-meaning (here yāga). And this is further construed in the -bhāvanā (= kri). Thus there the verbal understanding is of the form Īstāsādhanatvaśiṣṭayāgānukālakri.]

Redundancy of the two sentences namely pūrnamāsyām and amāvāsyāvām in the prima facie view

एतेन पूर्णास्या पूर्णास्या यजेतेति वाक्यबिधेश्वरि प्राधानानाः परस्परसाहित्याङ्गसाहित्यां चाविवक्षापतिहृद्या। अतं एव व्यर्थतापनित्रा।

By this, the contingency of unintendedness of the mutual co-performance of the main sacrifices (pradhāna) and the co-performance of the subsidiaries, is to be known even in the two sentences pūrnamāsyām pūrnamāsyām yajeta etc. (i.e. amāvāsyāvām amāvāsyayā yajeta). And therefore there is contingency of redundancy (of the two sentences).

[Notes: Since there is absence of any intention of the two sentences of enjoining the co-performance of the different prime sacrifices and of the co-performance of the subsidiaries, they serve no purpose at all. Hence they are redundant.]

न तत्वेतेताः धात्वर्धगतिमिश्रसामायसाधनत्वमिश्रविशेषसाधनत्वं बीथ्यं शाखात्तसिद्धतवात्।

It is not so that the instrumentality in general towards desire or the instrumentality towards the particular desired object existing in the root-meaning is to be made known by these two (sentences), because it is established by some other sentence (i.e.
by the sentence of *darśapūrnamāsa*). And also because of the lack of understanding of (any) particular desire (from them)(i.e. there is no mention of any particular desire in them.)

Nor can there be understanding (by the sentence *pūrṇamāsyām pūrṇamāsyā yajeta*) of the *īstasādhanatva* through (its) form of being (one that is) qualified by the *pūrṇamāsi* (full moon), similar to the sentence *dadhnā juhoti*(he sacrifices with curd), where there is understanding of causality (*īstasādhanatva*) through (its form) of being (one that is) qualified with *dadhi* (curd) of the sacrifice of which *īstasādhanatva* is already known by its very nature, because of establishment of such kind of cognition/understanding in the sentence of origination itself (i.e. *yadāgneya...* etc.)

[Notes: Though the *īstasādhanatva* of the sacrifice is known by the originative injunction *agnihotram juhoti*, still with respect to the sentence *dadhnā juhoti* which prescribes *dadhi*, it can be said that the *īstasādhanatva* of the sacrifice which is qualified by the subsidiary (*dadhi*) is known from the sentence. However even this cannot be said with respect to the sentence *pūrṇamāsyām* etc. because the subsidiary time (*pūrṇamāsi*) has been prescribed in the originative injunction itself *yadāgneya... pūrṇamāsyām* etc.]

Nor (is there understanding of) the instrumentality of the *samudāyāpūrva* (towards the fruit), because of unestablishment of it (*samudāyāpūrva*) in your view/opinion. And because of the absence of the intention of speaking of co-performance existing here which is the establisher of that (*samudāyāpūrva*).

[Notes: The sacrifice which is performed for a particular fruit ends after a certain time, but the fruit is obtained later. Thus to maintain the cause-effect relation between the sacrifice and the fruit respectively, there is conception of *apūrva* (unseen). The sacrifice produces *apūrva* and the *apūrva* produces the fruit later. Each prime sacrifice in the rite produces its *apūrva*. In the *darśapūrnamāsa* rite, there are six
prime sacrifices. Three of them are performed on the new-moon day and the other three are performed on the full-moon day. Since there is a time gap between the two performances, the apūrva of the three sacrifices which are performed on the same day are said to combine together to produce one apūrva named samudāyāpūrva (combined unseen). And the two samudāyāpūrvas together produce one phalāpūrva (apūrva leading to the fruit). But even this is not possible in the view of the opponent because of absence of establishment of co-performance which is a prerequisite for conception of samudāyāpūrva.

नापि प्रयोगार्थाधारनत्वं, प्रयोगार्थाधारत्वकर्मात्। उकाविवक्षणः। तत्तत्त्वभावाच।

Nor (is there understanding of) the instrumentality existing in the prayoga (performance), because prayoga is not denoted by the verbal root. And also because of the absence of obtainment of that (prayoga) in the said absence of intention (of co-performance).

[Notes: The injunction which enjoins the uninterrupted (i.e. continuous) performance is called prayogavidhi (injunction of performance). It is actually the injunction of the prime sacrifice forming sentence unity with the injunction of the subsidiaries. Prayogavidhi establishes the co-performance (sāhitya) of the prime and the subsidiary rites.]

अत: प्रावृत्तिविधि:। तत्तापि प्रावृत्तिकुलत्वात्मकः। प्रावृत्तिनालयमेव शक्तितावच्छेदकम्।

Therefore, inducement (pravartanā) is injunction (vidhi). There too, the state of being as inducement which produces inclination (pravṛtti) is the delimiter of the state of being expressed.

Discussion on pravṛtти (inclination)

न तु प्रावृत्तिविधिविभवेऽवैधिविभिवन्।

63 प्रावृत्तिकुलत्वात्मकप्रावृत्तिनालयमेव - S
It is not the case that inclination is outside the injunction on account of it being known by the other (from the ākhyātāmsa).

[Notes: It is refutation of the view stated in Khaṇḍadeva’s bhāṭṭaraḥasya.]

Refutation of inclination = bhāvanā

It is not so that bhāvanā which is the meaning of the verbal suffix is indeed inclination. Because all the volitions which are conducive towards the fruit are said through the form of being volition of the sacrifice by the verbal suffix. For indeed there exists the usage of the verbal suffix of the form yajati, in the case of (denotation of) time of anyone out of them.

Only the first volition is said to be inclination

The first volition indeed is said to be inclination (and not all the volitions), because of the usage of the expression pravartate (he/she is inclining) only at that time. And also because there is usage of the form urdhvaprajñātta (he/she is inclined hereafter).

न झाख्यातार्थभावेव प्रवृत्ति। यत्र आख्यातेन प्रत्यावृत्ता: कृत्यो यागः कृत्यतवाकारोऽस्व अयुच्यने। जायते हि तासामाः(म? )व्यवहारात्रः काले व्यवहारायायः।

It is not the case that bhāvanā which is the meaning of the verbal suffix is indeed inclination. Because all the volitions which are conducive towards the fruit are said through the form of being volition of the sacrifice by the verbal suffix. For indeed there exists the usage of the verbal suffix of the form yajati, in the case of (denotation of) time of anyone out of them.

Only the first volition is said to be inclination

आह्यावृत्तच च प्रवृत्तिरत्वुच्यते तत्काल एव प्रवृत्त इति व्यवहारात्रः। उद्धरः तु प्रवृत्त इत्येव।

The first volition indeed is said to be inclination (and not all the volitions), because of the usage of the expression pravartate (he/she is inclining) only at that time. And also because there is usage of the form urdhvaprajñātta (he/she is inclined hereafter).

नवमे प्रतियोगमार्गभ्रमणवृत्तिसम्बन्धनावसेरुपे अप्रवृत्तप्रवृत्तितार्थः। प्रवृत्तिरुत्तराध्यामां भेदेनान्तरायणानिरुपिततद्भेद इत्युक्तः।

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64 For details see contribution of Koṇḍadeva.
65 स्वयात् - S
66 उच्चप्रक्रृत(त?) इत्येव - B
67 इत्यके श्च - S
And also because of the statement in the ninth chapter at the point of supporting the non-repetition (of performance) of ārambhamaiśīṭi (lit. the beginning sacrifice) in each performance (of darśapūrṇamāsa), wherein the beginning (ārambha) is (defined as): 'inclination of the non-inclined' : (the statement) of the form- although there being difference of the beginning (ārambha) defined/enumerated/known by (each) performance, still there is indifference (i.e. oneness) of it (ārambha) (being) defined by darśapūrṇamāsa.

तथापि तस्या अपि आख्यातयथे तर्भाबोध्ये...वैत(आख्यातायथे)न्तरभाबोध्येवेवति?) चेत् कि तत्: ।

Even then (i.e. even after the above reasons supporting the first volition to be inclination) there is inclusion of even that (inclination) in the meaning of the verbal suffix, if you say so, then what by it? (i.e. what is proved by it?)

अपेक्षितरूपेण तद्दाधेनेवायद्यरूपबल्मितः।

(Because still there is presence of) The state of being obtained from the other (of the pravṛtti) on account of non-obtainment of it in the desired form (because of which it is excluded from the injunction (vidhi)) [In case of there being absence of its obtainment in the desired form, it is indeed not obtained from the other]

न हि नष्पा सह चैत्र आगत इत्युक्तं नपरं चैत्रीयत्वस्य नष्पा सह ब्राह्मणा आगता इत्युक्तेऽपि तत्र तस्य सुलभत्वम्।

It is not so that, on account of the statement, 'Caitra came with the grandson', as there is (obtainment) of the state of being related to Caitra (in the grandson), so also there is easiness in the case of, 'the brahmāna came with the grandson' (of the obtainment) of it (the state of being related with Caitra) in it (the grandson). [Because it is not obtained in the desired form.]

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68 JS. IX.1.10.
The real nature of pravṛtti (inclination)

Actually, it is the samkalpa (vow) of the form, 'I must perform it for this result', which is said to be the inclination (pravṛtti) which is the meaning of the verbal suffix (and) which makes known all the volitions.

(And) By way of denoting the function which is connection to it (pravṛtti) lin etc. is said by the word kartavyatā (meant to be performed). (And) by the connection to which, the function of the lin etc. explains the certain objecthood towards the bhāvanā having as fruit the desired object and the state of having/describing/indication the prompted person such as those desirous of heaven etc.

And on account of sticking to which there is explanation of the function of lin having the objecthood towards the bhāvanā having as aim the desired object and having the prompting-ness towards the person desirous of heaven in the view of Guru (Prabhākara), similar to the injunction of qualification, (in which) on account of the strength of being connected to the kṛiti (volition), the objecthood of the yāga and the specific agenthood (is explained).

[Notes: In the view of the Prabhākara, lin denotes niyoga (prompting). It is also called kārya. And it is also called apūrva on account of its being known only by the injunction and by nothing else. It is called niyoga because it acts as an incentive to the niyojya (prompted person) to put forth the effort (kṛiti) towards the action denoted by]
the verbal root. This कार्य is brought about by the कृति of the नियोज्य which he undertakes for a particular desire.69]

And this being the case, there is also justification of the text connected with the śabdabhāvanā having the form of inducement, (occurring) in the arthavādādhikaraṇa of Nyāyasudhā70 such as : there is statement of the state of being meant for some purpose of the bhāvanā which has the form of inducement , with the purpose of establishment of objecthood of inclination towards the fruit of it.

Therefore, similar to the (conception of)apūrva of the adhikāra(?), there is assumption of objecthood having the form similar to the desire of the inducing-person in the function of lin etc. although it being different from knowledge, desire and volition.

[Notes : Only knowledge, desire and volition are things that have an object(saviṣayaka). Lin does not fall into either of these categories. Still there is assumption of it having an object which is similar to the object of desire of the inducing-person. Thus lin has as its object that which forms the object of the desire of the inducing-person.]

The acceptance of the state of desire on the strength of this , the effort to refute the consciousness of word on the strength of this, even all these are defeated.

69 Jha G.N.,(1911),Prābhakara School of Pañcava Mimāṃsā, Allahabad, pp. 161-65.
70 on Tantravārttika on JS. I.2.1(adhikaraṇa).
Similar to the Veda, in the world too, the state of being one (always) having an object (saviṣayatvam) naturally, of the desire which is known as inducement is of no use, because of (it) being capable of (carrying out) all the works such as viniyoga etc.

And moreover, although being known as being iṣṭasādhana of oneself, where there is no desire nor the usage of (any) word declaring that (desire) of the elder-most, (either) because of being instigated by knowledge (present in him) in the form of (there being) the state of production of unbearable pain at that time (of performance) or because of the false knowledge of the state of being non-producible by the effort of the person, the inclination of the elder (the other person/observer) is produced even by the reflection upon the knowledge of iṣṭasādhanatā residing in him.

Even he (elder-most) speaks thus, ‘he is inclined by the ascertainment of intention’.

Even the observer thinks thus, ‘Being inclined by him I do it’.

Just as ŚrīRāma towards vanavāsau (residence in the forest) ; Gāṅgeya (Bhiṣma) towards the request of Satyavatī possessed of vow (sankalpa) of celibacy etc. meant
for the father. Even today a son is seen to accomplish sacrifice etc. for (his) father who is devoid of wealth ..." 

And this kind of inclination is praised by the seers - "he is the best (who) does (just) by reflecting, better if he does when told, and the least is when he does without respect/faith and he is (like) an excretion of the father who doesn't do at all. (Bhāgvata Purāṇa 9.18)

Here, on account of the performance of the (action which has been) reflected even in the one who does it after being told, by (the word) cintana there is exclusion of the usage of the word kāmanā (which is different from its own self)/ (by someone different from self).

Cintana is the ascertainment of īṣṭasādhonatā. Therefore there is statement such as : 'the one who does (just) by reflection he is the best'.

And in this way, because of the inducement even of the said knowledge on account of (its) yogakṣema(function?) similar to the desire, how can the contingency of knowledge-ness in the function of līn etc by the conception of objecthood residing in the knowledge, be avoided.

71 The sentence meaning is not clear.
[Notes: In case of assumption of object of \textit{lin} etc. similar to the object of the knowledge, there would be contingency of presence of the nature of being a knowledge in \textit{lin}. i.e. \textit{lin} would assume the form of knowledge, which it is not.]

\textbf{Purposefulness of \textit{ārthībhāvanā} is not to be inferred (i.e. not to be known by inference)}

\begin{quote}
 \textbf{एवं च प्रवृत्त्यनुरूपः विषयाकाशः प्रत्येकार्थतथात्वभावाः विषयाकुर्वती \textsuperscript{72} निष्फलताः विषयत्वबाधात्मत्तकलामेव विषयत्या स्वीकरोतीति न सफलतांजुमेय।}
\end{quote}

And also, inducement desirous of an object on account of its attachment to inclination in the process of accepting as its object the \textit{arthi-bhāvanā} (volition) (which is the) meaning of the verbal suffix, accepts as object only that (volition) which is with fruit (i.e. purposeful) because of the contradiction/refutation of objecthood in the volition which is purposeless, hence purposefulness is not to be inferred.

\textbf{Other examples where no other means of knowledge is expected for knowledge}

\begin{quote}
 यथाहि विश्वासित्सक्कृत्वंतानमेव प्रसिद्धकृत्वंतवाधाफलात्मितोपरिमित्रसिद्धिन्तु तत्सिधैः माननातपमेश्च।
\end{quote}

For example, there is establishment of God who is not commonly known, by the inference of agenthood having as object the earth etc. along with the negation of agenthood of (a person who is) well known; thus no other means of knowledge is desired for its establishment.

\begin{quote}
 यथा च घटोऽन जलमाहोत्वयेन सचित्ते साधनाताभाितवाधछिन्गाधायामेव शाब्दिकोऽध।
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{कुर्वती - S}
And as there is verbal understanding by the expression *ghatena jalamāharet* (one should fetch water by the pot) (only after) having taken into consideration the (the pot which is) not pierced, because of contradiction of instrumentality in the one having hole.

...continues with more complex Sanskrit text ...

And as there is establishment of variety (of rites) by the injunctions having the intention to (convey) origination, which (intention) is known by (the of usage of) different word, based on the understanding (produced after) considering/accepting the rite (which is) different from (that which is) already known because of the contradiction of origination of those already known by the other sentences.

[Notes: In cases where verbal forms such as *yajati, dadāti, juhoti* etc. occur in the same context, there is discussion of the kind whether the *bhāvanā* known by all of them is same or different. The prima facie view is that because the verbal ending is same in all, the *bhāvanā* known by all is same. But the *siddhantin* states that although the verbal ending is same, but there is use of different verbal roots in all of them. And the suffix along with that particular verbal root makes known only that *bhāvanā* which has as its instrument that particular verb. Thus by the difference of each verbal root (i.e. use of different word) there is difference of *bhavand*, because that which has already been enjoined cannot be enjoined again. SD. II.2.1(*śabdāntarādhikarana*)]

...continues with more complex Sanskrit text ...

And as the injunction while producing the inclination of the said form of those desirous of heaven in the volition qualified by (i.e. having actions such as) seeing of the clarified butter etc., on account of contradiction of inclination of the blind etc. settles upon the consideration of one desirous of heaven who is different/other than him (the blind).
Therefore, the revered (teacher) Bhāṭṭa (Kumarilabhaṭṭa) and the followers of other systems such as *aupaniṣad* (i.e. Vedaḥtin) etc. use/accept all the three i.e. understanding of origination (*upatti*), application (*viniyoga*) and qualification (*adhiścarā*) as the function of the injunction.

And because of the insertion of the inclination having the nature of making known the *kartavyatā* of the said form in the body of the injunction, injunction is also said to be one/identical with it. [i.e. injunction is *kartavyatā*]

And the inclination (when said to be) produced by way of inference which is produced by its own knowledge (i.e. knowledge of the injunction/*liṅ*) would uproot all the usage of the four fold functions of the *vidhi* which is similar to the smoke (in the inference of fire).

[Notes: Just as fire is infered by the smoke, similarly there would be inference of the inclination by the *vidhi*. Such being the case, there would be no need to accept the four functions of the *vidhi* said earlier because all the functions would be carried out by inference.]

How come in case of similarity with smoke, there is establishment of variety/difference (in the *vidhi* (inducement)) on account of/ based on the difference in the inclination – this must also be thought by the learned.

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73 Kāya - S
[Notes: In case of acceptance of inference of the inclination by the *vidhi* (which acts as the *hetu*), there cannot be establishment of the difference in the *hetu* by the observance of difference in the *sādhya*. But this establishment of difference in the *vidhi* (which is the cause) by the observation of difference in the inclination (which is the effect) is accepted by the *mīmāṃsaka*. (See pg. 124)]

**Consideration of āptatva (reliability) is unnecessary in case of Vedic Sentences**

किं च तौतिकवाक्येऽपि ज्ञातमिष्टाध्यात्मज्ञानं स्वतःप्रमाणम्। अनावश्यकत्वज्ञानप्रामाण्यारूढः प्रामाण्यायपवो योगेन तन्त्रार्थार्थार्थवाच्यालोचनस्वपेक्षेत्।

Moreover, even in the case of worldly sentence, the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* which is produced is self-valid.

Only in case when there is occasion of refutation (*apavāda*) of the validity, on account of the doubt of non-validity because of being produced by the words of a non-reliable person, (it) requires the reflection upon the state of being spoken by a reliable person etc. for the purpose of refuting it (non-validity of the knowledge).

बेदे तु अपवदास्त्रूपात्यन: वैराग्यार्थालोचनास्येति भाष्ट्रस्त्रिय: सर्वस्वसिद्धः।

But in case of Veda (i.e. Vedic sentence) there is no need of reflection upon the state of being spoken by a reliable speaker because of non-arising of the doubt of refutation (*apavāda*) — this process of the Bhāṭṭa is well known everywhere.

तद्विषयकथने प्रवृत्तातु वैदिकमिथस्ताध्यात्मानं मेवान्त्यालोचनापेक्षेत् न्यायाध्येम्।

But the statement that the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* with respect to the Vedic sentences is known by the inference that requires reflection upon the state of being reliable speaker/reliability, by those who are inclined to enumerate the secrets of it (Bhāṭṭa’s view) is indeed surprising.

[Notes: In the work *Bhāṭṭarathasya* (BR.) of Kanḍadeva it is stated that there is inference of the *iṣṭasādhanatā* even in the Vedic sentence by consideration of
reliability (āptatva) which is predefined in such a way that it is common to world as well the Veda (BR. pg. 21). This view is refuted here.

And where the statement of implication of the īṣṭasādhanatā by the inclination (is seen), that too is used out of the need to reflect upon the contradiction of object-hood of inducement of the purposeless volition, and not out of the intention to convey/show the arthāpatī (presumption), based on which there would be requirement of stating the inference in place of it (arthāpatī), by the one who wants to demonstrate that towards the neo-logician.

[Notes : Neo-logicians do not accept arthāpatī as a means of knowledge, but they include it in the inference.]

Discussion on prime-ness in the statement bhāvapradhānāmākhyātām

As to the refutation of the intention of (establishment of) primeness of the volition described by all the others present in the verbal suffix of the smṛti- ’bhāvapradhānāmākhyātām’, we accept that (refutation)34. Because there is (another) smṛti which is read after this (the said one) of the kind: ’sattvapradhānāni nāmāni, tadyatra bhāvapradhāne bhavatah’ (those wherein sattva is prime are nouns; and where there are both (the noun and the action) there bhāva (action) is the prime).

34See pg. 134.
The meaning (of the above statement) is this: Being present is (denoted by) sat. That sat itself is the state of being(sattva). The thing denoted by nāman (nominal word) exists in an established state on account of the capability of construction of gender, number etc. (into it); and the noun-word has that(sattva) as prime. In case of a sentence wherein both the noun-words and the action-words (verb) are present, there the prime (amongst them) is bhāvanā; bhāvanā is of the form of meaning of the verbal suffix of the nature of having the primeness described/determined by (those) denoted by noun(word).

In (the statement) bhavapradhānāmāvikhyātām the descrabor/determiner of primeness is not obtained by (any word), but here it is obtained by (the word) ubhe (both).

[Notes: In bhavapradhānāmāvikhyātām there is no word indicating the object with respect to which bhāvanā is said to be prime i.e. it possesses primeness. Thus it is not proper to claim that that the primeness of the bhāvanā is with respect to all the meanings denoted by the verbal suffix. Whereas in tadyatrobhe etc. the fact that the primeness of the bhāvanā is with respect to the noun words, is clearly known by the word ubhe.]

Thus by the manner said by the other, the state of being prime is indeed the state of being the qualificand, and thereby, all the objects denoted by the nominal-word (nāman) shall obtain qualifier-ness towards bhāvanā through various relations of instrumentality etc.
And all the case-endings in a negative injunction, getting connected with the negative particle will result in (creating) the understanding of the intention regarding the respective relations as accepted by the others.

विभक्तवश सर्व अपि निषेधे पोलकीत्या। नवं च तत्तत्संसर्गकोर्यंपथर्च्छ्रयसाधारित्यो
भवेयुष्मीहीं चरुमित्वादी च स्वसम्बविश्वसाधारक्यायकरणकत्र्पणाद्रथ्या श्रीहितंदर्श्योपि
भावनायाम्योऽस्य।

And in case of vṛihīm carum (he sacrifices with caru (made) of vṛihi) etc. let there be construction into bhāvanā of the substance vṛihi also by the manner of being instrument towards the yāga having caru as an instrument/means which is related to it (vṛihi).

एवं च षडीवज़ चैत्र: पश्यतीव्यादी क्वचिदेकुश्चिकार्यकारणभावापादनं यज्ञवदिः कृतः
तत्तसत्वानामस्वि विषयं कार्यपुष्पिततमिति प्रतीकताम्।

And thus, excluding the genitive case ending, in cases such as Caitrah paśyati (Caitra sees) etc. the criticism (āpādana) of single cause-effect state only at some places done by you, it seems that it is proper to be done with respect to all the nāmārtha.(See pg. 131)

यथा च नस्यति जनातीत्वादी भावग्राहानम्यायात्मिति स्मृत्युरोधेन कालभावनसंसर्गप्रविष्टोपि धात्यान्तः
भावनाभाग्यं प्रकारो भवित।

As in naśyati (perishes), jānāti (knows) etc. the root-meaning though entered into the relation between time and bhāvanā, is qualifier in the bhāvanā on account of the smṛti-bhāvapravadrhānamākhyātām.

तथा श्रीहितान्तमण्डसंसर्गप्रविष्टविद्वाति चुथ्यायी भावनाप्रकारो भविष्यत्।

So also, the caru and the sacrifice (yāga) though entered into the relation between vṛihi and bhāvanā will become the qualifier in bhāvanā.
It is not desirable, because (it would lead to) the contingency of uprooting of application by *srutipramāṇa* in the form of the case-ending. Let it be so.

**Function of the *smṛti bhāvapradhānāmākhyātām***

This *smṛti* does not reveal an unknown sentence-meaning which is contradictory to experience. But (it is useful/applicable there) where there is doubt in the sentence-meaning on account of opposition/contradiction of the prima facie view, as in *Caitrah pacati* (*Caitra cooks*) etc.

Here indeed, the neo-logicians consider/accept the understanding which has *Caitra* as qualificand and which has the verbal suffix-meaning as qualifier. The others (accept the understanding) having verbal suffix-meaning as qualificand and *Caitra* as the qualifier.

There(i.e. in such case of doubt) it restricts the sentence-meaning according to the second opinion, just as the sentence *upāṁśu yajuṣā* (he utters the mantras of the Yajurveda silently) (restricts) the silent-ness in those *(yajuṣ mantras)* which are different from *nigada*.

[Notes : Two sentences are obtained with respect to the utterance of the *mantra* of the Yajurveda(*yajuṣ*). These are *upāṁśu yajuṣā kriyate* (Maitrāyani Sāṁhitā 3.6.5)and *uccārmigadā*(the *nigada* mantra is uttered in high tone/loudly). *Nigada* is one kind of *yajuṣ* used for *praiṣa*( giving command in a sacrifice) etc. Here there is obtainment of
all the other tones other than the high in the yaus. Thus the injunction upamṣu yausā restricts the tone to silent in all the yaus. This is so accepted because there is brevity in acceptance of restriction than enjoining of something unknown (SD II 113).

Similarly the smṛti bhāvaprādhrāṇamākhvātām restricts the verbal understanding where different understandings enumerated in different disciplines are obtained together.

अतः एवेदांगविद्याभिषुक्तः सर्वेऽद्यां मीमांसकवेदांविश्वामार्गियोऽपि धार्मिकोऽपि अपमाण्यमाणामाणिषया प्रथमान्तरान्तराविश्वायकः बोधः न मन्यते।

Therefore, all the mimāṃsaka varākaraṇa (grammarians) and aupaṃsada (vedāntin) those who are inclined towards arriving at the meaning of the Veda through (i.e., based on the principles enumerated in the) the Vedāṅga (six auxiliary sciences meant for understanding of the Veda namely siksā kalpa vyākaraṇa nirukta chandas jyotis) do not accept the understanding which has the meaning denoted by the word ending in nominative case, as the qualificand.

मन्यते च दितियानानादिस्वते नामार्थप्रकारक कर्मविद्वाधिगतिष्ठते।

But they accept in case of (words) ending in accusative case-ending etc the understanding of objecthood etc which has as qualifier the nominał-meaning.

तद्हि भावप्रधानमाध्यायतिमिशपीपि तत्सैव ज्ञानात्तित्यावि वर्तमानत्वार्थप्रकारकधावल्वप्रकारकानुभवविशेषतः नैव वाक्यार्थः प्राप्येतु।

If it is so then, in case of jāṇāti etc this (smṛti) bhāvaprādhrāṇamākhvātām in the same manner etc would not lead to the sentence-meaning which is contradictory to the experience having as the qualifiers the root-meaning (and) present-time etc.
But, in case such as *pacati* etc., where, according to the manner of grammarians, root-meaning is action (क्रिया) and the suffix-meaning is case such as agent etc. , and according to the manner of the other (मीमांसाकार) case is the root-meaning and action is the suffix meaning; there,

in case of the doubt amongst (the three view/understandings viz.)

a) by the remembrance of (the स्मर्ति, तयोस्तु प्रत्ययाय प्राथ्यायनाय) (out of the two (the stem and the suffix) the suffix is prime), in the opinion of the grammarian itself, there is understanding having as the qualificand the case (which is the meaning of the suffix), or b) by the contradiction of the said स्मर्ति (tayostu etc.) there is understanding having as the qualificand the action (which is the stem), just as (it is also qualificand) towards the case (कारक) which is meaning of case-ending, or c) by agreement with it (स्मर्ति) there is understanding having as qualificand the action which is (accepted as) the meaning of the suffix;

it (the स्मर्ति भावप्रद्धानम् etc.) would restrict/regulate the last opinion because of the non-propeness of (acceptance of) contradiction in case where there is possibility (of acceptance of an understanding arrived at even) by the non-contradiction with (the knowledge obtained by) other means.

[Notes: The grammarians accept action as prime, but they accept action as the meaning of the verbal-root (stem) and not the meaning of the suffix. Thus for accepting their form of understanding in usage such as *pacati*, they have to contradict one of their own स्मर्ति that states: ‘amongst the stem and the suffix, suffix is prime’. But if they accept the view of the मीमांसाकार that states: action (क्रिया) is the meaning of the verbal suffix, then both their views that a) the action is prime, and b) suffix-meaning is prime, could be accepted without any contradiction. ]
Function of the *smṛti - sattvapradhānānī nāmāṇī*

In the same manner, in case of the word ending in nominative case ending such as: "Caitraḥ", which is (spoken as) an answer to the question “who is his son?”, when there is doubt (amongst the two views/understanding) such as:

a) there is understanding having the action as qualificand, according to the *smṛti astirbhavanti parah* and b) there is understanding having the nominal-meaning as qualificand,

(the *smṛti* sattvapradhānānī nāmāṇī restricts/regulates the last opinion. And (it) does not enjoin the primeness of the nominal-meaning in cases of nouns ending in accusative case endings etc, which is unobtained.

[Notes: The acceptance of the function of restriction amongst the obtained is considered as better than the acceptance of enjoinment of the unobtained. (ŚD. II.1.13.)*]

Then how can the *smṛti bhāvapradhānam* which is stated just before it would cause (i.e. lead to) the obtainment (i.e. enjoinment) of the unobtained (meaning).

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75 अस्तिरभवति: प्रथमप्रथमप्रथमप्रथमान्त: कृत्यायान्वयंकृत्याविषयकः। कृत्याविषयकः कृत्यायान्वयं कृत्याविषयकः।

76 See notes on pg. 177.
This obtainment of the unobtained is put forth/explained according to the manner of the other, (and) to the others, who in case of jānāti, naśyati etc. having accepted the secondary meaning in the form of locusness and counter positiveness (of the verbal suffix respectively) by the manner of the logician, state the construction of present-time etc. into it.

**Actual view of the Bhāṭṭa regarding secondary indication of locusness in jānāti etc.**

But actually, in the view of the Bhāṭṭa, locus-ness is not indicated (secondarily) in bhavati, jānāti etc.

But on account of contradiction of construction of (the root-meaning) ‘being/existence’, ‘knowing’ etc. as (different relations such as) instrumentality, objecthood etc. in the general function which is the meaning of the (verbal) suffix, when there is (acceptance of) the construction by (the relation of) non-difference, there is understanding such as: (there is) function which is non-different from the being/existence residing in the pot (in case of ghato bhavati) and (there is) function which is not different from the knowledge residing in Caitra (in the case of Caitaḥ ānāti).

[Notes: According to mīmāṁsaka, the construction of the root-meaning is possible as instrument or as accusative with the meaning of the verbal suffix. But when there is contradiction of the same in cases such as bhavati, ānāti etc. the relation of non-difference is accepted.]
And it has been said by the revered Bhatta in the vārttikās: ‘here the verbal suffix articulated after some of the verbal-roots makes known only the function (of the agent), which is (meant) just for the sake of obtainment of the nature of being an agent, like (the roots) asti, bhavati etc.

Although this (the above) statement (of the vārttika) is for stating the meaning of the term siddhakartr as krtya( suffix added to verb to form noun words) which (forms word) which is adjective formed from action, occurring in the verse which is readjust before (the said statement) as: sidddhakartrkriyāvācanyākhyāta pratyaye sati .samanyadhikaranyena karotyarthovagamyate (when the verbal-suffix denotes the action of the agent who is established, then the meaning/sense of the karoti (accomplishes) is known by semantical unity (non-difference))

[Notes: i) The word kartr is formed from the root kr (action) by the addition of the suffix trc (which is a krtya suffix used for denoting the agent).

ii) In the view of the mimāṃsaka, the analysis of a verbal form such as pacati is in the form ‘pākaṃ karoti’. Here since the agent is already established (existent), the verbal-suffix (ti) denotes the meaning which is known from the verbal form karoti (accomplishes). Hence the two form ti and karoti denote the same meaning. It is on the basis of this analysis that the mimāṃsakas establish the bhāvanā denoted by the verbal-suffix denoting action (krivā) (also said by the word vyāpāra). And the verbal suffix denotes the accomplishment of something else (then the agent) such as pāka (cooking) in the said case.
But when the verbal form such as asti, bhavati is used in sentence such as: ghato bhavati etc. there the agent is not established. In this case the verbal-suffix denotes only the existence/accomplishment of the agent and not of anything else. 

Tantravārttika 2.1.1.

And therefore examples of the verbal suffix (articulated) after the verbal root which states only the first and the second changes/stages of the root (i.e. only the production (jāyate) and existence (asti) stages), have been given, even then, because of the contradiction of experience of semantical unity with (the word) karoti, in (case such as) jānāti etc. similar to (the case of) bhavati etc., there (in jānāti) too there must be acceptance such as: ‘the (the verbal suffix) tin denotes function which is non-different from the stem-meaning (root-meaning)’, by this maxim (stated earlier).

[Notes: i) Nirukta states six stages of existence associated with the verbal-root (action) which are: jāyate (production), asti (existence), vipariṇamate (changing), vardhatate (growing), apaksīyate (decaying) and naš yatate (perishing). The verbal form bhavati, asti indicates the first two stages respectively.

ii) In case of jānāti there cannot be understanding of the form jñānam karoti (accomplishes knowledge (by effort)). This is because the natural succession leading to performance is of the form jānāti (knows) -> icchatā (desires) -> yatate (accomplishes). Accomplishment (performance) cannot be a cause that leads to knowledge (jñāna).]

अत एवः ॥ तद्व्याख्यासरे न्यायसूद्धामुक्त क्यापारस्थ क्रियाल्प्रसिद्धी: क्यापाराख्यक्रियाल्पविचित्स्य स्वर्णान्त: पाण्डवस्तवबाण्यं शोभितम्।

Therefore, at the time of explanation of that in the Nyāyasudhā it has been said that on account of (the fact that) vyāpāra is known as kriyā (action) since there is presence of the state of stating/denoting action which is said by the word vyāpāra in all the verbal-suffixes, (the statement of being a) qualifier is only on the basis (of

77 अत एव वै - S
consideration) of the meaning (and not on the basis of the syntactical form heard in the sentence.)

[Notes: Root-meaning is said to act as a qualifier of the suffix-meaning which is vyāpāra in the verbal understanding. Verbal understanding is of the form dhātvarthānukūlayāpāraḥ. But this kind of syntactical construction is not possible in the verbal form astī, bhavati and even ājanīti etc.]

Discussion on existence of destruction in the pot in ghato naśyati

न चैवमपि घटोनस्तात्त्वं घटाश्रितो नामाभिनोवायापारं हति बोधायुपपत्तिश्च स्थानाश्रितत्वादिति वाच्यम्। जायते असित वर्धिते विपरितमते अपक्षितं नयनतःति शैलस्वव्यः

And it should not be said that in case such as ghato naśyati (the pot perishes) because perishing/destruction is not located in the pot, there is non-arising of the understanding such as: ‘there is function indifferent to the perishing/destruction residing in the pot’; because there is no justification of the state of having the nature of non-existence (absence) (as) accepted by the others, of the destruction/perishing which is stated as being similar to a similar manner to the (other) five positive/existent qualities such as production, existence, changing, growing, decaying and perishing.

[Notes: The first five stages indicate the existent qualities, therefore it is not proper to accept that the sixth stage indicates a quality which is non-existent.]

अतो यथा तद्धिरक्षणाग्रंसांसंधिक्रियते सति तद्धिरक्षणात्मकाः कार्यायस्मात्माः ज्ञानव्यापारी

Hence it is proper to say thus, that as in ghato jāyate (the pot comes into existence), being the non-locus of destruction residing in it (pot), the function of (the form of)
coming into existence (which is) said to be the relation with the first moment which is momentary located/residing in it(pot), is known as being located in the pot, in the same manner, in ghato naśyati (the pot perishes) being the non-locus of the moment of prior-absence (pragabhāva = absence prior to coming into existence) residing in it(pot), the function, of (the form of) destruction (which is) said to be the relation with the end moment being momentary residing in it(pot), is known as being located in it(pot).

And in this manner the secondary meaning of counter-positiveness which is unobtained would not have to be postulated in the other verbal-suffix (as in nāsti) because of the following of (the view stating) denotedness (by the verbal suffix) of the function common to all the verbal-suffix (the view which is) established by the prime/source text.

It is not so that there is contingency of (acceptance of) secondary meaning (of the form) the destruction qualified by production (i.e. the destruction which is produced) by the verbal root in order to avoid the usage of (the expression) naśyati (even) in case when the destruction (has taken place) long back.

[Notes: Such kind of acceptance of meaning and construction has been proposed earlier in pg. 135.]

(Nor the contingency of) Construction of present-time in the production which is only one part of the (whole) meaning (of the verbal root).
Nor resorting to the two \textit{värttis} (primary and secondary) together, (which) makes known the destruction and its production (respectively), in order to avoid that (kind of earlier construction).

Nor there is contingency of acceptance of understanding contradictory to experience of all such as: ‘there is counter-positiveness which exists in the present time’, by accepting the relation consisting of both the production and destruction said by the neo-mimamsaka. (see pg. 135)

Nor in cases such as 
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{danda}\textit{ena ghato naśyati} (the pot is destroyed by the stick),
  \item \textit{upadeśena caitraḥ artham jānāti} (Caitra knows the meaning by the preaching/sermon) etc.
\end{itemize}
having accepted action-hood of the counter-positiveness and locusness which is unknown/unaccepted by all there is a contingency of acceptance of construction of the \textit{kārakas} (cases) into it.

The root-meaning is well known as being (of the form of) an action, (in view) of the logicians.

\footnote{क्रिया तेन प्रसिद्धः: - S}
It is not so that this is accepted by the neo-mīmāṃsakas, because of (presence of) the refutation (of the said view) on account of many faults put forth by Miśra in the vājapeyādhikarana.

And also because it will be redundant to accept the secondary meanings (of the personal suffix) such as locusness and counterpositiveness as it is possible to construe the agent, which is denoted by the word ending in nominative case, with the root-meaning as (its) locus.

[Notes: In grammar, the nominative case ending is used when the particular case associated with that nominal-stem has already been expressed by some other element (mostly the verbal suffix) in a sentence.]

In the view of the Bhāṭtas, the function which is the meaning of the verbal suffix is known as (being of the form of) action, and not the locusness and counterpositiveness.

And it is not so that the instrumentality of the preaching/sermon inlocusness and of the stick in counter-positiveness is a matter of experience (of anybody), in order to justify/support which there is need to assume the relation of the said manner in both.

\[\text{SD. 1.4.6. (see pp. 49-50 for details)}\]
Contingency in acceptance of function as the meaning of verbal-suffix

नन्देवमपि घटनिभो नामव्यापारः कि काल इति प्रश्नस्त घटो नयातीति, चैत्रविषो ज्ञानव्यापारः कि काल
इति प्रश्नस्त चैत्रो जानातीकुतर् स्थायिति चेन।

Objection – If you say, even in this way, the answer of the question ‘what time did the pot perish?’ would be ‘the pot perishes’ and the answer of the question ‘what time did Caitra know?’ would be, ‘Caitra knows’, then it is not so.

यतोज्ञाताश्चात्मकीयवृत्तान्तयोन्न्यायभाषासांक्षिप्तायोन्न्यायायायकन्यायमांसकयो: कल्पनायामेवे-
दृशी आक्षणपरीक्षारत सम्बंधतो नामस्याः \(\frac{187}{248}\) प्रविधं हेतुतः लिखले तत्ततः स्थितिन्योक्तिपरीक्षायामालायाम्।

(This is) Because this kind of objection and solution is possible only in the conceptions of neo-logicians and neo-mīmāṃsakas whose minds are (deeply)attached to the language of the neo-logic and who do not respect or accept the views of the other systems. This is quite known in bhāṭṭatantra (system of bhāṭṭa)and in the paunaruktyaparihāramālā of the father.

Denial by explanation of the view of Grammarians

व्याकरणे च नामव्यापारस्य भावनाक्रियाविदेशावत: पर्यायाः \(\frac{187}{248}\) नाम प्रतीतिहितभक्तीनां कृत्तत्तकरणादिशावतः।
वस्त्रवेच्यैः प्रथिः सिद्धान्तसङ्क्याक्रमेकन्तयोगमयतया सिद्धान्तस्य भावानायपिदार्थस्याक्रियावलात्।

In Grammar, the words bhāvanā, kriyā etc. are not the synonyms of verbal-suffix, nor the words kṛdanta, karana etc. of the case-endings such as instrumental case etc., because of the non-actionhood of the object denoted by the word bhāvanā etc. which is in established state on account of its capacity of construction with gender, number and case, although there is non-difference in the objects(denoted by them).
And (also) Because of case-ness of the instrumentality etc. which are said in the form of specific denotative power by the case-endings such as third etc. (And also) Because of not being of that nature (case-ness) of those said by the words karana etc. on account of their being accepted/acquired as substance (i.e. those substance that are accepted for the sacrifice are denoted by the word karana etc., thus these words do not denote karaka which is of the form of a specific power.)

The instrument etc. become contributor to the action which are expressed by the specific power of the third case; those words are not of the same nature which are expressed by the words denoting an instrument and which are subordinate to a substance.

And therefore, in the ninth chapter, in the case of (the sentence) proksitabhyam ulikhalamusalamabhyam avahanti, (he pounds with ulikhala and musala, (that) which have been sprinkled), although there is hearing of the niśtha suffix (i.e. past passive particle) which denotes the karmatvam (objecthood), (The question) that has been discussed is: whether sprinkling is subsidiary to pounding or subsidiary to unseen?, and the point of subsidiariness to ulikhala has not even been raised.

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86Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra II.3.39. (JS. IX.1.2)
This is for what reason? (It is) Because of the absence of laying/obtaining of subsidiariness of the objecthood denoted by (the suffix) *nīṣṭhā* which is not construed with the action on account of its not being a *karaṇa*(case).

But in *vṛiṇī proksatī* (he sprinkles the *vṛiṇī*), ‘(whether) it(sprinkling) is meant for *vṛiṇī* or meant for unseen’- has been discussed, because of contrariness of that which is denoted by second case-ending.

[Notes: *proksatī = proks* (**proksanām**=sprinkling) + *ta(nīṣṭhā* = object of *proksanām=ulūkhala*).

If the *karaṇa*(object) denoted by *nīṣṭhā* would have been *karaṇa* then *proksanām* would have been the subsidiary of *ulūkhala*, just as *proksanām* is the subsidiary of *vṛiṇī* because the accusative case-ending in *vṛiṇī proksatī* which denotes the *karaṇa* which is a *karaṇa*.]

The Grammarians also state : the action(*bhāva*) denoted by *kṛt* (derivative suffix) is (i.e. acts) like a substance/object.

And also, upon the question, ‘the instrumentality lies in what?’ as the answer ‘*daṇḍena*(by the stick)’ does not match/agree as (does) the answer, ‘lies in stick’. (this is) because there is cessation of the inquiry based on the question regarding the locus of instrumentality of the one existing in an established state, only by the answer having as object that specific locus of instrumentality existing in that(same state).
In the same manner, there is no agreement between question and answer, because of stating of the function existing in the established state by the word vyāpāra in the question put forth by you and because of stating of that(function) existing in to be established state by the verbal suffix in the answer given by you.

[Notes: The question such as घटनिक्षेत्रतयाष्ट्रपार: किकाल?: is with respect to the function which is already established, whereas and the answer:यदो नञ्चतिरtalks about the function which is yet to be established established. Therefore there is no agreement between the question and the answer.]

Doubt continued with respect to acceptance of same qualifier and qualificand

स्वादेतत्।
उक्तज्ञानांपृवृत्ती तन्मूलसंस्कारिनिवृत्तिनिमित्तं तत्र च समानप्रकारविशेषविशेषयोनिमित्तम्। एवं च करणत्वविशेषकसंस्कारस्य तद्दृष्टेष्यक निध्ययेन कथं न निवृत्ति:।

Let it be so, in the cessation of the said enquiry, the cessation of the doubt which is the root of that is the cause, and in that(cessation of the doubt) the ascertainment/definite knowledge having similar(forms of ) qualifier and qualificand(in the knowledge in comparison to the doubt)is the cause.

How come the doubt regarding the instrumentality as a qualificand does not terminate by the determinate cognition of instrumentality as a qualificand?

न चालकाभाषेदात्मकविशेषतावच्छेदकभेदान सैति शंक्यम्। यतो विभक्त्व्यतिड़र्प्रकारकबोधे प्रतिपदक्जन्योपस्थिति: कारणमित्यादि व्युत्तितताकरणत्वमित्यत्र लिङ्गादिप्रकारकरणत्वविशेषो बोधो जायते, न जायते च दण्डनेत्यादैः।

It should not be argued that it(cessation) is not possible because of the difference in the delimeter of qualificandhood based on the difference of the state (of existence of qualificand), because, on the basis of the understanding that ‘in case of the (verbal)
cognition having the meaning of the case-suffix i.e. the gender as qualifier, the cognition (remembrance) produced by the stem is the cause, there is karaniya, in such cases, the cognition arises of the form where gender is the qualifier and instrumentality is the qualificand. But such cognition does not arise in case of dandena etc.

The non-agreement should not be doubted on account of difference in gender and number

It should not be doubted that there is non-agreement between the question and the answer only because of the distinction brought about by the understanding and non-understanding of gender and number, because in case of karaniya, both of them, without any distinction, serve the purpose of indication.

If you say, ‘And also in case of (acceptance of) non-agreement in this manner, there would be contingency of non-agreement of the question, ‘where is āpa(water)?’ with the answer, ‘here is jalām(water)’. then (it is) not so.

[Notes : The word āpa in the question is in feminine gender and plural number where as the word jalām in the answer is in neuter gender and singular number. In case of

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acceptance of non-agreement with respect to gender and number, there would be non-agreement in the said case too. But this is against the experience.

Solution of the doubt: The difference is of the objecthood denoted by the state (avasthā)

On account of establishment by experience of the non-cessation of doubt having potness as qualifier and pot as qualificand such as: ‘this has class or not?’, by the ascertainment having that qualifier and that qualificand of the form, ‘this is pot’, although there being non-delimiteriness of the objects which are qualifiers in potness which form the constituent element of classness, as there is upholding of the non-cessation (of doubt) by that (knowledge) having dissimilar qualifier, upon accepting the difference in the objecthood;

in the same way there is justification of the non-cessation of the doubt based on the question by the knowledge produced by the sentence of the answer by accepting the difference in objecthood in the knowledge produced by verbal-suffix, third case-ending etc. in comparison to the knowledge produced by the words vyāpāra,karana etc., because there is possibility of scriptural indication by the words avasthā(state), yogyatā(capacity/capability) etc. of the two objecthood only.

[Notes: The fact that there is difference in the objecthood (viśayatā) is indicated by the use of the words that there is different avasthā or different yogyatā. Thus there is indication of objecthood (viśayatā) by the words avasthā and yogyatā.]
And (it is only) on account of the possibility of upholding the verbal understanding which is desired, by the acceptance that the presence of action is the cause in the understanding having as qualifier the case (kāraka) with the purpose of (showing) the delimiteness of effectness and causeness, of this two objectness (avasthā and yogyata), that the cumbersomeness caused by the acceptance of the effect-cause relation in the view of the others is also refuted.

To explain -

The presence produced by the verbal-suffix is not the cause in the understanding having as qualifier the meaning of the nominal-suffix (sūp), because of contingency of (acceptance of) qualifiemness of the meaning of the first and sixth case-ending, of the meanings of the upapada case-ending denoting such as itham bhāva etc. and of the numbers etc. which is the meaning of the case-ending, in the action And also because of the contingency of construction of instrumentality etc. which is the meaning of the third case-ending etc. even into the injunction which is (also) the meaning of verbal-suffix. And nor would there be contingency of construction of it into the suffix meaning.

[Notes: In the view of neo-mīmāṃsaka, there is construction of all the karaka into the volition (arthi-bhāvanā referred to as bhāvanā) and not into the injunction (śābdi-bhāvanā referred as vidhi)]
Therefore, in the meaning of sup which is part of the delimiter of effectness, the difference from the number must be included and the objectness delimited by the state of bhāvanā must be assumed as the relation of the delimiter of causeness.

[Notes : In the statement of the above expression that 'presence produced by the verbal-suffix (ākhyātārtha) is the cause in the understanding having the meaning of the nominal-suffix (subartha) as qualifier', by the word subartha the meaning of the nominal suffix (sup) which is other than the number must be understood, and by ākhyātārtha the objectness delimited by bhāvanā must be understood.]

THE STATE OF BEING bhāvanā MUST BE CONCEPTUALIZED AS THE STATE OF BEING KNOWN (AS THAT WHICH IS) DELIMITED BY THE STATE OF VERBAL-SUFFIX (AND WHICH IS) COMMON TO EFFORT (KRITI), LOCUSNESS, COUNTER-POSITIVENESS ETC.

And the cumbersomeness such as : 'inclusion of the property (dharma) of the kṛtya suffix, similar to the verbal suffixness, separately in the delimiter of causeness etc.' is refuted as superfluous by the two objecthood established otherwise viz. those not accepted as segregating/deliming and those accepted as following – this the intelligent beings must understand/accept.
It is also relevant in this manner when the learned say, ‘karaṇibhūtena dadhnā’, which is uttered with the intention of construing the understood instrumentality with the meaning of the nominal stem which is remembered as the established karana by the secondary meaning of the instrumental case in ‘dadhna’ in the expression, dadhnendriyakāmasya etc.

[Notes : In dadhmendriyakāmasya juhīyāt – Since there is no prescription of the homa which is obtained from some other sentence, and since the substance(dadhī) would not lead to the fruit without entering into an action, the instrumentality of curd(dadhikaranatvam) is enjoined as instrument towards the said fruit. The form of the verbal understanding is: karaṇibhūtena dadhnā indriyam bhāvayet.]

And in the sentence of parnatā (parnamayī juhīḥ bhavati) similar to the dadhikaranatvena, there is (usage of) the form, ‘parnatāyā juhīṁ bhāvayet’ (Let there be sacrificial ladle (made) by (the wood of the tree named) parna) with the intention of (stating) the construction into the action of instrumentality and objecthood which are known by the nominative case-ending.

And in the views of the other there is more cumbersomeness on account of the conception of different understanding caused by different arrangement(necessary for generation) of understanding of this kind.

81 TaitBr. 2.1.5.6
82 Mimāṃsāyāyopakāsa pg. 74. (Originally discussed in JS. II.2.11.)
83 TS. III.5.7. (JS. III.6.1)
Thus it is proved/established that in (the expression) jānāti etc. there is no (acceptance of) secondary meaning such as locusness etc. by the verbal suffix.

Constitution of present tense in the root-meaning and not in the meaning of verbal-suffix

Even in this opinion, there is construction of the present time etc. only in the knowledge which is the root-meaning and not in the function which is the meaning of the verbal-suffix, because it would be improper (of the conception) of the state of making known that which was unknown in the smṛti (bhāvapradhānamākhyaṁ) to account for the cessation of doubt regarding presentness having the nature delimited by knowledge-ness.

Or let there be the state of making known the unknown prime-qualificandness existing in the volition (ārthabhāvanā), of the smṛti And there is upholding/accomplishment of this (view), (even) by (acceptance of) the state of being qualificand towards the karaka existing in the same (verbal suffix) and the other (nominal suffix) word and by the absence of the state of being qualificand towards any other (of the arthabhāvanā), thus to implicate the qualificiness of time, injunction etc. towards it which is contradictory to experience, is not desired.
Acceptance of non- construction of bhāvanā into vidhi

ननेवं भावानयं भावायेंविविधाविशेषणतत्वमुक्तमुच्चितेऽवेत्ति।

Objection : If you argue that, by the said manner the qualifyness of the (ārthī) bhāvanā towards the injunction(vidhi) by being the bhāvyā(which is to be brought about/produced i.e. the fruit) which was said earlier would be uprooted/falsified, then.

नानिष्णुतं वार्तिककारेऽवादाधिकरणेनविधानविधायकपन्त्ये विधयः प्रवृत्ति कृपयेति बोधेश्वरयात्मवं दर्शिताद्वितिष्ठितजन्योऽथ तदनवयोपाधीनाय सूचनात्।

It is not so that this is not desirous (i.e. this is desired by us). Because of the indication of the absence of understanding of the construction of that (ārthī bhāvanā) in the understanding produced by that particular injunction, by the author of the Vārttika in the arthavādādhikarana84, while showing the construction of the three parts in the understanding of the form, ‘vidhayah pravrttim kuryuh’(the injunctions must bring about inclination) which is produced by implication based on the injunction of study.

यथैव तत्तद्भिधायभिधायशास्त्रभावानांकत्वत्तामधिगम्य काले तामधिकारणोऽत्तुतिष्ठति न्यायधिगमिनांशचभावानांकत्वत्तामधिगम्य वैदिक तिडादयोऽपि स्वावक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधकाले तामतुतिष्ठति।

As, the qualified persons, having known the duty of (the form of) volition(ārthī bhāvanā) qualified by the three parts by that particular injunction, perform it at the (prescribed)time, similarly the līṇ etc. occurring in the Veda, having known the duty of (the form of) sābādi bhāvanā(inducement) by the injunction of study, also perform that at the time of verbal understanding produced by its own sentence.

84 on JS. 1.2.1.
It is not so that at the time of performance there is expectation of the verbal understanding having the construction of the three parts.

Therefore, the construction of the manner of performance with the knowledge of the inducement is not based on experience. Nor is there construction of the manner of performance in the form, ‘having been helped by the knowledge of the praise’ (with the knowledge of the inducement).

[Notes: That there is no expectancy of verbal understanding having construction of all the three parts of sadhya, sadhana and itikartavyatin performance has been indicated in the Varttika as well as it is a matter of experience. Therefore the statement that ārthibhāvanā acts as qualifier to the śabdibhāvanā is not justified.]

The instrument such as lin etc. similar to the person such as sacrifice etc. establishes the knowledge of inducement, because of compulsory expection of the inducement which is attached to that (inclination), which (expectation) is on account of compulsory expectation of the inclination, similar to the next question (after inducement) such as ‘where is the inducement?’ (i.e. inducement is in which object?).

And in case where there is compulsory expectancy, because of establishment by the source, of the non-expectancy of the expectancy of co-utterance, of the knowledge of the related, (required) for arriving at the understanding of the word-meaning, (the lin) even without the mutual construction of the meaning of verbal-suffix and the meaning of lin, produces understanding such as ‘he induces him here’.
Process of understanding of the sentence *na kalañjam bhaksayet* (prohibitive sentence)

Therefore, in the prohibitions such as *na kalañjam bhaksayet* (one must not eat poisoned meat) the first understanding is of the form: ‘volition is one that has function’, having the volition as qualificand and having abstinence (*nivarttana*) as qualifier.

There the relation is: the counterpositiveness of absence produced by the inference of causality towards evil, (the inference which is) produced by knowledge of itself (abstinence).

After the said understanding, the desire of the āpta such as: ‘he must abstain from eating of the poisoned meat’, (which is) of the form of function is known particularly.

After that, there is occurrence of the inference by the previously said manner of the form, ‘the volition of eating of *kalañja* is the cause of evil because of being the object of abstinence known by the sentence of the āpta just as the volition of forwarding the finger towards snake (is the cause of evil).
After that there is absence of the volition of eating of kalaṇja, thus in this way the establishment of the particular/special form of the relation is also refuted

(Notes On account of the same understanding of the form, ‘volition is one that has function’ there is no establishment of assumption of any special or different relations known by any word in verbal understanding of injunction and prohibition (See pg 125))

Because of the explanation of the intention of the statement of smṛti bhāva-pradhitamakhyātam in a different manner of the one who accepts the statement of the assumption of understanding of such kind And also because of the showing of the over application in case of non-acceptance on account of the other statement of the form tadyatra ubhe (where there are both).

Let there be decision/determination of the said cause in the said volition. By that, the instrumentality which is (already) established, is established delimited by which dharma(property)?

If it is said, (it=amstādhanavatam is) delimited by the delimiter of paksatā of the form of the state of volition of eating of poisoned meat, then no, because of possibility of delimitlessness having the form of self-existing relation (which is a) separate vṛttī from the delimiter of paksatā, similar to the īstasādhanavatā which is inferred in the silver (which is) seen in the front or in the intake of food which is meant to occur later
In inference, different is the delimiteness of the form of being locus of the concomitance (and) entered into the relation between sādhyā and pākṣa existing in the delimitor of pākṣatā and different is that (delimiteness) obtaining its form by being dependent on no less no more state of the instrumentality (sādhanañāvaṁ) which is meant to be delimitated.

If you say that there is establishment of the instrumentality delimited by that (same) dharma, by which (dharma) the absence is delimited and entered into the relation, then there is necessity to speak of that which regulates the entering in the body of the relation of absence which is delimited by the state of volition of eating of the poisoned meat, because of non-propersness of the causeless/unexpectedness of the arrangement of entering into the relation of the different absences with respect to each prohibition.

Let it be so.

In order to uphold the distinction of entry of absence in the relation said in the place/context of prohibition than the relation said in the context of injunction, the
tātparyagrāhakatva of nañ (negative particle) has been stated by me in the form, that the tātparyagrāhakatva of nañ associated with the word kalañja etc. must be said for the purpose of obtaining the distinct absence.

It is not so, because of the excessive cumbersomeness and because of the impossibility.

How can infinite cause-effect relations of the nañ together with that many word with respect to each prohibition, be accepted in the many tātparyagraha obtained by the insertion of that particular absence arranged differently, by those who speak of the brevity in the conception of single cause-effect relation in their own view than (in comparison to) the conception of many cause-effect relation such as five etc. in the view of the other.\(^8^6\)

Thus being the case, in case of sentences na kalañjam bhakṣayet, na brähmano hantavya etc., how is it possible to avoid the applicable/present anisthasādhanatva which is delimited by the eating of one poisoned meat, and delimited by the killing of one Brähmin, on account of the contingency of tātparyagrāhakatva of the single number etc. similar to the words such as kalañja etc.

\(^8^6\) See pg. 121.
It is not so that there is sentence split of singularity etc. in the *tātporyagrāhakatā* as (there is sentence split) in the qualifierness of the object/predicate.

[Notes: According to the *grahaikatvādhihikarana* (JS. X.4.1) acceptance of *vivakṣa* (desire to speak i.e. prescribe) of any kind of qualifier of the predicate (*uddeśya*) causes sentence split. Therefore the number one that is heard in the word *graham* in the sentence *graham sammārṣṭi* is said to be *avivakṣita*.

It is not so that, there is possibility of entry/acceptance of the absence delimited by the state of volition of *kalañjabhaksana* in the said relation, because there is possibility (of presence) of the state of being produced by the inference of the *aniṣṭasādhanatva* produced by its own knowledge only in the particular absence of volition which is present at that time.

It cannot be the case that one can obtain the state of being delimited by the said *kriśna* (volition-ness) in case of the *kri* of *kalañjabhaksana* in general on the basis of the power of understanding or on the basis of the power of the desire of reliable speaker towards (understanding) the absence, counterpositive-ness of which is delimited by that kind of volition-ness and its content, because there is a possibility of understanding in that (person) qualified by the state of volition of *kalañjabhaksana* even of the counterpositiveness delimited by the state of volition of eating of fruit etc.
(and) even with respect to the desire of the āpta there is presence of objecthood of the particular absence which is present/possible.

विषयविशेषावच्छन्नप्रवर्तनानिनिर्व्यायांश्चाश्वबोध विना विशेषालिङ्गव्यवहारस्य तम्मूलकस्य विषयविशेषालिङ्गित्यपरेक्षासूचनास्यण्यस्याभ्यासभ्येन तद्विषयत्वहेतुकानुमितोदवैसम्भवाच।

And also, without the verbal understanding which makes known the inducement and abstinence delimited by the particular object, there is impossibility of inference based on the cause(hetu) of that objecthood, on account of impossibility of the usage that does not indicating the particular, and also (on account of the impossibility) of the inference of the desire of the other which is not indicated by the particular object based on that(usage).

कथं तस्ये विधिनिषेधयत्य व्यविषये इश्लिङ्गेहेतुतवाक्षेपनिरूपणं संगच्छते।

How then, the explanation of the implication of causality towards desired and evil, by the injunction and prohibition in their own viṣaya(object) (which is stated) in the sixth(chapter) is justified.

नहैश्लिङ्गेहेतुसूचनाभिन्नोस्तिः।

It is not so that implication is (something) different than the inference.

कथं च कलाश्वश्क्रणेपतिवाच्छन्नया अनिन्त्यहेतुवाय निषेधास्तिनिरदेशते चतुर्थं। श्रृणु।

If you question as, ‘how is there establishment of the evil-causality which is delimited by the state of volition of kalaṅjajabhakṣaṇa from the (sentence of) prohibition?’, then listen.
Implication is of three types:

i. \textit{aparyavasitapramāṇaparyavasānārtha} - that which is meant for completing/ascertaining the means of knowing which is incomplete/not ascertained

ii. \textit{paryavasita tatprāmitārthopapātyarth} - that which is meant for ascertaining of the meaning which is known by that (means of knowledge) which is complete

iii. \textit{annupapādyamāṇasya tasvopapātyarth} - for ascertaining of that which is not ascertained (otherwise)

The first (amongst the three) is (seen) in the last \textit{adhikaraṇa} of the first chapter (JS. I.4.20) and in the first \textit{adhikaraṇa} of the sixth chapter namely \textit{viśvajjadāhikaraṇa} etc.

As the inference accompanied by the \textit{tarka} (logic/reasoning) of the form, ‘if it be without fire, it would be without smoke’ is the establisher of fire, similarly in the

\footnotesize

87 \textit{प्रामाणपर्यवसानाय} - S
88 This line is missing in both the manuscripts originally, but it has been added in the Bhandarkar, Pune(B) manuscript in the margin.
89 \textit{तत्त्वविधिवधमेव} - B
topics/contents of those particular adhikaranas such as *vivēṇāvādyatē* (he cuts (and accepts) by ladle), *viśvajātā javeta* (should perform sacrifice named *viśvajit*), *svargakāmo javeta* (one desirous of heaven should perform sacrifice), in case of that particular suitable construction of the volition construed with the injunction, that particular sentence being associated/helped by the tarka which is *tātparyagrāhaka* (that which makes known the intention), (the tarka) such as ‘if there would be no motive-ness towards liquid substance of the volition of cutting, (if) there would be no motive-ness towards (that which is) desired of the volition of vāgai(sacrifice) and (if) there would be motive-ness towards the sacrifice (respectively), then there would be non-validity of that particular sentence of injunction’, (the sentence) makes known that particular *istikādhānātā* (in the form) *sravāvadānena dravam samskurvāt* (he should embellish the liquid material by the cutting with ladle), vāgai swargam kurvāt (he must bring about heaven by the sacrifice)

That kind of raising of the tarka based on the injunction is called implication and (it is) not inference, because there would be occasion/consequence of redundancy of the sūtra ‘tāsa mūtta paristih(IS 1 13)’ which is meant for discussing of that determination such as ‘injunction is the only means of knowing the dharma’. in the sūtra *codanālaksana* etc (IS 1 1 2)

*Tātparyagraha* is also not inference

It is not so that even *tātparyagraha* is inference

Presence of *tātparyagraha* in the said adhikaranas

90 MaiSam 3 10 1 4 (JS 1 4 20)
91 SatBr 10 2 1 1 6 (IS 1 4 1)
92 TandyaMahābrāhmaṇa (TanBr) XVI 15 5
Because of the similarity even in the said adhikaranas of the suitable tatparyagraha which must be accepted as fruit with respect to each adhikarana and which is of the form of possibility which is in agreement with the valid knowledge of that particular sentence; by the sāmagrai (group of necessary causes) of the form of perception of the other argument occurring at the time of creation of doubt; when there is contradiction of perception on part of one argument on account of the particular perception based upon the tarka put forth in the text of the siddhanta, of the doubt having many sides/arguments of the form of tatparya made known by the two opposite/contradictory sentence meanings caused by the non-perception of the particular, and (the doubt) which is the reason for beginning of that particular adhikarana.

Cumbersoness in acceptance of inference

And for those accepting the inference of causality towards the desired and the evil by the said manner with respect to each sentence of injunction and prohibition, there is excessive cumbersoness in the conception of presence of the state of being a sentence of the reliable person (āpta) common to both the (utterances of the ) world and the Veda of the form of the state of not being uttered by the deluded and the deceitful, forming the part of delimiter of causality.
Moreover, in the world the absence in general of the delusion does not form the part of āptatva, because of necessary presence of the delusion/mistake (bhrama) of understanding of oneself as body etc. of all (i.e. some kind of delusion is always present in human being). But absence of it (delusion) not indicated by the particular meaning which is expressed by the sentence (forms the part of āptatva).

In the world as well as the Veda, it is possible to decide the absence of it (delusion) as forming the part of āptatva which is entered into the body of quality/qualifier, by the logicians for the purpose of deciding the validity after the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence.

It is not the case that there is absence of defective utterance before the knowledge of Vedic sentence meaning, at the time of the operation of inference regarding the conduciveness of good in general which is at par with the said absence which is a part of the delimiter of causality.

**View of the mīmāṃsakas**

For us there is no expectancy of absence of delusion etc. existing in the speaker in the generation of valid knowledge or in the understanding of validity (of knowledge), because of the acceptance of self-validity (of knowledge).

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93  पूर्वभविन -B

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But there may be expectancy of that (absence of delusion etc.) for refutation of doubt about denial of validity.

It is not the case that there is emergence of doubt of the one having the knowledge of the *apauruseyatā* of the Veda because of which(doubt) there may be cumbersomeness on account of assumption of existence of that(absence of delusion) with respect to each sentence.

[Notes : That kind of doubt does not even arise for the one who accepts the *apauruseyatā* of the Veda ]

It is not so that even the consideration of the *tarka* of the said manner should be expected before the verbal understanding with respect to each sentence, because there is expectancy of that(consideration of *tarka*) only in the refutation of the doubt of denial of validity in the primary meaning by the *tarkābhāsa*(false *tarka*) put forth by the prima facie view.

**Process of understanding of the nimāṁśaka**

Arthatāvadāntaśtrādā vidyāvādyādyābhāsītā samākhāntā mahatāhārśvānodyaśāhāṃ sāmāyāṃ: sarvāvadyābhāsītā vrajāvadyābhāsītā ahārvadyābhāsītā tattvād tirakṣī taddalāthā kālanumā ḥīṅga ḥīṅgaḥ śatā ṛṣeṣāt paryāvaryaḥ nigrahaḥ nigrahaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryāvaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावaryaḥ paryावary
There being the knowledge of tātparya (intention) in īstasādhanata of the prescribed object of all the sentences of injunction and in anīstasādhanata of the prohibited object of all the sentences of prohibition by the injunction of study commonly,

(There is) tātparyagrāhakata which is suitable in the sentences of injunction and prohibition according to the power/capacity similar to the ārthavāda, mantra etc.,

There happens to be the remembrance of tātparya (intention) known by that particular causality (towards the desired and the evil) by the samskāra evoked by the sighting of the related (objects), of the person having the knowledge of the state of inclination existing in the liñ and the (knowledge of the) state of aversion (nvartanā) existing in the nāñ (negative particle) etc., and (of the one having knowledge) in the manner of different quality of the liñ and nāñ in jartilayavagyā juhuyā." and anāhutrvā (respectively)

[Notes Upon the doubt whether the anahuta (non-performance of sacrifice) is prohibition of the jartilayavagī (juice of wild sesame) or it is an ārthavāda of the payas (milk) which is also prescribed in that context, it is decided that prohibition leading to option of jartilayavagī and milk would render the sentence redundant as option is already established by the injunction of milk. Hence the prohibitive sentence is considered as an ārthavāda which praises the milk by censuring jartilayavagī. (ŚD X 8 7)]

After that, on account of co-utterance with the word svargakāma (desirous of heaven) there is understanding from the sentence of injunction such as ‘it induces me in sacrifice (meant for)/with the purpose of heaven’ And on account of the proximity to (the sentences of) ārthavāda there is understanding by the sentence of prohibition of

94 TaitSam V 4 3
95 The sentences meant for praise and censure of the enjoined and the prohibited respectively. They generally occur in proximity to the sentence of injunction and prohibition and form sentence unity with the same to give the meaning of praise and censure respectively
the form ‘it avers/repels me from the eating of kalanja with the purpose of avoiding hell’.

असति कामशाब्दवाचारादिसमभविष्याहो तु द्वारं द्वाररत्न्यमूर्तिलीकिके वाक्ये कारकस्मारितेन योमश्रीक्रि-पदेन पिपेहीत्वादिनेव विधेयनिषेधक्रियास्मारितोतिचि.

tatduśāyavācāṇoṣायोहोहोतेन शुरुपदे: शाब्दबोध उक्तविधः सभ्यसतीति न क्षापि इक्ष्याधनवादाधुमनम्।

In case when there is no co-utterance of the word kāma or arthavāda etc,

there is possibility of the verbal understanding of the said manner by the word stating that suitable particular purpose reminded by the action (associated with) the prescribed and the prohibited, just as (there is verbal understanding) by the suitable action word pidhehitī (you close) etc which is reminded by the case (kāraka) in case of the incomplete worldly sentence such as: ‘dvāram dvāram’ (door door).

Thus nowhere there is inference of istasādhyanatva etc.

Even in case of acceptance of inference there is no understanding of causality of volition

सत्यायुमाने कृतिश्चकं न तत्।

Though there being the inference, it does not have the volition as pakṣa96.

वेतनक्रामः पचतीत्यादि भावनोद्वैयमणि वेतनं प्रति भावनाया अहेतुतवतू स्वर्गकामो यजेत्यादित्यत्या तस्या: स्वर्ग प्रत्येहेतुतत्वात्।

Just as there is non-instrumentality of the volition towards salary although being the purpose of the volition in case of vetanakāmoh pacati (he cooks desirous of salary),

96 The subject in an inference where the sādhyā (that which is to be proved) is established. In the present case bhāvanā is not the one where īstasādhanatā is established.
(similarly) there is non-causality of it(volition) towards heaven in *svargakāmo yajeta* etc.

(And) Because there is absence of making known of the causality which is contradictory to world forming part of establishment (achieved) by some other manner, of the injunction which has served its purpose by making known just the purpose-ness towards it.

[Notes: The causality towards the heaven lies in the *yāga*(root-meaning) and not in the *bhāvanā*. The function of the injunction is only to make the purpose-ness of the heaven known. ]

अत एव न कृती धर्मत्वव्यवहारः केषामपि ।

Hence there is no usage of *dharmatva* in volition by anyone.(i.e. volition is never accepted as *dharma*. But root meaning such as *yāga* is accepted as *dharma*.)

**Second type of implication**

द्वितीय आक्षेपप्रकारस्तु पुरोडङ्गाविधिना प्रकृतिविध्यालयाय एवः प्रकृतिविध्यालयायः क्रियते इत्याकार्यसिद्धः ।

Second manner/type of implication is the implication of the source material/substance(*prakṛti dravya*) by the injunction of *purodāśa*(sacrificial cake) or the implication of the knowledge of meaning by the injunctions of rites. Or that obstruction which is done by the injunction of *vrihi* or by the injunction of study as it is known from the source text.
There, similar to the acceptance of stick etc. of the person desirous of (making) a pot, in the acceptance of *vrihi* etc. of the person having (knowledge of) cause-effect relation known by the world and who has the purpose of (making) *purodāsa*, the inclination itself is accepted as being the state of implication brought about by the injunction, because of it being caused by the *vidhi* successively/indirectly, similar to the usage of the form ‘the acceptance of stick etc. is implied by the injunction of pot’.

And in the same manner even at other places the inclination in the means of knowledge of meaning is (accepted as) implication.

Therefore the obstruction (*nirodha*) of the irregular inclination which is caused, (and/which is) the obstruction (*pratibandha*) produced by the two said injunctions which are producer of regular inclination is justified.

The inference of the form ‘my duty’ etc. having as object the acceptance of knowledge of the meaning in general and material substance in general, being
obstructed by the two injunctions, because of (the injunction) *vrihibhiryajeta* being meant (*pararva*) (to denote) the instrumentality (towards the *purodāśa*) on account of the strength of the expectancy of its source, (and) there being the relation in general which is unknown by context etc. of the knowledge of the meaning established by the injunction of study on account of the strength of the general relation which is its source, there is establishment of application (*viniyoga*) (in both the cases) because of the *linga* (the power in a word to express its meaning).

By this the inferentiality of the implication of the source of extension (*atideśa*), has (also) been answered (i.e. refuted).

By this the inferentiality of the implication of the source of extension (*atideśa*), has (also) been answered (i.e. refuted).

There is no experience of the invariable concomitance there. Nor is there acceptance by the learned.

Third type of implication

Third (type of implication) is the implication of the substitute by the injunction of *purodāśa*. In case of the absence of the primary substance the injunction of the *purodāśa* which remains unascertained (*anupapadya*), is ascertained by the acceptance of the substitute achieved according to the discussion/rule of the *yathāśakti* discussed in the sixth chapter.

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98. *JS. VI.3.1.*
This kind of implication is *arthāpatti* (presumption) and it is different from inference

अन्तःसौंपत्याक्ष्यः प्रमाणाधिकृतः। न चानुमान एवं तदन्तर्भावः।

Here the means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) named *arthāpatti* is the implication. It is not so that there is inclusion of it in inference. The result of *arthāpatti* which is of the form of knowledge enjoining the *vyāpya* (pervaded), is different from the result of the inference which is of the form of knowledge enjoining the *vyāpaka* (pervading).

अनुमानकलाद्रष्टायकविधेयक्षानारिहितक्षणं हि अर्थपतितसंक्तं व्याप्तिविधेयक्षानारिहितक्षणम्।
बहुत्प्रदेशेणुष
बहुभावानुभूतम्।
यो मृत्यु वहन्याभाववतवान् धूमवन्यवैति इति तं प्रत्येकविद्युभेदेन
वहितसमभावान्यवित्यं धूमवानिति कथनांनां स स्वीकरोऽति धूमवताम्।

The one who having experienced the absence of fire at lots of (most of) places speaks thus, “the mountain is without smoke because of absence of fire”, towards him after the saying, “this is with smoke “ because of the possibility of fire with respect to the place which has not been found/seen yet, he accepts the state of having smoke.

Refutation of all the other means of knowing

न धूमवानामिति वदन्ति प्रति तस्य तदन्तर्भावं प्रत्येकः स्वीकरः।
सन्निहितसभावात्।

नानुमानं तदब्याभावंत्याश्चाभावात्।

Towards the one who says, ‘ this is with smoke’, there is no perception of him of the knowledge of the state of having that (smoke) because of the absence of contact with sense of the one who accepts (the presence of smoke) . There is no inference because of the absence of knowledge of the state of having the one which is *vyāpya* (pervaded) by that;

न शाब्दनिश्चयः।
सत्याविविधये पूर्वाच्चारितवाक्यदेव निविधापते।
वहन्याभावेत्यक्षानारिहितक्षणं अपि तदअभेत वाक्या।
there is no determination by the means of word because though there being the
determination of āptaṭva there would be contingency of determination just by the
sentence which is uttered before. And on account of the power of that there would
also be occurrence of contradiction/negation of the doubt of invalidity described by
the cause of absence of fire.

(And) The absence of the necessary element (required) for upamiti(analysis) is clear,
thus the difference/distinction of the fruit must be accepted (of presumption).

**Difference of presumption from inference on the basis of experience/usage**

अनुभूते चैतन्य अर्थात् अनुभूतादितत्वाधिष्ठिता धृतमृणुपद्ययामीति | चन्दनवत्तावच्छेदेन सौभाभिवि
धृतवत्तावच्छेदेनविश्वासात्(न?) चतो धृतनीतज्ञातन्त्रवापि वत्ति गवये।

And it is even experienced that, ‘I establish smoke by the fire existing in the place
which has not been discovered (yet)’, is even possible to be said by the state of being
experienced/known with contact(āpāna) of the knower of fire as being delimited by
the state of having smoke just like the smell as being delimited by the state of being
sandal

परवतो विभावनिति ज्ञाते धृतेन विभावयुज्यात्मात्वमेव वैज्ञानिकवेत्ता मानत्वायत्वशायपक
परेशाम्।
तस्मानुवीतिवेषपि आवश्ये नानास्वयमत्वश्च।

The distinction/difference which is experienced of the form ‘I infer fire by smoke’, in
the knowledge of the form ‘the hill is with fire’, is the cause of arising of the
postulation of some other means of knowledge(māna), of the others.

Therefore even in the third implication there is no state of being an inference.
Absence of qualified knowledge even by the acceptance of inference [prima facie
view contd. from pg. 204]

अस्तु वा क्षब्याद्वयाद्यक्षराद्यक्षरामाध्यक्षरामोः। न तु तत्त्वंषूलवानुरुपितसंस्कृतं व्यापारवती कृतितित
विशिष्टसम्बन्धः।

Or let there be the state of being inference, of the implication at some places. But the
qualified understanding(dhī) of the form ‘the volition is one having function’ by the
relation forming the part of inference which is its result is not possible.

यो हि सम्बन्धे विशेषतो गम्यमानो इत्यस:सम्बन्धनौवैशिष्ट्यसामान्याभाविधियमादित्यति कथमिव तेन
tथेवैविष्ट्यधीर्जीयताम्।

That relation which is known specially of the two related(things) accepting(ādadhāti)
the understanding of the general absence of the qualified, in what manner can there be
the generation of the qualified understanding of them by it.

न जातु स्वप्रतियोगिताः संस्कृतं स्वसमानाधिकरणाभावप्रतियोगिता सम्बन्धने वान्धकारवानातीक इति
धी: सहदयेर्गीक्रीयते।

It is not so that the understanding of the form ‘the light is one having darkness’ is
accepted by the sahrdayas by the relation of counter positives-ness of oneself or by
the relation of counterpositiveness of absence co-existing with oneself.

प्रवृतिगिर्यवैज्ञान प्रवृतिगिर्यवैज्ञान कल्पवत्स्य: श्रीमद्विज्ञ निवर्तनाधित्य कृत्यभावरूपा निवृत्तितित
तुल्यन्यायत्य स्थीकर्त्तव्यम्।
By you the reverer who postulates the distinction of the inducement by the distinction known by the inclination, there must by acceptance by the same maxim of the form ‘the *mūrtti* is of the form of absence of volition produced by the *mūrtaniṇa*.

एव सति स्वविनिवर्त्तत्या स्वज्ञाननिवर्त्तत्या ज्ञातामान कथितविषयपद्धतिमारोहत ।

In such a case, how can there be acceptance of the nature of being qualified by itself, of the one which is known as something which is repelled by it or as something which is repelled by its knowledge

इदुसम्बन्धेन विशिष्टधियमकृतीक्रियेण किमिति गड़गाया घोषे यजमान प्रस्तार इत्यादी

By those who accept qualified knowledge by this kind of relation, why is there acceptance of a different (expressive) power such as *lakṣaṇā* (secondary signification) in cases such as *gangāyām ghosah* (there is house of the cowherd on the river), *yajamānah prastarah*\(^9\) (the sacrificer is *prastara* (a kind of grass used for making seat to keep sacrificial materials))

[Notes Since the house cannot stay on the *Gangā* which is flow of water, the secondary meaning of ‘bank’ is accepted of the word *gangā*. Similarly since there cannot be complete identity of the sacrificer and the grass, secondary meaning is accepted in the word *vajamāna* denoting the actions performed by the sacrificer]

शब्दते हि वकृ क्षेत्रकिल्पितत्वसम्बन्धेन प्रवाह्याच साम्यवेयज्ञव इति

It is indeed possible to state that there is construction of the flow itself in the meaning of the seventh case ending by the relation of being indicated by that which is connected by it (flow), and there is construction of *vajamāna* in the *prastāra* by the relation of being indifferent/identical from the counter-positive of absence existing in itself (*vajamāna*)

\(^9\) JS 14 13
It should not be argued that there is contradiction with the experience of similarity (of yajamāna and the prastara). Because there is generation of understanding of the particular form which is qualified by the quality in the identity of such kind by colocationness, later, on account of the strength of the desire of making known the similarity existing in the speaker.

[Notes The understanding of the similarity which is experienced can be produced later on. There is no need to accept secondary meaning for the same.]

If you ask, what is that which causes the appearance/presenting/reveling of such kind of desire (of the speaker), then we say that after the understanding such as ‘the volition is one with function’, in order to know the particular form of inducement and/or abstinence in the function, the cause of appearance/presenting/reveling is said by you to be the particular desire residing in the speaker, similar to the word (which is cause of presenting/making know/reveling the particular object).

If you argue that the qualification towards the absence is seen even of the pot etc which is contradictory (to the absence) by the relation of being the counter-positive (of absence), then no. Because there is acceptance of that kind of experience by the learned on account of being established in the world.
It is not so that the relation said by you is known anywhere in the world, nor is it accepted by any learned.

If you say that this kind of postulation which is unknown in the world is indeed commendable then no, because there would be redundancy of stating of the worldly example.

**Reason for acceptance of qualifierness of pot in the absence**

There is presence of that absence-ness which is delimiter of objecthood in the negative particle *nān* or in the word absence, (which) is regulator of the state of being related, in the object. Its nature of indicating depending on the construction with a counter-positive object, is the cause in acceptance of such kind(of understanding) of the learned.

Even if it is not seen in the cases where there is different name such as ‘not pot’ etc. still it is sufficient to generate the expectancy which has the relation of difference between two nominal stems.
And it is indeed fit to accept that compatibility, although being incompatible in producing the qualified cognition on account of it being contradictory.

[Notes The absence which is indicated by the negative particle naṇ etc is of such a nature that it can only give out its meaning only when it is related to some object which acts as its counterpositive. Therefore the qualification of pot etc in the absence, although it being contradictory to it, which was stated earlier is accepted by the learned on the basis of experience of such kind.]

Absence of that reason in the prohibition

It is not so there is presence of such kind of cause of being the regulator by way of being related, in such acceptance of that kind by you. Because volition does not depend on the description of nivartanā.

[Notes Unlike absence, knowledge of which depends upon the knowledge of the counterpositive, the knowledge of volition does not depend upon the knowledge of refrainment.]

Objection If you ask, how is it that there is no non-apprehension of the experience/perception in (sentence such as) abhāvāvān ghatah (the pot is one possessing absence).

Here absence is not the qualifier of pot, but (it is) the meaning of the possessive suffix (matup). It is not the case that it being general in nature is non-contradictory with the absence and with the pot.
It must not be doubted that even in the case of ‘the volition is with function’, meaning of the possessive suffix is like that (i.e. is the qualifier), because there is possibility of the relation of possessive suffix (matup) with that which is present with the present time only, by tadasyāstyasmannti (aphorism prescribing possessive suffix stating ‘matup is used when something is present (asti) (i.e. belongs to it) or in it’)

And because of the demonstration by you of the later occurrence (of the understanding) of the absences which are produced by the inference which is produced by the particular knowledge, which forms part of the relation approved by you

And also because of impossibility of qualified cognition in the relation which occurs later

And of those who speak of the state of cognition dependent on the intention of the speaker, with respect to the particular meaning having the form of abstinence which is experienced in the time following the (time of utterance of the) word (i.e. sentence), how come there would be no contingency of leading into the view of the Vaisesika of the contingency of the knowledge dependent upon that (intention of the speaker) of the meaning of the whole sentence this must be thought upon by the intellectuals
In case of cognition of the sentence meaning such as: 'this kind of qualified meaning must be made known by this', by its being the object of the intention of the speaker, in which way would the validity of the sentence be ascertained?

And, of the one who has ascertained that there is possibility of the inference of instrumentality towards the evil by the eating of the poisoned meat, there would be non-contingency of the verbal understanding of na kalaṇṭhāṃ bhakṣayet, because of contradiction of the cognition of the non-relation towards qualified understanding. (i.e. cognition of the absence of relation cannot lead to the cognition of qualified understanding.)

Moreover, in case of production of inclination and abstaining just by the inference of instrumentality in general towards the desired object and the evil, the postulation of the particular (result such as) heaven, hell etc. which has been stated in the viśvājīadvahāroṇa101 would not be justified.

101 JŚ. IV.3.5.
If the cognition of instrumentality towards a particular which is dependent upon other means of knowledge such as arthavāda etc would not be the cause towards inclination and abstaining by the said manner, then there won’t be the state of being produced by the inference of the general (desired and evil), and there won’t be justification of the qualified understanding by the relation constituted of the absence which is produced by that (inference)

But there would be justification of the sentence meaning in the opinion of the tradition such as ‘That eating of the kalaṇja which he should do, it is not’

There being the understanding of ‘abstinence qualified by the action of eating of kalaṇja’ by lin whose intention in abstinence has been known by the negative particle naṅ, there is obtainment of the particular absence, in the absence which has entered in the body of the abstinence by being described by the counter-positive which is delimited by the delimiter of the construed-ness, which is established by the understanding common to the learned

In this manner having accepted the understanding of abstinence by lin the intention of which is known by the negative particle naṅ, if there is meaning of the sentence such as ‘that which is eating of the kalaṇja, one should not do it’. 
and, in case of acceptance of anvībhūdhana (denotation of the construed) in the place of stem and the suffix (i.e., stem and the suffix give out one composite construed meaning), on account of non-accomplishment of the state of restated and enjoined (i.e., one is enjoined with respect to the other which is restated) of the two (stem and the suffix) which are devoid of any denotation (of meaning) which is independent of the other, there if the meaning of the sentence is ‘that which is kalāiṣa, one must not eat it’

Still on account of occurrence of the understanding of abstinence qualified by the particular action, the obtainment of the particular absence must be carried out by the said manner only, thus there is no cumbersomeness caused by acceptance of inference etc., nor is there any non-ascertainment.

Discussion on the arthavāda

एव निदर्घितविधिनिश्चिपक्षप्रशस्त्यप्राप्तम्यायम् तत्तत्समीपस्तितार्थवादे विद्वाने |

Thus, the praise and censure which are expected by the injunction and the prohibition which have (already) been explained, are known by the arthavādas which are read/occur near that

102 क्रियाविशेषणर्वर्णना- S
Definition of praise and censure

Now what are they? There some say, that praise is the state of being the producer of happiness which is greater than the inseparable pain inflicted in the performance of the rite/action which is enjoined. (And) Censure is the state of being the producer of pain which is greater than the inseparable happiness associated with the performance of that which is prohibited.

It is not so that there is obtainment of these two of such nature by the injunction and the prohibition, because of implication of only the causality towards desired and the evil, of them.

And there is possibility of understanding of praise of the said manner, even in the injunctions of subsidiaries, of/by the stated arthavādas by accepting/considering the happiness such as heaven etc. which is the fruit of the main rite, (happiness) which is greater than the inseparable pain associated with the performance of the subsidiaries which have been said.

वदि पर विवाहेन्नृतं वदेरित्याध्याध्यनजाविध्यवादानां नातिरत्रे रोडशिनं गृहातातिति विहितप्रतिध्यवादानां च नोतकितितुधविब्योधकत्वसम्भवः। अभ्यन्त्यात्वष्टुष्टुश्रार्कुजनक्षबाधवात्, रोडशिश्रस्याचार्यश्चार्कृतुकुजनक्षबाधवावानादित्या-लोचयते।
If you are thinking that there is no understanding of both of them of the said manner, of/by the *arthavāda* of the injunction of consent (*abhyanujāvidhi*) such as ‘one must speak a lie’ in the (context of) marriage, and of/by the *arthavāda* of the prohibition of the enjoined such as ‘one does not (must not) hold the cup named *sodasi* in the *atirātra* sacrifice*, because of the absence of being the producer of happiness through the unseen in case of *abhyanujāvidhi* and because of absence of being the producer of pain through unseen in case of holding of the *sodasi*.

Another definition of praise and censure

तदास्तु बलवदनिश्वानुबिधित्वं प्राराज्यत् , तदनुबिधित्वं चाप्राशास्यत्मम्।

Then let praise be the state of being non-producer of evil which is greater (*balavat*) and censure be the state of being producer of that.

बलवत्तं च नाधिक्यम् आधिक्यन्वयात्योपि सुखदुःखयो। प्राचीनकर्म्येऽनेनोलक्टारग्निमिधियतवत्।
तत्तनानीयकसुखदुःखयोनाधिक्यन्योपि तदनेन तादृशात्तिमिधियतवत्। अत एव विहितेवायप्रवृति:।

And the state of being greater is not the state of being more, because of not being the object of extreme attachment and repulsion depending on the actions performed earlier of the two happiness and pain which are known as being more (and) because of being the object of that (extreme attachment and repulsion) depending on that (past actions) of the two happiness and pain which are inseparable to that (performance) although being known as being more. Therefore, there in non-inclination even in the enjoined and there happens inclination in the prohibited of few persons.

अतो दुःखः बलवत्तं उत्कटदेशदिनियत्त्वं , सुखेऽलक्टारग्निमिधियतवत्म्।

Hence greater-ness in pain is (said as) being the object of extreme repulsion and in happiness it is the state of being the object of extreme attachment.
Although even that is not fixed, still the state of being non-producer of evil which is
greater is known as being co-existing with the delimiter of the state of being enjoined,
and the state being producer of the evil which is greater is known as being co-existing
with the delimiter of the state of being prohibited [ i.e that which is enjoined is
known as being non-producer of greater evil, and that which is prohibited is known
as being producer of greater evil ]

The purpose of accepting such understanding

The purpose of making known of that kind of understanding/cognition is the
accomplishment of inclination and abstaining/repulsion by effecting/bringing about
the knowledge of non-validity in the illusion/wrong knowledge which is contradictory
to it with respect to each one of them

Process of accomplishment of the purpose

There being the knowledge of the state of being non-producer of greater evil by being
co-existing with the state of sacrifice at some time, in case of establishment on non-
validity of the knowledge of the form that there is (presence of) the state of being
producer of greater evil in the sacrifice always, there is accomplishment of inclination
by the accomplishment/accumulation of the necessary material required for inclination.

And, there being the knowledge of the state of being producer of greater evil by being co-existing with the state of eating of kalāṇja at some time, in case of establishment of non-validity of the knowledge of the form that there is (presence of) the state of being non-producer of greater evil in the eating of kalāṇja always, there is accomplishment/establishment of abstaining/repulsion by the destruction of the material necessary for inclination.

And in case of the arthavāda associated with the abhyanjñāvidhi, there is indeed possibility of making known that kind of praise, because of understanding of the non-producer of the evil that is known by the prohibition.

[Notes: The speaking of lies in a marriage does not produce the evil which is known by the prohibition namṛtam vadet (one must not speak a lie), because it had been prescribed by the injunction of consent. Thus the arthavāda associated with such injunctions also denotes the praise which has been defined in the said manner.]

It is not the case that on account of implication of it(praise) by the injunction itself, there is redundancy of the arthavāda, because there is cognition of the general state of being non-producer of greater evil as being co-located/co-existing only by the arthavāda.
And even in the arthavāda associated with the holding of sodaśi, the greater-ness said as the state of being the object of extreme repulsion is known in the pain which is inseparably associated with the holding.

Although there being possibility of liking and dislike which is helpful in (generating) inclination and repulsion of someone on its own (i.e. even without arthavāda), there is no occasion of doubt regarding the redundancy of arthavāda because of the postulation of bringing (more) good by the knowledge of praise etc. which is known by the arthavāda similar to the postulation of bringing of more good by the remembrance which is produced by the mantra.

[Notes The purpose of the mantra is said to be remembrance of the activity that is to be done during the performance of the rite. But this remembrance is also possible through means other than the mantra. However, there is a rule stating mantraireva smartavyam (remembrance must be done only by mantra). The fruit of such a rule is postulated as the remembrance that is done by the mantra brings good. Similarly, the like generated by praise known by the arthavāda brings in even greater good than when it is just known by the injunction (SD 12 4).]

Construe of praise and censure into bhāvanā

The construction of praise is said to be into the volition (bhāvanā) by the relation of the state of being produced by the extreme attachment towards the desired object which is produced by the knowledge of the object of its own (praise), and of the censure into the same (bhāvanā) by the relation of the state of being the counter-
positive of the absence caused by the extreme repulsion towards the evil object which is produced by the knowledge of the object of its own (censure).

Refutation of the said view

That is not so (i.e. the view put forth by you does not hold good.)

Because, with respect to the first two definitions, the praise etc. must be necessarily explained by including the particular person and the particular action in the form: that which is producer of the happiness which is greater than the inseparable pain associated with the performance of desire of the particular person, that is praise-worthy towards that (person),

And also because of non-observation even in the world of usage of praise and of the inclination caused by such understanding, in those producing happiness which is greater than the inseparable pain associated with the other action and which is less than the inseparable pain associated with its own, and also in those producing happiness which is greater than the inseparable pain of the other person and less than the pain of oneself.

Thus being the case, upon the (undesired) consequence of understanding of infinite praise with respect to difference in the person and with respect to difference in the object in just single arthavāda such as pañcasaṅcāra etc., there won’t be obtainment
of conformity/accordance of that (kind of praise) in all arthavādas, on account of the fear of disturbance of which (conformity) in the abhyanyajñāvidhi there is your inclination towards statement of the other view (i.e. the other definition of praise).

[Notes: In the Cāturmāsa sacrifice there are four sections (parvan) namely vaiśvadeva, varunapraghāsa, sākamedha and śunāśīryā. There the first five brāhmāṇa related with the first five sacrificial–material is extended to the varunapraghāsa by the injunction etatrābhāmanāṇi eva paṇca havinīṣi. The doubt raised in this respect is whether only the arthavāda such as vārtraghni vā etāni havinīṣi etc. related to the injunctions of the subsidiaries is extended or the arthavāda as well as the injunctions of the subsidiaries are both extended. There it is decided that both are extended because the injunctions of subsidiaries are also related because of enjoining the subsidiary. ŚD. VII.1.3]

न च व्यासिलक्षणादिविव शाब्दानुगमोऽधिप सम्भवति । आसित्क्यातिशये
दौद्रामण्याधिनिवृत्तकर्मप्रवृत्तेतरजनुदत्तथा
सकलसन्नजननविधानन्धावापादिकया
अनुभव-
सिद्धसुखानुभवे प्रतिबद्धतया नातीरिक्तः खाप्रसिद्धः ।

It is not so that even conformity of words is possible as in the definition of vyāpti (invariable concomitance), because the invariable pain is not known as the same is obstructed by the experience of happiness which is caused by the feeling of blessedness described by the noble people as not attainable by lay persons which volition to discard bad brahminhood (bad people) is the result of faith par excellence.

प्रसिद्ध होतत्यामारणां वीरसाक्रान्तचेतस: शूरस्य न युद्धसमये शार्षिकातुः खोत्त्वतिरिति ।

This is quite famous/common of the unlearned people that there is no generation of pain by the strike of the weapon of the warrior/courageous whose mind is filled with the sentiment of courage/valour at the time of war.
It is not so that there is establishment of inseparable pain of the devotees of lord Śiva and Viṣṇu in the chants of them. (For) indeed it has been asked by Prahlāda: ‘O Lord! In all those infinite species/births (yoni) where I go, in all of them may my unmoving devotion in you always remain unmoving’.

It has also been stated by the poets in (the text) bhaktisataka: the pain of the world is moved to pacification only at the time of proper serving/devotion to (lord) Kṛṣṇa (lit. slayer of Kārmśa).

Example of this kind may not be in accordance with the experience of atheists, so let it be so.

There is no possibility of cognition of the said praise in the arthavādas associated with the injunctions of wearing of gold, accomplishment of fast, approaching wife at proper time etc. on account of non-occurrence of the associated pain towards some person.

Many people are seen inclined there(in these actions) after having known the necessary material suitable for it which is postulated by the other, on account of the excessive satisfaction.

¹⁰³ Visnu Purāṇa 1.20.18
It is not so that in these kinds of examples, there is possibility of determination of the fruit of good by the maxim of * mantra*, because, on account of non-occurrence of the associated/internal pain, there is impossibility of the cognition/knowledge of praise the explanation of which is dependent on that.

Moreover there is no possibility of cognition of praise by the * arthavādās* at the time of inclination based only on the injunction of (actions such as) *nitya* (obligatory), *naimittika* (produced by some cause) and *prāyaścitta* (expiatory), because of absence of happiness produced by it.

It is not so that the word *sukha* (happiness) has the secondary meaning of absence of pain, because of incompetency/absence of production of that (absence). And because of improperness of statement of the greater-ness which is the cause of the extreme repulsion, in that destruction of the sin.

It is indeed not possible of greater-ness(excessiveness) which is known by that, to be of that kind either by being the object of enjoyment for a long time of by the (large)number.

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104 ŚD. 1.2.4 (See pg. 230)
It is not so that it (excessiveness) is the state of having many numbers of counter positive (i.e., it denotes the destruction of many sins), because of the singularity of the sin which is the cause of (performance of) twelve year expiation etc.

And also because of the difficulty of the knowledge regarding the excess number, in case of removal/destruction of pain/sin, without (first having) the knowledge of the number of pains which is internal/associated (with the performance)

And also because of the non-contingency/non-generation of the inclination in the sacrifice which is producer of heaven etc. which is known as being the cause of evil having the nature of destruction of greater/excessive happiness, on account of (determination of) evil-ness in the absence of happiness similar to the (determination of) desire-ness in the absence of the pain

And because of the impossibility of conformity of the praise on account of the non-conformity in each (of them) of the elements which are part of praise in the manner stated by you

Refutation of the other definition of praise and censure

Nor is the other etymology/derivation of praise etc. possible
Question: The excess repulsion existing in the greater-ness (balavattva) is (something) common to oneself and the other or (it is) only related to itself?

There cannot be the inclusion of the repulsion of the other in the inclination

The first (option) is not (possible).

On account of observation/occurrence of inclination, upon the knowledge as being the producer of happiness which is object of the extreme attachment related to oneself, although there being determination as being the producer of the inseparable/internal pain which is object of extreme repulsion related to the other, there is impossibility of inclusion of repulsion of the other towards inclination either in the delimiter of the causality or in the delimiter of the obstruction-hood (pratibhandhakata).

Nor the second (option is possible).

Because, even if it (extreme repulsion) is only related to oneself then (i) it would be common pain which is associated with the performance of that which is object and

106 जाते -S
non-object of the inclination which follows the extreme repulsion, or (ii) it would be connected to/object of only the pain associated with the object of that kind of inclination.

The first option is not possible, because inclination is seen by the extreme attachment towards the fruit of the one who is devoid of that kind of pain related to the performance occurring later, even though experiencing the extreme repulsion known by the inseparable pain associated with the performance of *jyotistoma* performed earlier.

And because of non-observation (of inclination) in the case contrary/ opposite (to it), because of constitution in the *balavatva*(excessiveness) of only the extreme repulsion known by the pain associated with (the performance of) the object of inclination.

Another manner of cognition of praise in the above case and its refutation in different ways

Then, in case such as *jyotistoma* etc. connected with the time *vasanta*(spring) etc. which has appeared as a duty/obligation, let there be cognition of the praise having the form of being non-produced by the pain which is object of the extreme repulsion

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107 खेन रहितस्य - S
108 नन्तरावस्थानि - S
related to that person, by way of being co-located/co-existent with the state of *jyotistoma*, if you say so then no

Because of contingency of invalidity in case of cognition in such a manner towards a person having that kind of repulsion, (and) because of redundancy towards all such kind of person in case of cognition in such a manner towards the person devoid of that kind of repulsion

[Notes The one who has that kind of repulsion will never be inclined towards the action Hence the praise would become invalid since it would be unable to generate inclination And the one who is devoid of such kind of repulsion would be inclined automatically Thus the praise would become redundant ]

For indeed he knows even the absence of repulsion just as (he knows) the repulsion as something which is perceptible to the mind And on account of that (he knows) also the qualified absence

It must not be doubted that, there is possibility of illusion/false knowledge (*bhuma*) of the production of evil which is greater, of the said manner, as being delimited by the state of *jyotistoma* of the one who has the said determination, there may be possibility of removal of which by the purpose-ness of such cognition – this must be thought/considered by the intellectuals
It is not so that there is application/rule of the maxim of remembrance generated by the *mantra* here, because of the possibility of (the application of) the rule which has seen purpose towards that person, on account of possibility of (presence of) person who is devoid of remembrance. (And) There is impossibility of any seen purpose of the knowledge of praise of the said kind generated by the *arthavāda*, towards any person by the said manner.

[Notes: There is a general maxim stating that, as long as any seen purpose is fulfilled, there must not be postulation of unseen.]

Or, let there be the said false knowledge as being delimited by the state of *jyotistoma*. And let the said knowledge of non-production be the remover/repeller of that by being co-existent with that.

But even by that, there won’t be generation of inclination of the particular person in the particular performance. Because of possibility/occurrence of co-existence even in the performance that is present and which is producer of evil, without the knowledge such as: ‘this performance is producer of evil related to me’, when there is the state of non-production of evil in the other performance.
[Notes: Unless there is knowledge about the particular performance being the producer of evil towards the agent, the co-existence of the knowledge of being the non-producer of evil is possible.]

In fact/Actually the state of being known by the means such as inclination and aversion of the excessive/greater repulsion is not proper. Because of acceptance by all exponents, of the extreme attachment and extreme repulsion as that which brings about inclination and repulsion by (just) having the capacity (to produce the same as against actually producing it.)

अनुभवसिद्धताच्छ

And also because of being established by experience.

अतएव्वेच्छायाः अव्यवधानेन प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेऽद्य पतञ्य तिड्डलितवाच्यत्वमित्याहुरभिहुयः

Therefore, even when desire produces inclination directly, it(desire) is said to be the meaning of lin etc. by the learned.

यहर्मांवचिच्छन्ते प्रेष्यावतामुक्तताग: सम्भवति स्वर्गवादितादशमार्ब्लिच्छन्ति-साधनता बोधनेत्वा लीकक-वादिकपदेशानां प्रवृत्तकत्वम्। तस्य ज्ञानमुदेशेः इति वैदिकविधीनाममयंदेशात्ताया: सूतकत्तोक्तत्वात्

In that which is delimited by which quality, there is possibility/occurrence of the extreme attachment of the learned, there is the state of being the producer of inclination of the sermons of the world and the Veda, by making known the instrumentality delimited by that kind of quality of heaven-ness etc.
Because of statement by the composer of sūtra (i.e. Jaimini) of the sermon-ness even of the injunction of the Veda in the form ‘tasya jñānam upadesah’\textsuperscript{109} (the knowledge of it (dharma) is sermon (of the Veda))

Even in the world, the mothers etc. while compelling the child in the intake of medicine do not make them understand such as: ‘there won’t be extreme repulsion of yours in the pain which would be brought by it’. But they explain in this manner: ‘by this you will get to eat laddu (sweat ball) or you will obtain wife’

Those whose actions are conducive, they are inclined towards the fruit which is stated by it by extreme attachment and they obtain the happiness such as life etc. And those whose actions are non-conducive whose thinking is disturbed by the acceptance/overpowering of the force of passion are not inclined by the extreme repulsion only in/towards the pain of that time (of performance) and they do not obtain (the fruit such as) life etc. Just because of such (a behaviour) there is no invalidity of the sermon.

It is not so that there is non-reliability of the person who states (as fruit) the non-existent (object) such as wife etc. Because of acceptance by the learned of the

\textsuperscript{109} JS. I.1.5.
reliability which is composed of the absence of deceit which is non-conducive
towards the good of the other.

In the same manner, in the case of making known the instrumentality towards non
hearing of the censure which is non-existent/false by the arthavāda towards the
present/existent injunction of pannatā etc., if there is no inclination of the persons
whose minds are distracted, just on account of that there is no harm of any kind of the
sermon having the form of injunction which is accompanied by arthavāda.

[Notes: In relation to the sacrificial ladle (jāhu) a arthavāda is found stating yasya
parnamayi juhūrbhavati na sa pāpam ślokam śrṇoti110 (one whose sacrificial ladle is
made of the wood of the pārṇa tree, he does not listens to censures). This arthavāda
states the praise of the wood of pārṇa by which the ladle must be made.]

Because there is justification/production of the state of being the producer of
inclination just by the inclination of the learned who are contrary to it.

It has been said by the learned that though there being understanding of disinterest by
the observation of the momentary pain, there is (creation of) interest by the statement
of qualities either true or false.

110 TaitSān. III.5.7.
In this way the refutation of the understanding of non-praise having/constituted of extreme repulsion must also be thought about. And also in the same manner the refutation of the result of understanding of extreme repulsion in the *arthavāda* of the prohibition of (the holding of) *sodāsi*. And also the refutation of the result of making known only that which is already known in the *arthavāda* of the injunction of consent.

**Final view**

अत आकरोकमेव साध्वाणवत्च द्वाराशस्त्यं औषध्वत्चम् अप्राप्तस्त्वयसिति।

Hence as propounded in the source text praise is the state of having good quality and censure is the state of having fault.

न च भावनायं तदन्तः। अस्माभिनेत्रमस्वत्सीत्यावर्षक्षिप्तपयसेन तत्तव्यतात्यय: प्रदर्शनात।

It (praise and censure) is not construed with the *bhāvanā* (*ārthisbhāvanā* = volition), because the baselessness of it by the explanation/statement of establishment of the *smṛti* in a different manner has been stated by us.

तत्वैव गृहस्योकारपि प्रतीभेत।

And also because of the understanding of the statement of the revered teacher in the same manner.

प्राध्यानभूतप्रत्यान्यायमेवान्यथस्वीकारीपिविचित्त्यात।

Because it is proper to accept the construe in the inducement which is prime.
(And also) Because of non-possibility of construction of a non-case into the action by the maxim of vājapeyādhikarana.

Even upon acceptance of construction into the volition, for the purpose of justification of accomplishment of the arrangement such as: 'this is praise of the deity, this is praise of the material/substance' etc. it is proper to state the construction of it only by the relation of being the instrument towards the sacrifice having as deity which is connected/dependent/resorted in it(praise).

Therefore, it is established that, there is no construction of praise into the volition which is the qualificand of all the nominal-meanings and root-meanings either directly or indirectly, but into the śabdibhāvana, in accordance with the source text.

Thus ends (the chapter) vidhivāda (theory of injunction) in (the text) Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā which is composed by ŚrīKoṇḍadeva who is pupil of ŚrīAnantadeva who is an exponent of the systems of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā.

111 Colophon missing in the Varanasi(S) manuscript
Let it be so.

Although there is qualificand-ness of bhāvanā through the case (kāraka) towards the nominal-meaning ending in accusative case ending etc., there is no qualificand-ness of bhāvanā towards the nominal meaning ending in the nominative/first case-ending, because of acceptance by you of non-capacity/non-suitability of its (nominative case-ending) construction with the action on account of being a non-case.

Prime-qualificandness of the meaning denoted by word ending in nominative case

Similar to the number denoted by the verbal-suffix, in case of the construction even of bhāvanā which is presented by it (personal suffix), (and) which appears by the verbal suffix co-uttered with the negative particle naṁ, on account of brevity there is acceptance of that which is expressed by the word ending in the nominative/first case-ending as the regulator/governor because of it not being a subordinate to anything else.

[Notes: In case of co-utterance with the negative particle, bhāvanā is construed into negation. Thus it acts as a sub-ordinate in such cases leading to acceptance of different qualificands in different cases. Hence it is better to accept the state of being known by the word ending in the nominative case-ending as the regulator in all the cases.]
Construction in different kinds of usages

In case of co-utterance with the verbal-suffix which denotes agent(active voice) and object(passive voice) as in ‘Cairah pacati’ (Caitra cooks) and ‘tandulah pacyte’ (rice is cooked) (respectively), Caitra and rice which are agent and object are both expressed in that manner(i.e. not being a sub-ordinate to any other), thus there is construction of bhāvanā and number into it(nominative case-ending) only.

In case such as ‘gaja iva gacchati’ (walks like an elephant), the elephant although being expressed by the word ending in nominative case-ending, there is no construction of them(bhāvanā and number) into it, because of it being sub-ordinate to similarity which is meaning of (the word) iva (like).

In case of personal suffix denoting action in sthīvate (stays) etc., although there being non-subordination of the verbal root-meaning on account of non-perception of bhāvanā, there in inclusion of (the expression/word) prathamānta (denoted by the nominative case-ending) in order to ward off/restraining/avoiding the construction of one-ness into it(verbal root-meaning).

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On account of construction of bhāvanā into meaning of nañ and of the number into Caitra in case of co-utterance with negative particle nañ in ‘Caitro na pacati’(Caitra does not cook), volition-ness and qualifier of volition must be made known by nañ etc. as ākhyātatva (known by the ākhyāta part of the suffix) either by denotant power or by secondary implication.

[Notes: Two parts denoting two different meanings are accepted in the personal suffix. The part which denotes volition(ārthibhāvanā) is called ākhyātatva. It is common in all the tenses and moods. And the other part is the specific mood or tense which is only denoted by that particular mood and tense. It is called by the name of that mood and tense like lin-tva, loš-tva, leš-tva etc. In the present case, the bhāvanātva which is denoted by nañ etc. in case of co-utterance with the negative particle, is denoted as ākhyātatva and not as that specific mood and tense.]

By this there won’t be contingency of the construction of time etc. which is expressed by the ākhyāta in Caitra etc. because of absence of it(time) being expressed as delimited by the ākhyātatva on account of it being expressed by the specific/distinct lat (present tense) etc.

(And also) Because of restraining that contingency (of construction) into that(Caitra) on account of establishment by experience of the construction of time into bhāvanā in pacati(cooks) and into verbal root-meaning in jānāti (knows), and of the meaning of upagraha(voice) into fruit of the action in yajate(sacrifices) and into verbal root-meaning in upanayīta (should initiate).
And it is indeed possible that in case of pacati(cooks), jānati(knows) and naśyat(perishes) there is rule of construction of the volition expressed by denotant power and of the locus-ness and counter-positiveness expressed by secondary implication into the object/meaning denoted by the word ending in nominative case-ending.

Objection: (If you doubt that) In case of asti ghati(the pot is present), bhavisyati(the pot will come into existence) there is construction of time into the meaning denoted by the word ending in the nominative case-ending, then no, because of construction of time which is meaning of the lakāra(tense and mood) only in the bhavana(meaning of the verbal root bhū= to be) in (the usage) bhavisyati similar to the usage bhavati.

It is not so that there is contingency of non-construction of (the word) kapāle(potsherd = the piece of jar), because of the seventh/locative case ending in (the word)kapāle also being meant for delimiting similar to the (usage) namule(?).

[Notes: In case of the sentence kapāle ghatō bhavisyati (the pot will come into existence in the potsherd), there would be contingency of non-construction of the word kapāle since there is absence of bhāvanā. ]

Because there would be generation of the understanding such as: Pot is the locus of that bhavana(being/existence) related with the future time and which is delimited by the potsherd.
And the future-ness (occurring in) bhavana is either (of the nature of being the) counter-positiveness of the prior-absence related with the present time or (it is) a distinct whole meaning- this is an altogether different topic

Construction in case of passive usage

Moreover, if you raise another question such as, in case of pacyate (is cooked), by what relation is there construction of the bhāvanā which is expressed by the personal suffix denoting object (i.e. by the passive personal suffix) ⁹ then,

Some state that it is by (the relation of) objecthood, because of objecthood of rice towards the volition (i.e. rice is the object of the volition of cooking)

While others believing that there is no possibility of stating the construction of bhāvanā as the all-pervading objecthood on account of non-perception/understanding of the volition in cases such as gamyate (is gone to), jñāvate (is known) etc., state that there is no denotation of the volition by the personal suffix because of obtainment of bhāvanā by the instrumental case-ending, but there is denotation of the result/fruit of the contact/reaching etc. of the softening by the use of the ātmanepada in order to obtain the objecthood which is of the form of being the locus of the result produced by the action known/indicated by rice etc.
However in case such as jñāyate (is known) (there is denotation) of the objecthood.

And on account of contradiction of the fruit of cooking etc. in the past tense, there is justification of the obtainment of the said objecthood because of construction of the meaning of ātmeneṣāya in the meaning denoted by the word ending in the nominative case as locusness similar to the bhāvanā.

Objection upon the construction of bhāvanā in the meaning denoted by the word in the nominative case

Objection : There is indeed no rule of the construction of the bhāvanā in the meaning denoted by the word ending in the nominative case.

Because, in cases such as Caitro na pacati (Caitra does not cook), pacati eva (only cooks), pacati api (also cooks), there is construction of the bhāvanā serially in the meaning of the negative particle nañ (i.e. negation), in the ‘other’ which is partly the meaning of the word eva and in the assemblage/collection which is the meaning of the word api.

[Notes : The meaning of eva is defined as anva-yoga-vyavaccheda i.e. obstructing/denying the contact with the other. In the present case of pacati eva (only cooks), there is construction of the bhāvanā with the meaning ‘other’ which is only a
part of the meaning of eva, because there is denial of any other bhāvanā than the bhāvanā of cooking in the present sentence]

部分的含义的eva，因为在否定中没有其他bhāvanā比烹饪bhāvanā更合适

There is cumbersomeness even in case of adding of the qualifier ‘co-utterance with the negative particle nai’ [i.e. even if it is said that there is no construction of bhāvanā in the meaning denoted by the word ending in the nominative case in case when there is co-utterance with the word nai, it would not be correct but would only lead to cumbersomeness]

Because the non-accomplishment of the construction in the next two examples would remain in the same state [i.e. even the said addition of qualifier would not be able to accomplish the construction in the other two cases]

有cumbersomeness in case of addition of the qualifier of non-co-utterance with that

Moreover, there would be non-justification of the understanding which is produced even in the case of absence of co-utterance with the word ending in the nominative case in usage such as odnam pacati (cooks rice), because of the absence of the cause of the form of presence (of the meaning) produced by the (word) ending in the nominative case
[Notes  The natural steps in generation of verbal understanding are i) Knowledge of word -> ii) remembrance of the meaning of the word -> iii) construction of the word-meanings (i.e. verbal understanding). Thus the remembrance of the meaning by the word is the cause in generation of the verbal understanding. In the present case, there is absence of this cause because there is absence of usage of any word in the nominative case.]

न च तेन प्रथमानुपदाध्यायारूपं तत्कल्पने गौरवात्।

It must not be the case that there is understanding by supplying of the word ending in the nominative case, because there would be cumbersome in postulation of that

Justification in the view of the mimamsaka

न च गीताःकोमषोऽचैः पवित्रतत्त्वति आवातजन्तिभावनोपरिद्वितं रूपार्नमावात्

अस्तोल्लोध्याहारे गौरवतुष्टतेति ज्ञातः। असिद्धान्तान्तर वाचस्यनुस्वेतय्यस्तीति स्मृति-

सिद्धगौरवस्य प्राप्ताणिक्ष्ठात्।

It must not be doubted that there is non-generation of the understanding by the sentence caitrah paktā (Catra the cook) in the view of the mimamsaka on account of the absence of the cause in the form of presence of the bhāvanā produced by the personal suffix (And) the cumbersome in supplying the (verbal form) āsti (is) is the same

Because of validity of the cumbersome in supplying which is established by the smṛtu (rule), ‘astāḥ bhavantīparah prāthamapuruṣaḥ aprayujvanāne‘pavastī ’113 (there is presence of the verbal form āsti and bhavati even when it is not used in the sentence associated with third person).

[Notes  i) The term adhyāhāra means supplying of the ellipses(asrutaspadāyahānamansadhananai114) Many a time word/s is/are not used or omitted in the sentences. However the meaning of the sentence remains incomplete without that word. In such cases the word is supplied in order to complete the sentence for giving out its meaning.

113 Vārttika 11 on P 3 31
114 Nyāya Kosa, pg 16

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This supplying of the omitted part is technically called *adhyāhāra*. It is mostly contextual. It is widely employed in the scriptures as well in the worldly usages.

ii) If cumbersomeness involved in *adhyāhāra* of a particular part is supported by any rule, then even that is considered as valid.

More problems in the view of the logician and statement of the view of the mīmāṃsākās

कि च स्थीयते इत्यादि भावप्रत्ययस्थले भावनाप्रकारकोषाय प्रथमान्तरपदाध्यायः स्यात्।

And moreover, in cases such as *sthīyate* (stays) where the personal suffix denotes action, there would be *adhyāhāra* of the word ending in the nominative case, in order to generate understanding having *bhāvanā* as qualifier.

अथ तत्र भावनामुख्यविशेषणक्य एव बोधः।

Hence, there (one would have to accept that) the understanding is one that has *bhāvanā* as the prime-qualificand.

अत्तु तत्तवं सत्यवच सः भावनाप्रकारकोषं कार्यकारणभावे च। भावायात्मेन्द्रप्रकरणः च नैव सत्यपद्यते।

Then let that (understanding having *bhāvanā* as prime-qualificand) be (accepted) everywhere, in the understanding having as qualifier the *bhāvanā* and in the cause-effect relation. This being the case there would be no contingency of cumbersomeness of inclusion of (the phrase) ‘different from the personal suffix denoting action’ [which would become necessary in the view of the logician.]

कि च यद्यन्याविशेषणप्रथमान्तः भावनासंशयायोर्नयः।। चैत्र एव पवित्र चैत्र एव दृष्यत इत्यादिचैत्रे तथोर्नयोः न स्यात्।।

Moreover, if (it is said that) there is construction of *bhāvanā* and number in the meaning denoted by the word ending in the nominative case which is not a qualifier to other, then, in cases such as *Caitraḥ eva pata* (only Caitra cooks) , *Caitraḥ eva*
only Caitra is seen etc. there would be no construction of them (bhāvanā and number) in Caitra, because of its (Caitra’s) qualifier-ness in one part of the meaning of eva (i.e. Caitra acts as a qualifier to anya (other) which is one part of the meaning of eva (see pg. 250))

Nor (is there construction of the two of them) in exclusion etc. which is the meaning of eva, because of contradiction with the experience (i.e. such kind of construction is not a matter of experience of anybody.)

Then, the understanding is said by accepting two constructions of Caitra, such as kṛtimān caitrāḥ (Caitra is one possessing volition) and kṛtyabhāvavān caitrānyah (person other than Caitra is one not possessing volition). Thus being the case there would be sentence split.

And, upon the question ‘Caitra and the person other than Caitra are of what nature?’, there would be contingency of the answer caitrāḥ eva pacati (only Caitra cooks).

Hence, only the understanding having bhāvanā as the qualificand must be accepted, if you say so then, no.
Problems in the view of the mimāṃsaka

Because, even of you (mīmāṃsaka) who accepts the presence of bhūvanā as the cause in the understanding having as qualifier the meaning/s other than number and case, how is there no violation by the acceptance of the construction of Cāttra in the meaning of the words eva and api in usage such as caitrah eva pacati etc

If you say that there is no violation because of the possibility of obtainment of ‘person other than Cāttra’ etc after the (primary)understanding of the form ‘there is bhūvanā having Cāttra as agent and which having the absence of other (person) as agent’, either by the later-relation (i.e. relation that is established only after the generation of the primary understanding) or by secondary implication

In pacati eva caitra etc, because of non causal-ness of the two objects (purodāśa) of the word vistakṛt on account of the strength of ascertainment by the understanding of the word uttara dhatu and pada, by accepting the two related (purodāśa) occurring in the context and known by the words such as astākapāla and ekaḥāyani, and because of the ascertainment of the understanding of the words sodaraḥ (brother) lit born from the same womb) and nāpti (grandchild), by relating, to the meaning of the word
gachat(going) having the intention of construction as the object of abandonment and to the meaning of the word Caitra having the intention of construction with priya (beloved), as, although there being the rule in the qualified knowledge having the form of verbal understanding such as ‘meaning of a word does not construe with one part of the meaning of (another) word’, still this is not accepted in the qualified knowledge produced by the word nap₄ etc. having the meaning which is related because of non-ascertainment of the understanding of the meaning produced by the word by any other manner.

[Notes: i) The complete references are found on pg. 266 such as: uttarārdhāt sviṣṭakrte samavadyati115, apanthānām gacchantam sodaro pi viṁśacati116 (even the brother abandons him who threads the wrong path), napriyaścaitrah(Caitra to whom grandson is dear).

ii) He cuts from the front half (of the sacrificial material, here purodāśa) for the sacrifice to sviṣṭakṛt – here the main discussion is whether the sacrifice sviṣṭakṛt instigates two other purodāśas for its purpose, or it is subordinate and instigated by the purodāśa of āgneya etc. sacrifice obtained from the sentence yādāgneyaḥ astākapālah .... bhavaḥ117 etc. The latter option is supported on account of the fact that the word uttarārdhā (front half) is expectant of something related to it. It cannot give its meaning entirely on its own. Hence it is connected to the āgneya purodāśa heard in the context. Therefore it is not instigator (prayojaka) of another two purodāśas. (ŚD. IV.1.13)

एवं पदोपसिद्धांतपरमेश्वर विशेषणविशेष्येऽ: शाब्दो वैशिष्ट्यप्रकोष्ठ इति निष्कृष्टपदज्ञविशिष्टगाने विशेषणांशोऽदपोपसिद्धांतमन्यम; । असम्बन्धज्ञवाभावसहकृतसकस्ततांविशेषणांनानकायोपयते: ।

In this manner, although there being the rule that there is qualified understanding which is verbal of the qualifier and the qualified of only those that are presented by the word, there is no rule of the presence by the word on the part of the qualifier in the said qualified knowledge produced by the word, because of generation of the effect of

115 ĀpaŚS. II.20.3.
116 Subhāśitaratnahāra 40.9.
117 TaitSañ. II.3.6.
the knowledge of the qualifier by the impression (samskāra) along with the absence of any unrelated intervention

On account of there being presence of even the qualified knowledge as being part of the object of the conscience of perception (anuvyavasāya) of the desire and the volition similar to the qualified knowledge, the effect/result which is delimited by the two properties is carried out by the desire and the volition because of non-inclusion of knowledge-ness even in the two delimiters of the causality which is described by those which are delimited by that particular (causality)

Following this particular manner of the qualified understanding generated by denotation of the word denoting the meaning indicating the related object, in the adhikarana ‘samānam itareccheyenena’\(^ {118} \), having stated that by the word itara (other) that which has remained and which is similar to the earlier archetype must be denoted, on account of the enjoinment of the modification/ectype for the purpose of the subsidiary of the archetype by the words vistuti and sāma (occurring) in the two sentences isum vistutim karoti\(^ {119} \) and saptāham sāma bhavati, even in the said sentence (samānam itarecheyena), (enjoining) the similarity with the svena for the purpose of /meant for the subsidiary of the archetype which has remained, by the word itara there is (enjoinment of the) extension of the modification of the subsidiary

\[^{118}\text{Sadvimsa Brāhmaṇa} \text{iv} \text{3} \text{7} \]
\[^{119}\text{Ibid } \text{iv} \text{3} \text{3} \]
of the archetype such as *lohitosnīṣa* (red cloth) etc. – this has been said in the vārttika and the *paunaruktaparihāramālā* by the vārttikakāra and by the revered teacher (respectively).

[Notes: In one of the modifications of *jyotstoma*, there is particular injunction such as *iṣum viṣṭutiṁ karoti* (he does the *viṣṭuti* with the arrows) and *saptāham bhavati* (the *sāman saptāha* is uttered in the stotra), enjoining these with respect to the subsidiary of the archetype. And then there is the injunction *samānam itarat śyenena* (the other is similar to the *śyena* sacrifice). Here the opponent states that the word *itara* (other) denotes only that which is in proximity, on account of which only the subsidiaries occurring in *jyotstoma* would be extended. The *sidhāṅtin* states that the word *itara* denotes the proximity along with similarity. Thus the present sacrifice being similar to the *śyena*, the *dharmas* of *śyena* such as *lohitosnīṣa* (acceptance of red cloth) etc. are obtained by extension. (ŚD. VII.1.2) ]

Refutation of construction of the meaning of word ending in nominative-case in the meaning of eva, api or naṁ

And in this way, in both the cases of *caitra eva pacati* (only Caitra cooks) and *Caitra pacati eva* (Caitra only cooks), in case of later understanding serially such as Caitra is possessor of volition, nobody else, and he is not the possessor of absence (of volition), (such understanding) being generated in the initial understanding itself, by the words Caitra and the personal suffix, on account of the carrying out of that (generation of understanding) just by the impression produced after the initial understanding on account of absence of any distinctness of the two words which are un-imbibed with
any intention, in the view of the bhāṭṭas, in the understanding having as qualifier the meaning of the word Caitra, (? there is no construction) in the meaning ‘other’ which is one part of the meaning of the word eva. similar to the meaning ‘other’ in case of the understanding having as qualifier the meaning of the word viṣṭūti etc., because of the words itara and anya being known as synonyms.

Indeed it is not so that in the explanation of the cause-effect state, there is desire to state only the understanding having Caitra as qualifier by the word ‘understanding having the meaning of Caitra as qualifier’, but (there is desire to state) the state of having Caitra as qualifier which is delimiter of the produced-ness (state of being produced) of the cognition of Caitra which is produced by the word Caitra.

Otherwise there would be the contingency of non-production (of understanding) without the presence of the bhāvāna which is produced by the personal suffix in the view of the Bhāṭṭa, even when there is understanding having Caitra as qualifier in the form of perception etc.

Thus even in the view of the Bhāṭṭa the form of the understanding having the meaning of the personal suffix as qualifier must be known in this manner.
By this even (the refutation of the form that) there would not be construction of the bhāvanā in Caitra etc. which is a qualifier of the meaning of eva etc. (raised by the mimāṃsaka upon the views of the nyāya), is refuted, because of Caitra etc. not being the qualifier of that (meaning of eva etc.) by the said manner.

More problems in the view of the mimāṃsaka

Moreover, it is not proper for the learned (prekṣāvat= i.e. mimāṃsaka) to stick to in the brevity caused by the same form of the cause-effect state only in the sameness of the qualifier and the qualificand (i.e. similarity in the form of the understanding) by taking naḥ as revealer of intention etc., because of another postulation of the causality towards the knowledge of intention (i.e. knowledge of intention has to be accepted as a cause).

And also because of the necessary/compulsory postulation of either the causality or the delimiter-ness of causality of the acceptance of intention in the verbal understanding having special/distinct relation, such as ‘the tātparyagraha produced by naḥ is the cause in the verbal understanding produced by these two words having absence as the relation’ or ‘the two words whose intention is known by the naḥ is the cause in the verbal understanding having absence as relation’.
It is not proper to accept incidental (occurrence) in the production of the verbal understanding having the particular/distinct relation which is experienced, which conforming to (amavidhāyini) the positive and negative co-relation of the particular/distinct co-utterance (i.e. in explaining the experience some cause must be necessarily stated).

In cases such as bhunke (eats), though there being similarity of the capability of the two relations such as object-hood and conducive-ness of the root-meaning and the volition, on account of the usage of the expression śarkarāṃ bhunke (he eats sugar) for the person who being unaware of the sugar eats the food mixed with sugar, (in cases such as caitraḥ pacati eva) it is possible to state that after the (initial) understanding such as ‘Caitra is one who has volition which is favourable/conducive to cooking and he is different from one in whom there is absence(of cooking)’, because of obtainment of the construction of volition, in the eva-kāra by the later relation, in the absence by the acceptance of secondary meaning, and in the assemblage which is the meaning of the word api, there is no violation caused by the construction of bhavana which is the meaning of the personal suffix, there. (answer to refutation on pg. 250)

The nature of the qualificand of clubbing together of both of them(qualifiers), (and) which is together with the desire belonging to the two qualifiers, (brings about) the
purposeful relation of the qualifiers (occurring in the later understanding). And as by the (word denoting) action it is possible to bring about that (relation) even by Caitra etc. which is not of the form of an action.

Thereafter, on account of lack of desire of the volition, there is no later relation by the maxim serving the prima-facie view in the case of rathaghoṣaṇa.

[Notes: The adhikaraṇa is regarding the word rathaghoṣa occurring in the injunction rathaghoṣena māhendrastrotramupākaroti¹²⁰ (he instigates the māhendrastotra by rathaghoṣa) wherein the opponent contests that the compound involved here is dvanda and not śaṣṭhītapuruṣa. Thus there is no relation between ratha (chariot) and ghoṣa (sound) both of which individually serve the purpose of replacing darbha (grass) and mantra (respectively) which is stated in the archetype sacrifice. But the siddhāntin refutes the view on account of laksanā accepted in both the words of the compound in case of the sanīḍharadvandva. Thus the compound śaṣṭhītapuruṣa is accepted wherein laksanā is accepted only in the first member of the compound. (SD. X.4.1)]

And also, if you say that it (later relation) is not possible of the sentence pacati eva caitra, because of restatement of the meaning which is (already) established in the world , then this would also be the same in the sentences such as caitra eva pacati etc, because Caitra is non-expectant of the other. And also because of possibility of restatement.

¹²⁰ ĀpaŚ. XVIII.3.6.
Then if it is said that, on account of the words nañ, eva and api being particle (nipāta), and nipātas being tātparyagrāhaka (that which makes known the intention) on account of being indicator (dyotaka), in cases such as caitro na pacati (Caitra does not cook), by the two words (ākhyāta and nipāta), there is generation of understanding having bhāvanā as qualificand and Caitra as qualifier and having that meaning as the relation.

It is indeed possible to state (the understanding) as, ‘there is volition which belongs to Caitra by the relation of counter-positiveness of the absence residing in himself (Caitra)’ (in case such as caitro na pacati).

In the same manner, the understanding having the meaning of eva etc. (entered) as relation must also be carried out.

And by accepting the tatparyagrāhakata (the state of making known the intention) of the particle nañ etc., it is also possible to the state the understanding as, ‘Caitra is one who possesses the volition by the relation of being the locus of the absence of itself (volition).
Indeed, there is no lack of the desire to speak such relation, of the other (logicians). There being absence of such relations in the twelve chapters (i.e. in Purva-Mīmāṃsā), they have to be begged by the mīmāṃsakas from the other sāstra.

The old-logicians who are ashamed of the contradiction with the experience would not accept these kinds of understandings.

And in case of resorting to the injunction i.e. rule such as, ‘having abandoned a single shame, one should become victorious everywhere’, the childish neo-logicians who carry a great pride in resorting to the neo-views at every instance, why would they not explain the understanding which is accepted by them upon accepting whatever/any (kind of) relation.

Refutation of the view of mīmāṃsaka with respect to another sentence

But, by those who speak of the faults towards the logicians in (case of) pacati eva caitṛah etc. by resorting to sharp criticism, (must state as to) what is the condition/justification/explanation of the understanding of the construction of Caitra in maternal uncle etc. in case (of a sentence) such as sabhāryaḥ saputraḥ saśisyah.
sapitrtyah caitrah pacati (Caitra cooks accompanied by wife, accompanied by son, accompanied by student and accompanied by uncle).

न हि भार्षिदशब्दा निपाता येन तत्प्रयागहका भवेवुः। न च भार्षदीनां संसर्गल्लम्।

It is not so that the words such as bhāryā (wife) etc. are nipātas, on account of which they would become (i.e. act as) tātparyagrāhakas. It is not even the case that, there is relation-hood of wife etc.(i.e. they could be entered/treated as a relation in the generation of verbal understanding).

न च तथा सति प्रतिपद्धकसामानाधिकरण्यं सहस्रस्वते।

And also it is not that, such being the case(i.e. there being the absence of the relation-hood of wife etc.), there would be justification of the co-referentiality (sāmānādhihkaranyā) of the nominal stems.

सामा-धिकरणस्य भार्षिदिपतेः चैत्रीभार्षिदिशिक्षणयोपपादनेऽपि स्वाधे शब्दप्रयोग इति 
मीमांसकप्रसिद्धन्य चैत्रक्षेत्रभार्षासहित: पच्चतीति प्रयोगस्योक्ष्यगोगादुचितत्वपते।

And even in the case of explanation of sāmānādhihkaranyā (co-referentiality) by (acceptance of) secondary meaning such as ‘Caitra’s wife’ in the words ‘wife’ etc., there would be contingency of correctness/validity of the usage such as caitrah caitrabhāryāsahitah pacati (Caitra cooks along with Caitra’s wife), because of the said usage (supported) by the famous maxim of the mīmāṃsakā such as svāyatte śabdaprayage.

[Notes : In the sacrifice of the animal agniśomīya two mantras are present which are ‘aditiḥ pāśam pramumoktu’\(^\text{121}\) and ‘aditiḥ pāśān pramumoktu’\(^\text{122}\), having singular and plural numbers respectively. These are obtained by extension in the sacrifice having two animals such as maitraṁ śvetamālabheta vārunaṁ kṛṣṇam\(^\text{123}\). But the numbers of the animal and the mantra do not match. It is decided that the

\(^{121}\) TaitSām. III.1.4.
\(^{122}\) MaitSām. I.2.15.
\(^{123}\) TaitSām. II.1.9.
Modification (ūha) must be carried on both these mantras according to the sacrifice. This is decided on the basis of svāyatte śabdaprayoge which states that when the usage (śabdaprayoga) is dependent on itself (svāyatta), then the correct form must be used rather than resorting to laksanā etc (ŚD. IX.3.4.). Similarly in the above case laksanā must not be accepted in the word bhāryā, but the above stated usage should prevail by the maxim of svāyatte śabdaprayoge.

The knowers of (the science of) words (i.e. grammarians) indeed laugh at such kind of usage, stating that the word Caitra (occurring) second time is redundant.

Actually, such statement must not be initiated by the mīmāṃsakas. Because, in Vedic sentences such as uttarārdhatvāsvātke‘vadvati, saptamam padām grhnāti etc., in classical literature sentences such as opanthānantu gacchantam sodaro ‘pi vimuñcati, and in worldly sentence such as nāpraprivaścaitrāh (Caitra is fond of grandson), this nature (svāyatte śabdaprayoge) is known as being delimited by the meaning of the related word.

This kind of word-meaning, though necessarily expectant of the related (word-meaning) in order to ascertain its own understanding, do not expect the presence of that (related meaning) produced by the word, intended for construction with it (i.e. the meaning which is required for the construction with the present word for generation...
of the understanding need not be known by the usage of the word, but it may be obtained by other means.

कितु अन्यान्यता: त्यत्यथाय: कश्चात्यवर्धन-पदन्योपस्थितित्वः न्यायसंस्कारारूढःत्वसाधारणः प्रकृत्त: मात्रम्।
वाक्यान्तरे यागार्थतया क्रियार्थतया बाध्येन कार्यतावस्थेन च किरः अनुकूलतासंसर्गः प्रवेशः।

But (it expects) only the original (prakṛtata) which is commonly fixed/existing in the impression produced by the remembrance which is generated by the word belonging to the other sentence which has the intention of being construed with the other.

In another sentence, the relation of being producer enters towards the delimiter of producthood on account of non-compatibility (if it is) being subservient to yāga or kraya.

Refutation of the possibility of adhyāhāra of only the words asti and bhavati

न्यायसिद्धांतान्तरे इति स्मृतिसिद्धत्वेनाध्यायाहो विषेषः। न्यायसिद्धांतान्तरे नवावदत्वेनाध्यायातिप्रभुतियतान्तरे विषेषः।

It is not so that there is any speciality in the adhyāhāra on account of establishment by the smṛti astirbhavantipararh, because the understanding of the word asti etc. being repeated on the basis of logical argument, indicates towards compatible implication only.

[Notes : The word asti etc. is not enjoined in the smṛti. It is only meant to indicate adhyāhāra of anything which is suitable according to the context.]
Similar to the implying of the (compounded) number which is suitable (to the context) by the word sadvimsati (twenty six) in the injunction sadvimsatirityeva brūyāt124 (ŚD. IX.4.3).

[Notes: In the Aśvamedha sacrifice, a mantra related to the bones(vankṛ) of the horse wherein the word catustrimśad (thirty four) occurs is heard such as ‘catustrimśadvājino devabandhorvaṅkrīraśvasya svadhitih sameti’125 . There a statement is heard of the form ‘na catustrimśaditi brūyāt sadvimsatirityeva brūyāt’ (one must not utter catustrimśad , but only utter sadvimsati (twenty six). The prima facie view is that one must utter the mantra with the word sadvimsati which has been enjoined in the injunction. The siddhāntin states, on account association with the word eva ,the injunction cannot enjoin sadvimsati, because the term brūyāt occurs as a qualifier to it. Therefore, here the prohibition of catustrimśad is enjoined. The mantra must be uttered along with the word indicating number which is suitable. (ŚD. IX.4.3)]

And, because of non-validity of the smṛti of grammar in case of rules that are established by logic/maxim, has been said by Pāṇini himself such as pradhānapratyayārthavacanamarthasyaṇyapramāṇatvāt (P. i.2.56) ( The sense of a word is expressed by the predominant member(pradhāna)(in a derivative word) and by the affix(pratyaya)(in a derived word), because the sense is dependent on something else(anya pramāṇatvāt)[=convention]126 ).

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This has been stated as an example in the Mahābhāṣya at the time of making definition such as *abhihite prathamā* (nominative case is used when the case has already been stated (by some other element in the sentence)) and *tinsamānādhihkarane prathamā* (nominative case is used in case of agreement with the personal suffix), for the purpose of removing the doubt regarding the contingency of making another definition in case such as *vrksah, plaksah* (where only a single word is used in nominative case)

एतत्सृतिवेशोनामानिधिक्रियापेश सिद्धामानानिधिकरण्यमादाश्च शास्तकामिहाराः कैत्येन दर्शित ।

And on account of this *smṛti*, the removal of doubt by acceptance of the agreement with the personal suffix rather than (acceptance of) the implied action, has been shown by Kātyāyāna

एवः च च्य विद्वानः विद्वानित्यः तुत्त्वन्यायागतशाृहाकारिवृत्ते मध्यमपुश्चात्वधिक्तात्मानिच्छिन्नदिर्पि स्वीकृतीत्व स्मृतिप्राध्यपमुस्मयमप्रवणस्यः ।

And in this manner, in cases such as *tvam vidvān* (you (are) learned), *aham vidvān* (I (am) learned), in order to remove the doubt emerging from similar logic/maxim, the implication (*upalaksana*) in (the word) *prathamapurusā* (third person) existing in the *smṛti*, must also be accepted even by those who do not desire the implication of *madhyamapurusa* (second person) etc

[Notes If only third person is accepted in the said *smṛti* then there won’t be *adyāhāra* of the suitable verb in the sentence used for first and second person Thus implication is accepted in the word third person used in the *smṛti* to also denote the first and the second person Thus this would enable to supply the verbal form *asmi* in case of first person and *asi* in case of second person, in the example stated above ]

एवः च योगिनादायाहहोपलक्षणत्वेन व्याधिसिद्धानुवादत्वं सुवचम् ।

And thus, the restatement of (*adyāhāra* which is already) established by logic/maxim as an implication of the *adyāhāra* of the suitable word is correct/valid

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127 *Mahābhāṣya on l arttika on P II 3 46(pratipadrādayāramārnamāvanamaret prathamā)*
Another understanding of the *smrīti*

अस्तु वेय स्मृतिविवधायिका।

Alternatively, let this *smrīti* be an injunction (*lit.* that which enjoins) (and not *anuvādikā*-that which reinstates as in the previous view).

यत्रास्तित्यस्य तद्यथेदानातरस्य वाक्यावहार्ये शुद्धिक्यपूर्णवा समभव। तत्रास्तित्यस्य नियमं विद्यात्।

In case where there is possibility of completion of the heard sentence by *adhyāhāra* either of (the word) *asti* or of another word serving that purpose, there it should enjoin the restriction of (the usage of the word) *asti*.

न तु शुद्धिक्यनानानाकाक्षितं विस्तृद्व वा तद्यथावर्तमाणं प्राप्तेऽति। यथा जन्मोपयोगः कृष्ण इति प्रश्ने उत्तरम्

अयथ्यति। यथा वाह्यको मृत्यु इति प्रश्ने वैत्य इति।

And it must not enjoin the unobtained *adhyāhāra* which is either unexpected by the heard sentence or contradictory. As upon the question, ‘Who amongst the two is Caitra?’ the answer ‘He’, and As upon the question, ‘Who died today?’, the answer ‘Caitra’.

[Notes: In acceptance of injunction, either *apūrvavidhi* (injunction of the unobtained) which enjoins something new or *niyamavidhi* (injunction of restriction) which restricts the use of one amongst the available options, can be accepted. Out of these *niyamavidhi* is accepted in the present context.]

उभययापि नास्तित्यधारारो न्यायसिद्धं। प्रश्नक्वाक्यतापननोत्तरेणैव प्रश्नमूलातलकमाद्वभाषायो।

In both the cases, the *adhyāhāra* of *asti* is not established by logic/maxim, because there is cessation of the desire residing in the question only by the answer which forms sentence unity with the question. [i.e. there must be syntactical agreement between the question and the answer.]
And, on account of the existence which is established by direct perception of the one which is known by the word *udām* (this), and on account of the non-existence which is determined of the one who is dead, there is non-expectancy and contradiction (respectively) of the (supplied) word *asti* (in both the cases).

And also, on account of such kind of *adhīhāra*, there would be contingency of (the *adhīhāra* of *asti*) being the right/correct answer supported by the learned (i.e., *mīmāṃsaka*).

And it is not so that there being the possibility of injunction of restriction, the injunction of unobtained is justified, this has already been said before.

This being so (i.e., there being non-possibility of the *adhīhāra* of *asti* etc.), if, in place such as this (the above cases) accepting the understanding having the meaning of the word ending in nominative case as prime-qualificand, there is acceptance, in place of co-utterance of the action, the understanding having that (meaning of the word ending in the nominative case) as qualifier (by the *mīmāṃsaka*), then, accepting the understanding having volition as the prime-qualificand in case where there is absence of the word ending in nominative case such as *odenani pacati* (cooks rice), it is proper even by the logicians, to accept the understanding having volition as qualifier in case where there is presence of that (the word ending in the nominative case).
Hence, in the said place, it must be stated that there is understanding of one’s meaning which is construed with implied action in general.

This is quite common in your (mīmāṃsaka’s) prime text, as, there being determination of subsidiariness just by the (usage of the word) āindrya (by the mantra addressed to the God Indra) towards any implied action in general which is specified by some other word, the understanding of subsidiariness is not dependent on it(specific/distinct word), thus there is no loss of śrūtātva (the state of being known by the śrūti such as case-ending etc.) of subsidiariness.

Similarly, the explanation of this kind given here of the learned is indeed approved even in odanam pacati(cooks rice), such as ‘there is someone who is possessed of such kind of volition’.

By the consideration of suitability etc., there is adhyāhāra in the postulated word which denoting something distinct/specific, and there is ākṣepa in the remembered word denoting something in general- this is the difference (of adhyāhāra and ākṣepa).

[Notes: In case of āindrya, there is ākṣepa of any action in general, whereas in case of odanam pacati there is adhyāhāra of distinct Caitra etc.]
Refutation of the contingency in cases such as sthīyate [pg. 253]

As to the contingency of adhyāhāra of the word ending in the nominative-case in case such as sthīyate, that is also incorrect/invalid, because there is no capability of construction of bhāvanā in Caitra etc. (in such cases). Because in case of association with the suffix denoting action, its(Caitra’s etc.) form ending in the instrumental-case is only valid/correct.

(And) Because of impropriety of the adhyāhāra having the form of postulation (of distinct word), of the word ending in the nominative-case which is incapable of generating the qualified understanding, on account of having the power which is hindered by the knowledge of invalidity, for the purpose of that(generating qualified knowledge).

Although the cause-effect state of the form, ‘the presence of bhāvanā produced by the personal suffix is the cause towards the understanding having bhāvanā as qualifier’, is accepted, even then, the contingency of cumbersomeness caused by the inclusion of (the expression/part) ‘different from the personal suffix denoting action’, in the delimiter of causality, raised by learned (mīmāṁsaka), does not hold good.

[Notes: The mīmāṁsaka states (pg. 253) the acceptance of prime-qualificandness of bhāvanā, which would also avoid the cumbersomeness involved in inclusion of ‘difference from the personal suffix’ which would otherwise be necessary for the logicians who supports prime-qualificandness of the meaning of the word ending in the nominative-case.]
Although there being the presence of the stick, even in case of non-production of the pot, due to the absence of the wheel, as there is no loss of the causality delimited by the state of stick (i.e. stick is still considered as a cause towards the pot), similarly, although there being presence of bhāvanā produced by the personal suffix, in case of non-generation of the effect of the form of qualified understanding, due to the absence of the other cause of the form of the presence (of the meaning) produced by the word ending in the nominative-case, there is no loss of the causality delimited by the state of presence of such bhāvanā. Because there is possibility of occurrence of the production of the effect only by (the presence) of sāmagrī (all the necessary materials).

Refutation of the cumbersomeness regarding cause-effect state in case such as sthīvate

न चैव भावप्रत्ययस्तथायभावनामुख्यविशेषज्ञक्रियानिर्वाहाय कार्यकारणभावकल्पनागौरवमित्यि
शास्त्र्ययम्। तत्राकारकोधमिनीविरहे शाब्दबोधे तन्मुखविशेषकल्पनस्यार्थस्यिन्द्रत्वात॥

And the cumbersomeness of the postulation of cause-effect state for the purpose of carrying out/generating the understanding having bhāvanā as the prime-qualificand related to places where the suffix denoted action, must also not be doubted. Because of establishment by implication of the understanding having that/something as the prime qualificand, in the verbal understanding which is devoid of the necessary material towards (generation of) understanding having that thing as qualifier.

[Notes : If the necessary material to generate the understanding having bhāvanā as qualifier is absent, then the understanding having bhāvanā as qualificand is
automatically implied. Thus in cases such as sthīyatē there is no need to accept a different cause-effect state.

भाद्वमेते भ्रमसामग्रीविहिते विशिष्टाने 129 प्रमात्ववत्।

Similar to the (establishment of) validity in the qualified knowledge, in case of absence of the necessary material for (generation of) false knowledge, in the views of the Bhāṭṭa.

[Notes: The Bhāṭṭas accepts self-validity of knowledge, wherein any knowledge that does not have the causes to prove it as false, is considered as valid.]

Refutation of the contingency of sentence split in caitrah eva pacati

And that contingency regarding sentence split in case of caitrah eva pacati (only Caitra cooks), that too is not (correct/valid).

Because, in cases such as caitrah pāthati pacati ca (Caitra studies/reads and cooks), the sentence split being unavoidable, in the view of the Bhāṭṭa due to the difference of the two volitions obtained from different words forming the sentence-meaning on account of similar prime-qualificandness.

मैत्रावरुण: प्रेयति च अनु च आहेति वेदवाक्ये तद्वपर्याये अथ्यपर्यायार्थवत्।

And also because of the said fault being unavoidable even in the Vedic sentence maitrāvaruṇah presyati ca anu ca āha.130 (The priest Maitrāvaruṇa utters praiṣa and also the anuvacana).

[Notes: Since there is enjoining of the Maitrāvaruṇa priest with respect to the two actions represented by the two different verbal forms, sentence split is accepted in the said sentence because it is obtained by logic. Mayukhamālikā on ŚD. III.7.21]
But in the view of Nyāya, it is easy to avoid the sentence split in the said case (caitrah eva pacatti), by accepting the state of making known ‘the non-existence in the other’ of the word eva, (generating understanding) of the form ‘Caitra is possessor of volition which is non-existent in (person) other than Caitra’.

And that fault (of sentence split) in the Vedic sentence atra hyevāvapanti (the sāmans must be placed i.e. uttered only here (in the pavamāna stotra)), must also be avoided in the same manner. Here, the desire to state the aversion in the other places by (the understanding of) the intention, and the absence of the desire to state the obtainment which is generated by that(word eva) on account of the meaning that is heard as not meant to be made known by the intention, has been accepted by the Bhāttas themselves.

And in case of (sentences such as) ātmā iti eva upāśi (one must worship/serve only the soul), the aupanisadas (Vedāntin) must also accept (the understanding) in this manner

In both the mīmāṃsā (pūrva and uttara), there is absence of acceptance of the intention generating both the understanding which brings about sentence split, anywhere by the learned of those śāstras

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131 JaimBr. I 3.11 (SD X 4 12)
132 Brhadāranyakopanisad I 4 7
And in case of (accepting the) indication\(^{\text{dyotakatva}}\) (as against the denotation) of the particles\(^{\text{nipāta}}\), the sentence split is easily avoidable on account of the absence of Caitra and the (person) other (than Caitra), being known by two different words.

And, in the worldly sentences which makes known the worldly meaning, there is indeed no scope/seed of such fault of it (sentence split), this must be pondered by the wise.

Refutation of the contingency regarding question and answer [pg. 254]

And that contingency regarding the question and answer, that too is not (correct).

Because of the understanding of number and gender in the other meaning in the question, and because of non-understanding (of the same) in the sentence of the answer, and because only that which generates similar understanding of all meanings other than the \(\text{vidheya}(\text{enjoined})\) is (considered as) valid/correct answer.

Conclusion of the logicians and its refutation

And in case of (accepting the) indication\(^{\text{dyotakatva}}\) (as against the denotation) of the particles\(^{\text{nipāta}}\), the sentence split is easily avoidable on account of the absence of Caitra and the (person) other (than Caitra), being known by two different words.

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Conclusion of the logicians and its refutation
Hence, there is no contradiction in acceptance of the understanding having bhāvanā as qualifier and the meaning denoted by the word ending in nominative-case as qualificand. If you say so, then, no.

Valid means governing the prime-qualificandness of bhāvanā

Because there is rule/regulation of understanding having bhāvanā as qualificand in this kind of situation/sentence, on account of exception (apavāda) of the rule sattvapradhānāni nāmāni, by the smṛti tadyatro bhāvapradhāne bhavataḥ which is not established by any other means, as per the maxim stated earlier.(pp. 173-174)

[Notes: In case of two kinds of verbal understandings having a) meaning of the word ending in the nominative-case is prime-qualificand, and b) bhāvanā as prime-qualificand, the māṁsaka cites the smṛti which regulates one kind of understanding over the other. Thus, the māṁsakas establish the validity of their view on the basis of the smṛti which is considered as a valid means of knowledge.]

And it is also so accepted by Jaimini who states ‘tadbhitṛtāṃ kriyārthena samānmāyāḥ’ (JS. I.i.25) ((In a sentence) There is only predication (or mention) of words with definite denotations along with a word denoting an action.))

\[\text{Notes: Jha, G.N. (Trans.), \textit{Śabarabhāsya}, pg. 44.}\]
And also because of the strength/prominence of the rule of the grammarians etc. who are learned in the vedāṅga by the maxim ‘śāstrasthā vā tannimittavā’ (JS I.3.9) (which is equally applicable) in the sentence-meaning just as in the word-meaning.

[Notes • Meaning of a word which is based on scriptures of grammar etc. or usage by the persons who are well versed in the science of grammar etc. is regarded as more authoritative (JS I.3.9)]

And, the applicability of the smṛti ‘sattvapradhānāṁ nāmāṁ’ has already been explained before in case of the answer ‘caitrāḥ’ of the question ‘who is his son?’ , by experience and by the maxim

[Notes In case of application of the smṛti ‘bhāvapradhānāṁ’ over the smṛti ‘sattvapradhānāṁ nāmāṁ’; there would be a contingency of the latter becoming completely redundant Thus its application at other places has been shown.]

And also because of the justification/suitability of ‘ca’ in the statement of the seers such as taptakṣiraghrāṁbhūnāṁ ekakṣir pratyaham pibet ekarātropavāsaśca taptakrechra udāhṛtah124

((The expiation) Taptakrechra is said to be one wherein one must drink hot milk, clarified butter and water each day, and fast for one night(i.e. one whole day))

[Notes It is one of the expiations which is completed in four days (ताप्तक्रेश्च्य दिनचतुःसाधयं - Dipakalikā on Yajñavalkyasmrī)]

124 Yajñavalkyasmrī(प्रायस्तिक) 317
It is only upon the similarity of the presence of the bhāvanā of drinking and of fasting, (both) as being subordinate to something else, that there is possibility of the construction of the meaning of ca which is mutual association with each other. And it would not be possible in case of subordination of only the bhāvanā towards the other.

Indeed there is no understanding of the construction of the meaning of ca in the case of ‘bring dhavam and also khadira’ (names of different trees).

It must not be doubted that here the understanding is one having bhāvanā as qualificand because of the absence of the word ending in the nominative-case. There is some cause to prescribe the taptakṛcchra. In the same manner, the word ending in nominative case, being the cause of remembrance, is known on account of its power to do so.

Moreover, in case of samidho yajati etc. (one must perform samidh sacrifice= one of the five pravājas) etc., because of being inclined towards the rite darśapūrṇamāsā, there would be a contingency of phalisamskārarakta (embellishment of the sacrificer (lit. the receiver of fruit) ) of the bhāvanās of pravājo, on account of ascertainment of understanding having svargakāma (desirous of heaven) as qualificand and volition as qualifier.
And then (as a result of this), in the subsidiary like the *agniśomiya* etc. (one of the animals sacrificed in the *soma* sacrifice) because of establishment of the capability of enjoyment of the main result just by the *saṁskāra* stated there, (and) because of non-desire of the capability of an enjoyment of any other fruit on account of absence of that (other fruit), in case of non-obtainment of *prayāja* (by extension from the *darsaṇapūrṇamāsa*), there would be non-tenability of the injunction of number etc. with respect to that(*prayāja*).

[Notes : In *agniśomiya*, there is enjoinment of number(eleven) with respect to the *prayāja* which is obtained from the *darsaṇapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice (being five in number). In the above case, this enjoinment of number would become redundant because of lack of expectancy of *prayājas* in the *agniśomiya* ŚD. V.3.1.]

And, in cases such as *sthāṇau sthāṇvāhutun jihoti* on account of non-contradiction with the state of being a subsidiary which is understood of the locative case-ending, in order to obtain the state of (being a rite of ) embellishment, there would be (contingency of ) the embellishment(*saṁskāratva*) towards the person, this must be understood.

[Notes: The offering(*āhuti*) is a *saṁskāra* rite and must be performed only on the post which is designated for *yūpa* (pole used to tie animal in a sacrifice).]
Thus ends (the topic) beginning with the contingency of sentence split (and) ending in the contingency/criticism of the question and answer in ākhyātavāda (theory of personal suffix) in (the text) Bhāṭṭamatapradīpika which is composed by ŚriKoṇḍadeva who is an exponent of the systems of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā.

S- श्रीगोपीपत्रीश्रवहनिशम् ||
इति श्रीपूर्वांगमानसकश्रीकोण्डेवकृतीभाट्मतप्रदीपिकायां निक्यतात्वादारभः ||
समासोठव ग्रन्थः ||

May the lord of the gopi (i.e. Lord Kṛṣṇa) protect all the time.

Thus begins the ākhyātavāda (theory of personal suffix) in (the text) Bhāṭṭamatapradīpika which is composed by ŚriKoṇḍadeva who is an exponent of the systems of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā.

This text has ended.