PART A

INTRODUCTION :

A CRITICAL STUDY
**General Introduction**

Śabda (verbal testimony) is the most prominent means of knowledge amongst all the means of knowing for the system of Mīmāṃsā as this system is primarily concerned with the knowledge of Dharma. Dharma can be known only through the Veda which is of the nature of śabda. Also, human knowledge is encoded in language and as such śabda becomes the important means of knowing anything. The worldly as well as non-worldly knowledge acquired by śabda has been encoded and passed on in the form of a sentence. As Veluri Subba Rao states, “It cannot be argued under limits of human experience that there is the comprehension of an idea which does not assume the form of a sentence either in its active or inactive state. That is the very reason why a study of the sentence has been deemed obligatory for anyone attempting a critical investigation and a precise presentation of scientific knowledge.”¹ Thus, verbal understanding generated by sentences is one of the most significant matters for Indian philosophers. Chief amongst them who have extended special consideration to verbal understanding are the grammarians, the logicians and the mīmāṁsakas.

The grammarians who are directly concerned with the phonological and mostly the morphological aspect of language have also to deal with the syntactical and semantical aspects in cases of compounds, cases and certain suffixes. Logicians, who are deeply concerned with the epistemology, also have to necessarily deal with verbal testimony as a means of knowing. And mīmāṁsakas are directly concerned with the interpretation of Vedic sentences. Thus discussion on verbal import forms an inevitable part of all the three philosophies. This topic of verbal import occupies such an important place, that along with the primary texts that deal with the subject in some section, many independent works have been composed in each of these philosophies that are distinctively devoted only to it. Thus, in grammar, a large portion of a work such as the Vākyapādiya deals with it. Other than that there are texts such as Vaiyākaranabhūṣana, Laghu-Maṇjiṣṭā etc. devoted solely on discussion upon semasiological (ārthika) theme. In the tradition of the

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logic especially the neo-logic, texts such as *Vyūtpattivāda, Śaktīvāda* etc. deal with this semantic aspect. On the same line, there are texts specifically dealing with various aspects of verbal import in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (PM) too such as *Bhāṭṭarāhasya* and large portion of *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇī* etc. An addition to this list of texts in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā dealing specifically with the topic of verbal import is the present text *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā* of Koṇḍadeva.

**Name of the text and some background**

The name of the text is quite transparent. It is a text illuminating i.e. expounding (*prakāśikā*) the theories/views (*māta*) according to the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. It has been written by Koṇḍadeva. This text deals with exposition of certain topics such as the nature of injunction etc., which are related to verbal-understanding according to the views of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā especially according to the Bhāṭṭa school.

The system of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is concerned with the interpretation of the Vedic sentences in order to arrive at the correct meaning which is decisively related to the correct performance of the rite. PM was first systemized by Jaimini who formulated the aphorism and divided it into twelve chapters, each having at least four sections. Each section deals with many topics. For each topic, its problem(s), its discussion and its solution many *sūtras* are applied. This complete discussion on a single topic is called *adhikarana* in this system. Hence different topics in PM are generally referred to in the form of a chapter, a sub-chapter and an *adhikarana*. The aphorisms of Jaimini are explained along with suitable examples from the Veda by Śabara in his *bāṣya* called *Śābarabhāṣya*. *Śābarabhāṣya* has been commented upon by Kumārila Bhāṭṭa in his magnum opus in three parts namely *Ślokavārttika, Tantravārttika* and *Ṭupṭīkā*. There is another commentary on the *bāṣya* by Prabhakara Miśra who was a contemporary to Kumārila. Through commentaries the two famous schools of PM namely the Bhāṭṭa school and the Prabhakara school came into being. A third school was also initiated later by Murāri Miśra. Out of these the Bhāṭṭa school gained more popularity and therefore more number of texts are available in this tradition. The Prabhakara school has relatively
less followers hence the texts available in this school are limited. And not much is known about the Murāri school except for a few recent efforts made to reconstruct the same.

Most of the works of PM available in the present time belong to the Bhātta school. Some of these are commentaries upon the earlier works such as Kāśikā, Nyāyasaṅghā etc., others are independent treatises upon the whole system like Mīmāṁsānukramanikā Sāstrādipikā while some others are treatises on some specific topic such as Vidhiṅiveka, Bhāvanāviveka Nyāyairāmāla, Vidhyārasāvuna etc. In addition to these, there are many other works that have remained unedited and unpublished and lie only in the form of manuscript in libraries and various places throughout the country. One of these is the present text named Bhāttamatatpradīpikā of Kondadeva.

**Aim, Nature and Scope**

The present effort aims in bringing to light this unedited and unpublished text which is presently only in the manuscript form. This includes presenting an edited version of the text based on the collation and emendation of the readings from the two manuscripts of the text that could be procured. Its scope is limited to the manuscripts, the information of which could be collected from New Catalogus Catalogorum (NCC), all the published catalogues, bibliographies and other relevant sources presently available.

An English translation of the text has also been provided along with the edited reading. The translation of such a technical text written in such a highly technical language has been incorporated in order to facilitate better understanding. (In some places there could be different possibilities of revising the same, though) It has been literary as far as possible keeping the contextual meaning intact and intelligible. The translation is assisted by the notes at many places in order to make the context clear.

The critical study of the text has been presented in the introduction to bring out the overall import of the text and to point out its uniqueness in many ways.

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2 Panse, Ujjwala. *A reconstruction of the third school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā*
1. Apparatus

New Catalogus Catalogorum (NCC) identifies the present work as Bhāttamatapradīpa (-pikā) and has placed it under the author Kondubhatta (C 1600 – 1660 A.D.)³ who is considered identical with Kondadeva. NCC mentions the presence of the manuscripts of the said work at two places namely Government Sanskrit Library, Saraswati Bhavan, Benaras and Telugu Academy, Cocanada. Out of these a copy of the manuscript from the Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Benaras could be procured. As regards the other manuscript from Telugu Academy, Cocanada it was learned that the manuscript had been transferred to the Telugu Academy, Hyderabad. A visit to the Telugu Academy, Hyderabad for the collection of the same proved futile as the manuscript was not mentioned in the list of Sanskrit manuscripts possessed by the Academy. No other information could be gathered about the whereabouts of this manuscript. Similarly no mention of the present manuscript was found in the various catalogues of different manuscript libraries of India and abroad. However, out of the many visits to the different manuscript libraries, the visit to the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (BORI), Pune proved to be fruitful as one copy of this text was present there. A copy of this manuscript was also procured. Since no other information could be found regarding any other copy of the present work, these two manuscripts collected from two different places are taken as basis for editing the present work.

The manuscript from Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute is labeled as ‘B’, and the manuscript from Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Benaras is labeled as ‘S’ for the purpose of reference.

1.1. Description of the Manuscripts

The first manuscript that could be procured is from Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune. The accession number of the manuscript is 624 of 1886-92. A detailed description of the manuscript is as follows.

³ NCC Vol V, pg 92
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Kondadeva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folio</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines per folio</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters per line</td>
<td>42(approx.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>10.3” X 4.7”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting from</td>
<td>Folio no. 1B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending at</td>
<td>Folio no. 42B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning</td>
<td>श्रीगणेशाय नमः।</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>गणेशकृष्णादिसृतां प्रणमये श्रीमदनन्देवान् ॥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>श्रीकोडेवः: प्रकरोभित्वत्सां मुदे भाटमतप्रदीपिकां ॥१॥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End</td>
<td>जुहोतीवादी सम्भव्य प्रतीतमानगृहविरोधेः सनिपातित्वलमाभाय । पुरुषसंस्कारत्वमेव स्यादित्वेऽहम् ॥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colophon</td>
<td>इति श्रीपूतारमीमांसक श्रीकोडेवकृती भाटमतप्रदीपिकायां आख्यातवादे । वाक्यभेदायादिप्रश्रोतरस्यायात्माभिधानान्तसाम्म् ॥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Script</td>
<td>Devanāgari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Clear, handwriting is good, margins are given on both the sides.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second manuscript labeled ‘S’ has been procured from Sarasvati Bhavan library, Varanasi. The accession number is 29654⁴. A detailed description of the manuscript is as follows:

⁴ A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit manuscripts, Sanskrit University Library (Sarasvati Bhavan), Varanasi, vol. VII pg. 274.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Bhāttamatapradipah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Kondadeva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folio</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines per folio</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Letters per line</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>10” x 4.5”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting from</td>
<td>Folio 1B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending at</td>
<td>Folio 41A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Beginning             | श्रीगणेशाय नमः।  
गणेशकृष्णादिसुरानु प्रणाम्य पुरुषपि श्रीमदनन्देवान्। ||  
श्रीकोडेवे प्रकृतिसन्दर्भाता मूदे भास्मतप्रदीपिका ॥१॥ |
| End                   | जुहोतीपािदी समभायतीत्रयमानुगुणभावविलोकेि सनन्यवतित्रलाभाय  
पुरुषसेवकार्यमेव स्यादित्याय।  
श्रीगोपीपरक्षात्वहनिश। |
| Colophon              | इति श्रीपूजीतमीमासकश्रीकोडेवकृती भास्मतप्रदीपिकायामाध्यात्मावादर्थं  
समापोष ग्राम ॥ |
| Material              | Paper                        |
| Script                | Devanāgari                   |
| Remarks               | Photocopy received is not very clear, handwriting is average, margins on both the sides |

### 1.1.a Common features of both the manuscripts

Both the manuscripts procured from two different places share many common features. Neither of the two is the autograph copy but both the manuscripts have been copied from some exemplar. The information about the scribe or the date of copying of both the manuscripts is not known. Both the manuscripts begin and end at the same place. There is
no use of parasavarṇa in case of anusvāra. In case of purvavṛtta sandhi there is hardly any employment of avagraha(5) though use of avagraha is seen at a few instances in both the manuscripts. Manuscript B uses single vertical line(danda) for indicating the end of a sentence. At very few instances it also uses double line. But manuscript S also uses dot(.) in addition to danda placed in the middle to indicate the end of the sentence. Many small mistakes are seen as common in both the manuscripts such as the usage दृष्योऽत्र instead of the correct usage दृष्योऽत्र. Another common feature is the usage of only च in place of च्च in words such as अच्छेदक etc. throughout the manuscript. Use of म् at the end of the sentence or before the word beginning with vowel is also eluded. Only anusvāra is used at all such places. In words such as rūpā etc. the form having short vowel u is used.

In spite of having many common features there are many distinct features of each one of them which must also be discussed separately.

1.i.b Special features of the manuscript B

The most important feature of B is that its copy is very clear in appearance and the handwriting of the scribe is good. But there are other features as well that need to be stated. The manuscript has many scribal errors. These errors include things such as omission of the long vowels like writing आह्वे in place of आह्वत. Many a time there is dropping of an alphabet such as लिप्रकारक for लिप्रकारक, विश्वक for विश्वक etc. However this manuscript has been corrected by someone. All the major errors have been corrected. Most of the minor ones too have been corrected except for some which have eluded the sight of the reviser like the above example of लिप्रकारक. Such corrections are seen in almost all the pages. Another important feature of this manuscript is that the person who has corrected the readings is different from the scribe. This is clearly visible on account of the difference in handwriting of the scribe and the reviser. One more

5 Folio 39A line 6 in B and Folio 38A.1 in S
6 Folio 22B line 3
7 Folio 23A line 5
8 A term used for corrector by S.M. Katre in his 'Introduction to Indian Textual Criticism', pg 23.
important observation regarding the corrections is that, the corrections that have been carried out, have been done by looking at some other copy of the same manuscript which may be perhaps the same from which the present copy has been made. This is so because at many places the reviser has added a word, a phrase and even a line which is not usual if only the scribal errors are corrected just by reading and comprehension. For example in the line लिंगादिप्रकारकरणस्वविशेषाकबोधो जायते च, the expression ‘न जायते’ is added before the word जायते. Similarly, on folio 14A line 10 and on folio 25B line 4 one whole sentence has been added. Corrections that have been made in this manuscript have been done very technically. In pages where the number of corrections are more or where the correction is shown at the top or at the bottom of the page there the line number is given along with the corrected alphabet to avoid any kind of confusion regarding the place of correction. For example व्याप्त which is given at the top of the page indicating that the correction is at line number three. Similarly caret (kākapāda) has been used in the text for indicating that there is an addition at that respective place. At a few places correction has also been made in the folio number as in folio 25, 26, 27.

Apart from corrections the most distinguishing feature of B is that, chapterisation has been done in this manuscript. The whole manuscript has been divided into three sections and there is a colophon at the end of each section.

1.i.c Special features of the manuscript S

The label page of the Sarasvati Bhavan Library at the beginning of the manuscript mentions the name of the text as Bhāṭṭamatapradīpa though the same is not found anywhere in the manuscript. As stated earlier this manuscript is also not the autograph copy and there is no information about the scribe. The photocopy which was acquired of this manuscript is not very clear especially the first few folios. It creates difficulty in reading the same. The handwriting of the scribe is also not good. This manuscript has also been corrected, however corrections are comparatively very less due to very few

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9 Folio 22B, line no. 4
10 Folio 14A
11 Folio 5B, Folio 34B and folio 42B in the end.
scribal mistakes. Minor mistakes such as elision of the long vowel etc. are very rare. The corrections mostly include supplying of the missing alphabet, however, at a few places there is addition of phrase and line too. Major correction includes the addition of three lines in Folio 38B. However these lines must have been wrongly copied at Folio 39B from where these have been deleted. It has comparatively more punctuation marks such as dots and danda, and they are also found to be apt because of which most of them have been accepted. An important feature of this manuscript is that it is grammatically better than B. For example at Folio 38B line 9, the phrase नान्तीत्वार्थाहर ... has been correctly used, where at the same place, manuscript B has the reading नान्तीत्वार्थाहर ... Similarly, in place of मीमांसा which is seen in B, the present manuscript has the correct reading मीमांसा13. Thus it can be inferred that the scribe of this manuscript is more learned or careful.

The noteworthy feature of this manuscript is that there is no chapterisation throughout the manuscript. Unlike manuscript B, this manuscript is not divided into three chapters each having a colophon at the end. Only one colophon has been used at the end of the text.

1.ii Relation of the two manuscripts

The scribes of both the manuscripts are different. This can be easily known by observation of different handwritings in both the manuscripts. The fact that both the manuscripts have been corrected by different scribe can be known by the same reason. The scribe of manuscript S has relatively made very less scribal mistakes than the scribe of manuscript B. In spite of all the above facts one common feature in both the manuscripts is that, both of them have the same mistakes at many places. Few striking examples of this are: the reading अभ्यासिताच्छेकवलिक्षण14. This reading with the missing letter द is common in both the manuscripts and it has not been corrected by the reviser.

Again in the same folio, we find the reading कल्लभज्ञायण in B and कल्लभबज्ञायण in S. Both are

12 Folio 31A, 38B
13 Folio 30 line 9.
14 Folio 29A line 4 (in B)
scribal mistakes, but the same transpose of the alphabets is worth noting. Similarly, we find the reading नामीकरिण्य

15 with the missing ् य in both the manuscripts at the same place, though the word has been correctly used many a time in the context. And the mistake has not been corrected in both the manuscripts. Sometimes common grammatical mistakes are also observed in both the manuscripts. Like the use of the phrase व्यक्तिक प्राचैरिथ

16 instead of व्यक्तिक, in both the manuscripts. The mistake remains uncorrected. Again in Folio 32A line 8 (in B) the following usage is seen हिरण्यधारणविधिउपवासपारणविधिूगतनविधिशिष्याध्यायादेवु. Here in spite of being a samāsa, sandhi has not been carried out in both the manuscripts. However in B, this has been corrected later as हिरण्यधारणविधुपवास…etc.

From the above observations it seems that both the manuscripts are related in some way other than the fact that they are copies of the same work. The two obvious probabilities may be that, either one is copied from the other or both of them have been copied from the same exemplar. Out of the two, the first probability seems unlikely. This is because of the fact that many passages are missing at many places in both the manuscripts. Manuscript B has additional reading of two lines on folio 7B, one additional line on folio 16A and an additional phrase on folio 40A. It may alternatively be also said that these readings are missing in manuscript S at those respective places. Similarly manuscript S has an additional line on folio 10B which is missing in the manuscript B. Thus it is unlikely that one has been copied from the other. As to the other probability that both the manuscripts have been copied from the same source, this is not so unlikely. However the fact that there is chapterisation along with a colophon after each chapter in B, and absence of the same in S also makes it difficult to substantiate even this option. In the absence of the information about the details of the scribe, the time of copying and the place of copying, a definite conclusion about the relation of the two manuscripts is hard to arrive at, at this stage.

15 Folio 32A line 3 (in B)
16 Folio 18A line 4
1.iii Selection of the vulgate

Considering the special features of both the manuscripts, it is quite clear that with respect to the readings, manuscript S is better out of the two. Manuscript S has less scribal mistakes, on account of which there are comparatively less corrections. The grammatical mistakes are also comparatively less in S with respect to the manuscript B. Another important point with respect to S is that, it has more punctuation marks indicating the end of the sentences. And in most of the cases, these are found to be correct and hence they are also duly accepted. And above all, whenever there is doubt about the reading in manuscript B, manuscript S is helpful in most of the cases for arriving at the correct reading. Thus ideally manuscript S deserves to be considered as the vulgate.

However, even after the above advantages, manuscript S is not considered as the vulgate, but manuscript B is considered as the vulgate. The main reason behind this is the fact that manuscript B is better. Firstly, it is easy to determine the reading with this manuscript. Secondly, even though it has more scribal mistakes, but these have been mostly corrected. No major mistake that cannot be caught by a careful reader has been left uncorrected. Thirdly, though many mistakes in B could be corrected with the help of manuscript S, still because of the disadvantageous appearance of the manuscript S, it can only be read smoothly only when the manuscript B has been read first. Thus the initial reading is provided by the manuscript B.

In comparison to this, manuscript S is not very clear to read. First of all, the handwriting of the scribe is not very good. It takes time to adjust to the style of writing of the alphabets by the scribe. Secondly, the above fact is further aggravated by the poor photocopy of S that is received from the manuscript library. This is especially with respect to the first eight folios which are mostly dark and a little painful to read.

With respect to the above points, manuscript B is accepted as the vulgate as it provides a wholesome and clear reading of the text.
An important discussion with respect to the present manuscripts is with regard to the fact whether the manuscript is complete or incomplete. Though both the copies of the manuscript have colophons at the end, studies of the same reveal that the text is not complete. Manuscript B mentions at folio no 34B इति विधिवाद समाप्त (thus ends (the section dealing with) the theory of injunction) But in the end at folio 42B, it mentions in the colophon इति आख्यातवादेव वाक्यम्भेदापादनवि अभिधान समाप्त (thus begins (the section dealing with) theory of personal suffix) which clearly states that only some portion of the section dealing with ākhyātavāda (theory of personal suffix) is finished, but the whole section is incomplete. This is further supported by the colophon in the manuscript S which states इति आख्यातवादस्तथ (thus begins (the section dealing with) theory of personal suffix). Although this is an unusual colophon since it mentions the beginning of a section rather than the usual custom of mentioning the end, still it clearly indicates that the section dealing with the theory of personal suffix is not complete. Thus both the colophons indicate that there must be more topics which are discussed by the author. Another important fact which must be considered in the present discussion is the similarity of the present text with another text dealing with the same topics. It would be discussed later that the present text bears close resemblance with the text Bhāttarahasya of Khandadeva. This is more visible with respect to the arrangement of the text and the topic. Bhāttarahasya begins with the definition of dharma, then deals with the theory of injunction, then with the theory of personal suffix, and later with meaning of all the cases. The present text also begins with the definition of dharma, then with the injunction, and then it begins with the topic of personal suffix. And the text ends in the middle of discussion on personal suffix or in the beginning of the same (as per the two colophons of mss ‘B’ and ‘S’ respectively). Thus it is quite clear that the text forms a part of a larger scheme originally planned by the author.

In spite of the above facts indicating that the text is incomplete, there are other points which must be considered before arriving at the conclusion. First of all both the manuscripts of the text begin at the same place and also end at the same place. This indicates that the original text/s from which they are copied also had the same expanse.
Secondly, both the manuscripts have colophons indicating the end of the text. Thirdly, although the colophons indicate that there must be more topics to be discussed, still the indication that the present text has ended is quite clear. Manuscript B though indicating that one portion of ākhyātavāda is complete, ends with the traditional use of multiple श्री indicating the completion of the text. Similarly manuscript S clearly states समाप्ति ग्रन्थ: denoting that the text is complete. As to the comparison of the text with another text and also with respect to the colophon pointing towards more parts of the text, it has to be accepted that the original scheme of the author must have been larger than the present text. However, this does not indicate in any way, that the author had indeed written those portions as part of this text or as some other text, since no other copy of the present manuscript having more portions is available, nor is any other text available in the name of the present author. And the most important point in this context is the fact that the author has completed the topic that he has begun. There are no questions which have been raised and not answered in the text by the author.

In the light of the above discussion, it can be said that though the original scheme of the author might have been larger than the present text, there are no proofs to the fact that they were written by the author. Thus, with respect to the topic that it deals with, namely, the whole of dharmalaksana, vidhivāda and the discussion regarding the prime-qualificand in verbal understanding, the present text has completed the discussion and hence it can definitely be said to be complete.
2. The Author of Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā

2.i His Identity:

The benediction of the text mentions the name of the author as Kondadeva. And it mentions the name of his preceptor as Anantadeva. These two facts have to be necessarily accepted by everyone. However, there are certain views regarding the identity of the author of the present text which needs to be looked into.

2.i.a Popular views:

The first instance where the information about the author and the work was first come across was while reading of the Critical Bibliography of Mīmāṃsā named Mīmāṃsakusūmāṇajali written by Umesha Mishra. This is published as an appendix to the popular book Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources by Ganganatha Jha. In this book, Umesha Mishra states, “Kondadeva was the pupil of Anantadeva II and the son of Rangoji Bhatta. The only work of his on Mīmāṃsā known to us is the Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā.”

Umesh Mishra identifies the author of the present text with the renowned author Konda (or Kaunda) Bhatta of the celebrated work Vāvākaranabhāṣana and the vāra.

The New Catalogous Catalogorum (NCC) cites the name of the author as Kondadeva, mentioning him as pupil of Anantadeva, and gives the reference of the entry Kondu Bhatta. Thus, NCC also identifies the author of the text with the celebrated author Kondu/Kaunda Bhatta. Under the entry Kondu Bhatta, NCC mentions the present author as the son of Rangoji Bhatta who is brother of Bhattoji Diksita and who is the author of Advaitacintāmāni, and also states that the author is the pupil of Anantadeva II which is based upon the information got from the present work. NCC mentions the following works under his name:

1. Tarkaratna—a work of Nyāya quoted in padārthadīpikā
2. Padārthadīpikā—a work of Nyāya

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17 Pragnyā Gobudhā Shri Advaitacintāmāni Shri Kānda Kṛṣṇadēva Prapātottādī Bhāṣīlalatadīpikām
18 Pg 58
19 NCC vol V, pg 91
20 ibid pg 92
The present text *Bhāttamatapradīpikā*, is placed under the author Kaunda Bhatta, even by Karl H Potter in his Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies. However, Potter has clearly mentioned the source of his information as the NCC.

2.i.b Source of information

Although all the above sources identify our author with the celebrated author Kondu/Kaunda Bhatta, still there is no indication in the present text to substantiate the claimed view. Nowhere in the present text, including the benediction and the colophons, has the author been called Konda Bhatta. And we do not even get any other information about his father being Rangoji Bhatta. In this light it is important to analyse the sources of the above views.

The first catalogued information of the present work is found in the Catalogus Catalogorum (CC), a monumental work prepared by Theodor Aufrecht. Aufrecht published the CC in three parts. He has mentioned the present manuscript in Part-II of CC published in 1896. Aufrecht has prepared the entries both under the name of the author and the name of the text. Aufrecht notes the name of the author as Kondadeva and the name of the text as *Bhāttamatapradīpikā*. He mentions the source of this information as the catalogue prepared by Peter Peterson (vol VI, pub between 1883-98).

Secondly we find the information regarding the present work in first volume of The Descriptive Catalogue of manuscripts in the Government Sanskrit Library, Sarasvatī.
Bhavana, Benaras, prepared by Gopinath Kaviraj in 1923. This was a list prepared along with the extracts from the manuscript. This is mentioned as a source of information regarding the preceptor of the author by the NCC. Thus this notes down the extract from the manuscript that Anantadeva was the preceptor of Konda Deva. The manuscript on which this information is based has already been procured and included in the corpus of the present thesis (Ms. ‘S’).

Thirdly, we come across the information about the present author in the Critical Bibliography prepared by Umesha Mishra in 1942. Mishra identifies the present author with the celebrated author Koṇḍu Bhāṭṭa. This has already been discussed above. The fact that Mishra mentions the author as Koṇḍadeva, and mentions him as the disciple of Anantadeva II can be traced to the benediction and colophons of the present text. However the source of information regarding the similar identity of Koṇḍadeva and Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa mentioned by Mishra is untraceable i.e. he has not mentioned it.

And, lastly we come across the author’s information in the volume five of the NCC published in 1969, which has also been discussed above. NCC is careful to note the name of the author as Koṇḍadeva and the name of his preceptor as Anantadeva, based on the information from the present text. But NCC also identifies the present author with Koṇḍu Bhaṭṭa, the source of which has not been mentioned by it. It seems that NCC might have consulted the already published Critical Bibliography of Umesh Mishra for the above information.

All other informations in various works such as Potter’s Bibliography etc. which have been published later than the NCC, seem to be based on the NCC only.

From the above information, one finds that it is Umesh Mishra who first identifies the author of the present work with the celebrated author Koṇḍu Bhaṭṭa without mentioning the source of his information. And later we find the same information in NCC and other works.
2.i.e Kondadeva is different from Konda Bhatta

Although Umesh Mishra and NCC identify Kondadeva with Konda Bhatta, still some internal and also external sources do not allow us to draw to this conclusion. A careful analysis of these sources reveals that Kondadeva is different from the celebrated author Konda Bhatta. A point wise analyses of both the internal and external sources in this respect is stated below:

1. In the manuscript, both in the benedictory verse as well as in the three colophons, the name of the author has been mentioned as Kondadeva and not as Kondabhatta. This difference of names cannot be overlooked. Even Umesh Mishra as well as NCC records the name of the author as Kondadeva.

2. At the end of the second section on Vidhivada, the colophon in manuscript B reads thus, i.e. श्रीश्रीपूर्वमण्डलाप्रभुभि परिदर्शन-बद्धूपमण्डलाप्रभुभि कठिनाइकेत् भावम्। This clearly states that Kondadeva is the son of Anantadeva. Thus, he is not Konda Bhatta, the son of Raiagoji Bhatta.

3. Another internal reference is obtained from the manuscript S such as श्रीश्रीपूर्वमण्डलाप्रभुभि परिदर्शन-बद्धूपमण्डलाप्रभुभि कठिनाइ. This states that the text Bhattcilankara has been written by the father of the author of the present text. Bhattcilankara is a famous commentary upon the text Mīmāṃsāyaprakāśa of Āpadeva, written by his son Anantadeva II. Thus here too Anantadeva and not Raiagoji Bhatta, is known as the father of Kondadeva.

4. Konda Bhatta was a very celebrated author of vyakarana (grammar). However the end colophon of both the manuscripts states in agreement i.e. श्रीश्रीपूर्वमण्डलाप्रभुभि परिदर्शन-बद्धूपमण्डलाप्रभुभि कठिनाइ. Here the author declares himself as a neo-mīmāṁsaka. There is no indication throughout the text of the author being a vaiyākarana (grammician).

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24 Folio no 34B
25 Folio no. 10B
26 Refer to the discussion below on Anantadeva I and II.
27 Folio no. 10B
Though this is not something rare in Sanskrit Literature especially in the philosophical literature wherein the same author writes a number of works on different systems without indicating any special inclination, still an absence of any such reference even in the colophon cannot be overlooked especially while deciding the identity of the author.

Thus we find that there is no indication of the present author being the celebrated author Kondu Bhatta, in the text. There are other points too which support the said view and which must be considered in continuation of the above points. They are as follow:

5. P.K. Gode in his paper ‘The Chronology of the works of Kondbhatta’ has mentioned the works of Kondbhatta as mentioned in the Catalogus Catalogorum. In the list of 8 works, the name of the present work is missing. Gode has also showed many cross references of the works of Konda Bhatta in the same paper. Therein too there is no reference to the present work.

6. In all the published works of Konda Bhatta we find the colophon running as रङ्गोजीयक्तिप्रगुण कोण्डभग्नेन (by Konda Bhatta who is the son of Raingoji Bhatta). The mention of his father as Raingoji Bhatta is missing in the present text. On the contrary Anantadeva is mentioned as the father of the author in one of the manuscripts as pointed out earlier.

7. Konda Bhatta in his work vaiyakaranabhuisana has mentioned the names of around eighty five authors including the names of many authors of Purva-Mimarsa, and also the name of Raingoji Bhatta. But he has not stated the name of Anantadeva therein. And any reference to Anantadeva being the preceptor of Konda Bhatta is also missing in the other works of Konda Bhatta. The reference that Anantadeva is the preceptor of Kondu Bhatta which is stated by Umesh Mishra and the NCC is based on the manuscript of this text only. But the name Konda Bhatta is missing in the text.

8. The texts Vaiyakaranabhuisana and Bhattamatapradipikā, both deal with the philosophical aspects of their respective systems. Though the systems are completely different and can be dealt with by the same author, the common points such as the

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29 Part I, pg. 130
prime-qualificand in a verbal understanding, the denotant of the personal suffix etc., which have completely contradictory opinions, require refutations of the views of the other system for their establishment. Such instances where such contradictory views are established by the same author by the refutation of the other’s view, though not improbable are rather rare except for the author such as Vacaspati Miśra who has commented on almost all the systems of philosophy. This is further supported by the benediction in the Vaiyākaranaabhūsana30 which claims that Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa is writing the present work for showing faults in the refutations raised upon the (philosophical) principles of Grammar by the logicians and the mīmāṃsakas.

9. With respect to points 2 and 3 stated above, Koṇḍadeva being the son of Anantadeva belongs to the family wherein all are great mīmāṃsakas beginning from Āpadeva. Thus it seems more probable and suitable for a member of such a family to author the work Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā which deals with technical points of the philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.

In the light of the above points, it seems that we can claim that the identification of Koṇḍadeva with the celebrated author Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa by scholars such as Umesh Mishra and by the NCC seems to be a case of mistaken identity. The above points are clear indication to the fact that the author Koṇḍadeva of the text Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā is different from the famous author Koṇḍa/Kauṇḍa/Koṇḍu Bhaṭṭa.

2.iı Family Lineage of Koṇḍadeva

As pointed out above, manuscript B has the colophon clearly mentioning Koṇḍadeva to be the son of Anantadeva, and manuscript S stating that the work Bhāṭṭalankāra has been authored by the father of Koṇḍadeva. Bhāṭṭalankāra is the famous commentary on the work Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa of Āpadeva written by Anantadeva. Thus, the fact that Anantadeva is the father as well as the preceptor of Koṇḍadeva is evidently clear from the text Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā.

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30... दुष्टिदश भौतिकवैज्ञानिकवृहत्तमयाध्यात्मित्वेऽविशिष्टताः
सिद्धान्ताचल्पतियतिर्भूमिः प्रकटवेत्ता वचोपदेशेऽ। (Verse 4)
Anantadeva (II) : Anantadeva the author of *Bhāṭṭālankāra* is the son of the famous author Āpadeva. This fact has been clearly mentioned in the colophon of his commentary, which says he is the son of Āpadeva. Thus Anantadeva is both, the son of Āpadeva as well as commentator of his work *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*. Other than this commentary, there are many works ascribed to Anantadeva. NCC mentions around thirty works under the authorship of Anantadeva. Most of these are *prayoga* texts (text related to performance of a rite). However there are many other texts too mentioned under his authorship. The most famous amongst them is the *Smṛtikaustubha*. In *smṛtikaustubha*, Anantadeva mentions that he came from a family of Marātha brāhmaṇa and states the family tree up to Ekanātha. This is taken as a source of reference by Edgerton, Umesh Mishra as well as the NCC. As quoted by P.V.Kane, “Anantadeva had a younger brother Jyvadeva whose Gotrapravaraniṇya he draws upon in the Samskārakaustubha”. Kane has also quoted the necessary portion from the said text. Other than the above quoted work, Jivadeva is also credited with the authorship of *Āśaucaṇiṇya* and *Bhāṭṭabhāskara* a work on mīmāṃsā which has been published from Ganganath Jha Research Institute, Allahabad. Views in *Bhāṭṭabhāskara* have been criticised by Khaṇḍadeva in his *Bhāṭṭadīpika*. In addition to *bhāṭṭālankāra*, there are many works related to mīmāṃsā too which have been authored by Anantadeva such as *ākhyaṭāvādanirṇaya*, *phalasāṅkaryakhaṇḍana*, *balābalākṣepaparthāra*, *vākyabhedavāda* or *vicāra*. All of these works on mīmāṃsā other than the *bhāṭṭālankāra* are unpublished so far.

Āpadeva (II) : Āpadeva is known for his celebrated work *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* also called *Āpadevī* which is an introductory text of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. This text is the first introductory text compulsory for any student who wishes to study the science of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in details. Āpadeva in the benedictory verse of his work has saluted Anantadeva as his preceptor. And the colophon of the text mentions Āpadeva as the

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34. *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, pg. 198
36. Ibid. 507.
son of Anantadeva. Thus it is quite clear that Āpadeva is the son as well as student of Anantadeva. Since Āpadeva is the son of Anantadeva, and Āpadeva's son is also named Anantadeva, therefore Āpadeva's father is referred to as Anantadeva I and Āpadeva's son is referred to as Anantadeva II. This method of reference is followed by all the scholars including Umesh Mishra and NCC. NCC mentions under the entry Āpadeva II that he was the son of Anantadeva I, and father of Anantadeva II and Jīvadeva. NCC mentions four texts under his authorship namely bhaktikalpataru, mīmāṃsānīyāyaprakāśa, vedāntasāratvatvadīpikā bālabodhini a commentary on Sadānanda’s vedāntasāra and vaidikalinarthavivecana. Mishra apart from mīmāṃsānīyāyaprakāśa mentions the text adhikaranacandrikā based on Mittra’s manuscript Catalogue, vol. iii, 1911. However this text has been kept under some other Āpadeva by NCC which considers him to be different from Āpadeva II, probably based on the research paper of P.K. Gode establishing the difference of the two authors.

Anantadeva I : Anantadeva I is mentioned as the son of another Āpadeva (i.e. Āpadeva I) by the NCC. For ease of reference, the father of Anantadeva I is referred to as Āpadeva I, and his son the celebrated author of Mīmāṃsānīyāyaprakāśa is referred to as Āpadeva II. Further Anantadeva I is mentioned as the grandson of Ekanātha. This information from Anantadeva II up to Ekanātha is based on the description of the family given by Anantadeva II in his smṛtkaustubha. Mishra states that this Ekanātha is identified as the famous great saint of Maharashtra Sant Ekanātha, by Kashinātha the author of Dharmasindhu. This is based upon the statement of P.V. Kane who mentions the name of the text as viṭṭhalarmmantrasārabhāṣya (folio 37a). This view is also restated by the NCC. But this view is not supported by Franklin Edgerton, who has translated Mīmāṃsānīyāyaprakāśa of Āpadeva in English mostly because only one son named Hari is associated with Saint Ekanātha. Moreover Edgerton thinks that his date would not

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37 Vol. II, pg. 124. (also see next paragraph for the name Āpadeva II)
38 Mishra. pg. 55
40 Vol. I, pg. 165
41 Pg. 2-3. (The text is quoted below.)
43 History of Dharmasastra, Vol. I Part II, pg. 961
44 Introduction, pg. 17
match with our Ekanātha who is expected to be older. NCC mentions ten texts under the authorship of Anantadeva I most of which are related to bhakti of Śrī Kṛṣṇa such as Kṛṣṇakṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇabhartikāvya, Kṛṣṇabhakticandrānāṭaka (pub.), Bhakticandrāk, Bhaktibhāgavataśanāvraha, Bhaktiśata, Bhāgavadbhaktinirnaya (pub.), Bhagavannāmaśaumudīvyākyā (pub.), Manonuraṅjananāṭaka (pub.) and Siddhāntatattva (pub.) with commentary Sampradāyanirupana (pub.).

Āpadeva (I): As to the information about Āpadeva I, we do not know much except for the mention by NCC about him being the father of Anantadeva I and grandfather of Āpadeva II. But Gode has vaguely suggested that the works Adhikaranačandrākā and Smrticandrākā ascribed to Āpadeva may have been the works of Āpadeva I.

This family lineage up to Anantadeva I is rather clear on account of the reference found in the texts of the authors. If further information as given by Mishra and NCC is also incorporated, then the family lineage of Konda would be as follows:

(Saint?) Ekanātha (Maratha brahmaṇa who lived on the bank of Godāvari)

Åpadeva I

Anantadeva I (mentioned in Mīmāṃsāyaṣṭapakāṣa)

Åpadeva II (Mīmāṃsāyaṣṭapakāṣa)

Anantadeva II (Bhāṭṭābhāskara etc.) Jivadeva (Bhāṭṭābhāskara etc.)

Konda

This genealogy is also quoted by P.K. Gode in his paper entitled, 'Āpadeva, the Author of Mīmāṃsāṣṭapakāṣa and Mahāmahopādhyāya Āpadeva, the Author of Adhikaraṇacandrākā and the Smṛticandrākā - are they identical?' based upon the information got from Smṛtikaustubha. It is interesting to read the original verses from the

47 Ibid. pg. 40.
Another interesting fact that indicates affinity of the author Kondadeva with Anantadeva II, Apadeva II and Anantadeva I, is that, all these authors have shown their inclination towards the devotion of Śrī Kṛṣṇa or Lord Viṣṇu. This is probably because of the devotion of the whole family beginning from Ekanātha towards Śrī Kṛṣṇa as has been pointed by the verse in smrṭikaustubha. Anantadeva I has written many texts on the bhakti of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. Apadeva II in his Mīmāṁsāyāyaprakāśa has saluted in the benediction to Govinda and to the ananta(infinite) form of the lord referring to Lord Viṣṇu. And towards the end Apadeva has quoted the verse from Gītā to show the nature of liberation in the philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, which can be achieved by performance of all the actions with a sense of offering to Lord Govinda. Anantadeva II has also praised Śrī Kṛṣṇa both in the benediction and at the end of his work Bhāṭṭālankāra. And our author too has praised Lord Gaṇeṣa and Śrī Kṛṣṇa in the benediction. And the colophon at the end of the manuscript S also mentions Śrīgopīpītiśaṣṭhahṛitam.

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69 Smrṭikaustubha pp 2-3
69 Mīmāṁsāyāyaprakāśa, Pg. 489
50 Ibid. pg. 1 and pg.507.
It is interesting to trace the origin of our author especially with respect to the great family lineage of the ‘Deva’ family all of whom are great authorities both on *Mīmāṃsā* and *Dharmashastra*. However, providing any further corroborative evidence on this family would require an in-depth analysis of all their works most of which lie in the form of manuscript only. This opens up a huge scope for further research in this matter.

2.iii Date of Kondadeva

In accordance with the family genealogy stated above, it is quite clear that Kondadeva is the son of Anantadeva II the author of *bhattalankāra, smrtikausthabha* etc and grandson of Āpadeva II the author of *mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*. In the present text Kondadeva has not given any indication of the time of composition of the text, and there is no information given by the scribe too. Thus date of Kondadeva is mostly dependent on the time of Āpadeva II and also Anantadeva II.

About the time of Āpadeva, too there is not much information. Edgerton assumes Āpadeva to exist in the early part of the seventeenth century. His assumption is based on the criticism of the view of Āpadeva and its commentary *bhattalankāra* by Khandadeva who is stated to have died at Benaras in 1665 A.D. by his pupil Sambhubhatta NCC though not stating the date of Āpadeva directly, seems to echo the same view by indicating under the said entry the time of Anantadeva I as C. 1575 A.D. and the time of Anantadeva II as C. 1662 A.D. who are Āpadeva’s father and son respectively. Gode too, in his paper, about Āpadeva which has been stated above, does not state much about his date except for quoting P V. Kane who arrives at the same date on the basis of the date of Anantadeva who thrived in the third quarter of the 17th century. Other texts such as Potter’s Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy etc. are just reiteration of the same view.

As far as Anantadeva is concerned we can certainly arrive at some conclusive date. Anantadeva has himself mentioned his protege as Baz Bahadur. It is on behest of his...
protégé that Anantadeva composed *Smrtikaustubha*. Baz Bahadur ruled over Almora and Nainital from 1638 to 1678 A.D. P.V. Kane stating the said fact has established the date of Baz Bahadur by citing the Imperial Gazetteer of India. Gazetteer cites the names of ancestors of Anantadeva which are also cited in the *Smrtikaustubha*. P.V. Kane also points out on the basis of the Gazetteer that, Baz Bahadur introduced a poll tax in 1672, the proceeds of which he remitted to Delhi as tribute. To quote P.V. Kane, "Therefore Anantadeva must have been patronized by Baz Bahadur between 1645 and 1675 A.D." Kane has pointed out another estimation of the date of Anantadeva. Saint Ekanāṭha finished his Marathi Bhāgyvata at Benaras in Śaka 1495 and Vikrama Sarīvat 1630 i.e. 1573 A.D. According to *Smrtikaustubha*, Anantadeva represented fourth generation from Ekanath. Thus with an estimate of twenty five years for each generation, ‘Anantadeva should have been a grown up man in 1673 A.D’. Another indication of this date is the citation of Nirṇayasindhu (which was composed in 1611-12) in Āśaucanirnaya by Jivadeva who is younger brother of Anantadeva. Thus Anantadeva is assigned to the third quarter of the seventeenth century. This same period is also accepted by Gode who quotes Kane. Umesh Mishra also states the period of Anantadeva as the middle of seventeenth century. NCC has also accepted the same view and basically states the same reason as stated above.

Thus with respect to these external evidences, Koniḍadeva can be said to have flourished after the third quarter of seventeenth century which is the date of Anantadeva. In other words, the end of the seventeenth century to the beginning of eighteenth century may be said to be the date of Koniḍadeva. This date can also be supported by certain internal evidences.

Koniḍadeva has quoted many authorities in *Bhāṭmatapradipikā*. Amongst the list which would be provided later, his contemporary author is Anantadeva whom he mentions to be

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54 Ibid. (1975) vol. I, pp. 961-62
57 Ibid.
58 Printed along with *Smrtikaustubh*, pg. 582 line 16.
59 Vol. II, pg. 46
60 Pg. 55
his teacher and father. About the date of Anantadeva we have already discussed above. Further, Koṅḍadeva has criticized the views of Koṅḍadeva at one place by clearly stating the name of his text rahasya\(^{62}\) i.e. bhāttatantararahasya or simply bhāṭtarahasya. Koṅḍadeva is said to have authored three texts namely Mimāṃsākaustubha, Bhāṭṭadīpikā and Bhāṭtarahasya in the same order. Koṅḍadeva has criticized the views of Bhāṭṭālaṅkāra at many places in his Bhāṭṭadīpikā which is pointed out in its commentary Prabhāvalī\(^{63}\) which is written by Śambhūbhāṭṭa, his student. Koṅḍadeva has also criticized the views stated in bhāṭtabhāṣkara of Jivadeva as pointed out in Prabhāvalī\(^{64}\). Date of Koṅḍadeva can be arrived at by many sources. Prime amongst them is the statement of his student Śambhūbhāṭṭa\(^{65}\) who records the date of death of Koṅḍadeva as 1665 A.D. in Benaras. Another evidence as pointed out by A. Subrahmanya Sastri in his elaborate introduction of Bhāṭṭatantararahasya, is the declaration made in Śaka 1579 (i.e.1657 A.D.) in the muktimaṇḍapa of Kāśī, wherein a large number of scholars of that period gathered to decide on some important matter of dharmaśāstra. This declaration has been signed by Koṅḍadeva too. Gode too has arrived at the date of Koṅḍadeva in his paper entitled ‘Chronology of the works of Koṅḍadeva’\(^{66}\). He states the date of death of Koṅḍadeva as mentioned by Śambhūbhāṭṭa, and he also records the signature of Koṅḍadeva in 1657 A.D, both of which have been discussed above. In addition to this, Gode has mentioned the date of two manuscripts of Bhāṭṭadīpikā and Mimāṃsākaustubha as 1641 A.D. and 1660 A.D. respectively. On the basis of these evidences period of Koṅḍadeva is decided as 1600-1665 A.D. Koṅḍadeva was a contemporary of Anantadeva whom he criticizes, and he has been criticized by our author Koṅḍadeva. Thus Koṅḍadeva must be later than 1665 A.D.

\(^{62}\) इति भाट्टप्रक्रिया सत्वेशिस्ता । तदहस्यकाले प्रवृत्तेःतु ... इति आध्यात्मम् - Pg.172 (from the text)

\(^{63}\) Pg. 130, 458,735 etc.

\(^{64}\) Pg. 198

\(^{65}\) Bhāṭṭadīpikā with prabhāvalī, pg. 999.

Thus, both the external and internal evidences point towards the date of Koṇḍadeva as late seventeenth century to early eighteenth century, which may probably be stated as 1675-1725 A.D.

2.iv Works of Koṇḍadeva

Considering the above family lineage of Koṇḍadeva and the works authored by the members of his family, it is more likely that more works on Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and especially dharmāśāstra may have been penned by our author. However, presently only one work which is the present text Bhāttamatapradīpikā is known as being composed by Koṇḍadeva. A brief summary of the same is presented in the next section.
3. **Summary of the Text**

The text *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā* begins with the customary benediction in two verses. First in the form of salutation to Lord Ganesa and Lord Kṛṣṇa followed by salutation to the revered teacher named Anantadeva. The purpose of the text is mentioned as the delight of the learned along with the statement of name of the author and the work as Kōṇḍadeva and *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā* respectively. Second in the form of prayer of protection towards the *Dharma* which is established in the twelve chapters/parts such as *pramāṇa*(means of knowing), *bheda*(varieties) etc.

*Dharma* has been stated by Jaimini in his work *dvādaśalaksana* (lit. having twelve chapters, i.e. *mīmāṃsādarśana*) as it is the aim of human existence.

Kōṇḍadeva(K.) after the said statement directly begins the denial of *adharma* also being the object of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (PM). He proves this through the statement of Vijñāneśvara made in the commentary *śūkṣāra* upon *Yajñavalyasmrți* specifically stating only *dharma* to be its object and thereby making classifications of only *dharma* and not *adharma*. Moreover *adharma* is shown as not forming any part of the twelve chapters. And the discussion of *adharma* in few chapters is justified by K. as being only contextual.

Next there is refutation of the view of the Vaiśeṣika who accepts the unseen that is produced by *yāga* etc. as *dharma* along with establishment of only *yāga* etc. as *dharma* by providing quotations from *Veda*, *smṛti* as well as *śūra* of Jaimini. A very short but interesting discussion about the *smṛti* ‘*dharmah kṣaruti kīrtanāti*’ is seen wherein the meaning ‘destruction’ which is generally associated with the root *kṣar* and based on which the Vaiśeṣikas support their view, is denied.

Next K. discusses the nature of *dharma*. K. simply defines *dharmanvā* as the state of action which is enjoined or simple the state of being enjoined. Similarly, *adharmanvā* is defined as the state of prohibited action or simply the state of being prohibited. K.

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67 For details see Contribution of Kōṇḍadeva.
has specifically shown that the instruments of dharma and adharma are not dharma and adharma, and therefore the problem of non-application of the definition of dharma and adharma in milking of cow and giving of silver does not arise at all. An interesting statement of K. in this respect is that those items which are prohibited in a sacrifice such as silver etc. do not denote any kind of anīṣṭasādhanatā, but their absence denotes the instrumentality towards the fruit of the sacrifice. K. also states that though subsidiaries are not dharma directly but they form the part of discussion of PM because they are instruments of dharma.

Then K. elaborates the definition vihitatvā (the state of being prescribed) as having ēśtasādhanatā which is different from the help of the rite which is made known by the injunction (vidhi-bodhitā-kratāpārakārābhinna-ēśtasādhanatākatvam) or it is the state of being the performance prescribed by the injunction(vidhi-anuṣṭṭāpyatvam). This is to avoid the application of the definition of dharma to speaking of lies in marriage etc. A similar elaboration is also provided for nisīddhatvā (the state of being prohibited) as having the anīṣṭasādhanatva which is made known by the prohibition or it the objecthood of aversion produced by restrain (nivartanā) understood by prohibition. This is to avoid the over-application of the definition of adharma to the acceptance of the sōdasin etc.

Next K. discusses the word vidhi occurring in the definition of dharma. This is initiated to avoid the application of the said definition to the worldly action of earning wealth and eating of poison, because they are also known by worldly injunctions and prohibitions. Therefore, he offers various options for the word vidhi to denote Veda, then to denote the sentences of the Veda etc. Finally, he settles on the meaning apauruseyavākyā (sentence which are devoid of any human agency) to be denoted by the word vidhi. But still there is over-application in sentences such as agnirhīmasya bhesajam (fire is cure for cold) which do not denote dharma. Hence K. defines the next word bodhitatvam occurring in the definition as ajñāta-jñāpitatvam i.e. making known that which is unknown. This avoids any kind of over-application in the said case.
A question is raised about the over-application of the said definition of dharma in the syena sacrifice. This leads to the next big discussion about the dharmatva/adharmatva of the syena sacrifice. K does not accept the dharmatva of syena etc. by stating that the dharmatva of syena etc. is denied by the word artha occurring in the second vītra of Jaimini such as codenālaksanah arthah dharmah, which defines dharma. Another view supporting the dharmatva of syena and regarding only its fruit which is of the form of violence as adharma is also refuted by referring to (Parthasārathi) Misra who specifically states that the word artha has been used for the purpose of denying the dharmatva of syena. The same logic is also applied to all the actions that have violence etc. as its purpose because the volition of violence pervades the volition of the rite on account of which even the volition of rite becomes evil (anartha).

Next K refutes the views of some (probably Khandadeva(Kh)) who while accepting the dharmatva of syena on the basis of its being enjoined, also accepts adharmatva of it on account of the postulated prohibition based on the sentence of the smṛti such as ‘paras otsadānā tham vat tat tānasamudāhṛtam which censures such action which is aimed at destruction of the others. K states the redundancy of postulation of prohibition when the censure is possible by an already established prohibition (na humśāt sarvabhūtāṇi). This is also supported by the fact that there is no usage of the term dhārmika (righteous lit. one who performs dharma) for a person who performs abhcāra in the world. Thus, it is not possible to accept dharmatva contrary to the worldly usage. This discussion is further elaborated and K states that actually there is no prescription by the said injunction, in the whole context. He corroborates this by quoting all the verses related to the tāmasa actions from the related context.

The above discussion is continued further by refutation of another view wherein inclination towards syena is justified by defining the term artha as balavadanistānānubhīdānā in which balavattva is defined as dvesautkatya (powerful aversion) which is again said to be dependent on the previous actions. K is of the opinion that there is in fact no inclusion of that balavattva the nature of which includes something greater, but there is only inclusion of powerful
dislike which is accompanied by past impression. Therefore, although the dislike/aversion towards the sin of abhicāra and towards the enemy is alike, still a person is inclined for the annihilation of the enemy. And the other who is inclined towards non-violence, is seen as inclined towards removal of the sin.

The discussion is turned towards the optional acceptance of the sodasin. The injunction of acceptance as well the prohibition of acceptance, both of these are prescribed by the Vedic sentences. Since the prohibition of acceptance would establish the adharmatva of sodasin, therefore, mīmāṁsakas such as Kh. accept the generation of fruit even in case of completion of the sacrifice without the sodasigrahana, and in addition to that they postulate greater fruit/result in case of acceptance of sodasin in order to justify inclination towards it. This has been refuted by K. with many logical arguments. Further any kind of similarity of the said situation with the option of yava and vṛihi is also denied by K.

Lastly, K. discusses the denial of dharmatva of the knowledge of brahman which is known by the sentences of the upanisad such as tarati śokam ātmavid. This is denied on account of absence of both the state of being enjoined as well as the absence of actionhood in them, as they state only that which is already established(siddha) and hence they fall under the category of sentences such as agnirhimasya bhesajam. The dharmatva of the knowledge of emancipation in the view of logicians is also denied as it does not speak of anything that is unknown, but it only expresses the obtainment of emancipation in a fixed order. However K. supports the view of dharmatva of knowledge, in the view of a few mīmāṁsakas who explain emancipation as the result produced by the combination of both knowledge and action. In such cases there would be a possibility of the state of being enjoined by the injunction(vidhividheyatva) of the knowledge which is established by the injunction of study. Hence there would be no harm in accepting dharmatva in them. As to the views of some who add the adjective kṛitisādhyatva in order to deny the dharmatva in the brahman defined by the logicians in the sūtra dukkhajunnapravṛtti... etc., K. refutes such view by showing that even by the addition of the adjective, the fault

68 For details see Contribution of K.
would still persist as in that case there would still be *krtisādhyatva* with respect to the action of worship (*upāsanā*) etc. that is related to such brahman.

With this the first section dealing with the definition of dharma is discussed completely. As a continuation of the same, K. begins the next section dealing with the theory of injunction (*vidhivāda*).

K. raises the question as to what is that *vidhi* which makes know the *istāsādhana*, to which he answers as, *vidhi* is that by the knowledge of which produced by the *lin*, there is inclination of a person.

The whole purpose of the question and answer is to discuss that which is known by the *vidhi*. K. begins by stating the view of the old-logicians who accept *istāsādhana*, *balavadanistānamubandhitā* and *krtisādhyatā*, all the three as the meaning of *vidhi*, similar to the word *puspavantau* which denotes both the sun and the moon. This view is supported by the logicians by showing individual examples wherein the absence of one of them results in non-production of inclination. All of them are said to be present in the injunction of *darsapūrnamāsa*. But this view is denied by the neo-logicians. Neo-logicians argue that the knowledge of *balavadanistānamubandhitva* is not the cause of inclination, but the knowledge of *anubandhitva* is the obstacle in the production of inclination, and the absence of the same is the cause of inclination. Hence it need not be accepted as the meaning of *lin*. Similarly the meaning *krtisādhyatva* is also denied as it can be known automatically by the consideration of the relation of the verbal root and the volition. Thus in the view of the neo-logicians, only *istāsādhana* is the meaning of *lin*.

The neos show construction of various sentences including the prohibitive sentence wherein prohibition is also accepted as the meaning of *lin* which is indicated by the negative particle in the sentence.

This view is refuted by the statement, that the view where the meaning of *lin* is accepted as inducement (*pravartanā*) is even better. This is the view of the *mīmāṃsaka* (*mīm.*). Here K. states all the points related to the particular view of the *mīm.*
The statement is supported by showing that even in the views of neo-logicians at least five understandings (vyutpatti) are accepted with respect to different sentences.

The mīmāṁsakas support their view that inducement is the meaning of īn by showing the usage such as ‘I do this being induced by this injunction’ in case of inducement by the injunction.

Then the fact that, in the view of the mīm. there is only one kind of understanding in different sentences is shown, in which there is construction of the meaning of īn in the volition, by different relations.

The construction of the meaning of īn in the volition is supported by the smṛti of the Nirukta such as bhāvapradhānamākhyaḥ. The same is also said to be the reason for acceptance of prime-qualificandness of bhāvanā.

Then the relation prayojyatva said while stating the construction, is elaborated in order to avoid the usage of īn in cases where the inclination is already present.

Next K. states that although pravartanā is the meaning of īn, still pravartanātva is not the delimiter, but the delimiter of the expressed is said to be vyāpāratva (function-hood). This is said as a special class common to both the worldly and Vedic inducement which is indicated by the usage ‘this inclination is produced by inducement, and not this’.

Then the verbal understanding is elaborated in the view of the mīm. The initial understanding is of the form ‘the volition in one having function’. Later, when there is enquiry into the relation, then by gradual understandings, one leading to the other, there is understanding of both the kṛtisādhyatva and iṣṭasādhanatva by the inference. All these being known by different means, therefore both the desire of the inducer and the relation are not accepted as being denoted by the word. The same process is also shown in case of the Vedic injunction wherein too, the iṣṭasādhanatva is known by inference based on decision of āptatva (being reliable). In this context āptatva is defined in such a manner that it is equally applicable to the world as well as the Veda.
All the views of the mīm. are stated till here. Upon this, the neo-logicians deny all the views of the mīm. almost in the same order of their statement. These are later again refuted by K. and all the views are justified and established. Thus we find that the whole of the section on Vidhi is in the form of statement-refutation-refutation of the refutation between the mīm. and the neo-logician, wherein many arguments are put forth sometimes by logic and sometimes by the quotation of the smṛti.

The neo-logicians refute the claim made by the mīm. that there is establishment of pravarttanā on the basis of the usage. For this they show that, even when there is usage of a sentence devoid of lin such as ‘this is your istsādhanā’ by the King, even then there is the usage said earlier such as ‘being induced by the King, I do this’. Similarly, there is inducement of a person such as potter by looking at all necessary materials brought by the other person even without the use of words (lin etc.). But istsādhanatā forms the part of necessary material for inclination. Hence, istsādhanatā is the expressed meaning and pravarttanā is obtained by other means (i.e. inference).

Next the neo-logician refutes the view that both are equally placed and optionally one can be accepted as expressed and the other as known by inference. He establishes the prominence of istsādhanatā by stating that in cases when a person is self-inclined without any words of the other, there the inclination is seen to be produced by the knowledge of istsādhanatā and not by the knowledge of pravarttanā. And also it is easier to infer pravarttanā by the istsādhanatā than by discussion of āptatva which is cumbersome.

Next, the neos refute the explanation by the mīm. of the same form of understanding of the injunction and the prohibition by resorting only to the difference of relation. This is denied on the basis of its being against the experience. The doubt regarding the presence of the volition of cooking belonging to the present time and its absence in Caitra, is automatically removed upon listening to the sentences caitrah pacati and caitrah na pacati. This doubt will not be removed by the understanding having the same form, which has different relations dependent of some other means. This cannot even be justified by the different co-utterances, since each co-utterance would
produce a definite relation. And these different relations, forming a part of delimiter of the effect, would also cause different understandings. Moreover it would also lead to the abandonment of acceptance of different understandings in sentences such as caitraha pasyati, castram pasyati, caitrena pasyati etc. And in addition to that, in cases such as pacet this would lead to non-cessation of doubt such as 'it is inducing or repelling?', but it would only lead to the understanding that 'the volition is one with function'. And upon the question 'the volition is of what kind?', both the answers such as pacet and na pacet would be correct, which is again against the explanation in the text such as tantravārttika etc which accepts repeller-ness as the meaning of nañ. And the sentence na pacet having the same form of injunction is against the experience of anybody.

Next K while carrying forward the refutations by the neo-logicians which concern about the qualificandness of bhāvanā towards the vidhi, enters into an altogether different aspect of the same. K begins the discussion by refuting the views of some (probably mīm such as Kh) who refute bhāṭṭālankāra, a work by the father of K, by stating that bhāṭṭālankāra accepts the verbal understanding having vidhi as qualificand and bhāvanā as qualifier. They refute this view by citing the statement of the Nirukta such as bhavapradhānamākhyātam. K tries to justify the statement in bhāṭṭālankāra by pointing out that the said statement is meant to show that the smṛtībhāvapradhānamākhyātām must be interpreted such that it shows that bhāvanā is prime with respect to the verbal-root, because in cases such as jānāti, nāśyati etc. where there is no bhāvanā, the construction of present tense is accepted in the verbal-root.69

K starts another discussion by stating that even in jānāti, nāśyati etc there is no construction of the present tense into the verbal-root, but into the bhāvanā only. For this he states that bhāvanā is not volition, but it is that which is delimited by the state of verbal-suffix. Thus in jānāti it denotes locusness and in nāśyati it denotes counter-positiveness. Then K shows the relation by which the construction takes place both in jānāti as castruvṛtti-varttamānakālīna-jñānīyatva and in nāśyati as svavṛtti-
utpattika-nāśiyatva. But this is refuted by stating that acceptance of the construction of the present tense into locus-ness would lead to the contingency of usage of jānāti even before the occurrence of the knowledge. To solve this another option is put forth in which the construction of present time is said to take place in the locusness which is qualified by the verbal-root. K. proceeds to show that this would lead to the contingency of accepting of difference regarding the understanding of the construction of time between pacati and jānāti.

K. demonstrates the above said contingency discussing many concepts in between. It is stated that according to the view of the old, in case of pacati, only one whole volition beginning from the first effort and ending at production of the fruit, is accepted wherein the material time is said to be construed. Whereas according to the neo, any volition out of the many efforts, is fit to be construed with the present time which is again defined as the time which is not separate from the time of utterance of the said volition. K. goes on to show elaborately that acceptance of time which is not separate from the time of utterance would only cause the contingency of non-clearance of doubt regarding presentness, because the time of the question and the answer would also vary, causing the contingency that something else was asked and something else is being answered. And in both the views of the old and the neo, in case of pacati there is no construction of the time into the volition qualified by the verbal-root, but it is construed into pure volition. And in case of jānāti, it is said to be construed into volition qualified by the verbal-root. Thus the difference in understandings (vyutpatti) is quite clear.

K. concludes the above discussion and returns to the original discussion by stating that, if the present time is construed with locusness etc., then there would be no cessation of the doubt regarding the presentness of knowledge etc. Thus there is no rule of the present time being qualifier to bhāvanā. This is equally applicable to the voice such as ātmanepada. Hence, it is construed indirectly through the fruit or agent thereby not affecting the prime-qualificandness of bhāvanā. Therefore, the smṛti bhāvapradhānamākhyam does not state the qualificandness of bhāvanā towards all the elements of the verbal suffix. Here K. has elaborately discussed the interpretation

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of the said smrti and said that a meaning which is in agreement with the other smrti such as tayos’tu prayayah pradhānyena must be said And moreover, the bhāvanā (= arthabhāvanā) is said to be the purpose of the vidhi (= sādhibhāvanā), and there is a general rule that the purpose is construed into the bhāvanā. And another fact is that, there is a general rule in PM that only cases (kārokas) can be construed into action (bhāvanā). But vidhi is not a case therefore it cannot be construed into bhāvanā. On the contrary, vidhi is not an action, therefore bhāvanā can be construed into it. Therefore, K. explains that the statement in the bhāttālankāra only meant to state that vidhi cannot be a qualifier in the bhāvanā by any means and not for establishing the understanding having bhāvanā as qualifier and vidhi as qualificand.

Coming back to the refutation by the logicians, K. raises the objection that even the said relation (i.e., sva-prayojyatva) which was stated by the mūn, is not possible. This is so because of the maxim that all the injunctions do not induce towards their own objects, but the function of inducement is performed only by the prime injunction. And this is equally applicable to the qualified injunctions such as somena yajeta etc. Thus in such cases of subsidiary injunctions, qualified injunctions etc. the prayojyatva must either be accepted as the same or as different. Both these options are refuted. If the prayojyatva is accepted as same then once induced by the prime injunction, one cannot be induced again by the subsidiary injunction. Moreover, if the subsidiary injunctions induce independently, then there won’t be possibility of any kind of order in their performance. And it would also contradict the apakarsa and utkarsa of the subsidiaries according to the injunctions indicating the same manner of performance, when there is an extension of them in the other rite. And the second option of the prayojyatva being different is also denied on the logical ground that, if it is different, then there should be acceptance of that as the relation. Here K. also discusses the topic as to why there is no inducement by the subsidiary injunction, although they have the nature of being the inducer, i.e., they have lm in them. K. states that the inducement which is heard in the sentences of the subsidiary injunctions is restatement of the inducement known by the prime injunction. Even the reinstated prayojyatva can enter into the relation. Thus the logicians state that, the instigation
which distinguishes the bhāvānā, it is not possible for it to enter into the purview of relation

Next there is refutation of the inclusion of the inference of īstasādhanatā in the relation Prayojyatva is defined by the mīm as svājnānajanya-īstasādhanatānumitt- janyatva This is defined in this particular manner by the mīm, in order to avoid the use of the expression pacet when the action of cooking is already in progress But the logicians doubt as to, how can there be the usage of the term even before the production of the inference Moreover, how is it possible to state the construction of the vidhi in the bhāvānā having the said relation imbibed with īstasādhanatānumitt which is impossible in various cases, such as where there is no use of the verb, where the injunction is derived from the mantra, where the relation is established with the fruit which is derived from the arthavāda or where the expectancy is fulfilled by the extension

Thus K concludes the refutations by the logicians by stating that, neither pravarttana is the meaning of īn, nor is it construed in the bhāvānā and nor is there the relation which is imbibed with īstasādhanatānumitt Since īstasādhanatā cannot be obtained by any other means, therefore, it is said to be vidhi

Hereafter, K begins the refutation of the view of logicians and accords the justification of the view of the mīm

First of all, K justifies that īstasādhanatā is not the meaning of īn, by showing the positive and negative relation In some cases, even when there is use of the expression ‘this is your īstasādhana’, the inclination is not seen unless the verbal form with īn is used Similarly, in other cases even when the īn is used, still there is expectancy of the word īstasādhana Moreover, when the fruit is co-uttered with the word kāma such as svargakāma, then even without the use of īn, the volition having that as the purpose is known, thereby also making known the īstasādhanatā Thus because of the above positive and negative correlation and because of being obtained by other means, īstasādhanatā is not the meaning of īn
And if \textit{istaśādhanatā} is accepted as the meaning of \textit{liṅ}, then the prime injunction won’t be able to establish the co-performance of all the main sacrifices since \textit{istaśādhanatā} of each one would be known separately.

K. out of the present context shows the procedure of establishment of co-performance in the view of the \textit{mīm}. The \textit{mīm.} accepts four functions of the \textit{vidhi} which are \textit{upatti, viniyoga, adhikāra} and \textit{prayoga}. In case of obtainment of any of them from some other source, the \textit{vidhi} performs the other functions. And in case of non-obtainment of any function, the \textit{vidhi} performs all the four functions. Thus even when the main sacrifices are already established by their injunctions, the prime injunction can still establish the co-performance. But the same is not possible for the logicians. Hence in the view of the logicians, sentences such as \textit{piirnamasyd\textit{m pūrumāsyā} vajeta} become redundant as it conveys no particular \textit{istaśādhanatva} or qualified \textit{istaśādhanatva} or the unseen of the group of sacrifice or the procedure.

Thus K. concludes that \textit{vidhi} is \textit{pravarttanā}. And the delimiter of the state of of being the expressed meaning is the \textit{pravarttanāta} which has the nature of being favourable/conducive to inclination\textit{(pravrtti)}. K. denies the fact that the inclination is something that lies outside the purview of \textit{vidhi}. Here K. enters into an interesting discussion as to what is denoted by inclination. First he points out that all the volitions are expressed by \textit{pravrtti} because with respect to any one amongst all of them, the expression \textit{vajāti} is used. But he denies this and states that only the first volition is expressed by inclination, because only after that, there is usage such as \textit{‘he is inclined}. And it is also said that \textit{‘he is inclined hereafter’}. And this is also supported by the \textit{adhikarana} of \textit{PM} in the ninth chapter, where the word \textit{āreṃbha} has been discussed, which is explained as denoting the inclination of the non-inclined. However at the end of the discussion, K. states his own view that inclination which is the meaning of the verbal-suffix is actually the \textit{vovō\textit{sankalpa)} having the form \textit{‘this must be done by me for such result’}, which makes known all the volitions\textsuperscript{70}. And therefore, even the view of Prabhākara that \textit{vidhi} denotes \textit{kartavyatā} is also justified.

\textsuperscript{70} For detail see Contribution of K.
K. further elaborates and states that, even when the elder person does not use any word to express his desire, even then the observer is inclined just by reflection upon the knowledge of *istāsādhanaḥ*, and both of them believe that, the person is inclined by the inducement of the elder. Few example of this has been stated by K. as the forest dwelling of ŚrīRama, and the acceptance of celibacy of Bhiṣma. K. quotes a verse from the Bhāgavata to show that this kind of inclination is also praised in the world. The inducement which accepts as its object the inclination, automatically accepts only that inclination which is with some fruit. Thus there is no need of inference of the fruit. K. gives out many examples, where there is no need of inference and still the particular thing is known, like the establishment of God which needs no special means of knowing because the agenthood of any common man towards an effect such as the earth etc. is automatically contradicted. Similarly in the usage ‘bring water by the pot’, the fact that the pot must be without a hole is automatically known because of incapability of the pot with hole towards the said action. K. gives many examples from PM too. And therefore, the four fold function of the *vidhi* is accepted. In contrast, if the inclination is accepted as not being one with the *vidhi*, but in the manner of being generated from the inference of *istāsādhanaḥ* then the fourfold usage of *vidhi* would be failed.

Next K. states another important point regarding the consideration of *āpaṭatva*. It was stated earlier that the *mīm.* define *āpaṭatva* in such a manner that it is equally applicable to the world as well as to the Veda. Considering the *āpaṭatva* in Veda, there is inference of the *istāsādhanaḥ*. This is accepted by the neo-*mīm.* such as Kh. But it is denied by K. who states that knowledge is accepted as self-valid by the *mīm.* The consideration of *āpaṭatva* only arises when there is doubt regarding the validity of the speaker. But in case of the Veda, there cannot be any such doubt as it has not been spoken by any person. Therefore, K. states that it is a surprise to assume *āpaṭatva* for inference of *istāsādhanaḥ*, in case of Vedic sentences.

Hereafter, K. discusses in length about various aspects of the *smṛti-bhāva-vrddhāṇa-mākhya-tam*. He begins by accepting the earlier stated view that the said *smṛti* is not meant for stating the qualificandness of *bhāvanā* towards all the
meanings of the verbal-suffix. But the said *smṛti* must be read along with the next *smṛti* - *sattvapradhānāni nāmāni; tadyatrobe bhāvapradhāne bhavataḥ*. In a sentence where both the nominal word and verbal form are present, there the verbal suffix is prime. The primeness is accepted as the qualificandness. Thus, all the meanings of the nominal words through the cases are construed into the *bhāvanā*. Similarly objects such as *vṛīhi* also are construed in the *bhāvanā* by the manner of being related to the *cara* which is instrument of the sacrifice which is an instrument of the *bhāvanā*.

K. next discusses the function performed by the *smṛti- bhāvapradhānāmākhyātam*. He denies the fact that the *smṛti* makes one know something that was unknown. But, for him, it performs the function of restricting. In a sentence such as *caitrah pacati*, the logician accepts the understanding having the meaning of verbal-suffix as qualifier and Cāтра as qualificand, but the *mīm.* accepts the understanding having Cātra as qualifier and the meaning of verbal-suffix as qualificand. In such cases, the said *smṛti* restricts the sentence meaning according to the second view. Since it has the function of restricting only, therefore, it does not produce an understanding in case of *jānāti* etc. which is against the experience, as stated earlier. But in cases such as *pacati* where according to the Grammarians verbal-root denotes action and the suffix denotes the case, and according to the *mīm.* verbal-root denotes case and the suffix denotes action, there in agreement with another *smṛti - tayostu pratayah prādhāmyena*, the said *smṛti* restricts the view according to the *mīm.*

In the same manner K. also states the purpose of the *smṛti- sattvapradhānāni nāmāni* as restriction. In answer such as ‘*Caitrah*’ stated upon the question, ‘who is his son?’, there is availability of two understandings such as one having as qualificand the action which is supplied by *astīr bhavanti parah*, and other having as qualificand the meaning of the nominal stem. In such cases, the said *smṛti* restricts the understanding according to the second view. And it does not state the qualificandness of nominal-meaning in words ending in accusative case etc. The fact that such nature of prescribing what was unknown of the *smṛti bhāvapradhānāmākhyātam* is stated only

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71 For details see Contribution of K.
to the others who accept the meaning of locusness and counter-positiveness in jānāti and naśyati respectively.

As a contextual discussion, K. explains that actually in the view of the mīm. there is no secondary implication of locusness etc. in jānāti etc. But, on account of there not being any possibility of the instrumentality etc. of the verbal-root denoting knowledge etc. being construed into the general function denoted by the suffix, the construction is accepted with the relation of non-difference which generates the understanding such as, ‘the function which is indifferent from the action of knowledge, resides in Caitra. K. states that this view is supported in the āṛtтика and in the pyāyasudhā. A similar understanding is generated even in the case of ghato naśyati. A doubt is raised as to how can destruction being something non-existent, reside in the pot. This is justified by quoting the six stages as stated in the Nirukta, wherein destruction is counted as something which is existent(bhāva-vikāra). K. states the verbal understanding as generated in case of both jānāti and naśyati. In this way, there would be no need to accept counter-positiveness as the meaning of verbal-suffix in naśyati, but general function is accepted as its meaning which is also in agreement with the source text, and which is also the meaning in all the other verbal forms. K. states that, by this, many contingencies which are contradictory to the experience would be avoided, such as the inclusion of both the destruction as well its production in the relation in the construction of the present time into bhāvanā said earlier, or the acceptance of actionhood in the locusness and the counter-positiveness in order to construe cases such as instrumental into it. In the view of the Bhāṭṭa, the meaning of verbal suffix which is a function is itself accepted as action, thus the construction of cases is possible in it.

K. raises another opposition stating that in case of acceptance of vyāpāra as the meaning even in jānāti and naśyati, for questions such as ‘the function of destruction residing in pot belongs to which time?’ ‘the function of knowledge residing in Caitra belongs to which time?’ there would be a contingency of the answers ‘ghato naśyati’ and ‘caitro jānāti’ respectively. K. strongly denies such contingencies stating that these are possible only for those who are deeply attached to the language of the neo-
logicians and who do not consider the opinions of the other śāstras. With this denial, K. goes on to explain the whole process of understanding according to the views of the grammarians.

The grammarians do not accept the word bhāvanā or kriyā as a synonym of verbal-suffix, nor do they accept kṛdanta or karana as synonyms of instrumental case-ending. This is because of the reason that the word bhāvanā denotes something which is in an established state, whereas action denotes the contrary. The same is also true for case-ending and the word karana etc., because words denoted by the kṛt suffix acts like a substance. Therefore, when asked ‘the instrumentality(karanatva) lies in what?’, there cannot be the answer ‘dandaṇa’, because there would be contrariness of the established state(siddhayavastha) and the establishing state(sadhyavastha) in the question and answer respectively. Similarly, the question raised earlier with respect to vyāpāra being in a different state, would not accept the answer jānati, naivyati etc. which is in another state.

Another logic is put forth to support the contingency stated above. The question and answer must have similar form by having same qualifier and qualificand. There is no need of stating the difference of the state(avastha). This is also answered by stating that even when the qualifier and the qualificand are same in the question and the answer, as in the question ‘this is with class or not?’ and the answer ‘this is pot’, there is no cessation of doubt.

Here K. points out an important observation that the cessation of doubt is not possible by accepting the difference in the objecthood(viśayatā). And objecthood itself is denoted by the words such as avastha, yogvatā etc. K. adds further that, when this viśayatā is entered into the delimiter of cause and effect, then there is no need to accept the cause-effect relation belonging to the other’s (logician’s) view. K. has shown the process of generating the verbal understanding in the said manner. K. concludes the discussion by restating that there is no postulation of locusness etc. in jānāti etc. and that the present time is not construed into the volition as against the

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72 For details see Contribution of K.
experience, but into the root-meaning. Thus the smṛti bhāvapradhānam is meant for restricting and not for stating the unknown qualificandness of the bhāvanā. K. states another option that the said smṛti may also denote the unknown fact such as the prime-qualificandness of bhāvanā. This leads to another objection that states that, the view established earlier (at the time of explaining the statement of bhattalankara) that bhāvanā is the qualifier of vidhi will be denied. To this K. states that there is no evil in denial of the same, as this is according to the view of the Vārttikakāra. It has been stated in the vārttika that though the bhāvanā is known as the object of vidhi, but at the time of performance of a rite, such kind of verbal understanding of vidhi along with the three parts is not required.

This leads to the next discussion about the verbal understanding of the sentence of prohibition such as na kalaṅjam bhakṣayet. K. explains the whole process beginning from the general understanding ‘the volition has function’ having aversion as qualifier and volition as qualificand and having the relation svajñānajanyā-anistahetutānumitijanyā-abhāvapratiyogirśva. After the understanding of the meaning of the sentence, there is generation of the knowledge of the desire of the āpta towards aversion. Then there is inference of anistāsādhanatva. And then there is absence of the said volition. K. raises an important question in this context that, the inference of the anistāsādhanatva which has been said, is delimited by what property? A similar question is also raised with respect to the absence(abhāva) which also forms the part of the relation. After showing many contingencies in all the options of including the special action stated in the prohibition as delimiter, K. raises the question that, how is the implication of the instrumentality towards the desire and the evil, of the injunction and prohibition (respectively) towards their own visaya, which is accepted by the mīm., explained, because implication is not something different from inference. Along with this, the specific question is also raised such as ‘how is there establishment of the instrumentality towards the evil which is delimited by the volition of eating of kalaṅja, by the prohibition? As an answer to this, K. begins a detailed discussion on implication(ākṣepa).
K. begins by stating that implication is of three types. The first type is stated as that which is meant for ascertaining the means of knowing which is not ascertained, like the ascertainment of heaven in the sacrifice where the fruit is not stated. This is done by logic (tarka) that if the sacrifice is not meant for some result then there would be no inclination. The injunctive sentence along with the said logic, makes known the istasādhana avara. That kind of logic is called implication, and it is not inference. K. explains the problems in the view of the logicians and demonstrates the process of the mīm. Just by the injunction of study, the intention that the injunction and prohibitions are meant for īsta and anista (respectively) is known. And by the co-utterance of the word like svargakāma etc. there is knowledge of inducement towards heaven. Or by the arthavāda in the specific prohibition, there is understanding that there is repelling from the eating of kalaṇja for the purpose of avoidance of heaven. Thus there is no inference. The second implication is stated as that which is meant for ascertaining of the meaning which is known by that (means of knowledge) which is complete, like the injunction of purodāsa necessitates the implication of some substance. This is also denied to be an inference. The third implication is stated as that which is meant for ascertaining of that which is not ascertained (otherwise), like the implication of the substitute when the prime substance is not available. Here by implication, the means of knowing called arthāpati (presumption) is known. And this also does not form a part of inference because contrary to the inference that makes known that which pervades (vāpa), arthāpati makes known that which is pervaded (vāpa). Thus by the acceptance of aversion as the meaning of īm, and by the knowledge of the aversion qualified by the action of eating of the kalaṇja by nāt, there is obtaining of the particular absence. Hence there is no cumbersomeness of acceptance of inference etc.

After the discussion on vidhi and nisedha, K. begins to discuss the praise (prāśasta) and censure (aprāśasta) which are expected by the injunctions and prohibitions and which are known by the arthavāda. K. begins by giving the definition of praise and censure. Praise is defined as vihitakarmāṁsthāna-nāntarīyakadukkhādikāva-sukhayanakātvam (the state of being the producer of happiness which is greater than the inseparable pain inflicted in the performance of the rite/action which is enjoined).
and censure is defined as *nisiddhānuṣṭhāṇa-nāntarīyakasukhādhikadukkhaṇanakatvam* (the state of being the producer of pain which is greater than the inseparable happiness associated with the performance of that which is prohibited). Though both these definitions are applicable in injunctions and prohibitions, but they are not applicable to the *abhyanujñā vidhi* (injunction of consent) because there is no production of happiness there, and in the prohibition of acceptance of *sodāsin* because there is no production of pain there. Hence K. gives another definition of praise and censure as *balavadanīsta-ananubandhitva* (the state of being non-producer of evil which is greater) and *balavadanīsta-anubandhitva* (the state of being producer of evil which is greater). Here too K. explains that *balavattva* denotes the state of being the object of extreme repulsion and the state of being the object of extreme attachment, in pain and pleasure (respectively). The purpose of such understanding is stated as the accomplishment of inclination and aversion by the process of establishment of non-validity in the false knowledge that obstructs the production of inclination and aversion.

Next K. raises the question that the said knowledge can be produced even by the injunction and prohibition, thus the *arthavāda* is redundant. K. answers that the cognition of the general state of being non-producer of greater evil is possible only by the *arthavāda*.

K. then discusses the relation in construction of praise and censure. Praise is said to be construed into *bhāvanā* by the state of being produced by the extreme attachment towards the desired object which is produced by the knowledge of the object of praise, and censure is construed into the *bhāvanā* by the state of being the counter-positive of the absence caused by the extreme repulsion towards the evil object which is produced by the knowledge of the object of censure.

All the views stated above with respect to praise and censure are opposed by K.

K. first denies the earlier definition of praise by stating that the said definition is dependent on the particular person and the particular action. This would lead to conception of infinite understanding of praise. Moreover, when a person is in extreme
influence then the production of more pain is not seen, as in case of the pain inflicted by weapons in a war etc. Moreover in nitya, naimittika and prāyaścitta injunctions, such nature of praise is not seen at all. K. then refutes the second definition of praise. This is because the extreme attachment is also relative. K. also refuses the purpose of arthavāda that was stated earlier, by stating that the one who has repulsion, the praise does not work for him and the one who does not have repulsion he doesn’t need praise for inclination. Moreover arthavāda is not even like mantra which has the seen purpose of making something remember to a person who has forgotten what to do next.

K. states that, actually the extreme attachment and repulsion are themselves the inducer and repellent. The person who has that extreme attachment say towards heaven etc., the sermon of the world or Veda induces him by making known the īstasādhanatā. The Vedic injunctions are also said by the word sermon by Jaimini such as ‘tasya jñānam upadeśah’. And even in the world, at the time of giving medicine etc., there is praise in the form ‘by this you will get sweet’ and there is no praise of the form ‘there won’t be extreme repulsion in the pain bought by it’. It is stated that those that are attached to the immediate pain are not seen to be inclined, but by that the sermons do not become invalid. Thus, even when there is non-interest by the consideration of immediate pain, still there is interest created by the praise of qualities. Thus K. supports the view that is stated in the source text and states that praise is the state of having good quaśsadhaṅgūnavattvā and censure is the state of having fdiśdosaśavattvā.

K. refutes that praise and censure are construed in the (ārthī)bhaśvanā(volition). But it is construed in the prime meaning of inducement(śābdī bhāvanā). The reason for this is also stated that, only cases can be construed in the bhāvanā. And even if it is said to be construed in the bhāvanā, then too it would be construed only through the deity or the substance that it praises. Hence the view of the source text that praise is construed in the śābdī bhāvanā is accepted.

With this K. completes the discussion on the topic of theory of injunction(Vidhiśvāda).
The last section of the text deals with establishment of the prime-qualificandness of the bhāvanā against the view of the logicians who support the prime-qualificandness of the meaning of the word ending in the nominative case (prathamāntārtha). This section again has the same structure as the last section, comprising of the statement of the mīm., then the refutation of the same by the logicians and then the refutation of the refutations by the mīm.

K. continues with the topic of qualificandness of bhāvanā, by stating that, though bhāvanā is qualificand towards other cases, it is not qualificand to the nominal-meaning ending in the nominative case. This view of logicians is supported by the argument that the one which appears as non-subordinate to anything must be regarded as prime-qualificand. In negative sentences, in both active and passive construction, the meaning of the word ending in the nominative case (prathamāntārtha) appears as non-subordinate, hence bhāvanā and number must be construed in it. The logicians show the construction of bhāvanā in the prathamāntārtha with respect to many sentences.

This view is questioned by the mīm., who along with stating the fault also state their own view. The main point of construction of bhāvanā into prathamāntārtha is questioned in the sentences caitraḥ na pacati, caitraḥ eva pacati and caitraḥ api pacati. In all the three cases, the bhāvanā is not construed into the prathamāntārtha, but it is construed into the meaning of the particles. And any kind of additional attributes to ward off the fault would only lead to complexity. Moreover in sentences such as odanam pacati, where the word ending in nominative-case is not available, there would be complexity of postulation of the same. On the contrary, such complexity is not present for the mīm. in sentences where the verb form is not available, because the postulation of the verb form asti and bhavati is supported by the smṛti - astirbhavantiparah. Another problem for the logicians would be the impersonal construction (bhāva pravoga) such as sthīyate, where the word ending in nominative is not present. Thus in such construction there has to be acceptance of verbal understanding having bhāvanā as prime-qualificand. And the construction of Caiṭra in one part of the meaning of eva also renders the attribute of non-subordinate
stated earlier, as redundant. In addition to that, in case of *eva*, there has to be acceptance of the construction of *Caitra* twice giving the meaning ‘*Caitra* is one having the volition’ and ‘the person other than *Caitra* is one who does not have volition’, which would result in sentence-split. Moreover, upon the question such as *kīdrśau caśtratadanyau?*, there would be a contingency of the answer *caitrah eva pacati* in the view of the logicians. Therefore the *mīm* conclude that *bhāvanā* has to be accepted as prime qualificand.

The *mīm* has already stated his prime view in the discussion in *vidhvāda* where the *smṛti bhāvapradhānam* is quoted and explained. Here there is mostly refutation of the logicians and slight reiteration of the same logic stated earlier. These too have been stated by the *mīm*. Thus, most of the part of the remaining text, almost up to the end, contains the refutation of *mīm* and the support of their own view, by the logicians. However, in the discussion many principles of the *mīm* are also discussed contextually.

Upon this the logicians show a fault to *mīm* that, the *mīm* too have to accept the construction of *Caitra* in the meaning of the particle in sentences such as *caitrah eva pacati* etc. Thus their theory that all the cases are construed into the *bhāvanā* also fails. To this the *mīm* answer that such construction takes place only after the main construction of *Caitra* into *bhāvanā*. The *mīm* explains through various examples in the initial understanding, there is construction of *Caitra* and the *bhāvanā*. And the later understanding of *Caitra* into the meaning of the particle *eva* etc. is even possible by the impression generated by the first understanding. Thus there is no construction of *Caitra* into one part of the meaning of *eva*, or in the absence which is the meaning of *naḥ*.

The *mīm* points out another defect in the form of the state of being a revealer of intention (*tātparyagrāhakatva*) of the particle *naḥ*, in order to maintain the same form of understanding in the view of the logicians. This acceptance leads to the complexity of postulation of the intention. This is justified by first stating that even the *mīm* would have to support their view by accepting intention in the particle. Therefore logicians could also accept intention and support their view of construction of volition.
in the nominal meaning ending in nominative case by accepting the special relation of
\textit{sva-abhāvā-āśrayatva}.

The logicians points out towards the \textit{mīm.}, that as they criticize the logicians with
respect to the sentence \textit{pacati eva caitrah}, a similar problem would be faced by them
in the sentence \textit{caitrah sabhāryah pacati} where there would be construction of Caitra
in \textit{bhārya}. The word \textit{bhārya} (etc.) is not a particle and hence intention cannot be,
grasped there, nor can the word be considered into relation.

The logicians also point out that the \textit{smṛti astirbhavantiparah} quoted by the \textit{mīm.}
to support the \textit{adhyāhāra} of the verbal form is not something special. The said \textit{smṛti}
is just for pointing out that a suitable word must be supplied. The words \textit{asti, bhavati}
are only pointers. The logicians prove their point by pointing out examples such as
\textit{tvam vidvān}, where there is no supplying of the form \textit{asti}, but of the form in the
second person which is also pointed out by \textit{asti}. In another example such as \textit{adya ko
mrtah}?, there is no expectation of the form \textit{asti} etc. after the answer \textit{caitrah}. And
indeed such supplying is also contradictory in the context. Thus even in \textit{odanam
pacati}, it is proper to supply a word in general, in the nominative-case to generate the
understanding.

The logicians also answer the fault stated in cases such as \textit{sthiyate} which is an
impersonal construction, where there would be problem of supplying the word ending
in nominative-case. In such cases, where the necessary material is not available, as in
the present case, there the understanding having \textit{bhāvanā} as qualificand is indeed
accepted.

As to the fault of sentence split in \textit{caitrah eva pacati}, which was pointed out by the
\textit{mīm.} to the logicians, it is stated that in cases such as \textit{caitrah paṭhati pacati ca} the
\textit{mīm.} also cannot avoid the sentence split. And indeed sentence split is possible to
avoid by the logicians by acceptance of the meaning 'non-existence in other' of the
word \textit{eva} generating the understanding 'Caitra is one having the volition which does
not exist in the other', because such meaning of \textit{eva} is also accepted by the \textit{mīm.} in
sentence such as \textit{atra hi eva āvapatanti}. 51
And with respect to the doubt raised by the mīm. that upon the question ‘kāṇḍrau caitratadanyau ?’, there would be a contingency of the answer such as ‘caitraḥ eva pacatti’, the logicians point out that since there is presence and absence of number and gender in the Caitra and the other respectively, there would be non-agreement of the question and the answer. Hence the said answer is not fit for the question.

Thus the logicians conclude that there is no problem in accepting the understanding having bhāvanā as qualifier and the meaning of the word ending in nomainative-case as qualificand.

This is refuted very briefly by mīm., by stating the smṛti- tadyatra ubhe bhāvapradhāne bhavataḥ. The said smṛti restricts the understanding to the option having bhāvanā as qualificand in cases where both the nominal word and bhāvanā are present. It is also supported by the sūtra of Jaimini ‘tadbhiitam kriyārthena samāmnāyah’ (JS. 1.1.25).

As to the smṛti - sattvapradhānāni nāmāni, it is said that there is scope of application of the said smṛti in answer such as ‘Caitraḥ’ provided upon the question ‘ko asya putrah ?’. The view of the mīm. is supported by example from the dharmaśāstra. And the problem upon acceptance of prathamāntārthā as qualificand, in sentences such as samidho yajati etc. is pointed out.

With this the text ends. Though the logicians have supported many of their views through argument, which have not been again refuted by the mīm. still the mīm. have amply supported their view that bhāvanā is the prime qualificand in verbal understanding.

The text Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā of Koṇḍadeva ends here.
4. **About the work Bhattamatapradipika**

The work *Bhattamatapradipika* is one of the texts belonging to the neo school of *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*. This is ascertained on the basis of the fact that K has mentioned himself as neo-*mīmāṃsaka* in the text. He has also used this term at least at three other places in the text. Thus it necessitates an enquiry into this new school of thought in *mīmāṃsā*. For this, it is necessary to have certain ideas about the concept *neo(nāya)*. Along with this, there must be ideas about the *neo-mīmāṃsakas* along with their works. It is also necessary to compare the present text with the other text belonging to the same genre of work in order to trace the origin and development of the present work. It is also important to analyse the style of the present author to bring out his uniqueness. And lastly, the contribution of the present work which in the present case is not different from the contribution of the author must be pointed out for a true valuation of the present text. Thus these points are presented in the same order here.

4.i **Discussion on the term Neo School**

The holy soil of India has been a fertile ground for blossoming of various philosophies both orthodox and others such as Buddhist etc. Though each philosophical system has its own objective set into the fixed paradigm, still there has been a long dialogue amongst them regarding different issues which ultimately result in emergence of new concepts and refinement of the existing ones. This dialogue, in order to flourish, demanded standardization of the language of communicating various philosophical ideas used by the different groups. A pioneering work was written in the *Nāya* philosophy in this direction by Gangesopādhyāya named *Tattvacintāmāṇi*. As Gopikāmohan Bhattachārya in his book *Navya-Nāya* states, "This work zealously displays the author's love for precision and exactitude in expression. Epistemological and logical concepts are analysed in terms of definition". Not only did Gangesa deal with the concepts in the *Nāya* philosophy with his meticulous methodology in this work, but also provided a precise language which became a standard for unambiguous discussions in one's own philosophy.
and in respect to dialogue with the other systems. This work introduced a new era into the philosophy of nyāya. And henceforth this system began to be called navya-nyāya (neo-logic). As Bhattacharya\textsuperscript{75} states further, “In Navya-Nyāya traditional language in philosophy was superseded by a new set of vocabulary to keep pace with the emergence of new concepts. In course of time all the branches of Sanskrit literature adopted this new methodology and expression.”

Thus it may be said that the word neo (navya) first came to be associated with the philosophy of nyāya on account of adaptation of the precise methodology and especially the precise language. Not only this, this language is called navyanyāya language.

4.ii Neo-Mīmāṃsakas and their Works

Now it remains to be discussed as to who are the neo-mīmāṃsakas(mīm) that K counts himself in. One thing in this respect is very clear that, since Gangesa introduced this new system in Indian philosophical literature, those who are earlier to him are not neo-mīm. The date of Gangesa is mentioned as 1300-1360 A.D.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, those who are earlier to him such as Pārthasārathi Misra etc. are not neo-mīm. But the reverse i.e. those who are later than Gangesa are neo-mīm is also not true. Because texts such as Mīmāṃsānyāyasprakāsa of Āpadeva written around 1600 A.D are not considered as works of neo-mīm.

Thus it may be said that those who adapt the methodology and language of neo-logic while discussing the topics of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā(PM) are called neo-mīm. And the new school of thought initiated by them is called navya-mīmāṃsā. In this respect, it may also be noted that it is not necessary that the new school differs on each and every point with the earlier school. This only means that there may be some disagreement with respect to certain philosophical issues between them. Probably based on this, there is generally a unanimous view in the tradition upon this new school of thought. Let us look into this point in detailed manner.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid pg 5
In the tradition of *Mimāṃsa*, Khandadeva is accepted as the initiator of the neo school\(^{77}\) of *Mimāṃsa*. S. Subrahmanya Sastri in his introduction to *Bhattadipikā*\(^{78}\) states that similar to the logicians, there are two school of thought in *Pūrva-Mimāṃsa* too namely the old (prācyā) and the new (navya). There the *mīmāṃsākās* up to Pārthasārathi Miśra are called old (prācīna) and beginning from Khaṇḍadeva are called neos (navīna). The fact that Khaṇḍadeva initiated this new school of thought is also stated by scholars such as Anantakrishna Sastri\(^{79}\), K.T.Pandurangi\(^{80}\), Peri Suryanārāyaṇa Sastri\(^{81}\) etc.

It is indeed necessary here to state the nature of work done by Khaṇḍadeva based on which he is credited for such work. It has already been stated that neos are identified by their precise methodology and language. Khaṇḍadeva applied the same to the system of *Pūrva-Mimāṃsa*. It must be discussed here that based on the difference in views regarding the core principles of PM, there are only three schools of thought. These are the Bhāṭṭa school, the Prabhākara school and the Mūrāri school. The Bhāṭṭa school came into being through the commentary of Kuṇḍarila Bhāṭṭa on Śābarabhāṣaya which goes by three names: *Ślokavārttika*, *Tantravārttika* and *Tuptikā*. This school is the most followed school and has maintained a rich tradition even up to the present time. Maximum number of works have been produced in this school. The second school is that of Prabhākara also known as Guru. He was a contemporary of Kuṇḍarila, mostly believed as a student of Kuṇḍarila. This school could not gain as much pace and followers as the Bhāṭṭa school except for a few commentaries on the *Brhati* of Prabhākara such as *Rūvimalāpaṇcikā* etc. and a few independent works such as *Prakaranapaṇcikā*, *Nayaviveka* etc. The third school is that of Mūrāri Miśra. Not much is known of this school except for the famous quotation *muraśreṣṭrīyaḥ panthāḥ*. However in recent times some serious efforts have

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\(^{77}\) The word school must not be understood in the sense of one having different views because in that respect there are only three schools of *mīm.* namely the Bhāṭṭa, Prabhākara and the Mūrāri. And Khaṇḍadeva himself follows the Bhāṭṭa school.


\(^{79}\) *Intro. to Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, Vol. 1, pg. 3

\(^{80}\) *Intro. to Khanda deva bhāva prakāśa* (a commentary on *Bhāṭṭaraḥasya*), pg. 1

\(^{81}\) Ibid. pg. xxxii
been made to study this school. Out of these Khaṇḍadeva follows the Bhāṭṭa school of thought and accepts most of the views of this school.

Thus Khaṇḍadeva is not said to have laid new principles based on which there would be an altogether different interpretation of PM. But as K.T.Pandurangi states, “He introduced pariskāra style of Navyanyāya... He also applied certain Pūrvamīmāṃsā maxims differently. Thus he initiated a Navina school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā within the Bhāṭṭa School, though it is not fully developed as Navyanyāya or Navyavyākaraṇa”. This is also iterated by A. Subrahmanya Sastri editor of the Bhatarahasya, who states in his introduction that Khaṇḍadeva occupies the first position in exposition of the mīmāṃsā-śāstra in the manner of navya-nyāya. Thus it is seen that there is hardly any difference with respect to the manner performance of the rite, the decision of which is the sole aim of the science of PM. But there is difference in the exposition and in the discussion of the form of verbal understanding that is generated. Khaṇḍadeva analyses the principles of PM through the rigorous methods of the neo-logicians and enumerates the changes based on logical grounds. This is quite evident in his works. In addition to this, S. Sastri observes another specific feature of Khaṇḍadeva. Wherever Khaṇḍadeva finds any weakness in the logic(yukti) put forth in the siddhānta by the old, he places those yukti’s also in the purview of the prima-facie view, and establishes the siddhānta based on a different and strong logic. This can be seen in various adhikaranas such as the prayājasesādhi karaṇa, niśādasthapyadhikaraṇa etc.

Though mostly there is difference in the exposition, sometimes there are also differences in the views. Thus Khaṇḍadeva accepts prayatna(volition) as the meaning of ārthibhāvanā which is against the old view who accepts vyāpārasāmānyā. Similarly, śābdibhāvanā is not accepted as denoting istasādhanatva, a view which is accepted by Maṇḍana Misra, Pārthasarathi etc., but it denotes pravarttana. Khaṇḍadeva also does

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82 Panse, Ujjwala. A Reconstruction of the third school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.
83 Intro. pg. 1
84 अन्य खण्डदेवाचार्यं, नववयिवादयं मीमांसाशास्त्रयो परिष्करणं प्रथमं स्थानाधिकतोति – BR. Intro. pg. 66
85 Bhāṭṭa-dipikā (BD.) iv.1.14.
86 BD. vi.1.12.
87 Vidhiviveka
88 Nyāyaratnamāla, pg. 55
not accept *matvarthalakṣaṇā* in sentences such as *somaṇa yajeta*, but includes the understanding of the relation of *soma* and *yāga* as generated later (*pāṛthika-bodha*). There are many such differences that are found between these two views which itself forms an interesting topic of independent research. All these views are also accepted by the other neo-*mīm. such as Ṛṇḍadeva with certain minor differences which shall be pointed out in the contribution of the author with respect to points occurring in the text.

In light of the above discussion Ṛṇḍadeva is accepted as the pioneer of the *navya* school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. In this respect it is important to know briefly about him and his works. Ṛṇḍadeva was the son of Rudradeva which he mentions in benediction of his work *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*\(^\text{89}\). His pupil Śambhubhaṭṭa mentions that he passed away in 1665 A.D. Therefore his time is believed to be 1600-1665 A.D\(^\text{90}\). He was a pupil of Viśveśvara Bhaṭṭa, who is popularly known as Gāgābhaṭṭa. Ṛṇḍadeva has saluted him in the benediction of Bhāṭṭadipīkā. Three works are attributed to Ṛṇḍadeva in the tradition, which are also called Ṛṇḍadevatrayī. These are:

i. *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*

ii. *Bhāṭṭadipīkā*

iii. *Bhāṭṭatantrarāhasya*

These have been written in the same order as stated.

i. *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*: This is an exhaustive commentary on each *sūtra* of Jaimini. It starts from the second section of the first chapter and extends up to the end of *balābalādhihikarana* (iii.3.7) of the third chapter. Though it extends only up to the third section of the third chapter, due to its exhaustive nature it covers almost all the topics occurring in *PM*. It comprises of an in depth study of each principle of *PM*. It is here that all the principles of *PM* according to the *neos* along with their elaboration and justification can be found. In both the other works, in many places Kh. asks the readers to refer to the *mīmāṃsākaustubha* for details. This shows that *mīmāṃsākaustubha* must be the first work written by him.

\(^\text{89}\) *भृःदेवसः जनक कर्ते सदा स्मृत्वे – Mīmāṃsākaustubha.*

\(^\text{90}\) For detailed discussion see the sub-chapter 'Date of K.' above.
ii. *Bhattadipika*: This is an explanation of all the *adhikaranas* of PM. It has a similar structure to the *Śastraḍipikā* of Parthasarathi Miśra. It deals with one *adhikarana* at a time. It begins from the first *adhikarana* of the second section of the first chapter and continues up to the end of the twelfth chapter. Thus it covers all the *adhikanas* of PM except for the first section popularly called *tarkapāda*. The author himself states that he is going to treat the topics in brief. Here the complete *sāstra* of PM has been dealt with in the manner of *navya-nyāya*. There are four commentaries available on it out of which the commentary *Prabhāvalī* written by Śambhubhaṭṭa who was a student of Kh., is most preferred in the tradition. *Bhattadipika* has been mentioned in the *bhattarahasya*. Hence it is earlier to it.

iii. *Bhattarahasya*: This is a work that deals with the technical points of PM. It covers topics such as definition of *dharma*, theory of *vidhi*, prime-qualification of *bhāvanā*, meaning of personal-suffix, meaning of verbal-root, meaning of tenses and moods and largely with the meanings of the seven case-suffixes. It is based on the lines of the text *Vyutpativāda* of Gadadhara. It can be observed that this text deals with the topic of verbal-understanding in view of PM. The chief opponent in the text are the logicians and the grammarians whose views are refuted by Kh. to establish the views of PM. It is again a very technical text written with the logical acumen of the neos.

Other than the works of Khaṇḍadeva, the other work that belongs to the category of works of neo-*mīmāṃsā* is the present text *Bhattamatapradīpikā* of Kondadeva. As is evident from the above discussion, the present text *Bhattamatapradīpikā* bears a striking similarity to the text *Bhattarahasya* both in structure and content, as well as in the manner of treatment. Therefore it is necessary to make a comparison of both the texts on the lines of similarities and differences. Before this comparison, a few other texts may be mentioned in this context which are important.

First among them is the *Bhaṭṭacintāmaṇi* of Gāgābhaṭṭa. Gāgābhaṭṭa’s official name is Viśveśvara Bhaṭṭa. He was the teacher of Khaṇḍadeva whom Kh. salutes in his benediction of *Bhattadipikā*. Many works are credited to Gāgābhaṭṭa most of which are

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91 विशेषज्ञ नमस्कृत्य खण्डदेवः सत्यं मुदे | नृति तत्रप्रसन्देह संस्कारं भाष्ट्रशिक्षकं - benedictory verse *Bhattadipikā*.
92 ibid.
associated with prayoga of rites. His only published work on mīmāṃsā is named Bhāṭṭacintāmāni. It deals with the adhikaranas occurring in the PM on the lines of Śastradīpikā. It is said to extend over all the twelve chapters of PM, however only the part which deals with the first section of the first chapter named tarkapāda has been published. While commenting on the fourth sūtra of Jaimini, Gāgābhāṭṭa deals with each of the pramanās in details. While dealing with the śabda pramāṇa, Gāgābhāṭṭa has stated all the topics related with the verbal understanding in PM. He deals with this topic in different sections such as: vidhi-nirūpana, dhātvartha-vāda, akhyāta-vāda, lakāra-vāda, prātipadikārtha-vāda, subartha-vāda, samāsa-vāda, nañartha-vāda, upasarga-vāda. It can be seen that there is huge similarity of this text with the Bhāṭṭarahasya of Kh. Therefore scholars such as A. Subrahmanya Sastri who have edited Bhāṭṭarahasya, believe Bhāṭṭacintāmāni as its source, and even believe that the original scheme of Bhāṭṭarahasya was much larger and on lines of Bhāṭṭacintāmāni. Gāgābhāṭṭa has also used the language of neo-logic in this work.

Another work that is considered as a work of neo-mīmāṃsā is An̄gatvanirukti of Murāri Miśra. It is a small treatise dealing with the definition and other aspects related with subsidiary(anga). He is different from the Murāri Miśra who is believed to be the pioneer of third school of PM. Umesha Miśra places him in the 17th century. He closely follows the style of Kh.

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93 Intro. pp.62-63
94 Critical Bibliography, Pp. 59-60
4.iii Comparison with *Bhattarahasya*

It can be observed from the above discussion that the text which is most similar in content and language of the present work is the *Bhattarahasya* of Khaṇḍadeva. Khaṇḍadeva has mentioned the name *rahasya* while criticizing one of the views stated therein. Thus *Bhattarahasya* is an earlier text. Therefore, a comparison of the present work with *Bhattarahasya* would be interesting to reveal the actual nature and scope of the present text. It shall also indicate the contribution of Khaṇḍadeva, which shall be dealt with in details later.

4.iii.a Similarity

At the outset, even a cursory look would reveal a close association of *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā* (BMP) with *Bhattarahasya* (BR). With a detailed comparison even more similarities regarding the content become obvious. All of these have been stated below:

1. **Arrangement of Sections** : The first prominent similarity that is evident is the chapterisation or division into sections. BMP has been divided into three sections namely the a) *dharma-laksana* (definition of dharma) b) *vidhi-vāda* (theory of injunction) and c) *ākhyātavāda* (theory of personal-suffix). The third section, as stated earlier, is not in a strict sense dealing with the personal-suffix, but it is an extension of the *vidhi-vāda* dealing with the topic of prime-qualificandness in a sentence. These sections are based exactly in line with the sections occurring in the BR. BR has been divided into many sections and sub-sections. These sections can be broadly classified as :
   i. *dharma-laksana-vicāra* (definition of dharma)  
   ii. *vidhi-vāda* (theory of injunction)  
      a. *bhāvanā-vāda* (dealing with the theory of bhāvanā)  
      b. *karta-laksana-vāda* (theory of agent been known by secondary implication)  
   iii. *dhatūrtha-nirūpaṇa* (meaning denoted by verbal-root)  
   iv. *ākhyātārtha-nirūpaṇa* (meaning denoted by personal-suffix)  
   v. *vibhaktyartha-nirūpaṇa* (meaning denoted by all the case-endings)
2. **Arrangement of topics**: A detailed study of the topics discussed in these sections would reveal even greater similarity between the two texts. It is found that BMP deals with almost the same topics in these sections as they have been discussed in the BR. Moreover, it is also observed that these topics are dealt in almost the same order as dealt in the BR. Since the similarities are many, a section wise comparison with respect to topics is been shown here:

a) **Dharmalakṣana**

Arrangement of topics in *Bhāṭṭarahāsya*:

i. Definition of *dharma* and *adharma*

ii. Discussion on *dharmatva/adharmatva* of śyena sacrifice

iii. Discussion on śodāsin sentence

iv. Discussion on *dharmatva/adharmatva* of brahma-jñāna

Arrangement of topics in *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā*:

i. Definition of *dharma* and *adharma*

ii. Discussion on *dharmatva/adharmatva* of śyena sacrifice

iii. Discussion on śodāsin sentence

iv. Discussion on *dharmatva/adharmatva* of brahma-jñāna

This is just an indication of the arrangement of the topics. There are a few differences with regards to the minor topics associated with these. However the basic structure of arrangement of topics is almost the same.

b) **Vidhivāda**

Arrangement of topics in BR:

i. Meaning of *liṅ*

ii. Refutation of the view of *logicians*

iii. Justification of the view of mūn.

iv. Discussion on delimiter of the expressed meaning

v. Demonstration of understanding
vi. Discussion on prohibitive sentences
vii. Discussion on *arthavāda* and its construction

A similar arrangement of topics is also seen in the BMP. The only difference is that K. has first stated the views of the *mīm.* regarding the meaning, relation etc. of the *vidhi.* Then he has stated the refutation by the logicians in the same order. And then he has justified the views. And lastly there is discussion of prohibitive sentences and the *arthavāda.* Thus the general structure of arrangement of topic is still the same in both the texts.

c) *Bhāvanāvāda* - Both the texts deal with the prime-qualificandness of *bhāvanā.*

Here too there is refutation of the views of the logicians in almost the same order.

3.**Content** : There are many topics in BMP that have been treated in the same manner as they have been treated in the BR. Treatment in the same manner includes the similarity of arguments, the order of arguments followed during demonstration or refutation, similarity of examples also is there. In other words, when these topics are read in BMP, there is an inevitable remembrance of BR. These topics are stated below:

i. Discussion on *dharmatva/adharmatva* of *brahmajñāna*\(^95\)
ii. Refutation of the logicians view of *lin=īstasādhanatā*\(^96\)
iii. Justification of non-use of *pacet* when the action is already present in view of *mīm.*\(^97\)
iv. Understanding of relation of *vidhi* and *bhāvanā* (*vyāpāravatī kṛtī*)\(^98\)
v. Justification of prime-qualifandness of *bhāvanā*\(^99\)
vi. Refutation of logicians view of prime-qualifandness of *prathamāntartha*\(^100\)

In addition to these, it must be noted that all the points that are stated throughout the text by K. as the view of the *mīm.* either for demonstration or for refutation, bear a surprising
resemblance to the views stated in the BR. It is a different matter that K. does not agree with them later and states his own views.

4. **Similarity of expressions**: Not only is there similarity of arrangement and content, but it is also found that many expressions used by K. are identical with those used in BR. Few of them have been taken directly from BR, while others are almost similar. Though there are many such examples that could be noticed if a comparison of the two texts is made with respect to each sentence, however a few striking examples are given here which shall be sufficient to demonstrate the similarity of the two works. These are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā</th>
<th>Bhāṭṭarāhasya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>आपलं च लोकवेदाधारण</td>
<td>आपलं च लोकवेदाधारण</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रतारणायज्ञवसिष्टं हिंतोपेशेकः सति</td>
<td>प्रतारणायज्ञवसिष्टं हिंतोपेशेकः सति</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>तस्मानोपेशेर्तृत्तम</td>
<td>तस्मानोपेशेर्तृत्तम 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>तदुच्चारणकालाभिनकालक्त्वमेव वर्त्तमानत्व</td>
<td>तच्च लघुवारणकालाभिनकालक्त्वमेव वर्त्तमानत्व 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पिसुप्रेरणाया वदति राजि</td>
<td>पिसुप्रेरिते राजि 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पाश्चर्तिनिशाश्रितोगितभवं वर्त्तमानकालोत्सतिक-नाशीयत्वसम्बन्धेन वर्त्तमानत्वविदिति</td>
<td>पाश्चर्तिनिशाश्रितोगितभवं वर्त्तमानकालोत्सतिक-नाशीयत्वसम्बन्धेन वर्त्तमानत्वविदिति 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कीर्ति चैत्र तदन्याविदित प्रक्षेपं चैत्र एव</td>
<td>कीर्ति चैत्रमैत्राविति प्रक्षेपं चैत्र एव</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पचतीत्युतां चापचेत</td>
<td>पचतीत्युतां पचः 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न च विषवत्याव लिङ्धर्षस्य</td>
<td>नास्माति: प्रप्रेणाया: विषवत्याव लिङ्धर्षस्य</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>भावार्थमथयोगोपस्तिविस्तिविश्वरः शंकर</td>
<td>भावार्थमथयोगोपस्तिविस्तिविश्वरः शंकर 106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

101 Pg. 21
102 Pg. 51
103 Pg. 13
104 Pg. 51
105 Pg. 39
106 Pg. 15
It is quite evident from the above points that BMP bears a striking resemblance to BR both in the structure of the text as well as in the treatment of topics. However along with the similarities there are many differences too that are found in the two texts which must also be noted.

4.iii.b Difference

There is no doubt about the fact that BMP follows BR in many respects as pointed above. However the treatment of each topic of discussion is unique in itself in BMP. BMP has a different way of elaboration. Many a time there is more elaboration in BMP with more examples. BMP uses different sets of arguments to prove its views. In short, BMP has a unique style of treatment of topics different from BR. In addition to this, there is difference of opinion regarding many points between the two. BMP does not seem to agree with the views stated in BR at many instances. In most of the instances BMP directly refutes these points, while at other instances BMP suggests its view in parallel to the view stated in the BR. An indication to point out the difference of the two texts is being presented in a tabular form here. These shall be enough to establish a unique identity of the present text. A detailed treatment shall be carried out in the subsequent chapters separately.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bhāṭṭarahasya</th>
<th>Bhāṭṭamatupradipikā</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accepts dharma and adharma as the object of PM</td>
<td>Accepts only dharma as the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considers syena to be both dharma and adharma</td>
<td>Does not consider syena to be dharma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepts extra fruit in acceptance of sodasin</td>
<td>Does not accept extra fruit in acceptance of sodasin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepts inclination (pravṛtti) as obtained from ākhyāta therefore excludes it from the delimiter of the state of pravartana(inducement)</td>
<td>Does not accept inclination as obtained from outside, hence includes it in the delimiter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the above points, the difference of opinions in BMP and BR is quite evident.

4.iii.c Observation

An analyses of the above discussion of similarity and difference between BMP and BR brings to light certain noticeable facts. These are stated below:

i. The whole present structure of BMP is based on the structure of BR. Similarity of chapterisation and topics is most evident. If the present work BMP is considered as part of the larger scheme of the author, then a close observation of BR points towards that larger scheme. Most probably K. would have expanded the text on the same line of BR.

ii. Wherever K. has mentioned the views of the mīm. in general and has stated his own views later, in most of such cases the views point towards the views mentioned in BR. Thus, the refutations of mīm. stated by K. are mostly refutations of the views of Kh. stated in BR.

iii. With respect to the above two points it can be stated that K. is instigated by the work BR for production of BMP.

iv. The scheme of logical arguments provided by K. are his own and therefore a different understanding is generated even when the same topic is read from the two texts.

v. K. has his own views in many of the topics which he has stated as a refutation of BR as well as a parallel view to it.
vi. In light of the above discussion, the fact that Bhāṭamatapradīpikā has its own identity cannot be denied as it has taken the discussion on the concerned topics a step further.

In order to firmly establish the above observation a detailed analysis of the style of K. is required. Similarly, to point out this independent identity of the text the difference in the views stated in BMP which are the original contributions of the author also require a separate treatment. Hence, these have been presented in the next two sections namely Style of Koṇḍadeva and Contribution of Koṇḍadeva.

4.iv Style of Koṇḍadeva

The first noticeable feature of K. that is come across while going through the work is his organization of the text. K. has arranged the text in a unique organized manner. The system of question and answer by the pūrṇapakṣin and the siddhāntin is generally followed in all the philosophical texts. But K. has arranged the text in a slight different manner. K. has first stated all the views of the siddhāntin. Following this, there is refutation of the views of the siddhāntin by the opponent along with the establishment of their own views. This has been treated very elaborately. And then there is refutation of the views of the opponent along with the elaboration of one's own view by the siddhāntin who is a mīmāṃsaka here in the text. This feature is distinctly observed in the treatment of the topic of theory of injunctions (vidhiśāṣṭra). Thus, as stated in the summary, the general organization of the text is of the pattern statement of the views - refutation by the opponent - refutation of the opponent and elaboration of one's view.

While the above stated organization of the text is observed, there are also other features which are associated with it. Since all the views of one side are clubbed together, K. treats all the topics serially. The opponent raises questions in the same serial as the statement of the views, Similarly, the siddhāntin also answers them serially. For example, the mīm. first state the meaning denoted by the vidhi, then they state its construction, then the relationship in the construction is discussed etc. The opponent too refutes these views in the same order. Another feature associated with this is that, K. prefers to elaborate
one's views later. Though it seems that there is ample justification of the views at the
time of initial statement, still there is much elaboration after the opponent views. This
may be because of the fact that the refutation of the opponent necessitates the elaboration
of one's views. However, this specific manner of treatment has resulted in giving the
present shape to the text.

K. treats the topic with sufficient elaboration like the discussion on adharma not being a
topic of PM or the rejection of apiūrva as dharma which is accepted by the vaiś. as well
as some mīm. At the time of such elaboration, K. quotes from the valid texts wherever
necessary. Thus we find K. has quoted from Rgveda, Yajñavalīkyā Smṛti, Jaimini Sūtra
etc. to support his views stated above. Similarly at the time of refutation of dharmatva of
śyena which is supported by Kh. etc. by referring to one of the verse from the Gītā , K.
has extensively quoted almost all the relevant verses from the particular chapter in order
to prove that there is no enjoinder of any kind in the whole context. K. also quotes
sūtras of Jaimini at many places. At the time of discussing the prime-qualificandness, K.
states examples from the Veda, the Smṛti as well as the worldly usage. A similar kind of
treatment is also seen while demonstrating that if something can be proved by logic, there
is no need for any other separate means of knowing.

An important style that can be noted throughout the text is that, K. treats the topics very
logically. His logical arrangement of the text has already been pointed above. Other than
that, at the time of proving a point either by the siddhāntin or by the opponent, K.
provides necessary arguments. Like the discussion of arriving at the meaning denoted by
lin, or the justification of the views stated in the phāṭṭālāṅkāra, or at the time of
discussion about the prime-qualificandness in a sentence. One interesting feature that can
be noted while providing arguments especially for refutation is that, K. states multiple
options that are possible before refuting them all to prove his point. We find this style of
arguments at least at three places such as the refutation of extra fruit in case of acceptance
of sōdasīn, at the time of refutation of the relation of vidhi and bhāvanā as stated by the
mīm. in qualified injunction and at the time of refutation of the second definition of
praise.
One unique style of K. is to enter into another discussion in the middle of the present discussion which is also related to it. And K. specifically uses the expression स्वादेतल्ल for this purpose most of the times. K. has used this tool at least five times by usage of the said words. For example, during the justification of the views stated in the भातालङ्कः, K. states that in cases such as जनालि etc. present time is not construed with the भावनाः. There K. uses the expression स्वादेतल्ल and ventures into the topic that even in जनालि etc. present time is construed into the भावनाः. While discussing this, he enters into another topic regarding the acceptance of difference in constructions in पादपित्ति and जनालि if the view that present time is construed into the meaning of the verbal-suffix qualified by the verbal root is accepted. Similarly, K. enters into the discussion of the function of the smriti-भावप्राधान्यम by using the same expression. This tool is also used to state the point of inclusion of विनयता in the cause-effect relation. And the most important place where this expression has been employed is ज at the end of the विधिहिवाद. Although there is a colophon indicating the end of the section of विधिहिवाद in one of the manuscripts, for K. it is continuation of another aspect related to the topic. Therefore K. uses the expression स्वादेतल्ल, and states that although भावनाः is qualificand towards accusative cases etc., it is not qualificand to the nominal-meaning in the nominative case. With this K. enters into the topic of prime-qualificandness of भावनाः.

One particular style that is evident about K. in stating his own views is also notable. As it can be observed through the summary that the prime opponents of the mīm. are the logicians specially the neos. But K. has also refuted many views of the earlier mīm. especially Kh. in the text. In the process of doing so, K. first refutes the views of the opponent with logical arguments. Then at the time of stating the views of the mīm. he states his own views and refutes the views of the earlier mīm. by using the expression नच. This can be observed in the discussion on the meaning of लिन where after refuting through logic the view that इच्छाद्विमत्त is the meaning of लिन, K. states the views of the mīm. that प्रवार्त्तमात्र is the meaning of लिन. But along with it K. states that the delimiter is the प्रवार्त्तमात्रा which has the nature of being favourable to inclination. This is against the view mentioned at the time of stating the views of the mīm. in the
beginning of the text. The earlier view which said that delimiter is only vyāpāratva is the view accepted by the mīm. such as Kh. After stating his views K. explains how inclination cannot be obtained by any other source and therefore it must be included in the delimiter. K. also states here his views on what is the meaning of inclination. A similar example can be seen wherein at the beginning K. states that with the consideration of āptatva there can be inference of the īśtasādhanaṇa in the Vedic sentence. In that context K. has also stated the definition of āptatva which he has taken from Bhāṭṭarāhasya. But later, during the elaboration of the views of the mīm. K. states that there is no need of consideration of āptatva in the Vedic sentences, which is his own view.

There is another specific observation with respect to the style of K. in stating his view. Usually the expression वस्तुतः is used at the time of stating one’s own view. K. has also used it at around five places. But in addition to that K. seems to specifically enjoy using two expressions namely इति सुधोभिष्टलोचनीयम्107 and इति कुलप्रसूभिष्टलोचनीयम्108. These expressions have been used by K. for three times and two times respectively in the text. In addition to that K. has used the expression इति आश्चर्यम्109 once to show his denial of the stated view. And at one place K. has used the expression इति ...उत्तमसन्धेयम्110 in order to show his own interpretation.

With respect to the point of stating one’s own view, there is another important fact which must be noted. K. has stated his own views not only for the mīm. but also at the time of stating the view of the opponents. Thus it is found that at the time of justifying the understanding of the sentence caitraḥ eva pacati, the logicians state the examples from the adhikarana111 of mīm. dealing with the sentence atra hyeṇavapantī and state that the logicians can also state their understanding in the same manner in order to avoid the sentence-split. And moreover the problem of sentence-split does not apply to the worldly

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107 Pg. 193, 222, 277
108 Pg. 191, 194
109 Pg. 172
109 Pg. 195
111 ŚD. X.4.12.
sentence. At the end K. states that this must be considered by the learned. Actually, the said argument of the logicians has been provided to them by K. wherein he also states his doubt. We do not find any refutation of the said argument raised by the logicians, but the mīm. establish their view by a different logic.

K. after stating all the arguments in the particular context to prove his point, states at the end that the said view is also supported by the other authors especially the Vārttikakāra for whom K. has immense respect, a fact which is known by his usage of the expression bhāttacarana and Parthasārathi Miśra whom K. addresses as Miśra. Thus we find K. also substantiates his logical arguments by stating various previous authorities.

Since K. calls himself a neo-mīmāṁsaka, it is obvious that the manner and language of neo-logic has been used throughout the text.

With this the specific style of K. in dealing with various aspects of a topic has been made clear wherein some indication has also been provided about his contribution. It is now necessary to analyse the contribution of K. in details with respect to each topic.
4.v Contribution of Kondadeva

K. has penned a whole text that deals with the technical points with respect to certain topics of PM. This is in itself a huge contribution to the system of PM as it has resulted in production of something new (apiirva). However, there are other texts such as Bhāṭṭarāhasya discussed above, which also deal with the same topics. Hence it is important to note the specific contribution of K. This contribution is sometimes with respect to the new theories that have been stated by the author, sometimes it is the refutation of the existing theory or text, sometimes it is in the form of elaborate explanation of some topic which assists in better understanding, sometimes it is the critical and logical approach of the author, sometimes it is an important observation etc. In short, any distinguishing feature noted in the text, forms the contribution of the author.

A point wise analysis along with explanation of the context is been given here in order to point out the contributions of K. in various respects.

1. Just at the beginning K. has refuted adharma to be the object of PM. This is counter to the view of Khaṇḍadeva (Kh.) who has stated in the beginning of rahasya\(^{112}\) that both dharma and adharma are the objects of PM. K. has supported his view with many arguments such as the discussion of Viśīṣṭa-Śiśvāwala while commenting on Yājñavalkya Smṛti, who has specifically stated that only dharma is the object of smṛti. Viśīṣṭa-Śiśvāwala has categorized dharma and has placed the prohibitive sentences such as abstinence from drinking alcohol by the brahmā in one of its six categories. K. gives the argument that if adharma would also have been the object of discussion, Viśīṣṭa-Śiśvāwala should have made a different category of adharma and placed the respective prohibition there. K. adds another point that adharma does not form a part of discussion of any of the twelve chapters of PM. And in the case of acceptance of adharma also as the object of PM there would be contingency of acceptance of multiple sentence meaning by acceptance of laksau in the word dharma occurring in the sūtra 'athāto dharma jijnāsā'. As to the discussion on adharma found in some of the chapters such as the sixth in PM, K. justifies that they have been discussed only contextually,

\(^{112}\) धर्मायथार्थ एवं जैत्यमिनान्त्यायोध्योणित्याविचारयेत - BR. pg 2.
similar to the discussion of construction of chariot and house, which are discussed in the context of some adhkaranas in the same chapter. Thus it is seen that the said view has been elaborated by K by his own arguments, which are not seen in other texts. K combines the use of quoting the smrti as well as adding arguments to explain his views.

2 Another important point stated by K is the refutation of the view of the Vaisesikas (Vais) who accept the unseen result (apūrva) which is produced by rites such as yāga etc. as dharma. This is in contradiction of the view of the mīmāṃsakas who accept the rite such as yāga etc. as dharma. The view of the mīn has been clearly stated in the bhāṣya such as jyotiṣomāḥ and which is accepted in all the works of PM. This view of Vais is based on the statement of the smrti such as dharmah ksarati kirtanāt stating that dharma perishes by narration. Since yāga etc. are momentary, the word dharma here cannot be used in that sense. Hence the word dharma stands for the unseen result produced by yāga etc. In this regard author such as Kh has accepted the said meaning of dharma but he has stated another smrti such as dharmasvanusthitah pumsā etc. wherein the word dharma has been used for rites such as yāga etc. which produces the unseen result. Thus Kh states that although the word dharma also stands for the unseen result with respect to the smrti quoted by the Vais, but the other sense of yāga etc. which is the producer of unseen is also established. And this is the main object of discussion in PM. K on the other hand has refuted the usage of the word dharma in the sense of unseen which is based on the smrti dharmah ksarati kirtanāt. He has objected to the view that the word ksarati in the smrti denotes destruction, because originally it denotes an action associated with a liquid substance (ksar = to flow). Hence to denote destruction, a secondary meaning has to be accepted. If a secondary meaning is accepted then there is no regulation as to why it must only express destruction. According to K, secondary meaning can also be accepted in ‘fruitlessness (nīphalalatva). Thus, by

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113 SD VI 1 4
114 SB on JS 11 2, pg. 21
115 BR pg. 2
116 BR pg. 4
acceptance of such meaning, the *smṛti* may also be interpreted in such a way that it denotes the rites such as *yāga* etc. by the word *dharma*, in which case the *smṛti* would mean as ‘*dharmaḥ* (*yāga* etc.) becomes fruitless/futile (i.e. they do not produce fruit) upon narration’. The originality of argumentation of K. is evident from the above discussion.

3. K. has also shown his originality of arguments in the discussion on *dharmatva*/*adharmatva* of *śyena*. The *Śyena* sacrifice has been stated by the Vedic sentences *śyenena abhicaran yajeta*. Śabara\(^ {117} \) has specifically counted *śyena* under *adharma*. And others like Parthasārathi Miṣra have also accepted the same view by stating that, in case of non-acceptance of the same, the word *artha* occurring in the second *śūtra* of Jaimini would become redundant. Thus K. endorses the view that the *dharmatva* of *śyena* is denied by the word *artha* occurring in the second *śūtra* of Jaimini such as *cudanālaksanaḥ arthah dharmah*. But later *mīmāṃsakas* such as Kh. has accepted the *dharmatva* of *śyena* simply on account of the fact that *śyena* has been enjoined by the injunction for a particular purpose. However Kh. also accepts the *adharmatva* in *śyena* with respect to *smṛti* such as *parasyonsādanārtham yat tat tāmasamudāhīrtaṃ* which states that the actions which are meant to harm the others are *tāmasa*. This is a censure of such actions. Kh. derives prohibition of such actions from censures like this. Based on this prohibition Kh. also accepts *adharmatva* of *śyena*. Thus Kh. accepts both *dharmatva* and *adharmatva* of *śyena*\(^ {118} \). This view is also found in the *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi*\(^ {119} \) of Gāgābhaṭṭa. K. refutes this view. K. is of the opinion that there is already a prohibition in the result of the rite by the established injunction *na himsyāt sarvahūtāni*. Thus there is no need to derive a separate prohibition by the censure. This is further supported by the argument that, in the world the term *dhārmīka* is not used for a person who performs black magic. Thus, the acceptance of *dharmatva* in *śyena* is contradictory to the usage.

\(^ {117} \) ko anarthah ? yah pratyavāyāṁ śyena... ityādi ŚB. on JS.i.1.2.(pp.21-22)

\(^ {118} \) 73

\(^ {119} \) 73
K. does not stop here and goes on to show that the smṛti such as taddānaniṃ sāttvikam śṛṃtam\textsuperscript{120} along with the dharmaśāstra such as deśe kāle upāyena... pradīpyate yat tat sakalām dharmalakṣānam\textsuperscript{121} together show that intention of the śāstra is to show that only sāttvika actions must be performed. Kh.\textsuperscript{122} while putting forth his view has also supported the dharmatva of śyena by stating that śyena has been counted as a tāmasa dharma in the quoted smṛti. This would not have been possible had there been absence of dharmatva in it. This has been indicatively refuted by K. who states that the whole context is meant for classification and nowhere has there been any indication of the function of enjoining. Thus, the arguments of Kh. do not hold much water. From this whole context we again find that K. has given a new scope of discussion on the topic which more or less seemed decided.

4. K. is seen to refute Kh. at every possible instance with his critical analysis. There is a prohibition in the Veda such as nātirātre sōdasinān grhnāti\textsuperscript{123}, which prohibits the acceptance of the sōdasin cup in the sacrifice named atirātra. However there is also the injunction of the acceptance of sōdasin in the same context. Thus option is accepted in such cases. Kh. in order to avoid adharmatva of the acceptance of sōdasin has stated in his BR.\textsuperscript{124} that even in case of absence of sōdasigrahana, there is implication of the completion of the sacrifice even by the other subsidiaries, and therefore, some excess fruit is implied in order to establish inclination in the acceptance of sōdasin. K. refutes this view of Kh. vehemently. K. raises the question that the completion that is stated even by the absence of sōdasigrahana, is with the intention of stating that it is not produced by sōdasin or with the intention to state that it is produced by the absence of it. If it is with the first intention then the absence of sōdasigrahana will not be a subsidiary, hence there won’t be extension(atideśa) of it. And in the second option again a doubt is raised by K. that whether the excess fruit implied by the sōdasigrahana, is through the sacrifice or it comes independently. If it comes

\textsuperscript{120} Gitā. 17.20.
\textsuperscript{121} Yajñāsāṃ. 1.6
\textsuperscript{122} BR. pg.4.
\textsuperscript{123} Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa XVI.1.8.
\textsuperscript{124} BR. pg. 5
independently, then again there won't be extension of *sodaśigrahana*. And if it is through the sacrifice, then both the *sodaśigrahana* and its absence would become the subsidiary of the sacrifice. In that case, absence of one will only result in the lacuna in the sacrifice and not in the completion which is stated by Kh. And if the subsidiariness of both is not accepted, just as the *vṝhi* and *yava* both of which are not considered as subsidiary at the same time, then the statement of two fruits of both the subsidiary won't be possible. Thus the options would only indicate two different fruits of the two different *bhāvanās*. In such case the statement of Kh. that there would be implication of completion even in case of absence of one, is not justified. From the above discussion we find that K. is apt to critically analyse an issue.

5. An interesting aspect of K. is known in the discussion where K. has justified the views stated in *bhūṭālankāra*. *Bhūṭālankāra* is a commentary on *Mīmāṁsānyāya-prakāśa* of Āpadeva, which has been written by Anantadeva. Anantadeva is the father of K.²²⁵ It has been indicated by K. that the view of *bhūṭālankāra* such as the understanding having *vidhi* as qualificand and *bhāvanā* as qualifier is refuted by authors (probably Kh.) by citing the *smṛti* – *bhāvapradhānāmāthvātam*. *Bhūṭālankāra* states भावनाय मुख्यविशेषतायक्राथान्यक्राथान्य तिर्धरं प्रति प्रकारतया ज्ञापनं साम्प्रविति | ततुच्छम् | ... आन्यात्यार्थस्य तिर्धरं प्रति प्रकारतीतिचिन्ताम्.²²⁶ Taking this statement at the face value, others have shown fault in the said view. K. has tried to clarify the correct intention of the said statement in the present text through a long discussion. First of all he points out that the said *smṛti* states only the primeness of the *bhāvanā* with respect to the verbal root and it does not state the qualificandness of the *bhāvanā* with respect to all the meanings that are presented by the verbal suffix. This is because in cases such as *jānāti, naśyati* etc. the present time is experienced as construed with the verbal root and not with the *bhāvanā*. K. enters into couple of other discussions in between and proves the said experience through logic.

²²⁵ For details see : Identity of the Author
²²⁶ *Bhūṭālankāra* pg. 26
With this been accomplished, K. is left with the task of interpreting the said *smṛti*. For this, K. states that the said *smṛti* must be read along with the other *smṛti* such as *tayo'stu pratyayah prādhānyena* stating that among the stem and the suffix, suffix is prime. As a next argument K. states that all the desired objects (*bhāvyā*) are said to be construed into the *bhāvanā*. In agreement with said rule, the *arthābhāvanā* which is the desired object of the *sābdībhāvanā* must also be construed into it. Moreover, it has been proved in the *adhikarana* of PM that only cases can be construed into action (*bhāvanā*\(^{127}\)) and cases can be construed only in the *bhāvanā*\(^{128}\). Thus *vidhi* not being a case, cannot be construed into the *bhāvanā*. And on the contrary *vidhi* not being an action, *bhāvanā* can be construed into it. As a conclusion of the discussion K. points out that on the basis of the above points, *vidhi* cannot be the qualifier in the *bhāvanā* and the statement in the *ḥattālankāra* is intended to convey this meaning. And not to refute the prime-qualifiandness of the *bhāvanā*. K. has refuted the doubts raised by the opponent. However he has upheld the final views by showing the actual intention of the statement in the *ḥattālankāra*. Thus, K. has shown his unique ability to synthesize various opinions in this context by pointing out the correct intention with respect to the point of disagreement.

6. One of the most original and important contributions of K. is his discussion on inclination (*pravrtti*). This discussion is initiated at the time of stating the view of PM that *vidhi* is *pravarttanā* (inducement). The next discussion is regarding the point as to what is the delimiter of the property of expressed meaning (*sākyatā-avacchedaka*). K. has already mentioned the view of the *mīm.* in general at the beginning, wherein he stated that the *sākyatā-avacchedaka* is the *vyāpāratvā* (function-hood). This view is according to the neo-*mīm.* such as Kh. and it is generally accepted by all. Actually *pravarttanātva* is explained as *pravṛtti-anukūla-vyāpāratva* (function which is conducive to inclination). Kh. states that the *pravṛtti(bhāvanā)* is obtained by the *ākhyāṭa* part of the verbal-suffix, and the *anukūlatva* (favourable-ness) is obtained by the relation. Since both

\(^{127}\) *vājpeyādhikarana* - I.4.6  
\(^{128}\) *arunādhikarana* - III.1.12
of them are obtained by other means (anya-labhya), they cannot be the śakyatā-avacchedaka. Hence only vyāpāratva (function-hood) is accepted as śakyatā-avacchedaka.\(^{129}\) K. begins his discussion by denying the fact that pravṛtti is something that lies outside the purview of bhāvanā. For this, he begins the discussion as to what is pravṛtti. He denies that the fact that the bhāvanā which is obtained by the verbal-suffix is pravṛtti because verbal-suffix states all the volitions. Thus he states the second option that only the first volition is said to be pravṛtti. This is because, only after the first volition a person is said to be inclined. And this is also supported by the adhikarana in the ninth chapter of PM, where the object ārambha (beginning) is defined as the inclination of the non-inclined. Though there may be a doubt that even this is obtained by the verbal-suffix, but K. denies this by stating that since it is not obtained in the desired form, therefore it cannot be said to be obtained by the other. The whole point of discussion is that K. wants to show that even pravṛtti is obtained by the vidhi. Therefore, K. accepts pravarttanātva as the śakyatā-avacchedaka of pravarttanā which has the form of being conducive to the inclination (pravṛtti-anukālātmaka). Thus K. has established his own view of śakyatā-avacchedaka of pravarttanā. And with respect to the present discussion, K. also states his own definition that it is the sankalpa (vow) of the form, ‘I must perform it for this result’, which is said to be the inclination (pravṛtti) which is the meaning of the verbal suffix (and) which makes known all the volitions. Thus we find two truly original views of K. in this context. Such definition of pravṛtti is not found anywhere except this text. Moreover K. claims that acceptance of such a definition would support the view stated in the ēyāyasudhā etc. K. has also shown many plus points of acceptance of inclusion of pravṛtti in the vidhi.

7. K. has made an important observation in the process of understanding of an injunction and has doubted the process explained in the Bhattārahasya by directly mentioning the name of the text. The discussion begins after it has been mentioned that the meaning of vidhi is pravarttanā which is clarified as denoting vyāpāra and that it is construed with the volition (kṛti). In cases such as pacet, the

\(^{129}\) BR. pg. 18.
first understanding is of the form vyāpāravatī kṛtih. Then there is usage of the
form ‘being induced by the other, I cook ’ by which the function(vyāpāra) is
understood as having the form of desire of the other person such as ‘may he be
induced towards the action of cooking’. Then there being trust upon the reliability
of the speaker(āptatva) which is decided by other means, the desire existing in the
reliable speaker as well as the objecthood of the volition related to that desire is
known as existing in the act of cooking. Hence there is inference of the
iṣṭasādhanatā, the knowledge of which is producer of the inclination. Since
iṣṭasādhanatva is known by the other means (i.e. inference) it is not accepted as
the meaning of the vidhi. The same process is also applicable in the Vedic
sentences. The point which is to be considered here is that, how would there be
decision of āptatva (reliable speaker) in the Veda, since Veda is not considered as
said by someone. And āptatva is important in order to generate the inference of
iṣṭasādhanatva. Therefore, āptatva is defined as the state of being agent of
conducive and non-conducive sermons which are not produced for deceiving etc.
and absence of agenthood with respect to other(kinds of) sermons.130 Since this is
applicable to both the worldly and Vedic sentences, there is a decision of āptatva
even in the Veda. This has been stated by K. during the explanation of the view of
the mīm. mentioned earlier. The said definition has been taken from
Bhāṭṭarahasya131. Actually if we go a step further, then the said definition is
indicated in Bhāṭṭacintāmani of Gāgābhṛṭa. So this definition and process is
generally accepted by all the mīm.

But at the time of elaboration K. raises a doubt on decision of āptatva in the Veda.
K. points out that the mīm. accept the self-validity of knowledge. Thus both the
knowledges produced by the worldly sentence as well as the Vedic sentence are
self-valid. But in case of worldly knowledge, when a doubt arises with respect to
the validity of the knowledge because of it being said by a non-reliable person, at
that moment there is discussion on the āptatva of the speaker. This is carried out
in order to remove the doubt that arise with respect to validity. But in case of

130 Bhā. pg. 21.
131 BR. pg. 21.
Veda, there is no scope for the said doubt to even arise hence there is no need to consider the āptatva. Here K. says that the statement that the Vedic īstasādhanatā is known by the inference which is dependent on the consideration of āptatva, made in the(text) rahasya(bhāṭtarahasya)\(^{132}\) is indeed astonishing.

8. K. has refuted many views, but he has also humbly accepted many views. K. states that he accepts the denial of the fact that the smṛti bhāvapradhānam etc. states the qualificandness of bhāvanā towards all the meanings of the verbal-suffix. Not only does he accept the view, but also explains the same in great details. He states that the said smṛti must be read along with the other two smṛtis stated in the context such as sattvapradhānaṁ nāmāni and tad yatā ubhe bhāvapradhāne bhavatah. In the discussion he explains that satta denotes the object in the established state which is capable of construing gender, number etc. And where both the kinds of words namely ākhyāta and nāman are available, there bhāvanā is prime with respect to all the meanings of nominal forms. K. states that there is no word in bhāvapradhānam which states the object with respect to which the primeness is being said, but word such as ubhe is present in the other sentence. K. elaborates further and goes on to state that the smṛti bhāvapradhānam does not lead to the sentence meaning which is unknown and against the experience, but where there is doubt, there it performs the function of restricting the meaning to one of the options. K. demonstrates this by stating the example caitraḥ pacati. Here the logicians accept the understanding having Caitra as qualificand and meaning of verbal-suffix as qualifier, others(mīm.) accept the meaning of verbal-suffix as qualificand and Caitra as qualifier. In such cases, the said smṛti restricts the understanding according to the second option. In a similar manner, K. also demonstrates that the said smṛti does not lead to an understanding which is against the experience in case such as jānāti etc. But in case of pacati etc., the grammarians accept the verbal-root to denote action and the suffix to denote case, and the others(mīm.) accept the root to denote the case and the suffix to denote the action. There exists another smṛti of the grammarians such as tayostu pratāyah prādhānyena (amongst the stem and the suffix, the suffix is

\(^{132}\) अतः तेनेवसाधनवान भुवितिलोकवदेव नस्तुपणनः -BR. pg. 21

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prime. Thus in accordance with the above acceptance and the remembrance of the said smṛti, there would be three options that would be available viz. a) In accordance with tayoṣtu etc. the understanding would be that the case is qualificand, b) as action is understood as qualificand towards all the nominal-meaning, in the similar way the action is accepted as qualificand, by contradiction of the said smṛti, and c) the said smṛti is accepted and the other view where suffix is accepted as denoting the action is accepted, which would result in understanding having action as qualificand. In case of doubt amongst the three options, the smṛti bhāvapradhānām restricts the understanding to the third option on the basis of the maxim that if the understanding can be produced without contradiction of some other valid means then it is not proper to accept contradiction. In the similar manner K. also shows the places such as the answer that has only one word in the nominative case like Caitrah, where the smṛti sattvapradhānāmi is applicable, generating an understanding having the nominal meaning as qualificand. Thus we find that K. elaborated and explained the point in details with suitable examples.

9. In the context of the discussion stated in the above point, there is a very important observation that has been made my K. and it is worth noting. K. states that, those who are determined to arrive at the meaning of the Veda through the Vedaṅgas, such as the mīmāṁsakas, the grammarians and the vedāṇtins, they cannot accept the verbal understanding having the meaning of the word in the nominative case as qualificand, which is accepted by the logicians. Nirukta is one of the six auxiliary sciences (vedāṅga) meant for correct understanding of the Veda. And the smṛti- bhāvapradhānāmākhyātām has been stated in the Nirukta. Therefore, the three systems stated above do not accept an understanding that contradicts the statement of the Nirukta.

10. At the time of stating the meaning of bhāvapradhānāmākhyātām, K. stated that the said smṛti denotes the primeness of the bhāvanā with respect to the verbal-root, and it does not denote a meaning which is against the experience of

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133 अत एव ैवेदां गदेशदायिनेन स्वतंत्र नीपांशकै यक्ष्यांकौ द्विपिनिष्टै: प्रयामन्त्यपदार्थविशेषयं कोद न मन्तने. pg. 177
everybody. This discussion was stated with respect to cases such as jānāti, naśyati etc., because there the present time is experienced as being related to the verbal root and not to the suffix-meaning. In the same discussion K. justified that even in the said case, the present time is construed into the bhāvanā which is the meaning of the verbal-suffix. Bhāvanā is not accepted as volition in such cases but in jānāti it denotes locusness and in naśyati it denotes counter-positiveness by secondary relation. And then K. demonstrates the verbal understanding. Though the discussion was rather complete, as this view is mostly accepted, but later on at the time of detailed discussion on the said smṛti which has been stated in point no. 8 above, K. takes up the same topic and states his view which he shows as also supported by the vārttika. K. states that actually, there is no secondary relation of locusness in jānāti etc. But the verbal-suffix denotes general vyāpāra(function). Since in jānāti the verbal-root cannot be construed into it by the relation of instrumentality or objecthood, which are the two generally accepted relations, there the relation of non-difference i.e. identity(abheda) is accepted. Hence the understanding generated in jānāti is jñāna-abhinna-vyāpāra. And this stays in the agent such as Caitra. Hence the understanding of the sentence caitra jānati is of the form caitraśritah jñāna-abhinna-vyāpāraḥ. K. has supported this by stating that the revered (Kumarila) Bhatta has stated that in some cases the conjugational-ending (tin) is used only for obtainment of the agent such as in bhavati etc. K. also goes on to indicate the intention of the statement of the vārttika. It is also seen that K. generally supports his view by stating vārttika etc.

11. K. makes an important point when he observes that certain kind of doubts can only arise for those who are too attached to a specific principle and who do not consider the topics discussed in the other śāstra. It has been stated earlier that in sentences such as caitra jānāti, there is construction of time into the vyāpāra which is the meaning of the verbal-suffix. In such a case, if a question is raised such as ‘to which time does the function of knowledge located in Caitra belong?’ there would be contingency of the answer ‘caitra jānāti’(Caitra knows). But such answer is not desired. Though the doubt looks valid at the outset, K. points out that such kind of question and answer can only arise for neo-logicians and neo-
mīmāṃsakas who are deeply attached to the language of the neo-logic. And such doubts will not arise for others such as grammarians. We find that K. denies such doubt by explaining the very basic concept of grammar which is actually acceptable to all. K. states that in grammar the verbal-suffix and the words such as bhāvānā, kriyā are not synonyms. Similarly, the cases (vibhakti) and words formed by primary suffix (kṛdanta) are not synonyms. This is because one denotes the thing that exists in an accomplishing state (sādhyā) like the verbal-suffix or the case, whereas the other such as the words like bhāvanā, kṛdanta etc. denote a thing which is in an accomplished state (siddha). There is a common rule that any question expects as an answer only that which agrees with it in all the aspects including the state (avastha). In the above question, the word vyāpāra denotes something in an established state. But the answer which is given denotes something in the accomplishing state. Hence the said question would not expect the said answer. Here we find that K. has solved one of the problems that would have created a challenge otherwise. In the process he has also blamed even the neo-mīmāṃsakas for being too much attached to the language of the neo-logic, in spite of the fact that he calls himself a neo-mīm.

12. Another important point made by K. in the elaboration of the same context must be noted. K. rejects the popular view that if the qualifier and the qualificand are the same in the question and the answer, then there is agreement otherwise there is no agreement. K. demonstrate this by stating the example that there won’t be agreement of the question and the answer such as ‘kutra āpah?’ and ‘iha jalam’. But the answer is accepted as valid in the usage of the world. Similarly the doubt ‘ayam jātimān na vā?’ may accept the answer ‘ayam ghaṭah’ because the question and the answer both have ghaṭatva as qualifier and ghaṭa as qualificand. However, experience doesn’t support this. Here K. makes his point that there is agreement between the question and the answer when both have the same objecthood (samāna-viṣayatā). This objecthood (viṣayatā) is what is denoted by the words avasthā (state), yogyatā (compatibility) etc. There being acceptance of these viṣayatās as having the intention to delimit the cause and the effect, the generation of the verbal understanding would be possible without acceptance of
any complexities. K. demonstrates this by stating the statement that 'in the understanding having as qualifier the meaning denoted by the case-suffix, the presence produced by the verbal-suffix is the cause'. Though this statement is universally acceptable to the mīm., but it would cause certain contingencies. The number which is also one of the meanings of the case-suffix would become qualifier to the action which is the meaning of the verbal-suffix. In order to avoid this, there must be inclusion of the expression such as 'other than the number' in the expression 'meaning of the case-suffix' which forms part of the delimiter of the effect. Similarly, 'the presence produced by the verbal-suffix' must be accepted something which is delimited by bhāvanātva. Similarly, there would be postulation of bhāvanātva as something which is delimited by the verbal-suffix and which is common to volition, locusness, counter-positiveness etc. K. states that all these complexities would be rejected by these two viśayatās that have been stated above. K. makes a suggestion that this must be considered by the learned.

13. An elaborate discussion on the prohibitive sentences is met with in the text. K. has taken up the example of the sentence na kalañjami bhaksayet. Neo-mīm. accept that the understanding of the injunction and the prohibition is of the form 'vyāpāratī kṛtiḥ'. Vyāpāra is something common to both pravartanā and nivartanā which are accepted as the meaning of līn. In case of prohibition, the co-utterance with nañ is the deciding factor. Thus, the difference is accepted only in the relation wherein there is inclusion of abhāva-pratīyogīta in the prohibitive sentence. Since in the relation only the general absence can be included, K. raises the question as to how is there obtainment of the particular absence, without which the said inference of anīṣṭasādhanatva with respect to the particular object would not be possible. This leads to another question with respect to the implication(āksepa) of causality towards the desired and evil which has been discussed in the sixth chapter of PM. The question is raised with the pre-accepted view that implication is not something different from the inference. Since the inference has already been questioned therefore the said implication is also not possible. This leads K. towards discussion on the topic of implication (āksepa).
K. states that implication is of three types and elaborates on each one of them. K. demonstrates each kind of implication with examples from different contexts of PM and proves that none of the said implications can be included in the inference. For example in the discussion on *visvajitā yajeta*, there is use of the logic *(tarka)* of the form that if the volition of *yāga* is not meant for a desired *(iṣṭa)* purpose, then there won’t be generation of any inclination. The said sentence along with this logic makes known the *iṣṭasādhanatva* of the sacrifice. This kind of initiation of the logic is called *āksepa* here and it is not inference. So the question with respect to the discussion in the sixth chapter has been answered. Such kind of demonstration has been shown by K. along with the suitable examples for each kind of implication. *Āksepa* is a very important tool used by all the *mīm.* extensively. It is seen that the discussion on *āksepa* here is along with the classification and demonstration.

14. K. has discussed elaborately on the praise *(prāṣastyā)* and censure *(aprāṣastyā)* which are obtained by the *arthavāda*. Here again K. has refuted the accepted views of the neo-*mīm.* (probably Kh.). Neo-*mīm.* such as Kh, states that the simple definition *guyāvattra* and *doṣavattva* of praise and censure cannot be accepted. Since they are relative terms, it not possible to define them. Therefore praise has to be accepted as the *iṣṭasādhanatva* which is greater than the pain produced in the performance of the action, and censure is the production of evil greater than the happiness that is produced by the action. This same is stated by K. with slight change in the wording. This first definition is seen to be applicable to all the injunctions and prohibitions, but it does not apply to the *arthavāda* of the injunction of consent *(abhyamujñā vidhi)* and the prohibition of the enjoined *(vihi-ta-pratisthā)*. Therefore, a second definition such as *balavadaniṣṭānamubandhitva* and *balavadaniṣṭānumbandhitva* of praise and censure respectively is put forth. This is applicable to all the praise and censure. In the said definition *balavattva* is not accepted as denoting something greater, but it is accepted as denoting *utkata-rūga* (extreme attachment) in case of pleasure, and

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134 For details see summary and the translation.
135 BR. pg. 28
utkaṭa-dveṣa (extreme aversion) in case of pain. This has been accepted by neos such as Kh. But K. vehemently denies both these definitions. K. denies the first definition basically on the ground that there would necessity of inclusion of the particular person and the particular action for the explanation of praise. Because it is seen that a warrior does not consider the pain inflicted during the war as something greater because of his particular mental bent at that time. Similarly devotees are seen not to experience any pain in performance of the worship. Moreover, greater happiness won’t be made known by the praise in case of obligatory (nitya) rites etc. as there is no production of happiness there. The second definition of praise is also refuted by K. He states two options that the utkaṭadveṣa which is said to form a part of balavattva is common to all the persons, or it is associated with the individual. Both these options are denied as the utkaṭadveṣa varies from person to person, and it also varies in the same person at different times.

Here K. has discussed another important point made earlier about the purpose of praise. A person who already has the knowledge of the balavadanistānanubandhitva of the sacrifice, when sometimes he has the illusion (bhrama) of balavadanistānanubandhitva in the sacrifice, at that time the praise establishes the non-validity of the knowledge of the illusion, by which it induces the person. Thus, basically, the purpose of praise is stated as the accomplishment of the absence of obstruction. This view has been denied by K. He states that the person who already has such kind of knowledge would not have such an illusion. K. states that utkaṭarāga and utkaṭadveṣa are by their very nature inducer and repeller. The inducer-ness of the sermons of the Veda and the world, is said in the manner of making known the instrumentality towards that, in which there is a possibility of the utkaṭarāga of the person. Therefore at the time of giving of the medicine, there comes a statement of praise such as there would be obtainment of sweetmeat etc. but there is no statement of the kind that there won’t be utkaṭadveṣa in the displeasure produced by it. K. concludes that even when there is immediate pain, the statement of praise whether true or false produces the
interest in the person. Thus K. states that praise is *sādhuṣaṁavattva* and censure is *doṣavattva*, which are also in agreement with the source text.

Here K. has rejected the view of Kh. that praise and censure are also said to be construed in the volition\(^{136}\) accepting just one cause-effect relation. Praise not being of the form of case, cannot be construed with the volition. But it must be construed with the *sādhibhāvanā* which is of the form of inducement and which appears as prime in the injunctive sentence.

15. K. is not only seen to justify many views of the *mīm.* against the refutation, but he is also seen to justify the views of the opponent at a few places. The logicians accept the meaning of a word in the nominative-case (*prathamāṅtārtha*) as prime-qualificand in a sentence. The prime reason behind this is that, in sentences such as *caitrah pacati* etc. the meanings denoted by verbal-suffix such as the volition and number, both are seen to be construed into the *prathamāṅtārtha* which appears as non-subordinate in the sentence. Hence it must be accepted as the prime-qualificand. The *mīm.* refute this view by stating examples such as *caitrah na pacati, caitrah eva pacati* and *caitrah api pacati.* In all the three cases, the volition is seen as being construed with the meanings of the particles *naṁ, eva* and *api* and not with the *prathamāṅtārtha.* K. raises another doubt which has also been stated in *bhāṭṭaraḥasya* as one of the prime arguments for refutation. In *caitrah eva pacati,* the word in the nominative case is seen to be construed in the meaning ‘other’ which is one part of the meaning of the particle *eva.* The meaning of the particle *eva* is said to be *anya-yoga-vyavaccheda* i.e. absence of the contact with the other. Therefore it is subordinate to the other. Moreover, the logicians have to accept the construction of Caitra twice and state the understanding as ‘Caitra has the volition and the person other than Caitra does not have the volition’. This would result in sentence-split as a single sentence would generate two meanings.

This doubt has been addressed by K. during the discussion on the views of the logicians. It is stated that the meaning of *eva* can be accepted as *anya-avṛtti* (not existing in the other). This meaning can be construed as a qualifier of the

\(^{136}\) BR. pg. 30
volition (kṛti). In such a case there would be only one qualified understanding generated by the sentence such as ‘Caitra is the one having volition which is not existent in a person other than Caitra’. The problem of sentence-split can be solved in this manner. It is stated that even the mīm. accept such kind of understanding in sentences such as atra hi evāvapatanti. In such cases the mīm. accept the intention of the vidhi to be the exclusion of the other parts (parisākhhyā). It is further showed that even the Vedāntins accept such kind of understanding in sentences such as ātmā iti eva upāsita. Both the mīm. do not accept sentence-split in such cases. And there is another way also to avoid the sentence-split. In case of acceptance of dyotakatva (indicator-ness, as against the expresser-ness) of the particles, the composite meaning will be denoted only by the word Caitra and not by two different words. Thus the sentence-split could be avoided. Moreover, the sentence-split does not cause much of a problem in worldly sentences. It is seen that such arguments have not been put forth in other works such as BR. And even in the present text, these have not been refuted. K. has evidently answered one of the most disturbing problems of the logicians. However K. justifies the views of the mīm. by a different argument later on.

Thus we find from the above discussions that K. has not only expounded the theories of mīm. and refuted the views of the logicians, but he has also added many dimensions to the discussions of the neo-mīmāmsakas. He has opened up many new avenues for research through his novel suggestions.
4.vi Texts and Authors mentioned by Kondadeva

Kondadeva has quoted many works and authors in his work Bhāṣṭaratradīpikā. A general mention of their names along with the context is being summarized here as per their occurrence in the text.

First of all K. mentions the name of Anantadeva while saluting him as his guru in the benedictory verse.

In the section on dharmalaksana K. mentions commentators on dharmaśāstra such as Vijnānesvara etc. and quotes from the text. (Vijnānesvara has written the commentary Mtāksara on Yājñavalkya Smṛti.) In establishing that only yāga etc. are dharma, K. quotes verses from the Rgveda, Yājñavalkya Smṛti and from the Jaimini Śūtra. During the discussion on dharman/aharman of śyena K. mentions the name Miśra referring to Pārthasārathi Miśra and his work Śāstrādīpikā. In the same discussion K. quotes the verse from Bhagavadgītā which was quoted by Kh. in his Bāṭarhāsya and in order to support his view K. quotes many verses from the same chapter of Gītā. In the course of discussion on the dharman of brahmajñāna, K. quotes sentence from the Svetāṣṭara-upaniṣad.

In the discussion on vidhi while discussing the meaning of nañ K. mentions the names Tuptikad and Tantravārāti. Both of these form the part of vārttika written by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. K. mentions the name tātācarāṇyā bhāṭālaṅkāra while justifying the views stated therein. Bhāṭālaṅkāra is a commentary written by Anantadeva on Āpadeva’s Mīmāṃsānīyāprakāśa. Anantadeva is also referred to as his father here.
the end of the discussion Anantadeva is again referred to by the name pujyapāda⁴⁹. In the same context the name of the text Nirukta⁵⁰ is also mentioned. At the time of stating the non-inducement by the subsidiary injunction, K. mentions the name of the text Nyāyakaṇīka⁵¹. ‘Nyāyakaṇīkā’ is the commentary written by Vacaspati Miśra on the text Vidhiṇiveka of Maṇḍana Miśra. At the time of stating the obtainment of desired goal from the co-utterance of the word kāma he mentions the name of the text Vārttika as well as the name Bhaṭṭacarana⁵² which is a respectful reference to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. In the same context there is a mention of Miśra again. While demonstrating that injunction has four-fold function K. mentions the name Nyāyakaṇīka again. Along with it K. mentions the name Paunaruktyaparihāramālā⁵³ and credits the text to his father. No such name of the text could be found as ascribed to Anantadeva. During the discussion on inclination, K. mentions the name Guru⁵⁴ referring to the view of Prabhākara. In the same context K. mentions the name of the text Nyāyasudhā⁵⁵. Nyāyasudhā is a commentary on the Tantravārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa written by Bhaṭṭa Someśvara. At the time of supporting his view and stating the four fold function of injunction K. mentions again Bhaṭṭapujyapāda referring to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. In the context of denying the consideration of āptatva in Vedic sentence, K. mentions the name Rahasya⁵⁶ referring to the text Bhāṭṭatantrarahaṣya of Khaṇḍadeva. K. mentions the name of the text Nyāyasudhā again while stating the actionhood of function in the view of the mīm. In the context of stating the view that verbal-suffix is accepted as denoting action K. mentions the name of Miśra again. In the same context the name Paunaruktyaparihāramālā is mentioned again. There is mention of the name Vārttikakāra referring to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa while stating the objecthood of bhāvanā towards vidhi. Almost at the end of the vidhiṇi K. mentions the name Gurucarana⁵⁷

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⁴⁹ Pg. 145
⁵⁰ Pg. 134
⁵¹ Pg. 150 also pg. 159
⁵² Pg. 181
⁵³ Pg. 159 also pg. 167, 2.57
⁵⁴ Pg. 165
⁵⁵ Pg. 166, also 114, 182.
⁵⁶ Pg. 172.
⁵⁷ Pg. 2.43
referring to Anantadeva in the context of stating the construction of praise in śābdāḥāvana.

In the section discussing about the prime-qualificandeness of bhāvana, K. mentions the name Pāṇini while quoting a sūtra from his Aṣṭādhyāyī. In the same context K. mentions the name of the text Mahābhāṣya referring to the great work of Patañjali. K. also mentions the name of Kaiyata who has written a commentary on the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali in the same discussion.

In addition to this at many places we find K. referring to the different views as belonging to different schools by general names such as Navyanaiyāyika, Mīmāṁsaka, Navyamīmāṁsaka, Vaiyākaraṇa, Aupaniṣada etc.

\[158 \text{Pg. 26 x}
159 \text{Ibid.}
160 \text{Pg. 26 y}
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Conclusion

India has been a seat of learning since time immemorial. This is proved from its tradition of passing knowledge from generation to generation in various disciplines. Some of these such as the tradition of Veda is still a living and thriving tradition. As for the other disciplines such as philosophy etc., the innumerable manuscripts lying in various collections throughout India speak for themselves. This treasure of knowledge can be unveiled by bringing to light such works that lie only in the form of manuscript. The present work may be accepted as a small effort in this direction.

Two copies of the present work Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā could be procured for the present edition. It is observed while collating the manuscripts that there are very few major differences in the two readings. And most of the mistakes in the manuscripts are only of the nature of the scribal errors, majority of which have been corrected by the reviser. However, many grammatical errors are left uncorrected.

The present work seems to form a part of a larger scheme of the author indicated by the colophon as we have already stated. But no other part of the present work is available. Nor is there any other work available in the name of the author Koṇḍadeva. Even the author has given no clues to indicate a larger scheme in the text. Moreover the text has sufficiently discussed on the topic that it has initiated. Therefore irrespective of being a part of a larger scheme, the text is complete with respect to the topic it deals with.

The author Koṇḍadeva is considered as identical with the celebrated grammarian Koṇḍa Bhāṭṭa by some scholars and even by the NCC. But this fact is not corroborated from the manuscript, as there is no such indication in the manuscript or in the colophon. Indeed the colophon of one of the manuscripts mentions him as the son of Anantadeva. In addition to this in one of the readings in the other manuscript Koṇḍadeva mentions the name of the text bhāṭṭatāntkāra as authored by his father. Thus based on these and several other internal and external evidences it is concluded that the present author is not identical with Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and the above mentioned view in the previous works seems to be based on a case of mistaken identity. On the basis of the evidences from the text, the author Koṇḍadeva is accepted as the son of Anantadeva. His family lineage is traced up to some
Ekanatha who is also considered as identical with the great Maharashtra saint by some scholars. But the fact cannot be conclusively asserted at the present stage or in the scope of the present effort. However, there can be a definite assertion of the fact that Kondadeva comes from a family of great scholars in the field of Mimāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra.

Based on the family lineage of the author and on the mention of the name of the text such as rahasya in the present work, the date of Kondadeva is tentatively fixed as the end of the seventeenth century and beginning of the eighteenth century. At the present stage only the work Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā is ascribed to Kondadeva. No other work is known as penned by the author from external or internal sources.

It is apparently observed through the summary that the text Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā deals with technical points related to verbal understanding according to the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva-Mimāṃsā. It is spread across forty two folios and has been segregated into three sections as per the colophons of one of the manuscripts. The segregation is also found to be apt according to the topic of discussion therein. In the first section it basically deals with the topic of definition of dharma and its application and non-application to various rites and sentences. The second section which occupies about seventy five percent of the whole work deals with the theory of injunction (vidhivāda). And the third section deals with the discussion on prime-qualificand in a sentence. The text is an elaboration of the said topics in the navya-nyāya language. The main opponent in the text are neo-logicians and the text contains refutations of the same. An interesting aspect of the text is that it has refuted minutely many views of the neo-mimāṃsakas too.

Kondadeva calls himself a neo-mimāṃsaka. It is seen that the tradition of neo-mimāṃsakas is so called because of its following the critical method of analyses and use of the precise language of navya-nyāya for the same. This school is accepted as pioneered by Khaṇḍadeva (circa 1600-1665 A.D.). His three works together cover the whole system of Pūrva-Mimāṃsā elaborated in the manner of navya-nyāya. These have necessitated changes in many basic definitions of concepts and their understandings. Certain works such as Bhāṭṭacintāmanī of Gāgābhṛṭṭa seem to have influenced the work of Khaṇḍadeva. The work Aṅgatvanirukti is another text following the same tradition.
The closest work in nature and scope to the present one is the *Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya* of Khaṇḍadeva. A striking resemblance of *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpika* to *rahasya* is apparently observed in both structure and content. However, the differences in the views of both the authors are equally evident which amply justify the distinct identity of the present text. Khaṇḍadeva's style is observed to be systematic and based on logicality of argument substantiated by statements from the texts of authorities.

Khaṇḍadeva, through his work *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpika* has made many contributions to the system of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Khaṇḍadeva has elaborated up on many topics in his unique way. Along with the refutations of neo-logicians, Khaṇḍadeva has also refuted the views of some neo-mīmāṁsakas such as Khaṇḍadeva. This point has been discussed more than once. The discussion on āptatva, elaboration on ākṣepa, inclusion of visayatā, analyses of the definition of prāśastyā etc. are found in the present text. Many of the arguments of Khaṇḍadeva stated while demonstrating the views of the opponent are interesting as already discussed before.

The aim of bringing to light this work on Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā coming from the pen of an author belonging to an illustrious tradition of scholars is fructified in the form of this effort. The text *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpika* adds to the knowledge base of the Sanskrit literature in general and to the system of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in particular. It unravels the technical aspects of the theories of Neo-Mīmāṁsakas. The crux of this text lies in the addition of many new dimensions to the already established and mostly accepted views. Along with this Khaṇḍadeva has also suggested new ways of thinking at many places which again open up many avenues for initiating new thought and discussion.