CHAPTER V
END OF THE COLD WAR - REAPPRAISAL OF THE FRENCH STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

5.1 Metamorphosis of the EC into EU: New Endeavour on Strategic Thinking

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and withdrawal of the USSR from its satellite countries in Central and Eastern Europe, there started the long process of integration of the newly emerged independent countries into the European Union. Need to evolve and expand the European Union institutions was realised by the two major EU member states, i.e., France and Germany. With the end of the partition of Europe, a new definition of 'Europe' had to be delineated in place of the earlier one that was limited to Western Europe only.

The unification of Germany and disintegration of the USSR brought significant geopolitical change in the European configuration. Earlier, how to cope with the East-West relations was the core point, later security architecture replaced it. On the geopolitical changes in Europe and choices in front of the EC, Pierre Hassner said in July 1990 - paradoxically the end of the Cold War moved the political centre of gravity in Europe to the West, but within EC it moved to the east.¹

Without doubt, unification of Germany evoked fears of German domination within the EU, that could have destabilized well-established patterns of cooperation and reconciliation. To quell this fear in 1991 French President Francois Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl added another section dealing with political union and in particular a CFSP including defence in the agenda of the 1991 Inter-Governmental

Conference which prepared the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (which had been intended to work primarily on economic and monetary union).²

In the wake of disappearance of the Soviet threat to European security President Mitterrand considered declining role of NATO in the European defence in future; therefore a plan for proto-federal Europe was contemplated. And the development of EU with an integrative dynamics could put increasing constraints on its members and reduce the risks of a rebirth of nationalism in West European countries. Franco-German corps was linked to this plan.

The most important problem facing the Community in the early 1990s was of eastward enlargement i.e., to include nations of Central and Eastern Europe into the Community. But it was thought that it would affect cohesion and consultation among powers of the Community.

The review of NATO's role in Europe in the absence of its principal policy aim, that was war prevention or to deter Soviet aggression in Western Europe, became necessary. After disintegration of the USSR, Western European Union (WEU) and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) emerged as potential alternatives to the NATO to base an all European security and defence policy system on.

In April 1990, in Dublin the communiques of the European Council meetings emphasized on the need for European security.³

The unilateral decision on the part of US in Gulf crisis in 1990 demonstrated how far Europeans are dependent on US for their security needs. The unilateral decisions taken by the US on major security issues of importance to Europe were bone of

² See Appendices 4 and 5.

contention between the two which left Europeans seething with anger whenever US did that. The political disunity among West Europeans was visible. The failure of EC to formulate a single policy became manifest in January 1991 when Britain opposed a final initiative put forward by France during the Gulf crisis.

Since December 1990 France had advocated making the WEU the defense instrument of the projected EC political union. But at the same time they were aware of the utility of the US role in European security. The Gulf war in 1990 came as an eye opener to the French decision-makers. They saw big holes in their defence fabric. They realised the fact that it is still a long-long way to go for Europe when they could have a reliable defence arrangements.

Still, France found it difficult to let its decision-making capability pass on to alliance's decision-making apparatus. They wanted it to remain intact. 4

Another challenge was thrown by the Yugoslav crisis in June 1991. Though OSCE tried to abate the crisis, but it did not succeed. And EC found itself helpless in the absence of any institutional means in security area to respond to the crisis. Only in terms of foreign policy, EC could respond as a unit under the auspices of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the foreign policy coordinating mechanism of the twelve EC member states.

This uncertain and conflicting scenario that resulted from the upheaval caused by the fall of a super power prompted Europeans to review their policies to adjust themselves to the new strategic scenario. For that, institutions of past came to fore, their

role and relevance, whether they are relevant and capable of managing the newly emerged challenges is altogether a different matter. This query brought role and relevance of NATO, WEU, OSCE and EC in European politics to be reviewed.

In the post-Second World War NATO was responsible for the defence of Europe against any Soviet threat. European institutions were meant only to look after their economic interests. In the 1950s establishment of the ECSC, the EEC, and EURATOM completed the trio of the European Communities that ensured economic management of Europe. In 1968 institutions of the three communities were merged, there was now a single Council and a single Commission for all three. Though three treaties continued to exist separately, the same principle applied to the Single European Act in 1986. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992) is just one further step. This Treaty contains -

1. Amendments and additions to the three existing Treaties, namely the ECSC, EURATOM and the EEC. The most extensive of the three communities, the European Economic Community has since the late 1960s been designated as the European Community.

3. Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have also been made in a separate chapter outside the scope of the three existing Treaties.5

One of the five objectives of the European Union is -

to assert European identity on the international plane, in particular through implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the

5 For complete details on Treaty see European Union: Europe on the Move, November 1993 (Luxembourg). The Treaty of Maastricht on European Union was signed by 12 heads of state on 7 February 1992; and see also Appendix 5, Text of Treaty; and SIPRI Yearbook 1994: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford), pp.251-7.
eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead
to a collective defence.\textsuperscript{6}

According to the Treaty on European Union the principles and general guidelines
for the common foreign and security policy will be laid down by the Heads of State or
Government in the European Council. For the time being, decisions must be unanimous.
This would mainly occur in cases where current events made it particularly urgent for
common interests to be defended - in the case of export controls on arms. On specific
issues decisions can be made by qualified majority and use of veto has to be avoided.

Areas for joint action are -

- the CSCE process;
- the policy on disarmament and arms control in Europe;
- non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- economic aspects of security, including controls on the transfer of arms
technology to third countries and on the export of weapons.

These areas were to be extended to include neighbouring countries like Poland,
the Czech republic, Hungary, Slovakia and countries of the former Soviet Union.

In the Treaty on European Union, cooperation with the Western European Union
(WEU) is central to the gradual development of the Community's security policy.\textsuperscript{7}

The Community member states regard the long-standing partnership between
Europe and North America on security matters under the auspices of NATO as essential,
despite the ending of the Cold War.

In 1998 WEU will merge into European Union.

\textsuperscript{6} ibid. See Appendix 5.

\textsuperscript{7} ibid. See also Appendix 6.
The debate on concentrating more on European defence organisation resulted from the major changes that took place in Eastern Europe. On the absence of an institution that could play important role in formulating foreign and security policy for Europe questions were raised relating to the role of EEC and WEU. EEC being an institution established by the Treaty of Rome was responsible for economic affairs but WEU on the other hand could play an important role in framing security policy for Europe. This lack was felt during these upheavals and finally Gulf war awakened dormant issues of European security infrastructure. Former French foreign minister Roland Dumas expressed his views in front of the Western European Union Council of ministers in 1991 that: "Europe was not present enough in the Gulf because 'no political Europe yet exists that its security and defence dimension is limited.'"8

Further he said:

If we wish to create Europe, 'defence Europe' will also have to be created as an integral part of an indivisible whole.... There is nothing in this process that could debilitate the Atlantic Alliance or its military systems.... His concern does not mean we are going to have the alliance telling the Europeans what they may, or may not, do.

This debate brought Europeans to most sensitive question of role of NATO in Europe in wake of changing circumstances. This relationship hung between two sets of opinion one who represented reduced role of NATO in Europe and gradual withdrawal from Europe as no serious threat could be seen on horizon of European security, the second set on the contrary wished for NATO's staying in Europe for defending continent from unseen enemy or threat, above all to maintain internal stability in Europe.

8 Address by Roland Dumas, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of France, 4 June 1991 (Paris).
First point of view was represented by France as President Mitterrand said that France would remain a "loyal ally" but was also determined to preserve its independence in relation to the alliance.9

Keeping in mind uncertainties of political events, former French Defence Minister Pierre Joxe aptly said:

Everyone admits that a Soviet attack against Western Europe today is highly improbable.... However, history teaches us that sudden changes are always possible in politics. So, in spite of the improvement in relations with the Soviet Union, which we must pursue and support, we can neither abandon nor neglect the permanent factors of equilibrium guaranteeing long-term security and the stability of the continent.

In the face of Soviet power, and perhaps one could say more generally in the face of any threat to the security of the North Atlantic Treaty countries, European security and equilibrium depend on deterrence, which in turn is bound up both with the solidity of the alliance and the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent.10

But simultaneously,

... the organisation of common defence needs to change... We have reached a comparative level of prosperity. We need the intellectual courage and no doubt perspicacity to be ready to draw conclusions as regards defence.11

In May 1991 NATO announced creation of a multinational rapid reaction force that could be deployed from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. But van Eekelen stressed the need for the WEU to have an instrument of its own in Europe and outside Europe.12


11 ibid.

12 European Documents, no.1699, 3-4 June 1991, p.5.
Complexity of the issue is not solved as yet; debate is going on. New rationale to establish infrastructure for European security and defence are being searched.

According to the Maastricht Treaty, WEU will be the forum for European security issues, which will play a linking role between NATO and EU till 1998, when the term of WEU expires and it merges with EU.

Most of the countries such as those that favour full integration of the WEU with the EU are France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Greece, Spain and Denmark. Other countries that prefer Atlantic links are Britain, Portugal and the Netherlands.13

As per declaration of the Treaty

Cooperation between WEU and NATO should be as close as possible and relations between the two organisations should be transparent and their activities mutually complementary. WEU must act in conformity with position adopted by NATO. Later the WEU institute for security studies in Paris will become a European security and Defence Academy.14

The responsibility of accommodating Central and Eastern Europe's security interests rest with the NATO as there were disagreements between French and other European allies regarding 'widening' or 'deepening' of European integration.

In 1994 in the White Paper on Defence, former French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur put forward an idea of 'pact for stability in Europe.'15 The basis of this pact is to be principles and commitments, as established by the UN, the CSCE and the Council of Europe, which refer, respectively, to the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity and respect for existing borders and national minorities. Earlier in December 1989 President Mitterrand proposed a confederation of European nations.

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14 European Documents (Luxembourg), May 1997.

On 10 December 1991 at the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at the NATO headquarters in Brussels - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and representatives of the CIS participated. Their shared goal was to make Europe "whole and free". The focus of the NACC consultations and deliberations will be on security related issues such as "defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian military relations, civil-military relations of air-traffic management, and the conversion of defence production for civilian purposes." 16

As for NATO, in Rome Summit in November 1991, a comprehensive document on "new strategic concept was adopted. The security tasks for NATO are -

1. To establish a stable security environment in Europe in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

2. To serve as transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issue that affects their vital interests.

3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

4. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe. 17

Former West German defence minister Manfred Worner who was secretary-general of NATO also emphasized upon the continuing need of NATO for the defence of Europe. He said - NATO was prepared to "adopt overtime to reflect the role of European security and defence identity, as it emerges, within its own structures," and WEU's role in the near future "as a useful bridge between the Alliance and the emerging

16 NATO Review, vol.40, no.1, February 1992, p.30. NACC consists of 25 nations, associating with the alliance the member states of the former Soviet bloc. The mandate of the Council is to discuss regional security issues and promote confidence-building measures at a time of growing national and ethnic disputes in Eastern Europe and across the former Soviet Union.

17 European Document no.1742 (Luxembourg), 9 November 1991.
European Political Union." NATO has to preserve its integrated structure and its transatlantic dimension in the defence of its members' territories and enhance "Europe's solidarity and collective military capabilities in acting out of area in defence of common alliance interests." 18

According to Worner NATO was a necessity even for united European security and defence identity because it would not be able to balance the immense geopolitical mass of the former Soviet Union.

This may be pragmatic thinking but slightly different from former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas', who too supported NATO's presence in Europe for development of European security. According to him - the alliance itself has to change because of the momentous changes in Europe's strategic landscape. It is clear that the enhanced prospects of European unity constitute one of the key factors in the impending changes. While the alliance must bear these prospects in mind, there is hardly any factor impelling modification in NATO's role.

The present reasons for the changes within the alliance lie rather in the change in the security conditions affecting central and Eastern Europe.

Mutual distrust would be sterile for, whilst it is true that the strengthening of the building of Europe will add to the strength of the alliance as a whole, it is even more true that frustrating the European idea would undermine the foundation of the future European pillar of an alliance which cannot grow by some kind of magic of itself. 19

Another opinion is that longterm presence of NATO in Europe would not be sustainable and a European alternative is necessary for the defence of Europe. Another

19 Roland Dumas, n.8.
French opinion was that cooperation with NATO is necessary during the warlike situations but in peacetime Europe will retain its independence. Simultaneously Europe can take advantage of the fact that Europe does not have to spend on military training, equipments, and can seek help in domains like air transport, strategic lift, logistics, intelligence and communication.

It will be relevant for facing any threat that arises without any provocation, in peacekeeping operations, for political solidarity between Europeans and Americans.

There was a nagging suspicion in France that if NATO stays for long the US itself may stake hegemonic claims. But at the same time France could not deny NATO's relevance to European defence.20

France wanted to expedite the process of European Union, so that reunified Germany could be merged into a federal European Community, thereby attenuating Germany's sovereign powers.21 In the effort to develop European identity Germany and France had to make marked concessions on their national sovereignty. For economic and monetary union Germany gave up deutsche mark whereas an agreement prior to Maastricht was reached to form an integrated Franco-German military command under WEU. To a limited extent, France compromised on its exclusive national defences. President Mitterrand declared that France's nuclear force would inevitably become part of the debate on European defence.22

According to Mitterrand, "France is our home, Europe is our destiny."

20 On the basis of personal interviews with Frederic Bozo and other defence experts. See also Europe, 3 July 1991.


5.2 Franco-German Initiative at Euro-Armed Corps and Strengthening of WEU

Coming together on the same military platform by France and Germany date back to 1982-83, at the time when debate on deployment of Soviet SS-20s was raging in Europe. The US hesitation, that was not happening for the first time in European history, forced these two bete-noir of yesteryears to come together and form a military glacis to defend Europe. A Franco-German commission for Defence and Security was formed consisting of top level officials from defence and foreign ministries of both countries; the basic task of commission was approximation of defence views of partners in order to achieve common military perceptions, with respect to modernization of the French tactical forces and the security problems of the FRC.23

Second development in 1986 dealt with more efficient deployment of French military forces in Germany, with special focus on the French Force d' Action Rapide (FAR).

In 1988 the Franco-German Defence and security council was created with its secretariat located in Paris. It was a major change in Franco-German military cooperation as this Council was composed of the French President and German Chancellor along with defence ministers and foreign ministers of both the countries, and chiefs of staff of both military forces and the inspector general of the German federal forces.24

In 1990 a joint Franco-German brigade was established with 4,200 troops. This brigade was initially commanded by a French brigadier general with a German colonel


24 See Appendix 8.
as its deputy commander: this role was to be reversed in two years time. The initial combat units were two German battalions and a French infantry unit; French armoured battalion joined later. The forces are stationed in Southwest Germany, near Stuttgart, and headquarters are located in Boblingen.25

Most of the German forces used for Brigade and so-called territorial units, used for home defence had not been used previously for NATO.

Without mentioning specific mission for the brigade it was declared that "in the event of crisis, it will fight alongside the other European and Atlantic forces, but would not be a part of NATO's integrated command."26

In the past, Western European security cooperation was closely connected to the transatlantic security relationship. Europeans showed more reluctance in the past to share defence burden with the United States, they were dependent on the nuclear guarantee provided by the US to deter Soviet threat. But in absence of Soviet threat diverse security interests of individual EC members are coming to the fore.

But German position is different. It wants to keep its transatlantic links intact and aspire to develop a European defence identity side by side, without jeopardising its transatlantic links.

In September 1990 French government declared to withdraw 50 percent of its forces from Germany that restored full sovereignty. It shifted its headquarters from Baden-Baden in Germany to eastern France. But troops of the joint brigade were exempted. Biennial consultations between the top-level government officials of France and Germany as required by the 1963 friendship treaty led to a declaration by President

Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl that insisted on a fully operative status of the brigade, emphasised the need of full exploitation of the experiences gained from the work of brigade for other current military cooperation plans, and requested the Franco-German Council to develop proposals for the future developments of common military structures.27

At a Franco-German summit in May 1991, Mitterrand announced to submit a global plan for disarmament and refused. French participation in the rapid-reaction force planned by NATO and of joint NATO command force. He expressed his 'reservations on NATO's political strategy.'28

To keep French nuclear facilities away from inspections of UN International Atomic Energy Agency under earlier disarmament French policy was reversed.

In October 1991, Federal Chancellor Kohl, together with French President Mitterrand proposed to create a new multinational military unit, called Eurocorps. It was an outcome of German desire to provide momentum to European defence identity and bring France closer to military integration. The second aim was to prevent French troops from withdrawing from Germany: the First French Armoured Division. At the same time, a small German military presence at the corps headquarters in Strasbourg was planned. The Eurocorps was seen as a European reply to perceived NATO's domination in the form of establishment of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps.

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27 "Common Declaration of Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Kohl and the President of the French Republic, Mitterrand on the Occasion of the 56th Franco-German Consultations on 17 and 18 September 1990, Munich" (Paris).

At the same time Denmark and Greece, both NATO members were suggested to join Western European Union and Ireland to become an observer.29

The plan to develop Eurocorps received bitter criticism from Britain and the Netherlands along with the US. They accused France and Germany of trying to drive a wedge between the alliance partners.30 To warn Europeans against any such plan Washington asked them to do no such thing that can disrupt NATO.31 The American fear was that the Eurocorps will take away German soldiers from NATO forces.

Germany’s prime aim in the initiative to strengthen NATO by drawing France into closer military integration activities. But this dream fell victim to two conflicting factors: one was French motivation to draw European defence away from NATO, and second was Germany’s desire to bring France back to NATO.

According to the decided plan that brigade would be expanded to a corps-sized element and open to any WEU member as per Maastricht Treaty. This way French troops would have placed for the first time under an integrated command as French showed their willingness to pool military sovereignty with a European force, as part of a larger pooling of aspects of sovereignty in the European Union.32

Under the Maastricht Treaty WEU was accepted as European arm for defence. A planning cell has been created with a responsibility to -

(a) maintain and update costs of force units which are allocated to the WEU for specific purposes;


32 Ronald Tiersky, n. 22; See also Appendices 5 and 7.
(b) propose recommendations as to the command, control and communications arrangements of such force.\textsuperscript{33}

(c) prepare contingency plans for the use of such forces.

NATO still has major responsibility for Western European defence. Member states of the EU have been asked to accede to the WEU and European members of NATO were requested to become associate members. This means now Europe has three security related structures in Western Europe - NATO and WEU - explicit structures and the EU an implicit security structure.\textsuperscript{34} The areas which were allotted to WEU were - peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance to countries at war, peace making by military means. But there should be no conflict with NATO operations in the related fields.\textsuperscript{35}

This enhanced role of WEU was visualised by France in the changed geostrategic scenario, and its notion to strengthen pan European defence entity, with reduced role of the US on European continent. For many in France under new circumstances, NATO only needed a capability for joint planning, common procedures to ensure interoperability and joint exercises.\textsuperscript{36}

German unification also proved to be a strong incentive for the French efforts to achieve European Defence Cooperation. France and the US were at loggerheads about who will be responsible for Europe's defence. This wrangling led to President Bush to react in abrasive manner when he accused Eurocorps will draw German troops away

\textsuperscript{33} Text of Treaty; SIPRI 1994, n.5.

\textsuperscript{34} Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway and Turkey are members of one or the other organisation; this issue has to be sorted out. See Appendices 6 and 7.


Separate WEU and NATO naval task forces in Adriatic Sea to enforce the embargo against Serbia was a visible manifestation of this tension. This grew so much that one senior US official referred to France as a "strategic enemy".38

On 4 December 1992 this clashing relationship finally came to make peace. The status of Eurocrops was classified to the US. According to agreement Eurocorps was assigned to NATO command in the time of attack and crisis-management and peace keeping missions under a UN mandate. But integrity of the corps as a unit remains intact. The SACEUR's command authority over the corps would be subject to political consultation with French and German governments. Another agreement was signed by the three on 21 January 1993 - a three way agreement between France, Germany and NATO. The significant outcome of these agreements was French compliance to put their forces under NATO's 'operational command' from 'operational control'.39

Three conditions were put forward to before bringing French forces under NATO's operational command - that there be agreement between France and Germany regarding release of the forces, that the corps be used for a mission defined in advance by a plan approved by French political authorities and corps could be engaged 'as such'.40

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40 Daniel Vernet, n.39.
The French contribution to NATO was regarded a ‘strengthening of the European pillar in NATO’.41

Later French officers participated with NATO military staff work for a potential UN mandate on Bosnian peace settlement. General Jean-Paul Peisson the head of France’s mission to the Military committee participated in all Committee dealings with peacekeeping missions in April 1993.

European participation or intervention in a crisis would bear prior consultation with the US.

5.3 New Threat Perceptions: Managing Unified Germany Eager to Fill the Power Vacuum in Central-Eastern Europe

With the major changes in the strategic situation of Europe, new security challenges also confronted it. Emergence of nuclear states in East frustrated Western nations. Not only this proliferation but proliferation of unstable states in the eastern part of Europe and its impact on Western Europe made them aware of the dilemma they were going to face in future. Whether they have to include their neighbours in their own efforts or they should wait? Central and Eastern Europeans lacked security systems like West. Western European countries have multilayered security system like NATO, WEU and EU. CSCE does not offer viable alternative. The Central and Eastern Europe is divided along subregional lines as far as security structures are concerned like the Baltic area, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the CIS and Central Eastern Europe.

Another important salience of this part of Europe is that following their liberation from the Soviet domination, various centrifugal forces have been threatening domestic

and subregional stability, such as nationalism, secessionism and ethnic strife, the break-up of the Czechoslovak federation, tensions between Hungary and its neighbours, and war in Yugoslavia.

The disintegration of the USSR and war in Yugoslavia happened at a time when Western Europe was preparing to become a unit in economic and foreign and security matters. Similarly another outcome that made Western Europe to expedite unity programme was German reunification in 1990. Unification of Germany has far reaching influence on Central and Eastern European affairs.

Yugoslavian crisis that broke out before Maastricht Treaty was signed put European security architecture to a litmus test. It seems Europe could not fulfil this responsibility. Below the surface differences of past could be seen. Britain and France had good relations with Yugoslavia whereas Germany had closeness with Slovenia and Croatia. Germany went for recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as sovereign states whereas France wishes to maintain Yugoslavian federation.\(^{42}\)

At various times idea of peacekeeping and peacemaking was mooted by the EC with the help of WEU. That idea met with a failure. Ultimately Germany succeeded in its recognition plan, but the viability and credibility of European defence entity came under question. Europeans failed to prevent an escalation and then to end the conflict, they failed to overcome their traditional differences.

Europe is facing an identity crisis. What is Europe became a question? As was observed that disappearance of Soviet Union left a security vacuum between Germany and Russia, the area where European wars have historically taken place. EU has chosen Visegrad countries - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Romania,

\(^{42}\) Gregory F.Treverton, n.29.
Bulgaria, Slovenia and the three Baltic states were chosen as partners for association agreements.

Extending membership to Poland and Baltic republic can worsen the relations with Russia.\(^{43}\) As for European stability a balanced Russia is a necessity because Russia affects European security either strong or weak.\(^{44}\)

In absence of Russia, Germany is the most eligible guarantor to fill the vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. Bonn is contributing half of all international aid to the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe.\(^{45}\)

Germany is often viewed in other countries with mistrust and scepticism. There is an anxiety about German hegemonic interests in Europe, and about "German Europe". Though Germany itself is responsible for such opinion about itself, Yugoslavian crisis is an example to justify such claims.

In France, uncontrolled Germany was a major issue during the referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht. Denmark also felt nervous in the beginning of being steam-rolled by the big partners in Europe, especially by Germany. The guarantee of security against Germany is one of the priority goals.\(^{46}\)

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44 Leon Brittan, n.43.


Being in the heart of Europe, Germany's development is inextricably linked with that of its neighbours. Therefore Germany should be tied with EC for stability in Europe.

Since the collapse of Eastern bloc in Europe, it has lost former balance of the East-West antagonism. It has been distributed among East and West and now the EC.

With the exception of basic aims such as preservation of territorial integrity, Germany's security interests are defined in multilateral terms - preserving peace and stability - and avoid the formulation of any objectives that might clash with those of other countries.

Security concerns of Germany are divided into two categories - one, concerns carried over from the Cold War era that is called inherited security concerns, another concern is related to Germany's place in international system.

When military threat from Soviet Union ceased to exist, there was no danger to national territory any more. Nevertheless, the defence of national territory - together with Alliance defence - continues to be the primary military mission for Bundeswehr. Another new strategic concept adopted by NATO and Franco-German corps is self-defence. This concept is based on anticipation about Russian expansionist tradition as there are still enormous quantities of military equipment available. According to theory, these weapons could reconstitute a considerable force and pose a threat to Western Europe.

47 Karl Kaiser, "From Nuclear Deterrence to Graduated Conflict Control". *Survival*, vol.32, no.6, November-December 1990, pp.483-96.

Another fear was related to Germany's renunciation of any weapons of mass
destruction. The emergence of nuclear powers within the former Soviet Union can
cultivate new nuclear ambitions in Eastern Europe, that can be a security concern for
Germany.

Therefore alliance with the US for security is inevitable for Germany.

Western European integration brought more security for Germany because it
would avoid any new confrontation with other Western countries.

Understandably, the changes in Eastern Europe can disturb tranquillity and
stability in Western Europe. The influx of refugees, the ethnic conflicts, rise of
nationalism can disturb equilibrium further. The infighting between eastern republics can
endanger political stability and environment. The emerging balance of power in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union can affect Germany's ability to influence events in
the region.

Eastern Europe will serve as a buffer, between Germany and Russia. Economic
development of the region directly helps Germany in improving on its own economy and
will bring political stability as well.49

Germany of post world-war years is a country that has been tied to different
alliances. Therefore it cannot take unilateral decisions that affect the whole region;
another knot in German security planning is constitutional obligation of Bundeswehr,
that prevents German forces to go out of NATO area operations.

For Germany, stability in Europe is uppermost and principal security objective.
Its means are to achieve stability through OSCE and North Atlantic Cooperation Council

49 John Tagliabue, "Bonn Officer is Shot Near Soviet Base in Germany", New York Times, 21 April
1991; and Ronald D. Asmus, Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International
Reticence (California, 1992).
(NACC). Germany uses financial and economic aid to promote stability in the region and bilateral relations to influence events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The OSCE, a suprabloc security institution, was based on inviolability of borders and on confidence building measures. It aimed at reducing mistrust between the two antagonistic blocs. Germany played a key role in developing this organisation. It sees OSCE as an arbiter settling disputes within East European countries and the successor states of former Soviet Union.

It also helped in establishing NACC on 2 October 1991 which is responsible to protect Eastern Europeans from a probable Soviet threat.

Since NACC is an international body, Germany can pursue its security objectives in a multilateral way and cannot solve its security problems alone. It can use the resources of its NATO allies and can prevent accusation of special German role in Eastern Europe.

At present Germany is bound by domestic debate on security and with its responsibility towards its allies. Pacifism among people in Germany has emerged as a trend since its Cold War years. Now it will be difficult for German policy makers to convince the general mass to move away from it.

Secondly in newly emerged international scenario Germany is bound by different security structures. Its relations with NATO and the UN Security Council could prove counterproductive together with domestic reaction if Germany tries to deviate from its present path. 50

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On the French part to contain German power as well as Russian power on the continent, a political union of Europe seems inevitable. As former French foreign minister Dumas expressed French ideas in a speech that "to organise Europe, so that it escapes the two perils of hegemony or explosion... [with] a better-assured security, a will to solidarity." For these objectives, EU and OSCE are "indispensable for the maintenance of the balance of forces in Europe."^{51}

5.4 French Acquiescence into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Missile Technology Control Regime

On 3 June 1991 France declared to join NPT and acceded to it in August 1992. It was a major policy decision on the part of France, which since 1961 was exercising 'empty chair' policy with regard to disarmament. After this announcement France declared its intention to begin to apply the principle of comprehensive or "full scope" safeguards to the future export of equipment technology and materials linked to nuclear energy. And that "France firmly intends to work, in cooperation with its partners, for the universality of the treaty and for its extension in 1995 for an indefinite duration, and to achieve greatest possible international consensus regarding nuclear non-proliferation."^{52}

Earlier any attempt to hamper French nuclear weapon programme would have met with aggressive French resistance. The NPT was regarded a discriminatory Treaty. Opposing Partial Test Ban Treaty, President de Gaulle had said that -

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^{52} "Intervention by the French Representative at the Committee on Disarmament, 6 August 1992", in Politique Etrangere de la France: Textes et Documents, Juillet-Aout 1992 (Paris, 1992), p.75. For complete text of NPT see Appendix 10.
The Treaty was also viewed as discriminatory against France, which was just beginning to acquire a nuclear arsenal. As Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said of the Moscow Treaty, 'What is at stake is not to disarm those who are armed, but to prevent those who are not armed from arming, and that is why we, as far as we are concerned, cannot find it satisfactory'.

But times were different when such decisions were made during the 1960s and 1970s when the world was fraught with nuclear tensions.

Following this announcement, Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy announced about President Mitterrand's decision to suspend nuclear tests also, until the end of 1998. It was a self-imposed moratorium and its purpose was to help stop "over armament and above all the accumulation without end of atomic weapons." But he also asserted that "France will not renounce nuclear deterrence, which constitutes the 'keystone' of its defence policy."

The moratorium on nuclear tests was further extended till 1993, after the US and the USSR also declared to observe the same. [This moratorium went on till 1995]. Further France expressed its conditional support to CTBT - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The condition was that treaty should be 'universal and verifiable'.

When China had tested nuclear device on 5 October 1993, French President Mitterrand immediately declared that "France will not give the signal for a resumption of nuclear tests, but that "if countries other than China took the initiative, France would

be constrained to assure what is called the 'threshold of sufficiency' for its defence, to pursue its own tests.  

Though President Mitterrand ordered France's nuclear weapons establishment to develop simulation capabilities without any further tests.

The cause for these changes was change in Eastern Europe as well as the war in the Gulf. During the operation Desert Storm France received a jolt in its military-strategic policy. The realisation dawned on French military-strategic decision-maker about the questionable use of nuclear weapons. As President Mitterrand said:

We have conventional means that will permit us to defend ourselves and to make law triumph, but we must not succumb to reply on the same level... I exclude it. Neither chemical, nor bacteriological, nor nuclear arms.... To use such arms of these types would be a retreat towards barbarism that I refuse.  

This response of President Mitterrand once again raised question of the rationale behind having nuclear weapons if one is not going to use them. Earlier French stand was clarified by former Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson before the UN General Assembly on 11 June 1982 - he said that France "will not use nuclear arms against a state that does not have them and that has pledged not to see them, except if an act of aggression is carried out in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state against France or against a state with which France has security commitment."

56 Le Monde, 8 October 1993, p.9. See Table 5.1.

### Table 5.1

**Estimated Number of Nuclear Explosions**

16 July 1945 - 31 December 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA a</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR/ Russia</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France b</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2025</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Notes:**

- **a** All British tests from 1962 have been conducted jointly with the United States at the Nevada Test Site. Therefore, the number of US tests is actually higher than indicated here.
- **b** This total, unlike that for USA, does not include tests for safety purposes (of which there were 12, not yet identified by date).
- **c** This total includes tests for safety purposes, irrespective of the yields and irrespective of whether they caused a nuclear explosion or not.

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**Sources:**

But Mitterrand’s stand was criticised by former President Valery Giscard d’Estaing and former Prime Minister Jacques Chirac on the ground that - "By revealing one’s intentions to the adversary, one fails to maintain the famous uncertainty that is at the heart of all deterrence."\(^58\)

Later use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts was justified. Emergence of more nuclear states after disintegration of the USSR had enhanced uncertainty in the area of use of nuclear weapons. Though these states have acceded to NPT but the nuclear arsenal is still on their territory. Dispute between two such states can lead to policy reversal and thus increase danger of nuclear war.

To prevent debate on early accession of France to NPT French observer circulated a statement regarding French position in 1968 - that France had committed itself in 1968 ‘to behave exactly like states that chose to accede to the NPT.’ And to express French commitment to the extension of NPT in 1995 it said - France’s commitment to ‘an equitable and stable non-proliferation regime is based, in part, on the necessary balance between the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of civil applications of the atom.’\(^59\)

Another change that was important for the nuclear weapons development of establishment of missile technology control regime. It was established by seven countries to stop transfer of technology related to development of ballistic missiles.\(^60\)

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\(^59\) As quoted in Harold Muller, David Fischer and Wolfgang Kotler, *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order* (Oxford, 1994).

\(^60\) Original members of MTCR are Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States. For details see Appendix 11.
These missiles are responsible for the main destruction. As the chief requirement for nuclear weapons is a carrier, the debate first started in the 1950s and culminated in 1979 with the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe by Soviet Union. These missiles, because of their short flight time and high precision, were regarded as being particularly dangerous. In 1987 US and Soviet Treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, INF Treaty, eliminated a whole category of nuclear missiles.61

The MTCR was formally announced on 16 April 1987. It controls two types of items to be transferred - one is complete rocket systems and unmanned air-vehicle systems capable of delivering a payload of 500 kg or more to a range of at least 300 km (three-fifths of the conventional lower limit for IRBMs). Production facilities and subsystems for such delivery vehicles are also contained in this category. In another category, it includes propulsion components, propellants, equipment for marking propellants, guidance components, flight control systems, avionics, computer and software.62

France contended and supported the logic that MTCR is not designed to impede national space programmes or international cooperation in such programmes as long as such programmes could not contribute to nuclear weapons delivery systems. France used this as the basis for its decision to supply missile technology to countries that have legitimate space programmes, as long as they are not known to possess nuclear warhead capability. France has argued that under the MTCR rules, any decision to sell is a


sovereign one and that the end-use of the technology it sells will be for peaceful space programmes, then the MTCR permits for such sales.

In 1989 France offered to sell rocket motor technology to Brazil and India. It said that the end-use assurances offered by both recipients were sufficient, that MTCR allows such cooperation, and that France has sovereign right to sell if it so wishes.

Though on US insistence France put the space technology sales on hold.

The Gulf war finally brought France to review its missile technology transfer policy as well as rationale to possess them. Use of Scud missiles by Iraq through mobile launchers created lots of problem for alliance forces during their operation Desert storm in the Gulf. The emphasis was put on anti-ballistic defence capabilities, that is anti-tactical ballistic missile capabilities - a ground based defence capable of intercepting missiles of intermediate range.63

For deterrence and preemption, offensive capabilities, especially advanced non-nuclear strike systems were preferred.

The Global Protection Against limited strikes (GPALS) - a ballistic missile defence - both ground and space-based interceptors capable of neutralising intercontinental missiles including SLBMs was not supported by the French. Dumas said,

such defence may cause strategic uncertainty and instability and result in 'a new arms race in space'.64

Further Pierre Joxe rightly pointed out that -

63 Experts like Francois Heisbourg, Jacques Baumel, Francois de Rose, Henri Conze supported ATBM plan.

64 Address at Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale, 4 February 1992, p.3.
a necessarily selective protection could lead to new geostrategic fractures lines and therefore encourage the proliferation.65

Joxe further expressed doubts about American intentions of showing bias toward others.

"In surrounding the world with a protective bubble of which they would hold the keys, are not the Americans taking up the leadership of the new hegemonic alliance?"66

By introducing destructive weapon systems in the world the US adopted a wide terminology to restrict others, terms like non-proliferation, control regime etc. were used to stop others from possessing the same. But can one control modern genie once it is out of bottle? Technology is like that.

Now latest weapon systems are devoted to space. In the presence of new weapon systems nuclear weapons base take second seat but they still are there as ultimate guarantee for security.

5.5 New Rationale for the French Strategic Defence

According to new Defence White Paper French view regarding its nuclear strategy is -

Our deterrent posture must be maintained for the protection of our vital interests whatever the origin and form of the threat.67

This rationale is given for the totally changed military-strategic scenario as far as French nuclear strategy is concerned. The end of the cold war brought down every tenet

67 Le Livre blanc sur la defense n.15, p.57.
of earlier prevalent systems and structure. The Gulf war exposed futility of nuclear weapons in the regional conflicts if the war is with a non-nuclear weapon state.

It was said that as weapons of mass destruction were not seen as imminent peril during the cold war so France should have been content with a 'mini-super power' force posture. France could assert its nuclear independence because the cold war had frozen the international political situation.

In newly emerged scenario France wants to maintain its nuclear deterrence for two reasons - one is Russia and the other is Germany.

In 1992 Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy said -

as long as there continues to exist, despite the progress in East-West negotiations, an (ex-Soviet) arsenal henceforth divided between a greater number of powers, France must assume the credibility of this ultimate guarantee. 68

Further presence of large quantities of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet Union and West's inability to verify whether promises regarding tactical and strategic weapons are being observed by Russia or not.

To express this fear in Defence White Paper it was clearly stated that in the next twenty years a new threat of major aggression against Western Europe could emerge 'from a state or coalition of states with large nuclear and conventional forces'. 69 To maintain military balance in Europe France will retain its nuclear deterrence.


69 Le Livre blanc, n.15, pp.70-72.
## Table 5.2

*Franco-German Military Expenditure in Relation to Economic Indicators*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GNP (US $b)</th>
<th>Population (in 1000s)</th>
<th>Per Capita GNP (US $b)</th>
<th>ODA/GNP (%)</th>
<th>Military Expenditure (US $m)</th>
<th>Armed Forces Expenditure (US $m)</th>
<th>Military Unemployment</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
<th>Economic Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1690.1</td>
<td>78,819</td>
<td>21,200</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>39,517</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1199.1</td>
<td>57,050</td>
<td>21,100</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>42,433</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a - Official Development Assistance
b - Includes forgiveness of non-ODA debt as follows:
   i - Export credits claims: Japan $7m., UK $17m.
   ii - Military debt; USA $1855m.

Exclusion of these amounts would change the ratio for the USA to 0.17

Another reason for keeping nuclear deterrence was reunification of Germany. Emergence of a politically, economically, demographically superior neighbour in the East made France jittery. Further any kind of alliance between Russia and Germany could have aggravated problems for France. Therefore a US military and nuclear presence was desirable to counter German influence on the continent and with Germany to counter Russian nuclear threat.

The new French nuclear deterrent posture is for a nuclear defence of Europe. In January 1992, Mitterrand devised a "European doctrine" within the European Community for the French and British nuclear forces.70

Though an Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine was established, its credibility relating to defending European countries fell under doubt.

In May 1994 Mitterrand himself voiced these thoughts that building such a united Europe would require 'a century and perhaps two centuries'.

Relations with alliance on the nuclear deterrence issue is still sensitive. Still French nuclear forces will remain under French command. Under the White Paper on Defence 1994 two important threat assessments out of six, to use nuclear weapons are -

First is - 'Regional conflict that may involve French 'vital interests' in Europe on 'in a longer time-frame, in the Mediterranean and in the Near and Middle East'.

Second is - 'Resurgence of a major threat against Western Europe'; although considered 'hardly plausible today, this scenario, if it ever occurred would present 'a deadly risk' for France.'71

70 Bruno Tertrais, L'arme nucleaire apres da guerrefroide (Paris, 1994); and Le Monde, 13 January 1992; see also Frederic Bozo, "Une doctrine nucleaire europeenne pour quoi faire et comment?", Politique etrangere, no.2, 1992. See Tables 5.3 and 5.4.

71 Le Livre blanc, n.15. See Appendix 12.
Table 5.3

British Nuclear Forces
January 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>No. deployed</th>
<th>Date deployed</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Warheads × yield</th>
<th>Warheads in stockpile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft c</td>
<td>Tornado</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1-2 × 200-400 kt</td>
<td>100 e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBMs</td>
<td>Polaris</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1982 f</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>2 × 40 kt</td>
<td>100 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trident II</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1995 h</td>
<td>7400</td>
<td>4-6 × 100 kt</td>
<td>64-96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4

French Nuclear Forces, January 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number deployed</th>
<th>Year first deployed</th>
<th>Range (km) a</th>
<th>Warheads x yield</th>
<th>Warheads in stockpile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land-based aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage IVP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1570</td>
<td>1 x 300kt ASMP</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage 2000N/ ASMP</td>
<td>45 b</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2750</td>
<td>1 x 300 kt ASMP</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carrier-based aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Etendard</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1 x 300 kt ASMP</td>
<td>20 c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land-based missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3D d</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>1 x 1 Mt</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hades e</td>
<td>[30]</td>
<td>[1992]</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>1 x up to 80 kt</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SLBMs f</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-4A/B</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>6 x 150 kt</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Range for aircraft assumes combat mission, without in-flight refuelling, and does not include the 90- to 350-km range of the Air-Sol Moyenne Portee (ASMP) air-to-surface missile.
b Only 45 (3 squadrons - EC 1/4 and EC 2/4 at Luxeuil and EC 3/4 at Istres) of the 75 Mirage 2000N aircraft have nuclear missions.
c The Super Etendard achieved a nuclear capability in 1981 with the AN 52 bomb, and eventually all 3 squadrons were capable of carrying this free-fall bomb. From April 1989, the Super Etendard began receiving the ASMP missile, and by mid-1990 24 aircraft (2 squadrons) were capable of carrying the ASMP. The third squadron relinquished its AN 52s (and thus its nuclear role) in July 1991.
d The current plan is to retain the missiles through 2010 at which time they will be replaced with a modernized version of the M4/M45.
e Although the first regiment was activated at Suippes in eastern France on 1 Sept. 1991, the plan to deploy Hades was shelved soon thereafter and the missile and warheads were placed in storage. The programme had an original goal of 60 launchers and 120 missiles and was eventually cut to 15 launchers and 30 missiles. The Pluton short-range ballistic missile had been retired.
f On returning from its 58th and final operational patrol on 5 Feb. 1991, SSBN Le Redoutable was retired along with the last MSBS (Mer-Sol Balistique Strategique) M20 missiles. The remaining five submarines (Le Terrible, Le Foudroyant, Le Tonnant, and L’Inflexible) are capable of carrying the MSBS M-4A/B missile. Although there are 80 launch tubes on the 5 SSBNs, only 4 sets of missiles were bought, and thus the number of TN 70/71 warheads in the stockpile is calculated to be 384, probably with a small number of spares. Le Triomphant, the first of a new class of SSBNs, was launched on 13 July 1993 and will enter service in 1996, followed by Le Téméraire in 2000 and Le Vigilant in 2000 or 2003. It was due to budgetary constraints and a reduced threat, France had decided to build four new Triomphant class SSBNs instead of the six originally planned.

General de Gaulle linked nuclear weapons with France's international status and honour. In due course of time these weapons are being regarded as a guarantee of France's political and strategic autonomy and a security in unstable and uncertain world.

Considering enhancing value of conventional weapons once again France does not want to part with its nuclear deterrence. Though demand for non-proliferation is growing in the world, France wants to stick to its nuclear arsenals as 'haves' have a right to keep them in their possession. France also does not wish to bid adieu first. French support for nuclear deterrent 'irreversible in the foreseeable future. And if 'denuclearisation' has to be imposed it seems France would be the last one to let it go.

Though new strategic thoughts in France are concentrating on enhanced air and missile defence. Post Gulf war strategies are improved detection capabilities, space-based means, extended air defence.\(^{72}\)

The keywords in the newly emerge scenario after the collapse of communism in Eastern part of Europe, are cooperative security and collective security. That means increasing value of alliance systems. In this new system, when two potential rivals are standing strong in the East, France has to maintain a balance between its responsibilities towards alliance while making efforts to keep its autonomy on security issues intact. Once again contradictions are pulling France in two different directions - one relates to its international accountabilities, another is related to its national responsibilities. At the same time old policy of independent nuclear deterrent seems to be proving costly for France and is relevant for the changed strategic scenario after the Gulf war. Emergence of Germany has made it difficult for France to keep its hold on European affairs. Thus in the aftermath of unification of Germany, disintegration of the USSR and the Gulf War

\(^{72}\) ibid. See Table 5.4.
France has a lot to do to retain its position in Europe and justify the role of nuclear deterrent in the time of denuclearisation and non-proliferation.