The Soweto disturbances of June 1976 exposed the weaknesses of South Africa’s political structure. After the crushing of the rebellion, the verligte (enlightened) elements in the National Party began to question the suitability of Verwoerdian apartheid,¹ and demanded reforms in the social, economic and political structures. The inner contradictions of apartheid (particularly its economic prescriptions) by mid 1970s were also too hard to be ignored by the Afrikaner capitalists. The crises faced by the townships (see previous chapter) had their negative repercussions on the growth of economy.² Impelled by the need of economic expansion, the capitalist class pressed for relaxation in influx control laws (laws restricting movement, occupation and residence of blacks in cities), widening of urban labour market and increasing productivity by providing better education, housing and transport. Towards the end of 1970s influx control laws, which were difficult to enforce, created unnecessary administrative problems, inflated urban wages and precipitated black militancy.

¹ This involved the creation of ten homelands based on the principle of ethnic separation for black majority.

It is important to note here that even during the John Vorster rule some initiatives had been undertaken towards lessening racial barriers on the playing fields and in hotels and restaurants. However these steps were inconsequential if seen in the context of the all pervasive denial of human rights being practiced in major areas such as housing, education, health, freedom of speech, freedom of association and the like.

With the retirement of John Vorster and the ascendancy of P.W. Botha (a verligte and former defence minister) as prime minister in 1978 with clear reformist mandate, the state proceeded to bring reforms in urban regulation, labour legislation, constitutional representation and coercion. These reform initiatives of the prime minister came to be known as 'total strategy'. Besides resolving the internal crisis situation, 'total strategy' was meant to address the challenges that had emerged due to changed balance of forces in South Africa. Independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe and increasing popularity of SWAPO (South West African Peoples’ Organisation), which were signs of African ascendancy, were considered as threats to South African state. An analysis of 'total strategy' is essential as it would help not only in comprehending the white regime but also the position of Inkatha on various issues. The position of other black political formations can also be analysed vis-à-vis Inkatha.
TOTAL STRATEGY

The Defence White Paper of 1977 was the first official document to outline 'total strategy' when P.W. Botha was the defence minister. It was defined as:

... the comprehensive plan to utilise all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims. A total national strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable to all levels and to all functions of the state structure.3

Elaborating further, Magnus Malan, the regime's defence minister, pointed out: 'total strategy' should encompass the state, the private sector, diplomacy, commerce, industry and organisations like Armscor (the government corporation in charge of supplying arms), the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CISR) and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC).4 In other words, this strategy emphasised on restructuring of apartheid state in its entirety involving political, military, economic, diplomatic and ideological parameters.

The proposals of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions of Enquiry into urbanisation and labour respectively, published in 1979, became the first reform initiatives under 'total strategy'. The Riekert Commission categorised Africans as 'insiders' and 'outsiders' and the former being granted permanent

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status in urban areas. It also suggested that control be eased on the entry of non-white persons into the areas marked out for white occupation. As a complementary to this, the Wiehahn Commission recommended improved material conditions, right to form trade unions, to work in urban areas and a municipal franchise. Although these recommendations gave the impression of improvement in conditions of blacks they were half-hearted promises designed to placate the agitating urban blacks while continuing division. The delineation of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ was a camouflage to leave the territorial and racial basis of apartheid intact.5

Another aspect of ‘total strategy’ was the creation of tricameral Parliament under the new constitutional legislation of 1984. As per the new constitution, an all-white House of Assembly, a House of Representatives for the coloured minority and a House of Delegates to represent the Indian minority were created. The most striking feature of this arrangement was the conspicuous absence of black majority. This was a ‘consociational’ structure which did not take away the autonomy of white parliamentary system. This consociational structure was also seen as a component of a larger confederal structure that would link various bantustans and the South African government to facilitate political and economic interdependence of ‘separate’ states. The

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main reason for this entire exercise was that an integrated white,\(^6\) coloured and Indian electorate would weaken the national party majority in Parliament because most coloureds and Indians would vote for the parliamentary opposition. The new arrangement was designed to retain white supremacy and particularly the rule of National Party.

As a quid pro quo measure, the Africans received the Black Local Authorities (BLAs) under the BLAs Act of 1983, which were successors of Community Councils of 1977. As systems of self-government, BLAs were crippled financially due to lack of adequate revenue.\(^7\) The government, however, served its purpose by creating political gap between African population and the state, as direct control was at times risky due to attacks on state property and administration. Apart from this, the most striking feature of 'total strategy' was the dominance of military in the policy-making organs of the state. The National Security Council (NSC) was entrusted with the planning and implementation of 'total strategy'. Reforms, even with several limitations (as seen in the above discussion), were always taken with concern among the conservative whites. A result of 'total strategy' was a split in NP in 1982. Dr. Andries Treurnicht, leader of the Transvaal NP, and sixteen other NP MPs split

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\(^6\) White, here, is referred to the liberal Progressive Federal Party (PFP), the largest parliamentary opposition party which was in favour of a peaceful transition to majority rule.

to form the Conservative Party (CP), a party committed to apartheid ideology.⁸

**Inkatha in the Period of Reform**

The position of Inkatha in the period of reform in early 1980s needs to be discussed both in relation to the government and the opponents of apartheid. This would help in assessing the organisation’s role in anti-apartheid struggles. Following the logic of multi-strategy approach Inkatha rejected several of the state’s reform initiatives and boycotted meetings between the government and homeland leaders over the years. Inkatha, for instance, successfully resisted government plan to incorporate KwaZulu’s Ingwavuma district into Swaziland in 1982.⁹ Ingwavuma located in the south of the Mozambique border and a major part of KwaZulu, if ceded to Swaziland would have meant a major loss of territory. But to Swaziland it would have become an outlet to the sea at Kosi Bay. The government on its part intended to create a buffer zone between South Africa and anti-apartheid Mozambique which was helping the guerrillas of the ANC. In fact this land deal (also included ceding of KaNgwane, the homeland of South African Swazis, to Swaziland) was part of a non-aggression treaty between Swaziland and South Africa.¹⁰ This would also have converted the African inhabitants into foreigners at one stroke. A series of court cases and

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mobilisation of people in the district followed after the declaration. The government finally lost the case at an Appellate Division and the plan was abandoned. Success of the plan would also have encouraged the state to engineer more such acts.

Inkatha also waged vigorous campaigns against the new South African Constitution in 1983 and 1984, urging the whites to vote against it in the white referendum and also a boycott of the elections for the new tricameral Parliament. In order to block the proposed confederation of ‘separate’ states and to give credence to the federal formula, Inkatha and other homeland leaders held ‘unity talks’ in 1983. This unity, however could not yield any result. With the PFP, Inkatha held talks in Ulundi (Capital of KwaZulu) in March 1980 which led to an alliance between the two. In 1982, they jointly opposed to the incorporation of Ingwavuma into Swaziland and later the new constitutional proposals.

Although Inkatha was generally opposed to strikes, stayaways and politicisation of trade union movement, it did support workers’ right and the formation of trade unions. Inkatha’s ideological message to workers was outlined by Z.A. Khanyile, the KwaZulu chief labour officer, in a 1982 speech to members of the Federation of South Africa Trade Unions (FOSATU). He observed that the KwaZulu administration ‘acknowledges and protects’ workers rights ‘because it is committed to free enterprise system’ and because it ‘believes that harmonious relationships will be guaranteed by the cooperation
of industrialists and trade unionists'.

KwaZulu, like other homelands, had a number of industrial decentralisation points where investors were given incentives by the central government for their investments. This included the freedom to pay lower wages due to non-applicability of minimum wage law. But the role played by KwaZulu labour officials was at times confusing. During a 1982 strike at a Bata Shoe Company plant in KwaZulu, the officials failed to bring about rapprochement between the company and the work-force which eventually led to the relocation of the plant. The National Union of Textile workers which was involved in the strike accused the KwaZulu labour officials of having secret talks with strike breakers to ignore the union. Similarly, Inkatha leadership's threat to use consumer boycotts and worker action for change had never achieved success (the only exception was the white bread boycott in KwaZulu in 1982) due to its support to capital. A FOSATU-organised consumer boycott of white-owned Howick/Pietermaritzburg shops in August-September 1985 had to be called off for similar reason. It shows Inkatha's desire to promote business interests, though it claimed to uphold the workers' rights as well.

Chief Buthelezi continued to advocate change through reform and

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12 Ibid.

opposed armed struggle (unlike ANC and other radical black organisations), thereby presenting himself as a critical but potentially cooperative negotiating partner. He was even ready to compromise on the principle of one-man-one-vote, endorsed free enterprise and promised reform and stability within South Africa’s capitalist system if the government took up bold reform initiatives. Branding Buthelezi as a ‘Great White Hope’, Sutcliffe and Wellings commented:14

As South Africa descends yet further towards a state of civil war, there seems a greater likelihood that Buthelezi’s dominance of the moderate terrain in black politics could secure him some kind of limited, probably regionally confined, power sharing deal from an embattled white regime, desperate for muscular black allies.

POLICY OF REGIONAL CONSOLIDATION

Inkatha and ANC break up after the failure of London meeting had tremendous impact on the nature of black politics in South Africa. Open hostility between the two organisations became common occurrence. This necessitated a change in the policy of Inkatha. To face the challenges of the time the movement’s central committee decided at the beginning of 1980 to follow a policy of ‘regional consolidation’. An outline of this policy would help in understanding black politics and more particularly Inkatha’s relations with other organisations.

14 Quoted in Ibid, p. 154-5.
This policy had several aspects keeping in mind both militant and non-militant (i.e., political) nature of the challenges. Inkatha soon entered a phase of 'para-military' activities to face the militant opponents of apartheid. In a study in 1983, E.J. Langer explained that the decision on para-military strategy was taken up by the central committee on July 19, 1980 after acknowledging 'the increasing crescendo of attacks by the top hierarchy of ANC in exile, the SACP and the so called Radio Freedom'.

Expressing his views on this particular aspect Chief Buthelezi outlined in a speech on June 20, 1980 the need to establish training camps for well-regimented impis in Inkatha branches so that the movement could carry on its activities in the midst of chaos.

To pursue this policy, the KwaZulu Police Force was formed in 1980 which acted in coming years as a major instrument in Inkatha's fight against ANC, UDF and other radical organisations. Besides the formal training of the force, such as at the Emandleni-Matlang camp and others, some of the para-military activities were localised and were controlled by warlords. The government had also secretly provided training as part of its plan to fight

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16 The Chief said, "I think it is time for Inkatha to establish training camps where branches and regions are schooled in the employment of anger in an orderly fashion. We need to be able to control riots. We need to be able to conduct meetings in the midst of chaos which other people try to create. We need to tone up our muscles so that the dove of peace sits easily on the spear. I think we need to create well-disciplined and regimented impis in every Inkatha region which can be called out for the protection of that which is so sacred to Inkatha and black South Africa". Ibid, pp. 28-29.
militant organisations supported by the ANC.  

Another aspect of the 'regional consolidation policy' was Inkatha's looking back at the traditionalist following. The hierarchy of Inkatha contained men of old ANC school such as Bishop Alphaeus Zulu, Frank Mdlalose and Oscar Dhlomo. The movement became increasingly dependent on rural chiefs, warlords, and urban racketeers who were interested in building their own power base rather than common welfare.

To consolidate the power base and influence of Inkatha, Buthelezi put more stress on Zulu ethnic identity and symbolism. Shaka Day celebrations were organised to highlight Zulu might and pride. Buthelezi and King Goodwill would attend the celebrations by donning Zulu traditional war-time leopard skin, spear, headbands and feathers, symbolising the tradition of royal house. The emphasis was not always on the militant tradition of Zulus; the revival of reed dance in 1984, performed by unmarried women before the king, was meant to counter the diseases such as AIDS.

Inkatha’s traditionalist approach manifested most profoundly in its relations with the youths. The constitution of Inkatha assigned 'a vanguard role of upholding and consolidating the gains of the movement' to the youth brigade (formed in 1976) and required it to act in accordance with the directions of Inkatha president or central committee. However, the militancy of youth (in

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17 Ibid.

regard to the anti-apartheid struggles) and the generation gap resulted in the development of strains between the youth and Inkatha leadership. In its bid to contain the militancy of youth, Inkatha invoked role of older generation especially that of mothers (through women’s brigade). The members of women’s brigade resolved in 1977 to orient the students and youths towards the objectives of the movement, so that they would not create obstacles to the realisation of higher goals (liberation). Youth brigade members not willing to follow the official line of acting were expelled.

Since 1978 KwaZulu’s youth had been inculcated Inkatha ideology in schools and it was decided to establish a Youth Service Corps for Social Reconstruction (YSC) on a para-military line. The corps were organised into army-like structures with particular uniforms symbolising unity and loyalty to the president. The motive behind this exercise, as described by one official, was that, ‘our youths are getting out of hand. They need to be united and disciplined, otherwise they could be used by other people for their own ends’.

It is important to note in this context that when Inkatha decided to pursue the policy of regional consolidation, IYB with its organisational strengths and indoctrination of its members significantly contributed to the realisation of this policy. This role of youth brigade manifested on many occasions such as

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19 The *Ubufltlzu-Botho* (Good Citizenship) school syllabus stressed the need for discipline from youth.

20 Interview with a professional in the Youth Affairs Division, Sandile Makhanya, by Peta Ann Teague in November 1983, cited in Frankel and others, n. 11, p. 160.
KwaMashu school boycott (1980) and Ngoye incident. Often it led to fighting with students owing allegiance to radical organisations as happened during Ngoye violence (discussed below).

Third aspect of 'regional consolidation' policy manifested in the Buthelezi Commission recommendations (discussed below) and the Indaba proposals (to be discussed in next chapter). The Buthelezi Commission, by prescribing for single unit of governance for both KwaZulu and Natal, had aimed at strengthening the position of Inkatha within the region, because of its strong support base. The Natal Indaba further carried forward the recommendations of Buthelezi Commission. It proposed the setting up of a joint legislature for both KwaZulu and Natal. It also strengthened alliances between Inkatha and capital.

Fourthly, Inkatha sought to strengthen its position in the 1980s by providing material help to the people. The patronge activities were not just confined to business community (termed as petty bourgeoisie), the beneficiaries also included KwaZulu civil servants, unemployed youths and the poor. Pensions, land, and employment opportunities were made available through Inkatha and KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA). In this respect Inkatha claimed to be different from organisations such as United Democratic Front and Congress of South African Trade Unions who had no such means at their disposal to deliver.

The fifth and final aspect of the regional consolidation policy was
Inkatha’s access to media and information network. *Ilanga* newspaper, KwaZulu Bureau of Information and its publications such as *Clarion Call* and *Umnoxi*, Inkatha mouthpiece *Inhlabamkhosi* and South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) radio and television helped the organisation in spreading its messages among the people. Although not as strong as the ANC, Inkatha’s overseas offices in London, America and Germany helped in mobilising funds. The objective was to make Inkatha’s regional base strong.

The policy noted above was primarily designed to make the movement’s regional base strong in the face of growing attacks from radical organisations. Once this was achieved it would be easier to make its presence felt in national politics.

It is important to note here that discussion on the ‘policy of regional consolidation is not concluded here, as it was followed all through 1980s and even in 90s. The present discussion is limited till 1984, hence in the subsequent chapters this aspect will be analysed further.

**INKATHA AND BLACK POLITICS IN EARLY 1980s**

Since the beginning of 1980s Inkatha’s relationship with the ANC and its allies was been very bitter. In its attempt to marginalise Inkatha nationally as well as on the home ground in Natal, ANC started vigorous campaigns after 1980. The message was spread into South Africa by Radio Freedom broadcast: Buthelezi was the ‘major polical foe of the ANC inside South Africa’; ‘the
snake poisoning the people of South Africa – it needs to be hit on the head’.

Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders became increasingly critical of Buthelezi and often attacked him publicly as he did not support school boycotts and other popular campaigns in this period. In 1980 the school boycott in KwaMashu township in KwaZulu demonstrated the first instance of Inkatha-ANC hostility after their break up. This boycott was part of a countrywide school boycotts which started in African secondary schools in Cape Town. The grievances of students concerned mainly the standard and quality of education imparted to blacks. The first manifestation of boycott in KwaZulu/Natal region was a demonstration of about 6000 students in Durban on April 23. The police could manage to break this demonstration. On April 30 pupils at KwaMashu staged a protest march which was suppressed by police action. Students of a high school in Imbali (Pietermaritaburg) boycotted their classes on May 8 in protest against expensive uniforms and R10 charged for fencing the school. Unrest in schools continued despite attempts by Inkatha and Buthelezi to contain it. In a rally at Princess Magogo stadium on May 18 the Chief argued against the boycott as a strategy to fulfil demands. He saw no future for this kind of protest. “... It is nothing short of political sabotage, treachery and treason to present the people with alternatives which are not viable and cannot succeed”.

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21 Taylor, n. 18, pp. 352-3.


23 Rand Daily Mail, May 18, 1980.
About 6000 pamphlets were distributed by KwaZulu MPs on May 13, calling on the pupils to end boycotting educational institutions. But the situation did not improve. Newspaper reports indicated that classrooms in KwaMashu were deserted by boycotting students. There were also reports of intimidation and violence and both Inkatha and ANC-supported protesters were accusing each other. Violence continued in KwaMashu and other parts of Natal even in August. Two opposing viewpoints exist in regard to this boycott. For the ANC alliance, these events reflected the revolutionary potential of school pupils and had in them a strong anti-apartheid sentiment. They treated the boycotts as part of larger struggles against apartheid. hence the party was in favour of pupil’s struggles and was highly critical of police action and those organisations which did not support them. Inkatha, on the other hand, considered the boycott as an element of ANC’s strategy of ungovernability. It was precious waste of time and talent on something which was most unlikely to achieve. In line of its strategy to achieve liberation, the organisation’s opposition to boycotts was not surprising. To the ANC’s call for ‘liberation now, education later’, Inkatha gave the slogan ‘education for liberation’. At the root of hostility between them remained this fundamental difference.


The Chief and his Inkatha supporters were very critical of the criticisms by the ANC. Oscar Dhlamo, the KwaZulu minister of education and the general secretary of Inkatha, warned that “Inkatha was now ready to shed blood when it comes to dealing with those people who make, it their hobby to discredit the stature of Chief Buthelezi as our leader”. He even went a step ahead by predicting a possible tribal war between Inkatha (largely Zulu tribe) and ANC (largely Xhosa), if rivalry between the two continued unabated.

Continuing its anti-ANC activities, a resolution was passed in KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in April 1983 declaring ANC as “opponents of the black people”. However, gradually ANC received strong popular support especially among the angry and impatient young blacks for its guerrilla and terrorist actions, much to the disadvantage of Inkatha. In this regard, apart from several other activities, the car bomb explosion by the ANC outside the military headquarters in downtown Pretoria on May 20, 1983 was particularly important not only because of the casualties but this attack marked a tactical shift in

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28 Ibid.


30 19 people were killed and more than 200 injured including blacks in this blast. For details see Ibid, pp. 384-7.
approach.\textsuperscript{31} The popular reaction to this attack, as described by Joseph Lelyveld, was jubilant, despite the fact that blacks were among the victims.

The year 1983 was a crucial one in South African politics, as it saw the emergence of two political organisations – the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the National Forum (NF). The UDF brought under its fold about 650 local, regional and community organisations ranging from Soweto civic association to small town sports clubs and became a major force in the fight against apartheid.\textsuperscript{32} Its aims as adopted at the launching conference at Mitchell’s Plain near Cape Town were the creation of a united democratic South Africa, based on the will of the people and without Bantustans and Group Areas. It was also closely linked with ANC. However unlike ANC in the 1950s it established a link between the deprivation of people (socially and economically) at the grass roots level and the lack of political representation and rights at the national level.\textsuperscript{33} The National Forum – a body of about 200 organisations, although shared the long-term aims of the UDF, followed the ‘black consciousness’ tradition of Steve Biko. Whereas the ANC and UDF accepted the position of whites, the NF put emphasis on psychological freedom of blacks through self-

\textsuperscript{31} Attack on military headquarters was a tactical shift, as the previous attacks were targeted on mainly civilian departments.

\textsuperscript{32} The Economist, September 14, 1985, p. 30-1.

reliance.\textsuperscript{34} It was thus more close the banned PAC. The discussion below will focus on UDF-Inkatha relationship because of its primacy.

The relation between Inkatha and UDF had been very bitter right from the beginning. The denial of affiliation to Inkatha by UDF had much to do with this bitterness, especially when it (Inkatha) was facing growing radicalism in black politics after the break up with ANC. Buthelezi accused UDF as an 'internally based surrogate' of ANC set up to destroy Inkatha. Archie Gumede, a UDF President, even refused a KLA invitation to address the Assembly because that would compromise the alliance’s basic position in regard to apartheid. UDF considered KLA as an instrument of coercion by holding it similar to that of white regime. It also regarded Buthelezi as a sell-out. Inkatha, in order to counter the UDF advancement in KwaZulu, resorted to stricter control of its population and administration. Buthelezi threatened to dismiss KwaZulu civil servants who worked for UDF. He also held the UDF responsible for increasing student’s unrest in KwaZulu. Supporters of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the Azanian Students’ Organisation (AZASO), all affiliates of UDF, were allegedly excluded from KwaZulu educational institutions.

Ngoye Violence

The first manifestation of Inkatha-UDF hostility was the violence at

\textsuperscript{34} The Economist, October 13, 1984, pp. 24, 27.
University of Zululand situated at Ngoye (near Empangeni, northern Natal). The event was a commemoration ceremony of the death of Zulu King Cetshwayo (whose army clashed with the British during the Anglo-Zulu war in 1879 at Isandlwana with Zulus scoring victory at first encounter) which was organised by a branch of the IYB at the University. The president of Inkatha was invited to address the ceremony. The students supporting ANC and then operating under the banner of UDF vehemently opposed to Buthelezi addressing the meeting. They even tried to obtain a court order without success to restrain Inkatha leader’s entry into the campus. The ceremony took place on October 29, 1983. Violence soon broke out between the students and supporters of Inkatha leading to five deaths and over a hundred injured.  

The ANC and the UDF put the entire blame on Inkatha for the casualties. However, if Middleton Commission is to be believed the violence was a result of hatred that the students had towards Inkatha for its role in homeland. Inspired by the ideology of ANC and UDF, the students considered Buthelezi a ‘sell out’ and a ‘puppet’. This feeling of hatred was challenged by Inkatha supporters which resulted in the clash. Narrating the event, Reverend Musa Zondi, national chairperson emeritus (honorary) of IYB


36 Ibid.

37 A commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of Professor A.J. Middleton of the University of South Africa was appointed to look into the Ngoye killing. For its finding see Ibid, pp. 136-140.
and a member of IFP national council told, “As we arrived at the University early that morning (October 29) we were stoned away and told that we were not welcome and that our leader who was called a “dog”, a “sell out” and would be turned into minced meat. Then the clash broke out leading to serious injuries and deaths on both sides”.

The Middleton report did not find substance in the claims that Inkatha impis attacked the hostels with assistance from KZP, Inkatha women Brigade exerted pressure on women students and many such allegations of ANC and UDF. But the involvement of Inkatha supporters in violence cannot be denied since the visitors (who the Commission held responsible for violence) as defined by the Commission were Inkatha people who had come to the campus to attend the ceremony.

The Ngoye killing was a case of Inkatha and ANC/UDF hostility. UDF, due to its legal status, was more visible at that time in comparison to the ANC. There was however nothing new in the hostility which had always been there at ideological level. But violent manifestations of hostility like this one was not very frequent earlier as it became after this event.

**Inkatha and Issue of Township Incorporation**

The next issue which brought Inkatha in conflict with the UDF was the Pretoria proposed incorporation of black townships into KwaZulu homeland. On August 31, 1983 the Department of Cooperation and Development
announced that two Durban townships – Lamontville and Hambanathi, would be incorporated into KwaZulu. This was part of the government’s homeland consolidation plan of 1975. By incorporating black townships it thought to reduce black population in white areas. Once incorporated their responsibility would fall on the homeland. Before this declaration, rent increases in these townships in November 1982, then under the administration of Port Natal Administration Board (PNAB), had created hue and any among the residents. This helped the residents to unite under one umbrella organisation known as Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC), established on April 8, 1983. So by the time announcement for incorporation came, the townships had an organisation to fight for their cause. JORAC was an affiliate of the UDF. Under the leadership of Reverend Mcebisi Xundu, Mr. Daniel Tshabalala, chairman of JORAC, it came out openly against the incorporation. It was stated that incorporation would deprive the residents their Section 10 rights – entitling them to work and live in city. This would also deprive their birthright as citizens of South Africa in case the homeland to which incorporation would be done (here it was KwaZulu) accepted independence. The majority opinion,

39 In Lamontville, bus fares were increased by 20%, and rents by 90%. The increase was also affected in Hambanathi and other PNAB townships. Jeffery, n. 26, p. 49.

40 In March 1984 the PNAB was merged with Drakensburg Administration Board (having jurisdiction over Pietermaritzburg townships) and a new Natalia Development Board was born.

41 Section 10 was a part of the Bantu Urban Areas Consolidation Act, no. 25 of 1945. It was repealed in 1986 with the abolition of influx control.
argued JORAC, was not in favour of incorporation. Opinion polls conducted for this purpose substantiated this claim.\textsuperscript{42}

So far as the position of Inkatha was concerned, the organisation's interest in the issue, as claimed by it, stemmed from the requests of the residents that they wanted to be incorporated into KwaZulu. A delegation of Hambanathi residents met Buthelezi in Ulundi in 1983 to argue in favour of incorporation.\textsuperscript{43} It is quite logical to argue that incorporation of townships would have been a territorial gain for KwaZulu considering the geography of the homeland (KwaZulu was fragmented into separate pieces) and the proximity of its territory to the borders of white cities and their satellite black townships, any addition of land would have strengthened Inkatha's base further. This would have been particularly beneficial at a time when Inkatha's hostility towards ANC/UDF was increasing. But it did not decide on the issue unilaterally, rather preferred it to be decided by the residents themselves. A resolution in this regard was passed by the Inkatha general conference.\textsuperscript{44} The organisation did, however, discounted the criticisms of JORAC/UDF as

\textsuperscript{42} A poll of 100 residents in Lamontville and two other townships (Chesterville and Klaarwater) also under the proposed scheme showed that 17\% preferred KwaZulu as an alternative to the PNAB and 65\% favoured Durban City Council. In another poll 87\% of 736 respondents in Lamontville gave their opinion against incorporation. For details of these pools, see Michael Sutcliffe and Paul Wellings, "Inkatha versus the Rest: Black Opposition to Inkatha in Durban's African Townships", \textit{African Affairs}, vol. 87, no.348 (July 1988), pp. 325-360.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Natal Mercury}, (Durban), June 15, 1984. Also see Anthea Jeffery, n. 26, p. 142.

\textsuperscript{44} See Ibid.
mentioned above. On Inkatha’s insistence it was clarified by the government that incorporation would not affect the residents’ rights under Section 10. The criticism that the residents would lose their birthright as South Africans was not proper since KwaZulu had refused independence plan of the government.

The differences between Inkatha and JORAC/UDF as noted above were quite evident. What was disturbing, however, was the violent dimension of this relationship. The first such event took place on July 22, 1984 in Lamontville. The occasion was the unveiling of a tombstone to commemorate the death of Msize Dube. Violence broke out between supporters of Inkatha and JORAC resulting in death of three people from the former category. UDF attributed the deaths to the provocation by Inkatha members. Apart from this incident, many more violent encounters occurred between the rival groups since the issue was highlighted. Incorporation remained in focus till 1986 when influx control was abolished. This made the requirements under Section 10 meaningless.

From the above account it is clear that both the sides were responsible for the violence that took place over the issue. So far as the degree of support in

45 Ibid.

46 Msize Dube was a key figure in the formation of JORAC. He was killed in April 1983 by marked gunmen.

47 Jeffery, n. 26, p. 50.

townships was concerned JORAC/UDF had more popularity than Inkatha. The very nature of the issue helped the former to gain acceptability among the people. It was felt that incorporation would put them under an impoverished homeland administration which meant poor social services. Finally, for the reasons mentioned above Inkatha’s involvement in this issue was marked by caution. On the one hand it claimed to have no interest in black townships and was rather asked for incorporation by the township representatives. On the other hand it argued in favour of incorporation by countering the criticisms by JORAC. This indicated its support albeit a cautious one.

BUTHELEZI COMMISSION AND CONSOCIATIONALISM

In the face of growing political unrest, economic slump (due to fall in gold price in 1981 and other market-related problems) and deteriorating material and social conditions at the beginning of 1980s coupled with half-hearted reform initiatives undertaken by the Botha regime; several scholars debated upon the idea of ‘consociationalism’ as a viable alternative to democratise South African society without compromising the position of different races and ethnic entities and also in a peaceful manner. It is appropriate to note here that the tricameral Parliament involving whites, coloureds and people of Indian origin which was introduced under the new

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49 Gold price fell to US$ 460 from an average US$ 613 per ounce in 1980. For details of economic problems see Douglas Booth, n. 7, p. 38.
constitution, was an attempt to bring consociational central government structure. But the limitations of this arrangement, as discussed earlier, do not allow this to establish a linkage with the South African situation. In other words, complex racial composition of South African society requires a dynamic and all-encompassing system rather than this one, as it was designed to refurbish the segregationist ideology into an acceptable form. In this context the recommendations of Buthelezi Commission opened up a debate on South Africa's future political system.

The Commission was constituted in April 1980 under the chairmanship of Professor G.D.L. Schreiner. It had forty members which included: representatives of big capitalists (e.g. Anglo-American, South African Federated Chamber of Industry, Institute of Bankers), Natal-based enterprises (e.g. Chambers of Commerce, South African Cane Growers Association), KwaZulu (e.g. Inkatha, KwaZulu Development Corporation), representatives of professional bodies, and some internationally well known social scientists, notably Heribert Adam, Herman Giliomee, Arendt Lijphart and Lawrence Schlemmer (the head of Inkatha Institute). Among the political parties, both ANC and the ruling National Party turned down the offer, but the Progressive Federal Party, the New Republic Party coloured Labour Party and Indian Reform Party accepted the offer of membership.

The report of the Commission subtitled 'The requirements for stability and development in KwaZulu and Natal' was published on March 8, 1982. The
main task entrusted to the Commission was to devise a constitutional set up for Natal and KwaZulu within the context of South Africa. As told by Buthelezi in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, the main reason for the constitution of the Commission was the realisation that the present ‘political impasse’ could not be solved by violent means and the time had reached for a black political initiative to find out a future constitutional solution. The basic idea behind this exercise was that Natal would become a testing ground for the new political set up which could as well be made applicable in the whole of South Africa.

Recommendations of the Commission

After highlighting the economic disparity between blacks and whites and also the homeland and Natal, and acknowledging the adverse impact of Group Areas Act and influx control laws on development and findings of some opinion surveys, the Commission observed that both Natal and KwaZulu

50 S.C. Saxena, South Africa: Walking the Last Mile (Delhi, 1992), pp. 263-4.
52 The Commission observed that if the 1975 KwaZulu consolidation plan was implemented it would leave only 38% land for 77% of population. KwaZulu, having 55.7% of population of the region (both KwaZulu and Natal) had a share of only 6.2% of the total output (1967). This had resulted dependence of the homeland on migrant workers (77.8% in 1976) and economic deprivation. The gap between urbanisation rate of whites and blacks was enormous, whites – 89.8% and blacks – 22.5%. For details, see Buthelezi Commission Report, vol. II, (Durban, 1982), pp. 134-69.
53 A survey of Africans (predominantly Zulus) conducted in Soweto, Witwatersrand and metropolitan, small town and rural areas in KwaZulu reported majority support to universal franchise in a unitary system. Ethnic. area and territorial separation of Africans found little
should be integrated into one region having one administrative apparatus in which all groups would have some representation.

After discussing several alternatives, like Westminster-style majoritarianism, partition, separate development, political parallelism (i.e. separate parliaments for different racial groups), ethnically based federation, continuous co-option (in which franchise is extended gradually to members of subordinate groups) and geographically based federation (though good, was rejected, as it would require to develop some mechanism to protect white minority rights), the commission finally adopted consociational democracy as it would allow every group a place in governmental process and scope for cooperative decision-making. It would also ensure protection of minority rights and their representation in the executive.

It was recommended that a parliament of about 150 members should be set up for the region. Election would be based on universal suffrage and proportional representation of the list system type. Cabinet would consist of a prime minister elected by majority of members, and other ministers appointed by the prime minister. Besides safeguarding minority representation in cabinet, the report prescribed for a system of veto to the minorities of about 5 to 10


Southall, n. 53, p. 88.
percent of the members of legislature in matters concerning their cultural rights and other fundamental issues. An independent judiciary was given the power to examine the constitutional validity of legislation. The central government in Pretoria was given a key role as the new administration would be financed by it on a formula basis and the region would continue to be represented in the central parliament.

Major recommendations of the Commission in regard to social and economic spheres were removal of racial discrimination in labour and property markets, rehabilitation of migrant labour in urban areas, development of the homeland, abolition of Group Areas Act and influx control laws, extension of freehold rights to all races, educational opportunity for all race groups to develop skilled manpower and knowledge and finally the recognition of the right of cultural groups to establish and manage their own schools.

Limitations of the Recommendations

The recommendations of the Buthelezi Commission had many limitations. At the start, the report was based on some objectionable assumptions. Firstly, the assumption that South African politics was dominated by conflicts of races and ethnic groups, was not wholly true as it ignored the more radical perspective which considered racial conflicts as a product of

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55 Buthelezi Commission Report, n. 52, pp. 76-84.
capitalist growth and struggle between classes. Secondly, the argument that under the growing costs of apartheid policy, the whites would increasingly move in the direction of power-sharing, was also not a well-substantiated one. The truth was that the more entrenched Afrikaner settlers which had firm control over the NP government would not readily sacrifice their racial privileges.

The report also did not take into account the Africans freedom of political choice, or in other words the possibility of alternative political grouping(s) was not dealt with. Although the principle of proportionality was extended to the legislature, it was not so in case of a joint public service. This, according to R.J. Southall, was an indication of partial white acceptance of the consociational model as they (whites) would remain in key administrative positions. Another major handicap of the proposed political dispensation was the superiority of Pretoria over KwaZulu-Natal both for finance and political authority. This would seriously undermine the positive aspect of consociational arrangement. On the economic front, the report did not offer any concrete suggestion to ameliorate poverty and lopsided development of KwaZulu and Natal.


59 Southall, n. 53, p. 98.
By forwarding a radical Marxist criticism, Sam Nolutshungu argued that consociational theory was silent on the issue of class conflict and economic inequality; hence, it was more receptive to black elites rather than redistributive economic justice.\textsuperscript{60} The Commission’s emphasis on the need for economic equality and deracialisation of KwaZulu-Natal’s political economy did not address the more ‘fundamental inequalities of racial capitalism’. The proposals would also help large-scale capital as it emphasised skill improvement, stabilised cheap urban work force and a ‘strong and healthy’ trade-union movement all essentials of growth of capital.\textsuperscript{61}

**State Response to the Report**

Prime Minister Botha rejected the consociational plan and so did the Finance Minister Owen Horwood in 1982. However in 1985, when the Pretoria regime went ahead with the plan of restructuring the second tier of the government by abolishing the Provincial Council, it indicated in favour of implementing the Report. The restructuring of the government became imperative due to growing black resistance against tricameral parliamentary system. The government wanted the incorporation of Africans into the

\textsuperscript{60} Sam Nolutshungu, *Changing South Africa: Political Considerations* (Manchester, 1982), pp. 25-32.

\textsuperscript{61} For limitations of the Commission’s economic recommendations see Southall, n. 53, pp. 99-101.
Regional Services Council\textsuperscript{62} (the third tier of the three tier arrangement) and the replacement of PCs by strong multi-racial executive and administrative committees at the second tier level.\textsuperscript{63}

KwaZulu-Natal became a testing ground for the second tier government, and accordingly in May 1985 Co-operation and Development Minister Viljoen announced in Parliament that the Buthelezi Commission Report was in line with the Botha policy that recognised Natal and KwaZulu as economically and hence politically interdependent. The meeting between Buthelezi and P.W. Botha that followed after this announcement gave further credence to the Report. However, notwithstanding the limitations, the Commission was indeed a serious attempt to search for constitutional alternative which would have helped in future political deliberations.

**Implications of Recommendations for Anti-Apartheid Struggles**

Analysis of this aspect requires a contextual understanding of the South African situation in early 1980s. This has already been discussed in previous sections of this chapter. Suffice it to say that state in South Africa faced challenges from two quarters in this period. On the one hand, the challenge came from within; white capital felt that growth and accumulation were no

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{62} The USC Bill was passed by Parliament in June 1985.}

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{63} For details of constitutional restructuring by white regime to give Africans various degrees of involvement at different levels of government from first to third tier, see Frankel and others, n. 11, pp. 30-6.}
more possible unless changes in the labour system were brought about. Second challenge was a result of apartheid discrimination of blacks. This period witnessed increasing unrest in townships and among black population manifested in the form of school boycotts and other protests. Total strategy reforms were primarily a response to these challenges.

Buthelezi Commission needs to be understood in this setting. Before analysing the implications for anti-apartheid struggles, it is essential to mention the view of radical/marxist school in regard to the Commission’s linkage to South African situation. It was argued that Buthelezi Commission was influenced by the changes in South African state being undertaken in this period. This was because of the participation of representatives of large-scale and regional capital, liberal academics and politicians. Consociationalism for the apartheid state, was basically a cooption mechanism through which it could incorporate an upcoming African petty bourgeoisie into the political and economic structures of South African capitalism. This coopted African middle class, if backed by popular support, had the capability to contain some of the contradictions in apartheid. For African petty bourgeoisie, seeing in radical perspective, consociationalism, besides projecting its moderate reformist image, sought to establish a linkage with the apartheid state capitalism. This was beneficial for its class interests.

64 Southall, n. 53, p. 108.
From radical perspective, Buthelezi Commission was ostensibly meant to buttress Inkatha’s image in black politics in early 1980s. At a time when Inkatha was facing challenges from the ANC, acceptance of the Commission’s proposals would help it to claim that reforms were working. This would, argued R.J. Southall, save the leadership from the embarrassment of being branded as collaborators. For the regime, any alliance with Inkatha would help it to counter the ANC and other radical organisations. So viewing from this perspective Buthelezi Commission was actually not meant to bring constitutional changes thereby opening up an alternative to apartheid, rather it was devised as a survival mechanism for Inkatha.

Refusal to acknowledge the positive aspects of the Commission is perhaps a major drawback of the radical perspective. As such considering the recommendations of the Commission, an alternative line of argument can be developed. In the light of Inkatha’s multi-strategy approach, the Commission’s report can be said to be a manifestation of the policy of change through negotiation. Considering the organisation’s position in KwaZulu homeland and in the domain of anti-apartheid struggles, the recommendations would have been beneficial for the homeland as well as the struggles. A joint administration for the entire region was realistic because of the economic interdependence between Natal and KwaZulu. The whites of Natal would also have provided the much needed support to this experimentation. Predominantly

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65 Ibid, p. 111.
British descendants, Natal whites had differences with the Afrikaners and hence the National Party had no active constituency in the region. This provided avenue for the white elites and moderate blacks to explore cooperative political venture. Moreover inclusion of different race groups, proportional representation, safeguards for minority rights, recommendations for abolition of Group Areas Act and influx control laws etc. were also the objectives of anti-apartheid struggles. In other words implementation of the Commission’s proposals would have helped in bringing change in apartheid system albeit at a regional level. The report was actually a blueprint for future constitution making. So if analysed in the context of apartheid system, the Commission’s recommendations, notwithstanding the limitations, provided a set of moderate and realistic solutions for change.

INKATHA AND ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLES IN EARLY 1980s

As mentioned in previous sections, it can be said that anti-apartheid struggles of 1980s were different from the struggles of 1970s in terms of their spatial extent and the involvement of people. Although radicalism in politics was evident in the 1970s in workers’ strikes and more clearly in Soweto revolt, it could not reach the level of 1980s. The specific events noted earlier along with the general prevalence of discontent demonstrated the mood of people regarding apartheid state. ANC’s guerrilla activities from across the border continued to inject hatred for the state in the minds of the people.
Formation of UDF provided the much needed legal link and thus a stronger foothold for the ANC among the masses. Despite its independent organisational status, the UDF established close links with the ANC due to its radical approach and came to be treated as a strong critic of apartheid. This unity of purpose as well as strategy between the ANC and UDF was the most significant event in black politics in the 1980s.

Inkatha’s role in this period has to be seen in this general political context. The organisation’s reactions to state reforms have already been noted earlier. Its opposition to tricameral parliamentary system, Ingwavuma incorporation issue and formation of alliance with PFP were politically significant steps so far as the struggles against apartheid were concerned. By blocking Ingwavuma’s incorporation to Swaziland Inkatha effectively blocked the creation of buffer zone between South Africa and Mozambique. Its disapproval of the new constitutional plan was also unwelcome in the government circle. The government was trying to prove its reformist image not only within the country but also before its international critics. Inkatha, perceived to be a moderate black organisation in white circle, was always looked for support in this regard. But it remained unfulfilled.

The emergence of UDF and its popularity in black townships posed a major challenge to Inkatha. Beginning with Ngoye killing in 1983 both the organisations soon entered into a phase of violent confrontation. This was disturbing in the sense that it strengthened the oppressive arm of apartheid
state. The Inkatha-UDF hostility was a result of many factors – ideological differences, strategic disagreement and the attempts to control more territory so that their bases could be made strong. As seen in earlier discussion, no single party can be held solely responsible for violence. At the root, however, lies Inkatha-ANC hostility which got heightened by periodic Radio Freedom broadcast and other propaganda tactics adopted by the exiled organisation. By the time UDF emerged on the scene, the situation had already been volatile. Since 1983 it became worse. UDF’s challenge to Inkatha on its home turf, especially on the eve of protests to townships’ incorporation, was too hard to be ignored by the latter.

The issue in focus in this context is the impact of this inter-organisational hostility among blacks on the apartheid state. It is quite logical to argue that the state got some degree of satisfaction out of this conflict as it proved the vulnerability of blacks to violence. This logic became more profound in coming years. Moreover apartheid state had always considered the ANC and other radical organisations its prime enemy. So Inkatha’s bitter relationship with ANC/UDF was considered by the state as an instrument to counter the latter’s popularity. The help given by the state to set up and train KZP (see discussion on ‘policy of regional consolidation’) which in later years engaged in this struggle is instructive of the kind of relationship Inkatha had with the state.

In sum, a two-dimensional role of Inkatha is noticed in early 1980s. So
far as its relationship with the state was concerned, while the rejection of reform initiatives was a blow to it, the state got some breathing space out of Inkatha’s hostility towards radical organisations. This was however not a welcome development for anti-apartheid struggles. The second dimension is related to Inkatha’s relationship with ANC/UDF. As mentioned earlier, this was potentially the most damaging trend of the period.

It is important to note that the challenges that Inkatha faced in early 1980s were far more critical and had significant long-term implications than the ones it faced in late 1970s. In addition to the previous discussion on this aspect some more points can be added here. Mandela’s continued prison-stay was contributing to his increasing popularity among the blacks in general and Natal’s black intelligentsia in particular, while Buthelezi and Inkatha had to face disapproval because of their association with the ruling regime. As campaign for Mandela’s release gathered momentum in the country and around the world; by 1985, opinion polls in Durban were showing more support for Mandela than Buthelezi. In the opinion of Paulus Zulu, a political researcher, ‘people started turning against Inkatha for failing to deliver services they thought were due to them, while ANC still enjoyed symbolic cleanliness’.66

The next chapter is an extension of the present one as it discusses Inkatha’s role in light of its relationship with the government as well as other black and moderate organisations. The challenges of violence shall be discussed in detail.

66 Quoted in Taylor, n. 53, p. 353.