CONCLUSION

In the long years of anti-apartheid struggles several political organisations played their roles. But the roles of some of them got highlighted more than others. The ANC is believed to have entire credit for change in the system. Opinions about issues like this are shaped by the kind of information or knowledge one gets. ANC’s long years of existence outside the country enabled the organisation to influence world public opinion in its favour. Even the PAC, another exiled organisation, was not able to draw the kind of attention that the ANC managed. The present study has focused on lesser known Inkatha to understand and evaluate its roles against apartheid system. When the ANC and PAC were active outside the country, Inkatha was active inside. To have a balance view regarding anti-apartheid struggles one needs to study Inkatha’s role in it.

Inkatha’s origin took place at the time when black politics in South Africa was passing through a period of political quiescence. The banning of the ANC and the PAC following Sharpeville massacre in March 1960 compelled the anti-apartheid organisations to go into exile and underground. The Rivonia trial of Mandela and other ANC/SACP activists gave a serious blow to black politics in the country. The Black Consciousness movement, though active since 1969, was confined to few urban centres and universities and its support base was rather narrow.
The political situation of KwaZulu homeland also influenced the formation of Inkatha. Backed by Pretoria government, Zulu King and some other chiefs were posing challenges to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi who was heading the homeland administration of KwaZulu in early 1970s. Due to Buthelezi’s strong anti-apartheid position in this period and espousal of the causes of political prisoners the apartheid regime was trying to squeeze his power by granting legislative veto to the King. But this did not materialise. To face these challenges Buthelezi felt the need of mobilising people. He was also inspired by Kenneth Kannda in this regard. Even the ANC was not averse to the idea of forming an organisation, as it was not active at that time and thought to further struggles through a legal organisation. Under these circumstances Inkatha was born in 1975 as a national cultural liberation movement with the objectives of forging black unity, abolishing exploitation, racialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism and realising national independence.

Inkatha’s main support during anti-apartheid struggles came from the Zulus-South Africa’s largest black tribe, though the organisation received support from Sotho, Pondo and Tswana members as well. Since 1990 when Inkatha became a political party-Inkatha Freedom Party, many Indian origin people and whites have joined it. Predominance of Zulu was due to the fact that Inkatha originated in KwaZulu homeland where Zulu tribe is mainly concentrated. It has of course supporters in townships.
around Johannesburg. The growth of Inkatha since 1975 has been phenomenal with about 2 million members in 1993. Inspite of allegations of forced recruitment and chiefly manipulation, this massive support was a testimony to its strength.

To attain liberation from apartheid Inkatha adopted 'multi-strategy approach. The first aspect of this approach was a forthright denial of homeland independence. KwaZulu remained within South Africa unlike other independent homelands like Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. Considering the strength of Zulu population, independence of KwaZulu would have enabled the regime to claim that its policy of ethnic separation of blacks was working. The second aspect of multi-strategy approach was peaceful protests against apartheid rather than armed struggle. The third aspect was its adherence to negotiated settlement of apartheid. It emphasised black unity and believed in reforms in the system. Finally Inkatha's approach was to fight poverty which in its opinion was essential for political liberation. Along this line of thinking Inkatha supported foreign investment and argued against sanctions and disinvestment. It was however against exploitative capital which was anti-poor.

Evaluation of multi-strategy approach reveals its negative aspects. Although refusal to independence plan of Pretoria was a right move and it stopped the grand apartheid policy of reducing the black majority into
ethnic minorities reaching its logical conclusion, at the economic level KwaZulu’s status as a homeland (having self-government) served the purpose of a cheap labour reserve for white-owned industries. In other words, the objective of restricting black population in urban areas by confining the old, women and children in homelands and at the same time getting cheap black labour, was fulfilled. Secondly, Inkatha’s strategy of non-violence was due to pragmatic reasons, rather than its faith in pacifist belief. This became clear when the organisation became involved in township violence in the 1980s and during negotiations in early 1990s. Thirdly, Inkatha’s espousal of change through negotiation was also criticised by its radical opponents. Since the organisation was working within the government-created structures it was not in a position to fight apartheid other than by negotiation. Inkatha’s support to foreign investment and opposition to sanctions also helped the apartheid state. The tripartnership investment in which white and foreign capital were a parties along with KwaZulu Development Corporation and other black shareholders, strengthened the economic basis of apartheid. The rationale for adopting multi-strategy approach as argued in chapter 2 was Inkatha’s dual roles in KwaZulu homeland and in anti-apartheid struggles. The organisation had a base (among Zulus) in the homeland upon whose mobilisation its future depended and at the same time it tried to project an image of anti-apartheid force. For its role in homeland it had to depend on
Pretoria government (for funds etc). But to create an image of an anti-apartheid organisation it had to criticise the system. Only a moderate and middle-of-the-road approach could have performed the dual tasks of Inkatha. Multi-strategy approach was a reply to this need.

Since its formation until 1980 Inkatha while opposing apartheid policy of homeland independence, came in conflict with other black organisations like the Black Consciousness movement and the ANC. The BC movement rejected homeland system and objected to Buthelezi’s strategy for liberation. In this period Inkatha’s relationship with the ANC was the most crucial aspect of anti-apartheid struggles. This relationship has to be seen in the context of the then prevailing political situation. During this period black politics was highly radicalised due to Black Consciousness propaganda. Soweto riot was a manifestation of this radicalism. ANC, long absent in the country, was not aware of the ground realities and growing radicalism among youths at the time of Soweto uprising. It felt the need of establishing contact at the bottom level. Inkatha was also facing challenges in this period from Soweto Committee of Ten (a civic body of people supporting non-collaboration with the apartheid state) and the general condition of radicalism. So both ANC and Inkatha needed each other in this period. The ANC thought of gaining access to Inkatha’s vast mass base and for Inkatha any understanding with ANC would counter the criticism that the organisation and its leaders were collaborative with
the white regime.

But instead of forging unity, the meeting that was held in London in 1979 between the two organisations led to a formal break up. It was more due to strategic differences (ANC’s armed struggle opposed to Inkatha’s peaceful protest) between the two organisations rather than any breach of confidentiality on Buthelezi’s part as it was made out to be (Chapter 2). While the ANC refused to support Inkatha’s peaceful protest and negotiation, Inkatha on its part did not support the former’s policy of armed struggle and sanctions. However this break up between the two organisations significantly influenced politics in the 1980s.

Since early 1980s South Africa’s politics became radicalised especially by the activities of the UDF. ANC’s need for an internal organisation got fulfilled when UDF came into being in 1983. It provided the much needed legal link and thus a stronger foothold for the ANC among the masses. Despite its independent organisational status, the UDF established close links with the ANC due to its radical approach and came to be treated as a strong critic of apartheid. This unity of purpose as well as strategy between the ANC and UDF was the most significant event in black politics in the 1980s. Inkatha’s role has to been seen in this context. This can be analysed from two different angles. First, the organisation rejected reform initiatives by the Pretoria government as inadequate. It objected successfully to Ingwavuma incorporation plan, thereby stopped
the creation of a buffer zone between Marxist Mozambique and South Africa. It along with the PFP objected to the creation of tricameral legislature which excluded black majority. This was unwelcome in the government circles because it was trying to prove its reformist image not only within the country but also before its international critics. Inkatha, perceived to be a moderate black organisation, was always looked for support in this regard. But it remained unfulfilled.

Inkatha also proposed the creation of a joint administration for KwaZulu homeland and Natal province through Buthelezi Commission report. The report was criticised for its inability to address fundamental inequalities of racial capitalism. It was meant to help large-scale capital as it emphasised on cheap labour force, skill development and other pro-capital measures. But a joint administration for the entire region was realistic because of the economic interdependence between Natal and KwaZulu. In spite of many limitations such reform in the face of a hostile state was undoubtedly an attempt to forge unity among blacks and whites.

While Inkatha opposed state’s reform plans, its reaction was never violent. But its relationship with the UDF often manifested in violent encounters as seen in Ngoye Killing. Before UDF coming to the scene, ANC’s hostility towards Inkatha was more at a rhetorical level through Radio Freedom broadcasts. But once UDF in the picture, the situation changed. Physical attacks on political opponents which later took the ugly
shape of township violence was a new development in early 1980s. Inkatha’s rivalry with the UDF gave the apartheid state a breathing space as it proved the vulnerability of blacks to violence. For Pretoria ANC was the prime enemy. So ANC/UDF hostility with Inkatha was considered by the state as an instrument to counter the former’s popularity. The state even helped in training the KZP. This indicated the interests of state in inter-black fighting. In the long-run Inkatha and the ANC/UDF hostility strengthened the oppressive hand of the state which was not good for anti-apartheid struggles.

The political trends that developed in early 1980s became more profound since mid-1980s. Inkatha’s role in anti-apartheid struggles in this period can be judged from two different angles. At the first instance the organisation’s response to reform proposals has to be looked into. The proposals for Regional Services Councils and the National Statutory Council (in which provision was made for African representation) were not acceptable to Inkatha unless the government scrapped the Group Areas Act, Population Registration Act and released political prisoners like Nelson Mandela. Particularly important was Inkatha’s refusal to participate in the NSC. Its acceptance would have solved many of state’s problems. The state could have claimed that reforms were working. It would also have addressed the challenges faced by it from right wing AWB. The AWB was accusing the Botha government of weakness due to reform. The
government was also facing threats from township violence. This was a challenging period for the government. If Botha decided to proceed slowly on reforms he would have to face black anger and international opposition. On the other hand any strong reform would be opposed by AWB. So the NSC proposal was a middle-of-the-road reform initiative to avoid two extremes. Inkatha’s opposition to this reform came at a time when the state needed it most.

Inkatha was against imposition of sanctions and disinvestment which damaged economy. In its view sanctions would harm the growth of the economy and the long-term interest of blacks who were poor and impoverished. This was one of the reasons for Inkatha’s differences with the ANC and other organisations who were supporting international sanctions vehemently. In fact one of the main reasons for Pretoria’s long sustainability in the face of black unrest and demands of change was its ability to protect the country’s economy with the help of United States and the West.

Inkatha was also instrumental is organising Natal Indaba, a conference called to explore ways for a possible merger of Natal and KwaZulu homeland. The final proposal recommended for a Joint legislature for both the regions. The government rejected this on the ground that it was unworkable. Radical organisations such as the ANC, UDF and others termed the Indaba as an instrument to strengthen Inkatha’s
base in the region. But the joint legislature proposal had the potential of providing meaningful alternative to the then existing racial hegemony. Indaba proposal, like the Buthelezi Commission, demonstrated Inkatha’s attempts to go beyond the confines of protest politics. In both the cases it became an active initiator as well as participant in the process of negotiation. This had the potential of not only defeating apartheid but also providing an alternative for future non-apartheid society. However, these initiatives, if implemented would also have strengthened Inkatha’s regional base. This should be seen in the context of policy of ‘regional consolidation’ that Inkatha followed since 1980 in order to counter challenges of the ANC and UDF.

Besides Inkatha’s role in reforms, its role in violence since mid-1980s needs to be emphasised. The township violence of this period was an outcome of hostility between Inkatha and ANC/UDF that had its roots in 1979 break up. All these organisations were responsible for violence. Analysing the causes of violence the study distinguishes between simmering factors (social, economic and ethnic reasons) and triggering factor (political differences). Social degeneration, economic deprivation due to apartheid, appalling conditions of township residents and ethnic differences do not themselves cause violence, though they have the potential. When these conditions are exploited for political mileage or in other words, when socio-economic conditions meet with political
differences it manifests in violence. As seen in Natal both Inkatha and ANC/UDF were fighting for political space. Analysis of violence in KwaZulu-Natal reveals that it had primarily two bases – racial basis and tribal basis. Racial basis of violence manifested in Inanda township of Durban where the Indian origin people were attacked by Africans. Except this, fighting was primarily intra-back, though the perpetrators of apartheid were the whites and especially the Afrikaners, not fellow blacks. So while rejecting a monocausal analysis of violence, the study tries to prove that political and ideological differences were the main reason for severity of violence. ANC’s policy of ‘ungovernability’ was in contrast with Inkatha’s strategy of non-violent protest within the parameters of multi-strategy approach. This was seen as a challenge by the ANC. Significantly, for the ANC Inkatha was perhaps the only organisation whose strategy was diametrically opposed to its own.

Role of Inkatha in anti-apartheid struggles received a serious blow in this period because of its acceptance of military help from Pretoria (Caprivi training). It was impossible to raise voice against the state which was providing security assistance. While ANC and its allies took military help from Soviet Union and other world powers and managed to draw public sympathy, Inkatha by taking assistance from apartheid state lost its public acceptance. Although it was facing challenges from UDF and COSATU, using the apartheid state to fight the political opponents was
beneficial for the state. In other words Inkatha’s political posturing vis-à-vis apartheid state was against the larger interests of anti-apartheid struggles.

With the unbanning of apartheid Inkatha became a political party – the IFP and became actively involved in negotiations. It was against any kind of bilateral negotiation between government and the ANC. Rejecting the demand for an elected constituent assembly, the IFP proposed that the constitution-making body should be a duly constituted all-party constitutional conference. The party also put forward an alternative plan, that agreement should be reached at the first place on the boundaries and constitutional powers of all provinces that would constitute the new federation. The reasons for rejecting constituent assembly was that decision making in it would be dominated by the majority party, which might ignore certain fundamental provisions such as inviolability of bill of rights, power to remove a government by simple majority and electoral laws. It supported federalism for the reasons of country’s diversities. By advocating regional autonomy, the party did not want to be dictated by an ANC dominated future non-racial political order. Since it advocated that the constitution would be finalised first before elections and formation of government, there was no need for any transitional government. IFP proposal said that provincial constitutions would be first finalised and the constitution for the federal Republic of South Africa would follow

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afterwards.

To carry forward its demands the party tried to use the institution of Zulu monarchy. The symbolic and emotional value attached to the monarchy was effectively used to extract concessions from both ANC and the government. But ethnic mobilisation had a heavy price in terms of township violence which took an alarming proportion as deadlock in negotiations continued till the last moment. In the 1990s both ANC and the IFP along with their allies fought violently to strengthen their positions during the negotiations so that they could be dominant political forces in a non-racial socio-political order. While the IFP wanted to be a dominant political party in KwaZulu-Natal, the ANC wanted to control the only black region which was opposing its country-wide dominance. Particularly the local leaders of ANC in Natal like Harry Gwala, in their need for power, did not want the IFP to control the region. This struggle for power was central to the severity of violence at the time of negotiation. It is important to note that the fighting in Natal was not on ethnic line, rather it was fought among the Zulus with affiliations to either the IFP or the ANC. So it was correctly a political violence.

On the basis of the discussions made in the preceding chapters, following points needs to be emphasised to evaluate role of Inkatha in anti-apartheid struggle. First, Inkatha, since its inception, based itself heavily on the Zulu support in KwaZulu homeland and now KwaZulu-Natal
province. Notwithstanding its support from non-Zulu, whites and people of Indian origin, the organisation has cultivated Zulu constituency to strengthen its political base. This was intensified since 1980 when it started stressing on Zulu customs, traditions and cultural values to mobilise support and strengthen its regional base. Ethnic identity was a rallying point for unity. During transitional negotiations Inkatha sided with the Zulu King apparently to extract political concessions. So for mobilising support Zulu ethnic identity played a decisive role.

Second, although Inkatha's origin was rooted in the KwaZulu homeland, it has tried to transcend that barrier since its inception. While ANC and other radical organisations considered Inkatha as a homeland-based organisation, Inkatha thought it otherwise. Its attempts to perform a role in KwaZulu homeland and at the same time fight against apartheid created problems for the organisation. On the other hand, the ANC, UDF and others were performing the only task of fighting apartheid while Inkatha's role in homeland demanded it to take help from apartheid state, the other role made it to criticise the state. This was at the root of criticisms that Inkatha faced since its inception. As examined earlier the contradictory image of the organisation emerged primarily due to this.

But, notwithstanding the frailties of Inkatha, recourse to ethnic mobilisation proved beneficial as seen during transitional negotiations. The call for recognition to Zulu monarchy which culminated into a call for
secession were all possible due to ethnic mobilisation. IFP's bargaining power increased due to this. It is important to note that the call for regional autonomy and federalism was given not only by IFP but also by the NP, and right-wing Afrikaner organisations like AWB. But no one could take it to the extent of IFP. Political violence had a role in this regard. For this Zulu unity was most decisive. The support that IFP received by using Zulu identity and monarchy could not be ignored by the ANC and the government.

Third, the crucial role of Inkatha in anti-apartheid struggles was that it made many of the apartheid reform proposals unworkable. By refusing to accept independence, Inkatha successfully thwarted 'grand apartheid' policy which was for reducing the black majority into ethnic minorities. Being the largest ethnic population of South Africa, Zulu independence would have made a lot of difference to anti-apartheid struggles. All through the 1980, when apartheid state was trying to project its reformist image by proposing so called reforms, Inkatha refused to be a party to all these unless apartheid laws were scrapped and political prisoners freed.

Fourth, Inkatha's role in anti-apartheid struggles has to be seen in the context of an oppressive state trying to hold on to power. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4 even the militant anti-apartheid movements such as ANC, UDF and others were facing crisis situation towards the end of 1980s due to emergency and other military and police repression. Inkatha,
even if took military assistance (instances of its use in violence are there) from state, it did not accept all the reforms orchestrated by it. Considering the intransigence of state and its evil impact on anti-apartheid organisations, the pressures put up by Inkatha, albeit a moderate one, needs to be stressed.

Fifth, Inkatha played a major role in keeping the issue of apartheid alive both within the country and abroad at a critical time. Even before the establishment of Inkatha, Buthelezi had already acquired the image of an effective critic of the system. Formation of Inkatha gave the much needed fillip to anti-apartheid propaganda. Due to numerical strength of Inkatha, Buthelezi was always heard with due attention. His arguments with the leaders of the West for more investment in South Africa, at the same time his advocacy for the need for change was a demonstration of Inkatha’s fight against the system.

Sixth, in spite of its roles in thwarting reforms and other roles contradictions as mentioned earlier became more prominent in 1980 and in early 1990s as instances of government-Inkatha collusion came to light. By providing military and financial help (Inkathagate scandal, Caprivi training, assistance to KZP etc) the state tried to weaken the ANC so that concessions would be extracted at the time of negotiation. Of course Inkatha was under attack from UDF (especially in Natal) during this time. Notwithstanding this, understanding with the state was certainly not a
Seventh, IFP’s role during negotiations was a crucial one. Unlike others it strongly demanded federalism. This needs to be appreciated especially for a country like South Africa which has people of different races, cultures and tribes. The IFP did manage to extract concessions in this regard as mentioned in Chapter 5. However the realpolitik interests of Inkatha cannot be ignored in this context. The IFP did not like the idea that future would be dictated by the ANC. Federalism became a potent weapon to challenge majoritarian principles of the ANC. It was to help the party in protecting its political base in KwaZulu-Natal.

Finally, results of the 1994 elections point to some political trends which has long term implications. Although the IFP managed to retain its predominant position in KwaZulu-Natal it faced challenges from the ANC which came out as the second largest party in the province with 32.3 per cent votes. This has proved that the IFP’s support among Zulus is not absolute. Since KwaZulu-Natal is predominantly Zulu-inhabited the voters who supported ANC were also Zulus. The elections also proved that the IFPs support was overwhelming in rural areas because it got about 90 per cent of the votes from those areas. These were previously homeland controlled areas where appeal to ethnic identity was strong.

Notwithstanding the fact that the IFP secured third position in the National Assembly, its standing as a national political party was not
impressive. Except Gauteng province it had no representation in other provinces outside KwaZulu-Natal. In other words, 1994 elections proved national predominance of the ANC.

The IFP did perhaps its most valuable political act by extracting concessions regarding provincial autonomy. It is a different issue how mobilisation and pressure acted during negotiation time. The outcome is more important and should be seen on merit. Provincial issues can be best addressed at the level of province, rather than by national government. There should be clear division of powers between the two.