Chapter 2

U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREA

From 1945 when it acquired the atomic bomb there has been one objective of U.S. foreign policy that has been constant: the unfailing attempts, sometimes unsuccessful, to prevent other countries from going nuclear. This aspect of U.S. policy is known as its Non-Proliferation Policy. In this chapter we shall trace its course, successes and failures since 1945 and try to establish that it has tended to be tentative and improvised. The objective is to examine the effect of U.S. non-proliferation policies on North Korea and its quest for nuclear technologies. Was North Korea able to acquire or develop nuclear technology because, rather than despite, of U.S. non-proliferation policy? It is useful to begin with a brief sketch of the measures adopted to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons before exploring their link to North Korea’s nuclear policy.

The Baruch Plan:

The first step was the Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy made on 15 November 1945. Through it the U.S., Britain and Canada stated that they were prepared to share “on a reciprocal basis with others of the United Nations” information on the practical industrial application of atomic energy “just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes could be devised.” (Appendix I, Sec. V). The Declaration also called for the establishment within the United Nations of a Commission among whose tasks would be to “control atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes”, to make specific proposals “for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons...” and for “effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means, to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions” (Appendix I, Sec. V).

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*The Baruch Plan (Presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946) See Appendix I."
On 27 December 1945, after discussions with the Soviet Union a joint communiqué was issued calling for a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission that should be established by the General Assembly and should report to the Security Council. On 24 January 1946, the General assembly unanimously adopted a resolution to this effect. The objective of the Resolution was to deal simultaneously with peaceful uses of atomic energy, its control, elimination of nuclear weapons and the verification of compliance.

When the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) met for the first time in June 1946, the U.S. Representative, Bernard Baruch, proposed the creation of an International Atomic Agency (Appendix I). The purpose was to put all nuclear related activity under international control. All nations were to grant the freedom of inspection. It was thought that once the system was effectively operating, the further production of atomic weapons would cease, existing stocks destroyed and all technological information communicated to the Authority. This did not happen, of course. Amongst other reasons, there was too much distrust between the U.S. and the USSR. The first seeds of distrust were sown during the World War II itself and these were going to prove disastrous for eliminating nuclear weapons.

In his speech to the UN Atomic Energy Commission on 14 June 1946, Bernard Baruch had described it as a situation where the world faced a “choice between the quick and the dead” (Appendix I, Sec. V). He presented a plan for ending nuclear weapons. This plan came to be known as the Baruch Plan. Saying that “science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates,” he told the audience, “We face a condition in which adequate defence does not exist.” He then called for a

....mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. To that end, we must provide immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude between wars (Appendix I, Sec. V).

He then laid the basis of all foreign policy: “in this new age... anything that happens, no matter where or how, which menaces the peace of the world, or the
economic stability, concerns each and all of us" (Appendix I, Sec. V) Thus, it is clear that the proliferation that took place subsequently was certainly not because of lack of awareness of the consequences.

The Baruch Plan sought to place all aspects of atomic energy under an independent international authority called the Atomic Development Authority (ADA). It required all states to stop the production of atomic weapons. The Plan envisaged that the U.S. too would get rid of the bombs it possessed at the time and thus eliminate not just the U.S. monopoly of the bomb but also the bombs themselves. The USSR responded by saying that the U.S. should first destroy what it had and that the Agency could be created subsequently. The U.S. refused and negotiations went into a stalemate. The plan proposal was never revived. Had the U.S., at this point taken the first step of eliminating all the atomic weapons in its possession, something that it has been demanding of other newer members who possess the capability of producing these, including North Korea, the world might have been a different place.

The failure of the Baruch Plan, utopian as it was, persuaded the U.S. to opt for the second best choice: to maintain its monopoly over nuclear weapons technologies. It refused to share these weapon technologies or even data even with its closest allies, let alone its adversaries. On August 29, 1949 the Soviet Union conducted a successful nuclear test. Five months later, in early 1950 President Harry Truman announced that the U.S. would develop the hydrogen bomb. In April, 1950 the control of nuclear weapons and technology was shifted from the civilians to the military. Once that was done all chances of curbing proliferation was lost completely.

The famous NSC-68 document (Appendix II) not only endorsed major efforts of nuclear expansion but also advocated rapid and massive conventional rearmament. The document, thus, was clear about the military use of nuclear energy. On November 1, 1952, the U.S. successfully tested the H-bomb and the nuclear arms race had begun in right earnest.
Having failed to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring and expanding its nuclear weapons' capability the U.S. diverted its efforts towards preventing other states from obtaining this technical capability. However, Great Britain, as a trusted ally of the U.S. soon came to possess nuclear weapons in 1954. In 1956 after the Suez Crisis France also decided to possess its own nuclear weapon (1960). In 1964, China, like France, recognising that it could not rely on its super power ally to provide the expected support during a crisis, embarked on its own independent nuclear programme (Herrick and McRae 2003: 76). It is worth noting here, and as we saw earlier, the North Korean response was exactly the same when it realised that it could not rely on its super power allies – it accelerated its nuclear programme.

It should be pointed out here that although the declarations and associated proposals envisaged disarmament – the UN resolution speaks of the “elimination from national armament of atomic weapons” – the main powers did not think of them as such (Appendix I, Sec.V). Instead, they were seen as an assurance against the nuclear have-nots going nuclear. It seems valid, then, to conclude that non-proliferation was seen as a defensive measure, rather than being inspired by some higher principles. It was not surprising, therefore, that the main powers continued with their nuclear plans. In 1949 the USSR went nuclear followed by Britain in 1952. The scheme of establishing an international authority disappeared over time.

Impact of the Korean War:
When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, Truman's anxiety over the Chinese advances in November increased given this context of global nuclear politics. He had a ready threat that he could use of using 'every weapon that we have' that was to be conveyed several times. In 1953 President Eisenhower, who had come into office with the promise to bring the Korean War to an early end, also threatened to use nuclear weapons in order to hasten the truce process. He made no explicit public threats but dropped hints about it in India, the Formosa straits and at the truce negotiations at Panmunjom (Herrick and McRae 2003: 238-239). He also started sending B-29 and B-36 aircraft to Okinawa. This hurriedly brought the Chinese to the negotiating table in July of that year and the armistice was signed. Though Rees (1983: 426) is of the opinion that the use of nuclear weapons were
advocated by some but rejected by both Truman and Eisenhower the fact remains that the threat was implicit in their statements and actions. The purpose had been achieved without Eisenhower having to take a decision on expanding the war beyond Korea because that is what, he realised, would happen if he had to use atomic weapons in case the negotiations broke down (Oliver 1978: 405-408).

Meanwhile in North Korea, the American threats were creating a deep impression. Kim Il-Sung had always demonstrated a willingness to use force to achieve his political objectives. As early as 1949, with the forming of separate governments in the South and the North, when it had become clear that Korea would remain divided for some time to come, he had decided that the only way to reunite Korea was through force and launched an attack on South Korea in 1950. The effect of U.S. nuclear threats has to be viewed through this prism.

Nuclear threats from the U.S. only succeeded in convincing Kim Il-Sung, if such convincing were needed, that there was no substitute for military force. It is not known whether he decided to pursue nuclear technology then. It would be most unlikely that he did. But the idea would certainly have germinated then is evident from the fact that the bilateral agreement signed with the Soviet Union for cooperation in atomic energy in 1959 included the construction of a nuclear research centre. The fact that this was called as “furniture factory” by the North Koreans, to keep the activities clandestine, creates enough doubt regarding the motive behind this (Kaurov, Moltz & Mansourov 2000: 16). And, even though it was not known at the time that “U.S. planes had dropped infected fleas, ticks, and spiders in the Chorwan, Kumhwa, and Pyongyang areas of North Korea during February and March 1952, leading to outbreaks of plague and anthrax” (Endicott and Hageman 1998 cited in Harrison 2002: 9-10) and indulged in experimenting biological warfare, the horrific impact of this would probably explain the distrust of the Americans that the North Koreans harbor even to this day. Kim Il-Sung had gained total credibility in North Korea and had become firmly entrenched not only in the political scene but also in the psyche of its populace. This was to make him

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Apparently the nations that were assisting South Korea in the war issued a warning that if Communist aggression continued then it would not be possible to confine hostilities within Korea.
a hero of North Korean folklore and Kim Il-Sung was to maximize it further using his propaganda machine.

But in the U.S. by then opposition to the very idea of using nuclear weapons was growing, especially from the scientific community (Bundy 1989: 219-221). So much so that the U.S. was obliged to propose ways and means of countering this criticism. Eisenhower, therefore, came up with a plan called the "Atoms for Peace" which suggested stripping the military casing of the nuclear weapons and adapting the atomic energy for peaceful purpose. He thus, hoped to limit and eventually bring down the stockpile of fissile material, especially what the Soviet Union possessed. It found few takers though. He also suggested that the U.S. and the Soviet Union turn over to the UN a certain amount of fissionable material from their respective stocks for peaceful uses. Eventually, this led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with its head office in Vienna and also major studies in the field of nuclear physics. But no fissionable material was ever handed over to the UN.

The atmosphere was not conducive for countries to seriously consider ideas on nuclear disarmament. However, the Atoms for Peace ideas dominated the next two decades. And along with it came the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. So, the IAEA Safeguards regime however, predated the NPT by more than ten years. The NPT promised that if countries foreswore the pursuit of nuclear weapons, they could expect help on nuclear technology for civilian peaceful purposes like generating electricity. North Korea, along with India,

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3 The IAEA started operating in 1957. "To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy..."

8 Articles I and II enjoin the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon State Parties to the NPT to refrain from providing or receiving assistance to manufacture "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device." Article III prohibits the transfer of nuclear technology, except under IAEA safeguards. Article IV enjoins State Parties to cooperate with each other to use nuclear energy for development programmes. Article V envisages the "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions" being provided to State Parties. Article VI enunciates that, "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
Pakistan, Israel and South Africa refused to sign the NPT on the grounds that it was discriminatory because it divided the world, forever, between nuclear have and nuclear have-nots. As for North Korea, if it had signed the NPT then, it could have sought nuclear technology for electricity generation during its post-war reconstruction period and its economy might have been in a different shape now. However, for various reasons of the Cold War politics that did not happen.

The problem was that in the process of permitting the use of fissile material for peaceful purposes, the safeguards regime that was adopted (see earlier footnote) turned out to be very permissive. Though Ireland had even then envisioned the problem arising out of such sharing or providing of such assistance to various countries, and had proposed a treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1958, it did not get the support it needed from either the U.S. or the Soviet Union because of their mutual mistrust, not to mention other complex questions like the role of West Germany in NATO (Bailey 1991: 37; Bundy 1989: 487-490).

**Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’**

The ideas embedded in Atoms for Peace plan, drove nuclear debates for two decades – until India’s ‘peaceful’ explosion of an atomic device in May 1974 made them questionable and then obsolete. The interesting feature of these two decades was that far from being a period of non-proliferation, they turned out to be the era of maximum proliferation with three countries – UK, France and China – going overtly nuclear and three others – Israel, India and South Africa – starting down that path.

Eisenhower’s plan was based on a simple idea: it was possible to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as well as nuclear disarmament, by transferring fissionable material for civilian uses and using that as technique to take promise from the recipient countries that they will not divert this know how for military purposes. The plan initially did not mention safeguards and it was only later that as peaceful uses increased, international verification became the norm. There was a strategic purpose to the plan, which was obvious to the analysts, especially in the USSR: to limit and eventually bring down the stockpile of fissile material that
Soviet Union possessed. The U.S. and the Soviet Union both were to reduce their stockpile of nuclear fissile materials. The Soviet response, therefore, was a firm 'No'. They concluded that the American proposal neither checked the growing production of nuclear weapons nor limited the possibilities of their use (Bundy 1989: 294). Even the U.S. thought so, which, some scholars feel, is perhaps why it proposed it in the first place (Bundy 1989: 294).

The subsequent proposal of "Open Skies", suggested by Eisenhower to the Russian leader Nikolay Bulganin at a summit meeting at Geneva in July 1955, proposed that each country should give the other a complete blueprint of each other's military establishment and also provide the other with ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance ((Bundy 1989: 298). No one expected it to be accepted, and it wasn't. Yet, it needs to be pointed out, that this is what is expected of countries like North Korea and Iraq now. Though, it also needs to be added that, this demand was made forcefully of North Korea only when it was found to renege on the NPT requirement and was indulging in clandestine nuclear activities. The real motive behind this proposal was inadvertently revealed by Admiral Radford who said the acceptance of the proposal by the Russians would "give the U.S. a decided intelligence advantage and rejection, a decided public opinion advantage"(Bundy 1989: 294) . Either ways it was to be a win-win situation for the U.S.

There was a major effort towards Soviet-Chinese collaboration in 1955 to provide China with a reactor, cyclotron, fissile material and nuclear experts. This nuclear link is believed to have progressed at a phenomenal pace and on May 10, 1956 China announced the start of the Chinese nuclear weapons programme (Menon 2000: 69-70). In fact, Jawaharlal Nehru too is said to have made the first public statement in 1956 about India's technical abilities to make a bomb. This, apparently, was a result of the knowledge that after the signing of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) Pakistan could have nuclear weapons based on its soil (Menon 2000: 69). Thus, horizontal proliferation had already gained a great impetus by late 1950s. And, of course, so had the arms race, of which nuclear weaponry became the core element of the Cold War equations of Moscow and Washington D.C. Its driving philosophy was the policy of Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD), which remained the basis of their nuclear strategies until 1990s.

The year 1962 was another watershed year in metamorphosing the nuclear politics. The Cuban Missile Crisis was to be one example of U.S. and USSR coming closest to unleashing a World War III. The answer to public concerns about proliferation of nuclear weapons was found not in abandoning testing, but in framing the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. This prevented testing on land, in space and underwater, but it left a critical escape clause: it did not prevent testing underground. The ‘hotline’ agreement between the Soviet Union and the U.S., in order to handle such crisis, was also entered into in the same year. Instead of controlling the arms race, leave alone disarming, the two powers were only seeking ways of handling problems arising out of the arms race in the periphery. In some ways this also shifted the focus from Europe to Asia Pacific.

**The International Atomic Energy Agency:**

The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was opened for signature on 20 October 1956 and its safeguards provisions became the basis for the nuclear verification and monitoring activities that have been applied in the forty years that followed. Article II of the Statute requires the Agency to “ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”. Article III A.5 authorises the Agency to establish and administer safeguards in three categories of cases, namely, in connection with the assistance provided by the Agency or at its request, under its supervision or control at the request of the parties to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement and at the request of a state, to any nuclear activity of that state. Article XI F.4 provides that any project of the Agency for research on or development or practical application of atomic energy must include undertakings by the states involved that the assistance provided shall not be used in such a way as to further any military purposes and that the project shall be subject to safeguards.

The Agency's Statute itself does not contain any obligation for a state to submit to Agency safeguards, except where it is a beneficiary of an Agency project. In the
other two categories of cases listed in Article III, the reason for accepting safeguards may be either the fact that the state concerned is a party to a legal instrument obliging it to accept such safeguards or has other reasons for doing so - most usually because it is the recipient of nuclear material or equipment and the state supplying this has made it a condition that Agency safeguards should be applied in connection with such items. On such occasions, especially in the past, the obligation to submit to safeguards would be contained in a bilateral agreement for the provision of nuclear material or installations, of which many have been concluded by the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, that provided for the transfer to the IAEA of the safeguards function.

North Korea became a member of the IAEA in 1974, but withdrew from its membership on 13 June 1994. In the Agency's view this withdrawal did not affect the North Korean government's obligation under its Safeguards Agreement. North Korea had ratified the IAEA Safeguards Agreement only in 1992, after a period of seven long years of negotiation and international pressure since it signed the NPT. It has now walked out of the NPT and feels that it is no longer obliged to permit any kind of inspections. Thus all measures that were being taken to prevent proliferation of weapons were to be challenged by some.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty:
The entry of China into the nuclear club, the cost of the arms race, and the clear signs that horizontal proliferation of nuclear technology was unstoppable, persuaded the U.S. and the USSR to cooperate on at least one thing: the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. The result was the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. It was actively promoted by the U.S. and supported by Soviet Union. It did not, however, require anyone to roll back their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. In July 1968, the NPT was opened for signature and 50 countries signed it that year. The NPT requires signatories to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities. These agreements are called full-scope or comprehensive safeguards agreements. But this is not in itself sufficient because the IAEA can carry out safeguards only on the basis of specific agreements. A point that needs to be noted here is that North Korea too entered into an
Agreement on Nuclear Safeguards with the IAEA in 1977 which were confined to 66 of its facilities (Kaurov, Moltz and Mansourov 2000: 17).

The IAEA had found that a new safeguards system would be called for to apply to a country's entire range of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT entered into force, on 5 March 1970. A complete safeguards system designed to enable the Agency to apply safeguards pursuant to the Treaty was then devised. In 1971, it became the basis for the agreements required by the NPT. Ever since, it has set the terms for the application of safeguards under the Treaty.

The central contradiction in the NPT is that on the one hand it makes it mandatory to give up the manufacture of nuclear weapons and on the other, promises them the wherewithal to build them. Besides, it also allows five nuclear weapon states— that detonated atomic devices before 1st of January 1967- to continue to have their nuclear weapons thereby sustaining the stature of nuclear weapons as the ultimate 'currency of power' in international relations. The assumption was that the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation would be solved by international inspections and verification. But this has not happened, notably because of the actions of some of the members who are exempt from the NPT. Lately though it is the member countries like North Korea and Iran who have presented the critical challenge to the non-proliferation norm.

North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, threatened to walk out of it in 1993, but kept it in abeyance for a decade and finally withdrew from it in 2003. The international concern now is that this could trigger further defections from the treaty and cause a kind of arms race in the region. Yet another concern is of this resulting in weapons grade fissile material or nuclear weapons themselves falling into the hands of other states and non-state actors. No international norm has been able to prevent that from happening.

Nuclear Trade and Koreas:
It is widely recognised that if the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are to be widely received, there will have to be international trade in nuclear technology,
equipment and materials. Article III, 2 of the NPT sets the basic conditions for such trade and requires members to undertake

...not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subjected to the safeguards required by this Article.

This is the heart of the NPT because members undertake not to use nuclear material for making weapons, accept safeguards to verify compliance and to not export nuclear materials without safeguards being applied at its destination. In short, if a country wants nuclear materials and technology, it must accept safeguards. This had not been the case before. The problem of course came to the fore when commercial competition started to create difficulties. One basic problem was that of definitions. There had to be an agreement on the items to which export controls would be applied and to define in detail the meaning of the phrase ‘equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material’.

In the early 1970s, a committee was set up under the chairmanship of Professor Claude Zangger, to sort out this problem. The Committee came out with a list of materials equipment and components that would trigger the application of safeguards. But one item that was not covered: the provision of know-how. The original list did not also deal with dual-use items. These gaps were filed later, but as we know now, not to much avail. Of the several examples, the one of interest to us are the two Koreas. South Korea was also preparing to construct a reprocessing plant. American pressure succeeded in having the deals with it cancelled. But several other deals went through, albeit under IAEA safeguards.

It soon became clear that international safeguards by themselves would be unable to control nuclear proliferation. The response came in the form of an attempt to find a less “proliferation-prone” fuel cycle and in 1977 U.S. President Carter launched the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) in the hope of identifying a fuel cycle in which the use of the so-called ‘sensitive’ technologies,
facilities and materials could be avoided. This attempt did not succeed. North Korea has shown that if a country is determined to embark on a nuclear weapons programme, notwithstanding the fact that it is a party to the NPT, it is likely to have recourse to the use of facilities that are not part of the declared fuel cycle at which IAEA safeguards are applied.

When these initial attempts failed, a policy of not exporting items that might help recipients manufacture nuclear weapons was adopted. But this too did not work because some of the potential suppliers broke ranks. The essential differences between the work of what became known as the “Nuclear Suppliers Group” (NSG) and that of the Zangger Committee was that, beside the fact that they applied also to NPT parties, the guidelines drawn up by the NSG listed, among other things, items in regard to which exporters should “exercise restraint”. The NSG has been criticised for violating the letter and the spirit of the NPT, Article IV of which confirms the “inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to [benefit from the] use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination”. The supplier states have pointed out that the pertinent provision of Article IV ends with the phrase “... in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty”. These Articles forbid nuclear-weapon states to help non-nuclear-weapon states obtain or produce nuclear weapons. They maintain that it is part of their basic obligations under the Treaty not to supply anyone with the means to make nuclear weapons.

PTBT and CTBT
Attempts were also made to control proliferation by devising test ban treaties. The two most important were the limited or Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which bans nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, and entered into force in 1963, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was opened for signature in September 1996. A prohibition on nuclear tests is considered a non-proliferation measure because it was very difficult, if not impossible, to produce a proper weapon without making sure of its effectiveness through a nuclear test.
However, though it was difficult to judge the efficacy of the weapon without testing, the treaty could not prevent production of these. This is apparent from what John Holdren, then a member of President Clinton's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology and chair of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control, had to say, "Certain types of simple and relatively heavy and inefficient nuclear weapons can be developed without any nuclear testing at all" (Lewis 2005). However, he also added "...independent development of efficient and compact fission weapons, or thermonuclear weapons of any kind, could not be accomplished by countries new to nuclear weapons without nuclear testing which is highly likely to be detected" (Lewis 2005).

In the case of North Korea though CIA estimates had assessed North Korea to possess one or two nuclear bombs of fission type before the AF was entered into, as no nuclear tests were conducted by it the designs could not be validated. South Korean defence analysts are sceptical about North Korea's recent declaration that it possesses nuclear weapons. According to one, "It is one thing to talk about having a weapon and it's a different matter to talk about a complete nuclear weapons system" (Kwang-Ho Lee 2005: 8).

North Korea test-fired its short-range Nodong 1 missile and later its medium-range Taepodong 1 missile over Japan into the Pacific Ocean in August 1998 and a whole range of short, medium and long range missiles more recently, on the 5th of July 2006. But whether its nuclear war head was miniaturised enough to be successfully mounted on either Taepodong 1 or for that matter, Taepodong 2 which it is has recently developed, and fired cannot be verified. So, though the international community has a fair idea about the state of North Korea's weapons delivery system because of the recent tests, it knows very little about the state of its nuclear weapons programme. Therefore, all decisions are taken merely on speculations and conjectures. A major reason for North Korea not testing its nuclear devices is precisely to keep its nuclear capability, including the level of sophistication of its weapons, under the shroud of ambiguity.
Though there were experts including Holdren who tried convincing the U.S. administration of the need to ratify the CTBT by saying, "the worst-case scenario under a no-CTBT regime poses far bigger threats to U.S. security interests -- sophisticated nuclear-weapons systems in the hands of many more adversaries -- than the worst-case scenario of clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, within the constraints posed by the monitoring system." yet the U.S did not ratify it (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 2002). At present the CTBT has been signed by 176 states and ratified by 132 (“Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Status” 2005). Besides, India and Pakistan the other country that has not signed it is North Korea. The CTBT was eventually torpedoed by its originator, the U.S.

Domestic situation in North Korea
Domestically, this was the period when Kim Il-Sung was adapting the Korean hybrid version of Stalinist communism known as “Juche”, discussed earlier, as the political base (Lee and Baik 2000: 44-50). The initial tenet of the ideology was predicated on the premises and ideals of nationalism. Kim Il-Sung had adopted a system by which he reasserted a native Korean political practice of assigning super ordinate role to the leader thereby ensuring his legitimacy and survival. Just the way the South Korean leaders were promoting political integration and power consolidation through advocating anti-communism even though democracy as such had not been firmly established there, Kim Il-Sung strove to do this through his Juche style of nationalism. It defied any form of reliance or dependence on external powers and therefore showed that whatever South Korea stood for was wrong and illegitimate.

Kim Il-sung was also driven by anger that the UN had proclaimed the Government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in August 1948 as the only legitimate government after having conducted elections only in that part of Korea. Juche provided it the basis for its existence, which was distinct from the South and at the same time helped it to define itself as the ‘true Korea’. This was a period when Kim Il-Sung, after having consolidated his hold politically, economically and militarily with the help of the Soviet Union and China, tried to move away from these powers and become independent and self-reliant in these three areas in keeping with his Juche-ism. Internationally, the concept of Juche was adopted in
North Korea's foreign policy around 1955 to draw itself away from the Soviet Union. The concept appeared to grow in stature in the mid-1960s when Kim Il-Sung sought a stance independent of Moscow and Beijing.

For the North Korean economy this was a period of postwar reconstruction. Korean power plants had been mostly located in the South, and the North found itself almost without any power. So Kim Il-Sung set about building them. Initially, he thought he could do it without outside help but the task proved so formidable that he was forced to seek Soviet funds and technical means for the construction of hydropower and thermal power stations. With large amounts of aid from the Soviet bloc, the industrial sector recorded a growth rate of 25 percent per annum in the decade after the Korean War. The North Korean economy, at least until the mid-1960s, grew far more rapidly than the South. But by the early 1970s, growth had slowed to almost zero, as had aid from the USSR. It then turned to France and Japan for turnkey projects and thus began the external debt-servicing problem that was going to haunt North Korea for years to come.

This was also the period when even North Korea started its nuclear related activities with help primarily from the Soviet Union and also some from China. The currently disputed Yongbyon reactor; other laboratories essential in the nuclear weapons making process, and research institutes were all set up during this period. Many North Korean scientists also underwent training as nuclear specialists at various Soviet institutes and research complexes. It needs pointing out that North Korean policy was really no different from that of many others, notably Israel, which too had started making efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by mid 1950s. That attempt became known by the late 1960s (Bundy 1989: 505-506).

Indeed, South Korea too began its first nuclear research after the U.S. concluded a bilateral treaty for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in July 1954 (Wonjaryuk Yungooso 1990). Later, after the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, which aimed at scaling down the U.S. commitment to its Asian allies, in July 1969 President Park Chung Hee of South Korea also started pursuing a secret nuclear-weapons programme (Lee 1988: 6-13; Hymans, Kim & Riecke 2001: 138, n.17,18). In the period between 1968 and 1975 South Korea is said to have
attempted to obtain a plant to reprocess plutonium from spent fuel as well as intermediate range missile delivery system (Kang, Hayes, Bin, Suzuki, Tanter 2005: 43). South Korea collaborated with France for this and by 1974 had the technical design of a plant that could manufacture enough fissionable plutonium for two nuclear bombs per year (Oberdorfer 2001: 69). North Korea had the following information about South Korea.

In the late 1960s the South Korean authorities had invited some nuclear experts from abroad to train large number of nuclear experts. ...... Nuclear research institutes and bases have been established. One of them is Taedok Nuclear Arms Development Complex. The complex is the centre of nuclear arms development, comprising research institutes for the development of the means of nuclear warheads and the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the development of the C31 system. There are more than 30 research institutes, including the Atomic Energy Institute, the Defence Science Institute........Research reactors, the Korean Multipurpose Research reactor (K-MRR), the post-irradiation test facilities, the Korea Nuclear Fuel Company, the Korea Explosives Co, Ltd ..... Taedok is not only a pivotal nuclear arms development base for producing all kinds of spare parts and finished goods necessary for nuclear arms development" (Pyongyang Times, 22 May 1993: 7).

This fact is corroborated by the statement made by Choi Hyong Sop, Minister of Science and Technology of South Korea in the late 1970s that, “we (South Korea) are in a position to manufacture nuclear bombs within a year or two”(cited in Pyongyang Times, 22 May 1993: 7). The South Korean nuclear weapons capability would have also, therefore, become a major reason for North Korea to pursue its nuclear weapons programme more actively.

Some scholars believe that until the early 1980s Pyongyang’s security agreements with Moscow and Beijing provided it an adequate nuclear umbrella and that it had no need for an independent nuclear programme for military applications. However, the fact is that even then they had code-named their Yongbyon Research Centre as Object 9559 or Furniture Factory (Kaurov, Moltz and Mansourov 2000: 16). This raises doubts about their real motive. So, though they might not have had the need to possess nuclear weapons it does not automatically rule out the intention of possessing them.
It is also worth noting that North Korea's main facility, an IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor, at the Yongbyon Scientific Research Centre started functioning by 1965 (Kaurov, Moltz and Mansourov 2000: 16). Its capacity had been increased from 2 MW, which is what the capacity of the original Soviet supplied reactor was, to initially 5 MW and then to 7 MW, through their own effort (Kaurov, Moltz and Mansourov 2000: 16-17). The training that the North Korean nuclear specialists had received at various institutes in the Soviet Union had been put to good use. The functioning of the reactor helped the North Korean nuclear scientists to study the various physical and chemical processes occurring under the impact of ionizing irradiation and conduct other related research activities.

North Korea, in fact, refused to sign the NPT until 1985 because it wanted to keep its hands free for pursuing nuclear weapons since it believed that the U.S. troops on South Korean soil were equipped with such weapons (Li, Moltz and Mansourov 2000: 139). There is also evidence that North Korea attempted to design a missile with the co-operation of China whose missile designers had developed not only the CSS-4 but other ballistic missiles as well. These were abandoned in 1978 as they fell short of expectation (Bazhanov, Moltz and Mansourov 2000: 102). North Korea's desire for developing its own missiles seems to have stemmed from South Korea's efforts towards modernising its military with help from the U.S. (Lee 1990: 439-444; Bazhanov, Moltz and Mansourov 2000: 102). Lee (1990: 439-444) has analysed how the presence of American nuclear weapons in South Korea has served both as a nuclear deterrent and at the same time has been the cause for nuclearization of the peninsula.


This period marks the expansion in the export of nuclear technology by the established nuclear powers to their allies. At the same time efforts were made to widen the NPT regime and to ensure that the NPT signatories were honoring their obligations. The period ends with the discovery of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear weapons programme. Indeed, by the early 1980s several nations with nuclear weapons capabilities had emerged and there were many others on the threshold. According to Kathleen Bailey's classification (Bailey 1991: 17-18), there emerged
one set of 'probable nuclear weapon states' like India, Pakistan and Israel, one set of 'potential nuclear weapons states' with fairly advanced nuclear programmes but whose intentions were suspect and have, therefore, been characterised as 'rogue states' like Iran, Iraq and North Korea and yet another set of 'capable-but-restrained' nations, like, Belgium, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Germany. Clearly, non-proliferation was limited to weapons only, and not to the ability to make them.

As far as North Korea is concerned, this was a period when North Korea acknowledged the existence of South Korea and, wanting to take advantage of its economic boom, sought reconciliation with it (South-North Joint Communiqué, 1972). But that was not to be. The reconciliation started between the two Koreas in the early 1970s did not last long. By 1974 President Park was convinced that it was futile to try and engage North Korea because, as seen in the previous chapter, North Korea continued with its terrorist activities. In 1973 some North Korean agents had attempted to assassinate President Park but the premature explosion of the bomb spared his life. However, the following year when a similar attempt was made, this time with a gun, his wife was killed. As there has been no credible explanation for this outburst of hostility on the part of North Korea, an intelligent guess could be that factions within the North Korean regime, which were hostile to reconciliation with the South and were also opposed to Kim Il-Sung, sabotaged the process. However, the received wisdom, seeing DPRK's 1972 Constitution which states that DPRK "strives to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half, drive out foreign forces on a nationwide scale, reunify the country peacefully on a democratic basis and attain complete national independence", is that Kim Il-Sung still harboured hopes of unifying the peninsula by force (FBIS, 1972). He wanted to take advantage of the dissent within South Korea against the oppressive authoritarian rule of President Park. Whatever the reason and whoever the perpetrators of these acts, the attacks had the effect of helping President Park to rationalise his oppressive ways by pointing to the threat of North Korea. Relations between the two halves reverted to the 'normal' state of belligerent confrontation.
During these years the North Korean economy slowly reached the verge of bankruptcy. Aid from both Moscow and Beijing, always uncertain, had started dwindling in the late 1980s. Pyongyang had neglected its industrial infrastructural development as well as other areas of its economy in the process of building its "highly modern and mobile" defence system (Quinones, Park and Kim 2001: 34). By the end of the 1980s food was in short supply as excessive use of chemical fertilizers had depleted the soil’s fertility. Nuclear weapons and the missile programme seemed its only hope for survival. According to the CIA, North Korea earned about $580 million between 1987 and 1992 from its missile exports (Park, Park and Kim 2001: 92).

It would indeed be an interesting study to see whether North Korea would have been better off or gained more by investing funds in the economic development of the country than in the development of nuclear weapons. By opting for the latter North Korea has certainly obtained both political and international recognition, security assurances and deterrence capability, and significant economic assistance from countries, which were its former enemies.

That the economy suffered is not surprising considering the amount of resources that North Korea devoted to the military 20-25 per cent of GDP throughout the 1970s and the 1980s (Hayes 1994). This was in response to the fact that South Korea had started modernising its conventional forces with the help of the U.S. When Kim Il-Sung found that though he had increased the conventional military forces yet North Korea lagged behind South Korea in military strength, he calculated that nuclear weapons could be a cheap and yet a powerful deterrent to counter South Korea’s superiority in conventional weapons.

North Korea had developed its own indigenous nuclear weapons programme with the help of various specialists trained in nuclear physics and chemistry in Japan and Moscow. It was able to maintain complete secrecy, not even permitting officials from China or the Soviet Union to visit its key facilities at Yongbyon (Oberdorfer 2001: 254). It had learnt to reverse-engineer the Soviet-style Scud missiles in the late 1970s and upgrade its range from 300 km to over 500 km range (Bailey 1991: 107). Kim Il-Sung also authorized the implementation of a
nuclear weapons programme, including the rapid expansion of facilities at Yongbyon in the 1970s (Oberdorfer 2001: 253). Time and again it had been requesting the U.S. and South Korea to withdraw the American nuclear weapons from the South and turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear free zone (Rodong Sinmun, 10 November 1989: 1). In June 1986, the government of DPRK had made an official statement stating its willingness not to test, produce, store, import or transfer nuclear weapons on or through its territory if the U.S. withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea, stopped shipping nuclear armaments to the South and gave up any plans to use such weapons in Korea (Rodong Sinmun, 23 June 1986: 1).

The weapons that North Korea repeatedly referred to had been stationed on South Korean soil since December 1957 when Eisenhower had authorized their deployment. According to U.S. documents cited by Don Oberdorfer (2001: 257) by 1972, 763 nuclear warheads were deployed there and the nuclear weapons were apparently stationed very close to the DMZ and nuclear warheads were routinely flown by helicopter to the edge of the DMZ as part of the training programme. In August 1976 when the U.S.-DPRK relations deteriorated because of the killing of two American officers at the DMZ, the U.S. is said to have deployed more nuclear-capable air and naval assets to South Korea. These were reduced later to about 250 warheads during Carter administration and further to about 100 warheads during Bush Sr. Administration (Oberdorfer 2001: 257). According to a North Korean source,

South Korea’s stock of plutonium 239 amounted to 10 tons in 1992.... South Korea has also developed the means of nuclear arms delivery. The United States has transferred to South Korea nuclear-capable 155-mm howitzers and 8-inch guns, F-bombs and a variety of missiles. South Korea has developed its own medium-range guided missiles (Pyongyang Times, 22 May 1993: 7).

The fact that the presence of the nuclear warheads was so close to North Korea have been reason enough for North Korea to desire a few at least as a deterrent (Cheon 1993: 24). Moreover, since U.S. policy was of one of “neither confirming nor denying” the presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, North Korea too
did not feel the need to reveal details of its nuclear weapons at the time (Yun 1995: 45).

Until the mid-1980s the Soviet Union still seemed to have influence over North Korea. This is apparent from the fact that it pressurised North Korea to join the NPT in 1985 (Yun 1995: 18). North Korea also consented to eventual full inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But within five years the Soviet Union had collapsed and North Korea found itself without a nuclear security umbrella. Then, to add insult to injury, Moscow informed Pyongyang of its decision to establish diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1990. This prompted the foreign minister of North Korea Kim Young Nam to state "North Korea had no choice but to facilitate the development of necessary weapons, indicating a possible development of nuclear weapons" (Park, Park and Kim 2001: 90).

Nuclear North Korea (1991-2001)
This period, unlike the earlier one, begins on a happy note for non-proliferation: the Cold War ended. But it ends on a rather less happy note with altered security perceptions of the U.S. and their renewed efforts to put SDI back into place on the U.S. agenda. By 1991 the U.S. had a number of international agreements to its credit. It had concluded the START I agreement which had reduced the land, sea and airborne nuclear forces of the two superpowers to 6,000 weapons each. Under the START II agreement further cuts were undertaken and the levels dropped to between 2000 and 2500 weapons (Herrick and McRae 2003: 118). Most importantly, the NPT had received a boost with Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and Algeria suspending their nuclear activity and joining the NPT regime. President Clinton was also able to convince three of the emergent new states -- Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan -- to dismantle their nuclear capabilities and join the NPT. The policy reviews undertaken by the Clinton administration in 1994 also gave hopes of major changes in the nuclear posture of the U.S. The U.S. also started to pursue the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) with great vigour. And, in May 1995, the NPT when it came up for renewal was made permanent. The divide between the nuclear haves and the have-nots was frozen in stone – or so the haves thought because it became known that Iraq had been clandestinely
pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. North Korea was also found to be pursuing a secret nuclear weapons' programme. In fact with China undertaking the underground nuclear testing at Lop Nor test site in Xinjiang Province on October 5, 1993 amongst various other concerns one was that it would “embolden Pyongyang to push ahead with its nuclear weapons project, despite the international effort to prevent it” (The Korea Times, 7 October 1993: 1). Whether China’s nuclear testing emboldened North Korea or not, the fact that it believed that South Korea’s stock of Plutonium 239 was expected to rise from 10 tons in 1992 to about 24 tons by the 2000, despite the joint declaration by the two states to denuclearize the peninsula, certainly would have convinced it of the need (Pyongyang Times, 22 May 1993: 7). However, Article VI of the NPT, which talks of complete disarmament, seemed a distant goal.

It was also a period when the U.S. was professing stringent measures against nuclear proliferators by way of cutting off aid and imposing sanctions. However, the U.S. responses to acts of proliferation since then have not been uniform. For instance it ignores Israel’s proliferation. Similarly responses to Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 were also distinct, short and selective. Especially, even though Pakistan’s nuclear programme is well under way and Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s illegal activities of importing and exporting nuclear related technology were well known, yet Pakistan was not penalised. Such differential treatment only further undermines the norm the NPT strives to achieve. In fact, even when the U.S. was voicing concerns about the nuclear test conducted by China in October 1993 and its effect on global negotiations for CTBT and extension of the nuclear NPT, the U.S. itself had by then, apparently, detonated 900 bombs (The Korea Times, 7 October 1993: 7). It is because of these inconsistencies that countries like North Korea are able to walk out of their commitments with impunity.

Engaging Kim Jong-Il Regime:
Domestically, in North Korea this was a decade of consolidation of Kim Jong-Il’s position. Kim Il-Sung died in 1994, and the world expected the regime to collapse soon, just as other autocracies had collapsed in the Eastern bloc in early 1990s.
But that did not happen. On the contrary Kim Jong-II, went from strength to strength internally.

Kim Jong-II’s position as successor to Kim Il-Sung was secure even by December 1993. This is evident from the fact that Kim Il-Sung’s younger brother Kim Yong-Ju who had been viewed as a threat to Kim Jong-II’s succession was once again appointed as member of the politburo, the core organ of North Korean power hierarchy, in 1993 (The Korea Times, 11 December, 1993: 7). He had been kept out of active politics for nearly 17 years (Cumings 1997: 415-416; Downs 1999: 178).

Kim Jong-II soon started assuming military-related positions** and, by the end of the decade, established a new political system based on the military establishment (Hajime, Baik and Jin 2000: 229-231). Throughout the 1990s every new step in the missile-related activities was used by Kim Jong-II to consolidate his position is evident from the fact that in May 1990 when the first attempt was made to put the Nodong missile to a flight test Kim was elected First Vice Chairman of the NDC; he was then elected Chairman of the NDC before it was successfully flight-tested in 1993; again, the Taepodong missile was launched before Kim was reelected Chairman of the NDC (Michishita 2003: 610). The essential character of the regime remained intact despite the profound economic difficulties and the occasional political uncertainties (Noland 2004: 12-19).

While in North Korea a political system based on the military was being established, in the South for the first time a civilian president, Kim Young Sam, came to power in 1993. The democratically elected government in 32 years was tougher towards North Korea than the previous government under President Roh Tae-Woo and the divergence of policies of the United States and South Korea towards North Korea was becoming quite apparent (Scalapino, Moon and

** He was elected first as the Vice Chairman of the National Defence Commission in May 1990, then as Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army in 1991, elevated to the post of Chairman of the National Defence Commission in April 1993. After the death of Kim Il-Sung, when the constitution was revised this post was proclaimed as “the highest post of the state”. He had also been made the General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 1997.

** Kim Jong-II adopted a “military-first” politics in its constitution since September 1998.
Steinberg 2002: 266). However, soon political problems started mounting within South Korea and then the Asian crisis struck.

In February 1998, Kim Dae Jung, an opposition party leader, came to power. This was the first time that there had been a peaceful change of government. Soon after he entered office Kim Dae Jung took active measures to improve relations with the North. He eventually won the Nobel Peace Prize for this.

Internationally, this was a crucial decade for Kim Jong-Il regime, both in terms of its own foreign policy as well as its relations with the major powers. North Korea gained entry into the UN along with South Korea, in September 1991. It had initially refused to enter the UN as a divided nation but when the prospect of South Korea’s entry seemed bright, it changed its decision, and agreed to a simultaneous entry (Quinones 2001: 29, 33-35). Another major foreign policy decision was to improve relations with the four surrounding powers, particularly the U.S. (Rodong Sinmun, 25 June 1992: 1; Doug Joong Kim 1994: 523; Cheon 1999: 13). This too had been earlier predicated on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons by the U.S. from South Korea.

This reconciliation -- between North Korea and the U.S. on the one hand and between South Korea and North Korea -- was quite short-lived. The immediate cause was the North Korean People’s Army shooting down a U.S. Army helicopter that had flown mistakenly across the DMZ into North Korea. The North Koreans had assumed that it was on a spy mission and had fired a missile at it, killing the pilot. Things also started souring when it was discovered that North Korea was pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The IAEA insisted that it open the nuclear sites for inspection. North Korea then threatened to walk out of the NPT and began discharging spent fuel rods from its 5-Megawatt reactor in 1994. This turned tension into a full-blown crisis (Quinones 2000: 250-254). Ex-U.S. President Jimmy Carter paid an unofficial visit to North Korea and a diplomatic breakthrough was made, which culminated in the signing of the Agreed Framework Accord in Geneva in October 1994. North Korea was thus successful in drawing the U.S. into bilateral negotiations. But its desire to gain
diplomatic recognition from the U.S., as South Korea had done with the Soviet Union and China, who were historically North Korea's allies, did not fructify.

With the collapse of the socialist world market North Korea had lost even the few trading partners it had. In its inimitable way it blamed the U.S. for its "imperialist offensive against socialism" (Rodong Sinmun, 9 December 1993: 1). With the collapse of the Soviet empire and the economic transformation of China, North Korea's supply of imported oil which was paid for by its exports was sharply curtailed. This, in turn, affected the mining of coal, its principal energy source. Its oil imports from the Soviet Union fell from 440,000 tons in 1990 to mere 40,000 tons in 1991. Its GDP also shrunk by 5.2 percent in 1991 and by a further 5 percent in 1992 (Sigal 1997: 23). With its exports greatly contracting and its foreign debt expanding, the North Korean economy was in dire straits. Kim Jong-Il soon found that he could not sustain such a high level of military spending. To add to this, there were two years of floods in 1995 and 1996 and a summer of drought in 1997. This resulted in a famine that claimed the life of nearly two million people (Cumings, Park and Kim 2001: 106). North Korea was, therefore, desperate for the timely implementation of the Agreed framework Accord, which, unfortunately, got delayed -- for reasons more than one.

As far as North Korea's defence policy is concerned, the two most important features were the development of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. On the one hand, it was becoming more and more difficult to discern North Korea's nuclear intentions. The fact that North Korea was pursuing a nuclear weapons programme had become certain through the U.S. surveillance. However, whether it was openly engaging in these activities to attract the U.S. attention and extract concessions from it or whether it was doing so as a serious effort to acquire nuclear weapons to counter South's booming economy and growing conventional military strength had become a subject of debate depending on which prism one was looking through.

The U.S. policy in East Asia seemed contradictory to the North Koreans. Washington was talking peace with North Korea and China while at the same time strengthening its own and allies' military capabilities in the region. Nevertheless,
North Korea managed to bring the U.S. to the negotiation table. After decades of isolating North Korea, it began a series of negotiations with it in the early 1990s and succeeded in reaching an agreement. The Agreed Framework Accord laid out a comprehensive road map to a peaceful end to Pyongyang’s nuclear programme as well as a peaceful development of the two countries’ relationship. But, simultaneously, the U.S. was upgrading its own and its’ allies military capabilities in the region and, as a result, militarily intimidating not only North Korea but others in the region too (Jeon 2000: 69; Shen 2000). This policy has been referred to as ‘congagement’ by a South Korean scholar – meaning that the U.S. was seeking to contain as well as engage North Korea (Suh 2000).

By mid-1990s North Korea had developed the capability to produce 100 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles annually and these were believed to have a range of 300 to 500 kms (Yim 1999: 96-104). North Korea also test fired its missiles during this period. In May 1993, it test-launched one indigenously designed medium range Nodong missile with three North Korean version of Scud missiles. In August 1998 it took the world by surprise by launching a three-stage rocket based Taepodong missile in the East Sea off the Japanese coast. Also, the fact that North Korea indulged in missile exports was no longer a secret (Park, Park and Kim 2001: 92).

By 1999, one thing became certain that North Korea, despite its grave economic difficulties had decided to tread the path of building both a militarily and economically powerful socialist state (Rodong Sinmun, 3 January 1999: 1; Joson Inmingun, 3 January 1999: 1). This indicated that “its survival under security threats and economic difficulties were given first priority” (Park, Park and Kim 2001: 91).

Thus, it would appear that the initial diplomatic breakthroughs made with the signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework Accord were negated by the contradictory policies adopted by both sides. North Korea, blamed the U.S. for not observing its side of the deal. The U.S. faulted North Korea for violating the spirit of the

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**Footnote:**

The U.S. was following a two Major Theatres Contigency (MTC) as a post Cold-War global strategy that required the American military to be prepared to fight two wars in Korea and the Middle East. North Korea vehemently criticised the U.S.-Japan agreement on TMD for leading to further arms race in the post Cold War period.
Accord by continuing to indulge in nuclear weapons and missile programmes secretly. The following chapter takes a closer look at these bilateral interface as also examines the terms and implementation of the Accord with a view to arriving at a true assessment of the situation.