CHAPTER - IV

EVOLUTION OF NEW DEFENCE AND SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD

I. CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND MULTI-LATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES' FRAMEWORK

The Soviet Union was replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) grouping 11 of the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union in a loose alliance on December 21, 1991 at Alma-Aty.¹

However, the decision to form the Commonwealth of Independent States and to disband Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was taken on December 8 1991, when the leaders of three Slavic Soviet Republics – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus met at Minsk and decided to constitute the CIS.² This step was regarded as a fatal blow to the existence of the Soviet Union.

After the formation of the CIS, leaders of Central Asian states reacted sharply with surprise and resentment over the decision taken by the three Slavic states. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated that the conclusion of the tripartite treaty had come as a surprise adding ‘decisions as important as the denunciation of the Union Treaty of 1922 required as a minimum a preliminary conference of all the republics concerned’.³ Nevertheless, once Russia declared its

² SWB, SU/1251, P,C1/1, December 10, 1991.
central Asian states also tried to develop a common approach towards it. The first step was a meeting of the Central Asian Heads of States (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) plus Azerbaijan just after four days of Minsk Declaration, in Ashkabad, the capital of Turkmenistan, on December 12, 1991. These six republics unanimously decided to become members of the newly constituted Commonwealth of Independent States.⁴

At Alma-Aty the participant members of the eleven independent republics of the former Soviet Union assembled, where the formal declaration of formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States was taken on December 21, 1991.⁵ Just after four days of formation of the CIS, with the resignation of the Soviet President Mikhael Gorbachev on December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union finally ceased to exist.⁶

The formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States by the erstwhile components of the Soviet Union and their collective declaration on the various issues of socio-economic, strategic, defence and security co-operation was a landmark event towards their peaceful existence during the post-Soviet era. It was assumed by all members of the CIS that Russia, the real successor of the Soviet Union and having special as well as advantageous position, would play pivotal role during the transitional phase of independence in the overall security of the newly emerged Commonwealth of Independent States. Hence, all the five Central Asian Republics, though having some differences with Russian Federation, fully shared a common concern for their security on account of their

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⁴ SWB, SU/1255, P,B/6, December 14, 1991.  
mutual dependence. The leaders of Central Asian Republics emphasised that Russia, for all practical purposes within the institutional context of CIS, would be the sole guarantor of peace and security in the region, and hence all Central Asian states pursued collective as well as separate bilateral security agreements with Russia.

After the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the most significant development within the CIS with far reaching security implications for Central Asian Republics was the “Treaty on Collective Security” signed between Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Armenia, in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) on May 15, 1992. The only Central Asian Republic—Turkmenistan was not the signatory of the Treaty.

The Tashkent Summit, attended by the Heads of the Government of all the participant members and chaired by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, negotiated a five year collective security agreement providing for a collective response to aggression against any of its signatories. Other agreements signed by all participants at the summit included (i) agreement for reducing armed forces of the former Soviet Union, (ii) reducing chemical weapons in accordance with international agreements, (iii) creating a single air space, a single information space, and in principle, a CIS television and radio company, (iv) agreement on border troops, (v) social provision for servicemen, (vi) provision for formation of a collective Security Council consisting of the heads of participating states and the commander-in-chief of the CIS joint armed forces.

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Article 1 and 4 of Treaty of Collective Security of Tashkent Summit clearly states: 'The participating states shall not enter into military alliances or participate in any groupings of states, nor in actions directed against another participating states' and furthermore. 'If one of the participating states is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, this will be perceived as an aggression against all participating states to the treaty'. In the event of an act of aggression being committed against any of the participating states, all the other participating states will give it the necessary assistance, including military assistance, and will also give support with the means at their disposal by way of exercising the right to collective defence in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations' Charter.

General Leonid Ivashov, Head of working group on defence issues and one of the key participants in preparation of the documents for the Tashkent Summit, stated that the 'Treaty confirms already established views, particularly within the military circles of the Commonwealth governments, that the establishment of a system of collective security, or more accurately, its preservation, is a practical necessity and an objective requirement'. General V. Samsanov, Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff, pointed to the political significance of the Treaty: 'The treaty on collective security is the basis for forming a defence alliance' and '... the first and probably the most complex step towards creating an effective military and political structure capable of being a guarantee of security for the successful political and economic development of the subjects that form the CIS'.

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The Tashkent Summit of the Collective Security provided the main security dimension of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The significance of the agreement did not primarily lie in its internal provisions, more importantly it provided an essential precondition and backdrop for the more detailed and substantive bilateral military agreements which Russia subsequently signed with all the Central Asian states including Turkmenistan. Thus the formation of a security alliance between Russian and Central Asian States (Tashkent bloc) compelled all Central Asian states not to pursue a path of separate and independent military development but to fully depend upon Russia’s military support, active participation and remain under shadow of its security umbrella.

Immediately after the Tashkent Summit, two agreements, equally but not more significant, were reached among the participant states in Moscow (July 6, 1992) and Tashkent (July 16, 1992) which provided more substantive support to the previous collective security agreement. The two meetings specifically addressed the twin significant issues of the creation of the CIS ‘blue helmet’ force (Moscow Summit) for rapid deployment in the areas of regional conflict within the CIS, and the issue of security of the southern border of the CIS (Tashkent Summit).

The main result of the Moscow Summit was an agreement to establish joint peace keeping forces to intervene in CIS conflicts. A proposal by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev to establish a consultative economic co-ordination council with its headquarters in Kiev, and a military co-ordinating council, were also approved. A second group of issues, on which a protocol was signed, concerned collective security, including missile early warning systems, space control, anti-aircraft defence, a collective security council, the composition
of CIS strategic forces, operational principles of supreme command of CIS Joint Armed Forces and the protection of the state borders.\textsuperscript{12} The four states of the CIS with nuclear weapons on their territory (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine) also agreed to meet separately to discuss the removal of nuclear weapons to Russia.

The Moscow summit also defined ‘the exterior border of the participant states as the border of the CIS and its defence within the jurisdiction of CIS Joint Armed Forces’. Both Marshal Shaposhnikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and General V. Samsanov, CIS Chief of the General Staff, reaffirmed that the quick reaction to the threat posed against the ‘outside borders of the commonwealth’ is one of the key tasks of the CIS collective security agreement.\textsuperscript{13}

After the Moscow Summit, immediately within a fortnight, representatives of foreign, defence and border guard ministers of CIS member states met in Tashkent on July 16 to discuss the establishment of CIS peacekeeping force. They signed a protocol on interim measures to establish peacekeeping forces and military observers. In this Summit, Russia also announced the allocation of additional military force to protect the border with Iran and Afghanistan, and also suggested that Central Asian states should supplement border troops with national formations.\textsuperscript{14} Thus the Tashkent Summit of CIS come to the general agreement on the mechanism of creation of the CIS peacekeeping force/ ‘blue helmet’ and more importantly, the necessity of reinforcing the security of the southern border, especially the border of Tajikistan with Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{12} SWB, SU/1427, P,C1/1, July 8, 1992.
\textsuperscript{13} FBIS—SOV, 93-131, pp,12-14, July 8, 1992.
\textsuperscript{14} SWB, SU/1436, P,B/1, July 18, 1992.
Subsequently the CIS Defence Ministers, on September 3-4, 1992, in Moscow, successfully negotiated an agreement on the transfer of servicemen from the former Soviet armed forces to the armed forces of individual CIS member states. It was also decided that the High Command of the CIS joint armed forces will manage ex-Soviet strategic forces, co-ordinate CIS collective security and oversee peacekeeping efforts in internal CIS conflicts.\textsuperscript{15}

Another very important CIS summit was held at Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) on October 9, 1992, where leaders of CIS signed several economic as well as military agreements. Major military matters discussed at the summit included CIS concern over the deteriorating situation in Tajikistan, the general concept of military security in the CIS and the status of strategic and nuclear weapons in CIS member states.\textsuperscript{16} Agreement was reached on sending humanitarian assistance to Tajikistan, and on reinforcing military units present in the republic. A statute of the CIS joint armed forces high command was also signed, which according to the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces Marshal Shaposhnikov, would ‘allow the basis of military policy and the collective defence of CIS states to be determined and put an end to uncertainty’.\textsuperscript{17}

After the Bishkek summit, another summit of leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States with far reaching of security implication was held in the Byelarussian capital, Minsk, on January 22, 1993. After prolong debate, a charter for closer political, economic integration, and defence alliance was prepared. The charter was signed by seven of the 10 former Soviet republics represented at the meeting (Russia, Byelarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,

\textsuperscript{15} SWB, SU/1478, P,C1/1, September 5, 1992. Also SWB, SU/1479, P,C4/1, September 7, 1992.
\textsuperscript{16} SWB, SU/1509 P,C1/1, October 10 1992.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). Ukraine, Moldova and Turkmenistan refused to sign. This Summit rejected Russia’s proposal to take control of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan. A commitment was made within the CIS framework that Russia would be ready to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of Central Asian states and to defend it against external attack and internal instability.\footnote{SWB, SU/1594, P,C1/2, January 23, 1993.}

The Minsk Conference, in fact made a serious endeavour for the first time to create a new legal structure for the Commonwealth. It gave the CIS its charter. It postulated a year-long procedure for acceding to it. It also provided a mechanism for ratification by the legislatures of various states.

The Charter of this Conference may be looked upon as a ‘multilateral treaty’ consisting of fifty articles. Article 3 maintains that the member states ought to build their relations on the principle of ‘non-interference in one another’s internal and external affairs’. Article 4 and 29 stipulate ‘the co-ordination of foreign-policy activity’ and ‘co-operation in the field of the defence industry and the protection of external borders’. The third section of the Charter envisages ‘Collective Security and Military-Political Co-operation’. Article 4 may be viewed as an extension of the Collective Security Treaty signed at Tashkent. Significantly, Belarus was not a party to the signing of Tashkent Treaty, it has signed this Charter. Belarus of course has reservations about its participations in regional military blocs or alliances.\footnote{Ibid., P,C1/2-3.}

Another important CIS Conference began in Moscow on February 25, 1993, where Defence Ministers of CIS states which signed the Collective Security
Treaty, discussed various modalities for the implementation of Collective Security Treaty. Air Marshal Yevgeney Shaposhnikov, the Supreme Commander of the Combined Armed Forces of CIS, stated that one of the main issues for discussion by the Defence Ministers was proposals to improve the structure of the CIS Supreme command and increase the defence capabilities of those nations which had signed the Collective agreement. Two drafts were broadly discussed in this summit. First – reorganisation of the Supreme Command on the Warsaw Pact model making the Supreme commander himself Russia’s deputy defence minister.

Second - to set up a Council of Collective Security to include the heads of State and Prime Ministers of the six nations which signed the Collective Security agreement. The councils of defence ministers and foreign ministers, who would be co-ordinating joint activities, would be directly accountable to the Council of Collective Security. In addition, a Secretariat of the Council of Defence Ministers and the position of General Executive Secretary of the Council of Collective Security (which must be occupied by a politician and not a representative of the military) would be created.20

This meeting of Defence Minister of the CIS states which signed the Collective Security Treaty can be called an attempt to convert the Collective Security Treaty from a political declaration into an instrument for tackling urgent defence issues.

Just before the meeting, which had taken place behind closed doors, Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaponshinikov, Commander-in-Chief of the CIS joint armed forces stated: “We need to work out unified approaches to the forthcoming

20 SWB, SU/1625, P,C2/1, March 1, 1993.
meeting of the CIS heads of state at the end of April and to the sitting of the Interparliamentary Assembly so as to put forward concrete proposals and an improved system of Collective Security".  

The meeting was attended by Armenian Defence Minister Vazgen Manukyan, Kazakhstan’s Defence Minister Col-Gen. Sagadat Nurmagambetov, Maj-Gen. Dzhanybek Umetaliiyev, Chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for Defence Affairs, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Col-Gen. Boris Gromov, Maj-Gen. Farrukh Niyazov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the CIS joint armed forces and the representative of the Republic of Tajikistan and Maj-Gen. Rumil Khadyrbayev, Deputy Defence Minister of Uzbekistan and the plenipotentiary representatives of these republics in Moscow and military experts.

Defence Ministers of the six CIS States discussed on the line of instruction of the CIS Council of Heads of States, dated January 22, 1993, all possibilities of co-ordination of the joint activity of the Commonwealth member states in raising defence capability and deepening military co-operation defence legislation and also measures to implement accords on military issues. The need for military integration was also stressed by the CIS countries defence ministers. The ministers decided to establish a working commission to prepare draft agreements on how to implement the treaties on collective security and combined armed forces. This will in particular concern establishment of a single air defence system, possible regional amalgamation of CIS armed forces in theatres of war, and other matters.

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21 Ibid.,  
22 Ibid.,  
23 Ibid., P.C2/2.
At the recommendation of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, which took place in St. Petersburg on December 29, and in accordance with the decision of the CIS Council of Defence Ministers, dated September 4, 1992, the Heads of Military Departments also discussed for drawing up of legislative acts on matters of defence and progress in the realization of interstate agreements on social and legal protection of servicemen.

Defence Ministers also discussed about the possibility of setting up a regional association of the CIS armed forces within the borders occupied by the Turkestan Military District which was abolished after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. According to preliminary estimates by military experts this group could be made up of formations and units of the national armies of the four Central Asian CIS states, Kazakhstan and also of a few Russian subunits. It was envisaged that these units, without change of status or national jurisdiction, may be placed under the general leadership of the Main Command of the CIS joint armed forces, making the Collective Security Treaty more effective. 24

Lt. Gen. Ivashov praised the meeting as "extremely constructive and productive". He added, "the military can and should show an example of integration to the politicians." 25 It was also reported after the meeting that only Russia and Uzbekistan favoured setting up a defence structure similar to that of the Warsaw Treaty while Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan voted for creating an interstate co-ordinating military body along NATO lines. 26

26 Ibid.,
Addressing the press conference on the result of first conference of the Defence Ministers of the six CIS states which signed the Treaty on Collective Security, Marshal Y.Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the CIS joint armed forces, stated that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Treaty Organization, in their “pure form”, is the pattern to reform the CIS armed forces. There has to be a fundamentally new principle.27

Marshal Shaposhnikov also stated that to bring about a system of collective security efforts by defence ministers were not enough, and thus “political structures have to be employed, too.”.28 He further stated that a future collective security council must include the presidents and prime ministers and the council of CIS defence and foreign ministers.29 He also noted the importance of enhancing cooperation in the defence complex and manning the armed forces on a joint basis. According to Shaposhnikov, bilateral relations in military construction are clearly not enough cooperation that developed in this sphere is nonexistent in any other sector, therefore there arose the proposal to set-up interstate corporation on the basis of some scientific-industrial centres to produce military output.30

An extraordinary meeting of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was again held in Minsk on April 16, 1993. The meeting was called to discuss an appeal made in mid-March to CIS heads of state by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to strengthen the CIS through the creation of new mechanism of co-ordination among its constituent members. The summit was attended by all CIS heads of state except Turkmenistan President and

28 Ibid.,
29 Ibid.,
30 Ibid.,
Kyrgyzs President. Both Boris Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan—Nursultan Nazarbayev, emphasised for the security co-operation and to check growing intrigues of anti-government forces in Tajakistan.31

In another meeting of CIS Defence Ministers, on June 15, 1993, a significant development took place, where Ministers agreed that CIS Joint military command be abolished, and that efforts to hold together a unified defence structure for the CIS would be abandoned. The existing CIS command would be replaced by the 'Joint Staff for co-ordinating military co-operation between the states of the Commonwealth'.32

After the June Summit of the heads of Commonwealth of Independent States, the basic idea of formation of CIS and periodical meeting to discuss various issues of former Soviet republics and to provide collective response within the framework of CIS, gradually eroded. All members of the CIS, subsequently, on the basis of historical legacy, ethnicity and regionalism signed separate agreement on regional basis among themselves.

The concept of collective security within the CIS appears to have gained ground since the Minsk Summit. On August 7, 1993, Russia and the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, decided to set-up a regional security system 'in accordance with the agreement of collective security of the CIS states and bilateral agreements with Tajikistan'. President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan justified the security pact on the ground that the militant Islamic fundamentalistic forces were working overtime to turn Tajikistan into a 'springboard' for spreading militant fundamentalism in the Central Asian

31 SWB, SU/1665, P, B/5, April 1, 1993.
republics and other CIS states and that, therefore, it was necessary to ‘prevent in their territories the activities of persons, groups and organisations’ aimed ‘at violating the security of those states’. It was also emphasised that the borders of Tajikistan were ‘part of the common borders of the CIS’. 33

Keeping in view the security of the exterior border of the Commonwealth of Independent States particularity Tajik-Afghan border, a communiqué was issued by the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan following their meeting in Dushanbe on March 15, 1994. It demanded that peacekeeping forces of CIS in Tajikistan should be granted UN Status. Even Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev insisted that the CIS’s peacekeeping role did not require ‘international approval’ and that Russia had ‘a historic duty to guard the Tajik-Afghan border’. 34

The CIS Foreign Minister’s Council which met in Moscow on January 25, 1995, discussed a number of documents to be signed in the forthcoming meeting of the CIS Heads of States in Alma-Aty. All Foreign Ministers, with the exception of those of Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, approved a draft agreement on the concept of border protection by CIS Border Troops. But the ministers failed to agree on documents on CIS external border protection.

Subsequently, the CIS Council of Heads of States met at Alma-Aty on February 10 1995. It however failed to reach an agreement on joint protection of CIS external borders. Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan disagreed with the draft proposal for the joint protection of the CIS external borders. 35 The summit of the CIS Heads of states approved 10 documents, including viable measures to workout Tajikistan and Abkhazia settlement.

33 SWB, SU/1762, P.C2/7, August 9, 1993.
Another very important meeting of the Council of Commanders of the Border Troops of CIS opened in Minsk, the Capital of Belarus, on May 25, 1995. While addressing the meeting, Colonel General Andrew Nikolayev, Chairman of the Council and Directors of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation stated that, 'in the light of the changing situation in Europe and NATO's eastward expansion, the guarding of the CIS borders acquired special importance not only to Belarus and Russia, but to other CIS countries as well'.

Just after one day, a session of the CIS Council of Heads of States and Governments opened again in Minsk on May 26, 1995. Under Chairmanship of Boris Yeltsin, discussions began on the creation of an interstate currency committee, the conceptual framework of the treaty on the joint guarding of CIS collective peacekeeping force in Tajikistan and Abkhazia. Seven out of the twelve participants of the CIS signed the documents on the protection of external borders of the CIS in Minsk, but Ukraine, Azerbaizan, Moldavia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan failed to sign the documents.

To work out a viable peacekeeping activity, a conference of representatives of Foreign Ministers of CIS countries held in Moscow on September 18, 1995, for co-ordination of military co-operation of the CIS member states, and to consider and elaborate a concept of mutual peacekeeping activity of the CIS member states. The draft concept elaborated the instructions of Council of Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs based on the experience acquired both within the CIS and under the scope of the UN Organisation and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It discussed issues such as preventing armed conflicts, resolving conflicts without using arms and promoting and supporting peace.

36 *SWB, SU/2314, P,A/3, May 27, 1995.*
37 *SWB, SU/2315, P,A/5, May 29, 1995.*
38 *SWB, SU/2414, P,A/1, September 21, 1995.*
The CIS Moscow Summit held on November 3, 1995, was considered to be a giant stride. The participants discussed problems linked with the creation and improvement of a unified system of air defence for the Commonwealth, an agreement on organising work on interstate standardization of weapons and military hardware and questions of staff training for borderguards of CIS states.

The most important result of the 21st sitting of the CIS Council of Heads of Government was the signing of a number of important agreements on the integration of the Commonwealth countries. The CIS Prime Ministers approved six documents submitted by the military leaders. Among them were proposals on the procedure for financing, providing material and technical support, granting customs and other benefits for the purpose of establishing and enhancing a joint air defence system of the CIS states, as well as on the provisions of assistance to the CIS countries in establishing and upgrading the air defence system.39

Another important CIS Summit was held again in Moscow on January 19, 1996. President Boris Yeltsin, while addressing the meeting of the CIS Heads of State, proposed concentrating efforts on creating a single defence space and stronger system of collective security in the CIS. Boris Yeltsin stated: 'It is virtually impossible for the countries of the Commonwealth, acting individually, to ensure their national security, but we can achieve this through a system of collective security'.40 The Russian President also stressed the importance of preserving the military systems which previously protected the territory of the Soviet Union, in particular the single air defence system, and of restoring joint production in the military industrial complex. The CIS Heads of State acknowledged that the threat of regional and inter-ethnic conflicts still remained and that 'NATO and primarily the USA are constantly strengthening their military potential'.41

40 SWB, SU/2514, P,A/2, January 20, 1996.
41 Ibid.,
CIS Heads of States agreed on co-operation between members of the CIS on border issues, on collective measures to maintain the peace in the CIS, on training and instruction of military and civilian personnel of CIS members for participation in peacekeeping measures, as well as for acting together to crackdown on bandits and terrorists. Another outcome of Moscow Summit of CIS was the formation of 'the Council of Interior Minister of CIS' to look-after various issues and to co-ordinate among CIS members.42

A one-day conference of defence chiefs of the CIS countries had opened in Moscow on March 26, 1996, to discuss the formation of a collective CIS security system and implementing the Tashkent agreement of 1992. The conference was attended by the Defence Ministers of Armenia, Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.43

According to Andrey Kokoshin, Russian Deputy Defence Minister, despite numerous attempts, a full-scale theory of CIS collective security has yet to be worked out - 'the present idea of collective security reflects a level of relations between the states and their armed forces which rules out aggression and attempt at settling political and other disputes by means of war, armed conflicts or the threat of the use of force'.44

Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, while addressing the conference described NATO's expansion plans as the “biggest negative factor” affecting CIS security. The Council of Defence Ministers discussed procedures relating to the training of military and civilian personnel, delegated by each country to the

42 Ibid.,
43 SWB, SU/2571, P,B/8, March 27, 1996.
44 Ibid.,
collective peacekeeping forces, proposals for specifying the mandate of the
collective peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone in Abkhazia, as well as some
other issues. \(^{45}\)

Within a very short span of time, the Council of Heads of Governments of
CIS again assembled in Moscow on April 12, 1996, and after detailed discussion
approved a long-term plan for the integrated development of the CIS in 1996-97.
The plan included 'a set of measures for the next one-and a half years for the
development of co-operation between CIS countries in the Socio-economic,
military and foreign policy spheres'. \(^{46}\)

Another Summit of the Council of CIS Heads of states with for reaching
consequences, was held in Moscow on May 17, 1996. It was considered as an
important summit because UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali addressed this
CIS summit after the conclusion of the plenary session. \(^{47}\)

Boutros-Ghali confirmed his Organisation's wishes for co-operation in all
spheres with the CIS. He said the main principle of co-operation between the CIS
and UN was a joint effort to create an international system of stability, peace and
progress. He stressed the positive role of the UN's co-operation with the CIS for
bringing peace to the "hot spots" of regional as well as international conflicts. \(^{48}\)

The final document of the summit was signed by the 11 Head of States
attending the summit. Noting that Russia has 'always been and remains the pivot
of our integration', the Heads of state declared that 'the situation in the CIS states
largely depends on the success of the reforms in Russia'. \(^{49}\)

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\(^{45}\) Ibid., P.B/10.
\(^{46}\) SWB, SU/2586, P.A/1, April 15, 1996.
\(^{47}\) SWB, SU/2615. P.S/1/1, May 18, 1996.
\(^{48}\) SWB, SU/2615. P.S/1/3, May 18, 1996.
\(^{49}\) Ibid., P.S/1/1.
A routine meeting of the CIS Council of Defence Ministers was again held in Moscow on August 14, 1996. The Defence Ministers gathered there discussed the prospects for improving the unified air defence system of the CIS countries and the state of the collective peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan and Abkhazia. While addressing the meeting, Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov pointed out that ‘Russia considers its strategic priorities in military co-operation with the CIS countries to be the prevention and settlement of armed conflicts on the territories of these states and also the strengthening of collective security’.50

Regarding the eastward expansion of NATO, a communique was adopted by the CIS Council of Defence Ministers in Moscow, which stated that ‘the advance of the military and political bloc (i.e., NATO) right upto the borders of the Commonwealth States creates a serious threat to the political, economic and military security of the CIS and might lead to a conformation of alliances and to the arms race spiralling again’.51 Participants in this meeting confirmed their determination to speed-up the creation of a system of collective security for the CIS states on the basis of the treaty on collective security and bilateral agreements.

Another important CIS Summit on Afghanistan crisis was held at Alma-Aty, the capital of Kazakhstan, on September 4 1996. In the wake of Taleban Islamic militia’s success in Afghanistan, Heads of Russian Federation and the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan met at Alma-Aty mainly to discuss the Afghan crisis and possible commensurate measures in case of escalation of crisis into the Central Asian states. These leaders after summit, called on the UN Security Council to take urgent measures to end military activity in Afghanistan, which is posing a threat to regional stability. They exchanged views over the widening scale and intensification of the armed

50 SWB, SU/2692, P.A/1, August 16, 1996.
51 Ibid.,
confrontation in Afghanistan, which approaches CIS States, and might create direct threat to the national interests and security of these states, the CIS in general and destabilize the regional and international situation. 52

In another CIS Summit, the Defence Ministers of the CIS states, gathered in Moscow on March 26, 1997, and after a prolong discussion approved the basic principles of a programme of military and technical co-operation. A document was approved by the Defence Ministers, which allowed the CIS countries to assist each other in developing, producing and maintaining weapons and military hardware, as well as to adopt a programme of military and technical co-operation to equip their national armies, collective peacekeeping troops and the integrated air defence system with modern weapons. 53 It was viewed that implementation of the programme will revive and boost co-operation among defence enterprises and training programmes for military personnel.

Just after one day, a meeting of Council of Heads of State of CIS countries again convened in Moscow on March 27, 1997. Participants, although, having some doubt over development of integration system, endorsed the creation of a collective air defence system of the Commonwealth states. A Ukrainian Ministry of Defence delegation, headed by Defence Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk, participated in regular meeting of the Council of CIS Defence Ministers, agreed for military co-operation within the framework of the CIS, including the military and technical spheres, setting up a system of collective security in the CIS, the tasks and content of peacekeeping activities in the CIS. Out of seventeen documents tabled at the meeting, Kuzmuk signed only two of them concerning estimates on the setting up and development of an air defence system and drafts of leading documents on the use of the Parol radar identification system. 54

52 SWB, SU/2709, P.G/1, September 5, 1996.
53 SWB, SU/2879, P.S1/2, March 29, 1997.
54 SWB, SU/2880, P.A/1, March 31, 1997.
President Boris Yeltsin, while highlighting the achievement of peacekeeping operation under command of Russia in CIS, stated: "In defending stability in conflict zone, we are defending it throughout the Commonwealth. But we are not receiving the support that is due. Furthermore, we hear murmurs of dissatisfaction and complaints".\footnote{Ibid., P.A/4.} Although all participants unanimously concluded that Commonwealth is necessary, but five years is not long enough period for it to take final shape. But Ukrainian President Kuchma and Kazakh President Nazarbayev voiced dissatisfaction with CIS.

An important co-operation protocol envisioned co-ordination of defence, security, political and economic cooperation of CIS members was signed by the CIS Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya and Collective Security Council Secretary Vladimir Zemskey in the Minsk-based CIS headquarters, on May 19 1997. It was a due extension of the CIS-founding treaty signed five years ago.\footnote{SWB, SU/2924, P.A/1, May 21, 1997.}

Presidents of the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia in a joint statement, issued on January 6 1998, following two days of talks in the Turkmen capital Ashkabad, agreed on an individual approach to CIS. All leaders agreed that the CIS is ‘an acceptable model for co-operation at the transitional stage’. However, ‘each member of the Commonwealth should determine its participation independently on the basis of domestic priorities and international commitment’.\footnote{SWB, SU/3118, P.G/1, January 7, 1998.}

Uzbek President Islam Karimov, in a news conference after the summit, highlighted the problems of poor decision making and excessive bureaucracy in the CIS, and expressed the opinion that each country should retain its own
independent policy instead of 'setting up supera state structures'. He also stated that 'the CIS cannot act as an international legal entity, nor it exist as a military and political bloc'.

A landmark summit of the Council of Heads of States of the CIS opened in Moscow on April 29, 1998 to discuss future of Commonwealth. All leaders of 12 countries of CIS participated. Because of a long gap in holding the summit, it was considered as a revival of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The main agenda which widely discussed, was to take measures to improve the CIS's activities and to restructure the Commonwealth bodies. After a long discussion, the participating presidents jointly agreed in principle on ways of restructuring the Commonwealth and advancing its activities.

After the summit, the leaders decided against adopting any final declaration on the results of this CIS summit, and even President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan commented that 'What is the sense (of taking a declaration) if nothing is decided'. He was backed by President Boris Yeltsin, who noted that 'a faulty practice is shaping up' whereby 'it is necessary by all means to adopt a certain document' after each meeting.

President of Belarus, Lukashenko, while criticizing Russia for not being ready for a 'fully fledged union' with Belarus, stated that over 1,000 agreements have been signed within the CIS but none of them is working, that's why 'before any thing else, whatever has been signed must be implemented'.

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58 Ibid.,
59 SWB, SU/3214, P.A/1, April 30, 1998.
60 Ibid.,
61 Ibid.,
62 Ibid., P.A/5.
Moldavian President Lucinschi, while commenting on functions of the CIS, said: 'The Commonwealth is at a turning point, facing a dilemma – to be or not to be', and suggested that 'all 12 CIS states weigh their opportunities and sign a workable document' which should provide for 'transparent borders and the free flow of capital, people and commodities all over the CIS'.

Although, the first organisation after neglecting other members, particularly Central Asian States, was the initial CIS agreement of December 1991, when the Russian, Ukranian and Bylurussian leaders ignored Central Asian leaders and formed a Slavic Union. Since then, the greater priority of the post-Soviet Russian government has given to its European-Slavic as against its Central Asian muslim neighbours. No doubt, in all summit all Central Asian States within CIS framework participated and along with other members signed a number of collective agreements on security and defence alliances. But subsequently, like the other regional groupings between the former Soviet republics, leaders of Central Asian states have also moved towards the formation and integration of regional grouping for their collective socio-economic and security alliances. Leaders of all Central Asian states have discussed and collectively signed a number of agreements of mutual co-operation in different fields. Hence, the changing perceptions of leaders and the regional grouping and alliances entirely based upon ethnical lines by the members of the CIS, now has greatly eroded the relevance of the Commonwealth of Independent States as collective organisation to look after collective security as well as various issues of the Commonwealth republics.

63 Ibid., P.A/6.
II. RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS: BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS

In the post-Soviet era, Russia is continuously accelerating the process of reintegrating former Soviet Central Asian republics both through multilateral and bilateral security agreements. The implementation of an integrated military security structure within the framework of the CIS, as a Moscow-Centred political consultation mechanism, is supplemented by a series of bilateral military agreements with all Central Asian republics.

While the Treaty on Collective Security provided the security guarantee for the Central Asian republics and must be considered as a significant step in forming the ultimate shape of the region, it has still to face major political, economic and operational challenges in the implementation phase. The chances of this collective security for survival and endurance have, however, been greatly enhanced by the series of bilateral ‘friendship treaties’ that Russia has signed with all the Central Asian republics. It is this ‘bilateral level’ that provides the additional and perhaps real substance to the ‘collective level’ security.

Kazakhstan

The Republic of Kazakhstan (Until December 1991, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic) is the second largest of the former Soviet Republics. On December 13, 1991, together with the other Central Asian Republics, Kazakhstan agreed to join the newly formed Commonwealth, and on December 16, it become the last of the Republics to declare its independence from the USSR.

Kazakhstan, as the largest and most influential, prosperous of five Central Asian republics of the former USSR, its unique geopolitical strategic position by the possession of former Soviet nuclear warheads—approximately 1410, regarded as the fourth largest nuclear power in the world, have greatly attracted Russia.
That's why, after the formation of CIS, Russia has given special status to Kazakhstan and showed keen interest in forging bilateral defence and security agreements with Kazakhstan.

But following the dissolution of the USSR, Kazakhstan asserted its commitment to rid itself of its nuclear weapons, either by their destruction or transfer to the Russian Federation. In September 1992, the Kazakh Legislature ratified the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) signed by the USA and the USSR in July 1991, the provisions of which affected Kazakhstan as a nuclear successor state to the USSR. In December 1993, the Kazakh legislature ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons. The USA provided Kazakhstan with substantial technical and financial aid for the dismantling of the republics' nuclear arsenal. By April 1995, all nuclear warheads had been transferred to Russia, and in September 1996 Russia and Kazakhstan signed a final protocol giving the withdrawal of military units linked to the Russian nuclear weapons facilities in Kazakhstan.

One of the important factors reinforcing the security of Kazakhstan after it joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state was the acceptance of formal affirmation of security from Russia, the United States and Great Britain. In December 1994, in Budapest, during the OSCE Summit, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton and Prime Minister John Major singed ‘the Memorandum of Security Guarantees’. They confirmed their commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Kazakhstan and to avoid the threat of or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Kazakhstan, as well as to avoid exerting economic pressure against it.\(^{64}\)

All the three leaders also agreed that if Kazakhstan becomes a victim of aggression or an object of threat of using nuclear weapons, then Russia, the United States and Great Britain will demand immediate action from the UN Security Council to render assistance to Kazakhstan as a non-nuclear member state of the NPT. The Chinese Government had also offered guarantees of security to Kazakhstan. As expressed by the Xinhua agency on 8 February 1995: “China fully understands the desire of Kazakhstan to obtain security guarantees. To abstain unreservedly from the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of their use against non-nuclear states and non-nuclear zones, this is the consistent position of the Chinese government. This position of principle applies to Kazakhstan”.65

In May 1992 President Nazarbayev issued a decree on the establishment of Kazakhstan’s armed forces. By August 1997, the estimated strength of the national armed forces was 35,100 (army 20,000, navy 100 and air-force 15,000). In addition, there were 34,500 paramilitary troops. Kazakhstan also participated with Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the operation of the Caspian Sea Flotilla, a former soviet force, based under Russian command, at Astrakhan (Russia).66

The most important Soviet strategic nuclear weapons on Kazakh territory were the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) bases with 104-SS-18, each armed with ten warheads, 40TU-95 Bear bombers, the Semi-palatinsk nuclear test site, the Baikanur space launch centre, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) radar site. The disposition of these assets raised major difficulties since on the one hand Kazakhstan could not integrate them into its own military forces, and on the other hand, it had an interest in getting the most out of their presence on its soil. Furthermore, President Nazarbayev insisted that all military installations in

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65 Cited by Oumirserik Kosenov, June 1997, p.35.
66 Ibid.
Kazakhstan were the property of Kazakhstan. This was considered to be an important factor in forging the bilateral security agreements between Russia and Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet era.

Among the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan took the lead on May 25, 1992 for the bilateral security agreements. Following his trip to the United States, Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev arrived in Moscow to sign 'the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance'. Both the leaders, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Boris Yeltsin, signed a 25 years Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, Russian assistance in establishing Kazakh armed forces, joint use of space and military bases, test sites, to render each other military assistance in case of aggression and other military infrastructures.67

The Treaty was characterised by Yeltsin's Press Office as 'a kind of political test site and verifying philosophy' of relations between newly independent states.68 Boris Yeltsin and Nazarbayev expressed hopes that other CIS states will take the Treaty as a model to be followed. This first experiment in bilateral security within the CIS also had an additional regional significance, as it was taking place after the Ashkhabad Summit in which Central Asian leaders as well as the leaders of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan contemplated formation of an 'Asian Bloc'. The Ashkhabad Summit signifies the height of Russia's indifference or passive attitude towards the geopolitics of the southern republics. The Treaty with Kazakhstan was the beginning of Russia's 'Eurasian/ Eastern' shift and of the regaining of the some of the lost ground in the region.

68 Ibid.,
After the May bilateral agreement at President’s level, a delegation headed by the Russian Armed Forces of General Staff, Colonel General Viktor Dubynin and Kazakhstan’s Defence Minister, Colonel General Sagadat Nurmogombetov signed a famous accord on military agreements and assistance covering the transfer of personnel between two armed forces, training and military cooperation on August 19, 1992, at Alma-Aty. President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his counterpart President Boris Yeltsin issued a joint declaration and emphasized the importance of full scale economic cooperation, and coordinated security arms control and science policy regarding the former Soviet installation in space station at Baikanur and nuclear testing area at Semi-polatinsk.69

Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian republic which has strategic nuclear weapons acquired from the former Soviet Union. Although the Russian President’s demand to control over all nuclear weapons, that there should be only one nuclear successor state to the Soviet Union, was rejected by Kazakhstan along with two nuclear having states of Ukraine and Bylorussia.

On day one of their visit to Moscow (February 26, 1993) Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Premier, Sergey Tereshchenko, met Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin, and subsequently President Boris Yeltsin (Feb., 27) for talks on the establishment of a single economic and rouble zone and on military cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan. Speaking to journalists after the meeting Nazarbayev stated that the Kazakh delegation had arrived in Moscow at the invitation of President Yeltsin to “demonstrate at this difficult period of time, on the example of Russo-Kazakh relations, that the Commonwealth well exist, and that it is able to gain strength in conditions of the sovereign and

independent existence" of CIS countries. Nazarbayev stressed that such meetings were "in keeping with the unswerving course of the Kazakh and Russian leaderships to rally closer within the frameworks of the CIS and to create a foundation, a backbone for our Commonwealth". The leaderships of the two countries, he added, 'steadfastly support integrational process in the Commonwealth. 70

Moving on to the question of military cooperation, Nazarbayev stated that as Russia and Kazakhstan had signed a collective security treaty, they regarded the territories of the two states as a "single defence space", and that in order to promote the further unity of the armies of the two republics it was necessary to set up joint contingents. 71 During the meeting, the two Presidents agreed on a joint communiqué voicing support for early ratification of the CIS charter, and to draft a bilateral agreement on military cooperation by the Russian and Kazakh defence ministers.

A joint communiqué issued on the outcome of the negotiations between President Boris Yeltsin and Nazarbayev on February 26, 1993, reiterated the commitment of both states to the implementation of the bilateral treaty signed in May 1992, and the enhancement of the treaty of collective security by a Kazakh-Russian decision to "sign a treaty on military cooperation in order to set-up a united defence space (common defence zone) and make joint use of military capabilities." 72

70 SWB, SU/1627, P.B/1, March 3, 1993.
71 Ibid.
The communique also emphasized the necessity of swifter progress in the direction of close cooperation between the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan within the framework of the CIS, encompassing the political, economic and military fields. "On the basis of the Treaty on Collective Security, Russia and Kazakhstan have decided to sign a treaty on military cooperation in order to set-up a united defence space and make joint use of military capabilities. The ministers of defence of both republics have been charged with preparing a draft treaty within on month," the communique stated.73

After the February Summit, Kazakhstan President, Nursultan Nazarbayev made official visit to Russia on March 28-30, 1994. It was marked by the signing of 23 bilateral cooperation agreements – notably on the creation of transnational firms, military cooperation, the dismantling of Kazakhstan's nuclear weapons, and Russian leasing of the Baikanur space station, and also to exchange the idea of formulation of co-ordinate economic, foreign and military policy of both the countries.74

Nursultan Nazarbayev, in an interview with the Russian. Interfax news agency in Alma-Aty reiterated Kazakhstan's commitment for closer ties with Russia as moves towards greater integration in the CIS gain momentum, and also openly said, 'strategically Kazakhstan cannot do without Russia, just as Russia cannot do without Kazakhstan'.75

Another landmark bilateral military agreement where a package of total nine agreements was signed after a meeting by President Nursultan Nazarbayev

73 Ibid., P.B/2.
75 SWB, SU/2139, P.G/1, January 5, 1995.
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on January 20, 1995, under which both leaders agreed to establish joint armed forces by the end of 1995. The agreement provided for the establishment of a joint command for military planning and training, and a Kazakh-Russian border guards. It was regarded a major step forward in strengthening bilateral security relations between Kazakhstan and Russia. The package of agreements also included a joint declaration on expanding and deepening cooperation in the economic, military and foreign policy spheres. 76.

In the military spheres, the declaration registered the two leader's support for the 'active participation of their countries in setting up a system of collective security for the CIS'. 77 Both the President's expressed their desire to interact within the framework of the general military strategic area in order to ensure their military and nuclear security'. According to the declaration, 'Russia and Kazakhstan will in the future operate on the principle that facilities and buildings situated on the territory of one country can be used by the armed forces of another', and they will use their 'defence potential in the interests of ensuring mutual security'. 78

The package of bilateral agreements in the sphere of military-technical cooperation paved the way to setting up as of 1995 joint armed forces on the principles of joint planning for the training and deployment of the forces. In this meeting, both leaders also agreed for the joint protection of their external borders as well as to set-up a joint command of the Border Troops. Both Presidents also confirmed their adherence to a policy aimed at close cooperation in forging policy,

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78 Ibid.,
coordination on the major international and regional issues, as well as of their activities in the UN, OSCE, NATO and other international organizations.

Subsequently, on February 7, 1995, Russian President Boris Yeltsin gave his approval to a proposed treaty, which allowed Russia and Kazakhstan jointly to guard the Kazakh-Chinese border.79

Another important bilateral military agreement at the level of Defence Ministers, was signed in Alma-Aty, when Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev alongwith a delegation of senior military officials with the plan of joint military work of the two states for 1996, arrived in Kazakhstan on January 25, 1996. Kazakh Defence Minister, Alibek Kasymov, and his visiting Russian counterpart, Grachev, signed a package of 16 bilateral military agreements in Alma-Aty on January 26, 1996. The package included ‘agreements on a consolidated air defence system, on Kazakhstan’s national fleet which is to be set-up in the Caspian sea, and also documents regulating cooperation between the two countries defence ministers’ 80

Under a protocol on naval forces, Russia agreed to transfer five Cutters to Kazakhstan for carrying out coastal patrols, mainly used to combat drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Later on, this formed the basis of the Kazakhstan’s new Caspian fleet to establish control and order in Caspian water.

The package of agreement allowed Russia to give Kazakhstan SU-25, SU-27, and MIG-29 Combat aircraft – ‘Several dozen’ of each type to compensate for the transfer of 40 TU-95 MS strategic bombers from Kazakhstan to Russia. Pavel

80 SWB, SU/2521, P.G/1, January 29, 1996.
Grachev also agreed to help Kazakhstan in consolidation of air defence system, to maintain and operate radar reconnaissance facilities along the Kazakh border to protect the Commonwealth external borders. Kazakhstan also agreed on the withdrawal of a strategic Rocket Troops division from Kazakhstan to Russia within the first half of 1996. Both Ministers also discussed the regional security and NATO's expansion. Grachev expressed his views and said that Russia 'categorically opposes' the expansion of NATO into Eastern and Central Europe. At the same time he welcomed cooperation with NATO according to the '16 + 9' formula – NATO plus the nine members of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, or the '16 + 12' formula – NATO plus the military and political structures of the CIS.81

But the final protocol on Strategic Missile Troops was signed on September 11, 1996. The Russian Defence Ministry and Kazakh Defence Committee, 'set up for the removal of strategic offensive weapons', signed a final protocol on the withdrawal of the Russian Strategic Missile Troops from Kazakhstan.82

The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Troops, Col. General Igor Sergeyev, stated that since December 1994, when Russia began to cut its strategic nuclear forces deployed in Kazakhstan, '16 missile regiments had been disbanded, 898 warhead charges, 98 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and more than 18,000 tonnes of missile fuel components had been taken to Russia for utilization, and 104 combat and two training launching pads had been dismantled'.83

81 Ibid.,
82 SWB, SU/2716, P.G/1, September 13, 1996.
83 Ibid.,
A landmark agreement to step-up military cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan was signed on October 30, 1997, in Alma-Aty, by visiting Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev and his Kazakh counterpart Mukhtar Altynbayev. The military agreements included a joint planning of military training procedures and on training of Russian and Kazakh armed forces personnel, staging of joint military exercises and 'mutually acceptable positions on the use of force'.

The two Ministers also initialed two agreements on Russian compensation for Kazakhstan for its use of weapons testing sites and on terms for storing and moving out highly toxic missile fuel from the Saryshagan testing site in Kazakhstan.

The spirit of military cooperation between the two countries considerably enhanced and took a new shape by visualizing 21st century, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and his Kazakh counterpart, Nursultan Nazarbayev signed 'Declaration of Eternal Friendship and Alliance' in July 1998. The bilateral military cooperation further strengthened by the visit of President Boris Yeltsin to Alma-Aty on October 12, 1998. Both President Boris Yeltsin and Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a number of bilateral military documents on border demarcation between Russia and Kazakhstan, a number of intergovernmental accords, including agreements on the Baikanur space complex and on cooperation in the fight against trans-border terrorism, drugs trafficking and smuggling of illegal arms and ammunitions. President Nazarbayev, while commenting on bilateral agreements, stated: 'I pursue the policy of closeness and confidence towards Russia. We want to see Russia a prosperous country, and the Russian president shouldered the responsibility for the reforms which will put the country to a new road'.

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84 SWB, SU/3065, P.G/1, November 1, 1997.
85 SWB, SU/3358, P.G/1, October 15, 1998.
Uzbekistan

The Republic of Uzbekistan (formerly the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic) is the next largest republic of Central Asia, decided to join the CIS along with four Central Asian republics on December 13, 1991. After its declaration of independence, Uzbekistan also sought to develop relations particularly with the Russian Federation, and since both have concluded a large number of bilateral agreements in security and defence cooperation.

Although, Uzbekistan retained the entire security apparatus from the Soviet era, but at the same time, Islam Karimov has also created a National Guard of some seven hundred men and a new Ministry of Defence, staffed largely by Russian officers. The National Guard is being rapidly expanded. In early 1992, the government began to take over Russian military installations in agreement with Moscow, and in May, all Uzbek soldiers serving outside Uzbekistan were recalled home to serve under a joint Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Uzbek military command, which has 15,000 troops and 280 tanks as well as a large number of modern airforce.

Uzbekistan was the next to follow the model of Kazakhstan for bilateral security agreements with Russia. On May 30, 1992, Russia and Uzbekistan signed the ‘Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations, Friendship and Cooperation’. Both the Presidents Islam Karimov and Boris Yeltsin agreed that territories of Russia and Uzbekistan will form a common military strategic area. They also granted each other “the right to use military facilities situated on their territories in case of necessity on the basis of military agreement”.

In subsequent agreements the two states have gradually moved towards planning and implementing the bilateral treaty. In February 1993, a Russian military delegation headed by Paval Grachev, Minister of Defence, met with President Islam Karimov and discussed the integration of the two state’s positions in the sphere of military technical cooperation, joint utilisation of strategic facilities such as anti-air craft, intelligence gathering and space monitoring facilities, and joint plans for combat, mobilization, training and military exercises of the Russian and Uzbek armed forces. This in addition to the continuous presence of Russian officers who constitute more than 80% of the officer corps of Uzbekistan’s armed forces, also point to the close military relationship between Russia and its possible development into one of the pillars of security in Central Asia. This, especially in view of Uzbekistan willingness to perform an important role in dealing regional ethnic conflicts, as in the case of Tajikistan, might provide the military arms of a Russian-Uzbek political consensus in the region.87

But despite bilateral security relations concluded with Russia, Uzbekistan, in mid 1994, moved for the closer relations with the NATO members. To become member of NATO, Uzbekistan, in July joined NATO’s ‘partnership for peace’ programme for military cooperation. In September, Uzbekistan conducted joint military exercise with NATO countries.

The Russian-Uzbek military and defence cooperation was further strengthened, when Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin visited Uzbekistan on July 28, 1995. After prolong discussions with Islam Karimov on military technical cooperation, both leaders stressed the importance of the May 15, 1992 Treaty on Collective Security, and openly spoke out in favour of forming a

87 SWB, P.C3/2, February 5, 1993.
CIS collective Security System on its basis. Both leaders also stressed Russia' and Uzbekistan’s desire to continue ‘strengthening cooperation and coordination of activity in the interests of ensuring peace and stability in Central Asia’. 88

A high-ranking Russian delegation led by Foreign Minister, Yevgene; Primakov, which included Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, Director of the Federal Border Service, Andrey Nikolayev, Minister for cooperation with CIS countries, Valeriy Serov, arrived the Uzbek capital Tashkent in January, 1996. This was considered another important effort in strengthening bilateral defence and security relations between Russia and Uzbekistan. Parimakov and his delegation talked with Uzbek President Islam Karimov on ways to expand cooperation between the two countries, ‘matters relating to security and the guarding of the CIS borders, the exacerbated situation on the Tajik-Afghan frontier and other military issues’. 89

Uzbek President Islam Karimov also stated that Russia will always be Uzbekistan’s ‘Strategic partner’, and also welcomed Primakov’s statement stressing the importance on his country’s relations with Central Asian republics and as Russia’s ‘soft underbelly’. Even, speaking during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Karimov lauded the strategic relationship with Russia and told that, ‘Russia has been and will remain Uzbekistan’s strategic partner. This hinges on the community of approaches to the assessment of the danger of the fundamentalism’s onslaught from the south’. 90

89 SWB, SU/2521, P.G/2, January 30, 1996.
90 Ibid.,
Both President Islam Karimov and Boris Yeltsin, to settle the border dispute as well as to ensure border security, signed an agreement on border security cooperation accord at the CIS Council of Heads of State Summit in Moscow on March 28, 1997. The accord covers cooperation in border protection, the exchange of information, the prevention of terrorism, drugs and arms smuggling, illegal border crossing and other illegal activity along borders and at checkpoints, and efforts to ensure the security of Russian and Uzbek borders with non-CIS states. Both Presidents agreed to set-up border cooperation groups to implement the agreement.\footnote{SWB, SU/2881, P.G/2, April 1, 1997.}

But the May visit of President Islam Karimov to Moscow was considered a landmark in further strengthening of mutual friendship and confidence building as well as bilateral military cooperation. After a long hour bilateral talks, both President Karimov and Boris Yeltsin, on May 6, 1998, signed a joint statement and a military and defence cooperation agreement on the design, assembly and supply of II-76 MF and II-76 TF aircraft and also on the servicing and upgrading of II-76 and II-78 aircraft.\footnote{SWB, SU/3223, P.B/4, May 9, 1998.}

The bilateral defence and security relations between Uzbekistan and Russian Federation, has become more stronger, after Boris Yeltsin’s recent statements on the eve of his forthcoming state visit to Uzbekistan on 11th and 12th October 1998. During a question and answer session in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin lauded Uzbekistan’s relation as ‘strategic partnership and all round cooperation based upon the old traditions of friendship, mutual respect, cooperation and sincere sympathy between our peoples and also a common view on many regional and world processes’.\footnote{SWB, SU/3355, P.B/7, October, 12, 1998.}
Boris Yeltsin also stated that 'multifaceted relations between Russia and Uzbekistan are becoming deeper and ever more dynamic' and even 'agreed to strive to broaden our mutually advantageous economic cooperation and strengthen our partner-like ties in the area of security, military, technical and other sectors'.

After arrival of Boris Yeltsin in Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan on October 11, 1998 and his Uzbek counterpart, Islam Karimov discussed bilateral military cooperation and the situation in Afghanistan. President Boris Yeltsin promised 'specific steps which we must take jointly to neutralize the threats to regional security and stability from Afghanistan'.

After a long discussion on security cooperation President Karimov and his visiting 'Russian counterpart', Boris Yeltsin signed a trilateral document on the military assistance pact. The document had been signed earlier by Tajik President Emomali Rahmonov. The declaration says that the sides 'intend to develop dialogue and collaboration in security and defence on the basis of equality, partnership and enhanced military-technical cooperation', and these three states also pledged to develop their cooperation, interacting with the UN, the OSCE and the CIS and also with other interested countries 'in the interest of total political stabilization in Tajikistan'. They also intend to deepen their cooperation 'in the interests of ensuring international peace, stability and security at regional and global level, providing each other comprehensive assistance and primarily to prevent threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity'.

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94 Ibid., P.B/6.
95 Ibid.
96 SWB, SU/3356, P.S2/1, October, 13, 1998,
97 Ibid,
The same day, both Presidents—Islam Karimov and Boris Yeltsin also signed a joint statement on the situation in Afghanistan, in which they said that any outside intervention in Afghan affairs would pose 'a direct threat' to the southern borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The document expressed 'serious concern over the situation in Afghanistan and the possible negative effects that escalation of the armed confrontation between the conflicting parties in Afghanistan could produce on the Central Asian states and Russia'. The statement reiterated that 'hostilities must stop immediately, and other countries must cease supplies of military hardware to all parties in the Afghan conflict' and furthermore 'Russia and Uzbekistan are prepared to work for that goal in bilateral and multilateral frameworks and actively participate in UN efforts aimed at transforming hostilities in Afghanistan into political discussions.'

To sum up the result of Yeltsin's visit to Uzbekistan, a joint statement was also signed by both the Presidents. 'The communique notes, among other things, that Russian-Uzbek ties have lately been characterized by the beginning of strategic partnership and growing dynamism' and 'Russia and Uzbekistan will continue to move towards ever more close and intensive interaction'. Following the signing of the documents, Yeltsin expressed it was necessary to 'use the political potential more effectively in order to achieve stability and peace along the southern CIS frontiers'.

President Karimov emphasized 'the important stabilizing role that the Russian Federation plays in the Central Asian region', as well as 'the firm and unequivocal position of Yeltsin, who supports the equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russian Federation'.

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98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid, P.S2/2.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
Kyrgyzstan

The Kyrgyz Republic (formerly the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic) is a small, landlocked state, situated in Eastern Central Asia. After independent, Kyrgyzstan joined the defence structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and alongwith other five member states signed the Collective Security Treaty in May 1992, and till now it has strongly defended the preservation of the CIS, recognizing its dependence on the Commonwealth for military co-operation. Askar Akayev, the President of Kyrgyzstan, has tried to maintain close relations with the most influential CIS member, the Russian Federation, and hence, besides economic assistance, it has concluded a number of bilateral defence and security agreements with Russia.

Askar Akayev, President of Kyrgyzstan, was the next Central Asian leader to go to Moscow for a similar treaty with Russia. The two countries signed the ‘Friendship, Co-operation and a Bilateral Assistance Treaty’ on 10 June, 1992. According to Boris Yeltsin, this Treaty raised the bilateral relations to a new level and putting the two states ‘on an absolutely equal footing’, and thus signifying the end to Russia’s imperial ambitions. Russia’s role as the guarantor of Kyrgyzstan’s security was reaffirmed. Kyrgyzstan’s economic difficulties and inability to handle the financial responsibility of taking part in supporting CIS formations in Kyrgyzstan made this bilateral arrangement with Russia more appealing and more of a necessity.

Subsequently, an agreement with Russia on bilateral military cooperation and the utilization of military facilities was initialed in Moscow on April 8,

After this agreement, subsequently another Russo-Kyrgyz military agreement was signed on July 5, 1993, to extend military cooperation, following a meeting between the Russian Defence Minister, Marshal Pavel Grachev, and Major General Dzhanybok Umataliyev, Chairman of Kyrgyzstan state committee for defence. It was also decided that CIS (mainly Russian) troop, were to remain in Kyrgyzstan for the immediate future to protect the country’s border with the People’s Republic of China. Under terms of this agreement, Kyrgyzstan permitted Russia to operate a naval communications centre on Kyrgyz territory.

Subsequently, in 1995, to develop cooperation in military hardware technology, a joint military enterprise between Kyrgyzstan and Russia to manufacture torpedoes in north-east Kyrgyzstan of Issykul, was founded, and thus, this republic became the largest producer of this kind of output in the CIS.

In the beginning of 1996, a new impetus in the bilateral military cooperation was given, when Director of the Russian Federal Border Service Col. General Andrey Nikoloyev, who arrived in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek on March 5, met President Askar Akayev, and after discussing various issues related with defence cooperation, both signed two documents – one on the presence of Russian border troops in Kyrgyzstan, and another on extending the mandate of the Kyrgyz battalion currently serving in Tajikistan. They also signed ‘Air Defence Accord’, under which Russia agreed to supply Kyrgyzstan with arms, ammunition, spare parts and technical documentation, mutual exchange of information, and allowing Kyrgyz military units to carry out exercises at Russian test sites.

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106 Ibid.,
107 SWB, SU/2553, P.G/1, March 8, 1996.
Bilateral military cooperation with the Russian Federation further improved after President Akayev’s visit to Moscow on March 28, 1996, where his Russian counterpart, Boris Yeltsin signed a total of nine agreements at the government level covering cooperation in air traffic, air defence and jurisdiction over Russian forces based in Kyrgyzstan.

On the basis of previous bilateral defence agreement, Kyrgyz troops and Russian borderguards held a joint military exercise in Chon-Alay District in southern Kyrgyzstan on April 4-5, 1997 to prepare for possible trouble on the republic’s border with Tajikistan. In this joint exercise, units of the OSR Motor-Rifle Brigade, the OSR Militia, a Directorate of the Republic’s National Security Ministry and a Detachment of the Ministry for Emergencies were involved.108

This military exercise was first of its kind to be held in the republic. It was organised because of the Kyrgyz leadership was alarmed by the possible spread of the inter Tajik and inter Afghan military conflicts to the territory of the republic. Even Bishkek had repeatedly expressed fears that ‘the growing influx of drugs and refugees from Tajikistan posed a threat to Kyrgyzstan, and that armed groups ousted into the eastern Tajikistan would have easy access to Kyrgyz territory’.109

A landmark to further step-up bilateral military cooperation took place when after two days of talks between the visiting Russian Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev and his Kyrgyz counterpart, Murzakon Subanov, signed an agreement in Ashkabad on October 10, 1997. Russia agreed to expand their military cooperation, while Kyrgyzstan also agreed to lease four military installations to

108 SWB, SU/2887, P.S1/4, April 7, 1997.
109 Ibid.,
Russia in return for the training of 500 recruits.\textsuperscript{110} Both the leaders discussed which covered a wide range of issues relating to military cooperation and cooperation in military hardware. Russia agreed to increase its use of defence manufacturing facilities in Kyrgyzstan and to serve and supply parts for Kyrgyz military equipment.

Murzakan Subanov, Kyrgyz Defence Minister, while commenting on agreement, stated that: ‘the unanimous opinion was voiced that the existing potential of Kyrgyzstan’s defence industry enterprises is far from fully utilized, because of the cutback in defence orders from Russia, and measures have been planned to improve cooperation in this area’.\textsuperscript{111}

**Turkmenistan**

The Republic of Turkmenistan, (formerly the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic) is situated in the south-west of Central Asia. It is bordered to the north by Uzbekistan, to the north-west by Kazakhstan, to the west by the Caspian Sea, to the south by Iran and to the south-east by Afghanistan. Although, Turkmenistan not signed the CIS’s Collective Security Treaty of May 1992, but it remained within the collective security zone of CIS. It has established co-ordinial relations with Russia, and since independence, signed a number of bilateral agreements in defence and security cooperation.

Russia’s bilateral security treaties with Turkmenistan are the most significant of all, as they directly dealt with the future security of the southern borders of the CIS. The significance of the treaty with Turkmenistan was underscored by the intimate involvement of General Pavel Grachev, the Russian

\textsuperscript{110} SWB, SU/3048, P.G/2, October, 13, 1997.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.,
Defence Minister, who personally negotiated the agreement with Turkmen defence officials and Saparmurad Niazov, the President of the republic. The treaty signed between Saparmurad Niazov and Russian Defence Minister, General Pavel Grachev on June 8, 1992, in Ashkhabad, was a unique one that envisioned the formation of a national army for Turkmenistan under joint command. The armed forces formed out of two existing former Soviet units (Kushka and Kizylarvat) and other military units still stationed in Turkmenistan. The control of air force and air defence systems of Turkmenistan become entirely with the Russian Armed Forces (with some limited control by Turkmenistan).\textsuperscript{112} It was also decided that while logistics training and exercise will be in Russia’s hands, the Turkmen will share the costs and contribute in man-power. The approximate strength of the army will be around 42,000.\textsuperscript{113}

Another military agreement with Russia, signed on September 2, 1993, allowed Russian citizen for military service in Turkmenistan, while enabling Turkmen officers to receive training at Russian military institutes. Turkmenistan also agreed to bear the cost of maintaining Russian forces on its territories after January 1, 1994, in return Russia would preserve some strategic bases in Turkmenistan.\textsuperscript{114}

Turkmenistan formally became a full member of the CIS on December 24, 1993, at a summit meeting of CIS leaders held in Ashkhabad. In this summit, Turkmen President, Saparmurad Niazov, and Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, signed famous accord, which allowed Turkmenistan’s 4,00,000 ethnic Russians to hold joint Turkmen and Russian nationality. The accord which was formulated to

\textsuperscript{112} FBIS-SOV, 92-117, June 17, 1992, pp.53-54.
\textsuperscript{113} FBIS-SOV, 92-114, June 12, 1992, pp.82-83.
\textsuperscript{114} SWB, SU/1788, September 8, 1993.
ease ethnic tensions, was the part of security relation and was the first such agreement between Russia and another former Soviet state. After becoming member of the CIS at Ashkhabad summit, Turkmenistan became the first Central Asian republic of the former USSR to joint NATO's 'partnership for peace' programme in May 1994.

Thus, the June accord of 1992 was an important geopolitical agreement for both Russia and Turkmenistan. In the opinion of V. Otchertsov, member of the Turkmenistan Presidential Council 'for small Turkmenia surrounded on all sides by larger neighbours, the creation of its own armed forces guaranteeing the reliable defence of its sovereignty from outside aggression would be highly dubious'. Turkmenistan's Vice-Premier, Nazar Soyonov, pointed to the significance of the treaty for Russia, that it strengthened Russia's southern flank by maintaining her defensive flank and strength of its armed forces unchanged, and allowed Russia 'not to build its defence lines in the south of the Urals'. Colonel O. Falichev, military observer of Krasnaya Zvezda pointed that 'Turkmenistan is choosing Russia rather than any of its southern neighbours as guarantor of its security, its prosperity, and stability in the region'.

Obviously, among Turkmenistan's neighbours, Iran will be most concerned about the nature and the thrust of the treaty as it will continue to affect Iran's overall geostrategic position. In order to neutralize Iranian concerns, Turkmenistan has tried to maintain a posture of neutrality towards the CIS by raising doubts on its viability as a military bloc and emphasizing its role as a political and economic structure and forum, rather than a military alliance.

115 SWB, SU/1881, P.A/1, December 29, 1993.
116 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 16, 1992, p.3.
117 Ibid.
Turkmenistan’s politico-military posture will continue to reflect the two key realities and preoccupations of its post-Soviet positions. First, continuous and direct dependency on Russia for security of the new state vis-à-vis its neighbours. Second, the political desire and commitment to remain as independent as possible from Moscow and to avoid meaningful commitment in any regional politico-military bloc (i.e., CIS). Turkmenistan’s continuous effort to enhance the political weight of its position in the command structure and decision making mechanisms of the ‘joint command’ of the army and its persistent relevant policy within the CIS – rejecting any notion of creating a ‘supra state’ structure of the Commonwealth – are reflective of Turkmenistan’s dual predicament. Russia’s forward politico-military position in Turkmenistan will thus continue to be effected by the inherent tension between Russian security designs and Turkmenistan’s independent regional posture.119

The bilateral Russian-Turkmen military as well as security relation further strengthened when President S.A.Niyazov of Turkmenistan visited Moscow on August 6-7, 1997, at the invitation of President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation. During the working meeting between the two leaders, a meaningful exchange of opinions on the status and prospects for development of Russian-Turkmen relations and broadening and deepening of cooperation in the most important areas of defence and economic sphere, as well as on regional and international problems took place, and a joint communiqué issued after bilateral talks between President Yeltsin and Turkmen President S.Niyazov, which called “Strategic partnership” between the two countries.120

119 FBIS – Central Eurasia, January 23 1993, pp.5-14.
120 SWB, SU/2993, P.B/6, August 9, 1997.
The two heads of state reiterated that strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan meets the vital interests of the two countries and is a priority direction of special importance in their foreign policy. During the meeting, both leaders emphasized 'the political will and the necessary potential making it possible to take bilateral relations to a qualitatively higher level, and spoke for more active cooperation in all spheres, with unanswering observance of the principles of equal partnership'.

Having discussed regional security issues, both leaders particularly emphasized mutual interest in the early establishment of peace and accord in Afghanistan, confirming their readiness to assist in every way possible a peaceful resolution of the Afghan crisis. Both presidents welcomed the general agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord in Tajikistan signed on June 27, 1997, and expressed confidence that its consistent implementation would create conditions for peaceful and stable development in Tajikistan.

Tajikistan

The Republic of Tajikistan (formerly the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic) is situated in the south-east of Central Asia. To the north and west it borders Uzbekistan, to the north-east Kyrgyzstan, to the east the People’s Republic of China and to the south Afghanistan.

After the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, like the other colleagues of Central Asian republics, Tajikistan also come forward and has concluded a number of defence and security agreements with Russia.

121 SWB, SU/2993, P.B/6, August 9, 1997.
122 Ibid.,
Russia’s bilateral security treaties with Tajikistan are the most significant but more complex, because these directly dealt with the future security of the southern flank of the CIS. Although Tajikistan was a signatory of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, on bilateral level, close relations with Moscow remained in the shadows due to the ongoing political struggle in Dushanbe between President Rakhman Nabiyev and the democratic and Islamic opposition.

After the collapse of the Afghan regime and victory of Islamic forces in that country, Tajikistan became the vulnerable to the Mujahedeen influence, and border penetration increasingly captured the attention of both Moscow and especially all the Central Asian States. The ensuing ‘Civil War’ between northern and southern parts of Tajikistan after the victory of the democratic and Islamic coalition in Dushanbe and the collapse of the Tajik border troops formation, made the infiltration of arms and fighting groups from Afghanistan a potentially explosive issue. Islam Karimov, the Uzbek President, with a clear stake in the security of the ‘southern flank’ took the lead in addressing the issue in both the Tashkent and Moscow summits.

Tajikistan’s Security problem was raised again in the foreign and defence ministers meeting in Tashkent in mid July 1992, and an important decision was made to immediately enhance the strength of the troops on the border with Afghanistan. The commander-in-chief of the CIS forces announced the dispatch of 1200 additional troops to the border of Afghanistan.123 Now the stage was set for a broader security agreement with Russia.

A draft treaty with principles of bilateral relations between Russia and Tajikistan was initiated on July 21, 1992, in Dushanbe. Russian Vice-Premier Alexander Shokhin, the head of the Russian delegation, after the meeting with President Nabiyev announced that given the inability of Tajikistan to maintain its border security, Russia will take the border troops of the CIS under its jurisdiction.\(^{124}\)

Tajikistan’s further incorporation into the security agreements was underscored by the request of President Nabiyev for deployment of CIS ‘blue helmets’ in Tajikistan’s ‘conflict zones’ to dismantle the so called ‘popular front’ and to take over the task of ensuring the activities of the national economy’s facilities and protection of the population.\(^{125}\) Russian security relations with Tajikistan, however, remained subject to complicated because of domestic pressures generated by opposition forces in Tajikistan. Democratic and Islamic groups continued to be suspicious of Russian intentions and policies in the republic and feared that the Russian military presence disguised as ‘peacekeeping forces’ would in reality be used to tip the balance of political power in the republic towards pro-Moscow, i.e. the supporters of Rakhman Nabiyev. The committee for National Salvation, strongly protested against the presence of the ‘foreign military contingent’.\(^{126}\)

The ensuing civil war in Tajikistan, especially after the forced resignation of Nabiyev in September 1992, highlighted the complicated Russian political security role in defining both its internal political dynamics and its external security. There have been numerous accusations in Tajikistan that the Russian military, especially the 201\(^{st}\) Motorized Rifle Division, provided support to the opposition groups and to the supporters of the deposed President Nabiyev.

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\(^{124}\) *FBIS*—SOV, 92-141, July 22, 1992, p.72.

\(^{125}\) *FBIS*—SOV, 92-139, July 20, 1992, pp.60-61.

\(^{126}\) *FBIS*—SOV, 92-150, August 4, 1992, p.73.
Thus Moscow’s aggressive interventionist policy further confirmed the existence of a ‘structural dependency’ between Tajikistan and most of the Central Asian republics and Russia. Davlot Usmon, Tajikistan’s Vice Premier and Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Party of Revival, indicated that stability in Tajikistan without the help of Russia and the CIS will be ‘rather problematic’. The invocation of a collective security agreement in the case of Tajikistan by the Alma-Aty meeting on November 4, 1992, was a clear indication that Russia and the Central Asian partners regardless of their intra-CIS differences will continue to hold the former Soviet Union’s southern borders as the borders of the CIS and of Russia’s sphere of influence. More significantly, it also indicated that the maintenance of the domestic stability of the republic has been considered a legitimate security concern of the member states, which falls within the jurisdiction of the collective security agreements.

This was a clear message to all regional actors, including Iran, that inspite of the collapse of the Soviet Union, its geopolitical legacy will remain largely unchanged. Sergei Yastrzhemskiy, Head of the Foreign Ministry Press and Information Department, characterized Moscow’s position rather frankly:-

The Russian Ministry proceeds from the premise that interference in the internal affairs of Tajikistan that is located in the area of the Russian Federation’s important and versatile interest, can not be justified no matter from where it comes and what is motivated by ... Russia is ready to take all necessary measures to provide assistance to the fraternal Tajik people in stabilizing the situation in the country, to help it shore up its sovereignty and territorial integrity and ensure the security of the CIS’s southern borders.128

The downfall of the ‘Democratic-Islamic’ coalition government in December 1992, and the consolidation of ‘pro-Communist’ forces in Tajikistan headed by Imomali Rakhmanov, was not only a watershed in the Tajikistan civil war, but also signaled a qualitatively new stage in the involvement of Russia and its primary regional ally Uzbekistan, in shaping the political and security dynamics of the region. Uzbekistan’s direct involvement in providing political, logistic and military backing for the ‘pro-Communist’ forces, namely the ‘People’s Front’ was critical in changing the balance of power among the contending parties to the conflict.

Subsequently, Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, at a press conference held during the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in Minsk, on January 22, 1993, urged the members of the CIS to send a 500 strong battalion to Tajikistan to reinforce Russian units patrolling the Afghan border to check further incursion, border violation by anti-government groups and to protect the borders from attacks by Tajik-Islamic based in Afghanistan.129 Imamoli Rakhmanov, the President and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, on May 25, 1993, at Moscow signed a ‘friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance treaty’. Yeltsin stated Russia’s continuing commitment to ‘assist peacekeeping efforts on the part of the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan’.130

Another important Summit to assess the situation on Tajik-Afghan border and to stop the escalation of Civil War in Tajikistan, was started in Moscow on August 6, 1993. This Summit also may be called ‘Russian and Central Asian Summit’. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and all his Central Asian state’s counterpart participated and discussed various issues related with regional security.

Uzbek President Islam Karimov made public his viewpoint to resolve the complex knot of problems involved in the situation that has arisen on the Tajik-Afghan border. In his opinion Tajikistan’s conflict can never be resolved by ‘strong-arm’ methods. Only the way of peace, the way of negotiations is what is needed. He expressed his desire and hopes that Tajik leadership will perceive opinions of neighbours to be recommendations. He requested Tajik leaders to start dialogue with healthy forces with the oppositions. In Karimov’s view, it was advisable to unite various political forces building a new society and holding new democratic elections and to enlist a large proportion of the public in attaining these noble goals.\textsuperscript{131}

The Uzbek leader once again reaffirmed that he did not regard the Tajik-Afghan border as a border between two states but as a CIS border. To resolve the problem, signatories of Collective Security Treaty must help in strengthening the border.\textsuperscript{132} President Islam Karimov believed that instability on the Tajik-Afghan border may turn into a factor for instability on Uzbekistan’s borders with Afghanistan or even with Tajikistan. The instability in Tajikistan may back fire against its neighbours and for Uzbekistan, for its fledgling statehood, the blow may prove fatal.\textsuperscript{133}

Moscow Summit of Russia, and the Central Asian States was regarded by participants as an unprecedented event. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, while commenting on ‘Russian-Central Asian Summit’ noted that: Kazakhstan is not simply a country next door, but a guarantor of the secure existence (if not survival) of the Russian state. It is Kazakhstan with its half-Kazakh, half-non Kazakh population that

\textsuperscript{131} Izvestiya, Moscow, August 6, 1993.  
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{133} Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, August 6, 1993.
makes it possible for Moscow to feel itself to be part of Europe, by giving it a bridge into Asia; a Kazakhstan that turned into a sort of buffer between two different civilizations not only for Russia, but for the whole world. One can imagine the consequences of Almaty’s (Alma-Aty) switch from a favourable policy vis-à-vis Moscow to a confrontational one. This is why one cannot stop wondering how deep-seated is the Kremlin’s desire not to pay heed to Nursultan Nazarbayev – not only an outstanding politician, but also a real “political gift” to the current Russian authorities. At a time when it is becoming increasingly evident that “an Islamic revolution” in Central Asia in one or another is invitatable, Russia would be wise to hold onto Kazakhstan with both hands. This is its only chance not to bog down in Central Asia, but to remain a respected and welcome partner for the region’s countries.134

Turkmen President, Sapamurad Niazov, had declared his position in advance that Turkmenistan intends to distance itself from the rest of the Central Asian countries trying to resolve the Tajik conflict with Russia. He had also stated that Turkmen military contingent could not be sent to Tajikistan and that he would attend the Moscow Summit as an observer’.135

The President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, while inaugurating the Moscow Summit, stated that ‘the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border required an urgent discussion of this question and extra-ordinary joint actions’ and ‘protection of the Tajik-Afghan border is protection of the general CIS border. Russia expects more support in this respect from the countries of this region’.136 Boris Yeltsin called upon the heads of states to cooperate closely, on equal basis to

134 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, 6 August, 1993.
135 Ibid.,
136 SWB, SU/1762, P.C2/3, August 9, 1993.
ensure security of the CIS. He also stressed that this cooperation would determine the character and scale of the retaliatory measures. 'The military measures would not be our choices', he said 'but in our situation it is difficult to avoid them'.

The Russian President emphasized that 'there is a general position: the situation inside Tajikistan is closely linked with what is happening on its external border'. He called on the leaders of Tajikistan to conduct a direct dialogue with all sections of the opposition 'without a selective approach'.

Boris Yeltsin also stated that 'Measures of reconciliation, not suppression, are needed'. He also called for negotiations to be opened on this heated regional problem with other states of the region and in particular with the leaders of Afghanistan. Boris Yeltsin proposed that the Foreign Ministers of the Central Asian states collectively appeal to the UN Secretary General Mr. Butrus Ghali, on this issue and that finally a multilateral document be signed on peace and cooperation in Central Asia. 'Russia is ready for specific steps to achieve a peaceful solution of the problem in this trouble spot'. Boris Yeltsin said.

Boris Yeltsin in his speech on Tajik-Afghan crisis, stated that, it is "vitally important" to "neutralize the growing threat to security" in Central Asia, preserve stability in this region. He also stated that protection of Tajik-Afghan border is a matter of concern for CIS as a whole, reinforcements for Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan a priority, Tajik-Afghan border problem cannot be solved by military measures alone, political steps are necessary, advocates dialogue between government and all forces in Tajikistan and warned that situated should not be

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137 Ibid.,
138 Ibid.,
139 Ibid.,

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aggravated by “ill-conceived steps involving the use of force” such as the Tajik Government’s actions in Gorny Badakhshan. He also advocated that for the solution of Tajik-Afghan border, talk should be held with Afghan authorities, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia etc., and multilateral documents on peace and stability in Central Asia should sign.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev in an interview soon after Moscow Summit, stressed need for collective security to avert Islamic fundamentalism. He proposed creation of coalition armed forces based on the “blue helmets” model for the deployment over the Tajik-Afghan border.

In June 1994, a further round of peace negotiations between representatives of the Tajik Government and opposition took place in the Iranian Capital, Tehran, but the cease-fire accord was not implemented, and the conflict along the Tajik-Afghan border continued. In early February 1995, a fourth round of peace talks between government and opposition representatives opened in Alma-Aty, Kazakhstan, but little progress was achieved. In mid-May, 1995, President Rahmonov and Syed Abdullo Nuri, the leader of the IRP, started bilateral talks in Kabul, Afghanistan, for complete cease-fire but regarding the deployment of peacekeeping forces in limited numbers in Gorny Badakshan, the peace talk failed to achieve any meaningful goals. Russia, alongwith other members of CIS was determined to stop the escalation of civil war in the strife torn state of Tajikistan and deployed 12,000 strong para military forces in the state of Tajikistan. The entire efforts on the part of Russia was considered to maintain stability in the region and to secure borders of CIS from the intrigues of the Islamic fundamentalist forces, trained and exported by Afghanistan.

140 SWB, SU/1763, P.C1/1, August 10, 1993.
141 Ibid., P.C1/2.
During the subsequent period, Russia by its ‘forward policy’ tried to maintain internal stability by its military intervention in the republic of Tajikistan. Despite military intervention, Russia along with other members of the Commonwealth particularly Central Asian Republics, was busy in organizing peace talks among the concerned parties for the amicable solution of the ongoing civil war in Tajikistan. Finally, Tehran Accord, and subsequently Moscow Accord of 1997, signed by President Imomali Rahmonov and the opposition leader Syed Abdullo Nuri, where oppositions were given due share in the administration, ended the political crisis in Tajikistan.

Earlier, when Afghan crisis was deepened in May 1997, after the Taliban’s major victory in Afghanistan with the seizure of Mazar-i-Sharif, Russia along with other Central Asian States convened an emergency meeting in Moscow, and decided to put on full combat alert of the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division, which forms the core of the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan. Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, while addressing a group of officials in-charge of international affairs, on May 26, 1997, stated that the events in northern Afghanistan had put Tajikistan in danger of ‘the penetration of Islamic extremism’ not to mention the possible inflow of refugees and ‘streams of arms’ from Afghanistan into the neighbouring Central Asian republics, and that is why ‘Russian peacemaking is a necessary condition for preventing a domino effect throughout Central Asia’. So that end ‘Moscow is actively working to make the advance to peace in Tajikistan irreversible’.

When the second seizure of Mazar-i-Sharif by the Taliban Islamic militiam, which took place in early August 1998, all the Central Asian States (with the exception of Turkmenistan) together with Russia and China were ready to prevent the spillover effect of the forcible occupation of Afghanistan by the Taliban. As the Pakistan-American backed Taliban forces advanced towards the CIS borders, leaders of Russia and Uzbekistan declared their readiness to evoke the provisions of the 1992 Tashkent Security Pact. This decision was taken after urgent consultation between the First Deputy Defence Minister and Chief of General Staff of Russia, General Anatoly Kvashniv and First Deputy Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan, General H. Tursunov and A.Kamilov held in Tashkent on 5 August, 1998. They reserved their right to take all measures needed for strengthening security of their external borders in compliance with the Collective Security Agreement of 15 May 1992.

Russia’s Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, while addressing a press conference in Moscow on 12 August 1998, emphasized Russia’s commitment for the internal as well as external security of Tajikistan, and voiced that Russia was closely monitoring the situation and taking adequate measures to reinforce its military contingent in Tajikistan including the 201st Motorised Rifle Division.

Thus the participation of Russia, Uzbekistan and other CIS members in the conflict of Tajikistan indicate that any future security challenge in the republic either from internal or external sources, will have to calculate the politico-military response of Russia and its Central Asian allies. Russia’s involvement in Tajikistan’s conflict was thus the first successful test of the Collective Security Agreements.
In the post-Soviet era, Russia along with the newly independent Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, signed a number of bilateral as well as multi-lateral military confidence building and border security agreements with the People’s Republic of China, to ensure regional security and safeguard the strategic interest of all countries in the region. The Sino-Kazakh Joint Communiqué issued on February 28, 1992, the Sino-Kyrgyz Joint Communiqué of May 6, 1992 and the Sino-Tajik Joint Communiqué of March 11, 1993 declared the intention of the concerned sides to work for a settlement of their border disputes.\(^{143}\)

The most notable progress in negotiating the bilateral settlement of disputed borders was the Sino-Kazakh boundary agreement signed on April 26, 1994 by the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng and the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The agreement finalized in principle the delineation of the 1700 km. long Sino-Kazakh border.\(^{144}\) The official Chinese press hailed this as ‘a historical event of significance’ in Sino-Kazakh relations and claimed that the Sino-Kazakh border would become ‘a bond of friendly co-operation and common prosperity’.\(^{145}\)

The second Sino-Russian summit of September 3, 1994, and its final protocol on the border agreements on the western section was a landmark achievement in the process of negotiations to finalise the border disputes. This agreement delineated in a legal form 55 km. of disputed border lines in the western section of Altay Territory of the Sino-Russian border. This agreement


\(^{144}\) Ibid., p.209.

\(^{145}\) Ibid.,
supplemented the previous Sino-Soviet agreement of May 16, 1991, and thus for the first time delineated the Sino-Russian borders in a legal form. The Russian Foreign Ministry hailed this agreement as a ‘historical achievement’ and declared it as ‘conducive to the stability of the border areas’ and ‘a concrete expression of Russia’s policy of developing a long-term constructive partnership with China’.  

One important dimension of the new security relations between China and Russia alongwith Central Asian States, is their realisation of the need to develop bilateral and multilateral defence and military cooperation. Such cooperation is mostly seen in enhancing confidence building measures, reduction of troops and military forces along the common borders, disarmament in the border areas and increasing the transparency of border defence. Both the Chinese and Central Asian republics’ governments have been actively promoting such defence and military cooperation.

The most important achievement in the defence and military cooperation between China, Central Asian republics and Russia was the signing of the Five-Nation Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Forces in the Border Areas on 26 April, 1996, in Shanghai at a summit meeting among leaders from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.

Since the disintegration of the former Soviet-Union, the Chinese delegation and the joint delegation of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have held many rounds of talks on disarmament and confidence building in the border areas. The Shanghai agreement, as claimed by the Russian President Boris Yeltsin, was ‘an epoch-making document’ for the five countries involved, because by

147 SWB, SU/2598, P.G/1, April 29, 1996.
signing the agreement, they 'have undertaken very positive military and political obligations for the first time in history'. The Tajik President Rokhmonov, on the other hand, believed that the agreement is of inestimable significance, and the five countries concerned had 'traveled a prolonged and complicated road of negotiations' of five years achieved expected results. Kazakh President Nazarbayev described his country's willingness to develop its good neighbourly relations with China, and commitment 'to continue to work together with the parties concerned in an effort to build a peaceful, secure and stable Asia'.

Under the agreement, the military forces of both sides stationed along the border areas promised not to attack each other. The agreement ruled out conducting military exercises aimed against each other. It also specified that limits will be imposed on the scale, scope and number of military exercises on both sides of the border areas. The concerned sides should inform each other of any major military activities taking place in any area within 100 km. of the borderlines. It further stipulated that the concerned sides will invite each other to observe the military exercises, and will prevent any dangerous military activities. It also stipulated that friendly exchanges will be strengthened between the military forces and frontier guards of both sides.

Such a multilateral agreement is undoubtedly conducive to strengthening mutual trust between the Chinese military and the military of Central Asian states as well as that of Russia. It has increased the transparency of border defence on both sides. It was therefore an important step towards institutionalizing the security relations between China and Central Asia. More broadly as the Kazakh

148 Ibid.,
149 Ibid.,
150 Ibid.,
151 Ibid.,
President Nazarbayev stated: 'the Five-Nation Agreement lays a firm legal foundation for the sustained and effective development of bilateral and multilateral relations among the five nations'.

Another very important multilateral agreement on mutual reduction of armed forces in border areas was signed by the visiting Chinese President Jian Zemn, President Boris Yeltsin, President Nazarbayev, President Rahmanov and President Akayev on 24 April, 1997, in Moscow. But this agreement not included 'reduction of the strategic components of the armed forces, strategic Missile Troops, the navy and long range aviation and missile units of the Air Defence Troops'.

Speaking at the signing ceremony, Kazakh President, Nazarbayev described the document as 'a victory of common sense' and a 'universal mechanism for peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation in Eurasia'. Kyrgyz President Akayev said the agreement laid down 'the foundation for a continental security structure on the Eurasian continent'. Even Tajik President Rahmanov praised the agreement and said that the agreement was 'symbolic' as a bridge of peace and friendship between the five countries and 'it will allow China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to enter into the 21st century with a border which unites rather than separates them'.

Boris Yeltsin described the agreement as a 'a break through document which creates a zone of stability on a 7,500 km. long sector of the border. This implementation of agreement, the Russian president stressed, 'would consolidate

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152 SWB, SU/2596, P.B/3, April 26, 1996.
154 Ibid.,
in the most earnest way the mutual trust between its participants, a matter that
would also have a favouring bearing on mutual relations between the states as a
whole'. President Yeltsin praised the agreement as ‘unprecedented for the
Asiatic region’ which will ‘scrupulously balance the interests’ of the signatory
states ‘in such sensitive areas as national security’. This agreement was a real
mechanism in ensuring stability and good neighbourliness among its participants.

The five-nation summit meeting hosted by Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbay and attended by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgni Primakov, and the
Chinese, Kyrgyz and Tajik Presidents, Jiang Zemin, Askar Akayev and Emomali
Rahmanov, which was held in Alma-Aty on 3 July, 1998, noted that the
implementation of the Shanghai and Moscow agreements on military confidence
building measures and the reduction of armed forces along common borders had
‘laid the foundation … for turning the borders between the five countries into a
frontier of equitable cooperation, genuine friendship and complete trust.’

Primakov, who was representing Russia at the summit meeting in Alma-
Aty, stated that these states are ‘moving forward’ rather than resting on their
laurels and wanted to lay ‘a solid foundation for stability in the region as a whole
rather than just on their borders’. He also favoured that these five countries
should developed further confidence building measures, and fight against ‘new
challenges’ including illegal trafficking in drugs, separatism and religious
extremes.

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156 Ibid.
159 Ibid., P.G/1.
Participant members of the summit emphasized that further expanding and strengthening bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation in a spirit of good neighbourliness and friendship is in the fundamental interests of the peoples of the five countries and constitutes an important factor for the stability, security, development and prosperity in the region and the whole of Asia.

In a joint statement after the Alma-Aty summit, it was declared that 'the parties highly value the important positive impact of the Shanghai and Moscow agreements on security in this region and the world at large, believing that this is a concrete manifestation of the new-type security concept ... a successful try in consolidating regional and global security and cooperation. This coordination among the five countries is an open one, not directed at any third country'. Even participant members in joint statement supported 'the basic ideas of Kazakhstan's proposal on convening the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, and expressed their willingness to continue to actively improve them'.

In a speech at Alma-Aty summit, Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, lauded the bilateral defence agreement between China and Russia and reaffirmed the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and to stop targeting each other with strategic nuclear weapons. He appreciated Kazakhstan's move to destroy its nuclear weapons and its position on joining the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the status of a nuclear-free nation.

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161 Ibid.
It is quite clear that because of the dependence of the Central Asian States on Russia for their defence, and because of the special role Russia plays in defending the external borders of Central Asian States, confidence-building measures between China and Russia help the military co-operation and confidence building between China and Central Asian states as well. The Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have also been promoting separately bilateral military cooperation with China.

Earlier, the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, on a two days state visit of Central Asia, met President Islam Karimov in Tashkent on 2 July, 1996, and discussed Sino-Uzbek bilateral relation in security affairs.162

President Jiang Zemin, also met Kyrgyz President, Akayev, in Bishkek on 3 July, and stated that main purpose of his visit to the ‘friendly neighbour’ is to explore ways to expand the two country relations ‘on a strategic basis into the 21st century’. He also stated: ‘It is my belief that this visit will help to deepen our mutual understanding, trust and friendship, and bring friendly relations and cooperation between China and Kyrgyzstan to a new level’.163

After discussion on various issues President Jiang Zemin and President Akayav signed a joint declaration, several cooperations accords and border agreements. Both leaders reiterated their commitment that ‘China and Kyrgyzstan have promised not to invade each other, nor interfere in each others’ internal affairs, nor sign any accord with a third party against each other’.164 Both leaders also signed an agreement on the demarcation of their joint border.

162 *SWB*, SU/2656, P.G/1, July 4, 1996.
163 *SWB*, SU/2656, P.G/1, July 4, 1996.
164 Ibid.,
Chinese President Jiang Zemin, while commenting on Sino-Kyrgyz bilateral relation stated: 'no matter how the world situation changes, China will hold its policy of developing friendly and cooperative Sino-Kyrgyz relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful co-existence. Leaders of our two countries should map-out our future relationship looking towards the 21st century to enable ... long term and stable friendly and cooperative relations'.

Sino-Kazakh military cooperation began in early 1993, when a joint communique between China and Kazakhstan specifically stated that 'both sides agree to facilitate the contact and promote the relationship between their military and to conduct military exchanges according to international practice so as to enhance mutual trust and co-operation in the military field'. It was further corroborated by the joint communiqué of September 1 1995, at the end of President Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to China. Both President Nazarbayev and Jiang Zemin emphasized that efforts at working out an agreement on reduction of military forces along the borders and strengthening the trust in the military field should be speeded up. Military technological co-operation should be carried out on the basis of mutual benefits and taking each country's international obligations into considerations.

In 1995 and 1996, military exchanges were conducted between China and Kazakhstan on the regular basis. A Chinese military delegation from the garrison of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region visited Kazakhstan in August 1995. In May 1996, both the Kazakh Foreign Minister and Defence Minister received Fu Quanyou, the Chief of Staff of the People's liberation Army (PLA) in Alma-Aty, capital of Kazakhstan.

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165 *SWB, SU/2657, P.G/2, July 5, 1996.*


167 Ibid.,
But the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Alma-Aty on 4 July, 1996, further strengthened Sino-Kazakh military cooperation. Jiang re-affirmed China's commitment to 'supports all efforts towards safeguarding peace and stability in Central Asia and Kazakhstan's aspiration for joining the process of Asian-Pacific Cooperation'.

While addressing Kazakh Parliament, Chinese President 'stressed Kazakhstan's special role in the whole Central Asian region and stated that since our countries are bound by a 2,000 year-old history and the Great Silk Road, China intends to continue the old and good traditions of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation'.

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168 SWB, SU/2658, P.G/1, July 6, 1996.
169 Ibid.,