CHAPTER VI
FROM POST-COLD WAR TO POST-COMMUNISM ERA IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

No one could have foreseen that 1991 would witness not only the end to the Communist rule in the Soviet Union but the disintegration of the Soviet state itself. Even as the post-cold war era began, concerns and doubts about the course and fate of Gorbachev's Perestroika took hold. In the last quarter of 1990 "Gorbachev had become very concerned over the signs of gradual breakdown in law and the Constitutional Order that threatened the unity of the country as well as his course of Perestroika". Soon "the tragic climax came in a forcible occupation of the television and radio centre by troops with tanks" in which fifteen civilians were killed.¹

The deadly internal developments within the Soviet Union threatened to sour the much hailed superpower relations. President Bush described "the turn of events in the "Soviet Union" as deeply disturbing" but clearly he was not in favour to undermine the improving U.S.-Soviet relations.² Though "Washington remained" increasingly


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concerned over the internal situation in the Soviet Union”, it had become clear that Gorbachev was not going to impose Presidential rule or use force to compel submission of the defiant Baltic governments, and that -- in Bush’s earlier words -- the short tragic resort to force had, proved “an anomaly and not a new way of life”. The proof came in the next couple of weeks, when Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia voted overwhelming for independence by 90 percent, 74 percent and 78 percent respectively. “Gorbachev did not accept those votes as binding, but permitted the plebiscites to occur and continued negotiations with Baltic republic governments”

Gorbachev had placed high stakes on the nation-wide referendum on a renewed union, scheduled for March 17, after the Union Draft “had made significant Concessions, sharing with the republics decisions on national security, defense, foreign policy and the national budget”. The referendum on March 17 brought an overall country-wide

3 Garthoff, n.1, p. 448. According to Garthoff, in the Spring of 1991 the CIA’s National Intelligence Daily Top Secret Report to The President and other senior officials began to print a daily “Sitrep” (Situation Report) on the internal situation in the USSR, with particular attention to the Non-Russian republics.


5 Garthoff, n.1, p. 453.

6 ibid.

7 ibid., On the same day Gorbachev requested approval by the Supreme Soviet of nine Members of the new U.S.S.R. Security council: Yanayev, Pavlov, Boldin, Pugo, Kryuchkov, Yozov, Bakatin, Primakov, and Bessmertnykh. In five months, six of these nine trusted associates would make their abortive coup d’etat: Yanayev, Pavlov, Boldin, Pugo, Kryuchkov and Yozov.
vote of 76 percent for a renewed union. On April 23, the “9+1”, Gorbachev and the leaders of nine republics (the three Slavic and six Muslim republics) agreed to accelerate approval of the union treaty. Yeltsin, along with Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan now became strong advocates of the revised union treaty. Even though Yeltsin won the Russian Presidential election in June by 57 percent vote, often targeting Gorbachev and the Central Soviet government in the same breath, now publicly proclaimed Gorbachev “as an ally of pro-democracy forces and supporter of reforms”.

The U.S. administration “faced a delicate and difficult task in seeking to encourage democracy, economic reform, and freedom while not opening itself to danger of interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. President Bush had no intention to support those who sought independence “in order to replace a far off tyranny with a local despotism” or those who promoted “suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred”. For the United States to “choose between supporting President Gorbachev and supporting independence minded leaders throughout the U.S.S.R.” was, according to Bush, a “false choice”. He praised Gorbachev’s “astonishing” achievement and endorsed the 9+1 Union Treaty.

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8 Russia overall voted 71 percent in favour of the Union, Ukrain 70 percent, Balarus 83 percent, and in Kazakhstan, the Central Asian republics, and in Azerbaijan the Positive Vote ranged from 93 percent to 98 percent. The local governments and the vast majority of the population in three Baltic republics, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova boycotted the referendum. The conservative continued to oppose the “Union Treaty” “as a giveaway of central authority”, and on April 20-21 a “Congress” of the Sayuz (union faction) “denounced the treaty and called for the declaration of a national emergency.”

9 Garthoff, n.1, p.458.

10 Presidential Documents vol. 27 (5 August 1991), pp. 1093-1095; for other public statements in Kiev see, ibid., pp. 1090-97.
COUP AND COUNTER COUP

Before Gorbachev could return from the Crimea to sign the new Union Treaty on August 20,¹¹ a delegation¹² unexpectedly arrived to inform Gorbachev "that the members of the leadership had agreed to the imposition of a national State emergency".¹³ Gorbachev agreed to be house arrested, rather than approve the "national emergency" or transfer his authority to vice President Yanayev. In an immediate reaction, U.S. government, condemned "the unconstitutional resort to force," and President Bush announced support for Yeltsin's call for "restoration of Gorbachev to power".¹⁴ To put pressure on the plotters the United

¹¹ "On the surface, the political scene was quiet. But Gorbachev had, in a meeting with Yeltsin and the Kazakh leader Nazarbayev on July 29, discussed the growing tension within the leadership, and with the encouragement of the other two had decided that after signing of the Union Treaty, he would reorganize the leadership and dismiss a number of the hard-line leaders such as Pavlov and probably Kryuchkov and Pugo. Yeltsin, only half in jest had looked around to see if anyone was listening to their conversation, which Gorbachev and Nazarbayev had laughed about. In fact, the security Chief (General Plekhanov) had bugged the session, thus alerting those about to be purged" see, Garthoff, n.1, p. 473.

¹² The Delegation consisted of Party Secretary and Gorbachev's deputy at the Defense Council, Oleg Baklanov; Party Secretary Oleg Shenia; Deputy Defense Minister General Valentin Varennikov; and Gorbachev's trusted personal Chief of Staff, Valery Boldin.

¹³ Garthoff, n.1, p. 473. Pavlov had called a cabinet meeting on 17 August which discussed the Union Treaty in very deprecating term, but there was no discussion then of any action to forestall its signature. On 18 August in a meeting at the KGB headquarters, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov and Boldin decided that Gorbachev was no longer in control of the situation and that the course they were on would lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union. They then decided to despatch the delegation to Crimea to try to persuade Gorbachev to declare a state of emergency, but if he would not, then they would do so themselves.

States halted all economic assistance. The U.S. administration was above all, deeply concerned with the theoretical danger to the world from split authority over nuclear weapons.\(^{15}\)

Even though the subsequent events led to "the collapse of the coup",\(^{16}\) the "status quo" could not be restored. "It destroyed the very foundation of central authority that the conspirators had so desperately sought to preserve and reinforce."\(^{17}\) Political and economic reforms were "given a new lease of life and boost, but under conditions that involved a more radical political change than was envisaged under even a far reaching 'restructuring'. Moreover, "the reverberations of saving the Constitutional Order paradoxically led to the end of the that Constitutional order within a few months". The coup plotters, "in their attempt to prevent controlled change had unleashed change uncontrollable by central authorities".\(^{18}\)

\(^{15}\) From the late afternoon of 18 August to the morning of 22 August the Strategic Nuclear Control Coding and Communication device in the brief case that always accompanied the President of the USSR as Commander-in-Chief of the General Staff. Apart from the fact that the coup leader had "absolutely no interest" in firing nuclear weapons or threatening to do so, "they would in any case have been unable" but only because the Commanders-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Soviet Navy, and Soviet Air Force all remained loyal to the Constitutional order.

\(^{16}\) Among the most critical factors was the divisions in the military. See, Jerry Hough, "Assessing the coup," *Current History* (Philadelphia) (October 1971), p. 306. Also see the useful discussion in Seweryn Bailer, "The Death of Soviet-Communism," *Foreign Affairs* (New York) (Winter 1991/92), pp. 177-78.

\(^{17}\) Garthoff, n.1, p. 478.

FROM GORBACHEV AND THE UNION TO YELTSIN
AND THE COMMONWEALTH

In the aftermath of the failure of the coup, the most notable immediate step was the banning of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union along with the Communist Parties of most of the republics, including Russia and Ukraine. More importantly, there was a gradual but inexorable eclipse of not only the ‘Union Treaty’ but the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus too declared independence. Moldova, the three Transcaucasian States – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan in central Asia, either declared independence or the intention to seek independence.19

The American administration “held back from early recognition of the independence of the Baltic States, despite some domestic criticism, in order not to lean on Gorbachev at a critical time and to give time for prior recognition by the Soviet government.”20 Bush “formally recognized the three States” on 2 September, the same day “Gorbachev announced the intention to do so” and three days before “the new State Council of the U.S.S.R. did so formally”.21

19 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan -- and Russia held back till the end of the month.


The ‘self declared independence’ of the other republics was neither recognized by the U.S.S.R., Russia or the outside world. Though active negotiations continued for a much diluted Union Treaty, the fate of the union got intrinsically linked to Yeltsin--Gorbachev political struggle. Yeltsin not only had “played the central political role in defeating the coup” but in its aftermath had mounted “a counter coup” to usurp “the powers of the Union Presidency and other central union institutions of the Central government.” It was “Yeltsin’s counter coup, far more than the inept coup itself, that undercut Gorbachev’ effort to restabilize the status quo of controlled change under Perestroika and to legitimize a renewed Union.” It “confirmed the not unjustified suspicion of many leaders of other republics that Yeltsin and Russia were taking over the central government”. The U.S.S.R. Congress ironically on 5 September voted its own demise and the interim government formally recognised the independence of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Real power increasingly got concentrated in the hands of Russia and Yeltsin, rather than the residual union and Gorbachev.

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22 Though Yeltsin did not declare Russian independence in the aftermath of the failed coup, “he seized many of the powers, attributes, institutions, and assests of the Central soviet regime.” And he “asserted and exercised Russian authority in a way that invited and induced the other republics to follow suit.” See, Garthoff, n.l, pp. 478-499.

23 ibid., pp. 479-481.
In retrospect, Gorbachev had two crucial failures: temporizing and failing on economic reforms, and failing in time to recognize and to accommodate the centrifugal regional and national ethnic tendencies. Gorbachev was unable to devise an appropriate method to dismantle the command economy and give free play to the market without social chaos. Also, while he was able to neutralize and sideline the communist party at the center and make national and international policy, he could not overcome the entrenched interest of the "party administrative-economic-bureaucracy" or implement a "political-economic revolution" throughout the country. Above all, he was slow to recognize the power of the rising national and ethnic political tendencies, and coupled with it the tendencies, even in the regions where there was no ethnic factor, towards revolt against the continued dominance of the reforming Moscow "centre". It is unclear whether a Confederal Union was still possible in August 1991. Evidently though, with the failure of the 'August coup', and the success of the Yeltsin's 'counter coup' against Gorbachev and the central Soviet government, Ukraine could not be kept in a union and hence there could be none.

On 8 December leaders of Belarus and Ukraine along with Yeltsin concluded that "the negotiation to draw up a new Union Treaty

are deadlocked” and that “the objective process of succession by republics from the U.S.S.R. and the formation of independent States have become a reality.” Consequently, they agreed to the establishment of a “Common-Wealth of Independent States (CIS) consisting of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine but “open for accession by all member states of the U.S.S.R.” and even to “other states that share the aim and principles” of the agreement, and they gave a “guarantee to honour international obligations and agreements of the former USSR” and also “to ensure unified control over nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation”. But the powers and even the nature of the “Commonwealth” were exceedingly nebulous. Not only did the eight-Slavic and Central Asian republics join together, but so too did Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Moreover, the formal declaration of the eleven successor states explicitly provided that “with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist.”


ECONOMIZATION OF U.S. - RUSSIAN RELATIONS

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United states decided to play an unprecedented role in the historic transformation of the Russian economy based on market principles. It was hoped that the “swords-to-plowshares” philosophy would transform U.S-Russian economic relations into one of the largest two-way trading relationship in the entire world. Accordingly, the last year of Bush-Yeltsin era in U.S.-Russian relations was dominated by economic issues:28 “how much assistance should be given, how, when and for what purpose”.29

On November 12, the Office of Private Investment Credit (OPIC) approved insurance guarantees for trade with the Soviet Union, overcoming the reluctance of American banks to fund grain credits. On November 20, “Bush approved a further $1.25 billion in grain credits and a token of $12 million as humanitarian assistance30. The American Congress urged a “shift of funds from the Defense Department allocation to provide economic assistance to the Soviet-Union and the republics.” Later a bill “to transfer $500 million, of which $400 million would be for assistance in dismantling nuclear and chemical weapons was passed”.31

29 Garthoff, n.1, p.780.
30 ibid, p.494.
31 see, ibid.
At the June 1992, summit meeting between President Bush and Yeltsin, the U.S.-Russian Trade Agreement, was signed which provided for reciprocal most favoured Nation (MFN) tariff treatment and improved market access for both sides. The ‘Bilateral Investment Treaty ‘and the ‘Treaty for the Avoidance of double Taxation of Income’. created a further favorable business climate between both nations that broke down earlier barriers and disincentives to trade.\(^{32}\) Furthermore, the Export-Import Bank in February 1992 agreed to finance U.S. export to Russia. On the legislative front, on 1 April 1992, the “House Joint Resolution 465 repealed the Stevenson-Byrd Amendments”, which “removed a $300 million limit on trade financing with Russia”, along with other restrictive legislations.\(^{33}\) Consequently, “the establishment of Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States (NIS), an up-to-date-information service on trade regulations, legislation, and market data took place.

President Yeltsin, determined to set Russia on a path of Westernization, liberalization, and democratization, embarked on a multifaceted cooperative strategy with the West, which was particularly


geared to cementing strong ties with the United States. Yeltsin undertook to create a new administrative apparatus and a legal and business environment which was conducive to market economics. His reform plan became outlined in the document, “Russian Government Programme for Deepening Economic Reforms to 1995-96”, which was to liberalize the economy, stabilize the Monterey and financial crisis, privatise enterprises, implement programmes designed to enhance defense conversion and increase peace time consumer production, and create a competitive market environment and positive social policies in areas of health, welfare, and education.

A Major tool to accomplish these objectives was “global economic integration through increasing trade and investment with Western Countries” which Yeltsin hoped “will fulfill Russia’s need for


hard currency and better price for its export to the West”\(^38\), so as to stimulate economic development. He had relied on Gorbachev’s strategy of seeking industrial cooperation with the West, with a heavy emphasis on joint-ventures\(^39\). A second component of Yeltsin’s strategy was “to solicit economic aid packages from the West to rebuild Russia as a complement to foreign investment activities”\(^40\). Consequently, the Vancouver Summit assistance Package from the United State totaled $1.6 billion in grants and credits.\(^41\) In April 1993, the Group of seven countries announced a total of $44 billion aid program from the IMF, the world Bank and other sources of bilateral aid.\(^42\)

A third major component of Yeltsin’s foreign economic strategy had “been to gain membership in major Western international economic institutions”.\(^43\) In early 1992, IMF created a new ‘Former Soviet Union’ (FSU) division. By July 1992, the World Bank approved a $1 billion credit line for Russian stabilization programme. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was charged with the responsibility of aiding the privatization process of medium-to large sized Russian enterprises.

\(^{38}\) Palmieri, n. 33, p. 76.

\(^{39}\) Industrial cooperation is an umbrella term that refers to various types of Russian-Western economic activity including coproduction arrangements, technology transfers, joint venturing, and the delivery of complete plants. For background on such activity during recent decades, see, James L. Hecht, ed., Rubles and Dollars : Strategies for Doing Business in the Soviet Union (New York, 1991).

\(^{40}\) Palmieri, n. 33, p. 76.

\(^{41}\) ibid., p. 77.


\(^{43}\) Palmieri, n. 33, p. 47.
Yeltsin, like Gorbachev before him, had passed numerous decrees designed to draw foreign investment into Russia. These decrees included "on the committee for Foreign Investment under the Ministry of Economy and Finance" in December 1991; "on Measures to Develop Free Economic zones in the territory of Russia" in July 1992; and "on establishing the International Agency for insuring foreign Investment in the Russian Federation from Non-Commerical Risks" in February 1992.

There was bipartisan American interest in encouraging market economic reforms but caution was apparent about providing assistance that might simply be consumed rather than contribute to structural reform. As a result, "actual economic assistance by the U.S. was heavily concentrated in two areas: support for American business assistance roles, and support for nuclear disarmament, with a lesser additional expenditure for direct support of development of free enterprises in Russia". The major economic support was channeled through the large multilateral economic and banking institutions and was held back pending evidence of structural economic reform.

Both sides had identified crucial benefits to forging a strong commercial relationship, which encompassed an array of political,

44 For more on these decrees and problems of foreign investment in Russia see, Alexander Z. Astopovich and Leonid M. Grigonev, eds., Foreign Investment in Russia: Problems and Prospects (Moscow, 1993).

45 Garthoff, n. 1, p. 780.
economic, and social objectives. In the early period of the formation of the Independent Russian State, economic support for its reform movement had been a major cornerstone of the Bush’s foreign policy toward Russia. Beyond the obvious economic benefits, Yeltsin’s outreach to the West and the United States, was based on the foreign policy belief that Russia and the West each need to guarantee “a stable world order”, with Russia a member of the “democratic community” with a stake in serving as an “equilibrium force” in Europe and Asia.  

ARMS CONTROL

The far reaching events in the Soviet Union, in the last quarter of 1991 compelled President Bush and others in the administration into rethinking strategic requirements, and seeking “fast track” of “reciprocal action rather than protracted arms control negotiations”. In the post coup period of 1991, president Bush announced “several unilateral steps for redeployment and reduction of American Nuclear Forces and discontinuation of strategic bombers”. The key unilateral actions included the elimination of all remaining United States ground

48 Garthoff, n. 1, p. 490.
force tactical nuclear weapons, the removal from all United States naval ships and submarines, including aircraft carriers, of all nuclear weapons, removal from alert posture of all U.S. strategic bombers and about 600 ICBMs and SLBMs, scheduled for deactivation under the START Treaty; Consolidation of operational Command of all U.S. strategic nuclear forces submarines in one U.S. strategic command and cancellation of programmes for mobile ICBMs and new Short-range bomber attack missiles (SRAMs). 49 Furthermore, the United States President proposed ‘to eliminate all land based ICBMs with multiple warheads (MIRV)’ 50 and invited joint discussions to ensure safe handling and dismantling of the Soviet nuclear weapons. Gorbachev reciprocated by announcing that Soviet Union would destroy “all ground force tactical nuclear weapons” and “remove all naval tactical nuclear weapons from Ships and land based naval aviation’s” 51. Furthermore “the U.S.S.R. would remove from the forces all air defense nuclear warheads to central storage”, and proposed on a reciprocal basis, “removing all air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons to central storage.” 52 Gorbachev also reciprocated the United States

49 ibid., p. 491.


51 At Malta in December 1989 Gorbachev had proposed elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons with naval forces, only to be firmly rebuffed by Bush.

52 Garthoff, n. 1, P. 492.
actions on removal of all strategic bombers from alert, terminating new mobile missile projects and announced that “there would be no increase in the existing 55-24 rail mobile system.” He announced removal of “503 ICBMs from alert, including 134 MIRV missiles”, “92 submarine-launched missiles”, and “reduction of START limited warheads from 6000 to 5000”. Furthermore, he intended negotiations for deeper cut in offensive weapons “beyond START levels.” (see figure 1)

Additionally, Gorbachev was not only “ready to discuss United States proposals on non-nuclear anti-missile systems” but proposed at “creating joint systems to intercept nuclear missile attacks with ground and space based components”. Gorbachev, again did not stop at “talks on nuclear safety” but wanted” controlled cessation of the production of all fissible materials” and declared a “one year unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing”. Finally, in response to Bush’s plans to reduce its armed forces by 500,000 personnel, Gorbachev announced a further reduction of the Soviet-armed forces by 700,000.

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53 ibid.

54 Pravda, 7 October 1991; also see, FBIS-Soviet Union, 7 October 1991, pp. 1-3.
Fig. 1: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND UNILATERAL INITIATIVES

Number of warheads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As of Jan. 1992</td>
<td>8772</td>
<td>9537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-START Treaty</td>
<td>9456</td>
<td>6449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-initiatives</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>4456</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This radical reduction of tactical nuclear weapons on land and at sea by both the countries was made possible in part by “revised technical and strategic considerations”, but mainly due to “the end of the Cold War global and European confrontations”. It was especially timely because it gave “impetus to a Soviet redeployment to Russian centers of thousands of nuclear weapons in outlying republics and thus tried to control the risk of nuclear proliferation as republics of the Soviet union became independent and in some cases “laid claim to former Soviet military forces and weapons”

In the new phase of the U.S.-Russian relations, the political and economic condition in 1992 as a result, was clearly conducive to further progress in nuclear arms control An awareness came about that “traditional approaches to arms control were becoming anachronistic in both style and substance”. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 created Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as the new states with strategic nuclear weapons on their territories. As a result of ‘the Lisbon

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55 Garthoff, n. 1, P. 492 On 1 October when Soviet Foreign Ministry had Recommended to Gorbachev to remove all Soviet-ICBMs deployment outside the Russian Republic, the General Staff had objected.

56 The adversarial days of the Superpowers “competing to wring greater concessions” from each other and utilising “weapons programmes as bargaining was over-Russian arms control agenda moved towards facilitating “greater level of cooperation” in the dismantlement of warheads and disposal of fissile materials rather than on “limiting launchers and the nuclear warheads attributed to them.” Moreover, U.S.-Russian attention became focued on methods to “halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries”.

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protocol' of 23 May 1992, USA, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine became party to the START Treaty and further committed the three non-Russian former Soviet republics to accede to the NPT in the shortest possible time, as non nuclear weapon states.\textsuperscript{57}

**START II Treaty**

The most sweeping nuclear arms reduction Treaty in history was concluded when President George Bush of the United States along with his Russian counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow on 3 January 1993. The START II required "the USA and Russia to eliminate their Multiple Independently Tractable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVed), Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and reduce the number of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3000-3500 each.\textsuperscript{58} by 1 January 2003" or by 2000 if "the USA could finance the elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia"\textsuperscript{59} The START II Treaty also limited the number of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) warheads to 1700-1750 each. The Treaty required the U.S. to reduce its deployed strategic nuclear warheads by more than "70 percent from its September 1990 level" and by almost "60 percent" from the number it had planned to deploy under the START Treaty. The Russians were expected to reduce its strategic


\textsuperscript{58} Dunbar Lockwood, "Nuclear Arms Control", *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, p. 557.

\textsuperscript{59} ibid, for the text of the START Treaty, see Appendix 11A of *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*. 

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forces by approximately “70 percent” from the number the U.S.S.R. deployed in September 1990 and by about “50 percent” from the number which the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) projected Russia would deploy under the START Treaty. 60

Though Russia’s decision to ban ‘MIRVed ICBMs, which made the backbone of Russia’s strategic forces, constituted a significant concession to the USA, the widely held view that the START II Treaty was a U.S. ‘negotiating victory’ had been grossly overstated. 61 Even after the Treaty, Russia retained 3000-3500 strategic warheads, which “was more than sufficient for a robust deterrent.” 62 Furthermore, Russian benefits among others included: “a ceiling on U.S. SLBM warheads 50 percent below” that was required under 1991 START Treaty and “the right to inspect the B-2 ‘stealth bomber’. 63 More importantly, START II Treaty was in Russia’s security interest according to its ‘new strategic thinking’. On a mutual basis the Treaty enhanced “Strategic Stability”, increased “predictability and transparency” . 64

60 Lockwood, n. 58, p. 555.
62 Lockwood, n. 58, p. 559.
64 Lockwood, n. 58, p. 559.
Even then there was widespread consensus that 3000-3500 strategic warheads each was “much more than USA and Russia” needed “to maintain minimum level of deterrence”. In September 1991, the United States National Academy of Sciences had concluded that if other nuclear powers cooperated in the continuing positive trends, then United States and Russia could even reduce their strategic arsenals to 1000-2000 warheads. Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara even argued that 100-200 warheads would be sufficient for deterrence.

The Safety, Security and Dismantlement Talks

As a result, of the domestic instability in the republics of the former Soviet Union in 1991, United States and Russian arms control efforts were focused increasingly on the rapid implementation of measures to consolidate former Soviet nuclear weapons in Russia, to


strengthen Central Control over those weapons, and to improve their physical security and safety.  

In his September 1991 initiatives on tactical nuclear weapons, President Bush had proposed that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. explore "joint technical cooperations on the safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction of nuclear warheads". The American president also called for the enhancement of the "existing arrangements for the physical security and safety of nuclear weapons". In November, the United States Congress passed the 'Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991', which authorized $400 million to facilitate "the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and the destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet Union". A new nuclear arms control forum, the 'Safety, Security and Dismantlement' (SSD) was formed "to help institutionalize continuous co-operation between the United States and the former Soviet authorities on nuclear weapon issues". In 1992, the U.S. began SSD talks on a bilateral basis with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.


70 See, Lockwood, n. 58, p. 566.

71 Ibid.
Conventional Arms Control

Three of the arms control agreements on which negotiations began at the end of the Cold War were signed in 1992. The Vienna Document of 1992 was signed on 9 March, establishing a new set of Confidence and Security-Building Measures, (CSBM), and the multilateral Treaty on 'Open skies' was signed on 24 March. On 10 July, the 29 signatories to the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) signed the concluding Act of the Negotiation on personnel strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE-1A Agreement) limiting military personnel.

Ratification of the CFE Treaty, signed on 20 November 1990, was finally completed on 30 October 1992. In September, the participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened the forum for security cooperation in Vienna to coordinate future negotiation on regional security and harmonize the

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72 See, Appendix 12C in SIPRI yearbook 1993 for the texts of the Vienna Document of 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building measures convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the concluding Document of the Vienna meeting of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe (Vienna Document 1992) and the 1992 Treaty on 'Open Skies'.

rights and obligations of CSCE countries with respect to arms control.  

The CFE Treaty solved many of the old problems that plagued the Cold War relationship on the European continent, but to many critics, it did "nothing to prepare European government to deal with the new post-cold war problems" such as the genocidal aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unrest within and between the former Soviet republics.

Apart from the success on the CFE front, Chemical Weapons were outlawed as a result of the signing of the convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction in Paris on 13 January 1993. The historic agreement imposed "a wide spectrum of inspections to verify the ban", outlawed "any use of these weapons" and imposed "a strict ban on all activities to develop new Chemical Weapons".

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74 See, SIPRI yearbook 1993: world Armaments and Disarmament, Chapter 5.


ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS

The United States had no plan to be “directly involved in the environmental remediation”, but environmental concerns ranked high on the U.S. list of government proposed initiatives for democratic and economic reform in Russia. Paradoxically, the success of the disarmament process, which required dismantlement, deactivation and destruction of nuclear warheads, led to the significance of environmental issues in U.S.-Russia relations. In September 1992, cooperation was enhanced into assistance through the ‘Freedom Support Act’ in which the United States promised some $1.6 billion to the newly Independent States; $38 million of this was to be spent on energy and the environment, of which $7 million was specifically environmentally related. In the summer of 1993, an additional $2.5 billion was designated, with $125 million going to energy and the environment; $75 million was allocated for environmental projects in all the Newly Independent States (NIS).

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78 Webster, n. 77, pp. 126-127.
Reflecting the emphasis on coordinating international environmental cooperation and assistance, the forests of European Russia came under the purview of the European community, whereas the United States and Canada had taken the lead in developing projects for Siberia. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA’s) developed projects with Russia concerning “air pollution control, fugitive methane gas recovery technologies and integrated resources planning in utilities.” 79 An intended outcome of these projects was the stimulation of private investment. To build public awareness and environmental accountability, USAID awarded a contract to the ‘Institute for Soviet American Relations’, formerly known as the ‘Soviet-American Friendships Committee’, to make grants to Russian environmental NGOs. In addition to U.S. government assistance to Russia, private industry also became involved in environmentally related project. The focus in U.S.-Russian environmental relations shifted from cooperation to assistance and from the international scene to Russian internal concerns.

Moreover, at the Rio conference in 1992, Russia obtained recognition as a special status for countries with a transitional economy. In 1993, at the ‘Environment for Europe Conference’ held in Austria, Russia actively participated in the preparation of “The Action Plan for

79 ibid., p.129.
central and Eastern Europe”. The conduct of U.S.-Russian environmental relations in the last years of the Bush presidency made it clear that for a more fruitful outcome, it needed to be “characterized by mutual cooperation, rather than a donor-recipient relations”. Only then would the “Russian environmental professionals and activists take their place as willing partners in global environmental solutions”.

**HUMAN RIGHTS**

The acceleration of reforms in the Soviet Union inevitably led to a better understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union on human rights issue. Gorbachev and his closest assistants had evolved from being communists who tried to improve the existing order and image of their country to being reformers who realized the necessity for deeper reconstruction of the Soviet Union.

The period between 1989-1991 was a time of rapprochement in the U.S.-Soviet stands in the UN Security Council, the Commission on

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80 Webster, n. 77, p. 132.

Human Rights, the Human Rights committee, and on other international agencies. The full-fledged integration of the Soviet Union into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was accelerated, which made this framework more meaningful. In 1989-1990, much of the Soviet national legislations were amended to meet the requirements of the ‘Helsinki Accord’. Three meetings of the CSCE Conference on the ‘Human Dimension’, held between 1989 and 1991 in Paris, Copenhagen, and Moscow, allowed the CSCE to resolve the human rights issues more effectively, especially in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This was the time of mutual understanding and cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the creation of international legal mechanisms in the human rights areas. Russia under Yeltsin, not only continued to build on the strong reformative human rights foundation built by Gorbachev, but he assured the international community that Russia would “adhere to all international obligations” regarding human rights.

U.S.-Russian cooperation in the field of human rights came to depend much on Russia’s ability to solve “the developing contradiction between a declared adherence to western values and an unfavorable social and political climate for individual liberties” as a result of “deep...

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82 For information regarding changes in human rights record of Soviet Union during this period see, Helsinki watch publication of February 1990, Civil society in the USSR. (New York, 1990).

economic, social and psychological crisis". The adherence of the Human rights of the various ethnic minorities in the various former Soviet Republics, enhanced the appreciation of the role of human rights in the Soviet politics. Various steps were taken to safeguard the rights of the Central Asian Russian-speaking minorities which included, various “articles in the bilateral treaties on friendship cooperation signed in 1992-1993; decision to establish a CIS commission on human rights”, steps on adoption of “declaration on human rights in the CIS states”, and substantial progress on “treaties relating to free choice of citizenship, minority rights, and emigration and the status of refugees”. Though Human Rights was no longer a central issue in the conduct of the U.S.-Russian relations, the building of a strong and progressive relationship between them could have easily got derailed had a major human rights controversy come to the forefront. Success in the promotion of human rights helped both the United States and Russia to defend their security and national interests more effectively in the post-Soviet turbulent era.

The new Russia aspired to be, if different, even more pro-western, pro-cooperative and more consistent in its “new thinking” than Gorbachev’s policies had been. This new posture was partly self-
justification for Yeltsin's role in bringing down Gorbachev's reforming Soviet Union, partly manifestation of a real desire to take a new path, and partly emphasized to persuade the west that it should reward Russia with desperately needed economic assistance. However, though there was much debate, some promise, but little delivery of western economic assistance to Russia. The ultra-cooperative, migratating Russian policy toward the west did not yield the economic assistance expected. In the west, the promise of economic assistance was tied to implementation of far reaching Russian economic reform, which the Russian did not believe they could undertake without massive assistance, leading to a circular process in which little was done.

From the Soviet Union being essentially a junior partner in the 'Gulf war' with Iraq and in the sponsoring of the Arab-Israeli peace talks, Russia became a largely ignored non partner in later American-led decisions on possible sanctions against Serbia or the Bosnian Serbs. Some of these things rankled the Yeltsin administration. More importantly, it became the source of strong attacks from various quarters along the Russian political spectrum. As the Bush Presidency came to an end at the beginning of 1993, the "romantic period" in American-Russian relations, gave way to a more balanced synthesis of the globalist new thinking with assertive defense of 'national interests'.

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The "foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation" published in January 1993 gave first priority to the relationship with the countries of the CIS, but among other nations, relations with the U.S. were given highest priority. 'For the foreseeable future, relations with the U.S. will retain a prominent place on the scale of Russia's foreign policy priorities, corresponding to the position and weight of the U.S. in the world affairs". Moreover, "Russia will strive toward the stable development of relations with the United States, with a view toward strategic partnerships, and in future toward alliance".

The United States and Russia, as two world powers were destined by geography, by history, and by their extant and latent potentials, to be engaged in a special relationship with each other. At the end of 1992, when the Bush Presidency came to an end, adversarial decreasings of U.S.-Soviet relationship effectively had disappeared. Gradually, a new type of bilateral relationship had taken shape, based primarily on mutual benefits derived from developing economic cooperation. Although not without pitfalls and false starts, this movement had gained greater momentum and, through mutually reinforcing actions of both the governments, as also the private businesses of both countries, promised to be "self sustaining".

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90 ibid.