CHAPTER II

Immanuel Kant’s Contributions to European Enlightenment: A Critical Exposition
In this chapter, Immanuel Kant’s contributions to European enlightenment shall be expounded. The three kinds of ‘Reason’ – pure reason, practical reason and the judgment shall also be expounded.

It is obviously impossible to do full justice to Kant’s principal critical writings in the course of a single chapter. What is offered in the first two sections of this chapter is the tracing of aspects of Kant’s arguments in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Practical Reason*. Then Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* shall be discussed which deals with the faculty of beauty and sublime.

Kant calls his age an age of criticism. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is Kant’s response to the twin dangers which he argues in the *prefaces* to the first and second editions of the *Critique*. These are the dangers of unfounded dogmatism on the one hand and rampant skepticism on the other. According to Kant, the philosophy of his time offered two equally unacceptable alternatives. The rationalist thinkers such as Leibinz and Wolff made speculative claims about knowledge which could not be sustained. The thinkers of empirical school such as Hume seemed to undermine any claims to knowledge at all. That is why Kant calls his age- The age of criticism. To quote him, “scandalously, the history of reason
brought the queen of sciences into disrepute, and reason itself must therefore, as it were bring itself into question."\(^1\) By the term criticism, he understands the form of philosophy which before affirming weighs and before assuming any thing; inquires into the conditions of knowledge. Going to the same line, Kant gives this name — *Critique of Pure Reason* to his famous work. In his *Critique*, Kant examines 'reason' and carefully separates the different aspects of this faculty. Reason assumes three different forms, according to Kant; Theoretical Reason, Practical Reason and the Judgment.

That is to say, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he discusses how knowledge becomes possible, what are the different features that are involved in knowledge and how far mind can know the world of things. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, he explains what goodness of an action consists in, and what are the different duties of man; and in the *Critique of Judgment*, he shows how we get the idea of the beautiful and the sublime and what their nature is and how we conceive of things as means to ends.

The first *Critique* examines the faculty of knowledge, in the second *Critique*, formulates active faculty and the third *Critique*, develops the faculty of beautiful and teleological fitness.

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Section I

Before discussing Kant’s enlightenment rationality, the very concept of enlightenment would be discussed to show how it is related to rationality.

The European Enlightenment: The Age of Reason

In medieval European thought, the epistemological authority was the word of God as revealed through the teachings of the Roman Church and the nature was seen as creation of God. But towards Renaissance, there was a shift from a view of God as creator of nature to a view of him as expressed in nature. As Geoffrey Hawthorn says, “But as God came to been seen as expressed in (nature) rather than as distinct from and anterior to nature; so the importance of reason grew. God was expressed in nature; nature was accessible through reason; God therefore was accessible through reason. Reason was, perhaps, sufficient.”

In general, it is a cultural concept, a broad designation for a historical period, roughly in the eighteenth century in western society. As in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, it is defined as, “big general term through which we try to build up a mental construct out of very great numbers of facts.... Three clusters of ideas form

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our model of world view of the enlightenment – Reason, Nature, Progress." One can say, the long established claims of reason as means of knowing natural law were strengthened during enlightenment period. Hence, much insistence was given on supplementing the vindicated faculty of reason by experience and experiment. So, Reason triumphed over faith and experience over intuition. Therefore, enlightenment or the age of reason brought about an intellectual revolution that encompassed almost all the western world during 18th century. The famous thinkers associated with enlightenment era were Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and Montesqieu in France; Locke, Hume and Adam Smith in Britain; Goethe, Lessing and Kant in Germany; Jefferson, Franklin and Paine in America accomplished in bringing profound change in the ideas and outlook of their age. These thinkers were strongly convinced that 'reason' was the best instrument of discovering the truth in any sphere of life. So, enlightenment became a philosophical movement, in and around which philosophical schools like rationalism, empiricism and German idealism emerged and defined themselves.

However, there is a lack of sufficiently broad, accurate, comprehensive definition of the early enlightenment because there

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have been complex and quite contradictory views on core issues such as democracy, modernity, secularism, religion and scientific knowledge etc. Without going into details of this, the influence of enlightenment on Kantian philosophy would be discussed here.

**Kant’s Concept of Enlightenment : The Faith in Human Understanding**

Kant’s views on freedom along with its related concepts are generally under influence of the European enlightenment. In other words the basic concepts of Kant’s epistemology and morality are derived from the enlightenment movement. In December 1783, in the brief but seminal work, “Answer to the Question, What is the Enlightenment?”, Kant replies, “Enlightenment is the coming out of the man from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the unwillingness (unvermoger) to serve one’s own understanding without direction from another. *Sapere aude*; Think boldly, take courage, use your own understanding to serve: This is therefore, motto of the Enlightenment.”

In other words enlightenment develops reason to the extent that it becomes autonomous and gets rid of restraints from tradition and authority. In this way Kant defines enlightenment itself as the

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courage to use your own reason and argues for the desirability of freedom of thought as the essential prerequisite of a fully enlightened age. Kant is aware, however, that there are dangers in a blanket encouragement of independence of thought. He argues that a sudden access to freedom may result only in the embracing of a new range of prejudices. As he says, "Thus, a public can only achieve enlightenment slowly. A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism and to rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the ones they replaced, will serve as a leash to control the great unthinking mass." Kant's own philosophy of knowledge prevented him from explaining reason in naturalistic fashion, since all naturalistic explanations, he had argued, presupposed thinking subject. According to Kant, man is independent of god and also independent of nature. The way of enlightenment, according to Kant, is not to seek a mentor or authority in thinking, in feeling or in willing. Kant has placed freedom and maturity at the centre of enlightenment philosophy. He gave emphasis upon man's capacity for moral self-direction, (what Kant calls as autonomy), upon man's independence of God, of society and of nature, his ability to act. As Geoffer says. "Man's intrinsic quality

5 Ibid, p. 36.
as a supremely free agent who, when rid of independence and oppression is clearly able to see by virtue of his reason where his moral duty lies. It lies, ...... in unconditional or categorical imperatives, in directives to action which may be held to apply unconditionally to all men."\(^6\)

The Distinction Between Reason and Understanding

As we have seen, reason is the key point to European enlightenment as well as Kantian philosophy. Kant was so much impressed with the concept of reason, that he gave title of his book as *Critique of Pure Reason*. Before discussing Kant’s views on reason, a clear distinction would be made between reason and understanding as done by Kant himself. As Kant says, “All our knowledge starts with senses, proceeds from thence to understanding and ends with reason beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought.”\(^7\) The distinction manifested in Kant’s philosophy between ‘reason’ ‘understanding’ and sensibility’ constitutes a land-mark in the whole movement of German idealism along with the German enlightenment. As a matter of fact Kant distinguishes ‘reason’ from

understanding. Reason has never an immediate relation to object
given in sensibility. Reason is concerned with the understanding
and its judgments; the understanding through the use of categories
and principles unifies the manifold supplied by the sensibility.
Reason relates itself to sensibility only indirectly through
understanding. As perceptions are unified by understanding with
the categories, so understanding needs higher unity, the unity of
reason in order to form a connected system. This is supplied to it
by the ideas of reason – freedom of will, immortality of soul and
existence of God. These ideas have their use and value as the
guides are ‘regulative’ rather than constitutive. They do not
constitute knowledge but merely regulate it.

With the general exposition of the impact of enlightenment
and reason on Kant’s philosophy, it is adequate here to discuss the
key issues of Kantian philosophy.

The Role of Sensibility in Knowledge: Intuition vs
Understanding

In order to understand Kant’s three types of reason one
should understand the basic principles of his philosophy. He started
his Critique of Pure Reason by the elaboration of difference
between Pure and Practical knowledge. “All our knowledge begins
with experience there can be no doubt. But, though all our
knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows, that all knowledge arises out of experiences”. For it may well be that even "our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our faculty of knowledge (sensible impression serving merely as the occasion) supplies for itself....” It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and is not to be answered at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even all sensuous expressions?

A priori and Posteriori Judgment

‘In the Preface to the First Edition’ Kant claims about such knowledge which is independent of empirical knowledge, and calls it a priori knowledge. According to Kant, “The pure knowledge covers only those elements in knowledge which arise from our nature independently of experience, and these we should be able to know if we know anything, and can know further that they could form the nature of the case never be contradicted or even enlarged by experience, and secondly, because its knowledge, being a priori, must constitute a system such that each part is entailed by the rest and the omission of any part would lead to difficulties in the

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8 Ibid, pp. 41-42.
9 Ibid, p. 42.
Knowledge of this kind is called "a priori," in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is in experience. But according to Kant this expression of a priori is not yet definite enough, adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question about the pure knowledge. He further adds "In what follows, therefore, we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience but knowledge absolutely independent of all experiences. Opposed to it is empirical knowledge, which is knowledge possible only a posteriori, that is through experience."

**Necessity and Universality: The Criteria of a priori Knowledge**

Now question arises what is that criterion by which we may securely distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Kant says that in first place, "if we have a proposition which contains the idea of necessity in its very conception it is a judgment a priori; if, moreover it is not derived from any other proposition... it is absolutely a priori." Kant here gives two criteria of a priori knowledge universality and necessity. He assumes that no

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13 Ibid.
proposition which has these two characteristics can be derived simply from experience (observation, including sense perception and introspection). As Kant himself says, “What we here require is a criterion to distinguish with certainty between pure and empirical knowledge. Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise. First, then, if we have a proposition which is being thought as necessary, it is an a priori judgment; and if, besides, it is not derived from any proposition except one which also has the validity of a necessary judgment, it is an absolutely a priori judgment. Secondly, experience never confers on its judgment true or strict, but only assumed and comparative universality, through induction”.14

The Distinction between Synthetic Analytic Judgment

Kant, further made distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments. Kant thinks analytic judgments are to be useful as clarifying what we already know, though incapable of yielding any new knowledge. He, accordingly, would not exclude them from science or philosophy or deny their title to be judgments, but merely points out that for science we also need synthetic a priori judgments. According to Kant, “Analytic judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection

14 Ibid, pp. 43-44.
of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity; those in which this connection is thought without identity should be entitled synthetic. The former as adding nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely breaking it into those constitute concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly, can also be entitled explicative. The latter, on the other hand, add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it; and they may therefore be entitled ampliative. "If I say, for instance, 'all bodies are extended', this is an analytic judgment. For I do not require to go beyond the concept which I connect with 'body' in order to find extension as bound up with it. To meet with this predicate, I have merely to analyse the concept, that is, to become conscious to myself of the manifold which I always think in that concept. The judgment is therefore analytic. But when I say, 'All bodies are heavy', the predicate is something quite different from anything that I think in the mere concept of body in general; an addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment."\textsuperscript{15} And said that "Analytical
judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity...”

Knowledge is *synthetic a priori*: The Pure Knowledge

With this general exposition of different kinds of judgments one can proceed to Kant’s epistemology. Kant begins by saying, "Sensibility is the capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects". Thus “sensibility, takes place when an object affects our senses. And it is sensibility that gives rise to intuitions, to which all thought as a means is directed”. The term *Anschauung* which occurs in vast number of passages in the *Critique* is usually translated as *intuition* but it has no connection with the sense in which this word is most commonly employed in English. For Kant, human thought can be related to an object only through intuition which is possible only in so far as an object affects human being and thus produces sensibility. Kant holds that intuitions, which are yielded by sensibility can be regarded as sensible intuitions and “there must be a form in which they can be posited and ordered”. The form in which a manifold of sensible intuition is posited and

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16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid, p.66
ordered... must be found in the mind *a priori.*" But the form itself cannot be derived from the sensible intuition, and must, therefore, be *a priori.* Kant says "... there are two forms of sensible intuitions, serving as principle of *a priori* knowledge, namely, space and time".

**The Critique of Sensibility: The Transcendental Aesthetic**

Thus, for Kant, space and time are forms of sensible intuition in which the manifold of sensible intuition can be posited and ordered. Hence, space and time cannot be derived from sensible intuitions and must be regarded as *a priori.* Therefore, in the "Transcendental Aesthetic," Kant tries to show that space and time are *a priori* and that all the manifold of sensible intuitions can be posited and ordered in form of space and time.

In the "Transcendental Aesthetic," Kant discusses space and time under two heads — metaphysical exposition and transcendental exposition.

In the metaphysical exposition he tries to show that space and time are *a priori* and they can not be derived from sensible intuitions. One thing should be mentioned here that the term 'Aesthetic' must be understood in its etymological sense as derived

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
from the Greek word which means sense perception. It has nothing
to do with the theory of beauty but should rather be understood as
'thesis of perception'. As Kant says "The science of all principles
of a priori sensibility I call Transcendental Aesthetic".22

In the Transcendental Exposition he states that though space
and time cannot be derived from sensible intuitions, yet every
manifold of sensible intuition has to be received by the mind in the
form of space and time. The connection and difference between
metaphysical and transcendental expositions consist in the fact that
while the former states that space and time are a priori and are not
derived from sensible intuition, the latter states that though space
and time are not derived from sensible intuition yet sensible
intuitions have to be received in the form of space and time.

In the metaphysical exposition of space and time he says that
they are the presuppositions of representation of any object and
they must be regarded as the condition for the possibility of any
representation. "By exposition I mean the clear, though not
necessarily exhaustive, representation of that which belongs to a
concept: the exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which
exhibits the concept as given a priori".23 According to Kant, we can

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22 Ibid. p. 66.
23 Ibid.
conceive of only one space and time and different representations are only parts of the one space and time which are infinite and unlimited.

Now Kant's position on space and time would be analysed in the context of Newton, Locke and Leibniz in order to have better understanding. Kant's position in the metaphysical exposition of space and time is in certain respects similar and in certain respects dissimilar to Newton's views on them. Kant agrees with Newton who maintains that space and time are independent from material things and events while material things and events for their existence depend on them. C.D. Broad, explaining Newton's position, says, "the first and fundamental point is that space is logically prior to matter, time is logically prior to events and processes".24 There could not have been matter unless there had been space for it to occupy and to rest or move in and time for it to endure through. There could not have been events as processes unless there had been time which they have their dates and durations. But there would have been space... even if there had never been any matter; and there would have been time... even if there had never been any events or processes."25


25 Ibid.
This view of Newton can be related with that of Kant who maintains in the same way that sensible intuition can represent an object only if space and time must be presupposed. For Kant, it is possible to conceive space and time without any representation of an object, but it is impossible to have representation of object without space and time. Therefore, for Kant as well as for Newton, space and time are prior to any object or any event. Further, according to Newton, "Strictly space is indivisible. One can indeed talk of parts of space, i.e. different regions actually or in imagination marked out of entertaining certain material object or by being traced in pencil or ink. But parts of space are in principle inseparable."\textsuperscript{26} Newton states that we can talk of one "infinite"\textsuperscript{27} space and "the same is true of time; it had no beginning and will have no end."\textsuperscript{28} Newton, thus maintains that there are absolute space and absolute time, which are, "... independent of us, that even if there were no perceivers, there would still be space and time."\textsuperscript{29}

Kant differs from Newton's concept of absolute space and time, independent of perceivers and maintains that space and time

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, p. 159.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid, p. 160.
are in no sense independent of perceivers and, "...if the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all relations of objects in space and time, themselves would vanish".\(^{30}\) Kant in this way holds that space and time are "in us" forms of our sensible intuitions.

For Locke, the material substance has the primary qualities such as solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest and number. Out of these primary qualities only extension can give rise to the "idea of space".\(^{31}\) He holds that everybody has extension and therefore it occupies space. Locke says, "...there is no necessary connection between space and solidity, since we can conceive the one without the other and it is possible to form an idea of extension without solidity."\(^{32}\) The idea of space without bodies is regarded by Locke as vacuum: "Vacuum .... Signified space without body, whose very existence no one can deny to be possible."\(^{33}\) Through his concept of a vacuum Locke tries to justify Newton's concept of absolute space. Just as for Newton, it is possible to conceive space without any object; similarly for Locke it is possible to conceive a vacuum.

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\(^{32}\) Ibid, p. 88.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.
without bodies. Both these concepts are independent of the perceiver.

Locke accepts Newton's concept of absolute space and time and justifies it through his concept of vacuum on the basis that "it is evident that the space that was filled by the parts of the annihilited body will still remain and be space without body".\(^{34}\)

Kant differs from Newton and Locke. His concept of space is the form which we project upon the objects and is dependent on the perceiver. Another difference is that for Kant space is \textit{a priori}, but for Locke, it is derived from experiences.

So, far as the concept of time is concerned, Locke maintains that there must be eternity in which the succession and duration can be conceived. He says, "it is evident, to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession and the distance between any parts of that

succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call duration.”

Thus the ideas of succession and duration are derived from reflection on the succession and duration of a train of ideas, which are constantly succeeding one another. Locke holds that we can have “no perception of duration”, but we can have reflection on the ideas which have some duration and the same is true of succession. And since all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection, they can be regarded as the original source of ideas of succession and duration and “.... We shall find that the idea of eternity itself is derived from the same common original with the rest of our ideas.” Locke maintains that we have the idea of sudden eternal, being, i.e. God and reflection on this idea furnishes us with the idea of eternity.

But Kant differs from both Newton and Locke. On one hand, he rejects Newton’s concept of absolute space and time as independent of the human mind; on the other hand, he differs from Locke who derives the concept of eternity from the reflection on the idea of an eternal being i.e. God. Kant holds that the concept of time is dependent on the human mind and applicable to the

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36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
representation of co-existence and succession of an object in so far as it can be given in sensible intuition.

But Leibniz opposed Newton's concept of absolute space and absolute time. The ultimate reality for him is the individual substance known as monads which "... is nothing but a simple substance which enters into compounds, simple, that is to say, without parts." These monads are regarded by Leibniz as "... the true atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things." For example human body is a collection of monads, that is to say, it is a compound substance. Leibniz maintains that there are infinite substances independent of one another. Thus, ontologically he is a pluralist. At the same time, he holds that every substance is created by God and is dependent on God. Therefore Leibniz is an objective idealist. He defines space and time as "... are not individual substances" by reference to the actual existence and change of monads, "... space is nothing but an arrangement of bodies, and time is nothing but an order of changes." Leibniz holds that space and time have no independent existence outside the existence and change of monads became, "Space and time are nothing but the

38 Leibniz, Philosophical Writings, trans., Mang Morris (New York: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1961) p. 3.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid, Intro., p. xxii.
order of real existences."\(^{41}\) Therefore, he is opposed to Newton’s concept that space and time can be conceived without objects and events.

But Kant’s view is different from that of Leibniz because his concept of space and time are possible even if there are no representations of objects and events. Thus, he differs from Leibniz’s concept that “space and time cannot exist outside the existence and change of monads”.\(^{42}\)

Space and time as conceived in the theory of relativity propounded by Einstein “....is a plenum in the sense that it, is the ubiquitous metrical field and such it is obviously a continuum. At the same time, it is a system of relations between continuous events is nothing at all apart from them”.\(^{43}\) His theory of relativity is based on the refutation of Newton’s views of absolute space and time. He rejects Newton’s view that space and time can have independent existence apart from their relations with material things and events. By rejecting Newton’s concept, he also rejects Kant’s concept that the representation of things presuppose space and time though they can be conceived without any representations of things.

\(^{41}\) Ibid, p. xxiii.


The Critique of Understanding: The Transcendental Analytic

It can be concluded that according to Kant, when the manifold of sensible intuitions are synthesized in the form of space and time, then they are brought to the faculty of understanding, which by virtue of its categories, determines the manifold of sensible intuitions into categories of unity, reality, cause, effect etc. For Kant, the sensible intuitions, synthesized in form of space and time, become the objects of knowledge. These intuitions are regarded by Kant as blind without categories. Blindness of sensible intuitions means their meaninglessness. In order to give them meaning, they have to be determined by the categories.

What, then, is the origin and role of categories in Kant’s epistemology? They are at the very centre of his analysis. They are the transcendental conditions through which understanding seeks to satisfy its thrust to systematic unity. The categories are not inductive generalizations but deduced from the concepts of the ‘logical employment of understanding’. For Kant, our knowledge is synthetic a priori in which the a priori aspects, i.e. the forms, can not exist independent of the human mind but they can exist independent of the synthetic aspects which constitute the content. On this basis, Kant draws a distinction between form and content. Kant’s categories "are to be found in it some modes of pure
sensibility, and an empirical concept, none of which has any place in a table of concepts that trace their origin to the understanding”. For Kant “categories are the original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself a priori”. Knowledge of an object, according to Kant, is possible only through the categories. Categories provide only form and content, given by sensible intuitions, “for ...thoughts without contents are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind”. In order to give them meaning, they have to be determined by the categories. Thus “our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of mind; the first is the capacity of receiving the representations, the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations”.

Kant divides all kinds of judgments into four main heads – Quality, Quantity, Relation and Modality. He deals with them separately and does not show any interrelation. Each head contains three sub-divisions which are inter-related. Under Quantity, the judgments are universal, particular and singular. And, he deduces the concepts of unity, plurality and totality from the judgments which are universal, particular and singular respectively. Under

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid, p. 93.
Quality, the judgment is either affirmative or negative or infinite, and from it Kant deduces the concept of reality, negation and limitation.

The question may be raised how categories are interrelated. They can be regarded as interrelated because they are applicable to the sensible intuitions only by the ‘transcendental schema’ which is maintained by Kant as homogeneous, on one hand with the categories and on the other hand with the sensible intuition.

**Aristotle’s View on Categories:**

One important thing should be mentioned here that Aristotle (384-322 BC) was the first to use the term ‘categories’ in philosophy. He maintains that the categories are fundamental concepts of thought and at the same time they are basic features of objective reality. Hence, it is impossible to think of anything as real and existent except as subsumed under one or more of the categories. He enumerates ten such categories which are as follows - “substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity.”

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But Kant is opposed to Aristotle’s views on categories. Criticising Aristotelian categories, he says, "he merely picked them up as they came in his way."\textsuperscript{49}

The difference between Kant and Aristotle regarding the categories arise out of their fundamental philosophical positions. Whereas for Aristotle, an object is the amalgamation of form and content, and is independent of human mind, for Kant, an object is \textit{synthetic a priori} in which \textit{a priori} aspects, i.e. the forms, cannot exist independent of human mind but they can exist independent of the synthetic aspects which constitute the content. On this basis, Kant draws a distinction between form and content and this leads to his differences with Aristotle’s categories.

\textbf{Above all, human cognition as \textit{synthetic a priori} is possible through the transcendental unity of apperception which perceives all things and events in the form of space and time, and comprehends them under the categories of quantity, quality, substantiality, causality, reciprocity, etc. The transcendental unity of apperception provides the highest unity to the sensible intuition through the categories of understanding. It is the ultimate subject of knowledge and it provides universality and necessity to the objects of knowledge and thus gives the knowledge of}

phenomenon. The unity of apperception depends on the material provided by the thing-in-itself which acts on our senses. Thus, there is no relationship between epistemology and the thing-in-itself in Kant. As the thing-in-itself transcends the possibility of knowledge because it can never be comprehended in sensible intuition. "... Behind the appearance we must admit and assume something else which is not an appearance, namely, thing-in-itself although, since we can never be acquainted with these, but only with the way in which they affect us, we must resign ourselves to the fact that we can never get any nearer to them and can never know what they are in themselves."\(^{50}\)

The Distinction between Noumena and Phenomena

Now it is necessary to clarify and examine the relations as well as differences among noumena, thing-in-itself and phenomenon which are the basis of Kant's philosophy. The totality of these three concepts constitute the sphere of his ontology.

Kant conceives two completely distinct ontological concepts, with no mediating transitions – the concept of noumenon and the concept of phenomenon. The former constitutes the realm of the spiritual – the basis of Kantian morality and it is free from the

applicability of the categories like quantity, quality, cause-effect, etc. The latter is the sphere of actual and possible scientific knowledge wherein the categories have their applicability in mind. The distinction between noumena and phenomena is based upon Kant’s thesis that scientific knowledge has its jurisdiction within the world of phenomenon and that there is a realm of spiritual wherein science cannot penetrate. He limits the sphere of scientific knowledge to phenomena in order “to leave room for faith”. The sphere of faith, where scientific knowledge cannot penetrate, is regarded by him as the sphere of noumena. In the context of noumena as opposed to phenomena, Kant writes:

“Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories, are called phenomena. But if I postulate things which are mere objects of understanding and which, nevertheless, can be given as such to an intuition... such things would be entitled noumena”. According to him, an object is “...given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions...” The intuitions, which are yielded by sensibility, are regarded by Kant as sensible intuitions. “The manifolds of sensible intuitions, in so far as they are not determined by the categories of

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understanding, are the appearances." But when they are determined in accordance with the unity of the categories, they become phenomena. Thus human cognition is confined to the sphere of phenomena; that is to say, it is confined to the extent in so far as an object can be given in sensible intuition and is determined by the unity of the categories.

Kant defines noumena in two senses, namely, negative and positive. In the negative sense, it means "a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it". In the positive sense, it is "an object of nonsensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual...". But this intellectual intuition "is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility". Therefore, man can never comprehend the noumena because the intellectual intuition which comprehends noumena is of a special kind which he can never possess. The concept of intellectual intuition is based on Kant's assumption that, "we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the

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54 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
sole possible kind of intuition".\textsuperscript{58} Therefore, there must be an intellectual intuition in which noumena can be given.

\textbf{The Ideas of Reason: The sphere of Unconditioned}

The concept of noumena being unknown and unknowable are regarded by Kant as ideas of reason which are transcendent. He postulates the idea of reason because he holds that there must be a sphere of the unconditioned. It is in this sense that the ideas of reason, which are transcendent, differ from the categories of understanding which are transcendental. Ideas of reason have no applicability to the phenomena; whereas no knowledge of phenomenon is possible without the application of the categories of understanding. Kant holds that in the phenomenal world, everything is conditioned, but reason is not satisfied with what is merely conditioned and therefore seeks to get the concept of unconditioned. According to him, the concept of unconditioned can never exist in the phenomenal world because whatever exists here is always conditioned. Therefore, he regards the unconditioned as an "idea"; and since the unconditioned is a demand of reason, so it can be regarded as an idea of reason. In his analysis there are three ideas of reason, namely, immortality of the soul, freedom of will and existence of God. Therefore, the concept of noumena

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, p. 271.
constitutes the idealist aspect of his ontology and remains unknown and unknowable. But the concept of phenomenon constitutes the sphere of actual and possible scientific knowledge. The phenomenon and noumena are two different aspects of Kant’s ontology.

Further, in Kant’s analysis, the concept of noumena and the concept of thing-in-itself are also two different ontological concepts. He assumes the existence of thing-in-itself on the basis that when appearances are given through the manifold of sensible intuitions then there must exit something as the ground of appearances. Kant, therefore, says, “...things in themselves must lie behind the appearances as their ground”.

Thus, things in themselves exist as the ground of appearances, they are something which affect our senses and are the cause of appearances. But they can never be given in a manifold of sensible intuitions and the categories of understanding cannot be applied to them. Therefore, they remain unknown and unknowable. Thus, we can know things only in so far as they are given to us in manifold of sensible intuitions and for that matter in appearances, and are determined by the categories. As Kant says, “....appearances are only representations of things which are

unknown as regards what they may be in-themselves". The importance of the phenomena and noumena distinction lies in the way in which it testifies to the dependence of critique in both its limitation and transcendence. The thing-in-itself confirms both the power and the weakness of the pure reason. Reason’s power can be seen in the way in which appearance is regulated by the understanding. Reason’s weakness can be seen in the way in which the thing-in-itself remains forever beyond the reach of the cognition, we cannot know whether it exists or not.

In the context of theoretical reason, after the deduction of categories and the examination of the principles of judgment appears to complete the task of the critique. Having concluded his survey of the principles of judgment, Kant’s claims that the ‘land of truth’ has been fully explored and the entitlements of pure reason have been established. The critique, however, does not come to an end with the confirmation of its realm of operation in the cognition of phenomenon. Instead, reasons continues to push beyond the ground principles of theoretical reason and enter into realm of practical reason.

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Section - II

Discussion on Kant’s Views on Morality: Critique of Practical Reason

At the end of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant poses three questions to which critical philosophy must provide the answers: What can ‘I know? What ought I to do? What can I hope for?’ (A: 805; B: 833). Although the Critique of Pure Reason is clearly directed towards answering one of these questions by introduction of ideals and ideas of reason. The ideas of God, freedom and immorality are the goals towards which theoretical reason is oriented. The true significance of these ideals, Kant argues, is not theoretical but practical. Practical in the sense that reason here is doing more than establishing what can be known about the world, it is seeking to influence the world directly. He says,

“Laws of this latter type, pure practical laws, whose end is given through reason completely a priori and which are prescribed to us not in an empirically conditioned but in a absolute manner, would be products of pure reason. Such are the moral laws; and these alone, therefore, belong to the practical employment of reason, and allow for a canon.”61

In the shift to practical reason Critique moves from the question of how cognitive synthetic a priori judgments are possible to the question of the possibility of the moral law in the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant echoes the distinction introduced in the realm of theoretical reason between divine intellection and limited human cognition.

After a discussion on Kant’s pure reason – the possibility, validity and limits of synthetic a priori knowledge, we shall come to his Practical Reason. Now maxims of morality in light of freedom of will would be discussed for a clear picture of Kant’s views on morality. For this it is important to discuss the third antinomy of pure reason which is expounded by Kant under Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason.

The Antinomies and the Transcendental Dialectic: The Logical Illusion

Antinomies as such constitute an important place in the composition of the Critique of Pure Reason. The significance of the antinomies is that they raise such questions which according to Kant, human reason can neither comprehend, nor reject. Reason cannot comprehend them because it cannot present them in reality, it cannot reject them because they arise out of reason itself. Therefore, in the antinomies, Kant attempts to criticise the concept
of reason itself in order to resolve certain contradictions which create a conflict of reason with itself. He claims to curb and curtail the scope of reason and through such an attempt, he says that it been aroused from his dogmatic slumber.

An antinomy, according to Kant, is a kind of dialectical opposition. By dialectic, he means the “logic of illusion.” Kant maintains that there are three kinds of illusion, namely, logical, empirical and transcendental. An illusion “arises entirely from lack of attention to the logical rule. As soon as attention is brought to bear on the case that is before us, the illusion completely disappears.” According to Kant empirical and transcendental illusions are unavoidable even if their illusory nature has been exposed. In other words, they have a tendency to persist even when they are clearly shown to be illusory. Kant maintains that there are four antinomies of pure reason. In each antinomy there is a thesis, with supporting argument, and an antithesis, with supporting argument. Thus by combining thesis and antithesis we obtain an antinomy. Kant states that both the thesis and antithesis of the antinomies in isolation are false because they are “refusing to grant a fair hearing to the argument for the counter position”.

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63 Ibid.
64 Ibid, p. 385.
Therefore, Kant holds that we must regard both the thesis and the antithesis as equally important, so that we may not be alleged of dogmatically asserting one position and denying the counter position.

**Thesis vs. Anti Thesis: The Transcendental Illusion**

According to Kant, the thesis and the antithesis arise out of the specific nature of reason and sensibility. The thesis studies something which is sensible. The supersensible should not be confused with the sensible because the mode of knowing sensible reality is different from the way in which the supersensible is revealed. Kant regards the unity between thesis and antithesis as cosmological idea, because it is a unity of the world as a whole. Since this unity is given by reason through the concepts of understanding, therefore, he arranges them in accordance with the table of categories.

Kant states that the idea of the world as a whole, that is to say, the cosmological idea of the category of quantity is the absolute totality which can be applied to time and space. "Any given condition can be regarded only as preceded or conditioned by past time,"\(^{65}\) that has gone before it when the present condition is given, all the past conditions are "thought as being given in its

\(^{65}\) Ibid, p. 383.
The past time constitutes a series of conditions leading to the present and can, therefore, yield an idea of the absolute totality of the conditions. But space, according to Kant, "does not in itself constitute a series". Nevertheless, every condition can only be regarded as limited in space and therefore space also applies to the series of conditions. In this way time and space apply to absolute totality of the conditions. Kant calls it as "absolute completeness of the composition of the given whole of all appearances."  

The cosmological idea of the category of quality is regarded by Kant as "reality of space". The reality in space is always conditioned and its "internal conditions are its parts, the parts of its parts, its remote conditions". Every conditioned reality has to be divided to the extent that "the reality of matter vanishes either into nothing or into what is no longer matter – namely the simple". Thus, in the division of conditions, there is "an advance to the unconditioned". Kant calls it "absolute completeness in the

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67 Ibid.
68 Ibid, p. 396.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
division of a given whole in the (field of ) appearances." The cosmological idea of the category of relations is regarded by Kant as causality. Causality, "presents a series of causes of a given effect such that we can proceed to ascent from the latter as the conditioned to the former as conditions, and so to answer the question of reason." The category of causality can be applied to a given condition or effect in order to find out a series of causes leading to that effect. In this way, the category of causality can be applied to an effect in order to find out a series of causes leading to that effect. In this way, the category to find out the absolute totality of the effects, Kant calls it an "absolute completeness in the origination of an appearances".

The cosmological idea of the category of modality is regarded by Kant as an accident. Every "accident in existence must always be regarded as conditioned, and as pointing in conformity with rule of the understanding to a condition under which it is necessary, and this later in turn to a higher condition, until reason finally attains unconditioned necessity in the totality of series".

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73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
Kant calls it as "Absolute completeness as regards dependence of existence of alterable in the (field) of appearance". 77

Kant, thus, maintains that the division of categories lead to four cosmological ideas demanding absolute totality concerning composition, division, origination of appearances and dependences. All these ideas are related to appearances, not to things – in themselves. The four cosmological ideas are the four antinomies of pure reason. In the context of the thesis and the antithesis of the First Antinomy, it has to be noted that the world stands for anything which can be given in space and time. Both thesis and antithesis assume space and time as infinite. The thesis reads, "The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards spaces". 78

Kant does not claim that the thesis can be established consistently. On the contrary, he states the opposite in the anti-thesis, as – "The world has no beginning in time and no limits in space". 79

It is precisely in this that Kant finds the antinomy, the indissoluble contradiction that the thesis is just as demonstrable as the antithesis. Therefore, Kant states that the conflict between thesis and antithesis is not real. It is the dialectical opposition in

77 Ibid.
78 Ibid. p. 396.
79 Ibid.
which both the alternatives are illusory. The world as a whole, for Kant, is only an idea and it can never be presented in reality.

The Second Antinomy: Both Thesis –Antithesis unreal

In the case of the second antinomy, Kant states that both the alternatives, i.e., thesis and antithesis, are not real. In the second antinomy both thesis and antithesis assume space as “infinitely divisible.”80 The thesis reads, “every composite substance in it is made up of simple or what is composed of simple”.81 On that basis, it is maintained that every composite substance in the world is made up of the simple. But, the antithesis maintains, “no composite things in the world is made up of simple parts and there nowhere exists in the world anything simple.”82

For Kant, it is only a dialectical opposition in which both the alternatives are illusory. However, in the case of third antinomy, Kant does not reject either of the alternatives. On the contrary, both can be regarded as true. The thesis is true because it applies to thing-in-itself and the antithesis is true because it applies to appearances. Since Kant maintains that no knowledge is possible without a thing given in appearance and no appearance is possible without thing-in-itself, therefore both the appearances and the

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82 Ibid.
thing-in-itself are true. On this basis Kant uses causality, in the third antinomy in two different aspects; one of which supports the thesis and the other supports the antithesis. In the thesis, there is a free causality which is not caused by anything else while everything is caused by it. The thesis reads, “Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that is also another causality, that of freedom.” It is argued that in the field of appearances, every event is caused by a preceding event, and that in turn by another preceding event, and so on. But there must be a first cause in order to regard a beginning of the events. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a free causality which is not caused by anything else. Kant states that it is the thing-in-itself which is not caused by anything else while everything is caused by it. But in the antithesis Kant states, “there is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.” Here it is argued that everything in nature is determined by the law of cause-effect relationship. In the sensible world, whatever happens, has a cause which precedes it in time and cause itself happens in time, consequently it requires cause preceding it. Therefore, there is an

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83 Ibid, p. 409.
84 Ibid.
endless causal chain that cannot be completed and it is impossible to conceive a free causality. On this basis, Kant attempts to show that there is no freedom in the sensible world. Kant, in this way, maintains that in the third antinomy both thesis and antithesis are true because the former applies to thing-in-itself and latter to the appearances. But the free causality can never be presented in reality. Therefore, Kant regards it only as an idea.

Nevertheless, Kant's significant contribution lies in his attempt to show certain antinomies involved in human reason itself. These give rise to an era of dialectical thinking. Kant states that antinomies arise due to the search for the unconditioned which can never be given in reality. Therefore, he regards it an idea of reason. Kant maintains that there are three ideas of reason, namely, immortality of soul, freedom of will and existence of God. They are unconditioned, transcendent and nominal for Kant. They can never be given in reality. But they constitute the postulates of moral laws for Kant.

Kant's view on morality can only be discussed in the light of his epistemology and ontology. As discussed above, he makes a fundamental distinction between phenomena and noumena. The sphere of epistemology, according to Kant, is confined to the sphere of phenomenon. But the sphere of noumena transcends the
validity of scientific knowledge. If constitutes the realm of spiritual and hence manifests the aspects of idealism in Kant’s philosophy. He conceives the basis of moral laws in the sphere of noumena in which the categories of scientific cognition have no applicability. On this basis, Kant draws an unbridgeable gulf between epistemology and morality, between the is and the ought.

Is and ought Dichotomy in Kantian and Philosophy

For Kant, the source of the moral laws lies in the noumenal world, whereas moral actions are performed in the phenomenal world. The sphere of noumena is regarded as the sphere of three ideas of reason — immortality of the soul, freedom of the will and existence of God. The question of the knowledge of these ideas of reason does not arise. But they are regarded as postulates of morality by Kant. Kant derives moral laws from the realm of the noumena. He makes fundamental distinction between phenomenal world and noumenal world. In former, our knowledge is conferred to the laws. It provides the knowledge of what is not at all a thing as it is in itself, but a thing as the unity of apperception knows it through the forms of intuition and categories of understanding and thus gives the knowledge of “what is, what has been, or what will be”.\[^{63}\] In the phenomenal world, every effect is possible only in

\[^{63}\] Ibid, p. 473.
conformity of its cause. And, since all events obey immutable laws, so actions performed on the basis of the knowledge of phenomenal world are regarded by Kant as necessary actions.

On this basis, Kant says that it is logically impossible to conceive freedom in the phenomenal world. But morality presupposes freedom, because a person can be held responsible for his moral actions, if he can do something about the way his decisions go. Therefore man's action presupposes concept of freedom. Kant states that when one realises what has happened ought not to have happened and what has not happened, ought to have happened, then one has to transcend the phenomenal world because the concept of ought can not be derived from the phenomenal world. This is expressed by Kant in following words: "Ought expresses a kind of necessity and of connection which is found nowhere else in the whole of nature.... We can not say that anything in nature ought to be other than what in all these time-relations it actually is. When we have the course of nature alone in view, 'ought' has no meaning whatsoever".86 Again he says, "This ought expresses a possible action on the ground which cannot be

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anything but mere concepts; where as in the case of mere natural action the ground must always be an appearance\(^87\).

Kant, thus, draws a fundamental distinction between the *is* and the *ought*. It constitutes a landmark in the history of the development of moral philosophy. As a matter of fact Kant has borrowed this distinction from David Hume.

Before moving over the basic issues of morality, it would be worthwhile to draw Kant’s position on is / ought dichotomy with special reference to Hume. It may therefore, be pointed out that ought statements come out of the contradictions in the sphere of ‘what is’, ‘what has been’, or ‘what will be’. Ought has reference to an ‘idea’ and the same ‘idea’ becomes actual when man moulds the objective reality in accordance with his requirements. This is the process that both ‘ought’ and ‘is’ lose their independent state of existence and participate with each-other. With this they help in the growth of each other.

Kant’s distinction between is and ought gives an insight into the very source of difference between a factual proposition or a normative proposition. In other words, between a fact of conduct and a standard of conduct. A normative proposition has a reference to the consideration of nature of an ideal or a standard on the basis

\(^{87}\) Ibid, p. 473.
of which a conduct is pronounced to be right or wrong, good or evil. If we take first maxim of Kant’s categorical imperative, and say ‘one ought to act on that maxim through which one can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’. In what does this proposition differ from the one, like – ‘One does act on that maxim through which one can at the same time will that it should become universal law.’ In his formulation of the notion of ought, Kant not only articulates it in terms of the former example, but also he distinguishes it from the latter in most original manner. ‘One ought to act on that maxim, does not mean the same as ‘one does act on that maxim’. Thus, there emerges an unbridgeable gulf between ought and is. The ought statements in their formulation do not require any help from synthetic a priori judgments.

This is/ought gap has a reference to Hume, who for the first time discussed this problem, as he say in his Treatise.

“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that author proceeds for sometime in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of proposition is, and is not. I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."

Hume argues that the premise contains a 'is' proposition. While the conclusion contains an 'ought' proposition, which is a new term not already contained in the premises. Such an argument is defective. Here is a logical gap between the premise and the conclusion.

The distinction between is and ought developed by Hume has its basis in his ontology and epistemology. Existence of self, material substance and states of values are problematic. Since one is not confronted directly by them in impressions, one may know them via less problematic modes of existence like behaviour, impressions, feelings of pleasure or pain and so on. And all our feelings of pleasure or pain are mutually separate just like, "all our perceptions are different from each other, and from everything else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable. and may exist

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separately, and have no need of anything else to support their existence.”

In the first two sections of Book – III of the Treatise, Hume argues that the basis of morality is sense perception, and reason can help us to justify the claims of sensibility and reason is only the maid servant of sensibility. Hume’s basic contention is that morality is practical, that ‘morals’ have an influence on the actions and affections, and there is nothing that is made up of demonstrative reasoning, causal knowledge and factual information of ordinary sorts can by itself influence the action without the help of some passion or desire.

However desire cannot be intrinsically rational, they are at best only natural. In this context, we have to recall the distinction between what is problematic and what is not problematic. What is so significant behind the problematic issues like the existence of self as the ground of ought statement and non-problematic or less problematic issues like feelings of pleasures as the basis of ‘is’ statement in Hume; Hume’s insight into the very source of divergence between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ which finds elaborate analysis in Kant is important. It is important to note that whereas for Hume ‘ought’ statement is synthetic in their expressions, for Kant ought

\[ \text{David Hume, } A \text{ Treatise of Human Nature, Book – I, ed. by D.G.M. Mcnabb, 1984, pp. 179-180.} \]
statement is ‘a priori’ propositions. What is so fundamental with Kant’s ought statement is that they are derived from freedom of will alone which is one of the ideas of reason.

The Moral Laws: In the Realm of Noumena

In Kant’s analysis, the laws of the actions, as they ought to be, can not be derived from the laws of the phenomenal world in which there is no freedom. To posit freedom, he conceives a noumenal world or an intelligible world. In this context Kant states that the phenomenal world cannot determine the goodness or badness of moral actions because the occurrence of the results in the phenomenal world are beyond man’s freedom. Kant says, “The action to which ‘ought’ applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions. These conditions, however, do not play any part in determining the will itself, but only in determining the effect and its consequences in the field of appearances”.90

Thus, according to Kant, moral laws, cannot be derived from the laws of phenomenal world. Man derives moral laws from the noumenal world and then acts in accordance with those laws in the phenomenal world. In so far as he belongs to the noumenal world, he is regarded as a rational being by Kant. Kant defines will as, “a kind of causality (a power of causal action) belonging to living

90 Ibid.
beings so far as they are rational." The power of causal action, which belongs to the will of a rational being, is not the kind of causal action which belongs to the phenomenal world. The causal action which belongs to the will is possible only if it is free, because as, "a rational being, man can never conceive the causality of his own will except under the idea of freedom; for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world (and this is what reason must always attribute to itself)."

This postulation has its basis in the third antinomy of the transcendental dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason, which has been already discussed in detail in the first section of the chapter:

Thesis: "Causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom".

Antithesis: "There is no freedom; everything in the world takes places solely in accordance with the laws of nature".

Kant defines will as a kind of causality and the idea of freedom is a special kind of causality. Laws of freedom are self-
imposed laws. Freedom belongs to the rational will because it is the rational will that is free. Therefore, the laws of freedom and the laws of the rational will are one and the same. And since these laws are self-imposed, they express the autonomy of the will. In this way freedom of will, rational will and autonomy of will, in Kant, are identical concepts. He says, "... a free-will would act under laws, but that these laws could not be imposed on it by something other than itself; for if they were, they would merely be laws of natural necessity. If the laws of freedom can not be other imposed they must be self-imposed. That is to say, freedom would be identical with autonomy...".95

The autonomous will is something supersensible, or the ought statements describe only those objects that are not sensuous in nature, or where sensibility is done in such a way that it necessarily leads to a factual statement. The freedom of will does not claim what one ought to will. All it commands about itself is how one ought to will, what one ought to will. Since freedom and autonomy belong to the rational will and rational will is possible in the noumenal world, so it may be interpreted that in the noumenal world, freedom and autonomy terminate in reason in order to enter into the process of being made real. On this basis it may be said

that Kant’s moral laws are possible in the noumenal world and it is reason which gives laws in accordance with which one ought to act. Thus Kant’s notion of reason becomes the ultimate source of his moral laws. Such laws “cannot be based on sensuous experience”, 96 because sensibility can give rise to only what is contingent and probable. Moral laws must be a priori and derived from reason because reason alone can rise above the particular, the contingent, the individual and it can only provide the universal forms.

A moral law, in order to become a command, “has to set altogether to influence of inclination”, 97 because a law derived from inclination cannot be commanded. Similarly, a moral law cannot be derived from love, because action done out of love for instance (love your neighbour) cannot be commanded, thus, Kant maintains that moral laws can be derived neither from sensibility nor from inclination, but only from reason, so that they can be regarded as a command to all rational beings under all circumstances whatsoever.

The Categorical Imperative: A Universal Command

The command, which lies in the moral laws, is regarded by Kant as a categorical imperatives, “which does not depend on our desire for particular consequences and does not ever prescribe any

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97 Ibid, p. 22.
particular actions, all it imposes on us is law-bidingness for its own sake – ‘the conformity of actions to universal law as such... this law appears to us as a law that we ought to obey for its own sake ....’ A categorical imperative demands an unconditional obedience to the moral laws for their own sake and not for the sake of any others higher end. Otherwise they would became a hypothetical imperatives, by which Kant means, ‘a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one will (or that one may will).’ But a categorical imperative imposes a law-bidingness, that is to say, moral laws ought to be obeyed for their own sake, only then a human action can be regarded as morally good. “A human action is morally good, not because it is done from immediate inclination-still less because it is done from self-interest - but because it is done for the sake of duty.”

Duty for Duty’s Sake: Duty beyond Inclination

The moral worth of an action lies only in obeying the moral laws for their own sake. Kant calls it as, “duty for duty’s sake”. There is not moral worth in actions which are performed either out of the fear of punishment or with a view to gain some advantage.

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98 Ibid. p. 78.
99 Ibid. p. 19.
An action is morally good only if it is done out of the motive of duty. Kant says, "It is the motive of duty, not the motive of inclination, that gives moral worth of an action."\textsuperscript{100} The motive of performing one’s own duty does not depend on the results it produces or attempts to produce. As Kant writes, "an action done from duty has its moral worth, not from the result it attains or seeks to attain but from a formal principle or maxim – the principle of doing one’s own duty."\textsuperscript{101}

Being self-imposed, it is the duty of every rational being to act out of the respect for the moral laws. Kant says, "Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the laws."\textsuperscript{102} Since the moral laws are the results of the rationality of man, therefore an attitude of reverence towards the moral laws is an integral part of Kant’s view on morality.

The moral laws, according to Kant, ought to be obeyed for their own sake. In doing so, they manifest a good will. Kant says, "... good will is manifested in acting for the sake of duty."\textsuperscript{103} Good will lies at the moment of willing a maxim and "it is good through

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, p. 18.
its willing alone that is good in itself".\textsuperscript{104} The goodness of good will, according to Kant, does not depend on the results it produces. Therefore, the concept of moral responsibility of the moral actions does not depend on the results of moral actions. In Kant's view moral responsibility lies in the willing alone, because whereas the consequences are dependent upon the laws of nature in the phenomenal world, willing is due to man's free rational nature. And if the willing of a maxim is good, then it continues to "have its unique goodness even where, by some misfortune, it is unable to produce the results at which it aims".\textsuperscript{105} On this basis he says, "the only thing that is good without qualification or restriction is a good will. That is to say, a good will alone is good in all circumstances and in that sense is an absolute or unconditioned good. We may also describe it as the only thing that is good in itself, good independently of its relation to other thing."\textsuperscript{106}

The goodness of good will, according to Kant, lies in the form of a maxim which has to be law for its own sake. It possesses universality and necessity, and is performed for its own sake. This is what he means by the categorical - imperative and the concept of duty. Thus moral laws are categorical imperatives and he assigns

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid. p. 60.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
to them an unconditional obedience. Kant gives three such maxims and he also interrelates them.

The first maxim: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”.$^{107}$

Every moral action ought to be in conformity with the universal law which “serves the will as its principle....”$^{108}$ Kant illustrates this maxim through the examples of breaking promises and committing suicide. A promise “with the intention of not keeping it”$^{109}$ is not a duty, because the maxim underlying it is a device to extricate oneself from current difficulties. In the case of breaking promise, what determines one’s maxim is one’s rational concern not to do what one could not recommend everyone to do. Keeping promises is at the same time one’s obedience to the maxim of universal law which depends on the impartiality between myself and others. Therefore, Kant states that promise keeping would be a maxim of action which can be followed by every rational being.

Similar is the case with committing suicide. Kant, states that while willing a maxim on the basis of universal law, it has to be

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107 Ibid, p. 84.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
maintained that the willing of this kind is always to be considered also as an absolute end and never simply as a means because, ".... every rational, exist as an end in itself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use of this or that will; he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end".110

The second maxim: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."111

Kant, illustrates this maxim through his previous examples of committing suicide and breaking promises. To commit suicide out of disgust with life cannot be considered as moral, because here man, "is making use of a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable state of affairs till the end of his life."112 Similarly by making false promise, one is making use of another person as a means and is not regarding the person as an end.

110 Ibid, p. 90.
112 Ibid.
On the other hand, an action can be regarded as a duty if every rational being in all his actions regards himself as well as others as an end. To regard every rational being as an end and never as a means is indeed a great contribution of Kant in the history of moral philosophy. The maxim of end in itself is related to the maxim of universal law in the sense that while the latter states that one ought always to act on a maxim which can be willed as a universal law, the former states that the willing of this kind is always to be considered as an absolute end and never simply as a means.

*The third maxim:* "So act as if you were through your maxim a law making member of a kingdom of ends". 113

Kant defines a kingdom as "a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws". 114 Every rational being derives his actions from the maxim of universal law and in all his action, he regards himself and other rational beings always as ends. In doing so, "there arises a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws – that is a kingdom". 115 Through this

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113 Ibid, p. 34.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid, p. 95.
maxim, Kant attempts to bring out complete harmony between the maxim of universal law and the maxim of end-in-itself. The union of rational being as an end and governed by universal laws, is regarded by Kant as a kingdom of ends.

These three maxims of Kant’s moral laws cannot be derived from sensibility, they are \textit{a priori} and derived from reason. And since reason belongs to the rational will, so these maxims are derived from the rational will. Kant say, “.... morality consists in the relations of all actions to the making of laws where by alone a kingdom of ends is possible. This making of laws must be found in every rational being himself and must be able to spring from his will.”\textsuperscript{116} These maxims manifests autonomy of will, because they are self-imposed, every rational being makes these maxims and subjects himself to follow them. The maxim of kingdom of ends, which brings the harmony between the maxim of universal law and the maxim of end-in-itself, is itself made by every rational being. On this basis, Kant regards every rational being both as a member and as a head of the kingdom of ends. Every rational being is a member, “when, although he makes its universal law, he is also himself subject to these laws”.\textsuperscript{117} He belongs to it as its head, “when as the maker of laws he is himself subject to the will of no

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
other". In this way, every rational being is subject to the laws which he himself makes and this is what Kant means by the autonomy of will, which in his analysis is identical with freedom of will. Kant says, "A rational being must always regard himself as making laws in a kingdom of ends which is possible through freedom of will."119

These maxims are in conformity with the concept of duty, only when they are performed for their own sake and not for the sake of any other higher end. These maxims can manifest a good will, only when one asks oneself – whether the willing of one's maxim can be regarded at the same time as a universal law or not? And since these laws are *a priori* they can be derived from reason which itself belongs to rational will. And since these laws are self-imposed, so freedom would become identical with autonomy; and a free will would be a will under moral laws."120 Thus, in Kant's views on morality, freedom of will, rational will, autonomy of will are all identical concepts and they are related to the concepts of good will, duty, categorical imperatives and maxims of morality.

From the above it follows that moral laws can be derived neither from the existence of God nor from the immortality of soul,

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118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
but only from the freedom of will. Without it there is no possibility of any moral law whatsoever. Yet in spite of this Kant states that it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.

Kant assumes the existence of God on the basis that though the only thing that is good without qualification is the good will, yet good will is not the highest good. Moral laws are supposed to "promote the highest good; and it is not merely our privilege but a necessity connected with duty as a requisite to presuppose the possibility of this good. This presupposition is made only under the condition of the existence of God, and this condition inseparably connects this supposition with duty. Therefore, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God."\textsuperscript{121} But moral laws, according to Kant, can promote the highest good only if the will of every rational being is in perfect accord with the moral laws. In his analysis, a rational being can bring his will in complete fitness with the moral laws only if he succeeds in eliminating the base impressions and thus achieves what Kant calls a holy will. This is possible only in a process going on ad infinitum and this endless progress is possible only if the soul is immortal. Therefore, moral laws, require, "...... an infinitely enduring existence and personality

of the same rational being's this is called the immortality of soul." On this basis, Kant regards the immortality of soul as a necessary condition and a postulate of moral laws.

Kant in this way regards immortality of soul and existence of God as the necessary conditions of moral laws. But no moral law is possible without freedom of will. Therefore freedom of will constitutes the most pivotal aspect for the source and substance of Kant's moral laws.

**Section – III**

**The Idea of Beauty and Sublime: The Critique of Judgment**

In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant explicitly addresses problems raised by his exploration of the realms of the understanding and reason in the first two *Critiques*. He does this by focusing on the faculty of judgment as a faculty with its own *a priori* principles, that is to be deduced complementary to the categories of the understanding and the idea of transcendental freedom or the moral law. Judgment in both of the first two *Critiques* is constituted as the problem for which the transcendental critic seeks a solution. The *Critique of Judgment* therefore is introduced as a mediation between the powers of reason and the

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domains of theory and practice which they legislate and govern. As Kant says,

"And yet the family of our higher cognitive powers also includes a mediating link between understanding and reason. This is judgment, about which we have cause to suppose, by analogy, that it too may contain a priori, if not legislation of its own, then at least a principle of its own, perhaps a merely subjective one, by which to search for laws. Even though such a principle would lack a realm of objects as its own domain, it might still have some territory might be of such a character that none but this very principle might hold in it."123

The Distinction Between Determinate and Reflective Judgment

Kant distinguishes between two kinds of judgment, determinate and reflective. The former involves the assumption of particular instances under a general rule. The latter involves judgment of a particular in which the rule is not already given and must be sought. According to Kant, examination of determinate judgment will not yield the principle peculiar to the faculty of judgment, since in such cases judgment is directly dependent on the understanding and the power of theoretical reason. In the case of

reflective judgment, however, judgment does not rely on anything outside itself to provide a principle of judgment but, as it were, legislates for itself. It is therefore the critique of reflective judgment with which the two parts of the *Critique of Judgment* are concerned. The first parts deals with a critique of aesthetic judgment, the second with the critique of teleological judgment. The latter critique investigates the imputation of objective ends to natural processes as an aid in the understanding of nature. As such, according to Kant's introduction to both critiques, it is a branch of the critique of theoretical reason and is not in itself a special power of judgment without reference to concept in the sense in which Kant claims aesthetic judgment is. It is therefore the critique of aesthetic judgment through which Kant aims to elucidate the principle peculiar to the faculty of judgment as such.

**How a priori aesthetic judgment is possible?**

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* the elucidation of the conditions of theoretical judgment depends on the answer to the question of how *synthetic a priori* judgment are possible. In the critique of aesthetic judgment the principle of the faculty of judgment as such can be located through answering the question of how *a priori* aesthetic judgments of taste are possible. Only in the case of such judgments does "the feeling of pleasure and
pleasure operate independently of theoretical and practical interest.\textsuperscript{124} In his critique of aesthetic judgment, Kant examines two kinds of judgment, judgments of the beautiful and the sublime. He begins with the estimation of beauty in an object. The sole determinate of the judgment of beauty in an object is the subjective feeling of pleasure or displeasure in that object, unaccompanied by any interest. At the same time as being completely subjective, the judgment of beauty lays claims to an objective validity, commanding the agreement of all others. The judgment of beauty is universally communicable, yet, Kant makes clear, it can not be objectively grounded, since there is no concept of the understanding under which our intuition of the object is being subsumed. The exposition of the judgment of beauty therefore comes back to its two key elements, the feeling of pleasure and its universal communicability. Kant argues that pleasure does not come directly from the object itself, but from the subjective harmony or accord in the play of the cognitive faculties which attend the representation of the object. Thus, the subjective basis of the judgment is commonly present in all human beings, and in making such a judgment "one is implicitly claiming that it

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, pp. 196-197.
exemplifies a feeling that is available to everyone.” In contrast to his accounts of theoretical and practical judgment, Kant links the subjective basis to the judgment of beauty and sublime. At the same time, he is clear that the judgment of beauty “does not gain its authority from empirical location or interest.”

The a priori necessity of judgment of taste is seen to derive from the conditions of possibility of all judgment and therefore of all experience and knowledge. These conditions are the power of the imagination in its free synthesis of intuitions and of the understanding in its lawful assumption of intuitions under concepts. In the judgment of beauty, what can be neither theoretically cognized nor practically realized, the ‘super-sensible substrate of humanity’, is subjectively felt and generally communicated as a specific kind of pleasure. The autonomy and authority of this kind of judgment, however, remains some what mysterious. It is an authority linked with the supersensible, which is the basis of freedom, and which in some sense underlies the human experiences. It is also an authority tied to a concept of purposiveness, in which empirical presentations are in tune with the free play of cognitive facilities, and in which aesthetic ideas “individually exhibits or symbolizes the highest goals of reason

125 Ibid, pp. 239-240.
126 Ibid, pp. 296-98.
within the imagination." It seems that aesthetic judgment mediates between domains of nature and freedom (understanding and reason) because it invokes the possibility of harmony between both humanity and nature and between humanity and freedom. The possibility is not a directly practical one, however, since the principle peculiar to judgment is purely subjective, it legislates only for itself, unlike understanding and reason. Nevertheless, Kant suggests that the possibility of the judgment of beauty provides us with hope for the bridging between nature and freedom, since in such judgments and in works of art that give rise to such judgments, the gap is experienced aesthetically as closed. The beautiful stands as a symbol of nature, though it cannot be identified with morality itself. The process involved in the estimation of the sublime is different from that involved in the judgment of beauty. Here, rather than a general and happy accord of imagination with understanding there is an assault on the cognitive faculties which are incapable of either representing or knowing the ideas to which certain perceptions of nature give rise. In the estimation of beauty in an object, we are at ease with our limitations, since the object seems almost to adopt itself to powers of judgment. In the judgment of the sublime we are reminded of the

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demand that we exceed those limitations. The universal validity of judgments of the sublime derives from the "imputation of universally present moral feeling, the presence of which is derived from the presumptions required by pure practical reason." Kant does not consider that a separate deduction of the possibility of the aesthetic judgment of the sublime is necessary, since although the judgment of the sublime is grounded in feeling, it has its necessity in reason. In the case of judgments of beauty, however, a deduction is necessary because judgments of beauty cannot be subsumed by either the understanding or reason; they have their own ground. As Kant says, "Now, as far as the formal rules of judging (as such) are concerned, apart from any matter (whether sensation or concept), the power of judgment can be directed only to the subjective conditions for our employment of the power of judgment as such (where it is confined neither to the particular kind of sense involved not to a particular concept of the understanding), and hence can be directed only to that subjective (condition) which we may presuppose in all people (as required for possible cognition as such). It follows that we must be entitled to assume a priori that

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a presentation’s harmony with these conditions of the power of judgment is valid for everyone.”

Is mediation between epistemology and ontology possible?

The outcome of the *Critique of Judgment* is neither that possibility of such judgment is made clear nor that the divisions between the faculties and their domain is successfully mediated. Instead the *Critique of Judgment* confirms the mysterious origins of reason’s authority and the ways in which it is limited both theoretically and practically. What it also confirms, however, is the commitment of *Critique* to overcome its own presuppositions, even if only through the medium of hope in the judgment of the philosopher.

In the case of each of the *Critiques*, theoretical, practical reason and the judgment, the aim is to trace both the limits and the possibilities of the specific faculties in question. The peculiarity of the first *Critiques* lies in the way in which *Critique* necessarily pushes beyond the limits. The argument of the *Critique of Practical Reason* becomes little more than the confirmation of the legislation of an unknowable power of transcendental freedom in the moral law. The first *Critiques* do not adequately explain how intelligible and sensible words can be made to meet without ever meeting the

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identities of actual and possible worlds. *Critique of Judgment* confirms both the unknowability and power – a mediation which is both required by reason and impossible to achieve, although its achievement can be hoped for. In summary, the idea of critique emerges as inherently paradoxical.

The exercise of critique is necessarily an exercise of theoretical reason, an attempt to grasp the principles of knowledge, morality and judgment. Yet as an exercise of theoretical reason, *Critique* is dependent on practical reason, in the form of the ideas of reason that regulate on practical reason, in the form of the ideas of reason that regulates cognition and can not be grasped by it, and the equally elusive ideals of reason towards which cognition is oriented. At the same time, critique as theoretical reason continually strives to move beyond the boundaries of cognition to the intelligible realm in which it is grounded but cannot do so.

After critical analysis of Kantian Enlightenment Rationality one can conclude that it helped to define freedom, human dignity (human being as end in himself) which was formed in opposition to the very power of tradition, convention of feudal Europe. People were to be given control over their lives through the freedom to use their own reason. Thus, ‘reason’ covered every aspect of human life, – the knowing, the willing and the feeling. This comes out as
the three realms of European modernity – the science, the morality and the arts. In the present chapter we saw how Kant’s critical philosophy ran into variety of problems. The assumption of the limits of reason along with its legislative power led to the postulations of the thing, In itself on one hand and transcendental ideas of reason on the other.

European modernity tries to go ahead of these three realms and this has been one of the major projects undertaken by Jürgen Habermas. Further, Kant’s *a priori* concepts represent a limited theory whereas his enlightenment rationality comes out as a grand narrative. Habermas points out several inconsistencies in this ambitious project of Kant. In his communicative action which would be discussed in next chapter, Habermas tries to overcome this Kantian project.