Chapter 3

WOMEN AND WRITING

A Language of Absence

A ‘theory of poetry’ rather than any kind of ‘poetics’ would justify situations of poets such as Sylvia Plath. The difference lies between a synchronic and a diachronic analysis. For a woman writer the search for expression in a gendered language is obstructed by existing tropes in the poetic tradition. Modernism distinctly marks a movement towards ‘irony’ and displays an increasing preference for the metonymy vis-à-vis the metaphor.¹ This shift, however, is not an essential one, for, metaphor and metonymy are both heightened degrees of dialectical irony – the metaphor being more extended. Meaning in both these cases is derived through a displacement. Metonymy depends upon a repetition through ‘naming’. ‘Naming’ in poetry is a limitation of meaning and hints at a male compulsion and obsession. Synecdoche, on the other hand, is an initial mode of identification since the microcosm can represent the macrocosm without necessarily playing against it. It opens the possibility for a flexible form of writing that could set the standard for women writers to play ‘language games’ in an otherwise patriarchal system.²

In the last chapter we saw that the relation between the self and the other is dialogic, that is, based on exchange and not displacement. The female
subject must find a way to express herself and represent herself, without falling into the trap of male monologue. This requires a self-reflexivity that carries the intensity of particular experience and is yet not restricted by it. Only the rhetorical mode of synecdoche, not as a figure of speech, but as a trope, can fulfil this requirement. Like metonymy, it is associative in nature and can operate within existing linguistic paradigms. Yet unlike metonymy, where the meaning is eternally deferred, synecdoche has the power to convey the ‘whole’ through a ‘part’. While the ‘part’ remains unfixed, it manages to convey a ‘whole’ political position. This is especially true of Plath’s late poems. For example, in ‘Cut’ the intensity of the immediate experience is enhanced by a series of shifting allusions. The poignant image of the cut thumb which is bleeding is associated with or compared to ‘a flap like a hat’, an axed scalp, millions of redcoats running, etc. in each use there is an ironic detachment as the barrage of images seem to have no mental link, thus catering to an exercise in dissociative formalism. The only link seems to be the acute physicality of experience, the attempt at creating an impression through non-conventional comparisons. Such a discourse could easily be mistaken as a typical example of Modernist objectivity till one reaches the concluding lines:

    How you jump –
    Trepanned veteran,
    Dirty girl,
    Thumb stump.

    (‘Cut’, 24th October, 1962)³
The immediacy of the physical ‘cut’ is transformed to a state of being for the woman who is branded as ‘dirty’ as she is destined to be a ‘thumb stump’. She is a stain on the ‘Gauze Klu Klux clan’. And the red blood which generated images of violence is suddenly pitted against a stark white impassive mask. There is a reversal of values as the poem positions itself as a disturbing cut that challenges the clinical neutrality of existing values. The shifting cascade of images exist independently and yet become part of a politicized discourse. Synecdoche has the dexterity to co-exist and yet not conform. For writers like Plath, it provides an opportunity to participate in the Modernist movement and at the same time challenge it.

The study of rhetoric is unfit for the study of poetry as rhetoric has its roots in the analysis of political and legal orations, which are absurd paradigms for lyrical poetry. John Hollander illuminates tropes as ‘turns that occur between the meanings of intentions and the significance of linguistic utterances’. Freedom and lying are intimately associated with belated poetry and the notion that contains both may best be termed ‘evasion’. Linguistically these evasions constitute trope. Form in poetry ceases to be trope only when it becomes topos, only when it is revealed as a place of invention. Thus trope and psychic defence must inevitably be connected in the case of lyric poetry. This site of invention is rephrased by Kenneth Burke as the implicit presence of forms in subject matter and named as ‘the individuation of forms’. Burke defined form in literature as ‘an arousing and fulfilment of desires’. Thus, connecting trope and psychic defence seems an inevitable aid to the reading of poetry. The justification of linking language and ego, a trope and ‘defense’,
would depend upon a diachronic rather than a synchronic view of language and rhetoric. Considering the ‘aggression of reading’ and the ‘transgression of writing’, the breaking of form that produces meaning hints at certain topological displacements in language which require a psychic rather than a linguistic model.

Anna Freud in her study ‘The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense’, notes:

All the defensive measures of the ego against the id are carried out silently and invisibly. The most that we can do is reconstruct them in retrospect: we can never really witness them in operation. The statement applies for instance to successful repression. The ego knows nothing of it, we are aware of it only subsequently, when it becomes apparent that something is missing.⁷

In a poem the ego is the poetic self, and id is the precursor, idealized and frequently composite, hence fantasized but still traceable to a historical author or authors. The British critic Roger Poole elaborates on the absences in a poem or ‘the strategies of exclusion’ by stating:

If a poem is really ‘strong’ it must represent a menace. It menaces the way a reader thinks, loves, fears and is. Consequently, the reading of strong poetry can only take place
under conditions of mutual self-defense.\(^8\)

A poem can be about ‘experience’ or emotion or whatever only by initially encountering another poem, which is to say that a poem must handle emotion and experience as if they already were rival poems. Poetic knowledge is necessarily a knowledge by tropes, an experience of emotion as trope, and an expression of knowledge and emotion by further troping. Since a poem is necessarily further troped, in any strong reading, there is a bewildering triple inter-tropicality at work that makes a mockery of most attempts at reading.

Plath’s ‘Poem for a Birthday’ is a sequence of seven poems which began as a deliberate Theodore Roethke pastiche.\(^9\) Like Roethke’s ‘Shape of Fire’, this poem contains a series of objective images with a sense of detachment between observer and observed. Each section is linked through a direct address to a mother-figure that disrupts the stasis of the rest of the lines. Roethke’s ‘Mother me out of here. What more will the bones allow?’, ‘Mother, mother, stir from you cave of sorrow’, ‘Mother of quartz, your words writhe into my ears’,\(^10\) is echoed by Plath’s ‘Mother you are the one mouth / I would be a tongue to. Mother of Otherness / Eat me…’, ‘The mother of mouths didn’t love me’, ‘Mother keep out of my barnyard, / I am becoming another’.\(^11\) However the inter-tropicality at work problematizes the concept of ‘the mother’. In Roethke’s case there is a sense of surrender to an archetypal figure, who as, the idea of an archetypal mother is challenged in Plath’s poems. There is an ironic distance established between the woman-speaker and ‘the Mother of Otherness’. Even though she follows Roethke’s model,
there is a further troping that challenges any act of reading. Plath exposes a sense of alienation from the eulogized image of the mother which is clearly a product of patriarchy.

To evade such destructive weariness one has to return to the poetic self that De Manian deconstruction dissolves into irony. Narcissistic self-regard or poetic self-esteem is wounded by the its realization of belatedness and this provokes the poetic self into aggressivity that Freud calls ‘defence’. The poetic drive towards an idealized immortality is a result of the triadic sequence of narcissism, wounded self-regard and aggression.

But in language itself defence is compelled to be manifested as trope. Anomalies in a poem are both intra-poetic and inter-poetic. Strong poems manifest the will to permanent truth – this intention to prophesy is necessarily a dynamic of space as well as time. As long as it is situated within a tradition of utterance, the discourse is involved in thematics, in topology or literary place. Themes are things placed into stance, stance is the attitude or position of the poet in the poem, and placing is a dynamic desire seeking either its apotheosis or entropic self-destruction. Self-preservation is the labour of the poem’s litanies of evasion.

In this situation can a woman be merely a poet and not a woman-poet? Though defiance is still a reactive stance is it possible to be defiant against a patriarchal tradition of utterance when poetry itself is situated in defiance? When we speak about the stance of a poet, we are inadvertently placing
him/her in literary space or a tradition of utterance. If we deliberately seek out a female tradition, the poet’s ‘stance’ is rendered abortive. For this stance is a dynamic desire for self-presentation in an attitude of defiance. For a woman poet, this defiance is not only against the precursor of the poetic self who is a product of patriarchal society, but also against one’s own poetic identity. This is a double act of ‘defence’ and the sense of belatedness challenges any state of aggression.

Susan van Dyne’s access to Plath’s manuscripts of ‘Ariel’, being a professor at Smith College, produces a unique and detailed discussion of Plath’s poetry.\textsuperscript{13} She highlights how biographical events and earlier texts deeply interpenetrate each other in the composition process. Van Dyne finds significant links between the poetry drafts that were written on the reverse of Hughes’ poetry and the ‘Bell-Jar’ manuscripts. For example, Plath’s often disparaged ‘Burning the Letters’,\textsuperscript{14} which was drafted on the reverse of Hughes’s ‘Thought-Fox’ manuscripts, is not merely the bitter poem of a rejected wife. It is a revisionary reply to Hughes’ visionary equation of his own poetic genius with the mysterious powers of nature.

The last stanza of the ‘Thought-Fox’ is an apt example:

\begin{quote}
Till with a sudden sharp hot stink of fox

It enters the dark hole of the head.

The window is starless still; the clock ticks

The page is printed.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}
Hughes chooses to minimize the mediation of the active subject in the poem and claims an objectivity which annihilates the distance between nature and art. The poet here is privileged with an absolute negative capability that obscures the difference between abstract imagination and reality. The journey from the first line: ‘I imagine this midnight moment forest’, to the last line, ‘The page is printed’, reveals a dexterous formalistic exercise that claims a transparency of language.

In direct contrast, Plath’s ‘Burning the Letters’ is defiantly personal and yet the experience is politicized and contextual. Not only does the poem acknowledge agency, it also questions the sanctity of writing and the ability of language to convey meaning conclusively:

So I poke at the carbon birds in my housedress.
They are more beautiful than my bodiless owl,
They console me –
Rising and flying, but blinded.
They would flutter off, black and glittering, they would be coal angels
Only they have nothing to say to anybody.
I have seen to that.

(‘Burning the Letters’, 13th August, 1962)
That meaning is never final or fixed, but open to interpretation, manipulation, and often governed by absence – is what Plath tries to emphasize through her lines. If this is revenge, it is not just setting personal scores: it is also a way to challenge the sanctity of abstraction by preferring the literal, an attempt to vindicate an alternative mode of representation. Writing as a woman is always an act of resistance:

The dogs are tearing a fox. This is what it is like –
A red burst and cry
That splits from its ripped bag and does not stop
With the dead eye
And the stuffed expression, but goes on
Dyeing the air,
Telling the particles of the clouds, the leaves, the water
What immortality is. That it is immortal.

(‘Burning the Letters, 13th August, 1962)\textsuperscript{16}

This courage, if decontextualized, loses its significance. This poem written on the reverse side of the ‘Thought-Fox’, by its very violence, exposes the complacency of abstraction. If the ‘Thought-Fox’ represents the perfection of art, its destruction too is an act of immortality, for it challenges any notion of perfect representation. Meaning is generated through the antagonistic relationship between the poems.
In other words, the woman poet can preserve her exclusive identity only by situating herself in an antagonistic relationship to her poetic precursor who is a subject rooted in patriarchal society. For, ‘The Madwoman in the Attic’ can maintain her privileged position only through her marginality which is negatively dependent upon an established hegemony. In the process, she is condemned to isolation. Her hysterical outbursts would be silenced if she were to be released from the attic. Women’s literary expression condemns them to schizophrenia. While the male poet creates a poetic subject out of narcissistic aggression, the woman-poet is locked in her own subjectivity. She cannot ‘choose’ to be a subject, as she is already one – being engaged in a constant dialectics with her objective ‘otherness’. Virginia Woolf in ‘A Room of One’s Own’, indicates the possibility of appropriating language for female use. In this context she specifically refers to lesbian experiences and the kind of discourse that could do justice to these. Ultimately however, Woolf is calling on women to write as women but without consciousness of their sex occluding their creative vision. The mental state that she sees as most creative calls for the ‘unity of mind’. She advocates the notion of androgyny, an almost Romantic ‘reconciliation of opposites’. This androgyny seems to be a mental collaboration between male and female elements, a conscious effort at harmony.

Is it possible to develop this abstract androgyny in the existing cultural matrix? The second voice in ‘The Three Women’ underlines the politics of this predetermined system:
It is these men I mind:

They are so jealous of anything that is not flat! They are jealous gods

They would have the whole world flat because they are.

I see the father conversing with the son

Such flatness cannot but be holy.

‘Let us make a heaven’, they say.

‘Let us flatten and launder the grossness from these souls.

(‘Three Women’, March 1962)

In such an androcentric world it is impossible to develop a creativity that rises above a sense of ‘otherness’:

I see myself as a shadow, neither man nor woman,

Neither a woman, happy to be like a man, nor a man

Blunt and flat enough to feel no lack. I feel a lack.

(‘Three Women’, March 1962)

Woolf does not indicate a difference between sexual and gender identity and as far as writing is concerned, urges women to transcend any sense of ‘otherness’. Cixous on the other hand urges that feminine writing should be rooted in the body: ‘Write your self. Your body must be heard’. Male visions of the world have achieved the status of ‘theory’ precisely by abstracting from the data of actual experience, by withdrawing from the world of sense and transforming the unconscious into an ideal world of pure forms,
substance, the absolute idea, the transcendental ego or the soul. Historically, then, to write without the body, has been the norm. To write with the body implies facilitating a return of the repressed, or resurrection of that which has been subordinated and treated as secondary, as dirty, as weighing us down and preventing us from rising to the perception of higher truths. It is to reinforce the claims of the body as legitimate in the overall constitution of humanity.

Whereas Simone de Beauvoir had reviewed the rootedness of woman’s experience in bodily functions as a kind of imprisonment within immanence, Cixous regards women’s great attunement to bodily needs and drives as potentially liberating. In a sense, the body resists pure theory. (in relation to Derrida’s theory of Western thought being based upon a structure of binary opposites, Cixous claims that the fundamental opposition is male/female). The body is a name, a metaphor for many things, the uniqueness of experience which refuses to be subsumed into a category or to be reduced to exemplificatory status. It can express the individuality of the self, inhabiting a determinate position in place, time, class, colour, race and religion. To write with the body is to refuse to annul these differences. One cannot simply dismiss these factors, as the male tradition would have it, to arrive at some neutral perspective which is somehow based on ‘pure’ reason or ‘pure’ thought and pretends to objectivity.

Cixous insists, ‘there is … no general woman’. One can talk of what woman have in common, but the infinite richness of their individual constitutions prevents us from talking about ‘a female sexuality that might be
uniform homogeneous, classifiable into codes. If the body represents resistant particularity, particularity that is recalcitrant to the generalization of its nature, it is because it harbours an irreducible and unique richness. Each body is unique in as much as it distributes desires in its own special way. When this body is hear, when it is expressed through writing, then ‘will the immense source of the unconscious spring forth’, the unconscious being the place where the repressed takes refuge/lurks. This new writing, expressing the ‘new woman’ and based on the ‘empire of the body’ will resist the ‘analytic empire’ built up in the language and categories of men. The ‘new’ feminine writing will be momentous: ‘writing is precisely the very possibility of change, the space that can serve as the springboard of subversive thought, the precursory movement of a transformation of social and cultural structures.’

This ‘insurgent’ writing will 1) ‘return’ the woman to the body, uncensored, without guilt; 2) will make her ‘shattering entry into history’ – her use of writing as ‘anti-logos weapon.’ Women’s writing will confirm a place for her other than that recovered by the symbolic order, the order established by male institutions and history. In contrast with the writings that structure the symbolic order, woman’s writing is closest to the drives. ‘She lets the language speak … her language does not contain, it carries.’ A woman’s language is never abstract, never loses touch with the pre-symbolic and with the resources of the unconscious. Cixous insists that one cannot define a feminine practice of writing: ‘this practice can never be theorized, enclosed, coded … it will always surpass the discourse that regulates the phallocentric system.’
Text and Context

‘The Detective’ is a poem in which Holmes is investigating a death with Watson. A woman is dead and the death weapon is a man’s smile. The mystery is that ‘There is no body in the house at all’. The poem describes how one by one the body began disappearing. First the mouth, then the breasts and then finally ‘the brown motherly furrows, the whole estate’. Ironically enough, the poem identifies the body as the ultimate point of resistance in a culture that values abstraction:

This is a case without a body,
The body does not come into it at all.

(‘The Detective’, 1st October, 1962)30

Plath contrived to contribute stories to popular magazines all through her career. She took her role as a writer very seriously and her stories are well-crafted, often catering to popular taste. As a poet however it seems she never came to terms with any defined mode of expression. Her poems fluctuate between rage, black humour, devastating satire, bitter irony, cynical withdrawal and sheer tranquility. However, one cannot trace any sort of chronological progression between these various stances. This frustrates the authenticity of any biographical analysis of her poems. Plath is known to have written reassuring letters to her mother, celebrating Ted Hughes’ growing fame, their marital bliss, and her motherhood, even when their marriage was falling apart. Her letters serve to mask the rage and depression she was
undergoing at that time by deliberately concentrating on a superficial domesticity. She writes to her mother, June 15, 1962:

Luckily I have lots and lots of work to do, like painting furniture and weeding, because I am so excited about your coming I can’t sit still! I wish now you had seen the house in its raw state so you would see how much we have done. Of course there is still an immense deal to do, and my eyes are full of five-year plans.31

Yet her mother found her marriage to be in serious trouble on her arrival the next week. In a few months, Plath was ready to rent out the Devon rectory. She felt more at home in London and admits that moving to the country had been her husband’s choice.

Letters, short stories and poems are all acts of writing that need not be supplementary to each other. Any act of comprehension lies in the reader’s mind and it is the tendency of the reader to make a case out of it all by using these unique acts of writing as clues that fit into already existing categories of theorization. The reader/critic assigns himself with the task of deciphering, much like a detective. Except that these categories of generalization are entirely dependent upon a predetermined language system that denies the resistant particularity of experience.
When a son of her mother’s friend was deeply depressed, Plath refers to her own breakdown and advises her mother to encourage him to shed all anxiety of performance: ‘I remember that I was terrified that if I was not successful writing, no one would find me interesting and valuable’.32

Writing itself is already part of any existing text. Non-performance or refusal to be part of an existing paradigm is itself a performance by choice. On one hand it is true that Plath and Hughes grabbed all opportunities to make a livelihood solely out of their writing skills. Their contributions to magazines was one more means of conforming to domesticity, a promise of day to day sense of security which was so important to Plath after her own mental breakdown. She used to chalk out plots for women magazine stories and declares that ‘… I’ll have a story in the Letters Home Journal or Saturday Evening Post yet’:

The wonderful thing about these stories is that I can do them by perspiration and not inspiration – so that I can work on them while Frieda is playing in the room.33

Her letters were a kind of communication that both camouflages and reveals. On October 18th 1962, she ends her letter to her mother saying ‘…I love and live for letters’. Yet on the same day she writes to her brother ‘…I know just what I need, what I want, what I must work for. Please convince mother of this. She identifies too much with me.’34
Writing thus becomes both a means of conformity and rebellion. To make a mark as a writer, Plath had to subscribe to existing categories of the expression of ‘womanhood’. Yet by choosing poetry as her mode of expression, she had to challenge existing notions of celebrated domesticity, the very concept of ‘success’ as an artist. As long as her marriage survived, her country house, children and friends are a major source of sustenance for her. Communication that caters to stereotypes gets indulgent consideration in the form of magazine stories and radio talks. Plath was a perfectionist and this anxiety pervaded her day to day existence. Ironically enough, it is this drive for perfection that leads her to challenge and question the crystallized social images of women and a poet. Her poems declare war upon any kind of generalization by referring to the uniqueness of experience. Ultimately her poetry is propelled by a sense of difference:

I am even enjoying my rather frustrating (culturally and humanly) exile now. I am doing a poem a morning, great things, and as soon as the muse settles shall try to draft this terrific second [third] novel that I am dying to do. Don’t talk to me about the world needing cheerful stuff! What the person out of Belsen – physically or psychologically wants is nobody saying – the birdies still go tweet-tweet, but the full knowledge that somebody else has been there and knows the worst, just what it is like. It is much more help for me, for example, to know that People are divorced
and go through hell than to hear about happy marriages.

Let the Ladies Home Journal blabber about those.\textsuperscript{35}

That this exile is both human and cultural, and that, for a woman, it often becomes impossible to distinguish between the two categories, is the very reason why woman writers often feel alienated by the very language they inhabit.

The body is an emblem of drives, the resistant particularity of experience, the uniqueness of individuals that cannot be subsumed under coercive classifications, the impossibility of abstracting the historical and the national from the personal. The writing that writes the body refuses classification and closure, resists obeisance to the throne of reason and insists on its living connections with the materiality of the body, its drives, the unconscious, the libido. Cixous stresses that to escape her imprisonment within the discourse of man, she cannot merely appropriate male concepts and instruments, she must, rather, ‘fly’ and ‘steal’. She must ‘take pleasure in jumbling the order of space, in disorientating it, in changing around the furniture, dislocating things and values, breaking them all up, emptying structures, and turning propriety upside down’.\textsuperscript{36} She must, with her body, puncture, the ‘system of couples and oppositions … successiveness, connection, the wall of circumfusion’.\textsuperscript{37}

In terms somewhat reminiscent of de Beauvoir, Cixous suggests that the new woman will embody ‘risk’, the danger of being a self-created woman.
De Beauvoir offers her own existential overview of women’s history, an account that challenges certain male-generated myths about woman. While she accepts the contributions of biology, psychoanalysis and historical materialism, they must be situated within a broader context of social life and values that only an existential attitude can furnish. In the first part of her book *The Second Sex*, she endeavours to show how the concept of the feminine has been fashioned and to consider why women has been defined as the other. She points out that the body is not a ‘thing’ but a ‘situation’. Not least among the factors inhibiting women’s social and economic freedom is the perpetuation of certain obstinate myths of women, in the realms of art and literature, as well as in daily life. Beauvoir examines the ‘great collective myths’ of authors whose presentation of the feminine she considers to be ‘typical’: woman as flesh, as first womb and then lover to the male, woman as the incarnation of ‘nature’ and the door to the supernatural, woman as poetry, as the mediation between this world and beyond. She appears as the ‘privileged other’, through which the subject fulfils himself: one of the measures of man, his counterbalance, his salvation, his adventure, his happiness. But these myths are orchestrated very differently by each author: the ‘other’ is defined according to the terms in which the one sets him up. And for each of them, the ideal woman is ‘she who incarnates most exactly the “other” capable of revealing him to himself’. De Beauvoir’s point is that, no matter how exalted or debased woman is in the works of these writers, she fulfils the role of otherness, being always an integral aspect of man’s self-definition, of the fulfillment of his being, rather than enjoying true autonomy. Another way of saying this is that her existence is always attenuated,
adjectival, ever mired in the mode of objectivity, never blossoming into true subjectivity, true humanity. In the chapter ‘Myth and Reality’, de Beauvoir observes that the myth of women exerts an important influence not only in the world of literature but equally in everyday life. She points out that the myth of woman is a static myth: it ‘projects into the realm of Platonic ideas a reality that is directly experienced’. 

In other words, the myth substitutes for actual experience, a transcendent idea which is timeless and unchangeable; because this idea is beyond or above the realm of actual experience, it is endowed with absolute truth. Hence mythical thought opposes this fixed, universal and unitary idea of the “Eternal Feminine” to the ‘dispersed, contingent, and multiple existences of actual women. If we say, for example, that ‘woman is flesh’ or that she is ‘Night’ or ‘Death’ or ‘Nature’, we are effectively abandoning terrestrial and empirical truth and soaring ‘into an empty sky’. The myth is unassailable: if the behaviour of a real woman contradicts the mythical idea, she is told that she is not feminine; the ‘contrary facts of experience are impotent against the myth’. What the mythical treatment of women does is to pose woman as ‘the absolute other, without reciprocity, denying against all experience that she is a subject, a fellow human being.’

Of all these myths, the one most deeply ‘anchored in masculine hearts’ is that of the feminine ‘mystery’. This myth allows man the luxury of ‘legitimately’ not understanding woman, and above all, it enables man to remain above by living in the company of enigma: such an experience is more
attractive for many than ‘an authentic relation with a human being’. De Beauvoir argues that such feminine mystery is an illusion: in truth, there is mystery on both sides, male and female. But the male perspective is elevated into an absolute and normal perspective, and from that vantage point, woman appears essentially mysterious. What underlies the feminine mystery is an ‘economic substructure’ of subordination: mystery always belongs to the vassal, the colonized, the slave. Ultimately Beauvoir, like Woolf, talks about a change in economic, moral, social, cultural and psychological transformations that would lead to a more androgynous world. She talks about woman’s emerging subjectivity, due to an ‘understanding’ of her own sexuality by transcending all inhibitions. Then both man and woman will exist both for self and for the other: ‘mutually recognizing each other as subject, each will not remain for the other an other.’

Anna Tripp, in her essay, ‘Saying “I”: Sylvia Plath as Tragic Author or Feminist Text’ acknowledging the influence of Jacqueline Rose, suggests that feminist critics can circumvent biographically driven interpretations by employing post-structuralist reading practices that free the text from a limited intentional relationship with the author, and thus enable feminist critics to locate resistance at the level of language. Her arguments support Rose’s claim that ‘Plath regularly unsettles certainties of language, identity and sexuality, troubling the forms of cohesion on which ‘civilized’ culture systematically and often oppressively relies.’
In the poem ‘I am Vertical’, for example, the pronoun ‘I’ is problematized as the authorial voice grapples with it:

But I would rather be horizontal.
I am not a tree with my root in the soil
Sucking up minerals and motherly love
So that each March I may gleam into leaf,
Nor am I the beauty of a garden bed
Attracting my share of Ahs and spectacularly painted,
Unknowing I must soon unpetal.

(‘I am Vertical’, 28 March, 1961)\(^{50}\)

These lines propound a continual denial of the established and authoritative ‘I’. The poet’s subjectivity cannot be categorized according to prevalent notions of the masculine or feminine. The ‘I’ is negatively defined. The irony lies in the fact, that though the poet wishes to be ‘horizontal’, she has to negotiate with the vertical, phallic, ‘I’ to express herself. Though she does not rely upon this mode of expression, it has been thrust upon her. Under the surveillance of this ‘I’ both the tree and the flower are patriarchally predetermined.

It is rather simplistic to read this biographically and interpret this as a desire for death. The entire contention exists because of an intense desire to associate with the world around and the inability to do so comfortably. Even
death, as a signifier, symbolizes a paradigmatic shift, which is what the author desperately seeks:

Sometimes I think that when I am sleeping
I must most perfectly resemble them –
Thoughts gone dim.
It is more natural to me, lying down
Then the sky and I are in open conversation.

(‘I am Vertical’, 28th March, 1961)\textsuperscript{51}

This seems to indicate a more ‘rhizomatic’ communication and the impossibility of a cultural rootedness. One is reminded of Kristeva’s definition of ‘chora’ as a spatial intuition of language – a rhythm or space which is truly feminine. One has to remember that it is the son’s historical constraints that determine the organization of the ‘chora’. The ‘I’ in this poem too is positioned within a system of differences.

It is important to note that it is impossible to gauge whether the writer is male or female from the poem, if the reader is unaware of the poet’s identity. Anna Tripp compares the poem to an excerpt from Ted Hughes’s poem ‘Egg Head’ and correctly identifies an inherent insecurity in the act of self-definition:

To the staturing ‘I am’
To the upthrust affirmative head of man
Braggart-browed complacency in most calm
Collusion with his own
Dewdrop frailty ....\textsuperscript{52}

While Plath’s poem identifies two possible modes of (vertical) existence, here
there is one, which is masculine and universalized. The ‘I’ here is hardly
transparent – it pretends to be self-reflexive, ‘dew-drop frailty’ explicitly
obscure, silence or even obliterate the feminine.

An interesting parallel with Plath’s poem may be found in a famous
section of Virginia Woolf’s ‘A Room of One’s Own’:

But after reading a chapter or two a shadow seemed to
lie across the page. It was a straight dark bar, a shadow
shaped something like the letter ‘I’. One began dodging
this way and that to catch a glimpse of the landscape
behind it. Whether that was indeed a tree or a woman
walking I was not quite sure. Back one was always
hailed to the letter ‘I’. One began to be tired of ‘I’. not
but that this ‘I’ was a most respectable ‘I’, honest and
logical, as hard as a nut and polished for centuries by
good teaching and good feeding. I respect and admire
that ‘I’ from the bottom of my heart. But … the worst of
it is that in the shadow of the letter ‘I’ all is as shapeless
as mist. Is that a tree? No, it a woman.\textsuperscript{53}
The signifier ‘I’ may give the impression of being unique and free-standing, but the subject is in fact produced by and anchored in its specific historical and cultural contexts. The subject, is thus a position taken up within language: it is linguistically determined and enabled. The ‘I’ is culturally and historically specific rather than natural, universal and eternal, and is divided in a number of different planes. ‘… deep rifts appear between the spoken subject and the (inaccessible, partially represented) speaking subject, and between the central, dominant masculine subject and the peripheral, subordinate feminine subject.’

The self-reflexivity of the ‘other’ must be perused both ontologically and epistemologically. If the ‘unconscious is structured like language’, can there possibly be ‘language-games’ that allow the woman to emerge as a subject without loving self-reflexivity? If the myth of woman as an objective ‘other’ is to be deconstructed and reconstructed, one has to negotiate with a language that facilitates masculine myths. It is not as if an inner transformation will lead to a deconstruction of myths. Any socio-cultural change in positioning is impossible while the so-called ‘transparency’ of language is authenticated.

As Lacan rewrites Freud’s account of the unconscious using linguistic terminology and concepts, he points to three orders or states of human mental dispositions: the ‘imaginary’ order, the ‘symbolic’ order and the ‘real’. The imaginary phase is one of unity where the demarcation between itself and
objects of the world do not exist. It is a world that is not yet fragmented or mediated by difference, by categories, by language and signs. The mirror phase marks the point at which the child is pushed into the symbolic order, which is the world of predefined social roles and gender differences, the world of subjects and objects, the world of language. Lacan thus effectively reformulates in linguistic terms Freud’s account of the Oedipus Complex. The child in passing from the imaginary to the symbolic order, contrives to long for the security and wholeness it previously felt: it is now no longer in possession of its mother and of entities in the world, rather it is distinguished through them ‘in and through’ a network of signification. The child’s desire, according to Lacan, passes in an unceasing movement along an infinite chain of signifiers, in search of unity, security, of ultimate meaning, in an ever elusive signified, immaturesly clinging to the fictive notion of unitary selfhood that began in the imaginary phase. The child exists in an alienated condition, its relationships with objects highly mediated and controlled by social structures at the heart of whose operation is language. For Lacan, the unconscious is structured like language. Lacan, never really describes the ‘real’: he seems to think of it as what lies beyond the world of signification, perhaps a primordial immediacy of experience prior to language or a chaotic condition of mere thinghood prior to objectivity. In other words, the real is impossible. He rejects any notion that the mind of either child or adult has any intrinsic psychical unity. It is merely a ‘subject’ rather than a self or ego, merely the occupant of an always moving position in the networks of signification. The subject is empty, fluid and without a creator, and is always recreated in its encounter with the ‘other’, with what exceeds its own nature or
grasp. Influenced by Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, as well as his account of objectivity, Lacan sees the individual’s relation to object as mediated by desire and by struggle. According to Lacan’s metaphors, the id – the locus of unconstrained instincts and desires, and perhaps the projection of remembered imaginary unity and totality – is the lofty inner castle, to whose protection the floundering ‘subject’ (the ‘I’ that has entered the constraints and alienation of the symbolic order) wishes to return. And yet it seems that the metaphor of fortification expresses both the ‘defences of the ego’ and the alienating, neuroses-generating nature of these defenses, dating from the end of the mirror stage, from the ‘deflection of the specular I’ into the ‘social I’. In the paper called ‘The Agency/Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious since Freud’ (reprinted in *Ecrits*), Lacan urges that psychoanalysis ‘discovers in the unconscious … the whole structure of language.’ Lacan is reacting implicitly against a psychological view of the unconscious as a locus of desire and instinct. Lacan attempts to clarify this definition: language does not consist of ‘various psychical and somatic functions that serve it in the speaking subject’. Language and its structure exist prior to the moment at which the speaking subject makes its entry into it. It is language or even accumulation of individual speech acts. It is language, then, which determines and authorizes the range of cultural structures and possible experience. The point is, that, language does not arise from these, for there cannot be meaningful experiences which are somehow prelinguistic.

Lacan’s formulation robs the subject of ‘agency’. Under such circumstance any voluntary act of resistance becomes almost impossible.
Lacan identifies metonymy as the core of the signifying process, as a connection between signifiers, between words, and not between signifiers and signifieds. Lacan has spoken of the ‘sliding of the signified under the signifier’. According to Freud, dream distortion,\(^6^2\) referring to the repressive transformation or disguising of embarrassing elements of the conscious ego, was accomplished by at least two strategies, condensation and displacement. Lacan quotes these two strategies with what he has described as the two ‘sides’ of the effect of the signifier on the signified: metaphor and metonymy. Condensation corresponds to metaphor, whose field is the structure of superimposition of the signifiers.\(^6^3\) Lacan has defined metaphor as the substitution of one signifier for another, with the displaced one remaining in metonymic form.

In other words, Lacan, borrowing from Jakobson,\(^6^4\) enconsces the metaphor within the eternally deferred metonymic structure. If we recollect Bloom’s concept of the metonymy and the metaphor being forms of ‘dialectic irony’, it is clear that in poetry, the very act of naming is a limitation of meaning, as there is no ‘absolute’ signified. Metaphor and metonymy both subscribe to dialectical irony, hinting at a male psychology of compulsion, obsession and ceaseless displacement.

Synecdoche on the other hand, includes both the part and the whole, the microcosm and the macrocosm, without necessarily pitching each against the other. It coincides rhetorically, with Woolf’s advocacy of the notion of androgyny, De Beauvoir’s description of women’s subjectivity that does not
exclude the ‘other’ by reducing it to a mere object and Cixous’ prescription of a bisexuality that will supersede man’s ‘glorious phallic monosexuality’.\textsuperscript{65} If there is a ‘propriety of woman’ urges Cixous, it is her ‘capacity to depropriate unselfishly: body without end …. If she is a whole, it’s a whole composed of parts that are wholes’, as distinguished from masculine sexuality comprised of a phallic centrality under the dictatorship of its parts.\textsuperscript{66}

The deflection into a social order determined by language causes the relation to objects to be mediated by desire and struggle:

His head is a little interior of gray mirrors.
Each gesture flees immediately down an alley
Of diminishing perspectives, and its significance
Drains like water out of the hole at the far end.

(Insomniac, May 1961)\textsuperscript{67}

In an infinite chain of signifiers, ‘He’ is forever in search of an ever elusive unity and meaning that belong to an imaginary order, whereas the subject himself has entered the symbolic order. Ultimately it is language that determines experience. When naming is itself a limitation of meaning, even the metaphor is restricted by the eternally deferring metonymic structure. How can then poetic language be rescued from this dialectics of irony?
Beyond Syntax: Alternative Poetics

Kristeva starts out by observing that modern linguistic theories treat language as a formal object which is marked by arbitrary relations between signifier and signified and the substitution of sign for the extra-linguistic (reality outside language).\textsuperscript{58} Language considered as such a formal object lacks a \textit{subject} of enunciation – it merely passes over the question of the possible existence of the subject beyond language.

Two recent trends have addressed this issue of externality, which become important when we are dealing with a theory of poetry. 1) Signifying systems in which the arbitrary connection of signifier and signified is seen as ‘motivated’ by the unconsciousness process. These theories rehabilitate the notion of the pre-Oedipal fragmented body, but fail to explain this body’s link to the post-Oedipal subject and his symbolic language. 2) Trends which begin from the subject of enunciation or transcendental ego, purveying the necessary connections that linguistics bears with semantics and logic, views signification as an ideological and historical process.\textsuperscript{69} Kristeva calls the first trend ‘semiotic’ and the second trend ‘symbolic’. The \textit{dialectics} between them determines the type of discourse involved (metalanguage, theory, poetry, etc.). This necessary dialectic between these two modes is also ‘constitutive of the subject’, ‘a subject which is thus both semiotic and symbolic’.\textsuperscript{70}

Kristeva adopts from Plato’s \textit{Timaeus} the term \textit{chora}, which refers to the space that is occupied by a thing; it can also refer to a position or station,
and, in Kristeva’s extension, receptacle or womb. The _chora_ is not yet a signifier: it precedes the linguistic sign, which articulates (as Lacan claims) both the absence of the object itself and distinction between real and symbolic. This _chora_ which regulates the drives is to be distinguished from the realm of the symbolic which is the realm of spatial intuition of language. The realm of the symbolic is a ‘social effect’ of the natural or socio-historical constraints (such as biological difference or family structure) which ultimately organize the _chora_. The French poet Mallarme, according to Kristeva, speaks of the semiotic as a rhythm or space which is feminine, enigmatic and indifferent to language; it is, however, constrained by one factor: syntax.

According to Jakobson, for poetry, metaphor, and for prose, metonymy is the line of least resistance and, consequently, the use of poetical tropes is directed chiefly towards metaphor. In relation to discourse, we refer more to tropes rather than words when we talk of figures of speech. Metaphor, as a trope, possesses a quasi-predicative quality; that is, it possesses a relationship to words other than nouns or naming units. In other words, if the basic unit of metonymy is the word, that of metaphor, is the sentence. According to Ricouer, a metaphor has a particular context as it is connected with the rest of the discourse. However, ultimately, the relationship established by the metaphor is between signs which are generic and conceptual in nature. Metaphor involves the act of substitution achieved by the predicate but the task of the predicate is finally, the determination of the subject.
So, though the metaphor falls into the semantic category, being contextual in nature, it has to evoke the semiotic. Since we are talking about language myths, it becomes impossible for a semantic category to go beyond the dominant patriarchal discourse. To break this deadlock, the metaphor has to move beyond this selection axis and fall back upon the combination axis which deals with words. Both metonymy and synecdoche belong to this semiotic category and depend on contiguity in time/space.

We observe that the most important analyses of metaphor in the English language school show a strong kinship with a theory of language like that of Emile Beneviste,⁷⁵ who sees language as resting on two kinds of units — those of discourse or ‘sentences’ and ‘signs’, the units of langue (langue). Structural semantics, on the other hand, developed progressively on the postulate of the homogeneity of all the units of language, in so far as they are ‘signs’. According to Ferdinand de Saussure,⁷⁶ the fundamental units that characterize various levels of organization in language are homogeneous, and they all come under a single science, the science of signs or semiotics. This fundamental orientation towards a semiotic monism is the most decisive reason for the divergence in the explanation of the metaphor. It explains the opposition at the level of a metaphor, between a substitution theory and an interaction theory. It also reflects ‘the deeper opposition at the level of basic linguistic postulates between a semiotic monism (which rules the semantics of the word and of the sentence) and a dualism of semiotics and semantic, where the semantics of the sentence is built on principles distinct from all operations with respect to signs.’⁷⁷
From a gendered perspective, one has to fall back upon the sign for a spatial intuition of language that opens the possibility of a rhythm or space which is feminine. Since it is impossible to be indifferent to language, one has to explore the possibility of the sign to be free from the constraints of syntax as far as signs are concerned, metonymy opens the way for an endless displacement, a continuous deferral in terms of meanings which rules out the possibility of any agency or resistance. It is the synecdoche, which in spite of being associative in nature, allow the possibility of language games by consecutive acts of expansion and condensation (part for a whole, whole for a part). The synecdoche trope endows the metaphor with interactive qualities through an interplay at the level of signs. Synecdoche, surpasses metonymy in its ability to express unconventional combinations. Instead of displacement, it works upon a change/interplay of perspective that can emancipate the subject from a language of absence.

Let us compare the lines of two poems, based on a single idea, from this gendered perspective of language. The identity of the poets could be withheld for the time being:

(1) I saw a young snake glide
    Out of the mottled shade
    and hang, limp on a stone;
    A thin mouth, and a tongue
    Stayed, in the still air.
It turned; it drew away
Its shadow bent in half,
It quickened, and was gone.

I felt my slow blood warm.
I longed to be that thing;
The pure, sensuous form.

And I may be, some time.

(2) … these are the people that were important –

Their round eyes, their teeth, their grimaces
On a stick that rattles and clicks, a counterfeit snake.

Shall the hood of the cobra appall me –
The loneliness of its eye, the eye of the mountains

Through which the sky eternally threads itself?
The world is blood-hot and personal.

In the first poem, there is a literal synecdoche at the end of the first stanza, but it is never converted into a trope. The mouth and the tongue remain that of the snakes. There is a vast distance between the well-established
subject and the observed object. The snake achieves symbolic dimensions. The predetermined subject is bound by syntactical constraints. The distance between the subject and the object reiterates the difference between the signifier and the signified. In the second poem, on the other hand, the subject is relegated to the position of a mere observer. The ‘counterfeit snake’ – which is an inert object in one line – becomes the powerful hood of the cobra and is promoted to the position of a subject. This in turn becomes the ‘eye’ to be observed. The observer is the ‘me’ of the previous line who was supposed to be appalled by the hood, but when it achieves the ‘eye’ of the subject it cannot help empathizing with the loneliness of the snake’s eye. Needless to say, the snake thus becomes an interactive metaphor through a series of word combinations that involve consecutive acts of reduction and expansion, a continuous displacement of the part for the whole and vise versa. Finally, the eye of the observer and observed is released into space and expands to engulf the entire sky. This is the synecdochic trope. It allows the sign to be released from syntax and generates new meaning by achieving an interplay between the subject and the object where neither are fixed. It allows space for anonymity (people reduced to ‘eyes’ and ‘teeth’) and yet can operate on a personal level. The helpless victim assumes power and depth and through a neat reversal of perspective the positions of subject and object achieve a porosity and are rendered interchangeable. The fixity of the ‘I’ is challenged through the changing ‘eye’. The poem allows agency, accommodates the personal voice and yet avoids the hegemony of the inflexible subject. The first poem is ‘Snake’ by Theodore Roethke and the second is an extract from Sylvia Plath’s poem ‘Totem’. The above argument reveals a strategic difference in
the use of language as a means of expressing male and female subjectivity. If language as a pre-determined system cannot be denied, and there is no way to escape this system, the woman-poet can explore the various dimensions of this system to discover an axis to her advantage. Reduced to its basic unit, the arbitrary nature of the sign can be instrumental in changing the dominant discourse.

It is the mother’s absence that makes necessary the central projects of our culture. The positioning of the literal poses special problems for women readers and writers because literal language, together with nature and matter to which it is epistemologically related is traditionally classified as feminine, and the feminine is, from the point of view of a predominantly androcentric culture, always elsewhere too. A dualism of presence and absence, of subject and object, structures everything our culture considers thinkable; yet women cannot participate in it as subjects as easily as can men because of the powerful, persuasive way in which the feminine is again and again said to be on the object’s side of that dyad. Women who do not conceive of themselves as subjects – that is, as present, thinking women rather than as ‘woman’ – must continually guard against fulfilling those imposed definitions of being returned to the position of object. The androcentric culture identifies women with the literal, for reasons having to do with women’s own development and identity, even though that identity is never entirely separable from culture as a whole. The literal is ambiguous for women writers because women’s potentially more positive view of it collides with its devaluation by our culture.
Any particular revisions of the cultural myth of women’s place in language requires an exploration of the myth of language. For a daughter, sexual difference that underlies the functioning of the symbolic order are not the same in the way that they are for the son. The daughter discovers that she is the same as her mother and different from her father, so her relationship to her mother contradicts, rather than reinforces, the dependence of the symbolic order on the absence of the mother. Nancy Chodorow argues that because of her likeness to and identification with her mother, the daughter does not need a copula such as the phallus, paradoxically, because she is never told she may not use it: in a culture already heterosexual the father would be unlikely to suspect threats to his sexual terrain from that quarter. Because he does not threaten castration, the daughter never needs a phallus. Or, the father does not threaten castration because the daughter has never been far enough away from her mother to have devised a phallus to wish for. A daughter is never encouraged to abandon her mother in the way that a son is, never needs to replace the lost phallus with other hyphens, is never given so great an incentive to enter the symbolic order as a consolation for that renunciation. She does not enter the symbolic order as whole heartedly or exclusively as does the son.

Since the girl does not experience her father directly as a rival – the dyadic relationship with the mother is not entirely replaced by the triangular relationship that for Lacan is the pre-requisite of the symbolic order. Freud says that the girl having seen a penis and having decided in a flash that she
wants one, hates her mother for not giving her one and scorns her for not having one herself. Chodorow, using clinical revisions of Freud to reassess his theory, argues that the girl turns to the father not because she hates her mother but rather because, continuing to love her mother, she hopes that the father will be able to supply her with what she perceives would satisfy her mother’s (heterosexual) desire. A girl’s libidinal turning to her father is not at the expense of, or a substitute for, her attachment to her mother.

Our mythographers, from Freud to Lacan’s explicators, view this continued pre-Oedipal attachment to the mother as the daughter’s tragedy because it means she is deprived of the experience they value most highly. Only in an androcentric culture would it be considered tragic for a girl, for it is pre-eminently a masculine experience (primary castration).

The daughter’s continued pre-Oedipal attachment to her mother, has important consequences for the writing of daughters, for the ways in which women rewrite the story of language. The daughter does enter the symbolic order, but she does not do so exclusively. She has the positive experience of never having given up entirely the pro-symbolic communication that carries over, the bond to the mother, beyond the pre-Oedipal period. The daughter, therefore, speaks two languages at once. Along with the symbolic language, she retains the literal or pre-symbolic that the son represses at the time of his renunciation of his mother. Just as there is for the daughter no Oedipal ‘crisis’, her entry into the symbolic order is only a gradual shift of emphasis.
The daughter’s retention of this earliest language has profound implications for the differential valuations of literal and figurative, and for women writers’ relations to them. The daughter will perhaps prefer the literal that her brother devalues. Although she does not share Chodorow’s view of its continuation past the Oedipal phase, Luce Irigaray suggests most compactly the implications of this pre-symbolic mother-daughter relation for figurative and literal language in our present culture – that is, the mother’s and daughter’s earliest relation takes place prior to the distancing of one from the other that would give either of them a visible face, and also, prior to figuration or to the symbolic order. Unlike the son, the daughter does not, in Chodorow’s views, give up this belief in communication that takes place in presence rather than in absence. Her pre-symbolic or literal language, with its lack of gaps between signifier and referent, will resemble the literal from which the son is in flight. She might not find the opposition between literal and figurative as ‘telling’ for it maintains a boundary not sacred to her. Or, recognizing such a boundary, she might favour the literal over the figurative. Her operation of language might not be based on the privilege of figuration, and possibly not on any concept of representation that requires the absence of and covert desire for the object. ‘Representation’ in the daughter’s view might indeed mean presence, not absence, since her experience is not one of complete loss in the first case.

In ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, Cixous relies heavily on the materiality of language, the texture of words, the effect of word combinations and word-play, as well as on an over-stress of metaphor that minimizes the possibility of
attributing literal meaning – grounded as this spurious notion is on centuries-old traditions of masculine categorizations of concepts – to any portion of the text. The text attempts to move beyond even poetic stratagems in as much as its ‘parts’ resist assimilation into unity or into any reductive hierarchy that might assign a status of centrality to any of its claims. Addressing women, she charges that men have ‘riveted us between two horrifying myth: between the Medusa and the abyss’. The ‘abyss’ refers to the connotations and implications of Freud’s designation of women as a ‘dark continent’, pregnant with a mystery recalcitrant to analysis and understanding. Like Beauvoir, Cixous resists this view as being symptomatic of the resisting male. Countering the other myth, that of woman as Medusa, she affirms ‘you only have to look at Medusa straight on to see her. And she’s laughing.’ For Cixous, (as for symbolic poets like Laforgue and thinkers like Schopenhauer and Bergson) laughter is a symbolic mode of refusing the history of male conceptuality, of truth as defined by masculine tradition of thought. It is not that laughter opposes truth with some other truth in the conceptual mold. Laughter is a way of exceeding the very notion of truth, of refusing to engage in the thought processes and categorization of the world, that have generated this motion. Laughter exceeds or transcends ‘theory’, which by its historically determined nature is ‘male’. Cixous states that a ‘feminine text’ is more than subversive. It is designed ‘to break up ‘truth’ with laughter’. It is the Medusa, in her newly envisaged beauty, who wears this laughing countenance, beyond the assaulting reach of her own reflectedness in the male shield of self-protection truth. In her demythified and remythified status, she cannot be destroyed like the Medusa of myth.
To focus on the ‘laugh’ of Medusa, is to redeem woman, to liberate her from her degraded status in the history of male mythology. It is also to undermine the entire conceptual apparatus that has perpetuated the myth of woman. The Medusa’s laugh returns the woman to her pre-mythic state, to the reality that has been repressed, to the state of actuality behind the myth. It does not oppose the theory but laughs in its face, creating through the laughter an engagement with theory that cannot be reduced to simple opposition but gestures towards a reformation of the very grounds of communication between the system of language on which conventional notions of truth are grounded and an alternative, female language. This new language will subsist in relation of laughter to conventional male language (not in opposition).
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3


6. Ibid., p. 127.


8. Ibid.


19. Ibid.


21. Ibid., p. 182.


23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.


32. Ibid., p. 133.

33. Ibid., p. 403.

34. Ibid., pp. 471,472.

35. Ibid., p. 473.

37. Ibid.


39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., p. 43.

41. Ibid., p. 61.

42. Ibid., p. 239.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p. 238.

46. Ibid., p. 240.

47. Ibid., p. 688.


51. Ibid.


53. Woolf, *Room of One’s Own*, p. 95.

54. Woolf, *A Room of One’s Own*, p. 112.


56. Ibid., p. 2.

57. Ibid., p. 6.
58. Ibid., p. 147.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., p. 148.
61. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 293.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., p. 43.
71. Ibid., p. 27,29.
72. Ibid., p. 27.
73. Ibid.

77. Ibid., p.119.


