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Chapter IV

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION

4.1 Review of Literature of the Study

a. Literature on Veddas

Book and other publications written about the Veddas in general are abundant. Though there is no dearth of material written in English, Sinhalese and other languages, well researched literature among them are few and far in between. Hence, it would be more appropriate to concentrate more on those dealing with the subject in particular.

Almost all literature written about the Vedda folk by early writers I have sought to review. Apart from some indirect references in the ancient literature such as MAHAVAMSA (600 A.D.), NAMAVALIYA (1426 A.D.), RASAVAHINI (1270 - 1293 A.D.), RUWANMALA (1314 A.D.), THISARA SANDESAYA (1409-1450 A.D.), PARAVI SANDESAYA (1433 - 1440 A.D.), it was Rebert Knox who was more specific in his study of this community. Robert Knox's HISTORICAL RELATION OF CEYLON was first published in London in the year 1681. The author, a sailor in the English East Company, was arrested in 1660 and detained for nearly twenty years by the king of Kandy. HISTORICAL RELATION OF CEYLON was published after the author's escape and it gives an authentic description of his personal experience and the kandyen kingdom. The book is valuable for several reasons. It records and gives vivid description of the social and economic history of Ceylon in the seventeenth century. Chapter I of part III of the book is mainly concerned with the inhabitants of the island. He deals with 'Wild-men' (Veddas) in general and their way of life in particular from page 98 - 101. His account has been made one of the chief sources of information by the later researchers on the subject.
The seizure of the island by the British imperialists in the late 18th century resulted in a prolific output in terms of research on the physical anthropological aspect and the life of Veddas by the colonial administrators. Scholars like Percival (1805), Gillings (1853), Tennant (1860), Bailey (1863), Hartshorne (1876) Virchow, Le Mesurier and Sarasin brothers (1886) and Hugh Nevill (1887) are to name a few prominent researchers on Veddas. These early 19th century writers have made a valuable contribution to the literature of Veddas. Bailey’s article (1863 : 278 - 320) entitled AN ACCOUNT OF THE WILD TRIBES OF THE VEDDAS OF CEYLON: THEIR HABITS, CUSTOMS, AND SUPERSTITIOUS describes the Vedda way of life and their social organization. The author has also discussed the origin of Veddas and is of opinion that the Veddas of Ceylon and many of the wild tribes of India are identical.

Le Mesurier and Virchow had also written in the same manner. But Virchow’s writings were more descriptive compared to those of his contemporaries. Virchow (1886 : 346 - 495) wrote an article on THE VEDDAS OF CEYLON, AND THEIR RELATION TO THE NEIGHBOURING TRIBES in the Royal Asiatic Society Journal. It was believed by the author that linguistics can be used only as an aid, in an investigation of the origin of a human group. Hence, to find out on investigate about their origin one has to rely more on physical anthropology. Accordingly, he made a comprehensive study of the skulls of Veddas.

Busk (1862), Bailey (1863), Hartshorne (1876), and Sarasin brothers (1886) took a keen interest in the Vedda physical anthropology. The contribution of Sarasin (1886 : 289 - 305) is of great importance here. Vedda skulls were compared and contrasted with the neighbouring Sinhalese and Tamils to determine specific characteristics of each one. Eventually they concluded that Sinhalese, Tamils and Veddas are three well-distinguishable races.

The colonial administrator, Hugh Nevill had taken a deep interest in the culture and history of Ceylon. The author’s (1887 : 13 - 31) comment on Vedda dialect proves that language of the Veddas is largely, identical with the old Sinhalese, which is now termed ‘Elu’. Neither the numerous Sanskrit derivatives of the later Sinhalese nor any trace of Pali has been found in it by the author.
Writers like Parson (1907), Parker (1909), Seligmann (1911), Hartley (1913) and Wayland (1919) who conducted their research in the first quarter of the 20th century are also worth noting.

Henry Parker in a separate section of his book on *ANCIENT CEYLON : AN ACCOUNT OF THE ABORIGINES AND OF PART OF THE EARLY CIVILIZATION* focuses his attention on the aborigines of the country. In his volume a thorough factual account of the ancient and modern Veddas along with their history and way of life is documented. The author has explained (1982 ed: 26-29) that the Veddas enjoyed a high status and played a significant role many Sinhalese Kings of the country in the ancient times. Parker has reported a 16th century manuscript called *Wanni Kadyim pota*, where the appointment of a Vedda as ‘Bandara Mudiyanse’ (a title applied only to high caste chiefs) on the orders of the king Bhuvanekabahu VIII is mentioned. This Vedda chief is said to have supplied the king with elephants captured in the area. In another manuscript Parker has also mentioned of the early seventeenth century, giving an account of a civil war between Veddas and king Rajasimha II. This puts beyond doubt that the Veddas held a strong and powerful position in the ancient society. As Parker’s book had given a direction to the later writers in the early twentieth century, it was considered an excellent work by the latter.

C.G. Seligmann who was the teacher of Bronislaw Malinowski at the London School of Economics, came to Ceylon in 1911 and wrote a book on the Veddas. Indeed, this is a critical piece of work, which could be considered as one of the masterpieces about the Vedda. *THE VEDDAS* (1911), in a combined effort of C.G. Seligmann and Brenda Seligmann. The book consists of seventeen chapters, four hundred and fifty seven pages including the conclusion, appendix, glossary, index, Vedda vocabulary and seventy one plates. In the first chapter, the authors present a historical and geographical setting of Veddas. In writing this chapter the authors quoted early writers such as Knox, Parker, Tennant, Bailey, Virchow, Rutimeyer, Sarasins, Green, Pole etc. With the help of these works Seligmann tried to reveal the correct historical and geographical setting of these inhabitants. The authors believed that the legend of Vijaya and Kuveni to be a mere concoction. In the second chapter, the authors examine the prevailing condition of the Veddas. This chapter gives a comprehensive description of the Veddas scattered over the various parts of the island such as Hennebedda, Danigala, Kovil Vanama, Uniche, Sitala Wanniya, Galmeda, Badulla - Batticaloa, Omuni, Unowatura Bubula, Dambani, Malgode.
Elakotaliya, Kalukaleba, Yakure, Rotawewa etc. The above mentioned ‘Dambari’ village, which is now called ‘Dambana’, is the area of present study of Seligmann who was not impressed with the Dambari Veddas. He describes them as follows:

The Dambari people are unfortunately “show” Veddas, that is to say, people who have been sent for so often by white visitors that they have learnt certain tricks, which they show off directly they see a European, and so constantly demand presents that serious work with them is an impossibility (1969: 49).

But the authors say, that a positive advantage which has, however, arisen from this condition, is that these folk have kept up the remains of the so-called Vedda language. In the third, fourth and fifth chapters, the authors present the Vedda’s social organization, genologies, family life, property and inheritance respectively. In order to examine the clan organization of Veddas, they did a thorough investigation in each and every Vedda village. Seligmann’s investigation shows that some Veddas practiced their father’s waruge (Clan) and others practiced their mother’s waruge (Clan). Thus custom differed from case to case accordingly to the practice. In the fourth chapter, family life of Veddas, while discussing the he mentions the status and puberty ceremony of the Vedda women. He highlight the fact that in every respect the Vedda women seem to be treated as equal with the men. Chapters fifth to tenth are based on the religion of Veddas. The authors have discussed even the smallest detail of Vedda religion and magic. They have given an extensive account on their beliefs, invocations and ceremonial dances. Subsequently, the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters, deal with music and songs of this group. These chapters consist of thirty-four musical records and several Vedda songs. In fact, the thirteenth chapter was written by C.S. Myers. He says, that the account of Vedda music given in this section is based upon an examination of thirty-four phonographic records of songs obtained from the Veddas by Dr. and Mrs. Seligmann. The authors provide an introduction to the music and have analysed the methods, intervals and rhythms. Apart from these subjects, Seligmann also talks about the coastal Veddas1 art and crafts, language and the way of life. Eventually, the authors sum up the volume with their own conclusion.

Other writers such as R.L. Spittle (1924 - 1957), Joseph (1933) and Hill (1941) have conducted studies on the Vedda community. Spittle was prominent among those who searched for material on the Vedda folk. Almost all the books written by him about this.

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1 The Veddas who live coastal areas of the Eastern Province in Sri Lanka.
community are in the form of novels such as WILD CEYLON : DESCRIBING IN PARTICULAR THE LIVES OF THE PRESENT DAY VEDDAS (1924), SAVAGE SANCTUARY (1941), VANISHED TRAILS : THE LAST OF THE VEDDAS (1950), THE VEDDAS : WHERE THE WHITE SAMBHUR ROAMS (1951), WILD WHITE BOY (1957), FAR-OFF THINGS : INTRODUCING THE LEGENDS, PEOPLES, INCLUDING THE VEDDA ABORIGINES JUNGLE LORD AND ADVENTURE OF CEYLON (1957). In his introduction to the novel SAVAGE SANCTUARY (translated into Sinhalese WANASARANA - 1995 ed) spittle explains his purpose of the work thus.

I neither measured the bodies of Veddas nor used them as scientific experimental tools. What I needed was to capture at least a glimpse of their souls and depict them as human beings in the existing scenario (1995 ed : introduction to the novel).

In the mid twentyth century M.D. Raghavan (1953), P.E.P. Deraniyagala (1953, 1963), and Bridget Allchin (1958) emerged as prominent writers on Veddas.

Raghavan who was an ethnologist at National Museums in Ceylon man mainly concerned with the welfare planning of Veddas. He also discussed about another aborigin called Kinnarayas in Ceylon. In one of his articles, which appeared in the journal of Ceylon Today (1955) he presents his suggestions for a welfare plan to these backward communities. The author also wrote an article in 1953 in the New Lanka journal on Veddas entitled : THE VEDDA TODAY. In this article he emphasises the necessity of education for this community and said, that the progress in the field of tribal education in India give us a pattern for the development of a Vedda educational scheme.

P.E.P. Deraniyagala who was an eminent archaeologist cum anthropologist had a great interest in the pre-history of Ceylon and had conducted a detailed study on the excavations at Bandarawela, Diyatalawa, Balangoda, Kuruwita, Bellan Bandi Palarsa etc. He had written numerous articles on the stone age of Ceylon and on the Vedda as a man of the stone age of the Island. Among his articles are THE STONE AGE AND CAVE MAN CEYLON in JRAS (Ceylon Br - 1943), STONE AGE OF CEYLON in JRAS (Ceylon Br - 1954), THE HYBRIDIZATION OF THE VEDDA WITH THE SINHALESE in Spolia Zeylanica (1963). S.U. Deraniyagala, the grand son of P.E.P Deraniyagala is engaged in carrying further his grand father's research work till now. Deraniyagala (Junior) also
contributed an important literature to the same field and recently (1992) wrote a book with two parts on pre-history entitled, **THE PRE-HISTORY OF SRILANKA : AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE**. In this book the author gives his special attention to the Veddas.

Allchin, a contemporary of Deraniyagala (Senior) wrote on Veddas in JRAS (Great Britain and Ireland Br - 1958). Her interest of studies is also based upon the late stone age of Ceylon. Therefore she had collected many information on the caves of this period in the island relevant to her study area.

Many writers in recent time have also written about the Veddas. Wijesekara in 1964, Brow in 1978, Punchihewa in 1984, K.N.O. Dharmadasa and S.W.R.de A. Samarasinghe in 1990, Stegaborn in 1993, Meegaskumbura in 1995 are to maintain few.

Among their works, the book **VEDDAS IN TRANSITION** authored by Nandadeva Wijesekara in 1964 is of anthropological significance. The author has proceeded to record present-day information and contemporary data pertaining to the Vedda community. The book comprises of twelve chapters with diacriptions of pre-historic age cultures and an appendix on population figure of other races. From chapter one to three, Wijesekara has recorded certain information on the pre-historic ancient reces of Ceylon and their society. In the third chapter, he introduces Veddas. In the fourth and fifth chapters the writer tries to reveal the origin of Veddas with the aid of the legends and their physical anthropology. In the sixth chapter entitled : “Gographical distribution of the Veddas and their present condition” he mentions the provinces where the Veddas lived and has paid specially emphasis on the Veddas who were scattered in Uva and Eastern provinces. Thirty years ago in his book, Wijesekara (1964 : 58) has described Dambana Vedda thus.

The Veddas living in Dambana still preserve some of the customs, traditional manners and modes of behaviour. They greet and treat visitors cordially. They help them as is the custom of jungle people when no suspicion exists about their presence. They observe certain ritual and ceremonial performances with the coming of age and thereafter. Segregation huts which used to be erected ten or fifteen feet away from the houses have now become mere adjuncts. It is understood that the aggregation hut has now become a site for early romances child marriage still continues. There was a case of a girl who had not yet come of age but had been married to an older man and they were living as husband and wife. There was another case of a girl of about 12 years who was married to a man of about the same age and she was expecting a child. They still preserve some of the ancient lore, songs and stories. But the
truth emerges boldly that this culture does not shape their way of life now. They exist but are
not influenced very much by it.

Subsequently, he writes on Vedda way of life, social organization, Vedda language, beliefs, invocation and magic in the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth chapters. The eleventh chapter discusses the future of the Vedda. I suppose that this chapter gave a vivid picture to the scholars and readers as to what would happen to this community in the near future. Eventually, the author gives substantial tables on Veddas in his twelfth chapter. This book was translated into Sinhala, as \textit{Veddange Vikasana Kramaya}. This scholarly work written in a forceful and attractive style became popular among the Sinhala readers, and it awakened the Sinhalese to pay attention to this vanishing community in the decade of 1960.

The book written by James Brow in 1978 is entitled, \textit{Vedda Villages of Anuradhapura: The Historical Anthropology of Community in Sri Lanka}. According to the author this monograph has several aspects. It is an account of the social institution of a caste group (Variga), located in Anuradhapura District in the North Central Province of Sri Lanka, which is barely mentioned in the existing literature. And also, it is an historical study that examines the operation of a kinship system during a period of considerable upheaval and change. This work has been subjected to severe criticism by many scholars, such as K.N.O. Dharmadasa on the grounds that Brow had selected a wrong sample by taking Vanni folk as Veddas. Brow points out the contradictions present in earlier writings on Veddas of Seligmann and Leach. However, Brow has critically analysed the early ethnographs and presented a rich ethnological context to the readers.

The combined work edited by K.N.O. Dharmadasa and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe (1990): \textit{The Vanishing Aborigines} examines the various aspects of the Vedda community. There are seven papers contributed by prominent scholars in the field. The book starts with an attractive introduction entitled: \textit{The plight of the indigenous} written by Rodolfo Stavenhagen. Chapter one entitled: \textit{The Vedda and his mentors: Some theoretical and methodological considerations} was written by C.R. de Silva. In his essay he is concerned with Vedda identity, population, status in the past and so on. In the latter part of his essay he pays attention to the Indian experiences of tribal education and health. One of the editors K.N.O. Dharmadasa has written the second, fifth and seventh chapters of
the book. Essays are entitled, *Veddas in the history of Sri Lanka: an introductory sketch*, *The Vedda language*, *The Veddas' struggle for survival: Problems, policies and responses*. In the second chapter the author analyses the ancient writings on Veddas and thereby makes an effort to reveal their history. In the fifth chapter he pays attention to his own specialized field on the Vedda language and gives a detailed phonological analysis to their vocabulary, compared to Sinhala terms. The seventh chapter is devoted to their present position. In this chapter the writer gives sufficient description of Veddas' gradual transition which is largely attributed their re-settlements. Finally, he also points out the views of Jawaharlal Nehru regarding Indian tribals. S.B.Ellepola is another contributor to the same book. In the third chapter he presents a genetic analysis of the Veddas. The author has done a comparative study of Vedda genetic distance from six tribal groups of Asia and Oceania including the Sinhalese. He has also discussed with the relationship between the Vedda and the 'primitive tribes'. The author had concluded that the physical similarities among these tribals may be due to adaptations to similar environmental conditions. The fourth chapter entitled,*The Cost Veddas: Dimension of Marginality* is written by John Dart of U.S.A.. However, due to the ethnic wars the scholars were unable to keep contact with this community. Dart's study provides us with a valuable anthropological information on coastal Veddas. The author has pointed out that the coast Veddas have attracted little attention from anthropologists. In the first part of the paper he presents an account of the Vedda way of living, with special reference to their religious practices. He also mentions their puberty rituals. Eventually he says that the concept of marginality seems applicable to Veddas in Sinhala and Tamil speaking areas on the Eastern coast, which confirms Brow's hypothesis that Veddas as a whole occupy a structural position in Sri Lankan society which to some degree is uniform across the different regions in which they are found and the different groups (Sinhalese and Tamils) with which they interact. P.B.Meegaskumbura has written the sixth chapter of the book. The title of the paper is; *Religious beliefs of the Veddas in relation to their world-view*. His essay consists of XI parts with an appendix. He presents the various aspects of Vedda culture along with their ancestor worship and cosmology. Since this book provides us with the current information on various aspects of Veddas, it could be considered as a commendable work of the editors.

*SIRILAKA VEDDIJANA PURANAYA* (History of the Sinhala Vedda community - in Sinhala)written by P.B.Meegaskumbura in 1995 is another important book which provides historical facts about the Vedda community. This book comprises of eleven chapters. Second to fifth chapters could be considered as the most important. The author examines the
origin and the status of this inhabitants through the survey of the Sinhala classical literature, where references are given to certain aspects of Vedda life. In the rest of the chapters the author presents their clan division, social organization, religious beliefs and rituals, Vedda language, the present position and so on.

Though many books have been published about facts relating to the Veddas, in general yet there is severe dearth of information related to Vedda women. Hence, as there is no recorded literature about the Vedda woman, most of my material are derived from the field study.

b. Literature on Adolescence and Puberty Ritual

However, a number of anthropological and psychological studies have been published on adolescence and rites of passage up to now. It was from the earliest times that the connection between human behavior and the individual’s age had been enquired into. For example, the initial recorded sources about the development of the puberty process comes from Aristotle (384 BC) and Pliny (300 - 400 AD).

In this century we have Havelock Ellis (1902), C.H.Cooley (1902), G.Stanley Hall (1904) who is regarded as the European father of Adolescence psychology, Sigmond Freud (1905), Anna Frud (1945-1956), Sullivan (1940 and 1945), Erik H. Erickson (1951), Anna Freud (1945-1956), Herbert Mead (1956), Elizabeth Hurlock (1956), Peter Blos (1962) and many other psychologists have written and published a host of articles and publications on the subject of attainment of puberty.

Among pioneers, Havelock Ellis was the first to introduce ‘adolescence’ to the field of psychology about the turn of 20th century. He had written four massive volumes on psychology entitled STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX, first published in 1901 and reprinted in 1936. From first to third volumes Ellis has dealt mainly with the sexual impulse in relation to its object, leaving out the external factors and the environmental influences which yet may substantially affect that impulse and its gratification. In the fourth volume which is the most significant for this study he deals with sex in relation to society, with emphasis on adolescence. This volume consists of twelve chapters. In the second chapter of this volume the author discusses sexual education, by giving a broad description on psychological disorders during the menstruation. In fact the author tries to analyse this factor from psychological and medical point of view in bid to explain many aspects of the
human sexual life. Since very few studies had been done on this subject by the early 20th
century, Havelock Ellis's contribution can be considered as of tremendous significance.

The next important contribution is made by C.H.Cooley. HUMAN NATURE AND
THE SOCIAL ORDER was, first published in 1902 and again in revised edition in 1922,
'Society and individual' is the main subject of Cooley's book. In the first chapter he
discusses heredity and instinct and gives more importance to society than heredity. The
author says that social enrichment is achieved through interaction with other persons. He
states that if we believe in the evolutionary process we can see the relation between society
and the individual as an organic relation. From third to fifth chapters he explains the role of
society in the personal development. In the fifth and sixth chapters Cooley explains the
meaning and various phases of 'I'. In fact Cooley was the one who first explained the
formation of self as a social context. A social self of this sort might be called the reflected or
looking - glass self:

Each to each a looking - glass
Reflect the other that doth pass.

Further the author says as we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, through
imagination one can vividly perceive ones appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character,
friends, and so on. In the same chapter he also pays his attention on adolescence and
explains the linkages between the stimulating social impulses and rapid development of the
functions of sex due to adolescence. From seventh to twelfth chapters Cooley considers
hostility, emulation, leadership or personal ascendancy, the social aspect of conscience,
personal degeneracy and freedom.

G. Stanley Hall was working on a companion set of text books on childhood and
adolescence. The text on adolescence actually appeared first and with its publication the
psychology of adolescence may be said to have entered adulthood. In ADOLESCENCE :
ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY,
ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION AND EDUCATION
(1904 ) Hall explains psychological development on the basis of his theory of recapitulation.

A year after Hall, in 1905, Sigmond Freud published his book ON SEXUALITY :
THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY AND OTHER WORKS. Here
Freud describes psycho-sexual development and offered the psycho-analytic concept of early childhood and puberty. In these book Freud provides us with an important perspective on adolescence based on his theory of personality development. Sexuality is the frame of reference for Freud’s theory on the development of human personality and as such it can be termed ‘psycho-sexual’. The psychological structures on which Freud based his theory of human personality - Id, Ego, Superego - are seen as some kind of internal “Objects”, located and extended in psychological space. Special metaphors, such as “depth psychology”, “deep unconscious”, and “subconscious”, are prominent throughout the Freudian system. In this volume Freud realized the importance of childhood in the psycho sexual development of personality and its characterization by infantile sexuality and the transformation of adolescence. In fact, the classical theory of psycho-analysis was the brilliant result of Freud’s attempts to integrate his many revolutionary discoveries and ideas into a coherent conceptual framework that satisfied the criteria of the science of his time.

After Sigmund Freud, his daughter Anna Freud also followed psycho-analytic theory and wrote many books and articles on childhood and adolescence. Anna Freud says in her book entitled: INDICATION FOR CHILD ANALYSIS AND OTHER PAPERS (1945-1956), ego superiority is overthrown as soon as the first signs of adolescence appear. Because of the biological increase in pregenital tendencies during pre-puberty, and genital tendencies during puberty the libidinal forces rise in strength. Throughout adolescence, Ego forces and Id force struggle with each other for the upper hand, a combat that is responsible for many of the conflicting and abnormal manifestations of that period. Thus, like her father Anna Freud also speaks on adolescence mainly in psychological perspective.

By mid 20th century Erik H. Erikson’s writings had also become very popular. He was mainly influenced by his contemporaries such as Sigmund and Anna Freud. Erikson discussed the society through the ‘identity’ and ‘personality’ of childhood and adulthood and gives more attention to the pre-adolescence and adolescence. In his books entitled CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, IDENTITY : YOUTH AND CRISIS and many other articles in journals, he broadly speaks on this fast developing subject. In his book IDENTITY : YOUTH AND CRISIS Erikson recognizes eight stages of human psychological development, adolescence being the fifth stage. It is marked by identity vs identity confusion. Here he says that the adolescents try to figure out who they are, how they are unique, if they want to have a meaningful role in society, how they can establish sexual,
Feeling of confusion can arise over these decisions. Thus Erikson gives a clear description of crisis situation during the adolescence through his writings.

After Freud, whose pioneering works generated an interest on psychology among scholars and intellectuals, G.H. Mead one of the most brilliant and original American pragmatist emerge as a major contributor to the field of social psychology in the mid 20th century. Mead's collected essays published posthumously in 1969 was entitled: GEORGE HERBERT MEAD ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. The most important sections of this book considering of part v on mind, part vi on self and part vii on societys are of relevance to the present study. Here Mead provides us a set of concepts directly pertaining to crucial matters such as complex mental activities self, self-control, audience, role-playing, social interaction, motivation, group membership and group functioning. In the fifth part of the book he deals with the relationship between social psychology and psychology. Mead explains that social psychology is mostly concerned with the effect which the social group has in the determination of the experience and conduct of the individual members (See Mead 1964 ed: 115). In the same part he pays his attention on behaviorism. Mead says behaviorism is, the study of experience of the individual from the point of view of his conduct, particularly, but not exclusively, the conduct as it is observable by others. ‘The self and the organism’ is the main title of the sixth part of the book. Giving an absolute definition on self, Mead says that the self is something which has a development; it is not initially there at birth but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that it develops as a result of an individuals relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process. Subsequently he also tries to distinguish ‘I’ and ‘me’ as different phases of the self. The seventh part devotes on society: the community and the institution. Here considering the activities of society, Mead states that the institutions of society are organized forms of group or social activity, and is so organized that the individual members of society can act individually or socially by taking the attitudes of others while performing any activity. Apart from mind, self and society Mead takes into consideration the views of other sociologists and psychologists such as Comte, Cooley, Bergson etc. Mead’s position is radically different from that of most social psychologists and sociologists and sociologists quoted by him. Therefore Anselm Strauss who edited the same book in 1964, says in his introduction that Mead’s writings remains genuinely exciting and still stimulate researchers.
The book DEVELOPMENT PSYCHOLOGY authored by Elizabeth B. Hurlock in 1959 is another significant work. The book consists of fifteen chapters. In her book the author surveys the different episodes of human life from conception to death. Here she says that this covers from ‘sperm to worm’ is a gigantic task. Therefore, no attempt has been made to give a complete picture of the development at any one stage of the life span. Thus she tries to give a lengthy description. From seventh to ninth chapters Hurlock speaks on early adolescence, adolescence and late adolescence. She says, puberty is a unique and distinctive period in development with certain characteristics not found at other times in the life span. Further she explains that early adolescence is a crucial time during which the individual should be sheltered and protected. She has given special emphasis mainly to the physiological and psychological changes during the adolescence. She is concerned with the behavioural changes which occur during puberty. In her book, Hurlock describes crucial points by illustrations, figures and tables. Therefore she has succeeded in giving a vivid pictures on what is common to human beings.

When observing anthropological studies, Arnold van Gennap (1908), B. Malinowski (1927), Margaret Mead (1928), Rafel Karsten (1935), Ruth Benedict (1946), Audry Richards (1956), Adomson Hobel (1958), Kathaleen Gough(1961), Nur Yalman (1963), and many other many other scholars have been engaged in this popular field and written a number of books and articles. From among them, RITES DE PASSAGE written by van Gennap in the early stages is considered of great importance.

RITES DE PASSAGE, written in 1908 by Arnold van Gennep, is considered as one of the classics ever written on this field of study. He analyses ritual behaviour and its relation to the dynamics of individual and group life. The book consists of ten chapters including the conclusion. He discusses various kinds of life ceremonies according to his own classification of rites. Explaining the objectives of the study the author says, “since no one has shown why such rites are performed in a specific order he tries to understand it”. He has analyzed the ‘Rites of Passage’ in the entire life-span of a human being. Here, Van Gennep describes the rites of separation from a previous world, preliminal rites, those executed during transitional stage, liminal rites, and the ceremonies of incorporation into the new world, postliminal rites. In sixth chapter van Gennep writes on initiation rites. Reviewing many puberty rituals in various societies the author said that, “the puberty ceremonies were misnamed, since this type of rite occurred at ages which had no specific relation to the physical appearance of sexual maturity. He further considered these rites to
be primarily rites of separation from an asexual world, followed by rites of incorporation into a sexual world. Giving an introduction to this masterwork, Solon T. Kimbali states that, “van Gennep helped to clarify and to systematize existing data for the benefit of subsequent scholars.” In fact the author’s attempt should be appreciated, since it is a great inspiration to these scholars those who would like to conduct further research on rites of passage.

In 1927, Bronislaw Malinowski was influenced by Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytical theory. In his book entitled *SEX AND REPRESSION IN SAVAGE SOCIETY*, Malinowski basically observes the matrilineal complex among Melanesians. Emphasising on the family he speaks on rights, status and sexuality of members of the Melanesian family. The author says, “undoubtedly the age of puberty must be regarded as the most important landmark in the sexual history of the individual.” While describing the observenceof puberty rituals among Melanesians, Malinowski applies Freud’s psychoanalytic theory to this significant event in life called ‘puberty’.

The book *COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA : A STUDY OF ADOLESCENCE AND SEX IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY* authored by Margaret Mead in 1928, evoked the readers’ curiosity towards the field of adolescence. She spent nine months in Samoa and gathered many detailed facts about the Samoan girls. She studied most intensively the households in which adolescent girls lived. She tried to present the Samoan girl in her social setting. In fourteen chapter of the monograph, Mead pays attention on the education of Samoan child, their household, Samoan girls, their formal sex relations, their experiences and individuality, attitude towards personality, conflicts, maturity, old age, and so on. In the early twentieth century, Stanley Hall said that the adolescence could be identified as a period of storm and stress. But the author denies this claim through her experiences with the Samoan youths. Franz Boas while introducing her book, gives credit to Margaret Mead for having undertaken an effort to identify herself so completely with Samoan youth that she was able to give a lucid and clear picture of the joys and difficulties encountered by the young individual in a culture so entirely different from our own. But Mead’s study on Samoan adolescents was subjected to severe criticism by Derek Freeman in 1983. Through a comparative study of these data Mead tells us the growth and development of young people in pre-literate societies. Apart from this book Mead had written number of books on tribal societies such as *SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES, MALE AND FEMALE : A STUDY OF THE SEXES IN A CHANGING*
After Margaret Mead, an important book was that of Ruth Benedict in 1946 entitled: \textit{Patterns of Culture}. The three different 'primitive' people described in this volume have been chosen because knowledge of these tribes is comparatively enormous and satisfactory. She was able to supplement published descriptions with many discussions with the field ethnologists who have lived intimately with these people and who have written the authoritative descriptions of the tribes in question. She herself lived several summers in the Pueblo of Zuni, and among some of the neighbouring tribes which she has used to contrast Pueblo culture. The book consists of eight chapters. In the first chapter she is concerned about the science of custom. In the second chapter the author pays attention to the diversity of cultures. Here she talks about the adolescence in cultures such as in Central North America, in Australia, in interior of British Columbia, Nandi of East Africa and etc. The authoress says that in order to understand puberty, we do not need the analysis of the necessary nature of rites of passage; we rather need to know what is identified in different cultures with the beginning of adulthood and their methods of admission to the new status. Not biological puberty, but what adulthood means in that culture conditions of the puberty ceremony. In her fourth, fifth and sixth chapters she writes of the cultures of the Pueblos of New Mexico, Dobu and the Northwest Coast of America. She describes their way of living, culture patterns, rites of passage, economy, rituals, magic and religion, crime etc. In addition to above topics she also considers the integration of culture, the nature of society and finally the individual and the pattern of culture. In fact the author attempts to understand different cultures is really commendable. Therefore in a preface to Ruth Benedict's book, Margaret Mead states that for quarter of a century, this book has provided a felicitous and provocative introduction to the understanding of anthropology.

Audrey I. Richards \textit{Chisungu: A Girl's Initiation Ceremony Among the Bemba of Zambia} is written in 1956. The book consists of three parts such as the cultural setting of the society, the ceremony and the interpretation of the ceremony. This is a study of girls' initiation ritual from the woman's point of view. 'Chisungu' is shown to involve human concerns with sex and reproduction, the birth and health of children involved, also ideas about the continuity between past, present and future. According to Richards the Chisungu might be regarded as an extreme expression of the dilemma of a matrilineal society in which men are dominant but the line goes through the
woman. She writes "the puberty ritual is of interest to different types of scientists. The psychologists studying symbolic behaviour or the linguist interested in the ritual use of language, needs to know the whole system of symbols used if he is to draw deductions from the material". Part II of the book is mainly concerned with the details of the ceremony. Citing many songs Richards describes the ritual step by step. She finishes this part explaining the performance of the last night of the ritual. Part III of the book is entirely concerned with the interpretation of the ritual. Here the author expressing the purpose of the 'Chisungu', concentrates on the pragmatic effects of the ritual. Some of her explanations are based on sociological assumptions and some on psychological ones. She said that she was unable to draw neat boundaries between the two. In fact this is one of the best books written on this subject. Giving an introduction to the Chisungu 1982 edition, Fontaine says "this book contains more than a classic description of ritual no longer performed, although it does provide us with that, set in its social and cultural context. It also presents a plethora of ideas, which stimulate our thinking about ritual and social life".

The review of literature is concluded with Nur Yalman's article ON THE PURITY OF WOMEN IN THE CASTE OF CEYLON AND MALABAR written in 1963. The central argument of this essay has been that there is a close connection between the anxiety concerning female sexual purity, puberty rites and pre-puberty marriage on the one hand, and caste as a bilateral structural principle on the other. Accordingly, in this article she examines the rites concerning female puberty and sexuality and relate them by comparative analysis, first, to the general structure of caste and, second to the local and limited variations in certain kinship systems. Here Yalman hopes to show, that filiation through the mother, and the protection of female purity is fundamental to the caste system of Ceylon and Malabar and that these principles may have structural implications in other Hindu castes. A different aspect of this study concerns the relation between structural and psychoanalytical explanations, and the problem is examined in its context. This essay is in seven parts. In the part II, Sinhalese kinship and puberty ceremonies is presented. They are then related to the general scheme which Kathleen Gough (1955) has presented for the Malabar coast. The structural implications of caste are discussed in part V and further comparative evidence from Brahmans, Nambudiris, and Ceylon Veddas is presented to support the argument. With each and every steps of the Sinhalese puberty rituals she shows how it help the girl to re-entry into the community. Also she concerns about the puberty ritual of Malabar coast which consists of symbolic marriage called tali-kattu kalyanam (tali - tying marriage). Here Yalman compares these two ceremonies that are practised among the kandyan Sinhalese and
the Nayar and Tiyyar communities of Southern Malabar. Finally she focuses to the central theme of the essay and argues that “there is a specific and important relationship between female purity and the purity of castes. The preoccupation with caste purity narrows and focuses attention on a profound ‘danger’ situation — the appearance of female sexuality — in a formal manner; it marks the timing of the rites and gives form to the ceremony”.

The present study draws upon the secondary literature and on field interpretation.

4.2 Theoretical Consideration

a Introduction

Since the present research is on the puberty ritual and socialization among the Veddas, an inter-disciplinary approach (anthropology, sociology, and psychology) is indispensable. That will help in understanding, describing, and interpreting the significance of the puberty ritual and socialization of the Veddas, from the observations of the author’s empirical study over the last four years.

Like every society, Vedda society too has been changing gradually and now it is even faster and drastic. Special attention is paid to their social and cultural changes throughout this research study. A separate chapter (chapter 08) is completely devoted to explain the social and cultural changes of this vanishing community. The puberty ritual and socialization of Veddas are presented in this changing scenario.

Before embarking on the task of formulating the theoretical framework for this research study, a brief survey of the central issues which underpin the task of analyzing culture is carried out. The issues are the limits of sociologistic reductionism and the domination of positivistic tendencies. To resolve these problematics various contemporary analysts of culture such as Althusser, Barthes, Bellah, Berger, Douglas, Eliade, Foucault, Geertz, Habermas, Levi-Strauss, Lukacs, Ricoeur have been looked at.

Two such approaches are considered here in the study of culture which have been pursued with growing interest and with some success over the past quarter century. The cultural anthropology of Mary Douglas is extensively used in this study complemented by the phenomenological approach of Peter Berger. While Mary Douglas gives emphasis on
the importance of moral dimension to reality, Peter Berger adds subjectivity as an important dimension of reality. This is one of the major reasons for using both these two approaches in the theoretical consideration of this research study.

The other main reasons are:

- Both Douglas and Berger approach culture primarily from the standpoint of everyday life;
- They reject possibilities of the social sciences being modeled after the physical sciences and, for this reason, have given more attention to the assumptions and purposes underlying the social sciences; and
- Berger and Douglas have contributed significantly to grasp symbolic world more effectively. Through her empirical work Douglas demonstrates a technique for understanding symbolic patterns.
- At the centre of Douglas's work is the belief in the role of ritual and symbol in the production and re-production of social relations.

Theoretical framework commences with a brief discussion on Levis-Strauss's approach, his originality and his limitations. Then the cultural anthropology of Mary Douglas is presented followed by its application to the present study. Subsequently, the phenomenological approach of Peter Berger is briefly discussed focusing on his originality, and relevance to the present study. While highlighting the originality and the insights provided by Douglas and Berger some limitations and shortcomings of these two cultural analysts are also discussed separately at the end of the two approaches.

b. The Central Issues Which Underpin the Task of Analyzing Culture

I. Sociologistic Reductionism: Instead of treating culture as an interesting phenomenon in its own right social scientists have reduced it to some other level. On one hand it is assumed that culture can only be understood by relating it to social-structure. This is one form of reductionism. For example instead of attempting to understand religion, one attributes it to differences in social class. On the other hand it is assumed that only individuals have culture. This assumption is another form of reductionism. If culture is indeed nothing more than thoughts and
feelings, then, to be sure, individuals are the only ones who can think and feel. But in other areas of social sciences progress have been made only when this assumption is abandoned. Durkheim’s classic study of variations in suicide rates was conceivable only assuming that these rates were independently interesting apart from the actions of individuals. So with Marx. The study of capitalist class relations implied something of importance that even individuals were neither aware of nor able to control.

II. The domination of positivistic tendencies: With the enormous success of natural sciences, attempts were made to model social sciences too after the natural sciences. As a result of this various positivistic sociologists had the endemic tendency to reify social phenomena. Positivism has this shortcoming because of its tendency to construct third and fourth order constructs (e.g. through mathematical modeling) and to analyse social reality entirely with reference to these constructs. What one has is a conceptual apparatus that is removed from the social reality in successively distant degrees. Constructs that have been reified in this manner are unable to penetrate what is specifically human in human reality—a serious fault in a science that takes this human reality as its avowed objective.

A cultural analysis likely to advance is a redefinition of the premises concerning culture. Its definition, its main elements and its indicators are, its relation to social structure, and how its changes need to be rethought, as it were, from the ground up. This task has, in fact, begun and much insightful progress has been made. Levis-Strauss’s contribution in this regard is worth considering at the outset.

Levis-Strauss’s innovation was that rather than opposing human nature to cultural variety as two incompatible notions, he has attempted to show that the first lies behind the second as a unified, abstract structure governing concrete, observable variations. This principle is not new. It was taken for granted by classical philosophers of human nature. Levis-Strauss set himself the task of renovating this principle, while at the same time meeting the new challenge, by attempting simultaneously to make better sense of cultural peculiarities and to establish the intellectual unity of mankind. In describing how this ideas took shape Levis-Strauss acknowledges that geology, Marxism, and psychoanalysis as his three sources of inspiration (Sperber 1979: 19-21).
At the very beginning of *The Savage Mind*, Levis-Strauss argues against the notion that 'primitive' peoples are incapable of abstract thought. Many anthropologists would agree with this and cite this as an evidence of the highly varied and elaborate moral and metaphysical concepts which have been recorded among such peoples throughout the world. Levis-Strauss’s approach is original in at least three ways. First, in its purpose: What he aims at understanding through the study of cultural symbolism is neither some primitive stage in human intellectual development nor the underlying ideology of a specific cultural area, but a mode of thinking shared by all humans, irrespective of time or place. Secondly, he is not concerned with ascribing a single interpretation to each symbol but rather with showing that symbols are open to a great variety of different and complementary interpretations. Thirdly, he is concerned with systematic relationships between symbols, the abstract level of interpretation is a means of establishing these relationships rather than an end in itself (Sperber 1979: 26).

Levis-Strauss’s originality, which might easily go unnoticed or be misunderstood, combined the notion of the psychic unity of humans with new arguments to show that ethnography has a true, indeed unique, psychological relevance. Dan Sperber (1979: 33) also argues that Levis-Strauss’s approach to totemism and more generally to symbolism has renewed the issues in a most important and positive way. Levis-Strauss assumes that the structure of such symbolic systems as totemic classification is determined by a universal human ability rather than by the inabilities of ‘primitives’ or by practical need, whether individual or social. He neatly summarizes this when he says that symbolic animals are chosen not because they are ‘good to eat’, but because they are ‘good to think.’

With regards to myths Levis-Strauss’s contribution has been, first to show that resemblances are not the only close links to be found between myths. Similarity is one type of systematic relationship between them; inversion is another. Some myths are related to others in differing from them in a systematic way. Further he argues that myths should not be analyzed one by one, but only as a part of a group of related myths (Sperber 1979: 37).

It might well be asked why Levis-Strauss should have bothered to put forward a ‘structuralist’ method based on principles which he himself does not feel impelled to follow. Sperber sees two reasons for this. In the 1940’s and 1950’s, many forward looking scholars set great store by the development of a unified science of communication based on semiotics, cybernetics, and information theory. This science would bring together the study
of language, culture, and society with that of the human brain and mind. Common concepts, and a common method, would lead to a new scientific take off. Levis-Strauss's early methodological papers were meant as contributions to this new science and he probably expected that they would soon be superseded by further advances along the same lines, made either by himself or by others. Twenty years later, it has become quite clear that such expectations were largely unjustified. The important advances that have taken place in these particular fields owe little or nothing, except a jargon, to any unified science of communication (Sperber 1979: 48-49).

Secondly, Levis-Strauss's structuralist stance must be understood in the context of the rationalist/empiricist controversy. In asserting that cultures have developed not simply in response to external demands but, more fundamentally, in accordance with the human mind's internal constraints, Levis-Strauss took a major step away from empiricism. He did this at a time when empiricism exercised an almost total domination over the social psychological sciences, under such labels as 'behaviourism' in psychology and 'cultural relativism' in anthropology. The very simple and homogenous structures which structuralism postulates served to make this reintroduction of the human mind into anthropology much more acceptable (Sperber 1979: 49).

Dan Sperber (1979: 25-33) argues in conclusion that in the case of Levis-Strauss, structuralism has become an uninspiring frame for an otherwise stimulating and inspired picture. The use Levis-Strauss makes of these new perspectives is sometimes seminal, sometimes unconvincing; but this matters less than the fact such an analysis having opened them up.

c. The Cultural Anthropology of Mary Douglas

Mary Douglas approaches culture primarily from the standpoint of everyday life. Here's is a world of ordinary symbols, rituals, objects, and activities all of which dramatize the construction of social life. Although her training is cultural anthropology, she has been less concerned than many of her colleagues with abstractions about values and world views, focusing instead on the more observable artifacts of culture in daily life - its goods, its views of what is clean and dirty, the ways in which people treat their bodies, so on and so forth. In this respect she goes one step further than Berger in making everyday reality the centerpiece of her investigations. For Berger, it is the philosophical immediateness of everyday reality
that serves as a vehicle for considering other, more abstract, more remote, modes of legitimation. For her, everyday life is itself the focus of interest. Accordingly, she has written most about such seemingly mundane matters as dirt, food, bodies, jokes, material possessions, and speech (Wuthnow and et.al 1984:77).

In all her work Mary Douglas has been concerned with classification schemes—the patterns or cultural structures—that give concrete symbols their meaning and are reaffirmed in ritual and speech. Deviance, dirt, and other things that are regarded as pollution are important for her because of what they reveal about systems and rules of classification. The very basis of cultural classifications of order in social life, she argues, is the presence of symbols that demarcate boundaries or lines of division. These are the ways in which collectivities differentiate themselves from other collectivities (external lines) and subgroups or individuals are differentiated from one another (internal lines). It is, in fact, this concern for symbolic boundaries that underlies her most ambitious theoretical contribution, the attempt to describe whole societies and whole cosmologies in terms of the nature and clarity of various combinations of external and internal lines of demarcation—what she calls ‘grid’ and ‘group’ (Wuthnow and et.al 1984:77-78).

Her interest in classification schemes derives from a questing about the ordering of collective life. Here she departs noticeably from Berger. His consideration on culture, while including such macroscopic concerns as the modernization of institutions, harken back repeatedly to the needs of the individual—for meaning and purpose, for a secure world in which to live, for a sense of personal coherence. Douglas, in contrast, favours questions about the kinds of cultural distinctions that are important for the functioning of whole groups, and the vehicles by which these distinctions are made known. This emphasis reflects her indebtedness to Durkheim. She has taken seriously the Durkheimian injunction to treat social phenomena as facts sui generis. At the same time, the world she describes is never far removed from the individual. It is the world in which self-concepts are constructed; it is dramatized in the linguistic codes that the individual assimilates as a child; and it involves the individual as moral actor who feels constrained and compelled by the valencies attached to objects and actions (Wuthnow and et.al 1984-:78).

Because of its concern for the concrete, the mundane, Douglas’s work requires a somewhat different approach to understand and appreciate it. It is pitched at a relatively low level of abstraction, depends heavily on induction, and is defended on the basis of revealing
examples rather than philosophical argument. Although Berger also relies heavily on induction and example, there is a clear sense in which the philosophical and theoretical assumptions of phenomenology have guided his work. With Mary Douglas, the theoretical underpinnings of her approach to culture remain more in the background. She is less consciously concerned with defending a metatheoretical approach than with deriving 'middle level' observations about the ordinary components of culture (Wuthnow and et.al 1984 : 78).

Among the classical theorists who have shaped the social sciences, Durkhiem is virtually the only one whose imprint can be recognized clearly in the work of Mary Douglas. She knew what Durkhiem realized, that there is a social basis for human thought, and the brunt of her work has been applying that understanding to the belief systems of modern society. She feels, though, that Durkhiem did not push his thoughts on the social determination of knowledge to their full and radical conclusion. This occurred, she argues, because of the assumptions Durkhiem made. First, he thought 'primitives' were different from 'moderns'. 'Primitive groups' are organized by similarities; their members are committed to a common symbolic life. We by contrast, are diversified individuals, united by exchange of specialized services (Wuthnow and et.al 1984 : 80; also See Douglas 1978 : xi). Second, Durkhiem believed in objective scientific truth, that is, the possibility of non-socially determined knowledge. Douglas disagrees with both these points. The difference between Durkheim's mechanical solidarity, the social glue of similarity holding 'primitive' society together, and organic solidarity, the social glue of interdependence holding modern society together, while important, does not separate 'primitives' from 'moderns'. The mechanical-organic scheme cuts across both, as there are conditions of mechanical and organic solidarity in both 'primitive' and 'modern societies'. From this point of view secularization is just another cosmology generated by a certain kind of social organization. 'modern societies' are secular because of their social organization, which is not modern as opposed to 'primitive', but represents particular patterns of social relations. If 'primitive societies' possessed the same form of social organization they would also have a secular cosmology, albeit in the form of 'primitive religion'. Evolutionary movement, then, is not only not the same as movement from mechanical to organic solidarity, but it is not a move from religion to science either. The pygmies, a 'primitive' society, do not have much, or any religious life, which Douglas attributes to their low level of social organization. A similar, more tightly organized 'primitive' society, should have a richer religious life as a function of their different social relations.
As for science, Douglas (1978: xvi) suggests, 'It is entirely understandable that Dukheim should have internalized unquestioningly the categories of nineteenth-century scientific debate since he strove to have an honorable place in the very community from which the standards to conduct emanated.' Here, then, is the heart of the problem of analyzing modern culture. A community's socially constructed picture of the cosmos, like science, is protected by not only being defined as sacred and dangerous, but more fundamentally, as truth—that is, as reality and a priori nature itself. For modern society this insight suggests that the very things we consider the most real—hence scientific—are, in fact, the most religious (Wuthnow and et al. 1984: 81).

The second essential character of the sacred is that its boundaries are inexplicable, since the reasons for any particular way of defining the scared are embedded in the social consensus which it protects. The ultimate explanation of the sacred is that this is how the universe is constituted; it is dangerous because this is what reality is like (Douglas 1978: XV).

Douglas welcomes the relativity implied in carrying the Durkheimian program to our own world. For her nothing is sacred. Scientific and hygienic explanations are just as much legitimations of social order as the 'primitive's' Gods and spirits. This assumption gives her the desire to unveil our ideas about hygiene, cleanliness, dirt, and pollution, and on a much broader scale, whole cosmological systems. From daily cleanliness rituals to world views, she makes the basic assumption that culture is rooted in daily social relations.

She grants—although this assumption is not unique to structuralism—that all experience is received in a structured from. Like Berger, she assumes that reality must be symbolically organized ('constructed') in order for us to interpret it and take action in relation to it. With Levi-Strauss, she also grants that the structuring of experience often comes about through a system of paired opposites: male/female, black/white, good/evil, purity/dirt. These are the kinds of distinctions that let us know when we have encountered a symbolic boundary. But she does not go so far as Levi-Strauss does in suggesting that all classification systems are comprised of paired opposites or that the secret to comprehending these systems is to identify parallel patterns among these opposites. Generally she has refrained from looking at highly integrated patterns of this type in her own work, pointing at most to similarities between the surface content as symbols (bodies, for example) and
implicit beliefs accompanying these symbols. For her, it is often problematic whether a symbolic boundary exists at all, and the interesting question therefore is to discover how clearly one is evident, how permeable or mispassable it is, and how social activities dramatize its presence. Nor does she accept the structuralists' assumption that paired symbolic opposites correspond to some physiologically determined pattern in the human brain. While the brain may in fact operate on binary impulses, these are of little use in understanding why cultures actually get structured the way they do. She looks instead to the nature of social groups for answers. Where there is frequent interaction among a closed group of persons, for example, the messages necessary for coordinating group activity are likely to be manifest in behaviour itself and, therefore, need only minimal articulation in codified speech or ritual. In a loosely knit collectivity, on the other hand, the infrequency and diversity of activities may require that more be spelled out in an elaborate, complex system of articulated symbols (Wuthnow and et.al 1984 : 82-83).

Her other difficulty with structuralism is its presumption to have identified a method of discerning the 'real' meaning of a myth or of some other cultural system. To assume that an anthropologist can figure out exactly what is being communicated, and why, by looking only at the arrangement of paired opposites in some cultural system, she argues, is clearly presumptuous. The reason is that there is never just one meaning that can be conveyed, by a system of symbols. The anthropologist simply identifies one of a number of the possible meanings that can be conveyed, and while this 'interpretation' may be insightful for some purposes, it is always less than the set of rich meanings which are there in the social setting itself. In short, the anthropologist engages in a kind of reductionism by claiming to have discovered the one true interpretation of any myth. A better approach, she claims, is to become sufficiently immersed in the social situation itself, is by paying attention to all of the ways in which communication occurs, so that one is at least sensitive to the multiplicity of meanings present. She departs from structuralism, then, in rejecting its strongly positivistic assumptions, preferring instead to acknowledge with the hermeneuticists, the relativity of meanings to the larger contexts in which they occur (Withnow and et.al 1984 : 83).

She makes no claims to have discovered higher truths or deeper meanings in these materials than what their originators saw. But she has also attempted more than sheer description of these original or surface meanings. She seeks to discover why symbols occur in some settings and not in others, and why patterns among symbols are sometimes more complex than at other times. To answer these questions she has herself focused heavily on
patterns or structures or relations among symbols, rather than on the specific meanings hidden in these symbols.

For Marx, it was the commodity which held the secret of the capitalist mode of production. Understanding how a commodity is produced, exchanged, and attains value illuminates the essence of capitalism. For Durkheim, it was the simple Australian totem which contained the essence of religion. Understanding why such seemingly non-significant objects as carved sticks or stones were sacred was the key to understanding not only Australian aboriginal religion, but the elementary forms of all religious life. For Mary Douglas, the artifact is simple, obvious, and everyday much like Marx’s commodity and Durkheim’s totem. It is dirt; ordinary plain dirt. Understanding what makes things dirty or clean is the basis in her work for understanding the innermost secrets of the moral order itself and the means whereby society periodically renews and reaffirms its basic social relations and collective sentiments (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 84-85).

Dirt, why do we have the ‘ugh’ and ‘ick’ and the compulsion to clean things up? At first glance it seems that things are dirty in and of themselves. We know dirty shoes when we see them, we know hands that need washing, stuff on the carpet, and spots on white shirts. But why are they dirty? If it is the ‘dirt’ itself which makes things dirty, why are bits of leftover dinner dirty when they fall on the floor, but clean when they are put into the waste basket, which is still on the floor, only in a different place? Or better yet, why are shoes dirty when placed on a table, but not when on the floor? In considering these examples, it soon becomes clear that it is not so much the bits of food or pieces of earth themselves that elicit the response ‘dirty’, but their location. “We are left with the very old definition of dirt as matter out of place. This is a very suggestive approach. It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt, then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is a system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements” (Douglas 1966: 48).

From this point of view what is dirty is relative. It is not earth per se that is dirty, but earth on the carpet; it is not cigarette ashes per se, but their location on chairs. What is clean and dirty depends on a system of classification and the location of matter within that system. As she says: “It’s a relative idea. Shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining-table; food is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave cooking utensils in
the bedroom, or food bespattered on clothing; similarly, bathroom equipment in the drawing room; clothing lying on chairs; out door things in-doors; upstairs things downstairs; under-clothing appearing where over-clothing should be, and so on. In short, our pollution behavior is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications.” (Douglas 1966: 48).

Now generalize this point about dirt to whole systems of purity, and from purity to questions of the sacred and holy. ‘This idea of dirt takes us straight into the field of symbolism and promises a link-up with more obviously symbolic systems of purity’ (Douglas 1966: 48). In short, systems of classification form the basis of Douglas’s approach to culture.

But what is the system here? There appear to be at least two things. First, society’s normative rules, the do’s and don’ts that not only regulate behavior but more fundamentally divide reality into forms and structures, the shapes of which constitute the basis of human thought, a point recurringly made from Durkheim and Mauss (1963) on ‘primitive’ classification systems to Levi-Strauss (1966) on the logical basis of ‘primitive’ thought. Although we tend to focus upon moral rules themselves, there is, second, a more fundamental level at which order exists. This is the very definition of things, independent of, or a priori to, their moral evaluation. We live within what peter Berger calls ‘symbolic universes’, referring to the fact that our taken for granted reality is socially constructed, constituting a ‘sacred canopy’ (Berger 1967) which not only legitimates our experiences but defines the very nature of our existence. ‘Legitimation not only tells the individual why he should perform one action and not another, the distinctly moral component; it also tells him why things are what they are. In other words “knowledge” precedes “values” (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 93-94).

While being precedes its moral evaluation, it is also true that this very factual social reality - the myriad categories, classifications, types, labels, and definitions involved in naming things and transforming the formless void of unorganized experience into meaningful social reality also appears to be simultaneously infused with moral significance. It is not just that this is this and that, but that this is in its right, correct appropriate, and just place. In effect, social reality legitimates itself by its mere existence, independently of any larger set of rules, myths, or formally religious beliefs. That which is dirty, unclean or deviant, is that which does not fit into its appropriate category. “If uncleanness is matter
out of place, we must approach it through order. Defilement is never an isolated event. It cannot occur except in view of a systematic ordering of ideas. Hence, any piecemeal interpretation of the pollution rules of another culture is bound to fail" (Douglas 1966: 53-54).

Being dirty or clean, then, is not just a matter of factual location; it is not just a purely cognitive issue. It is not that scraps of food are clean when on the plate and dirty when on the table, but that they should be on the plate, not on the table. There is moral dimension to reality that makes the question of classification, and misclassification, also a question of right and wrong. The moral order is coterminous with social reality such that things have at one and the same time a factual and moral existence. When we say ‘that’s the way things are’ we are not only making a factual statement about the mechanical appropriateness of nature, but a moral evaluation of that order.

The moral order is so infused into our structuring of reality that activities such as sorting, tidying cleaning, and putting things in their place in general, act to reinforce not only the structure of social reality but of moral sentiments too. That moral component of assigning reality to different categories becomes particularly apparent when things get out of place. At that point we are socially obliged to reset the structure of things and thereby reinforce the fabric of social and moral order. Traditional religious rituals obviously have something to do with reaffirming social order, and as such are considered part of society’s arsenal of ritual. But so does straightening our desk, brushing off our coat, and tidying up in general. These mundane activities also carry ceremonial and ritual significance. The moral order enlists a cognitive classification system - the social assignment of things to their place - as a ritual mechanism for its periodic renewal. This is what Douglas realized. In theory, every activity that involves bringing some order is something of a social ritual, for the act of re-establishing order is one means for re-establishing society, which is itself nothing but ordered relations.

In Purity and Danger she makes this point by contrasting the propensity to see cleanliness as a matter of hygiene, with similar purity rituals in ‘primitive’ societies, which are seen as magic and religion. ‘Our practices are solidly based on hygiene; theirs are symbolic: we kill germs; they ward off spirits (Douglas 1966: 44). Her point here is that modern pollution fears are as much magic and ritual as those of the ‘primitives’. The
modern propensity to identify pollution rituals with hygiene reflects our use of conceptions of ultimate reality (science and medicine) to justify and legitimate social order.

If dirt is the by-product of ordering and classifying, and society is the source of rules and categories, then dirt is very much a normal part of social life, like crime and deviance. The presence of order makes disorder possible. Rules, boundaries, categories, and all sorts of cognitive and moral classification systems create lines that are crossed and categories of things for which there are exceptions. Not everything fits, and what doesn’t becomes deviant, odd, strange, or criminal. From this point of view crime and dirt are the same phenomena. Both represent something out of place. For crime, it is behavior which violates the normative and legal order; for dirt, it is matter which is not in its correct place. When things get out of place the normative and legal order is challenged and society re-establishes that order by taking ritual action. For individuals and crime there is punishment. For dirt there is a clean up (we often speak of ‘cleaning up’ crime too).

Fear of pollution, then, is like fear of moral deviance. Shoes do not belong on the kitchen table and parents should not have sex with their children. Both involve things and behavior out of place, and as such, a threat to the larger moral structure from which their place derives. But deviance and dirt are normal and functional, and our reaction to them is one of the basic social mechanisms to renew and redefine social rules and boundaries. We find out on a daily basis what is what by the reaction of ourselves and others to the violation of social rules.

This idea, it is worth observing, has been taken one step further by Kai Erikson (1966), who argues that society need not wait for someone, or something, to violate its rules. Society can have the same moral revitalization ceremony by simply treating people as if they had, in fact, violated the moral order. Through looking for scapegoats and the ritual persecutions of witch-hunts (cf. Bergeson 1977; 1978), imaginary enemies and deviants are created and ritually punished for crimes they never committed. Erikson argues that this occurs in two general ways. First, other things being equal, a society will manufacture a relatively constant volume of deviance, like so many people being arrested for moral crimes, or so much political subversion discovered. Second, given what he calls a ‘boundary crisis’ in the moral order, the volume of deviance will dramatically increase, constituting something like a crime wave. The reasoning here is compatible with Douglas. Given a threat to a collectivity’s boundaries or collective identity, it will respond by ritually persecuting people.
scapegoating, witch-hunting, etc.) as a means of redrawing the threatened boundaries. If a community is not sure of what it stands for, or of its collective identity, then the discovery of those who would oppose its central values is a means for reaffirming those very collective moral purposes. The political show trial, purge, and Congressional investigation, utilized to create subversives, are all ritual mechanisms in the periodic renewal of social order.

This process is also applicable to Douglas’s understanding of dirt and pollution rituals. We often experience things out of place but do not react. Given some crisis in our social relations, however, we suddenly announce that ‘this place is a mess’ and proceed to clean it up. It is the social crisis, not things out of place, that suddenly makes the room seem messy and dirty.

In general, then moral deviance, including the experience of dirt, is created in two ways. The first, the original Durkheimian proposition adopted by Douglas, centres upon individuals crossing moral boundaries, or things being out of place, e.g. shoes on the table or people committing crimes. When this occurs people are mobilized to reset the order and reaffirm lines and categories by either cleaning up the mess or persecuting the deviants. Things are put back in their place. Here the effort and ceremony of cleaning up are much like the trial and purge. Both are ritual ceremonies which draw attention to the violated moral order, whether that be purported communist sympathizers in the State Department or a messy room. The second process involves the movement of moral boundaries. Here people do not violate the rules, but the rules are moved to reclassify people as deviant, subversive, or unclean. In this way the community can actually ‘manufacture’ deviance, which is exactly what a witch-hunt is all about. An aroused community persecutes people who have done nothing. The community need not wait for individuals to stray across the moral boundaries; the boundaries can be shifted to redefine individuals as being on the other side. Authorities can always declare some activity illegal or immoral and prosecute, no matter whether the same thing in a different place or at a different time was ‘legal’. The community’s rules shift when there is a crisis in its corporate identity or collective existence creating an organic need to manufacture enemies to bring the community closer together.

The idea of dirt, filth, and uncleanliness representing things which defy their place is illustrated by Douglas when she tackles the old question of the biblical admonitions of leviticus. At a general level the question is familiar to everyone: why did the ancient Israelites forbid eating pork? The most popular answer was because they somehow linked
pork with disease. She dismisses this kind of argument as 'medical materialism', a term taken from William James. In other words, hygienic reasons are sought for obviously religious beliefs. Instead, she suggests the admonitions reflect animals, or categories of animals, which do not fit into a broader cosmological scheme.

The underlying principle of cleanliness in animals is that they shall conform fully to their clan. Those species are unclean which are imperfect members of their class, or whose class itself confounds the general scheme of the world.

Douglas's analysis of dirt and pollution centers upon things or people who do not fit the classification system and hence are considered morally reprehensible. But she also points out that the boundaries of these classification systems generate feelings of awe, danger, and potency. To make her point she expands on the van Gennep (1908) imagery of society as a house, with rooms being well defined status categories and corridors being transitional zones that are filled with fear and danger. But, she argues, along with margins, power also resides in a well structured social system. Where the social system explicitly recognizes positions of authority, those holding such positions are endowed with explicit spiritual power, controlled, conscious, external and approved. . . . where the social system requires people to hold dangerously ambiguous roles, these persons are credited with uncontrolled, unconscious, dangerous, disapproved powers -- such as witchcraft and evil eye. (Douglas 1966 : 120).

It might be added that along with power, emotional states are similarly recognized. Executives, army officers, and bureaucratic positions in general, are thought to create people with either a narrow range of emotions, or emotions clearly under control. Artists, poets, and people with more vaguely defined roles are conversely thought to be capable of a wider range of emotions.

It 'intelligence' is considered a disposition similar to the imputation of power or emotion, then the imputation of intelligence that is uncontrolled and unconscious creates a state commonly referred to as something like 'genius'. Intelligence reflects ability, and unbounded and uncontrolled ability gets very close to our idea of a genius. As such, we tend to think of occupants of more ill-defined roles, like artists, poets, or musicians, as carrying out their role from an unbounded reserve of potentialities - genius -- whereas occupants of more well-defined roles are seen as gathering their ability from identifiable sources, like
training, experience, schooling, and so forth. Where abilities are bounded, there is also a sense in which the source of those abilities is definable. The military general is good because of battlefield experience; the professor, because of a degree from Harvard; the executive, because of organizational experience (he knows the ropes). But the poet is good because he has something ill-defined—inspiration—and the composer of music is good because he is a natural genius. It would be hard to convince anyone that it was the classical training in music that made Mozart or Beethoven what they were, or that art school made Picasso a great artist. These are clear cases of genius, and a similar military genius, say Napoleon, would also have been attributed abilities above and beyond what was learned from the academy. The point here, it seems, is that when behavior transcends the accepted expectations of a role, we attribute it with extraordinary powers and abilities, like the idea of genius.

Douglas (1966:136) also argues that 'pollution is a type of danger which is not likely to occur except where the lines of structure, cosmic or social, are clearly defined'. This position represents the strand of Durkheim's thought which derives from the *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* and holds that a sense of power and potency goes with the presence of a strong corporate order. Here the Gods are sacred, powerful, and dangerous. She seems to be arguing, though, that power, potency, and danger are generated both by the presence of a well-bounded social order and by the presence of social breakdowns, marginal situations, and ill-defined areas, such that both form and non-form generate the same social experience. It might be that positive rites, such as celebrations and ceremonies, are intended to reaffirm corporate social reality and negative rites, such as pollution beliefs, pertain to boundaries and ill-defined areas. But this hypothesis oversimplifies; there are moral interdictions against touching, seeing, and polluting sacred religious objects which are collective representations of corporate society, not the margins of social life.

How then can order and disorder generate the same beliefs? Possibly a strong corporate order is accompanied by ritual and pollution beliefs to reaffirm its collective reality, with the margins of the system having an extraordinary sense of potency and danger because the contrast between form and non-form is so great. Further, given a boundary crisis (the Erikson concept), a strongly bounded system will generate more of a ritual response (manufacturing deviance and dirt) than a society with weaker boundaries and less corporate reality. Conversely, a weaker corporate order will have less ritual and fewer
pollution beliefs, as there is less collective reality to renew; and if all its social relations are somewhat ill-defined, the presence of ambiguity at the boundaries will be less threatening and hence not emit such a sense of power and danger. Finally, given a boundary crisis, there will be less of a response, as there is less corporate reality to be threatened and ritually reaffirmed.

As Douglas suggests, the margins of social life create a variety of experiences. Large breaks in the continuity of social reality, like death, are filled with dread and horror. Smaller gaps create feelings of anomie or identity crisis, and temporary breakdowns in the organization of interaction can create very mild identity crises like embarrassment (Goffman 1967). There is also a certain ecstasy that can be experienced during temporary breakdowns in social reality, a very minor loss of self that is not significant enough to create the negative feelings of severe anomie, but out of the ordinary enough to create a momentary sense of danger and excitement. Ecstasy argues Berger (1967: 43), involves a sensation of standing or stepping outside reality as commonly defined. This is like anomie, but not quite as severe. It is as if one is at the edge of organized reality and can feel the anomie terror of uncertainty and confusion, but if taken in mild proportions, this can be experienced as ecstasy rather than anomie. Too much of a break is terrifying. Just a little bit is exciting and ecstatic and sometimes dangerous and frightening.

As an example, the experiences of dawn and dusk might be considered from this perspective. Here there is a sense of danger, sacredness, and ecstasy. People sometimes gather at dawn and dusk, watching the sun rise and set in quiet and reverence, as if in the presence of some larger cosmic force, certainly something beyond the experience of daily taken for granted reality. When camping, people may stop what they are doing; sit on a hill, silently, sometimes with others, sometimes alone and watch the sun rise. They don’t spend the whole morning watching the sun move across the sky. It is as if there is a certain fixed period in which it is proper to watch the sunrise, and then there is a call to return to the chores and necessities of everyday living; breakfast has to be made, tents folded, and sleeping bags rolled up. As the crack between night and day is traversed, the roles; rules, and identities of daytime are activated and people are drawn back to their social obligations. Dusk also generates but of the ordinary experiences. Here the feeling is more of eeriness, but it may also be a quasi-religious experience like dawn. People go to watch the sunset, and again this is done quietly, almost reverently, as if in the presence of something sacred that requires a demeanor of silence and respect. Again there is a suspension from the duties
and obligations of daily life. Traditionally, dusk is understood as an in-between time, and this idea holds the sociological secret for the experience of eeriness or sacredness that both dawn and dusk generate. A common ending in Western films is for the hero and heroine to ride off into the sunset. If this is examined more closely it can be seen why riding into the sunset constitutes an appropriate end of the film. To ride into the sunset is to ride into a crack, or gap, between the social worlds of night and day, and as such, to be suspended from the obligations of either world (if they ride into the night, there is the question: where will they stay, or will they sleep together, and if they ride off in the daytime there are the bad guys and a possible resumption of role obligations). Riding into the sunset is safe, because it is riding into nowhere, and as such, is a perfect way to terminate plot development. They are, in effect, riding out of reality itself, or at least out of the socially constructed reality of the movie.

Within the framework developed by Mary Douglas, dawn and dusk can be treated as in between times, between the social worlds of day and night. The experience of awe or ecstasy that is generated is a mild form of anomie, a loss of self that is not as traumatic as falling through larger cracks in social reality. At dawn and dusk people experience the break or crack between the socially constructed cosmologies of day and night, which are by definition discontinuous spheres. The point here is the one Douglas makes about the corridors between the rooms being filled with a sense of danger and dread. Day and night are like two rooms, with dawn and dusk being the corridor which joins them. There is no way of going from one room to the other without passing through the corridor and experiencing the mild fright and anomie of the in between time. "Danger lies in transitional states; simply because transition is neither one state or the next it is undefinable. The person who must pass from one to another is himself in danger and emanates danger to others (Douglas 1966: 116). Day and night are separate social worlds, part of the 'sacred canopy', to use Berger's phrase, whereby we relate to ultimate cosmic reality. These cultural constructions - day and night - are discontinuous, and the break between them is what creates the experience of a momentary loss of self that we acknowledge as an out of the ordinary experience.

The movement from day to night is not like turning on a cosmic light switch. The change in light is continuous and gradual, not discontinuous and abrupt. It takes a few hours for the sun to set, and it begins to get light long before the sun actually breaks the horizon. There is a smooth transition where shades of light or dark appear gradually. The anomie
break, then, is in the social categories of day and night, which do have a break, not the physical light, which is continuously changing. Where the social sphere of day meets night there is a necessary crack, a place where the social membrane is so thin that the anomie of unorganized and unstructured life seeps through and bathes us in mild anomie or ecstasy.

There is, though, a sense in which the quality of the light itself generates anomic feelings. Douglas suggests that stickiness can create mild identity crises, because sticky things are neither solid nor liquid. They are in-between, and as such when sticky things get on our hands they create a visceral reaction which seems very threatening because it blurs the boundary between self and its larger environment. Stickiness provides a continuous link between the individual and the larger world, and as such threatens the separate identity of the self. Now, the colors of dawn and dusk are similarly in-between the black of night and light of day. The colors are more opaque, rose colored, and as such blur the distinction between the well-defined worlds of night and day. Distinctions are lost, signposts gone, and people momentarily enter an illdefined in-between world that is neither light nor dark, day nor night. In short, there is anomie. People do, however, remain connected to their institutional roles at dawn and dusk, making the crack in the mythical cosmos somewhat removed from daily, institutional experiences. Here the uncertainty of this transitional state flows over the well structured world of occupation, family, and community which insulates us from the severity of the naked crack in the sacred canopy. As such we do not experience a full blown identity crisis, but more of a euphoric experience, where for a moment we are suspended by at least one layer of the many layered social realities out of which we are socially integrated.

For Mary Douglas, what began as an inquiry into the origins of dirt and cleanliness ends with a general discussion of boundaries and their ritual reaffirmation. In this scheme the general question of ritual looms large. It is the linchpin to her whole scheme serving as the intermediary between the society below and the culture above (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 102).

But what exactly is ritual? To this question Douglas (1970: 3) starts with the sociologist's usual understanding of ritual as action devoid of personal commitment to the values being expressed. But, 'to use the word ritual to mean empty symbols of conformity, leaving us with no word to stand for symbols of genuine conformity, is seriously disabling to the sociology of religion'. Instead, she argues that ritual is a viable means of
communication, and ‘it will help us to understand religious behavior if we can treat ritual forms, like speech forms as transmitters of culture’ (Douglas 1970 : 21). For her, ritual ‘is preeminently a form of communication’ a kind of language which communicates social information, and as such helps replenish society’s collective sentiments. As such, ritual should be treated like speech, which also transmits culture and is generated in social relations.

To develop a conception of ritual she turns to the British sociolinguist Basil Bernstein and his notion of ‘elaborated’ and ‘restricted’ linguistic codes. Bernstein starts with the idea that there are two basic categories of speech, distinguishable both linguistically and sociologically. The first arises in a small-scale, very local social situation in which the speakers all have access to the same fundamental assumptions; in this category every utterance is pressed into service to affirm the social order. Speech in this case exercises a solidarity maintaining function closely comparable to religion as Durkheim saw it functioning in ‘primitive’ society. The second category of speech ...... is employed in social situations where the speakers do not accept or necessarily know one another’s fundamental assumptions. Speech has then the primary function of making explicit unique individual perceptions, and bridging initial assumptions (Douglas 1970 : 22).

In terms of their actual organization restricted codes utilize a smaller lexical pool and more simple and rigid syntax. Elaborated codes provide a larger lexical pool and a wider range of more complex syntactical alternatives. Restricted codes limit the ability of the individual to communicate very specific meanings. What is spoken is general, known to all, and as such part of the group culture. Douglas, like Bernstein, follows the sociolinguistic tradition of Sapir and Mead in which society is thought to be transmitted primarily through its internalization of speech.

As the child learns his speech or in our terms learns specific codes which regulate his verbal acts he learns the requirements of his social structure. From this point of view every time the child speaks the social structure of which he is a part is reinforced in him, and his social identity develops and is constrained. The social structure becomes for the developing child his psychological reality by the shaping of his acts of speech. (Bernstein, quoted in Douglas 1970 : 24-25).
Here the transmission of culture occurs through the individual carrying society in speech. But language also acts in a more direct fashion, independently of its effect upon the psychological realities of those who use its codes. When an individual speaks in a restricted code he or she is performing a linguistic ritual which acts to renew common sentiments independently of reinforcing his or her social identity.

A restricted code, because of its very restrictedness, forces others to utilize their commonly held group assumptions to decode what is said, and this, in turn, brings these assumptions to life, and as such reaffirms the group which they constitute. If groups are comprised of shared assumptions among individuals - a common culture - then the activation of that culture is an activation of the group. It is important to realize that this process works independently of intentions. It is not so much that the individual desires or intends to reaffirm group sentiments, but when a restricted code is utilized group sentiments are automatically reaffirmed, for when one speaks in code others must utilize their baggage of shared assumptions to understand what has been said. Restricted codes are so brief that without some prior knowledge it is virtually impossible to decode what has been said.

Douglas's analogy of language and ritual is important. Ritual carries or transmits collective information, like language. But, it is also true that language acts like ritual, and its structure - its codes are part of society's arsenal of ritual utilized in the periodic reaffirmation of social order. To speak is to perform a ritual, and partake, intentionally or not, in the affirmation and reproduction of basic social relations and commonly held values (Wuthnow and et.al 1984:104).

The importance of the Douglas-Bernstein linkage of language, ritual, and social solidarity is that it permits an examination of changes in group life that are associated with changes in the amount of ritual activity. There should be more ritual and more restricted codes where the solidarity of the group is higher. Increases in group solidarity or corporateness should generate more ritual of all sorts as there is more social order to periodically reaffirm. Douglas's focus is upon variations in the immediate context of individual speakers. But solidarity is also a property of the group, and not just a matter of 'uniting the speaker to his kin and his local community' as Douglas refers to it. Solidarity is a group property, referring to strongly bonded integrated collectivities, and as such is a concept for the comparative analysis of different groups and not just different pressures.
upon the individual. Her emphasis is sufficient for analyzing differences between individual speakers, but limits explanations for ritual in general.

Another difficulty arises when she identifies 'small scale, very local' situations as the origin of restricted codes. This makes comparative analysis difficult, for at the societal level restricted codes become limited, by and large, to 'primitive' societies or local neighborhoods in modern society. Small scale and very local is simply not a collective property of modern national societies. Douglas (1970: 31) also argues that "industrial society with its geographical and social mobility ... detaches [people] from their original community ...[and] here are the people who live by using elaborated speech to review and revise existing categories of thought. To challenge received ideas is their very bread and butter. They (or should I say we?) practice a professional detachment towards any give pattern of experience".

This purportedly modern use of language is contrasted with language in 'most primitive cultures' in which speech forms are firmly embedded in a stable social structure. The primary use of language here is to affirm and embellish the social structure which rests upon unchallengeable metaphysical assumptions (Douglas 1970: 28). That speech should be used to 'review and revise existing categories of thought' in modern society and merely 'embellish social structure which rests upon unchallengeable metaphysical assumptions' in 'primitive' society seems like the same sort of ethnocentric nonsense she herself debunked in Purity and Danger. Her progress made in showing how modern hygienic practices are sociologically similar to those of 'primitive' societies seems to have been completely forgotten when it comes to the 'wonders' of language. It would seem that language is used as much for embellishing the modern social order with its own unchallengeable metaphysical assumptions as that of our so-called 'primitive' brethren (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 106).

This problem arose, it seems, from her reliance upon the linguist's emphasis on the individual speaker and the social relations in which he or she is embedded. From the point of view of the individual speaker this may make sense. From the point of view of the group as a whole it is a definite limitation. The resolution of this problem is to move the level of analysis from the immediate social context of the speaker to the overall corporateness or solidarity of the group, community or nation as a whole. Codes, as cultural patterns or procedures, can be seen as properties of the group, like its collective representations, and as such determined by the organization of the collectivity as a whole not just the immediate
social pressures on the speaker. To broaden the analysis of codes, therefore, the relationship between the organization of groups and the kind of codes that are prevalent should be examined, bypassing the immediate context of the individual speaker.

Douglas’s linking of linguistic codes, ritual, and social solidarity can be expressed in two simple propositions:

Proposition 1: The greater the group’s level of solidarity or corporateness, the more restricted the linguistic code.

Proposition 2: The lower the group’s level of solidarity or corporateness, the more elaborated the linguistic code. (Douglas, quoted in Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 106).

The importance of this association between language and ritual is that the same theoretical logic can be applied to various kinds of linguistic codes. There are a great variety of symbolic systems which communicate meaning and as such can be considered languages. Their codes should shift between being more elaborated and restricted depending upon the overall solidarity or corporateness of the group in which they are produced. From this point of view one can decode the ‘language’ of music, art, and food much like one decodes speech.

Douglas’s perspective on groups is derived from Bernstein’s understanding of the social contexts that affect the types of codes people speak. Her interest is in how individuals are controlled by society. Following Bernstein’s lead, she makes two distinction, group and grid.

*Group* means the outside boundary that people have erected between themselves and the outside world. *Grid* means all the other social distinctions and delegations of authority that they use to limit how people behave to one another (Douglas 1982: 138).

From these two dimensions she creates a fourfold table: strong grid -strong group, strong grid -weak group, weak group -weak grid, weak grid -strong group. Strong grid involves moral and normative prohibitions which limit or highly structure individual interaction. As grid weakens,
Individuals have more scope to deal with one another as they wish. The move away from the insulation of strong grid is not necessarily a move to disorganization and a lack of rule. To permit the maximum possible number of contacts fairly entered, their conditions known and their performance accessible, a new form of control emerges: the invisible control of fair-comparison rules. (Douglas 1979: 39) [sic]

These rules range from courts of chivalry to the stock or cattle market. Regardless of the historical period, the purpose of these rules is to 'regularize competition' and ensure a 'fair contest'.

In weak-grid, weak group societies, instead of group values being imposed on the individual, the latter's personal responsibility is crystallized in the triangle of honor, shame, and luck.....Instead of accepting their allotted station in a given scheme of things, as where grid is strong, each family is involved, for its very survival, in the effort for advantageous alliance -- martial, defensive, or financial. (Dauglas 1979: 40).

In this world of individualism, 'when luck, shame, and honor have replaced the avenging ancestors as controlling ideas, we have moved away from a society that is regulated by reference to any hereafter to one explicitly concerned with this world' (Dauglas 1979: 41). This, of course, sounds very much like the Protestant Ethic and with this in mind, she goes on to reclassify the four types of economic orientation listed by Weber in terms of her group-grid scheme.

The peasant social order epitomizes strong grid, where peasants are insulated from other groups in society. Here, the system strongly classifies them into the periphery of the main society, so that they can neither compete with one another nor unite against oppressors. They would save, but their low level of output makes it difficult' (Dauglas 1979: 42). Conversely, where group is strong 'the individual store is constantly raided for group purposes' (Dauglas 1979: 42), and traditional society involves both strong grid and group. The individual saves little, but the group accumulates wealth. Guild halls and cathedrals get endowed and built. The otherworldly doctrine is one of the ways in which this pattern of behavior is made intelligible and acceptable (Douglas 1979: 42). This would be the pre-Reformation doctrine Weber contrasted with the Protestant Ethic cosmology which followed. Finally, weak group and weak grid involves the most private accumulation. 'The individual capitalist economy....extolling the virtues of honesty, industry, and solvency which uphold the rules of interaction -- is somewhere fairly low along the line of grid, possibly a little to the middle, if the common rules of commerce which are agreed upon
attest to some strong group consensus' (Dauglas and Isherwood 1979 : 42-43). Perhaps the least restrained --weak group, weak grid -- are adventurers who are less constrained by the ethics and rules of conventional business practice. One thinks here of pirates, Spanish conquistadors, nineteenth-century American robber barons showing a strong disregard for business ethics, and marginal areas of contemporary economic life, like of shore banking, some aspects of organized crime, and the most speculative of business ventures. In sum, Douglas suggests Weber's different economic orientations can be seen as different cosmologies generated by different group-grid relations.

What started out as a simple discussion of dirt, and later extended to acquisitive orientations, ends with a general scheme linking the axial features of whole cultural systems to variations in their social organization. In Cultural Bias (1978) Douglas briefly links the group-grid scheme to cosmologies in general: to how nature is contrasted with culture; questions of space, gardening, cookery, medicine, and time; attitudes to youth and old age; human nature in general; sickness, health and death; personal abnormality and handicaps; personal relations; punishment; and definitions of distributive justice. (Douglas, quoted in Wuthnow and et. al 1984 : 121-122).

At this level she is attempting to grasp whole social systems, and not just individual pollution beliefs, the linguistic base of ritual, or orientations toward economic goods. Most generally, 'when the social group grips its members in tight communal bonds, the religion is ritualist; when this grip is relaxed, ritualism declines. And with this shift in forms, a shift in doctrines appears' (Dauglas 1970 : 14 ). For her group and grid represent two different ways in which society can 'grip' its members.

Group is obvious -- the experience of a bounded social unit. Grid refers to rules which relate one person to others on an egocentric basis. Grid and group may be found together. In this case the quality of relations is ordered and clearly bounded. (Douglas 1970 : viii).

As mentioned before, she then cross-classifies group and grid, creating her fourfold table. Three sectors... predispose toward ritual in its most magical and concentrated sense. Where grid is strong and group weak, magic is at hand to help the individual in a competitive society... where both group and grid are strong, magicaity supports the social structure and moral code. Where group is strong and grid weak, magicality protects the
borders of the social unit. Only in the area of zero organization are people very uninterested in ritual or magic. (Douglas 1970: 144).

The key limitation of the group-grid scheme is its egocentric nature, which derives from its origin in Bernstein's thinking about the social pressures on individual language users. Here both group and grid are meant to characterize immediate environments, of the face-to-face kind, and not the institutional or corporate organization of collectivities themselves. Douglas is quite explicit about this.

If I speak of group, then, though the group may be ever so big, so that all the members cannot possibly know each other well, there would have to be in all parts of it a pressure from face-to-face situations to draw the same boundaries and accept the alignment of insiders and outsiders. A unit such as 'England' or 'the Catholic Church' would not qualify as 'group' in this sense. (Douglas, quoted in Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 125).

What of the origin and function of ritual? The linguistic analogy was important for two reasons. Ritual carries meaning like language, and as such is probably generated under the same conditions that generate linguistic codes. But Bernstein focused upon the individual speaker and his immediate social environment which might have made sense for his original British neighborhoods, but is a limitation when the inquiry turns to ritual and whole cosmologies. At this point we are dealing with broad cultural systems and need theoretical ideas which are capable of grasping the social organization of whole collectivities, not just the face-to-face environments of individuals.

There is another importance to the linguistic analogy; namely, it is probably more significant to understand that language acts like ritual than that ritual acts like language. This means that the explanatory task is not to see ritual as language and rely upon the sociolinguistic studies of conditions which generate patterns of speech, but to see language as ritual and look for different patterns of social organization which generate more or less ritual. For instance, when studying linguistic codes it makes sense to inquire about the social milieu of individual speakers. Here we follow the individual and vary his environment. But, consider a more large-scale ritual -- a public ceremony, religious festival, coronation, or national holiday. Here it makes more sense to focus upon the ritual itself, independently of the individual participant. We want to know why there are witch-hunts, feast days, sacrifices, and not why individuals partake of them, although that can be asked too. Large scale rituals seem to have more of a life of their own, existing as independent
entities, and are not as closely tied to the individuals who carry them out as are linguistic
codes. Codes have a life too, as they have a structure and organization of their own, and as
social facts exist independently of individuals who bring them to life when they speak.
More importantly codes are generated by certain kinds of social organization, not just
pressure on individuals. It is the Durkheimian point about social realities having social
origins. Here social organization generates ritual, whether that ritual be various kinds of
linguistic codes or large scale public ceremonies of the more obviously religious kind.

What then of group and grid? One solution is to view them as aspects of the
development of the overall corporateness of collectivities. It was Swanson’s (1964) notion
that when Durkheim spoke of societies sui generies he was referring to collectivities that
had a corporate life of their own independently of their individual members and consistent
groups. When collectivity moves toward becoming a corporate actor it shifts from being a
mere aggregation of members to a unitary whole. Following Swanson, corporateness can
be considered a continuum, with collectivities varying in the extent to which they are
organized to realize their distinctly collective interests and purposes. Although the idea of
group and grid may equally ‘grip’ the individual, they are not equivalent dimensions of
social organization. Group, emphasizing the well-boundedness of group life, seems to
represent a more highly corporate order than grid, which pertains more to collectivities as
aggregations of partial interests linked together rather than unified corporate wholes. Grid,
it would appear, is an intermediary stage of corporate organization where the collectivity
exists as a structuring of individuals rather than a single corporate actor.

This brings us to the question of corporateness and ritualistic cosmologies. Ritual
carries collective information (the analogy with restricted codes) and thus reaffirms the
collective reality of group life. Following Durkheim, ritual is understood as being
performed to Gods, spirits, and other collective representations which stand for or mirror the
collectivity as a corporate whole. The more a collectivity exists as a corporate entity the
more collective reality there is to be periodically reaffirmed, and hence the more ritual.
Corporateness and ritual are not only positively correlated, but causally linked. The more
corporate the collectivity, whether a small group, formal organization, or national society,
the more ritual there will be to reaffirm these collective sentiments. This also means more
restricted linguistic codes, whether speech, music, art, or food. Groups that are mere
aggregations of separate interests should have less ritual, but as the group becomes more and
more of a corporate entity the amount of ritual should increase.
First, there is weak group weak grid, a social arrangement with very little organization of any kind. It would be vaguely bounded and have weak ties among its members. As such there would be little external social reality present, and little need for ritual, with so little to reaffirm. Weak group weak grid would have the least ritualistic cosmology. Second, there is strong grid weak group. Here a collectivity exists as the linking or binding together of constituent sub-groups or individuals. The collectivity is an aggregation of parts bounded through multiple role reciprocities and strong rules.

Where grid is strong and group weak, magic is at hand to help the individual in a competitive society. He trusts implicitly his know-how, his private destiny or star, and in the power of the rules... the cosmos is morally neutral and basically optimistic... (his) work is not controlled by independent ghosts or witches, or evil men. There is no sin: only stupidity (Douglas 1970: 144, 137)

This sounds very much like the cosmology of Western societies, in which the individual and his institutions are strong (strong grid) and not totally subordinated to the state (strong group). The presence of ghosts, witches or evil men seems more relevant to ‘primitive’ and traditional societies, but the same sort of phenomena is present in contemporary states where the Gods and cosmic forces have taken a more secular form. In more corporate states, (strong group weak grid)political ideologies, like the sacred forces of history or nature, present themselves as cosmic forces which are periodically threatened by ‘ghosts, witches or evil men’ in the form of subversives, enemies of the people, spies, traitors, foreigners, and aliens.

As mentioned before, there is good reason to believe that the third category, strong group strong grid, does not exist empirically. Finally, there is the fourth category: strong group weak grid, comprising well-bounded highly corporate societies. In the modern world these are best represented by single party states and authoritarian regimes. Here the power of the state is supreme and there is an extensive state apparatus to insure the enforcement of state purposes above those of constituent groups and individuals. These states have the most corporate reality and hence the most ritualistic cosmologies. One-party states, for instance, are constantly plagued with boundary and purity concerns. Worries over infiltrators and enemies are common, and so is the periodic mobilization of the state’s machinery to ritually root them out.
Finally, Douglas has employed her theoretical framework to address the purported effect of modernity on ritual and religion. There is something of a consensus in the social science that modernity has been hard on ritual and religion. Some call it a solvent, dissolving not only traditional ascriptive ties but also ideas of Gods, spirits, and the supernatural. Modern culture is supposedly a secular world, where science has replaced religion and provides an ever changing and updated cosmology in accordance with the latest empirical findings and theoretical speculations. What is left for religion and ritual is at best a source of comfort for those made insecure by modernity, and at worst some sort of false consciousness. That is a rough indictment of religion and ritual, and one that has existed at least since the Enlightenment if not earlier.

For Douglas, though, this perspective goes too far. From her point of view as long as there is collective life there will be ritual and religion, myths and collective representations, ceremonies and rites. Modernity changes the shape of society, but there are still social relations, and rituals for their renewal. Social change, then, does not mean the demise of religion. Until social relations disappear altogether, religion and ritual will play a role. The point is that religion is generated in social relations, which change, but do not disappear, with modernization.

Modernity was supposed to have had three negative effects on religion, and she dismisses them all. First, the ‘prestige and authority of science . . . is supposed to have reduced the explanatory power of religion’ (Douglas, quoted in Wuthnow and et. al 1984: 129) which she dismisses as a nineteenth-century relic opposing science and religion. She argues instead that people now understand that religion and science apply to different kinds of problems and hence pose no tension for each other. Second, the bureaucratization of life is supposed to have reduced the sense of the unknown and sacred. But, she argues, bureaucracy flourished in ancient Byzantium or, the Vatican of the fifteenth century and so did religion. Religion and a bureaucratized world are not incompatible; at least they have’t been in the past. Third, we are now supposed to have little direct experience of nature, at least when compared with the past. Here she suggests that science has substituted a new sense of awe, as ‘the sense of wonder in nature is deepened by the discoveries of science, and the sense of a game against nature to wrest a living from impersonal forces is still provided by bureaucracy’ (Douglas, quoted in Wuthnow and et. al 1984: 129).
For Douglas, then, secularization is not new, but a cosmology generated by a certain set of social relations. As mentioned earlier, there have been 'primitive' societies that one could characterize as having a secular cosmology. Social change may bring new social forms into being that have never existed before, and in that sense religion will change. But to the extent that we are still dealing with questions of group or grid, these will dictate the cosmology, not whether the society is new or old, big or small, traditional or modern.

She further suggests that a big part of the problem in modern society is the belief that culture (religion) is autonomous from social relations. "When a scholar proclaims that nature has been demystified by modernization, I know that I am going to witness some mystification of culture" (Douglas, quoted in Wuthnow & et al 1984: 129). A safeguard is to: treat cultural categories as the cognitive containers in which social interests are defined and classified, argued, negotiated, and fought out. Following this rule, there is no way in which culture and society can part company, nor any way in which one can be said to dominate the other (Douglas, quoted in Wuthnow and et al 1984: 129-130).

If modernization per se doesn't bring about the demise of religion, it is still the case that social change does involve a shift in ritual and alternative symbolizations of social relations. Changes in social morphology are accompanied by shifts in the morphology of a group's collective representations, and Douglas suggests a great number of ways in which social relations are symbolized. For instance, she focusses upon the biological body as a symbol of the social body, with her central proposition being that bodily control will be as strong as in concern over the propriety of laughing, breaking wind, belching, publicly yawning, and so on. If social control is weak, the body will be relaxed, informal, untidy and sloppy, as with loose-fitting clothes or shaggy hair. Academics and artists, she points out, symbolize the less formal definition of their role with a 'display of carefully modulated shagginess according to the responsibilities they carry' (Douglas 1970: 72). She also suggests that where there is explicit social control over individuals, a positive value will be placed on consciousness. Trances and trancelike behaviour or other situations involving a loss of control over the body will be frowned upon in more highly structured situations.

The body can also serve as a symbol for concern over group boundaries. Where there is concern about entrance and exit to the social body there will be concern about bodily orifices. Spittle, blood, milk, urine, feces, and tears, which have traversed the boundary of the body, can serve as symbols for concern about entering and leaving the social body.
Similarly, ideas about the relationship of the heart, head, and sexual parts can symbolize social hierarchy or relations between groups and institutions. In short, the biological body is a perfect *tabula rasa* on which the form and structure of society can be written. Dauglas also argues that moral revitalization movements involve a shift from external to internal symbols.

Probably all movements of religious renewal have had in common the rejection of external forms. In Europe manicheism, Protestantism and now the revolt of the New Left, historically they all affirm the value of the follower's inside and of the insides of all his fellow members, together with the badness of everything external to the movement. Always we find bodily symbolism applied, from the values placed on internal and external parts of the body, on reality and appearance, content and form, spontaneity and established institutions (Douglas 1970: 52).

Here social change seems to involve the delegitimation of the ritual props of the old order and an affirmation of internal states as symbolic alternatives.

d. Application to the Vedda Society.

Through the approach of Mary Douglas the Vedda society and puberty ritual could be considered thus. The Vedda community talk of spirits in dealing with the attainment of age, certain diseases, and death etc. Whereas the main stream community talk of germs in this regard. According to Mary Douglas these two approaches are nothing but two different models developed in two different cosmologies. In the cosmology of Veddas spirits or devils are their dead ancestors. Veddas should not displease these relative devils. Otherwise these devils will retaliate by causing calamities. In the case of the attainment of age of Vedda girls the relative devils get involved in two ways. First the Veddas believe that the usually blood greedy devils are attracted to the bleeding involved in the menstruation. Secondly they also believe that their relative devils get annoyed if the ‘devil box’ (*yak pettiya*) is polluted. In their classification system the ‘devil box’ and the menstruating female do not fit together. That is why in the past they secluded the menstruation female away from the house, and at present while keeping the menstruation female inside the house they keep the devil box away from the house.
The custom of separating newly attained girls can be explained from another point of view put forward by Mary Douglas. Expanding on the van Gennep's concept of liminality model, Mary Douglas develops the dawn and dusk model. She argues that danger lies in transitional state simply because transition is neither one state nor the next, it is undefinable. The person who must pass for one state to another is himself/herself in danger and emanates danger to others. Therefore it is necessary to separate the newly attained girl during puberty which is a transitional state from childhood to adulthood.

In the attempt to describe whole societies and whole cosmologies in terms of the nature and clarity of various combinations of external and internal lines of demarcation, Douglas introduces the two distinctions called 'group' and 'grid'. From these two dimensions she creates a four fold table. The present Vedda society could be identified with the weak group weak grid type which is a social arrangement with very little organization of any kind. It would be vagely bounded and have weak ties among its members. As such there would be little external social reality present, and little need for ritual, with so little to re-affirm. Weak group weak grid would have the least ritualistic cosmology. The puberty ritual and one or two rituals related to their religion such as Hethma are the only rituals that are performed in the present Vedda society. The lifestyle of most of the Veddas is very much similar to their neighbouring Sinhala peasants. On the other hand I came a cross a Sinhalese peasant posing as a Vedda in order to earn a livelihood. This clearly shows that the boundary which demarcates the Veddas and the outside world is vague, [indicating a 'weak group' characteristics]. According to my observations in the two Vedda communities at Dambana and Henanigala, the authority of the Vedda chiefs on their respective communities members is insignificant. Also the existing one or two social institutions in the Vedda communities barely make an impact and the ties among the Veddas are very weak. These factors point to a 'weak grid'. Therefore the present Vedda society could well be considered as a weak group-weak grid type according to this classification of Mary Douglas.

Douglas has employed her theoretical frame work to address the purported effect of modernity on ritual and religion. As mentioned above she dismisses the existing views about the impact of modernity on ritual and religion. From her point of view as long as there is collective life there will be ritual and religion. Modernity changes the shape of the society, but there are still social relations and ritual for their renewal. Religion is generated
in social relations, which change, but do not disappear with modernization. All most all the anthropologists who studied the Vedda society have pointed out that in the midst of the turbulent changes occurring in this society, it is the Vedda religion that stand out distinctly while the distinctive features of Vedda language, and rites pertaining to important events in their lives etc., have faded drastically. This seems to hold true from what I found in the field.

e. Some Shortcomings and Limitation of Mary Douglas

There are great deal of controversy in anthropology is about theoretical considerations on culture. Most of the theories that are used to study a culture are ambiguous in nature. Hence, it is appropriate to highlight the limitations created by Douglas in her conceptual framework.

While discussing the environmental pollution and over consumption or the extreme consumerism apparent in affluent societies Mary Douglas seems to violate her own principle. Turning her attention to macro-pollution concerns in contemporary America, Douglas attributes it to the sectarian groups and their value systems. Douglas argues that these sectarian groups have systems. She argues that "these sectarian groups have three positive commitments: to human goodness, to equality, to purity of heart and mind. The dangers to the sectarian ideal are worldliness and conspiracy. Put into sectarian terms, worldliness appears in big organization, big money, and market values - all deny equality and attack goodness and purity; conspiracy includes factions plotting secret attack, transporting evil into an essentially good world. Infiltration from the evil world appears as Satanism, witch-craft, or their modern equivalent - hidden technological contamination that invades the body of nature and of man. We shall argue that these ideas and these dangers respond to the problems of voluntary organization: they are the daily coinage of debate in groups that are trying to hold their members together without coercion or overt leadership. The remedies most easily proposed in such organizations are to refuse to compromise with evil and to root it out, accompanied by a tendency toward intolerance and drastic solutions. These organizations depending on the voluntary principle also tend to reject wealth. Nature in the wild, uncorrupted by social artifice, equivalent to a society without social distinction, is their preferred emblem of godliness and symbol of unworldliness." (Douglas, quoted in Wuthnow and et.al 1984 : 93).

2 See (Chapter 11, Sub topic: The Vedda Population)
In this kind of analysis the origin of pollution beliefs (concern with dangers to the environment) are rooted in those groups who most vociferously expose them, rather than being seen as a cosmological concern of the society as a whole. Here whole cosmologies are reduced to the ideological positions of sectarian interest groups, and beliefs are seen as a product of conflict, and competition. This is quite a micro-orientation, and something of a shift from Douglas's previously stated commitment to more macro-analysis.

This brings us back to Douglas's desire to take Durkheim into modern society and expose all the clearly ritualistic and religious beliefs as just that ritual and religion, and not real concerns with hygiene. It would seem, though, that the Durkheimian task is more difficult than it initially appears, for to use some Douglas on Douglas, as she used Durkheim on Durkheim, she has provided something of an analog to the 'medical materialism' in her own account of modern pollution beliefs. First, there is the general social scientific prejudice toward a more individualistic analysis of modern culture. Belief is often seen as ideology, and thus as the cultural expression of material interests of particular groups, rather than as the cosmology of the collectivity as a whole. Where is the Durkheim that so brilliantly illuminated her earlier, studies of pollution and taboo? Pollution concerns now have been reduced to a kind of social glue to hold members to voluntary associations (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 93-94).

Historically, sectarian groups have tended to have the general ideological orientation Douglas describes, but this has more to do with their form of social organization than with problems of voluntary association Revolutionary parties, religious organizations, and Utopian communities all have simple dichotomous cosmologies, of good insides and bad outsides. But these are a function of their organization as solidary corporate groups, where the black-white cosmology mirrors the clearly bounded, inclusive-exclusive, social organization of these groups. Environmental beliefs, though, are not limited to the groups which may champion them the most. They are general and as such part of the overall cosmology of the whole society (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 95).

If, as seems useful to suggest, environmental pollution concerns are more general than those of a few special interest groups, what are their social origins? The answer lies with the very Durkhemian analysis Douglas has made in her earlier work. Pollution concerns appears when social lines and boundaries are threatened, and since these
environmental pollution concerns are national, they need to be examined in relation to national identity crises.

In general, pictures of nature represent ideas about ultimate reality, and as such are part of society's cosmology. To the extent that culture mirrors the social body in which it appears, the sudden appearance of a troubled nature should reflect social troubles in that society. The sudden concern with dangers to the environment, then, represents something of a 'pollution scare' that passed through the United States and perhaps through a good part of the Western world during the later 1960s and mid-1970s. Although groups like the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and others championed these causes, the paranoia and concern over the environment was more general. There were national celebratory rituals, like 'Earth Day', bringing forth millions of people to affirm their concern with the environment and federal legislation to 'protect the environment'. This concern with the environment was institutionalized, and made a responsibility of the state itself. The national collectivity was clearly aroused, from the average citizen to the bureaucratic apparatus of the state (Wuthnow and et.al 1984:95).

This brings us back to the original Douglas question, why did this concern suddenly appear? Surely it was not because the environment suddenly became dirty. The amount of waste and dirt in the environment was probably increasing, but this had not generated a concomitant growth in environmental concerns. The environment was 'dirty' before the mid-1970s and dirty after, but the hysterical concern dramatically surfaced and then largely went away in just a few years. Why? The answer lies with Douglas's explanation of pollution concerns. 'As I see it, ritual pollution also arises from the interplay of form and surrounding formlessness. Pollution dangers strike when form has been attacked' (1970:126, emphasis added). The idea here is similar to Erikson's boundary crisis hypotheses.

The later 1960s and mid-1970s witnessed a number of national traumas including race riots, student protest, defeat in the Vietnam War, and the exposure of political wrongdoing in the highest office, the scandal of Watergate. These were traumatic years, and they also witnessed a turning point of American power in the larger world-system: American hegemony, so dominant since 1945, seemed by the mid 1970s to be declining.
Looking back, the pivotal year in the American decline was perhaps 1973, a year that began with the United States' military withdrawal from Vietnam and the final collapse of the American dominated monetary system of fixed foreign exchange rates. It closed with the quadrupling of oil prices by the Middle East-led oil cartel. American political and economic hegemony had been successfully challenged. (Crittenden, quoted in Wuthnow & et.al 1984:96).

All of these social crises of the late 1960s and mid-1970s constituted a crisis in America’s self-confidence, which manifested itself in a loss of confidence in a great number of social institutions (Bergesen and Warr 1979), and in the environment itself. The social crisis was mirrored in the cultural sphere with a sudden concern over the very existence of nature. A crisis in the social base generates a crisis in its collective representations. Concern over the future of America was symbolized as concern over the future of the environment. The mid-1970s seem to have been years of shock and anxiety for the nation as a whole. The loss of confidence in the environment, and in institutions which deal with it, was, it can be argued, part of this ‘loss of confidence’ that passed through American society. Finally, it should be noted, that even this national analysis may be at too low a level of analysis, for the environmental movement was present in many Western nations during this same period, suggesting that it was a function of shifting global social relations, and not just the dynamics of one country.

In the *World of Goods* (1979) Douglas generates an anthropological critique of the individualism of the economists’ lonely consumer. To name one more familiar grief with economic theorizing: the idea of the rational individual is an impossible abstraction from social life. It is clearly absurd to aggregate millions of individuals buying and using goods without reckoning with the transformations they affect by sharing consumption together...Man is a social being. We can never explain demand by looking only at the physical properties of goods. Man needs goods for communicating with others and for making sense of what is going on around him. The two needs are but one, for communication can only be formed in a structured system of meanings (Douglas and Isherwood, quoted in Wuthnow and et.al 1984 : 116).

Economic goods are part of a larger cultural system, and like other aspects of culture they carry meaning and have identifiable social functions. The giving and acquiring of goods is a means for anchoring meaning in social life. ‘Goods are neutral, their uses are
social; they can be used as fences or bridges (Douglas and Isherwood quoted in Wuthnow and et.al 1984 : 116). The point here is not just the conspicuous-display-to dramatized-social-position idea of Veblen, but that goods are social markers used to construct and demark social reality in the first place. We desire goods not just to fill material needs, but to decipher our social surroundings, locate our social self, and transmit knowledge about who and what we are. In this regard, most social scientists don't take Vance Packard very seriously. But he understood the very sort of point Douglas is trying to make. When he wrote about the sexual implications of buying certain car models, the point is not so much how advertising persuades, although, of course, it does, but that the meanings we derive from goods are part and parcel of the ways in which meaning is acquired and transmitted in the first place.

In developing her analysis of the cultural role of goods Douglas utilizes a scheme introduced in Natural Symbols, what she calls ‘group and grid’ analysis to reinterpret Max Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis concerning economic goods. She begins by suggesting that rather than examining religious factors as the explanatory variable, we should look at the social relations which gave rise to the Protestant Ethic. How the spirit of the age is generated is precisely what we want to discover’ (Douglas and Isherwood 1979:31). Her strategy is to treat the Protestant Ethic as another cosmology, no different from those of more ‘primitive’ people, and as such generated by the social relations in which it appears. For example, the Catholic belief in a glorious afterlife, as contrasted to the Protestant sense of worldliness, is, she argues, not unique, but found in many cultures that promise heaven as a reward for deeds in this life. The Vikings had Valhalla and the North American Indians had a happy hunting ground. Further, 'the wild extravagance of the princely and ducal courts was undoubtedly less due to a lively faith in the world to come than to a rational and calculating overconsumption, an investment in conspicuous loyalty that might, with luck, pay handsome dividends’ (Douglas and Ishewood, quoted in 1984: 116-117).

This may be so, but it should be pointed out that she is reasoning exactly like the economists she criticized earlier. The problem is that everything can be made to be in someone’s interest, and she searches for real reasons for what could be seen as more purely symbolic or ritualistic behavior. One may not want to label this conspicuous consumption as irrational, a la Weber, but the alternative need not be a search for hidden rationality. Certainly there is some calculation and rationality involved, but by looking for rationality in what seems clearly ritualistic she is conceding the game to the utilitarian outlook of the
economists and their fellow travelers. It would seem the social world of pre-Reformation Europe was one of extensive social layers and demarcations (social lines and boundaries) with the conspicuous display goods one of the mechanisms to anchor these lines and cleavages. This is the very point of her argument about the social role of goods as a markes, the more there is to be marked the more markers there will be, whether that be Hindu India or Europe of the Middle Ages (Wuthnow and et.al 1984 : 117).

Nevertheless, her basic observation is brilliant. Speaking of pre-Reformation Europe she notes, 'At that time individuals were not saving, but corporate groups were; the Protestant ethic takes over from pre-Reformation other-worldliness when the balance of power is reversed and when corporate groups lose out to the claims of individuals' (Douglas and Isherwood quoted in Wuthnow and et.al 1984 : 143). The sixteenth century marks the beginning of the transition from the corporate world of medieval guilds, church, and nobility to the individualism of competitive capitalism and the citizenship of modern nation-states. She argues that the rise of Protestantism, at least as a cosmology, reflects the transformation of group life, and not the other way around. In this sense her argument is similar to Marx, although she takes this sense her argument is similar to Marx, although she takes a more Durkheimian position, focusing upon the corporate group rather than class relations.

These shortcomings of Mary Douglas could be attributed to the enormous difficulty for an individual, however brilliant he or she may be, to transcend the domination paradigm of one's era. In the dominating paradigm of the Western civilization, where the tendency of the human nature to increase the ego and excessive indulgence in sensual pleasures are exploited. This inevitably result in manipulating the nature and disturbing its balance. The above mentioned shortcomings are due to her efforts to defined these contradictions.

f. The Phenomenological Approach of Peter Berger

Berger's philosophical perspective bears on his methodology in specific ways. It would be possible to trace the influences on Berger's assumptions and concerns about the philosophical nature of man and society to the complex philosophy of Kant. The overwhelming Kantanian emphasis on the centrality of the individual and individuals engaged in social interaction speaks to what Berger sees as the basic subject matter of Sociology - not the only or necessarily the most important but the basic subject matter. for Berger (as with
Weber and Schutz), the common sense knowledge of everyday life, the way in which people organize their daily experience and especially those of the social world, is the background within which inquiry must begin. Moreover, this emphasis on the subjective meanings actors impute to their activity implies that actors themselves are 'rational' and therefore 'free' and not mechanically determined. Such 'rationality' and 'freedom' is, however, inaccessible to the tools of positive science (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 19).

In penetrating the world of everyday life, Berger contends that tools of phenomenology prove indispensable. Though influenced by a number of phenomenologists such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Berger's chief source of enlightenment was his teacher, Alfred Schutz. It is important to note that the brand of phenomenology, Schutz proposes is of a particular sort.

Every phenomenology can be described as empirical in that the concern is with everyday life. Yet how one approaches everyday life can be very different. On the one hand, phenomenological description can occur at a foundational level - describing the fundamental categories of consciousness as it pertains to everyday life. Schutz would be representative of this orientation. At another level, phenomenological description can address problem areas. Berger would fall into this category in his efforts to describe modern consciousness or religious consciousness. At still another level it may deal with specific problems in everyday life. Some of Berger's students would fall into this category. Corresponding to each level are broad techniques for assessing the empirical. At the foundational level, the technique generally thought most appropriate is a reliance upon intuitive senses. Meta-data or the reliance on data/conclusion generated by other studies is a technique successfully employed by Berger at the problem area level. Actual data collection whether through quantitative and/or qualitative means is most suitable for the analysis of specific problems. These categories are by no means exclusive in the methods implied (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 31).

Application of phenomenology to the social sciences stems primarily from the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and, more importantly Alfred Schutz. Their works reemphasize the call that had been put forth earlier by Max Weber, George Herbert Mead and others to give special consideration to the role of subjective meanings of social life. It stresses the 'inter-subjectivity' or shared understandings on which social interaction is based and argues for descriptive research oriented towards the more empirically grounded
understanding of the ordinary perceptions and intentions of social actors in daily life. Even though phenomenology is clearly rooted in Germanic intellectual idealism, and in some cases it avoids empirical reality altogether. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schutz and Peter Berger have succeeded in making phenomenology much less foreboding-more empirical and thus more conducive to the empirical sciences. It is empirical in the sense that it is concerned with human experience in everyday life. Its task (most generally) to describe human experience as it is lived and not as it is theorized about - to account for social reality from the point of view of the actors involved. Consciousness as a web of meaning is a phenomenon of subjective experience, none the less, as Berger writes, 'it can be objectively described because its socially significant elements are constantly being shared with others' (Berger 1973:14). Moreover, it has been noted, cultural objects 'manifest the intentionality of those who produced them'. In this way, human experience-subjective meanings, intentionality, consciousness, and the like-is empirically available for systematic description. Meanings are shared and it is from these shared meanings that the social scientist derives his concepts and ideal types. In Schutzian phraseology, 'the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene'.

At the base of Berger's work on culture it is an understanding of the biological and environmental constants which are inherent within the human condition. Based on the work of such philosophers and biologists as Gehlen, Helmut Plessner, Adolf Pornmann and others, Beger maintains that humans, unlike other animals, have no 'species-specific environment'. Humans can inhabit, within the limits determined their organisms, any number of geographic and climatic environments. In addition, their instinctual apparatus, as compared to the other higher mammals, is grossly underdeveloped at birth. They suffer from what Gehlen calls 'instinctual deprivation'; they are 'unfinished', as it were. Humans do have drives, naturally, but these are, in the main, undirected and unspecialized. Organismically, the human body is still developing biologically outside the mother’s womb for the first year of life in ways that are completed for other mammals inside the womb. Thus our constitution at birth is one of 'world openness' and 'plasticity'. During this period of utter dependence, we interrelate with the human and natural environment in which we are placed and it is this environment which initially serves to delimit the wide range of socio-cultural formations that may develop (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 23-24).
The human condition, as a result of these anthropological givings, is inherently intolerable. The human organism simply cannot survive. Our biological constitution does not provide stable channels in which to direct our drives, but only the imperative that we must provide a stable environment which will protect us from the threat of extinction. What biology does not provide must be compensated for through nonbiological means (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 23-24).

The world that people create in the process of social exchange is, following Durkeheim, *reality sui generis*. It possesses a thing-like quality - the quality of objective facticity. But again the reality of this world is not an intrinsic quality, nor is it given once and for all. Culture must be constructed and reconstructed as a continuous process. It remains real, in the sense of subjective plausibility, only as it is confirmed and reconfirmed by oneself in relation with social others. Berger acknowledges with Marx that the process whereby man's world becomes an objective reality can reach an extreme in the process of 'reification'. What is in fact a human product is perceived as having a reality in and of itself, as an alien reality no longer recognizable as a product. In this situation man is alienated (in a strictly technical sense of the world, not in its popular, pejorative meaning). He merely 'forgets that the world he lives in has been produced by himself (Berger, quoted in Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 24-25).

It is important to note what Berger regards as essential in culture. The very heart of the world that humans create is socially constructed meaning. Humans necessarily infuse their own meanings into reality. The individual attaches subjective meaning to all of his or her actions. In this sense, one may understand one's acts as intentional: consciousness of something; directed toward something. In concert with others, these meanings become objectified in the artifacts of culture - ideologies, belief systems, moral codes, institutions, and so on. In turn, these meanings become reabsorbed into consciousness as subjectively plausible definitions of reality, morally sanctioned codes of personal and collective behavior, rules of social discourse and general recipes for daily living. Culture, then, is at base an all-embracing socially constructed world of subjectively and inter-subjectively experienced meanings. without the intended and subjectively meaningful actions of individuals, there would be no such thing as culture. Culture, as artifact, emerges out of the subjective meanings (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 25).
All individuals inhabit a life-world, that is, a total sphere of experience circumscribed by a natural environment, man made objects, events, other individuals. Yet this world is not in most cases a single unity: consciousness is capable of moving through different spheres of reality: dreams, hallucinations, and the theater provide examples. The life-world then consists of multiple realities. Among these is one that presents itself as the reality - the reality of everyday life, known in Schutzian terms as the paramount reality. The paramount reality is experienced in the wide-awake and presents itself as normal and self-evident, ordered and objective, and taken-for-granted as such. It further presents itself as an inter-subjective world, a world of meanings one shares with others. Compared to the reality of everyday life, the other realities present themselves as finite provinces of meaning.

The reality of everyday life is shared with others. The most important experience of others is in the face to face situation. All other types of social encounter are derivatives of this face to face experience. In the face to face encounter, individuals cannot readily know the other's subjectivity; they must view and understand each other by means of typifications. The social reality of everyday life is comprehended in a continuum to typifications which are progressively anonymous as they are removed from the face to face situation. Together, people share a common stock of knowledge that differentiates reality and provides the necessary information to carry on in everyday life. This body of knowledge varies in relative degrees of precision and is organized around various concerns and priorities. In the main, however, this knowledge is determined by the individual's everyday pragmatic interests - by the pragmatic motive (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 32).

Berger's views of sociological interpretation are most fully developed in Sociology Reinterpreted. He does not argue for objectivity as defined by the positivists; that of reporting 'raw facts' in and of themselves. His views of objectivity is oriented around the interaction between values and scientific investigations and is grounded in what is known as the phenomenological reduction. Berger would agree that values do influence the problems and design of scientific research but that they should be controlled as much as possible so as not to distort sociological interpretations. That is, the researcher should bracket his or her own biases and opinions about the goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness, legitimacy or illegitimacy of the phenomenon under investigation. One must not pass judgment on the objects of inquiry. Questions of what 'is' and what 'ought to be' should be separated in the course of research.
Perhaps the most controversial methodological debate of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the social sciences (specially in Europe) concerned whether there really was difference between natural and cultural sciences and if in fact there was one, what was the nature of this difference and what were its implication for the actual performance of social scientific research. The effort to delineate the proper sphere of the cultural sciences has continued to be of concern to the present among some of the more philosophically oriented social scientists. For Berger, however, it is not an important issue, at least it is not something he addresses directly, at any length. In the main, Berger simply assumes that nature, purpose and methods of the natural sciences are different from those of the cultural sciences. What they do share is concern for rigor, objectivity and grounding in the empirical.

The present scenario of the Yedda community can be explained quite satisfactorily by Berger’s analysis on culture. Berger defines culture as ‘the totality of man’s products’. Defining culture in this way is to view it not only as material artifacts and non-material socio-cultural formations that guide human behaviour, but the reflection of this world as it is contained within human consciousness. The subjective side of culture must be emphasized, for these products on the individual level serve as more or less lasting measures of human subjectivity. In different words, these products manifest the subjective meanings or intentionality of those who produced them. The fabric of culture then is the inter-subjective meanings individuals hold concerning the world in which they live. culture exists ‘only as people are conscious of it’.

In the first and last chapters\textsuperscript{3} it is explained to some extent how this community is assimilated in the mainstream of society. In fact, the Vedda culture is their own construction, produced and reproduced by their ancestors since distant past. As the Veddas continue to produce and use their material artifacts such as bow and arrow and non-material socio-cultural formations such as their beliefs, rituals, language, dress etc., they have preserved their culture up to now. They still find the above practices meaningful and useful for their survival. But because of the strong impact due to the resettlements, influences of tourism, formal education and mass media\textsuperscript{4} the younger generation is rapidly embracing these alien values and attitudes and deviating from their own. Therefore, the survival of the Vedda culture is in danger. This situation justifies the Berger’s view that culture exists only so far as people are conscious of it.

\textsuperscript{3} See (Chapter II and IX).
\textsuperscript{4} They have their radio sets and they watch television of their Sinhala neighbours.
What Berger means by the term dialectic is something very different from that which in used by Plato, or Marx. While this term assumes a more technical meaning in different contexts (as will be seen), overall it is roughly synonymous with the term interaction or interplay (ef. Wisdom 1973). What is critical to emphasize is the sustained and unremitting character of this interplay.

Berger maintains that all reality is in a constant dialectic with itself. None the less, two dialectical processes are particularly important to human experience in the world and play a part in Berger’s writing: a dialectic between the self and the body (or organism and identity), and the dialectic between the self and the socio-cultural world. The last is at the heart of Berger’s theory of culture (Wuthnow and et.al 1984-: 38).

References have already been made to the dialectic between self and organism. At one level, there are the limitations that the human body places upon the individual at birth, the biological parameters which circumscribe the range of social possibilities open to any individual. Throughout the course of life the organism continues to affect one’s world-constructing activity; yet, as Berger argues, the world one has created acts back upon that person’s organism. It imposes limitations upon what is biologically possible to the organism (Berger 1966:181). Variable rates of longevity according to social class factors provide one example. Not only in terms of temporal limitations imposed upon the organism but in terms of the actual functioning of the organism, culture intrudes as well. Sexuality and nutrition provide the most obvious illustrations. People are driven by their biological constitution to seek sexual release and nourishment. The ways these are attained are highly variable - the body does not tell a person where to seek sexual release or what to eat. The channeling of these organismic drives is determined by socio-culture factors. Thus the individual ‘knows’ that there is a ‘right and wrong’ way to achieve sexual release (e.g. Western prohibitions against incestuous and pre- or extra-marital sexual relations) and that there are ‘right and wrong’ foods to eat (dietary prohibitions for Muslims and Jews against eating pork). Thus, while culture is spawned by and placed in a biological setting, culture reimposes its own constraints and patterns upon the organism and the interplay between the two continues giving rise to changes in each.

The dialectical interplay between the individual and the socio-cultural world is more-conspicuous in Berger’s writings for it is out of this dialectic that culture in its totality is
constructed and maintained. This dialectic is summarized by the interaction of what Berger calls, three simultaneous moments' in a continuing dialectical process: externalization, objectivation, and internalization.

*Externalization* is the ongoing outpouring of individuals’ physical and mental being into the world necessitated by their biological underdevelopment. Externalization, Berger suggests, is the essence of human being (Berger 1967:4) Because there is no biologically grounded structure of instincts which can channel thought and behavior, people are constrained to construct human structures which will perform the same functions. People’s world-building activity is rooted in their biological necessity to externalize. To speak of an externalized product, is, however, to imply that it has acquired a measure of distinctiveness from the one who produced it.

There is the process of *objectivation*. Here the world, as Berger puts it, ‘comes to confront him as a facticity outside of himself’, as ‘something “out there”’, attaining the character of an external and ‘objective reality;’ not as a reality only plausible to the individual, but as one experienced in common with others (Berger 1967:8). In the Durkheimian formulation, this world as an objective reality manifests itself most unmistakably in its coercive power, in its capacity to direct behavior, impose sanctions, punish deviance and at the extreme, destroy human life.

*Internalization*, the third moment in the dialectic of reality construction, is the process whereby the objectivated world is ‘reabsorbed into consciousness’ such that ‘the structures of this world came to determine the subjective structures of consciousness itself’ (1967:15). In this way the individual not only comprehends the objective socio-cultural world but identifies with and is shaped by it. As Berger has phrased it, the world becomes his world. Internalization occurs through the process of socialization -- a life-long process whereby individuals are initiated into the meanings of the culture and learn to accept the tasks, roles, and identities that make up its social structure. Socialization among other things, solves the problem of how one generation passes its world on to the next generation. Summarizing, Berger writes: ‘It is through externalization that society is a human product. It is through objectivation that society becomes a reality *sui generis*. It is through internalization that man is a product of society’ (Berger 1967: 4). What must be underscored in all of this is that this dialectic occurs as a collective process within which the
individual participates. It can never occur as an individual experience in isolation from the collectivity.

Berger maintains that it is only through an understanding of this inherently dialectical nature of man and society that one can understand any social phenomenon adequate to its empirical reality. The theoretical significance of this dialectical view of social reality is, as Berger himself posits, the integration of the fundamental insights of two seemingly opposed approaches to sociology, the Weberian and Durkheimian, namely: culture as subjectively meaningful activity; culture (social facts) as things. Both are correct, but each must be understood in terms of the other.

The dialectic out of which culture is constructed is the same dialectic in which the individual acquires an identity. Berger acknowledges that the individual is provided with "genetic presuppositions for the self" at birth. Yet at birth the individual is not provided with a subjectively and objectively recognizable identity. The character of the self is open-ended, not predisposed to any particular configuration but culturally relative in its formation. In a word, identity is like any other aspect of culture, indeed any other part of the reality of everyday life: it is a social product incomprehensible apart from the particular social context in which it was shaped and is maintained (Wuthnow and et.al 1984: 43).

The larger dialectical process of externalization, objectivation and internalization is not a sequential but a simultaneous phenomenon at the collective and the individual levels. Yet in the life of every individual there is a temporal dimension in that at birth he or she is not a full participant of society but a potential one. The beginning point for the individual is internalization - the appropriation of the reality of culture into subjective consciousness. Through internalization, the individual becomes a member of society. The process through which internalization occurs is called socialization - "the induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it" (Berger 1966:130).

For a conceptualization of the process of socialization, Berger is careful to distance himself from Freudian or psychiatric models which implicitly or explicitly posit a normative conception of reality and of the self. More suitable to his task and to his phenomenological assumptions and agenda is Median social psychology - an indebtedness he acknowledges at every available opportunity.
Primary socialization is the first and most important socialization an individual undergoes and it is the this process that he becomes a member of society. The conceptual apparatus Mead develops to explain this process is well known and unnecessary to elaborate here. The child learns to take on the roles and the attitudes of significant others. Gradually he is able to abstract the roles and attitudes of concrete significant others to a generalized other, society. This process is largely concurrent with the internalization of language. Language is the principal means by which an individual becomes a member of a social world and through which the world becomes and continues to be plausible. What Berger highlights in all of this is the fact that in the same process whereby the individual takes on the roles and attitudes of others, he or she also takes on their world. Identity as an objective location in a certain world can be subjectively appropriated along with that world. Society, identity, and reality in general are all solidified in consciousness in the same process of internalization/socialization.

Berger follows closely the intellectual cues offered by Mead and Cooley and the symbolic interactionist school of social-psychology. If roles are types of activity performed by types of actors, then each role has a particular identity attached to it. Since individuals ordinarily play out a variety of roles in everyday life, one may speak of an identity set. The occupational identity, however, carries a certain paramountcy in this repertoire. While a certain degree of role discrepancy is socially permitted and psychologically bearable, there are strong social and psychological pressures to achieve a level of consistency in the roles individuals play and in the identities they therefore assume. Important to emphasize is the fact that roles and therefore identities are socially bestowed in acts of social recognition. One is that by which a person is addressed. Identity, for Berger, constitutes what Mead calls the ‘social self’. At the extreme, roles may become reified in the minds of people where individuals totally identify them-selves and others with their socially assigned roles or identities. They see themselves only as the embodiment of these typifications. This is not always the case, however, for the actor is capable of establishing a sense of distance from the roles he or she plays in an act of reflection (Berger quoted in Wuthnow and et.al 1984 : 45).

Berger notes what is usually absent from most symbolic interactionist writings, namely that socialization and the process of identity formation always take place in the context of a specific social structure. Inasmuch as roles mediate the knowledge and meanings of specific institutional configurations to the individual, the substance of identity
will therefore reflect the social structural conditions from which it emerges. Though Berger
does not develop this line of thought at length, he does point to the way in which social
class, racial and ethnic peculiarities, gender, and so on, play a critical role in the shape and
substance of individual identity. Social structure also is a factor in the relative ‘success’ of
the socialization process - success only defined in terms of the relative symmetry between
objective and subjective reality (Berger 1966:173). Maximum success (greater symmetry) is
more likely to occur in societies with a simple division of labour and minimal distribution of
knowledge greater rates of ‘unsuccessful’ socialization are more likely in a society marked
by a plurality of culture and identity - where the individual subjectively experiences himself
and the world as one possibility among the many available. Alternation, the experience in
which a new perspective of society and new identity is acquired, is also more likely under
these social structural conditions.

This latter situation points to the artificial and thus inherently precarious nature of
reality in general and, for present purpose, identity in particular. The reality of everyday life
of which personal identity is a significant part, is maintained as plausible only as long as it
remains plausible in the ongoing conversations one has with others, especially significant
others. When the conversation is interrupted or held in abeyance for any number of reasons,
the entire world begins to lose credibility. In Berger’s use of the metaphor of the theater, the
stage upon which the theater of everyday life is played is made of cardboard and threatens to
collapse at even the slightest provocation (Berger, quoted in Wuthnow and et.al 1984 : 46).

The reference to the metaphor to the theatre is not insignificant. It not only
illustrates the inherently precarious nature of all social reality, it implies another problem.
The metaphor of the individual as an actor playing out roles in a drama called society is one
that in Berger’s early works (The Precarious Vision and Invitation to Sociology most
notable) is carried out relentlessly, almost to the point of stylistic ponderosity. In this he
was not unlike some proponents of symbolic interactionism. One question that arises
(unoriginally) is this: is the individual’s identity nothing more than the sum total of the roles
he plays in society? That is, does Berger have an oversocialized conception of the self? If
one were to consider only the more salient themes in these books one might have to
conclude that he probably does. A second look at this theoretical work, however, is enough
to conclude that he does not. Internalization, Berger emphasizes, is only one part of the
larger dialectic. Without an adequate grasp of the other two, one is presented with a picture
of society as mechanistic determinism where the individual is solely the product of society.
Though Berger would acknowledge society is the stronger partner in this dialectical relationship, he also contends that the individual is not passively shaped by his world. He is a participant in the process, co-producing with others not only the social world but himself as well. More important is Berger's repeated insistence that individuals can say 'No' to the institutional imperatives. The consequences may in the end be grim, but to deny that one has the capacity to say 'No' is to be, in the Bergerian sense, alienated from that which is humanly constructed. It is an exercise in self-deception and 'bad faith'. Quite to the contrary of some opinion the individual, while a product of society through socialization, is, according to Berger, capable of genuine acts of freedom (Philosophically not sociologically defined).

g. Conclusion

The contributions of Mary Douglas and Peter Berger represent two significant alternatives for the investigation of culture. Berger compellingly argues that things may not be what they seem, only constructions held in place by mutual consent. Douglas extends the argument, viewing ritual as a necessary component of reality construction.

Despite considerable differences in style and conceptualization, Berger's discussion of cultural patterns actually conforms quite closely to that of Mary Douglas. She too devotes primary attention to the identification of patterns - objective, demarcations and regularities - at the symbolic-expressive level itself, rather than attributing culture to ultimate determinants at the level of social structure. Hardly any of her work focuses on aspects of social life which have been associated with the idea of social structure, such as material resources, differentials in power, or population size. She has described other aspects of social structure, such as technology, goods, kinship, deviance, and the physical environment, but she treats these primarily as symbolic forms in which patterns of culture are displayed. And when she relates linguistic codes to their social environment, the environment itself is portrayed as a set of symbolically expressed relationships. Like Berger, she associates culture with the dynamics of social interaction, dramatized in ritual, in speech, and in social arrangements. These arrangements she regards as transmitters of messages necessary for the orderly conduct of social life.
Two characteristics, nevertheless, distinguish Douglas’s perspective from Berger’s in so far as social structure is concerned. First, there is no explicit analytic separation of culture from social structure in her work as there is in Berger’s. From her perspective culture is not a subjectively perceived reality or world-view which can be related to social contexts or interaction - to plausibility structures - which are analytically distinct from culture. Rather than defining culture from the standpoint of the individual, she regards it as an object which can be observed by the analyst and which exists at the social rather than the individual level.

Secondly, Douglas (Following Durkheim) stresses the moral aspect of culture, as opposed to its psychological functions for the individual. The underlying philosophical reasons for the existence of culture do not derive, as they do for Berger, from the individual requirement for cognitive and emotive security, but from the necessity of having predictable behavior if social interaction is to be possible. Moral order implies that certain relations can be counted on, even taken for granted. These relations affect the flow of social resources and define subjectively felt loyalties or commitments, including ones which cannot be defended strictly in terms of rational argument or short-term utilitarian interest. Symbols of pollution typically establish external boundaries around such collective loyalties and other arrangements dramatize the relations among actors within a given social setting. These dramatizations allow actors to co-ordinate their personal activity with the activities of others, thereby accomplishing collective objectives. Because culture is so intimately woven into social arrangements, Douglas does not concern herself with finding ‘deeper’ explanations for culture by attributing it to social structure. Again, culture is inherently an aspect of social structure.

Douglas’s work focuses on subject matter which has largely escaped the attention of scholars concerned with beliefs and attitudes, on the one hand, and has been neglected by empirically minded social scientists, on the other. Hers is a world of implicit symbolism, of expressively contained neither in words nor conscious gestures but built into the arrangement of social life itself - of banquets and eating habits, of consumer goods, in pollution rituals and social movements. She emphasizes that culture consists not only of codified knowledge but of the cues inherent in all collective activity.

From Douglas’s point of view social relations are like clay. We mold them this way or that way as we make, or shape, our society, social order, class structure, state apparatus,
or mode of production. But whatever the shape however redistributed the rights, power, and surplus value, there is still some kind of social order - still some clay, - and that clay is reaffirmed and reproduced by ritual, regardless of the shape it is in. Religion doesn’t disappear with modernization; it just reappears in new forms, from the cleanliness rituals of daily life to the political ceremonies of contemporary civil religion.

Rite, symbol, and myth do change, however, and to account for that in a systematic and theoretical way Douglas has devised a categorical scheme, group-grid, which enables her to analytically look at social relations in any social context. Most importantly, these analytical dimensions are linked to differences in cosmologies, so that a comparative study of culture and belief is possible. She has extended not only our understanding of what constitutes ritual, but in the connection of ritual and linguistic codes provides a new way of understanding all sorts of symbolic systems.

It should be clear that while Berger emphasizes subjectivity in his writings more than the other theorists it would be grossly inaccurate to characterize him as a subjectivist. His own perspective has clearly moved beyond the suppositions found within a traditional phenomenological approach where subjectivity is regarded of paramount and nearly exclusive importance. The foundation of Berger’s perspective on culture rests upon an on going dialectic between subjectivity (perception, intentionality, etc) and an objective socio-cultural reality. Human subjectivity (in the course of social interaction) is externalized in objectified social products and, in turn, this objective reality acts back on subjectivity, influencing and even reconstituting it. Theoretically, this represents a unique balance and highly penetrating perception into the nature of social reality and further represents the very best of a theoretical approach that deliberately incorporates the subjective element in cultural analysis.

The advantages of incorporating subjectivity in cultural analysis are not insignificant. One advantage is simply the inclusion of an important dimension of the social into analysis. Cultural reality, in as much as it is a human phenomenon, is necessarily rooted at some level in human subjectivity. And while culture is clearly analytically distinct from human subjectivity, it profoundly and continuously affects human consciousness. This perspective offers one way of dealing with the factor of subjectivity in cultural analysis, allowing the latter to retain that which is specifically human in this human/social science. Along similar grounds the methodological advantage is seen in an implied critique of the reifying
tendencies of social scientists. To incorporate subjectivity into cultural analysis provides one deterrent against the ossification of social reality into categories totally detached from the actors that individually and collectively produce them. If the issue of social science is to describe and interpret social reality, then plainly subjectivity has a place in cultural analysis. Berger’s perspective, again, goes some distance in contributing to an understanding of just how subjectivity fits in.

Berger can be credited with constructing a scaffolding between the two spheres of social life namely the micro and macro social worlds. Although the connectives are in place and sturdy, the road is not yet sturdy enough to facilitate heavy traffic between the two. Too much is left to implication given the novelty of this bridge-building effort. As Berger recognizes, an exclusive emphasis upon subjective meanings lead to idealism; an emphasis on the objectivity of social reality leads to sociological reification. Both are distortions of social reality. These two, he maintains, are correct only when seen together. The phenomenological approach to the analysis of culture has provided a measure of balance to the positivistic tendencies dominant for so long in sociology. Berger’s work itself does not achieve that balance to an entirely satisfactory degree. For many it leans uncomfortably towards idealism. His notion of the dialectic between individual and society and his own extensive work in the analysis of culture, however, do offer important clues for achieving such a balance.